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
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JANUARY, 1859.

ARTICLE I.

JEWISH SACRIFICES, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO
THE SACRIFICE OF CHRIST.

In the following Article it is designed to treat of the origin of sacrifices, the various rites and ceremonies by which they have been accompanied, and especially of their religious significance. The materials for the Article have been derived from the celebrated work of William Outram, a divine of the church of England. This work, composed in Latin, was printed at Amsterdam in the year 1688, and is the storehouse from which a large portion of what has been written since its publication, on the subject of sacrifices, has been taken. In presenting the views of Outram, we are not to be understood as, in all cases, agreeing with them.

1. *Significance of the term "holy."*

Every careful reader of the Scriptures will have noticed a two-fold use of the word *holy*. The word denotes, in some places, the invariable choice, on the part of God, of that which is morally right. It is thus employed in 1 Pet. 1: 15 — "as he which hath called you is holy, so be ye holy in all

manner of conversation." The Scriptures, in the next place, affix the epithet *holy* to Jehovah, for the purpose of denoting the supremacy which characterizes the Divine nature, in relation to every species of excellence, whether natural or moral, his supremacy in wisdom, and power, and dominion. As by reason of this supremacy God is worthy of praise and worship, the word *holy* is used to signify this worthiness. This is the significance of the word when God is denominated the Holy One of Israel, when his name is said to be holy and reverend.

From this double meaning of the word *holy*, as applied to Jehovah, arises a double significance of the same word in reference to other objects. In the first sense, as indicative of moral purity, it is used in relation to those, who being endowed with moral powers, are capable of a moral likeness to Jehovah. In the latter sense, the epithet *holy* is given to beasts and inanimate objects, to denote their separation from profane and secular, to religious uses. Not rational beings alone, but all objects, and times, and places, and all rites and ceremonies which, in any special form, pertain to God or to his worship, are to be numbered among the things which are holy. It is easy to see, therefore, how sacrifices, both in respect to the objects which were used as victims, and the ceremonies with which they were offered, should be denominated holy, sacred rites, inasmuch as they have so special a relation to the worship of Jehovah.

2. *Origin of sacrifices.*

In approaching our general subject, the question of the origin of sacrifices immediately suggests itself. Are we to find their origin in an express command of God, or in the promptings of the mind, independently of any such command? Little more can be done, however, than to state, quite summarily, the considerations which have been urged, by different writers, on the different sides of the question.

Those who attribute the origin of sacrifices to an express divine command, lay much stress upon the consideration,

that it is impossible to conceive any other origin. It could never have occurred, they maintain, to the mind of Abel, that the slaughter of innocent animals, the smell of burning flesh, entrails, and fat, could be grateful to the Divinity, and that the highest reverence of the mind for Jehovah could be best expressed by rites of this kind. In addition to this argument, the words of the apostle, in the eleventh of the Hebrews : "by faith Abel offered unto God a more excellent sacrifice than Cain," are cited. The faith which is commended in this passage, could be, it is said, nothing else than obedience to a divine command. The obedience rendered by Abel to the divine command was the clearer indication of faith, because the command was so strongly in conflict with the natural convictions of the mind. It could indicate faith only upon this supposition.

It is urged upon the other side, that we are not at liberty to refer the custom of sacrifices to an express command of God, because of the silence which is maintained by Moses concerning it. It ought however to be considered, in reference to this, that, if the authority of Moses cannot be cited in favor of a divine command, it cannot be cited against it. He leaves the question of the origin of sacrifices entirely open. A command to offer sacrifices may have been given, though it is not spoken of in the writings of Moses. It is not at all surprising that he should pass over the subject in silence. There must have been many matters of no little intrinsic importance, in which a writer so studious of brevity as Moses was compelled to be, could say nothing. He says nothing, for instance, concerning the prophecy of Enoch, nothing concerning the vexation of Lot's spirit in view of the iniquities of Sodom, nothing concerning the preaching of Noah to the antediluvians. The object which he had in view in relating the sacrifices of Cain and Abel, did not require him to set forth either all that was true concerning them, or all that he knew to be true. His object is merely to exhibit the innate hatred of Cain towards Abel, and the detestable murder in which it resulted. The question of the origin of sacrifices was entirely irrelevant.

It is urged, again, in opposition to the idea of a divine command, that the passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews concerning the faith of Abel, instead of proving the existence of such a command, proves the opposite. For if Abel offered sacrifices in obedience to an express divine direction, and if his obedience, in this instance, illustrated the depth of his faith, why is not this equally true in respect to Cain? Did not he bring his sacrifice to the altar in obedience to the same command, and did not his act betoken the same faith? We know, however, that he was censured for the absence of such a faith. If, on the other hand, Cain believed nothing of any such divine command, then, at the bare prompting of his own mind, he gave back to the Almighty, in the form of sacrifice, a portion of that which the divine bounty had given to him. And if Cain, an irreligious man, led by the mere call of nature, did this, how much more easily may we suppose that Abel was the subject of the same conviction, and rendered to it the same compliance? The assertion that the idea of sacrifices never would have occurred to the mind of such a man as Abel, is met by the counter assertion, that we, who live at such a distance of time from Abel, and with a culture so different from his, and especially amidst religious observances so diverse, are not proper judges as to what would have been likely to suggest itself to his mind, in respect to the most fitting method of honoring God. The case would be somewhat changed, could we believe that sacrifices were essentially at variance with the laws of our moral nature, and with proper views of God. This we know is not the fact, as, at a subsequent period, in obedience to a heavenly command, the Jewish ritual sprang into existence.

In the judgment of those who thus argue, the faith cherished by Abel was essentially distinguished from the state of mind harbored by Cain. It was, in the instance of Abel, an exalted estimate of Jehovah as the Creator of the universe, and the rightful possessor of universal dominion, such as led to the selection of the very choicest of his flocks and herds, as alone fit to be presented in sacrifice to the Al-

mighty. Nothing else could serve as a proper token of reverence to the divinity, and of gratitude to the unwearied benefactor of the world. The absence of such sentiments from the mind of Cain, occasioned the selection of objects for sacrifice that were of inferior worth. He had no true faith in the infinite God, and hence the sacrifices which he brought were so far from being acceptable to God.

On these grounds it is maintained, that we cannot refer the origin of sacrifices to an explicit command from Heaven, but are to refer it to a natural impulse of the soul. It is an instinctive sentiment, that worship should be paid to the Almighty, that his universal dominion should be reverently acknowledged. It is an equally instinctive sentiment, that the fittest form in which this worship can be paid is the sacrificing, with appropriate rites, of whatever each one holds most precious. The words of Moses: "It came to pass, in process of time, that Cain offered," etc., are in agreement with this mode of arguing. The expression "process of time," refers to the end of the harvest which Cain had gathered, and, in the instance of Abel, to the time in which his flocks were enlarged by fresh births, when each judged that a portion of the gifts bestowed on him by the Almighty should be offered in sacrifice. In the different feelings by which the minds of the two brothers were actuated, we are to find the reason of the approbation and the displeasure with which their sacrifices were respectively regarded by the Almighty.

These considerations in favor of the human origin of sacrifices, seem to have had so great an influence on the mind of a large portion of the church fathers as to lead them to discard the idea of a divine commandment. Chrysostom for example, commenting on the words: "It came to pass in process of time," etc., affirms that nothing except a suggestion of his own reason and conscience could have led Cain to offer such a sacrifice. In allusion to Abel, it is said, that he had no teacher, no guide nor counsellor, but, prompted by his own conscience and by the wisdom given to men from heaven, he was led to the performance of sacri-

fices. And yet again, Chrysostom affirms, that not as being taught by any one, not from obedience to any express statute, but by the dictate of his own reason, by the operation of a natural conscience, Abel was persuaded to offer true sacrifices.¹

Similar views are entertained by Jewish writers. Rabbi Levi Ben Gerson, in commenting on the fourth chapter of Genesis, thus remarks: "Cain and Abel were preëminently wise men, and therefore when they reached the end of their labors, each one offered to God a portion of the good things which he had accumulated; and, as it seems to me, the principle on which these sacrifices rested, was this, that God was the Creator and Preserver of everything that existed, and that consequently such sacrifices were a fitting acknowledgment of God's dominion, and a suitable token of gratitude." Isaac Abrabanel affirms, that "Adam and his sons offered sacrifices to God because they judged this a proper mode of honoring and worshipping God."

Eusebius of Cæsarea gives a somewhat modified, but yet not substantially different, view. The origin of sacrifices, he does not think, was fortuitous, nor yet due to mere human reason. Inasmuch, he affirms, as pious men who were incessantly with God, and had their minds illuminated by the Holy Ghost, saw that there was a necessity for some instrumentality by which mortal sins could be expiated, they judged that a sacrifice to God, the giver of life and of the soul, was the true means of reaching this end; and since they had nothing better than their own souls, which they could consecrate to God, they sacrificed beasts in the place of their souls.²

3. *Origin of Jewish sacrifices.*

Although the question of the origin of sacrifices in general must be allowed to be still undecided, we may, without any doubt, refer to the command of God the origin of those sacrifices which were in use among the Jews. Into the rea-

¹ Homil. 12.

² De Demonstrat. Evangel., Lib. 1. c. 10.

son of the divine command, in relation to these sacrifices, we shall now inquire.

And upon this point, the Jewish writer Moses Maimonides pertinently suggests, that there is nothing in the religious rites which accompany sacrifices in itself pleasing to Jehovah. This is sufficiently plain from the words 1 Sam. 15: 22—"Hath the Lord as great delight in burnt offerings as in obeying the voice of the Lord?" and from the language of Jehovah in the book of Isaiah: "I am full of the burnt offerings of rams and the fat of fed beasts." These passages indicate that there was ground in the nature of things for the requirement of spiritual obedience; there was a factitious reason only for the requirement of sacrifices. Obedience is essentially pleasing to Jehovah; sacrifices, separate from obedience, are not at all pleasing.

Yet the reasons which led to the institution of the Jewish sacrificial ritual, were far from being unimportant. The view taken of this subject by ancient Christian writers was, that this form of religious service had been with the Hebrews, previously to the migration from Egypt, much in use, and that their attachment to it had become very deep. This form of religious service, the sons of Adam, Noah, Abraham, had all employed. Sacrifices also had prevailed among the Egyptians. The fondness of the Israelites for sacrificial observances, thus contracted, could not with safety be at once suppressed. Nor yet, as superstition was ever liable to make inroads among the people, could this fondness be allowed to operate in any other ways than such as God should expressly enjoin. If it had been suppressed by statute, so great was the power which it had gained, it would almost inevitably have broken out in sacrifices to false gods. And unless this fondness had been restrained and regulated by divine injunctions, it would speedily be deformed by the admixture of every sort of barbarous and incongruous ceremony. With a view to the prevention of these evils, God directed the transfer, to his own worship, of the custom of sacrifices, as one which could neither be abolished with safety, nor yet be allowed to exist without care-

ful restraint and regulation. Thus God, to a certain extent, indulged the wishes of the people, and, at the same time, aimed to counteract those wayward dispositions by which the people were liable to be drawn aside into degrading and criminal superstitions.

We cite, in confirmation of these remarks, the words of Chrysostom: "God, with a view to the salvation of those who were disposed to err, allowed himself to be worshipped by the Jews in similar modes, by the use of similar rites, to those by which pagan nations were in the habit of adoring their false divinities; modifying, correcting these rites, indeed, in some measure, and designing thereby to conduct his chosen people gradually to a purer and higher wisdom."¹

The language of Justin Martyr is to the same effect: "God," he says, "accommodating himself to the weaknesses of the people, directed them to offer sacrifices to his name, lest they should worship false gods."² So also Tertullian: "The burden of sacrifices, and rites, and oblations, and the scrupulosity attending them, let no one blame," he says, "as if God desired them for their own sake. But let all see, in these things, the care of the Divinity to bind to his worship a people prone to idolatry and to the transgression of his laws, and to guard them from sacrificing to graven images."³

The opinions of Jewish writers are to the same effect. They conceive the custom of sacrificing to the Supreme Being to have been of such wide extent, and the propensity to its indulgence so vehement, that God, in accommodation to it, allowed and even commanded numerous sacrificial observances on the part of his ancient people, otherwise the people would have relapsed into idolatrous practices without check. Maimonides, after alluding to the almost universal prevalence of sacrifices, goes on to say, "that on this account God was unwilling to enjoin the entire disuse of sacrifices among his chosen people, men being always reluctant to abandon that to which they have been long ac-

¹ Homil. 6, on Matthew.

² Contra Tryphon.

³ *Adversum Marcionem*, Lib. 2, c. 18.

customed. And indeed a precept of this sort at that time would have been of the same effect as if a prophet, designing the honor of God, should now arise and assert that God forbids men to pray, or fast, or implore his help in time of trouble, on the ground, that religion lies wholly in the thoughts of the heart, and is entirely independent of all outward deeds. God, with a better wisdom, retained in use the forms of religious observance which had previously prevailed, and transferred them from created and imaginary objects, such as had in themselves neither truth nor value, to the worship of his own name."¹

Whatever degree of confidence may be placed in these suggestions, God unquestionably instituted the Jewish ritual with the design of foreshadowing the sacrifice of Jesus Christ. Hence the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, comparing these Jewish sacrifices with the sacrifice of Christ, says, that the law had a shadow of good things to come. It was a type. Hence it is that he compares the innermost apartment of the tabernacle with the heaven of heavens, the high-priest of the Jews with Christ the great high-priest, and the sacrifices in general and particularly those in the day of atonement, with the great sacrifice of Christ, as types with their antitype, as earthly things with heavenly. In relation to the principal sacrifices, there were certain rites which were emblematic of the more particular features of the sacrifice of Christ. As Christ was put to death without the walls of the city, of which city the camp of the host in the desert was a designed emblem; so was it enjoined that the principal peculiar victims should be burned without the camp. And because Christ did not pass into the heavens without the shedding of his blood, he being at once high-priest and sacrificial victim, so was it carefully provided for that the earthly high-priest should not pass into the holy of holies without the shedding of blood.

¹ More Nevochim, Part III. c. 32.

4. *On the places appointed for sacrifices.*

In respect to the places in which worship, whether in the form of sacrifice or otherwise, was to be rendered to the Supreme Being, we are to observe that before the sacred tabernacle was built, it was lawful to employ any place for this purpose. This freedom, however, was restrained after the building of the tabernacle. As long as that tabernacle, the receptacle of the ark, was placed either in the midst of the camp, as was the case in the desert, or, as afterwards in Palestine, was lodged in any city as a fixed seat, thither all victims for sacrifice were to be led. Jewish writers, Abrabanel and Levi Ben Gerson, thus speak on this subject: "While the Israelites were in the wilderness, it was enjoined in the law that no one should sacrifice in high places. But when the host had reached Gilgal, the strictness of this law was somewhat relaxed, because at that time there was no fixed place assigned to the tabernacle. As soon, however, as the sanctuary was built at Shiloh, the former strictness was revived. Afterwards, the ark being carried to Nob and to Gibeon, it became lawful to sacrifice in high places. Hence we find Samuel doing sacrifice in a high place.¹ But this was never allowed after the building of the temple, the temple becoming the permanent resting place of the ark of the covenant."²

On the structure and arrangement of the tabernacle it is needless to descend to particulars. It was the peculiar seat of the symbolical presence of God; it was the earthly palace of the monarch of Israel. The whole structure seems to have been intended to exhibit this idea. The cover of the ark was God's seat. Above the seat were the two cherubim, an emblem of the servants and attendants of a monarch. The apartment in which these were placed was the audience-room. Here God was in the habit of meeting Moses and giving forth sacred oracles. In the outer apartment was the table of show-bread, the golden altar, and the

¹ 1 Sam. 9: 13.

² On 1 Kings 3: 3.

golden candlestick. In the court encircling the tabernacle was the altar of incense and the brazen laver. An analogy was meant to be preserved, in all these things, to the structure and furniture of a royal palace. The tabernacle and everything connected with it were, in accordance with this idea, denominated holy. They were wont to be anointed with holy oil, in token of the sanctity with which they were invested.

The tabernacle, which could be moved, comported with the migratory life of the Hebrews in the desert. No sooner, however, had they taken possession of Canaan, than a new institute of worship was planned, suited to the circumstances of a people of ample wealth and dwelling in permanent habitations. Ultimately the temple at Jerusalem was built, in accordance with this idea. It rested in the same principle with the tabernacle. There was an obvious analogy between the two in reference to their structure and arrangement. The great idea pervading both was, that they were the places in which God dwelt in a peculiar sense, as a sovereign in the midst of his subjects. This was the difference between the temple and the synagogue, and between the temple and all places of Christian worship. In the latter, God is only worshipped; in the former, he was not only worshipped, but in a peculiar sense considered as dwelling. Consider the terms of the command enjoining the building of the tabernacle. "They shall build me," God said to Moses, "a sanctuary, and I will dwell in the midst of them."¹ On this ground unclean persons were forbidden to remain in the camp. Their presence was unsuitable to the palace of the great King. And as the tabernacle, so the temple, was constructed with the design that it should become the residence of the celestial monarch. Hence the language of Solomon: "I have surely built thee an house to dwell in, a settled place for thee to abide in forever."²

The sanctity always ascribed to the temple, grew out of the same idea of its being the dwelling-place of the Divin-

¹ Exodus xxv.

² 1 Kings 8: 13.

ity. A place may be said to be sacred as being consecrated to the worship of God. So Christian churches are viewed as sacred places in this modified and figurative sense. A place may be said to be sacred as being the place of God's special abode. Such was the temple. Such are attempted to be made the churches and cathedrals of the Romanists.

In keeping with this idea, God was unwilling sacrifices should be offered to himself anywhere else but in the temple. That was his earthly palace. With this view the priests who ministered in the temple, and all who at any time appeared therein, are said to appear in the presence of God. Whatever was done in the temple was done before God. The figurative use of the word *temple* is derived from the same idea. Christ called his body a temple for no other reason, than that the same divine Power which inhabited the temple dwelt, in all its fulness, in the body of Christ. With a like significance, his flesh is called the veil, a type of the veil which, in the temple, concealed the scene of God's glorious presence. Thus, also, Christians are called the temple of God.

The language employed by Jewish writers is in perfect harmony with these remarks. "God directed such a house to be built for himself," says Rabbi Schem Tob, "as answered to the idea of a palace. In a palace are found those who prepare the food of the monarch, those that watch for his security, those who sing, play on musical instruments for his entertainment. There is an apartment in a palace set apart to the preparation of food, a place where perfumes are burned, a place where the table is spread, a secret place into which none are permitted to enter but such as stand next in dignity to the king or whom he admits to his peculiar confidence. In the same manner, God designed that all these officers and arrangements should meet in his earthly house, lest, in any respect, he should be considered as inferior to earthly kings."¹ We can easily deduce from this idea the propriety of the custom of the priests subsisting from the sacrifices. This answered to the custom of earthly kings

¹ More Nevochim, Part III. c. 45.

maintaining, in the palace, their ministers and servants. All these arrangements were designed to engrave upon the minds of the people the idea that their king, the Lord of Hosts, was dwelling among them in the temple.

[Do we not get an insight, it may be asked in passing, hereby, into the significance of the custom of sacrifices? The significance of sacrifices is analogous to the significance of the temple. The significance of a temple was that of a palace; and the sacrifices, did they not answer to the presents offered to the monarch, on various occasions, by his subjects? May not sacrifices be considered as the appropriate expressions of the feelings of a subject towards his sovereign? When a subject wished to do honor to the sovereign, when he would acknowledge allegiance, when he would appease the anger of the monarch, when he would supplicate forgiveness, when he would appear as intercessor for another, he brought a present. The subsistence of the king's household was derived from these presents. May not the various ideas involved in sacrifices, those of gratitude, of worship, of prayer, of confession, and atonement, be derived from the thought just announced?]

5. On the priesthood.

The priesthood, as it existed among the Jews, has been asserted by many writers, both Jewish and Christian, to have been the peculiar birthright of the first-born son. It was a provision of the Levitical law that all the first-born of the Hebrews, if males, should be holy unto the Lord, as those whom God called, in a peculiar sense, his own. This provision is thought to favor the idea of the priesthood's being confined to first-born sons. It is also affirmed that the Levites, who subsequently became God's sacred ministers and priests, were substituted for the first-born, so that the priestly office was conferred on them on the ground of its having previously been among the peculiar privileges of first-born sons. The fact that Moses is said, on a certain occasion, to have sent young men to offer sacrifices, is adduced in sup-

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port of this view, on the ground that the young men, thus deputed, were first-born sons.¹ Stress, also, is laid upon the fact that Esau has become infamous for having sold his birthright, the privilege of offering sacrifices as a priest.

It is maintained, on the other hand, that first-born males were holy unto the Lord, not as the prerogative of their age, nor from a prescriptive right to the priesthood, but because they were spared when God smote the first-born of the Egyptians. The sacredness pertaining to them was a peculiarity of the Jewish religion. It did not exist among them before the exodus from Egypt; nor, after that event, did it become an essential qualification for the priestly office. Its only effect was to convert the first-born into a species of property of the priests, such as could be redeemed only by the payment of five shekels.² Neither is it an argument of much weight, that the Levites took the place of the first-born. Although thus substituted, they did not necessarily become priests, but only servants of the priests; nor did they become servants, until they had been consecrated by peculiar rites. The argument, derived from the fact that Moses sent young men to offer sacrifices, is inconclusive. It is not at all clear that these young men were first-born sons, nor that they sprinkled blood upon the altar, which was the peculiar office of the priests and the distinctive mark of the priestly character. When the apostle affixed a stigma to the character of Esau for selling his birthright, it is by no means certain that the right to the priesthood was comprised among the privileges of primogeniture. Paul may have referred only to the double portion of the paternal inheritance, and to the chief authority in the household, which unquestionably were among these privileges. As these privileges were properly regarded as divine benefactions, the slight value placed on them by Esau, indicated signal ingratitude towards God.

In addition to these remarks it may be observed, that in the earliest ages, in such sacrifices as individuals offered for

¹ Exodus 24: 5.

² Numbers 18: 16.

themselves, each was his own priest. Cain and Abel each presented his own offering. This one circumstance makes it apparent that no peculiar qualification for the priestly office was connected with primogeniture. It has been alleged that Cain and Abel merely presented at the altar their respective gifts, which were afterwards offered up by Adam, in his character as priest. For this opinion, no valid reasons can be given. It is also contrary to the scriptural narrative. In the sacrifices appointed for families, the master of the family had the right of officiating as priest. Thus Noah and Job exercised priestly functions. In the sacrifices appointed for larger communities, it was the rule that the chief of the community, if he chose, should preside as priest. It was in the exercise of this function that Moses, in preference to Aaron, sprinkled the altar with the blood by which the covenant was sanctioned.¹

Greater pains have probably been taken to establish a connection between the priestly office and primogeniture, from a desire at the same time to make out an analogy, in this point, between the priestly character and Christ's relation to the Father as his first-born Son. This analogy is far from being without interest; nor is it certain that the sacred writers did not design to suggest it.

We come, after this discussion, to a more particular consideration of the Jewish priesthood. After the Hebrews left Egypt, the priestly office was separated from the civil authority, and transferred to Aaron and his posterity. Besides their strictly priestly functions, certain others were assigned to them as being supposed to be endowed with a full knowledge of the law of God; functions which were sometimes shared with those who were not priests. Among these other functions are enumerated those of giving judgment in cases of litigation, and of the interpretation of the sacred records. The duties peculiar to the priestly office were the performance of sacrifices and giving the benediction to the assembled people.

¹ Ex. 24: 6.

Two grades were established in the Aaronic priesthood. To the higher, belonged the high-priest alone; to the lower, all the other priests. Besides this, there was a subdivision of the priests into eight ranks; in the first of these, as in the principal division, the high-priest alone was placed. The greatest care was taken to maintain the dignity and purity of this officer. He was forbidden to marry any other than an undefiled virgin. He was not permitted to come into contact with any dead body, nor in any way to defile his person in token of grief for the dead. It was unlawful for him to do this even in the case of deceased parents. The more modern Jewish writers specify numerous other particulars, in which the purity of the high-priest was scrupulously guarded. He was required, they say, to excel his brethren in five particulars: in elegance of bodily form, in strength, in beauty of color, in riches, and wisdom. They considered all these things as indications of a noble and excellent disposition. It was a provision of a more doubtful character, that the high-priest should keep himself from all unnecessary intercourse with the people. He had also the privilege of performing sacrificial rites at any time which he might select, and take into his own hands the duty of any of the inferior priests. [In this permitted absorption of all the functions of the whole priesthood in the hands of the chief, as if he alone were priest, are we to observe anything typical of the *one mediator* between God and man, Jesus Christ?]

A description of the duties incumbent on the other seven classes of priests would be tedious and unnecessary. A somewhat higher interest attaches to the minute details given, in the Pentateuch and in more recent Jewish works, in respect to the rites used in the consecration of the priests, the peculiar dress and ornaments which they were to wear. These details sometimes appear to modern readers insignificant and tiresome. To the devout Jews, however, to any one indeed, who should examine them with the aid of a thorough acquaintance with the customs and peculiarities of the times, they would by no means appear frivolous and uninteresting. Such students of the subject would see in

them much that was symbolical of the priestly and intercessory character of Christ.

6. *Sacrifices, their different kinds and accompanying rites.*

The general name given, in the Scriptures, to the various objects which were brought to the tabernacle and to the temple, to be used in the construction of those buildings or in the sacred services, was oblations, offerings. This term even included the Levites and the priests. Different uses were made of these various objects. Some were sent away into the desert, as the scape-goat. Some were employed in the service of the sanctuary, entire and uninjured. Some were put to death and consumed. The offerings which were put to death, divided in various ways, and consumed in the sanctuary, were sacrifices in the vocabulary of the Jews. All sacrifices, then, were offerings; but all offerings were not sacrifices. The presentation of the victim at the altar, and its division and consumption there, in whole or in part, appear to be the distinctive outward marks of a sacrifice. This definition would exclude certain things which, sometimes, are comprehended under the term *sacrifices*. Among these were the bird used in the purification of the leper; the heifer, offered to expiate a murder committed by a person not known; the red heifer, used to purify those who were defiled by touching the dead; the scape-goat, which, though of a piacular character, yet being sent away alive into the wilderness, cannot properly be ranked among sacrifices.

Of proper sacrifices, there were two great divisions, animate and inanimate. The former were selected, almost exclusively, from animals judged fit to be used for human sustenance. The animals thus sacrificed are, with the exception of birds, styled *hostiæ* or victims; a name, however, more generally applied distinctively to peace-offerings. All others were denominated simply gifts, bloodless sacrifices.

Confining our attention, for the present, to the bloody sacrifices; we notice the scrupulous care used in the selection of

victims. The choice was to be restricted to oxen, goats, sheep, doves or pigeons. One purpose of this restriction doubtless was, to perfect the separation of the Israelites from the surrounding pagan nations, among whom it was judged fit to exclude no animal, however unclean and savage, from sacrificial uses. Still further, the comparative tameness and gentleness of these animals, the fact that they were used for food and could therefore be considered as costly sacrifices, and also that they were found somewhat plentifully in the land of Canaan, seem to have been among the grounds of the selection of these animals. The greatest care, also, was to be used in the choice of animals for sacrifice from among the prescribed classes. They were uniformly to be perfect in their kind. No animal that was blind, or that had a broken limb, or that was in any way mutilated or diseased, could properly be presented for sacrifice. No animal that had come into the possession of its owner by any unlawful means, could be presented for sacrifice. Pagan nations, though, as above remarked, they did not hesitate to use the most savage and unclean animals for sacrifice, were still careful to select only such as were perfect in their kind. This caution would be prescribed by the natural religious instinct. We should anticipate its operation among a people whom Jehovah had particularly trained for his service. Attention was to be given to the age of the animal, on the principle that all animals were not of the same worth at the same age. Animals of the one or the other sex were to be offered, according to the order to which they belonged, and the particular kind of sacrifices which were to be performed.

Passing from this account of the animals which were deemed proper for sacrificial purposes, we take notice of the divisions of the sacrifices themselves, in relation either to their significance or the mode in which they were performed. Four divisions are specified: burnt-offerings, peace-offerings, sin-offerings, and trespass-offerings. Of these, burnt-offerings are recorded as having been usual at a very early period. The sacrifices of Abraham, of Noah, and very probably those of Abel, were of this kind. Few traces, indeed, of

any other than burnt-offerings are to be found in the Scriptures till a period even subsequent to Abraham. Before the promulgation of the Sinaitic law, however, peace-offerings seem to have been in use. The demand made by Moses of the Egyptian king, indicates this: "Sacrifices and burnt-offerings shalt thou give unto us, which we may offer unto the Lord."¹ The same is evident in the language used concerning Jethro, who is said to have offered sacrifices and burnt-offerings.² The word translated sacrifices, in each of these passages, has the meaning of peace-offerings.

The principle on which all sacrifices rested is, that they are essential elements of divine worship. They have the force and meaning of prayers. The peculiar significance of burnt-offerings is the acknowledgment implied in them of God, as the Creator and Preserver of all things. They were peculiarly expressive of the sentiment of adoration. They were presented, also, when the object in view was either to ask for the bounties of Providence or to render thanks for such as had already been vouchsafed. On both these occasions, the sentiment of adoration would necessarily accompany the petition or the thanksgiving, and burnt-offerings would be its most proper expression. They seem, in short, to have comprehended, within themselves, in some measure, the significance of all other forms of sacrifice; as it would be fitting that, when the bounty of Jehovah was implored, when this bounty was gratefully acknowledged, when one would appease the anger of Jehovah, his sovereign power and greatness should also be acknowledged; and on the other hand, when adoration was to be expressed, it was fitting that the favor of God should be asked, his goodness be praised, and his forgiving mercy be implored. For each of these subordinate purposes, however, by the law of Moses, particular sacrifices were assigned, notwithstanding that the import of these other sacrifices was often meant to be expressed in burnt-offerings.

It was a peculiarity of burnt-offerings, that foreigners as

¹ Exodus 10: 25.

² Exodus 18: 12.

well as native-born Jews were allowed to present them in the temple. Piacular sacrifices, thank-offerings, peace-offerings, could be received from none but Jews, on the ground that the Jews only had been instructed by the Almighty, that sacrifices of these descriptions would be acceptable to him. Burnt-offerings, as embodying that general acknowledgment of God as Creator and Benefactor, and offended Sovereign, which even nature suggests to all men as expressive of the instinctive and universal sentiment of adoration, might be received from all, because in this loose sense they were enjoined upon all.

The class of sacrifices to which our attention is next turned are those denominated peace-offerings. A difference of opinions exists as to the meaning of the word *peace* as applied to these offerings. The term, as is well known, has in the Scriptures two meanings: one, that of mutual concord among friends; the other, a condition of prosperity and happiness. The verb from which the noun *peace* is derived, is used in the two senses, of giving and enjoying peace, in the double signification of that noun already pointed out. It has been supposed, therefore, by some, that the offerings in question are called peace-offerings, with a reference to the latter signification of the verb, because to each one of the parties, Jehovah, the priests, and the offerers, a certain portion of the victim was given. On the other hand, it is conceived, that peace-offerings were meant to be significant of the concord and friendship which subsisted between the different parties in the sacrifice. A common table has always been regarded as a symbol of friendship; and so of the parties represented in the peace-offering, each received and fed upon a portion, in token of a mutual friendship. This is the view of the subject adopted by many Jewish writers. These offerings, says Levi Ben Gerson, are called peace-offerings, as customarily presented whenever one was consciously in favor with God; and their significance lay in the fact, that the offerers, the priests, and Jehovah sat down, as it were, at a common table. The blood and the entrails lay upon the altar, as before God, the breast and the shoulder were given to

the priests, and the skin and the remainder of the flesh to the persons who brought the sacrifice.¹ The opinion, in which peace-offerings were viewed as betokening prosperity, seems nevertheless the more simple and rational. These offerings relate to a condition of prosperity. They were either petitions for prosperity, or expressions of thanks for prosperity. This is the view adopted by Philo and the Greek commentators.

Three kinds are included under the general denomination of peace-offerings : freewill, votive, and thank-offerings ; the two former are to be considered in the light of petitions ; the latter, as an expression of gratitude for prosperity. The judgment, even of those who lived before Moses, was, that the favor of God could neither be implored nor gratefully commemorated in any form so appropriately as by that of a sacrifice. This consideration seems to have given rise to the peace-offerings which, as we have observed, were presented by individuals before the time of Moses. To such an extent did this view prevail among heathen nations, that it was judged improper to commence eating, before the gods had been honored by the offering of a portion of bread and wine. This custom, as readers of the book of Daniel will remember, prevailed among the Chaldeans. Thank-offerings referred, in general, to the actual reception of benefits, or to deliverance from remarkable perils. Other peace-offerings, however, are sometimes included under this designation. The Nazarite, who had fulfilled his vow, was commanded to sacrifice a ram as a token of gratitude. Certain peace-offerings were usual on solemn feast-days set apart for commemorating the goodness of God. The sacrifices which had relation to the redemption of first-born males are thank-offerings, because the consecration of the first-born was a symbol of gratitude for the preservation of the children of the Israelites, when the Egyptian first-born were put to death.

Besides the two classes of offerings of which we have now treated, there were in use two others, denominated respectively sin- and trespass-offerings, both which may be in-

¹ On Levit. iii.

cluded under the one designation of piacular. Of sin-offerings, the Jews speak of two varieties: one, appointed alike for the poor and the rich, and consisting always of the same definite objects; the other, consisting of objects of greater or less worth, according to the ability of the persons by whom it was presented. Sin-offerings of the former variety were appointed in the case of transgressions against prohibitory laws, committed ignorantly or thoughtlessly, and which, if they had been designedly perpetrated, would have rendered the perpetrator worthy of death. They must, also, have been overt acts, and not merely designs unexecuted, or words. The greater part of the transgressions, included under this head, appear to have been either acts of ceremonial impurity, or acts of a sacrilegious character. The transgressions for which sacrifices of the second variety were appointed, seem to have been very nearly of the same description. The difference between the two kinds related more to the different circumstances of the offences than to any essential diversity in the sins for which they were presented.

As with sin, so with trespass-offerings; Jewish writers comprehend under this term two specific sorts: one for trespasses suspected, either by himself or others, to have been committed by a particular person; the other, for trespasses known to have been committed by him, known both by himself and by others. The diversity was evidently similar to that existing in the case of sin-offerings; and it referred, not so much to the essential nature of the trespasses, as to the degree of consciousness with which they were committed.

The peculiarity of sins as distinguished from trespasses, it is a matter of some difficulty to state with precision. Jewish writers as well as commentators on the Scriptures, both ancient and modern, have come to conclusions on this point very much at variance with each other. Abrabanel considers sins to have been acts committed in unconsciousness of their illegality. Aben Ezra considers the difference to be, that the one class of acts was committed in ignorance, the other, in forgetfulness of their illegality. Grotius conceives the difference to be the same as that existing between posi-

tive and negative faults. Another writer conceives the difference to be, that sins were acts done in mere thoughtlessness; trespasses, acts done from design and from motives positively malicious. Other writers maintain that sins are acts committed against Jehovah alone, from which men receive no direct injury; trespasses are acts tending directly to the injury of one's fellow creatures. This latter opinion appears, on the whole, to be more worthy of adoption than any one of the others. Is not this difference indicated in the fact that, in the case of sin-offerings, the blood of the victim was sprinkled on the sides and on the horns of the altar; that sin-offerings were appointed for the whole congregation; while trespass-offerings were confined to individuals, as most properly capable of that class of acts which we have just defined trespasses to be?

The division of sacrifices into those appointed for individuals and those appointed for the congregation in its collective character, is not undeserving of attention. Besides the sin- and trespass-offerings, which, as we have just seen, were prescribed to individuals, the paschal lamb is to be included in the same class. The distinctive features of a sacrifice belonged to this offering. The victim was directed to be put to death in the sanctuary, and its blood, to be sprinkled on the altar by the priests.

In the sacrifices prescribed to the whole congregation, the people were regarded as one commonwealth, capable, in a collective capacity, of sin; as the proper object of divine goodness, and often standing in need of blessings and deliverances. The victims offered were procured and presented at the altar by persons representing the commonwealth. In the statutes relating to these sacrifices, it was provided that their efficacy should extend to the entire people, considered as one. Of this class of sacrifices, some were presented only when some peculiar circumstances might demand; others were presented at stated times and at regular intervals. Sacrifices of the first kind were offered in case of a national transgression fallen into through ignorance, and consisted of a single bullock. They were also required

whenever the people had become guilty of the sin of idolatry. The sacrifice, on such occasions, consisted of a single bullock or goat, with a second bullock added as a burnt-offering. Later Jewish writers add, that in some services of this kind, twelve animals of each class were presented. They describe, with much minuteness, the ceremonies with which these sacrifices were accompanied. A sacrifice of the former kind, that of a single bullock, was specially required whenever the commonwealth, though still retaining much in its character which was morally good, and addicted in general to the worship of God, had ignorantly fallen into some act of the nature of idolatry. The latter form of sacrifice, in which the piacular goat was added, was appropriate to a period in which there had been a more general and personal relapse into idolatry. As this sacrifice supposed not only the neglect of the prescribed religious rites, but also the introduction of foreign and heathenish ceremonies, the piacular goat was intended to atone for the sin which had been committed; and the bullock, added as a burnt-offering, denoted the resumption of former rites of worship. Thus Hezekiah, after the temple had been for some time closed and many foreign superstitions brought in, offered for the two transgressions, respectively, bullocks and piacular goats.¹ In the same manner the Jews, on their return from the Babylonish captivity and the restoration of the temple and the ancient service, sacrificed, in the name of the entire congregation, both these kinds of victims.

With respect to the sacrifices which recurred at regular intervals, we find daily, weekly, monthly, and annual sacrifices commanded. Such were the morning and the evening sacrifices so frequently alluded to, the sacrifices appropriate to the new moon and to the Sabbath. Such were those which were ordained for the paschal holidays and those of the Pentecost, for the day of propitiation and the feast of tabernacles.

Much of the peculiar significance of sacrifices was hidden in the rites with which they were accompanied. Attention

¹ 2 Chron. 28: 24. 29: 3.

to these is therefore a matter of importance. Whenever a burnt-offering was presented by an individual, it was commanded to be brought before the great altar by him. When there, his hand was to be laid upon the victim and the appointed words of prayer to be uttered. After this, the victim was to be immediately slain and the blood poured round the sides of the altar. The skin was then to be removed and the animal cut in pieces. The thighs and the inwards were to be washed, and these, together with the entrails, were to be taken up the sloping ascent of the altar, and, having been there sprinkled with salt, to be laid out on the hearth. The same rites, with the exception of the imposition of hands and the prayers, were observed in the case of all sacrifices for the whole congregation. In the case of other sacrifices, these rites were somewhat varied.

It is to be noted, that the services proper to such sacrifices as were presented by individuals might be, in part, shared between the priests and the individuals offering. There was a portion of these services, however, which no one could properly perform except the priests. The sprinkling of the blood, the kindling of the fire, the laying out of the victim to be burned, was the peculiar work of the priests.

The piacular victims, occasionally presented in the name of the whole people, it was the duty of all the elders personating the people, to lead up to the altar and place upon them their own hands. A similar division of services took place in the instance of these sacrifices as of those last mentioned. The priests retained, in these, their peculiar functions. There were, moreover, certain sacrifices in which the sprinkling of the blood upon the altar was retained as the peculiar prerogative of the high-priest. Such were all those whose blood was to be carried into the holy place, as the piacular bullock and goat, the sacrifice presented for the whole congregation on the day of atonement. Certain points of interest come into view on a more particular examination of the rites observed in sacrifices. In the first place, the victim having been rightly selected, was to be placed before the altar. A command to this effect was virtually embodied in

the command to place the victim at the door of the tabernacle, because there the great altar was situated, and God may be supposed to have laid stress on the door of the tabernacle, lest it should be believed that a victim was rightly presented, if the altar was in some other position. By specifying the tabernacle as his own house, the emblematic abode of the Divinity, God would admonish all worshippers that sacrifice must be offered to Him and not to foreign deities. Everything that was originally directed to be done at the door of the tabernacle, was afterwards appointed to be done at the gate of the temple of Jerusalem.

The placing of the victim before the door of the tabernacle, was identical with the offering which God directed to be performed. This is insisted on to obviate the mistake of those who confound the offering, the oblation, with the slaying of the victim; as if there were no oblation previously to the slaying. Yet, though the placing of the victim at the door of the tabernacle was the same as its oblation, and is wont to be so termed, still it is undeniable that the blood, the inwards, and entrails, when placed upon the altar, are also said to be offered. But the oblation of these parts was not the oblation of the victim itself while yet living. More often, what was done to the separate parts, the sprinkling of the blood and the like, is styled burning rather than offering.

After the offering of the victim, in the sense just defined, there followed, in the case of peace-offerings and the piacular lamb of the leper, a turning of the victim towards all parts of the world; a designed emblem of the truth that God fills and possesses all things. To this succeeded the imposition of hands, demanded by a sacred law, of all who presented victims at the door of the tabernacle. According to Maimonides, both hands were to be used, and the whole strength exerted. This rite was to be observed in all burnt-offerings by individuals, in peace-offerings and in certain sin-offerings. The same is supposed to have been the case with trespass-offerings. It is added, that in piacular sacrifices and burnt-sacrifices, hands should be imposed at the north side of the altar; in peace-offerings, anywhere within the

sanctuary ; yet still, so that wherever they were placed, the eyes of the worshipper should be turned towards the west or towards the temple. This requirement was the more suitable, because certain prayers were to be uttered when hands were placed, which could not properly be done, unless the face was towards the temple. In regard to sacrifices for the whole congregation, it is agreed among the Jews, that hands were to be imposed, only in those of a piacular character. While this judgment is not in conflict with any known law, it is in harmony with the ascertained usage. When, at the command of Hezekiah, burnt-offerings and piacular victims were sacrificed, we are told that only in the latter sacrifices were the hands of the elders laid upon the victims. It is not, however, the unanimous judgment of Jewish writers that even in all piacular sacrifices were hands to be imposed.

The imposition of hands symbolized the devotion to death of the object, or its commendation to the favor of God, or its being set apart to some sacred use. And certain words were appointed to be used in connection with this rite, expressive of the particular object to which the imposition of hands was meant to refer ; in all cases, however, expressive either of prayer for blessing or of imprecation of evil. Imposition of hands is sometimes used as an interchangeable term for prayer.

The imposition of hands, therefore, was always required to be followed by the utterance of certain prescribed forms of prayer, always referring, of course, to the precise purpose which the sacrifice itself had in view. Prayer of confession was used in the case of sin-offerings ; with free-will offerings, supplication for blessings was joined ; with thank-offerings and votive-offerings, expressions of gratitude and praise were used. With all, might properly be combined the deprecation of evil on account of sin, as what suited with the condition of every man as a transgressor. No doubt can be entertained of the invariableness of this custom. Jewish writers uniformly insist, that no sacrifice can be effective in the procurement of pardon, unless it be accompanied by penitent supplication and confession.

The blood of the victim represented its life, and the sprinkling of the blood upon the altar was the most sacred of the sacrificial rites. It was practised in different forms and different parts of the temple, according to the nature and meaning of the particular sacrifice. In some instances, the blood was carried into the tabernacle. In some cases, it was required to be sprinkled on the sides or on the horns of the altar; in certain cases, this was to be done in the holy place; in others, in the holy of holies.

The flesh of the victim was, in some cases, to be consumed by fire on the altar. Whenever it was commanded that only the inwards should be burned on the altar, the remaining parts were either to be eaten by the priests and the offerer, or else consumed without the camp. The flesh of the victim was disposed of in this latter manner in most piacular sacrifices. Those who bore the flesh to the appointed place of burning, were regarded as unclean, in consequence of the uncleanness of the victim; and the uncleanness of the victim, as in the instance of the scape-goat, consisted only in this, that the sins, which it was meant to expiate, were supposed to be symbolically laid upon it.

The flesh of all peace-offerings and of all piacular offerings, except those whose blood was carried into the temple, was to be eaten, yet not by every man, nor at all times indiscriminately. Certain portions of certain victims went to the priests and their families; others were eaten by the persons who offered the sacrifice in token of the peace, the concord, supposed to subsist between God and themselves. The ground on which it was unlawful to eat things offered to idols, lay partly in this consideration: such an act betokened a belief in and affection for the divinity to which the things were sacrificed. The flesh of sin-offerings could not properly be eaten; partly, no doubt, because of the uncleanness they had contracted from the sins symbolically laid upon them, and partly because feasting was judged to be incompatible with the feelings and dispositions indicated in all piacular sacrifices.

7. *The general nature of a type.*

After this discussion of the general characteristics of Jewish sacrifices, we proceed to a consideration of their typical nature. A preliminary question, however, must be first disposed of: What is a type? A type, in the theological sense, may be thus defined: it is a symbol of some future event, designed in its nature and the circumstances of its occurrence, to prefigure that future event. That which is thus prefigured is called the antitype. It is, then, in the first place, an essential feature of a type that it shall actually prefigure its antitype. One thing can thus prefigure another in two ways: either by means of some property or important circumstances actually belonging to it in common with its antitype; in the same manner, in which the Jewish sacrifices were a type of Christ in the putting to death experienced in both instances; or else by means of some property symbolically attached to the type. In this last manner, the images of the cherubim, in the holy of holies, were a type of the celerity with which the angels moved; not because the images actually moved swiftly, but because they possessed that which was a symbol of swift motion, namely wings, artificially attached to the body. Yet furthermore, one thing may be a type of another, on the ground of a proper comparison between the two. Melchisedek shadowed forth Christ our eternal high-priest; for though Melchisedek is not in reality an eternal high-priest, yet he has that which may be viewed as an image of eternity, in the absence of any historical record of his descent, of his birth and death.

It is, in the second place, an essential feature of a type, that it is plainly shaped by the Almighty with a view to its representation of a future event. This is the distinction of a type from a simile. Many things resemble each other, between which we are not to suppose any typical relation. All flesh is grass; yet evidently grass is not a designed type of the frailty of man. Sometimes the same name is given to two objects on account of a likeness which the one bears

to the other. Yet there is no need of supposing any typical relation in such cases. Herod was denominated a fox. The fox, however, was not a type of Herod, because it was not so designed by Jehovah.

In these statements in reference to the distinctive features of types, the usual sense of the word is regarded as well as the strictly Biblical usage. The Bible recognizes nothing as a type, except such things as God has plainly intended should represent future events. Thus the institutions of Moses, to which the principle of a type belongs, are called the shadow of things to come.¹ The Mosaic law, which was replete with types, is said to have had a shadow of good things to come.² There is the same difference between type and symbol, as between genus and species. All types are symbols, though all symbols are not types. A symbol may represent a thing as past, or present, or to come. Thus rites which were intended to illustrate some trait of character, required to be cultivated by contemporary Jews, were symbols and not types. Some rites may have had both the symbolical and the typical character. Only those, however, which were designed to represent future events were properly types.

From what has been said of the nature of a type, that of the antitype may be easily gathered. The antitype invariably succeeds the type. The existence of the latter ceases, when that of the former begins. Still more, the force which belongs to the antitype, is found in the type, either in the form of shadow, mere appearance ; or, if really existing, in an inferior degree only. The death, which was common to the Jewish victims and to Christ, had, in the type, far less force in relation to God and men, than it had in Christ. The law, it is said, having only a shadow of good things to come, could not make the comers thereunto perfect. The Jewish sacrifices had only a shadow of that virtue which belongs to the sacrifice of Christ, and therefore they could not, of themselves, purge those who trusted in them. As the shadow

¹ Col. 2: 17.

² Heb. 10: 1.

with the solid body, so the Mosaic law is, in the Scriptures, contrasted with the gospel. The law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ. It is objected by Socinus, to this view of the subject, that the type never can be considered as entirely destitute of the very property which belongs to the antitype. Always in the type, he says, is found something of the identical nature of the antitype.¹ He asserts, therefore, that there was no force existing in the sacrifice of Christ, which did not properly exist in the Jewish sacrifices. This idea is wholly untenable. Nothing is more evident than that a type may have only the appearance or a symbol of the properties of the antitype, but of the properties themselves be wholly destitute. The cherubim had, in their wings, a symbol of the celerity of the angels. The property itself, they entirely wanted. The incense, burnt in the temple, was a symbol of prayer. Had it, in itself, aught of the properties of prayer?

8. *Sacrifices, more particularly typical of Christ, and the points in which their typical character lay.*

Those sacrifices very evidently were intended to be types of Christ, in which the victims were to be burned without the camp. Besides the analogy which lay in their unspotted purity and in their being put to death, these victims were employed as piacular sacrifices, and their flesh was burned without the camp. "We have," says Paul, "an altar, whereof they have no right to eat, which serve the tabernacle. For the bodies of those beasts whose blood is brought into the sanctuary by the high-priest, for sin, are burned without the camp. Wherefore Jesus also, that he might sanctify the people with his own blood, suffered without the camp."² And this argument, derived from the place in which Christ suffered, would be without force, unless all those victims whose blood was carried into the sanctuary, were a type of the sacrifice of the Redeemer. For Christ would not have suffered without the gate, merely

¹ Praelect. c. 22.

² Heb. 13: 10, 11, 12.

because those victims were burned without the gate. There must be other and higher points of agreement; and this higher agreement can be found only in the relations of type to antitype. All victims, therefore, whose bodies were burned without the camp, were types of Christ; and this in the stronger sense, because they not only prefigured his death in the general, but the place in which it occurred.

Of many of the victims whose flesh was to be burned without the camp, the blood was to be carried into the holy of holies. These, too, were preëminently typical of the sacrifice of Christ. They not only prefigured his death in the general, and the place of his death, but also his entrance into the upper sanctuary. "But Christ," says Paul, "being come an high-priest of good things to come, by a greater and more perfect tabernacle, not made with hands, that is to say, not of this building; neither by the blood of goats and calves, but by his own blood, he entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us."¹ In this passage, the Jewish high-priest and ours, Christ Jesus; the blood of goats and calves and the blood of the Saviour; the most-holy place and the sanctuary above; and, finally, the entrance of the high-priest into the former and that of Christ into the latter, are compared together as types and antitypes. Nothing, it may be here observed, can be further from the truth, than the confident assertion of Socinus, that no piacular victims were types of Christ, except those which were slain at stated times and in the name of the whole congregation.² Among the victims thus burned without the camp, were those piacular bullocks of which one was for the congregation and the other for the high-priest alone; both of which were sacrificed only at irregular intervals.

9. *Exclusive reference of sacrifices to God.*

The typical nature of the sacrifices now described, lay in these two points: the first, that they had a specific relation

¹ Heb. 9: 11, 12.

² Praellect. c. 22.

to God ; the second, that a vicarious punishment was laid upon the victims. These sacrifices thereby teach us the correspondent truths concerning Christ ; that his sacrifice of himself had a reference to God, and that he endured a vicarious punishment. Each of these positions, it is well known, has been denied by Socinus and his school.

In proof of the first proposition, that the Jewish piacular sacrifices had particular relation to God, that they were designed to operate on the mind of God directly, we allude to the place in which these sacrifices were required to be offered. This, at first, was the tabernacle. Afterwards, it was the temple at Jerusalem, which had the same character and uses with the tabernacle. Each was rendered holy by that glory, the cloud, which presented a certain symbol of the presence of God. Each was built with the design of its becoming the dwelling-place of Jehovah. Those who entered the sanctuary are said to appear in the presence of God, and whatever was done in it was done before God. Here God was willing to be approached and consulted ; towards the temple prayer was to be offered by travellers or exiles, as we know to have been done by the prophet Daniel. These facts indicate that there was a certain special presence of God in the sanctuary. The inference is an easy one, that sacrifices performed in this place, thus selected by Jehovah as his abode in the midst of the people, and made sacred by his peculiar presence, were meant to have a particular reference to God. There was no reason why they should be performed in the sanctuary, unless they were performed with particular reference to the inhabitant of the sanctuary ; nor could they be performed with reference to him, unless their aim had been to affect his mind, just as was the case with the prayers and thanksgivings which were uttered in the sanctuary.

Let it be noted, besides, that of certain victims the blood was to be carried into the holy of holies, the peculiar dwelling-place of Jehovah. The only purpose of this act must have been, to win for the worshipper the favor of Him before whom the blood was sprinkled. And if this be con-

ceded, then must it be allowed also, that the virtue of these sacrifices, whose blood was thus sprinkled before God, must have been directed especially towards Jehovah, that God must have been their specific object. Not otherwise are we to judge, in the general, concerning all sacrifices. The whole sanctuary was consecrated to services, in performing which, every one drew near to God. If such was the nature and relation of sacrifices in general, this must be the nature and relation of those sacrifices which we have enumerated as specially typical of the sacrifice of Christ.

The consideration of the functions of the priests, leads to the same conclusion. These functions are described in the words addressed by Jehovah to Moses: "Thou shalt put them," i. e. the priestly garments, "upon Aaron thy brother, and his sons with him; and shalt anoint them and consecrate them and sanctify them, that they may minister unto me in the priest's office."¹ To execute the priestly office, therefore, and to minister unto God, were the same thing. They were acts of which God is the great and exclusive object. The priests, when they ministered unto God, that is to say, when they performed sacrifices, drew near only to God; and all the religious rites and ceremonies, which are connected with the offering of sacrifices, are so arranged as to appear to bear a specific relation to God. We are to observe the distinction existing between the office of the priests and that of the prophets and apostles. It is the office of the latter to transact the business of God with men. It is the office of priests to transact the business of men with God. The prophets and apostles were God's ambassadors to men; the priests are the advocates of men before God. Now then, says Paul, are we ambassadors for Christ, as though God did beseech you by us. On the other hand, it is said, that every high-priest taken from among men is ordained for men in things pertaining to God.²

It has been urged by Crellius, in reply to Grotius, that Paul, as if invested with the priestly office, affirms that he

¹ Exodus 28: 41.

² Hebrews 5: 1.

had whereof he might glory through Jesus Christ in those things which pertain to God.¹ But it will appear, by a reference to the verse immediately preceding, that Paul had transferred to himself, figuratively, certain functions of the priests. He had prepared the Gentiles, by the instructions he had given them in evangelical doctrine, to become living sacrifices unto God. In consequence of this, he ventures to assume to himself, in this figurative mode, a priestly character, and to say that he had whereof he might glory through Jesus Christ. Though Paul, using this figurative style, though all Christians, are sometimes denominated priests, yet it is to be noted, that no ministers of the gospel, whatever rank they may occupy, are, in their official character, ever spoken of in the Bible as priests. The ministry never should be confounded with the priesthood. The former, as has been affirmed already, is an embassy from God to men; the latter, an embassy from men to God. The former has to do directly with men; the latter, with God. To the Jewish priesthood, the priesthood of Christ, not the Christian ministry, succeeded; and, with Christ, the priestly office ceased to exist on the earth.

Again, we take notice of the careful provision made, in the Jewish ritual, for the preservation of the official sacredness and purity of the priests. Great regard was paid to their descent, their marriage, the healthiness of their body. No foreigner, no unclean person, no one with any personal blemish, no one under the influence of wine or strong drink, no one not clothed in the robes strictly proper to his rank, could perform any priestly function. These regulations grew out of the idea of the singular sacredness of the priestly office; a sacredness which had no other basis than the closeness of the connection of that office with God. The priests were, in all things, to minister unto God. He was the direct object of every preparation for the work through which they passed, because he was the direct and exclusive object of the work itself.

¹ Romans 15: 17.

We advert also to the caution which the Jews were commanded to use in the selection of animals for sacrifice. Not all kinds of animals, of which it was lawful for man to eat, was it lawful to employ for sacrificial purposes; nor was it permitted to offer, even from among the allowed classes, individual animals that were, in any degree, diseased or blemished. The reason for this extreme caution is found in the fact, that sacrifices are either an expression of praise to the Almighty for his goodness, or else they are the designed means of conciliating or retaining his favor. No victim that was not perfect in its kind could be considered as a fitting instrument for such purposes, if we assume that the significance of sacrifices is derived entirely from their relation to Jehovah. Sacrifices may be likened to gifts made to a king by his subjects. The dignity and excellence of the monarch, as estimated by his subjects, are in proportion to the excellence of the gifts presented to him. The words of Malachi may be here properly cited: "If ye offer the blind for sacrifice, is it not evil? Offer it now unto thy governor; will he be pleased with thee, or accept thy person?"¹ And as the transgression of the rules, given for the selection of sacrificial victims, occasioned the rejection, and the careful observance of these rules occasioned the acceptance, of the victims by Jehovah, we are to infer that Jehovah was the one great object of all sacrificial observances.

Reflection on the rites which accompanied sacrifices will suggest the same conclusion. The victim was to be properly placed before the altar; hands were to be imposed upon him; he was to be slain by the priests, and his blood to be sprinkled. These were rites by which the victim was offered to God. The altar was the table of the Lord. The mercy-seat and the innermost sanctuary were the peculiar dwelling-place of Jehovah. Whatever was presented at either of these places was presented to God. The waving of the sacrifice, in certain instances, to all points of the compass, was meant to indicate its being offered to God as filling all space. In all these rites, there was a manifest refer-

¹ Malachi 1: 8.

ence to God. The sacrifice itself must therefore be considered as having such a reference. The priests, who attended at the altar, directed their activity, not to the altar itself, but to the God to whom the altar was dedicated. For in all worship rendered to God, the rites by which the worship is performed, and the worship itself, must be conceived of as referring to the same object.

Furthermore, since all worship whether natural or artificially established, relates either to the attainment or the commemoration of the Divine favor, we infer that sacrifices, which are essentially worship, must have tended to the same point. Hence prayers are called the "calves of the lips," for the reason that prayers are sacrifices and sacrifices are prayers. Prayers are spiritual sacrifices, and sacrifices are symbolical prayers. The sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination to God, while the prayer of the righteous (that is, his sacrifice) is his delight. Prayers, also, were interspersed among the sacrificial rites. It was their intended effect to secure from God the same end as the sacrifices themselves; and the sacrifices must be supposed to refer to the same Being as did the prayers which were mingled with them.

It is instructive to observe the frequency with which the Bible gives the name of sacrifices figuratively to certain actions of men. Prayers and thanksgivings are denominated "spiritual sacrifices."¹ In the same manner expenses, labors, sufferings, borne for the glory of God, have the name of "sacrifices." Kindnesses done to the needy, brokenness of spirit, are spoken of in a similar way. These are all described as being pleasing to God, and they are figuratively denominated sacrifices, because sacrifices have a similar purpose in view, and refer, like these actions, directly and exclusively, to Jehovah. The sacred writers would not give figuratively the name of sacrifices to certain actions on the ground of their being acceptable to God, and being directed exclusively to him, unless sacrifices, properly considered, were of the same nature.

¹ 1 Peter 2: 5.

The exclusive reference of sacrifices to Jehovah is specially obvious in those which were of a piacular character; and which, beyond all others, were symbolical of the sacrifice of Christ. In these, the relation supposed to exist between him who offered the sacrifice and God, is that of an offender to an indignant sovereign who possesses the power both to punish and to pardon. Piacular sacrifices are to be performed only for the purpose of averting punishment, and no one needs to avert punishment from himself unless he has contracted guilt by sinning. In all piacular sacrifices, the guilty party who offered the sacrifice, and the priest likewise in the same character of sinner, approached Jehovah as one that was offended and possessed the power of punishment and of pardon, and for the purpose of obtaining pardon; the criminal, placing the victim before the altar and performing the other rites incumbent on him, that he might properly express his contrition for his crime, and render God propitious; the priest, sprinkling the blood of the victim upon the altar, thus symbolically presenting to God the very life of the animal as a ransom for the guilty party; a special reference to God manifestly pervading all these rites and lending to them their entire significance.

All that has now been said in relation to the reference of sacrifices to God, is in harmony with the opinions of Jewish writers. Philo asserts that those who drew near to the altar did so for the purpose either of prayer or of thanksgiving to the Almighty.¹ If any one inquires, he goes on to say, for what reasons men, in early times, performed sacrifices and offered prayers, two will be obvious: one, the majesty of God, as being intrinsically deserving of honor; the other, the advantage of the worshipper, the procurement of good or the removal of evil. Sacrifices having the former end in view, whose chief purpose was to give expression to the sentiment of adoration, are called burnt-sacrifices or offerings; those having the latter object in view, are called either peace- or piacular- sacrifices. Both, however, have this feature in common, that they are directed exclusively to Jeho-

¹ De animalibus idoneis sacrificio.

vah. In a similar strain Abrabanel speaks of the principle on which all sacrifices rest. They are expressions of gratitude, they are supplications, to God. The law, he says, does not direct that the blood of the piacular victim should be sprinkled on the altar, except for the purpose of appeasing God and obtaining the forgiveness of sin.¹ Another Jewish writer, Isaac Ben Aramah, asserts the affinity between sacrifice and prayer to be so close that each avails to the same purpose and has the same significance; and consequently, if God be the exclusive object of prayer, then also of sacrifices. In a word, it seems to be the unanimous judgment of Jewish writers, that sacrifices not less than supplication and thanksgiving, related alone and directly to Jehovah.

The opinions of pagan writers on this point coincide with those of Jewish writers. Sacrifices are offered to the gods, says Porphyry, for three reasons: for purposes of adoration, to testify gratitude for benefits conferred, to procure favors.² The pagans evidently looked upon sacrifices as acts of worship, of which God was the object. They seem to have identified sacrifices with prayers. The Greek and Latin terms for sacrificing are of like signification to the words supplicate, appease, propitiate. Cæsar relates that among the Gauls of his time, it was a common opinion, that, unless the life of a man was given for the life of a man, the gods could not be appeased.³ The language, uniformly employed by pagan writers on this subject, points to the same conclusion with that which we have already drawn from writers among the Jews. Early Christian authors teach the same truth. Sacrifices were never to be offered except to the one god. Sacrifices were of the very nature of religious worship. Jehovah is their exclusive object.

10. *Vicarious punishment, implied in piacular sacrifices.*

The typical nature of piacular sacrifices lies, we have said, in these two points: the first, that they have a specific relation to God; the second, that a vicarious punishment

¹ *Praef. in Levit.* ² *De abstinencia, L. 2, c. 24.* ³ *De bello Gallico, L. 6.*

was laid upon the victims. We have already demonstrated the peculiar relation of sacrifices to God. We pass to the proofs of the statement, that a vicarious punishment was laid upon the victims.

By vicarious punishment, is meant any evil inflicted on one for the purpose of expiating the guilt of another. It is essential, that it have the effect of procuring the forgiveness of the sin of the offender, and removing from him the punishment which his sin deserves. That is not vicarious punishment, as we design to use the term, which, although it consists formally in evil suffered by another person, is yet in reality punishment to the offender himself. Children often suffer for the sins of the parent. The evil thus endured is penal to the parent; and because it does not have the effect of averting punishment from the parent, it has not the nature of vicarious punishment.

Vicarious punishment may be of two kinds. It may be a punishment of the very same nature with that whose place it is designed to take; as when one suffers death in order to liberate his friend from death. It may be of a different nature. It is, also, to be observed that vicarious punishment inflicted on animals for the sins of men, had its proper effect only as being a condition, as it were, prescribed by the law, without which God was unwilling to forgive the offender. For although it was, for the most part, only the lighter kind of offences that could be expiated in this way, still God was not willing they should be passed over without this species of punishment's being inflicted, lest too free a licence should be given to sinful indulgence. Vicarious punishments have a real and intrinsic efficacy in the removal of punishment. They are an exhibition of the justice and righteousness of God, and have a real tendency to arouse and perpetuate a proper regard to the law. Their efficacy does not depend on an arbitrary Divine appointment. They remove guilt or the liableness to punishment, because they answer all the purposes of actual punishment.

For the purpose of proving that piacular sacrifices had the nature of vicarious punishment, we observe, that the sacred

writers are in the habit of representing sin as a foul spot polluting the person of the offender, and of describing the expiation of sin by terms expressive of purification. God directed, that on the day of atonement, the sins of the congregation should, in a symbolical manner, be transferred to the goat, which was afterwards to be led into the wilderness. To deepen the moral significance of this act, the goat was to be considered as defiled by the very sins which were designed to be expiated. This defilement was so great, that the person, by whom the goat was conducted into the wilderness, contracted uncleanness. He was not allowed to return into the camp, till he had been purified by water. Sins were symbolically transferred to the goat by the imposition of the hands of the high-priest, and the utterance of certain words of confession. The priest, in this transaction, was considered as personating the people. In the case of all piacular sacrifices, whose blood was carried into the holy place and the flesh burned without the camp, the same rites were observed as in the case of the scape-goat. Hands were laid upon the head of the victim, and confession of sin uttered. The animals contracted, by means of these rites, the same ceremonial uncleanness. The persons by whom their bodies were carried away to be burned, were supposed to become unclean. We are to infer, therefore, from this similarity in the rites practised in the two cases, that to piacular victims in general, as well as to the scape-goat, the sins of the guilty party were transferred. No better exhibition of the nature of vicarious punishment can be given than that which is here seen. The sins of the party actually guilty are laid symbolically on the victim, and expiation for these sins is then made by the shedding of the blood of the latter.

The objection urged by Socinus, that the punishment due to the sins of a man cannot be laid upon a beast, because man and beast have not a common nature, is of little weight. The sins of men can be symbolically laid upon an irrational animal. We affirm this, because it is explicitly said in the Scriptures to be true in reference to the scape-goat. The Scriptures not less clearly assert that the sins of

men can be expiated by the blood of piacular victims. In vain is it urged that this transference of sins to an irrational animal is done only in appearance; that in reality it can never be done. This is admitted. This figurative transference of sins, however, has a significance, which can lie only in this, that the animals on which sins were laid, were put in the place of the guilty, and, by the shedding of their blood, expiated the sins of the guilty. And, though we should concede that there was rather the appearance than the reality of vicarious punishment, still should we be warranted in affirming that the reality existed in the sacrifice of Christ. For it is the law of the type and the antitype, that whatever exists in appearance in the type, exists in the antitype in reality.

It is said, still further, that animals could not endure a vicarious punishment unless they were put to death; but they could not endure a vicarious death, because death is not the punishment affixed to the sins in reference to which these sacrifices were appointed. This objection rests upon the supposition that a vicarious punishment must be of precisely the same nature with that whose place it is designed to take; that animals could not properly be put to death except in those instances where death was denounced against the actual offender. But this supposition is groundless. It is not needful, in order to a vicarious punishment, that it should correspond precisely to the punishment for which it is intended to be a substitute. The kind of punishment, which may properly serve as a substitute, depends upon the will of the sovereign power.

In fine, whoever rightly apprehends the points of agreement and the points of disagreement between vicarious and proper punishments, will have a ready answer to the objections brought forward by Socinus and his followers. All punishments, whether proper or vicarious, go upon the ground of violated law. They are designed to inculcate a proper regard for law. Both are meant to teach that no sin can be allowed to pass unrebuked. But though they possess these points of likeness, there are other points in which they differ. Punishment, in the proper sense of the term, can

be inflicted only on the evil doer. Its necessity grows directly out of the nature of the law. Law ordains punishment only on such as have deserved punishment. It is deserved, in no case, by one man for the fault of another. Desert, in a moral sense, originates in the intentions of him of whom the desert is predicated; and there is nothing which is more strictly one's own, nothing less capable of communication with another, than acts of the will or intentions. There is, therefore, nothing which is more strictly one's own and less capable of communication than sin. Punishment, in the strict and proper sense, as inflicted on an individual, relates alone to the sin of that individual, and can rightly be inflicted only on the strength of that sin. But the right by which vicarious punishment is inflicted, originates either in the sovereign dominion of the ruler, in distinction from his judicial character, or else in the consent of him who suffers the vicarious punishment, in conjunction with that sovereign dominion. The latter element is seen in Christ, suffering death of his own accord, in obedience to the will of the Father. The former element is seen in the piacular sacrifices appointed to the Jews.

It is wont to be alleged, at this point, that vicarious punishment, inflicted on the strength of either of these rights, lacks the essential characteristic of punishment relatively to him on whom it is laid. It does indeed lack this characteristic, if we fail to remember the distinction between proper and vicarious punishment. Proper punishment, provided it be proportioned to the crime, and there be no interposition of pardoning grace, immediately takes away the obligation to punishment by literally and fully meeting the obligation. Vicarious punishment, however, not arising directly from the obligation to punishment created by the law, but from the sovereign power of the ruler, may properly consist in something else than that which the law literally prescribes. And it does not have for its purpose the satisfaction of the law strictly construed, but merely the demands of that sovereign power. Hence it is, that the idea of the remission of sin is altogether incompatible with the idea of proper punishment.

The reverse of this is the case with the punishment which is vicarious. With the nature of this, the idea of pardon is entirely congruous. This can have no influence, except such as the pardoning grace of the ruler may see fit to assign to it. It is not viewed by the sovereign as the literal punishment of the evil doer, but only as the indispensable condition of the maintenance of the authority of the law. A condition of this kind may reasonably be exacted at the very moment that grace is exercised in the pardon of the offender. There is no inconsistency between these two things, unless one choose to affirm that the exaction of any condition whatever is at variance with the idea of pardon. Punishment, in the proper sense of the term, then, satisfies the law by means of the actual endurance, by the transgressor, of the precise evil appointed in the penalty of the law. In vicarious punishment, that is suffered which the penalty does not contain, but yet that which relates to the same point and effects the same end, the confirmation of the law. It is not of essential importance with what mind proper punishment is borne. If in its formal nature it be proportioned to the crime, it meets the full claim of the law, whether it be endured willingly or reluctantly. But vicarious punishment derives its efficacy from many other sources besides its formal nature. It depends on the voluntariness and innocence of the sufferer, upon the greatness of the evil endured, and upon its tendency to magnify the law.

11. *Views of Jewish, Pagan, and Christian writers on the subject of Vicarious Punishments.*

It was evidently the sentiment of the earlier Christian writers, not only that the sins of men were laid upon victims presented in sacrifice, but that the lives of the victims were given in the place of the souls of the offerers. Origen asserts, that, as hands were imposed on the head of the animal sacrificed, so the sins of the human race were laid upon Christ, for he is the head of the body of the church. Theodoret, commenting on Leviticus, says, that every one who

offered a sacrifice, placed his hands on the head of the animal, and by that means transferred to the animal his own sinful deeds; the hand, by which most deeds of men are performed, being taken for the deeds themselves. The early Christian writers conceived that the lives of the animals sacrificed were substituted for the souls of offenders. The writer just quoted, commenting on Exodus, affirms that the priests did not lay hands on all victims, but only on those which were presented for themselves, and especially on all sin-offerings. In the case of other victims, the hands of the persons sacrificing were imposed. This was intended to signify the substitution of the victim in the place of the offender. Quotations to this effect might easily be multiplied from Eusebius of Cæsarea, Athanasius, and the early Christian writers in general. They uniformly ascribe to the death of Christ, as a piacular sacrifice, the nature of a vicarious punishment.

The coincidence between these views and those expressed by Jewish writers, is worthy of remark. Levi Ben Gerson asserts the significance of the imposition of hands to be the transference of the sins of the offerer to the victim.¹ Isaac Ben Aarama teaches that as often as any one sins, whether ignorantly or consciously, he removes the sin from himself to the animal sacrificed, on whose head he places his hand.² It is the doctrine of Abrabanel, that after confession, in the instance of the piacular bullock, the sins of the children of Israel were placed on it. If any one doubts whether those who considered sins to be transferred to the victim, also considered that these sins were expiated by the death of the victim as by a vicarious punishment, this scruple may be removed by recollecting the words of deprecation used in respect to a piacular victim: "Let this be my expiation." All Jewish writers conceive these words to be a prayer that the evil feared by the offerer in view of his own iniquities may fall upon the piacular victim.

The most interesting of these testimonies from Jewish writers, are perhaps those which bear upon the doctrine, that

¹ Exodus 29: 10.

² On Leviticus iv.

the life of the animal slain was substituted in the place of that of the offending party. The Jewish writer Baal Aruch explains the words of deprecation cited in the preceding paragraph, in the following mode. It is, he says, as if one exclaimed: "Let this animal be regarded as standing in my place, as bearing my iniquities in order that they may be forgiven me." Solomon Jarchi explains this formula in the same manner. It is equivalent, he says, to the prayer: "Let the evil which is due to me fall upon this my substitute." Another writer, Moses Ben Nachman, speaking of sacrifices in general, says: "It would be just that the blood of the offender should be shed and his body be burned; but God, in his clemency, accepts the victim at the hands of the offender as a thing substituted, and a ransom, that his blood may be shed in the stead of that of the transgressor." It is not necessary to multiply quotations.

It only remains to observe that a similar idea in reference to the nature of sacrifices, evidently was spread among the pagan nations of antiquity. Herodotus thus describes a custom prevalent in Egypt. It was usual, he says, to imprecate upon the heads of victims whatever evil was supposed to threaten either individuals or the land, in such a manner that the victim might be made to endure it. A victim thus treated was considered, he adds, as unclean and as not fit to be eaten.¹ Servius, commenting on Virgil, tells us, that whenever, in a certain city of ancient Gaul, the pestilence prevailed, one of the poorer inhabitants allowed himself to be led through the streets, and, after the evils infesting the city had been imprecated on himself, to be put to death.² A custom somewhat similar to this, is said to have existed among the Athenians.

12. *The Priesthood of Christ.*

The death of Christ embodies in itself the reality to which the various observances that have been described bear the relation of type. The points to be proved in respect to the

¹ *Euterpe.*

² *Æneid.* 3.

death of Christ are, that it was a sacrifice and that it had the nature of a vicarious punishment. Previously, however, the priesthood of Christ must be briefly discussed.

By the priesthood of Christ, we are to understand the advocacy which he undertakes on behalf of men in the presence of God. In his office of prophet and king, he has to do directly with men. In his office of priest, he has to do directly with God. As prophet, he is ambassador from God to men. As king, he is the representative of God in his regal character. As priest, he is the ambassador from men to God. This is the same distinction which exists between the priestly and the clerical office ; and it is such, that by the very nature of the case, the priestly office, in its real and proper sense, cannot be sustained by any man. In harmony with all this, we are told that "if any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous."¹ Christ appears before God on our behalf, pleading our cause in that presence.

To what order of priests does Christ properly belong? The Scriptures speak of him as a priest after the order of Melchizedek. Between the priesthood of Melchizedek and the Aaronic priesthood, two points of unlikeness are to be noticed. The first is, that the priesthood of Melchizedek was not confined to any one family : the Aaronic priesthood was restricted to the family of Aaron. The second difference is, that whoever became a priest after the order of Melchizedek, became a priest forever : either in a shadowy, symbolical sense, as was the case with Melchizedek ; or in a real and substantial manner, as was the case with Christ. The latter is to perform the priestly functions through all the ages of the world. In the Aaronic priesthood, the office was continually transferred from one to another ; and, in the general, it was destined to come to an end with the advent of Christ.

The mode in which Christ was inducted into the priestly office, differed from the mode used in the case of the Aaronic priesthood. In the latter case, the rites employed were

¹ 1 John 1: 2.

intended to be emblematical of the excellences which every priest should possess. These excellences were given only in an emblematic form. The rites, by which purification was symbolized, could not impart a real purification. In the case of the Son of God, as it was needful he should actually possess the qualifications of a perfect priest, what may be called the rites of consecration were such as, actually and not in the way of emblem alone, imparted these qualifications. To the highest perfection of a priest, these three qualities are essential: the first, that he stand in such a relation of favor and influence with Jehovah, as to be able efficaciously to commend unto God those to whom he would render God propitious; the second, that he be of a disposition towards men, so kind and compassionate, as to be willing to exert his priestly power on their behalf; the third, that he be endowed with an immortal life. Reason not less than Scripture establishes the necessity of these qualities to the character of a perfect high-priest. It is essential, according to the Epistle to the Hebrews, that every high-priest be able to offer both gifts and sacrifices for sins; that he have compassion on the ignorant and on them that are out of the way; that he have an unchangeable priesthood, and be able to save unto the uttermost all that come unto God by him, and ever live to make intercession for the saints.

These essential qualities met, in the most perfect manner, in Christ. Their impartation to him constituted his induction into the priestly office. The purity of his life and the severity of his sufferings, united with the voluntariness with which they were undergone, were the elements of that favor with God, on the strength of which he is able to commend unto God those whose cause he undertakes. He is of such a compassionate temper as to banish all reluctance to sustain the burdens and pains, connected with the sacerdotal functions. He was raised up from the grave and ascended to heaven, that he might there perform its closing act.

Such is the nature of the priestly character as predicated of Christ. Was this character actually sustained by him?

Every reader of the Bible will take notice that, whatever things are affirmed concerning the priestly character, in the most strict and literal meaning of the words, are affirmed of the priestly character of Christ. It is said in the Epistle to the Hebrews, that if perfection were by the Levitical priesthood, there was no further need that another priest should rise after the order of Melchizedek and not be called after the order of Aaron. For the priesthood being changed, there is made of necessity also a change of the law.¹ The argument here is, that, if the transference of the priestly character to Christ rendered necessary a change of the law, then it was a real and proper priesthood which was thus transferred to Christ. Priests, in the improper, figurative sense of the term, existed among the Jews, while the Mosaic law remained in force. Every one was a priest who offered spiritual service to God; indeed the whole Jewish nation were priests in this figurative sense. It must have been a real priesthood, then, which was conferred on Christ. Still further, it is said concerning Christ, that "if he were on earth, he should not be a priest, seeing that there are priests that offer gifts according to the law."² Such, according to this passage, is the nature of the priesthood of Christ, that it was forbidden him by the law to exercise its functions on the earth, because the law restricted the earthly functions of the priesthood to the family of Aaron. But if Christ were a priest only in an improper and figurative sense, there was nothing in the law adverse to the exercise of his functions on the earth. As already said, such a priesthood existed under the Mosaic law; it has always existed; its duties have always been allowed to be performed. If Christ, then, be a priest at all, he is a priest in the proper meaning of the word. He performs proper sacerdotal duties, not indeed on the earth, but in heaven, the holy-of-holies of the evangelical temple. The great difference between his priesthood and that of the Aaronic family, relates to the place in which their respective duties are discharged.

¹ Hebrews 7: 11.² Hebrews 8: 4.

Inasmuch, then, as the title of priest is often given to Christ in the Scriptures, we are warranted in supposing the proper priestly character and functions to belong to him, unless some adequate reason to the contrary is given. Our adversaries, however, furnish no such reason. They attempt, without success, to show that there is no real distinction between the regal and prophetic offices of Christ and his priestly office; that these are different names for one office. It is to no purpose to allege that the title and functions of priest are but seldom ascribed to Christ. They are as often ascribed to him as are those of prophet and king. No greater weight belongs to the other objections which are set up against our doctrine.

13. *Christ's Death, a Sacrifice and of the Nature of Vicarious Punishment.*

Having thus established the priestly character of the Redeemer, we proceed to remark, that his sacrifice belonged to that class which we have denominated piacular. Its intended effect was to purge away, to expiate, our sins; he is said to offer himself to God, as a sacrifice for sin. These things cannot be properly predicated of any other than piacular sacrifices. His sacrifice, it is true, procures for us not only the forgiveness of sin, but also the influences of the Holy Spirit, and whatever else is needful to our salvation. The various classes of sacrifices appointed to the Jews, were designed to procure for the offerers these manifold benefits. The sacrifice of Christ may be conceived to combine, in itself, all the efficacy which was lodged in these others. Its direct effect was that of expiation; its indirect effects were equally extensive with those intended to arise from the entire Jewish ritual.

The class, to which the sacrifice of Christ belonged, being ascertained, we are next to ask in what it consisted? We are to remember, therefore, that those sacrifices in which the body was burned without the camp, more distinctly than others were typical of the sacrifice of Christ; and of these, more especially those whose blood was carried into the most

holy place. The sacrifice of Christ, therefore, consisted in the performance of rites similar to those which were observed in the case of victims whose blood was carried into the holy-of-holies. We are to seek for this similarity in three things: in the voluntary offering up of himself, in the death which he underwent, and in the subsequent entrance into the holy-of-holies. The language, not less than the deportment of the Saviour, illustrates his offering of himself as a sacrificial victim at the altar. His language as given in John, "for their sakes I sanctify myself,"¹ is equivalent to the phrase, "for their sakes I offer myself." It is so translated by Chrysostom. The prayers by means of which Christ, as it were, consecrated himself to death, are of similar import and effect to those with which the high-priest, on the day of expiation, presented the victims at the altar. Christ's prayer, as given in the seventeenth of John, is particularly to be regarded as one of consecration to death. His deportment was, throughout, in keeping with his language. He went willingly to the place, from which he knew he should be conducted to his mock trial and subsequently to crucifixion.

The death which he underwent corresponded to that appointed for piacular victims. It was required that the flesh of these victims should be burned without the camp; Christ was put to death without the walls of the city. The action of Christ, in which we are to trace an analogy to the carrying of the blood of the victim into the holy-of-holies, was his ascension to heaven, there to present himself in his double capacity of priest and victim, before the throne of God.

The death which Christ underwent for men, we are to consider more particularly in the light of a vicarious punishment. His death is considered, in the New Testament, in a threefold aspect. It is the death of a martyr, confirming the truth of the doctrines to be inculcated. It is the death of a testator, affording to the heirs the immediate possession of the legacy bequeathed. Finally, it is the death of a piacular victim, by which

¹ John xvii.

our transgressions are expiated. Of his death, viewed in this latter aspect, we affirm that it has the nature of a vicarious punishment. As God was not willing to deny to men in view of their sins all hope of forgiveness, and yet could not pass over their sins without exhibiting some clear tokens of his extreme displeasure, some strong proof of his holiness and justice, he determined to give his only son as an expiatory sacrifice, that by means of his vicarious punishment men might secure the remission of their sins.— We offer now some of the more prominent reasons why Christ's death should be regarded as a vicarious punishment.

We refer, in the first place, to the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah. It is here affirmed of Christ that he bare the sin of many. A sense is to be attributed to these words which suits with the character of one who is declared to be numbered with the transgressors. The meaning of this last expression is, that Christ was treated as a transgressor. But when we read of one that he bare the sins of others, and that he was numbered with the transgressors, we can attach no other idea to such declarations than that he endured the punishment which is due to sin. The treatment proper to a transgressor is the infliction of punishment. It may indeed be objected, that Christ was treated as a transgressor by his Jewish enemies. But the force of this objection is removed, when we remember that by the express counsel of God this treatment was practised. Another expression, found in the same chapter, should be considered in this connection. The Lord, it is said, hath laid on Christ the iniquities of us all. This expression must have the same import with that on which we have just commented. No form of speech more aptly describes vicarious punishment, than that which we find in the fifth verse: "he was wounded for our transgressions." To these words Paul may be supposed to refer, and thereby to confirm the view we have taken, when he says that Christ was delivered for our offences. The evident intention of the prophet, in this chapter, is to represent Christ as a peculiar victim, offered up for our sins. We have already seen that the peculiar sacrifices

were symbols of vicarious punishment. This view of the subject is so plain that we find at least one Socinian writer, Brenius, forced to confess that the principle of a piacular sacrifice is the substitution of the life of the animal for the soul of the offender. Nor does Crellius himself stop much short of a similar confession. He admits that sacrifice had, in itself, the principle of punishment; though he affirms that the punishment did not lie in the killing of the animal, but in the things (the sprinkling of the blood, and the like) by which the killing was followed. This qualification amounts to but little, because it was in the carrying of the blood into the holy-of-holies and its sprinkling upon the mercy-seat, that the life of the animal was offered unto God. The killing was comparatively meaningless, except as preparatory to this latter transaction.

We are also to call to mind, here, the fact which has been so often insisted on, that all victims whose body was burned without the camp, were considered as polluted by the sins of the worshippers, as were also the persons by whom they were carried out. These victims were specially typical of Christ. They were specially typical of Christ because that which was done to them, was specially symbolical of the bearing of sins and the infliction of vicarious punishment.

We may refer, in the next place, to the words of Peter: ¹ "who his own self bare our sins, in his own body, on the tree." It could not be sins, in the proper sense of the word, which Christ bare in his body, but most evidently, the punishment of our sins. It may be conceded that the use of this one phrase does not, of itself, indicate vicarious punishment, as a matter of necessity; but when used concerning Christ, whom we have before, as we think, so plainly proved to be a piacular victim, the phrase can have no other meaning than that which we have assigned to it.

It is unnecessary to dwell at length on that numerous class of texts in which Christ is said, by means of his death, to cleanse us from sin, to take away the sins of the world, to

¹ 1 Peter 2: 24.

ransom, redeem, our souls from sin and its attendant curse. After what has already been remarked, the proof which these passages afford of the doctrine we have tried to establish, will not easily be misapprehended. The redemption and the purification, mentioned in these passages, it must carefully be observed, are effected by Christ in his peculiar character of a piacular sacrifice. The whole efficacy of a piacular sacrifice, consists in its being a symbol of a vicarious punishment.

The death of Christ, it should not be forgotten, redeems no one from eternal death, who fails to render a personal obedience to the gospel. The truth of this is apparent from what has been already said of the nature of vicarious punishment. It was the death of the sinner, and not the death of Christ, which was demanded in the penalty of the law; and consequently the death of Christ cannot, in the proper sense of the phrase, abolish that penalty by its own virtue and aside from the sovereign will of the Father. The sovereign will of God ordains that the death of Christ should be of saving efficacy only to such as exhibit a true faith and a sincere obedience. There is this distinction ever to be observed, that proper punishment, having its origin in the sanction of the law, by its own force and irrespectively of the disposition of him by whom it is endured, meets fully the obligation of the law to inflict punishment. Vicarious punishment has no such effect, except as it procures to the offender an act of grace on the part of the sovereign power. It is hence obvious, that there is nothing in the death of Christ, notwithstanding its being a vicarious punishment, which is at all repugnant to the grace of God; nor aught which at all impairs either the legal or the moral obligation to practise holiness in the case of those by whom its benefits are received.

The death of Christ as a piacular victim was succeeded by his ascension to heaven, there to offer himself unto God, in a manner analogous to the entrance of the high-priest into the holy-of-holies with the blood of the sacrifice. If

Christ was a piacular victim, this was the necessary completion of his work in that character. We should have to infer that it, or something answering to it, took place even if it were not asserted in the Scriptures. It is, however, asserted in the Scriptures with sufficient plainness. "Christ is not entered," it is said, "into the holy place made with hands, which are the figures of the true, but into heaven itself, now to appear in the presence of God for us."¹ The office of the high-priest, in this particular respect, was two-fold: it was, in the burning of incense, to present unto God the supplications of the people; in his entrance into the holy-of-holies with the blood of the victim, it was his office to present supplication for the people. Christ combines these two offices in the one act of presenting himself before God in the upper sanctuary.

The Socinian interpretation of this act of Christ is, that he entered into heaven in order thence to take care for the salvation of our souls, and that we are the direct and the exclusive objects of his labor. They refuse to ascribe to him the office either of presenting our prayers unto the Father, or of interceding on our behalf. But there is no satisfactory ground for denying that the Redeemer, in this final act, had a direct reference to the Father. Such a reference, we have seen, pervades all his previous transactions as Mediator. Why should the reference cease at this particular point? The passage which we have cited in the preceding paragraph, from the ninth of the Hebrews, seems in direct conflict with this Socinian interpretation. In this passage Christ is said to appear in the presence of God; why, unless what he is about to do has a direct relation to God? And as he is said to appear in that presence for us, his intention must be supposed to be to commend us unto God, to offer prayer in our person and on our behalf. And the objects, to which these prayers refer, are exclusively the forgiveness of sin and the bestowment of those spiritual influences and helps which are needful in order to our attainment of eternal life.

¹ Hebrews 9: 24.

[Are we not, then, to regard the whole significance of the active obedience, the sufferings, the death, the ascension of the Saviour as virtually embodied in this final act of his mediatorial work, his appearing in the celestial sanctuary, there to present supplications in our name and in our behalf? Were not all the transactions of his life virtually a prayer? Many things which he did were only indirectly a prayer, it is true. Their designed influence, however, was either to qualify himself to offer effectual prayer, or to remove such obstructions as might lie in the way of the success of his prayer, or else to furnish arguments for a favorable answer to his prayer. They may be all viewed, therefore, with the strictest propriety, as one act of supplication. And what is true of the antitype, in this respect, is true of the types. The various sacrifices, comprehended in the Jewish ritual, whose nature and rites we have endeavored in the foregoing remarks to unfold, were prayers. This is in conformity with the theory, several times alluded to in these remarks, that prayers are spiritual sacrifices, and sacrifices are symbolical prayers. There is nothing connected with sacrifices which may not, on the whole, be most satisfactorily explained when it is viewed in this light.]

ARTICLE II.

EARLY EDITIONS OF THE AUTHORIZED VERSION OF THE BIBLE.

BY REV. EDWARD W. GILMAN.

RECENT events in this country have directed public attention to the desirableness of securing a perfect standard text of the version of the Scriptures now in common use, and have led to many inquiries concerning the exact form in

which King James's translators committed their work to the public. The earliest editions, of course, are rare, and the opportunities of comparing them side by side, are exceedingly limited. Twenty-five or thirty years ago there was such a state of feeling in Great Britain in respect to alleged departures from the original version, that the delegates of the Clarendon press at Oxford published, in 1833, "an exact re-print, in Roman letter, of the Authorized Version published in the year 1611 in large black letter, folio;" a re-print "so exact as to agree with the original edition page for page and letter for letter; retaining, throughout, the ancient mode of spelling and punctuation, and even the most manifest errors of the press." This measure quieted the excitement then prevailing; and, while it showed that changes had crept into the text in the course of two and a quarter centuries, it gave satisfactory evidence that some of those changes were indispensable, and that no one would be satisfied to retain all the peculiarities of the earliest editions. There are, however, some points on which that republication shed no light, which will be treated in this Article.

After the translators appointed by King James had devoted to their work the labor of "twice seven times seventy-two days, and more," it was sent to London to be reviewed and perfected by a smaller committee of revision; and finally was published under the editorial care of Drs. Bilson and Smith, by whom the preface and the heads of chapters were prepared. The general principles by which the translators were to be guided in their work were laid down by the King, who prescribed the following rules among others.

1. The ordinary Bible read in the church, commonly called the Bishops' Bible, to be followed, and as little altered as the original will permit.

2. The names of the prophets and the holy writers, with the other names in the text, to be retained as near as may be, accordingly as they are vulgarly used.

3. The old ecclesiastical words to be kept, as the word *church* not to be translated *congregation*.

4. When any word hath divers significations, that to be kept which hath been most commonly used by the most eminent Fathers, being agreeable to the propriety of the place and the analogy of faith.

5. The division of the chapters to be altered either not at all, or as little as may be, if necessity so require.

6. No marginal notes at all to be affixed, but only for the explanation of the Hebrew or Greek words, which cannot, without some circumlocution, so briefly and fitly be expressed in the text.

7. Such quotations of places to be marginally set down, as shall serve for the fit references of one Scripture to another.

14. These translations to be used, when they agree better with the text than the Bishops' Bible, viz. Tindal's, Coverdale's, Matthew's, Whitechurch's, Geneva.

The remaining rules have reference to some details of the work, and are not important for our present purpose. It will be noticed that, while provision is made here for marginal references, and for marginal explanations of terms transferred from the original tongues, nothing is said of chapter summaries, of italics to express supplementary words, or of marginal readings in cases of uncertainty as to the meaning; nor are any directions given in respect to possible variations in the Greek or Hebrew text; and while various English versions are referred to, no mention is made of the Vulgate and translations into other languages.

We have some further facts, of an early date, that come in here. Lewis, in his "History of English Translations,"¹ after giving these rules in full, says: "Dr. Smith was ordered to write a preface to it, the same which is now printed in the folio editions of this Bible, the first of which was, I think, at London, A. D. 1611, with the Title mentioned below in the margin. *Much the same account* of the manner of making and finishing the Translation was given, afterwards, by the English divines at *Dort*, in a paper which they delivered to the Synod, Nov. 20, 1618." On turning to the

¹ Second edition, 1739, page 323.

records of the Synod,¹ we find that four delegates from Great Britain were present, bearing a commission from the King. These were George Charlton, bishop of Landaff, Dr. Joseph Hall, dean of Worcester, Dr. John Davenant, professor and president of King's College, Cambridge, and Dr. Samuel Ward of Sidney College, Cambridge; the last of whom was one of the company employed in translating the Apocrypha.

Early in the session these delegates, having been called upon for advice in respect to a new translation of the Scriptures for the use of the Belgian churches, presented a written statement of the method pursued in England, and of the laws prescribed to the translators by royal authority. A copy of their statement is entered upon the Minutes. The fact of a variation between these rules and those already quoted is so important that we insert the entire paper in its original form.

"Modus quem Theologi Angli in versione Bibliorum sunt secuti.

"Theologi magnæ Britanniæ, quibus non est visum tantæ quæstioni subitam & inopinatam responsionem adhibere, officii sui esse judicarunt, præmatura deliberatione habita, quandoquidem facta esset honorifica accuratissimæ translationis Anglicanæ mentio, a Serenissimo Rege Iacobo magna, cum cura, magnisque sumptibus nuper editæ, notum facere huic celeberrimæ Synodo, quo consilio, quaque ratione sacrum hoc negotium a Serenissima ejus Majestate præstitum fuerit.

"Primo, in opere distribuendo hanc rationem observari voluit; totum corpus Bibliorum in sex partes fuit distributum; cuilibet parti transferendæ destinati sunt septem vel octo viri primarii, Linguarum peritissimi.

"Duæ partes assignatæ fuerunt Theologis quibusdam Londinensibus; quatuor vero partes reliquæ divisæ fuerunt æqualiter inter utriusque Academiæ Theologos.

¹ Acta Synodi Nationalis Dordrechtii habitæ anno 1618. Lugduni Batavorum, 1620. See also, *The Annals of the English Bible*, by Christopher Anderson, Vol. II. p. 377, London, 1845; and Bishop Newcome's *Historical View of the English Biblical Translations*, Dublin, 1792, page 105.

“ Post peractum a singulis pensum, ex hisce omnibus duodecim selecti viri in unum locum convocati, integrum opus recognoverunt, ac recensuerunt.

“ Postremo, Reverendissimus Episcopus Wintoniensis, Bilsonus, una cum Doctore Smitho, nunc Episcopo Gloucestriensi, viro eximio, & ab initio in toto hoc opere versatissimo, omnibus mature pensitatis & examinatis, extremam manum huic versioni imposuerunt.

[Leges Interpretibus præscriptæ fuerunt hujusmodi:]

“ Primo, cautum est, ut simpliciter nova versio non adornaretur, sed vetus, & ab Ecclesia diu recepta ab omnibus nævis & vitiis purgaretur; idque hunc in finem, ne recederetur ab antiqua translatione, nisi originalis textus veritas, vel emphasis postularet.

“ Secundo, ut nullæ annotationes margini apponerentur: sed, tantum loca parallela notarentur.

“ Tertio, ut ubi vox Hebræa vel Græca geminum idoneum sensum admittit; alter in ipso contextu, alter in margine exprimeretur. Quod itidem factum, ubi varia lectio in exemplaribus probatis reperta est.

“ Quarto, Hebraismi & Græcismi difficiliores in margine repositi sunt.

“ Quinto, in translatione Tobit & Judithæ, quandoquidem magna discrepantia inter Græcum contextum & veterem vulgatam Latinam editionem reperiatur, Græcum potius contextum secuti sunt.

“ Sexto, ut quæ ad sensum supplendum ubivis necessario fuerunt contextui interferenda, alio, scilicet minusculo, characteri, distinguerentur.

“ Septimo, ut nova argumenta singulis libris, & novæ periochæ singulis capitibus præfigerentur.

“ [Denique, absolutissima Genealogia & descriptio Terræ sanctæ, huic operi conjungeretur.]”

In some respects this seems to be simply a statement of what was practically done; and yet it is quite possible that his majesty was consulted while the work was in progress, and was pleased to give his royal assent in such a way as

to make the rules binding. But the practice corresponds with these rules only in part. The supplementary words were expressed by a different type, corresponding to our Italics; genealogical tables and an account of the Holy Land were prefixed, and new summaries were prepared indicating the contents of chapters; but no arguments were prefixed to individual books, and very seldom indeed was there any recognition of various readings in Greek or Hebrew. In the New Testament only twelve passages were noted as having an uncertain reading, viz. Matt. 1: 11. 26: 26. Luke 10: 22. 17: 36. Acts 13: 18. Eph. 6: 9. James 2: 18. 1 Pet. 2: 21. 2 Pet. 2: 2, 11, 18. 2 John 8.

Much perplexity has been occasioned in consequence of discrepancies that have been detected in volumes purporting to be copies of the first edition of King James's Bible. It is now a settled fact, though one which men have been slow to admit, that *two* folio black-letter editions, instead of one, were published in the year 1611. Copies of the two editions are still extant, though it is still, and may always be, an open question, which of the two has priority.

The credit of discovering and proving this fact seems to belong to Mr. Thomas Curtis, a dissenting minister of England, who directed public attention to it in 1833, in a pamphlet addressed to the bishop of London, inveighing against the monopoly of printing the Scriptures, which is conferred upon four presses in Great Britain.¹ Before that time, there were reputed to be two editions in 1611; but the evidence was unsatisfactory, and the statement itself was founded upon a mistake. Beloe is one author who had mentioned this. He speaks of a collection of English Bibles, many of them of unexampled rarity and value, which *Dr. Combe* had collected and disposed of to the British Museum. Describing one, he says:² "This is the first edition

¹ The Existing Monopoly, an Inadequate Protection of the Authorized Version of Scripture: Four Letters to the Bishop of London, by Thomas Curtis. London, 1833.

² Anecdotes of Literature and Scarce Books, by Rev. Wm. Beloe. Vol. II. 1807, p. 318.

of King James's Bible;" and adds: "There is another edition of King James's Bible in the British Museum, of the same date. This, also, belonged to Dr. Combe. They are, word for word, the same throughout. One, however, is printed in a larger letter than the other, and makes a thicker volume; but it is impossible to determine which of these two was first printed."

The assertion that "they are, word for word, the same throughout," is to be taken with considerable allowance. On a cursory examination, they might seem to be alike; but there is no evidence that Beloe had critically compared them. Dr. Combe had been misled, as will appear from the quotations that follow from Mr. Curtis, Dr. Cotton, and the Museum Catalogue, and his error has greatly increased the perplexity of others.

Mr. Curtis, speaking of his own collection, enumerates "two very distinct folio black-letter editions of 1611; the first roman quarto (the only copy I can distinctly hear of), 1612; first separate New Testament, black, same year; first black quarto Bible, 1613; second roman quarto edition, 1615; first roman folio, 1616 (at least, I take it to be the first, in roman), and a black folio, page for page with the 1611 editions, of 1617." Also an octavo edition of 1615. He then says, page 54: "And now shall we find, my lord, that Dr. Blayney, or any of his learned friends knew the edition of 1611, to which they evidently refer as King James's Bible, to be the first or original edition? The phrase, '*the edition of 1611*,' was evidently written on the supposition of there being but one edition of that year. But I personally possess two. * * * The copies of the Universities are all of one edition, I believe; but in the Archbishop's library at Lambeth, and lately in the possession of George Offor, Esq., of Tower Hill, was a *distinct* edition of 1611, answering to to my No. 1. Those of the Universities answer to my No. 2; and these editions are both in the 'large black letter.' Moreover, in the British Museum is a third, distinct edition of this date, in a smaller black letter, and having 'I EDIT.' lettered on the back, by the original direction, as it appears,

of Dr. Charles Combe, of whose library the country became the purchasers at a large sum. In Dr. Cotton's list this is described as an edition of 1611, in small black letter. True it is, with regard to this last edition, that it exactly corresponds, in various typographical errors and minute points, with a copy in Christ church, Oxford, and with another which I now have before me, belonging to the Rev. the Conference of the Wesleyan Methodists, *dated* 1613. It may be regarded, therefore, as doubtful at what period between 1611 and 1613 it was issued."

The *second* edition of Dr. Cotton's work,¹ published at a later date, shows that *his* opinion respecting this volume had changed in 1852. "Though there certainly are two different Bibles in that collection, bearing the date of 1611 on their title pages, there is little doubt that *one of those titles has been borrowed and affixed to a later edition.*" (Page 60, note.)

To this we are able to add, on private information from a recent inspection of the new manuscript catalogue of the Museum, that this error is there acknowledged. A note appended to the title, in the catalogue, says: "this is the edition of 1613, with the title page of that of 1611 prefixed."

This enables us to reject entirely one of the so-called editions of 1611. Some book-vender imposed on Dr. Combe by selling him a genuine title page with a volume of later date. And thus we dispose of Mr. Pettigrew's note, in his *Bibliotheca Sussexiana*.² "A second edition of this Bible appeared in the same year. It is distinguished from the first by the large size of its black-letter type. The Psalms commence on different signatures: in the first, on Kk 1; in the second, on Bbb 4." His first edition, in smaller type, seems to be that of 1613.

We now revert to the genuine folios of 1611. Mr. Curtis's claims were discredited for a long time. His pamphlet

¹ Editions of the Bible and Parts thereof, in English, from the year MDV. to MDCCCL., with an Appendix. Second edition. By the Rev. Henry Cotton, D. C. L., Archdeacon of Cashel, etc. Oxford, 1852.

² Catalogue of the Library of the Duke of Sussex, 1839, Vol. II. page 332.

on the monopoly called forth replies from Oxford and Cambridge,¹ and his allegations against the fidelity of the privileged presses were discussed in the *British Critic*, the *British Magazine*, the *Eclectic Review*, and other periodicals of the day. Dr. Cardwell stated, in rejoinder to Mr. Curtis, that thirteen copies of Mr. C.'s No. 2 had been examined at Oxford, and eight copies of his No. 1. Of the latter, four *had no titles* to the Old Testament, and the other four had titles dated 1613, though in each the New Testament bore the date of 1611; and that the *Lambeth* copy was made up from different editions. The conclusion drawn from this was, that Mr. Curtis was wrong in claiming that his No. 1. was published in 1611; or, as the *British Critic* expressed it:² "It appears, therefore, that there were not two editions of 1611; but one of 1611 and one of 1613; that the *Lambeth* edition is, for the present purpose, of no authority whatever; and that the delegates [in Dr. Blayney's time] had before them the Oxford original of 1611, the *only document to which any genuine authority* can be ascribed."

This opinion, seems to have been received, for a time, as conclusive. In the reprint issued from the Oxford press in 1833, it is quietly assumed that there was but one edition to be regarded, "copies of which may be seen in the British Museum, at Sion College, in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, and in the University Library at Cambridge." It is admitted, however, that between these copies there are slight variations in two passages.

In 1841, the English Hexapla was published, but made no mention of more than one edition in 1611. It says (page 160): "The Authorized version is printed from a large black-letter copy of the year 1611. * * It will be found to differ in several minor respects, as to the punctuation and use of italics, from the modern copies in general use; and it.

¹ Mr. Curtis's Misrepresentations Exposed. By Edward Cardwell, D. D., St. Alban's Hall, Oxford, 1833.

The Text of the English Bible Considered. By Thomas Turton, D. D., Regius Professor of Divinity in Cambridge, and Dean of Peterborough. 1833.

² 1833, Vol. xiv. page 11.

may be necessary to state that great care has been taken to follow the original copy very exactly." It does not, however, fully agree with the reprint of 1833, in the words of the text.

In 1845, Mr. Lea Wilson's catalogue was published,¹ but it recognizes only one edition of 1611, and that one essentially different from the exemplar reprinted at Oxford. Describing what it calls the first edition by certain typographical peculiarities, it says: "The dedication and preface of this volume so closely resemble those of the edition of 1613; and the other preliminary leaves, as well as the text, are at first sight so very similar to the editions of 1617, 1634, and 1640, that attention to the minutiae here given is necessary for their identification; and this is particularly needed as regards this first edition, which being a most interesting and desirable volume, imperfect copies are continually made up with the prolegomena of the later editions. * * And with a similar fraudulent intent I have met with copies of all the four later books, to which the title of the 1611 had been put, to make apparently fine copies of the first edition." The same year, also, Anderson (*Annals*, vol. 2. Appendix, page xxii.) said emphatically: "there certainly was no second edition in 1611."

The Report of the Committee on Versions, submitted to the Managers of the American Bible Society in 1851, everywhere speaks of "the edition of 1611," as if there were but one; and the Committee seem to have had before them, in their collation, not the original, but the reprint of 1833.

Thus far the authorities on one side. On the other, it is sufficient to quote one or two only. Dr. Cotton says:² "Still I cannot but believe that two editions were actually issued in 1611; and to this conclusion I am led by the following facts. Dr. Daly, bishop of Cashel, possesses two Bibles, dated 1611; both of which agree with Mr. Lea Wilson's tests of the real edition of that year, as contradistin-

¹ Bibles, Testaments, Psalms, and other Books of the Holy Scriptures in English, in the Collection of Lea Wilson, Esq., F. S. A., etc. London, 1845.

² Page 60, note.

guished from those of 1613, 1617, etc. Apparently, these two copies agree perfectly with each other. But on close examination it will be found that the wood-cut initial letters are frequently different in the two; 2d, that in Genesis 10: 16, one copy reads, 'the *Emorite*;' and the other, 'the *Amorite*.' 3d, in the copy which has the misprint 'Emorite,' Exodus 14: 10 is thus printed:

1. And when Pharaoh drew nigh
2. the children of Israel lift up their eyes,
3. and behold the Egyptians marched af-
4. ter them, and they were sore afraid: and
5. the children of Israel lift up their eyes,
6. and behold the Egyptians marched
7. after them, and they were sore afraid:
8. and the children of Israel cried out un-
9. to the Lord.

"The verse occupies nine lines of text; and the catch-word at the bottom of the page is the word "For," occurring in the middle of ver. 12. Whereas, in the other copy, the verse fills only six lines; and the *whole* of ver. 12 is included in the page.

"The bishop kindly pointed out to me these discrepancies. There was no appearance of a cancelled leaf; and I agree with his lordship's opinion, that the inaccurate copy is really the *first*, as undoubtedly it is the *rarer* edition. Trinity College, Dublin, has a similar copy, but not quite perfect."

To this we add some memoranda made recently in the British Museum.

"I. *First edition, 1611.*

"In the new manuscript catalogue of this library, the following note is appended to the title: 'Note. This is the first edition of this translation.' In this edition the Psalms begin on signature Bbb 4, which page contains Psalms I and II and three [two?] verses of Psalm III. The catchword of this page is — '3 But.'

"N. B. In Gen. 10: 16, this first edition reads *Amorite*.

"II. *Second edition, also in 1611.*

"It is printed in same sized type as the first edition. The

British Museum manuscript catalogue has the following note after the title: '*Note.* This is the second edition in the same year. It has many typographical variations from the preceding.'

"N. B. In Gen. 10: 16, the reading is *Emorite*. The Psalms, in this second edition, *begin on the same signature as in the first edition.*

"III. *The Third edition, 1613.*

"Manuscript note in the British Museum catalogue: 'This is the edition of 1613, with the title page of that of 1611 prefixed.' In this edition, the Psalms begin on signature Kk 1. The page contains Psalms I. II. and III., and the first four verses of Psalm IV. The catchword is — '5 Offer.' This edition is in *smaller type* than the two preceding editions."

These memoranda confirm the accuracy of Dr. Cotton's conclusions respecting the first edition of the Bible. It should be noticed, however, that what Dr. C. calls the first, is here called the second; and this, rather than the other, was followed in the Oxford reprint.

There are a few copies of these early impressions in this country. Mr. James Lenox, of New York, has both the editions of 1611; and the Rev. Dr. S. H. Turner and the Astor Library, and also Mr. George Livermore of Cambridge, have copies of that first mentioned on the Museum catalogue. A partial collation has been attempted between some of these and the Oxford reprint, in order to ascertain the variations in the two editions. In comparing them, the reprint will be denoted by A; Mr. Livermore's copy by B; and the Astor Library copy by C. The collation does not extend to the Apocrypha.

In the Old Testament, variations between A and B were found in every sheet except that with the signature Ss. In the New Testament, variations in A and B were found in signature A; also in Q and in all following it to the end. Matt. xix. John xx. and Rom. 14: 1—21, being taken as tests, agreed exactly, and no variations were noticed from B to P inclusive; the discrepancies begin with Rom. 14: 22, at

the top of Q. A B agree in printing the head-line of 2 Chron. xxix.—“Chap. xxxix,” but this is in the signature Ss. B has *not* the error, found in A, of putting, in the head-line of Micah iv, the reading “JOEL.”

One peculiarity, and probable inaccuracy, in the reprint A, deserves notice here: in B, the usual method of representing the name of the Supreme Being is by large capitals, **LORD**. This usage prevails through the Old Testament. But A, while professing to retain all the peculiarities, and to represent them in roman type, gives **LORD** *throughout Genesis*, and then quietly falls back to **LORD**.

On the other hand, C was found to *differ* from A in Ss of the Old Testament and in all the sheets of the New Testament where B agrees with it. C is supposed, however, to agree with A in the sheets Y, Z, and Aa of the New Testament, but differs on the last leaf, which may have been borrowed from some other copy.

This fact implies that the sheets of the two editions of 1611 were, to some extent, interchanged; either in the original binding or subsequently. Many of the variations, however, are very trifling, and the catchwords of the pages almost always correspond exactly.

We present, here, some specimens of the variations, retaining all the typographical peculiarities, even to the division of lines, and presenting every case of variation in the passages cited, as well as in the accessories. In the passage from Revelation, however, the collation is confined to the text.

GENESIS, CHAP. I

- | | | |
|-----|---|---|
| A | 1 | The creation of Heauen and Earth, 3 of the light, 6 of the firmament, 9 of the earth separated from the waters, 11 and made fruitfull, 14 of the Sunne, Moone, and Starres, 20 of fish and fowle, 24 of beasts and cattell, 26 of Man in the Image of God. 29 Also the appointment of food. |
| B C | 1 | The creation of Heauen and Earth, 5 of the light, 6 of the firmament, 9 of the earth separated from the waters, 11 and made |

fruitfull, 14 of the Sunne, Moone, and
 Starres, 20 of fish and fowle, 24 of beasts
 and cattell, 26 of Man in the Image of God.
 29 Also the appointment of food.

verse 3 *Margin* A * 2. Cor. | B * 2. Cor. 4.
 4. 6 | C 6.

verse 5. A the euening and the morning were the
 B C the Euening and the Morning were the

The same differences are found, in the same connection,
 in verses 8, 13, 19, 23, 31.

verse 5 *Margin* A † *Hebr. and* | B † *Hebr. and*
 the euening | C *the Euening*
 was, and the | *was, and the*
 morning was, | *Morning*
 &c. | *was, &c.*

verse 6 *Margin* A * Psal. 136 | B * Psal. 136.
 5. ier.10.12 | C 5. iere. 10.
 and 51. 15. | 12. and 51.
 15.

verse 8 *Margin* A * Ier. 51. 15. | B * Iere. 51.
 C 15.

verse 10 A the drie land,
 B C the dry land,

verse 11 *Margin* A † *Heb. tender* | B † *Hebr. ten-*
 grasse. | C *der grasse.*

verse 13 A And the euening and the morning
 were the third day.

B C And the Euening and the Mor-
 ning were the third day.

The same variation in the *lines* is found where some of
 these words are repeated, in verses 19, 23.

verse 14 A ¶ And God said,
 B C ¶ And God saide,
 A let them be for signes and for seasons,
 B C let them bee for signes and for seasons.

Margin A * Deu. 4. 19 | B C * Deut. 4.
 psal. 136. 7. | 19 psal.
 136. 7.

- verse 15 A And let them be for lights
B C And let them bee for lights
- verse 17 A And God set them in the firma-
ment of the heauen,
B C And God set them in the firma-
ment of the heauen,
- verse 18 A and to diuide the light
B C and to diuide the Light
- Margin* A * Ier. 31. 35 | B * Iere. 31.
35.
- verse 20 A And God said,
B C And God saide,
- verse 22 A And God blessed them, saying, * Be
fruitfull, and multiply, and fill the wa-
ters in the Seas, and let foule multiply
in the earth.
B C And God blessed them, saying,
* Be fruitfull, and multiply, and fill the
waters in the Seas, and let foule mul-
tiply in the earth.
- verse 24 A and | B C and it
it was so. | was so.
- verse 25 A vpon the earth, after his kinde :
and God saw that *it was* good.
B C vpon the earth, after his kind : and
God saw that *it was* good.
- verse 26 *Margin* A 1. corin. 11 | B 1. cor. 11.
7. | C 7.
- verse 28 *Margin* A † *Heb. cree-* | B † *Hebr. cree-*
peth. | C *peth.*
- verse 30 A and to euery foule of the aire, and to eue-
ry thing
B C and to euery foule of the aire, & to eue-
ry thing

PSALMS I.—IV.

- A PSALME I.
B C PSALME. I.
- verse 2 A But his delight *is* in the Law
B C But his delight *is* in the Lawe

Margin A iere. 17. 8. | B C ier. 17. 8.

verse 3 A And he shalbe like a tree
B C And he shall be like a tree

Margin A † *Hebr. fade.* | B C † *Heb. fade.*

A PSAL. II.

B C PSALM. II.

verse 1 A and the people † imagine
a vaine thing?

B C and the people † imagine a
vaine thing?

verse 4 *Margin* A * Prou. 1. | B * Prouerb.
26. | C 1. 26.

verse 5 *Margin* A || *Or, trouble* | B † *Or, trouble*
C

verse 6 *Margin* A † *Hebr. an-* | B † *Hebr. an-*
ointed. | C *ointed.*
|| *Hebr. vpon* | † *Heb. vpon*
Sion, the hill | *Sion, the hill*
of my Holi- | *of my holi-*
nesse. | *nesse.*

verse 7 *Margin* A * Acts. 13. | B C Acts 13.
33. heb. 1. | 33. heb.
5. | 1. 5.

verse 8 *Margin* A * Psal. 72. | B C * Psal. 72. 8.
8.

verse 12 A and ye perish *from* the way,
B C and yee perish *from* the way,

Margin A iete. 17. | B C iere 17.
7. | 7.

PSALM III.

verse 2. A Many *there bee* which
B C Many *there be* which

verse 4 A and he heard me
B C and hee heard me

verse 5 A I layd me downe and slept ;
B C I layde me downe and slept ;

verse 8 *Margin* * Isa. 43. | B C Isa 43. 11
11. | hos. 13. 4.
Hos. 13. 4. |

PSALM IV.

verse 1 A thou hast enlarged mee

when *I was* in distresse,

B C thou hast enlarged mee

when *I was* in distresse,

Margin	A	Or, bee gracious vn- to me.		B C	Or, be gra- cious vnto mee.
--------	---	-----------------------------------	--	-----	-----------------------------------

verse 2 A *how*

long will yee loue vanitie,

B C *how*

long will ye loue vanitie,

REV. xxii. 1—7

A A Nd he shewed mee a pure
riuier of water of life, cleere
as Chrystall, proceeding
out of the throne of God,
and of the Lambe.

2 In the midst of the street of it,
and of either side of the riuier, *was there*
the tree of life, which bare twelue man-
ner of fruits, and yeelded her fruit eue-
ry moneth: and the leaues of the tree
were for the healing of the nations.

3 And there shall be no more curse,
but the throne of God, & of the Lambe
shall bee in it, and his seruants shall
serue him.

4 And they shall see his face, and
his name *shall be* in their foreheads.

5 * And there shalbe no night there,
and they need no candle, neither light of
the sunne, for the Lorde God giueth
them light, and they shall reigne for e-
uer and euer.

6 And hee said vnto mee, These
sayings *are* faithful and true. And the
Lord God of the holy Prophets sent
his Angel to shew vnto his seruants
the things which must shortly be done.

7 Beholde, I come quickly: Bles-
sed is he that keepeth the sayings of the
prophecie of this booke.

REV. 22: 1—7

B

A Nd he. shewed me a pure river of water of life, clear as crystall, proceeding out of the throne of God, and of the Lamb.

2 In the midst of the street of it, and of every side of the river, *was there* the tree of life, which bare twelve manner of fruits, and yeelded her fruit every moneth: and the leaves of the tree were for the healing of the nations.

3 And there shall be no more curse, but the throne of God, and of the Lamb shall be in it, and his servants shall serve him.

4 And they shall see his face, and his Name *shall be* in their foreheads.

5 * And there shall be no night there, and they need no candle, neither light of the sun, for the Lord God giveth them light, and they shall reign for ever and ever.

6 And he said unto me, These sayings *are* faithfull and true. And the Lord God of the holy prophets sent his angel to shew unto his servants the things which must shortly be done.

7 Behold, I come quickly: blessed is he that keepeth the sayings of the prophecie of this book.

C REV. 22: 1—7

(C agrees with A in all cases, in this passage, where words are omitted.)

A Nd hee shewed mee a pure riuier of water of life, cleere as Chrystall, proceeding out of the throne of God, and of the Lambe.

2 In the midst of the street of it, and of either side of the riuier, *was there*

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the tree of life, which bare twelue manner of fruits, and yeelded her fruit euery moneth: and the leaues of the tree were for the healing of the nations.

3 And there shall bee no more curse, but the throne (etc. as in A).

4 And they shall see his face, and his Name *shall be* (etc. as in A).

5 * And there shall be no light there, (etc. as in A).

the Sunne, for the Lorde God (etc. as in A).

7 Behold, I come quickly: Blessed is he that keepeth the sayings of the prophcie of this booke.

It will thus appear that, while most of the variations are unimportant and undesigned, they are sufficient to establish the fact of a difference in the editions. Furthermore, each edition has obvious errata of its own, while others are common to both. In the comparisons we are now to make, still other editions will be brought into view. In the year 1612, the first quarto edition appeared printed in roman letter, and a copy of it, in the possession of the writer, will be referred to as G. The text is perfect throughout, and the genuineness of the volume is unquestionable. To the Oxford reprint in 1833 was added "a collation made with an edition of the year 1613 in *smaller black-letter folio*. * * * * That edition was selected for the purpose in preference to the *large black-letter folio* of the same year, or to the large black-letter folio of the year 1617, because no two entire copies of either of the two latter editions could be found, all the sheets of which corresponded precisely with each other. Many of these copies contain sheets belonging, as may clearly be proved, to editions of a more recent date; and even those which appear to be still as they were originally published, are made up partly from the edition printed at the time, and partly from the remains of earlier impressions." This edition of 1613 as contained in the reprint, will be referred to as H. Mr. Livermore has a copy of this edition, which will be cited by I, *where it is not known to*

agree with H, and in a few cases X will be used to denote the reading given in the English Hexapla. Unless it is otherwise indicated, the *orthography* of A and B will be given; and where other copies are represented as agreeing with them, reference is made only to agreement in *words*: verbal rather than literal. This is to be regarded only as a partial collection of variations.

Ex. 21: 32. In B C this verse is numbered 33; in A it is correct.

1 Chron. 25: 16. In B it is numbered 19; in A and C it is correct.

Gen. 13: 15 margin. A G 26. 4. B C 29. 4.

Numbers 21: 9 margin. A G ioh. 3. 14. B C iosh. 3. 14.

Deut. 22: 12 margin. A G Num. 15. 38. B C Num. 15. 31.

Job 37: 6 margin. A G Psal. 147. 16. & 17. B C Psal. 148. 16, 17.

Gen. 10: 16. A G I and the Emorite B C and the Amorite.

Gen. 35: 27. A G I which is Hebron B C which the Hebron.

Exod. 14: 10. A (has the printer's doublet before quoted.) B C G H (avoid this erratum.)

Exod. 21: 26. A let him goe free B G H, and some copies generally followed by A, let them goe free.

Exod. 38: 11. A G hoopes of the pillars B C H hookes of the pillars.

Lev. 4: 35. A shall burnt them B C G H shall burne them

Lev. 13: 56. A the plaine be B C G H the plague be

Lev. 17: 14. A shall not eat B C G H shall eate

Lev. 18: 3. A of land of Canaan B C G H of the land of Canaan.

Numbers 20: 7. A G Lord B C H LORD

Judges 19: 11. A turne in into G turne in vnto B C H turne into

Ruth 3: 15 A G (? H) and he went into the citie B C I and she went into the citie

- 1 Sam. 27: 3 A C G and some
copies represented by H, | B H I dwelt in Achish
dwelt with Achish.
- 2 Sam. xxiv. *heading.* eleuen thou-
sand. | B C G H thirteen hun-
dred thousand.
- 1 Kings 1: 52 A C G not an haire B H not a haire
- 1 Kings 3: 20. A C G shee arose B H she rose
- 1 Kings 8: 30. A C G when they | B H when thou shalt
shall pray | pray
- 1 Kings 9: 22. A C G bondmen B H bondman
- 1 Kings 20: 3. A G *euen* the goodliest B C H *euen* thy
goodliest
- 2 Kings 5: 12. A G So he turned B C H So hee re-
turned
- 1 Chron. 2: 3. A Canaanites. And Er
B H Canaanitesse, and Er
C Canaanitesse And Er
G Canaanitesse. And Er
- 1 Chron. 4: 30. A G and at Hormah B C H and Hor-
mah
- 2 Chron. 6: 5. A G my people Israel B C H my people
of Israel.
- 2 Chron. 30: 6. A G and his Princes B C H and the
Princes
- Ezra 9: 2. A G hath bin chiefe B C H haue bin
chiefe
- Neh. 4: 14. A to rest of the people B C G H to the rest
of the people
- Neh. 8: 10. A G vnto our LORD B C H vnto the
LORD
- Job iv. *heading.* A excellencie of Creatures
B C G H excellencies of Creatures
- Job 11: 16. A C G forget *thy* misery B H forget *the*
misery.
- Job 19: 15. A G my maides B C H my maidens
- Ps. 74: 23. A C G that rise vp B H that arise vp
- Prov. 11: 20. A C G to the LORD B H vnto the LORD
- Eccl. 12: 14 A euer secret thing B C G H euery se-
cret thing

- Cant. 2: 7. A till she please | B C G H (and some copies
represented by A) till he
please
- Isa. 19: 5. A G the riuer shalbe wasted
B C H the riuers shalbe wasted
- Isa. 44: 13 A maketh it out B C G H marketh it out
- Isa. 49: 1. A G from farre B C H from afarre
- Isa. 49: 20. A G too straight for me
B C H too straite for mee
- Isa. 57: 10. A C G art wearied B H art wearie
- Isa. 59: 21. A mouth of the seede
B C G H mouth of thy seede
- Isa. 60: 4. A C G from farre B H from afarre
- Isa. 61: 10. A C G and as a bride B H as a bride
- Jer. 5: 24. A G later B C H latter
- Jer. 22: 3. A the spoiler B C G H the spoiled
- Jer. 23: 6. A G The LORD etc. B C H THE LORD etc.
- Jer. 25: 15. A G at my hand B C H at mine hand
- Jer. 50: 29. A hath done vnto her
B C G H hath done, doe vnto her
- Ezek. 5: 5 A C G This is Ierusalem
B H Thus is Ierusalem
- Ezek. 6: 14. A C G my hand B H mine hand
- Ezek. 14: 18. A daughter B C G H daughters
- Hos. 6: 5. A G shewed *them* by the Prophets
B C H hewed *them* by the Prophets
- Mic. 7: 7. A vnto you the LORD B C G H vnto the
LORD
- Hab. 3: 3 A holy on B H holy one
G holy One
- Mal. 1: 8. A G And if hee offer B C H And if yee offer
- Matt. 6: 3. A B G X thy right doeth
H thy right hand doeth
- Matt. 8: 25. A awoke, saying B C G H X awoke him,
saying
- Matt. 13: 4 A B G the wayes side H X the way side

- Matt. 13: 31. A B G like to a graine H X like vnto a
graine
- Matt. 18: 30 A B G went and cast H X went out and cast
- Matt. 22: 24. A B G If a man die H X If any man die
- Rom. 10: 21. A B G I haue stretched H X haue I
stretched
- Rom. 11: 22. A B G towards thee H X toward thee
- Rom. xvi. *postscript* A G seruant of the Church
B C H seruant to the Church
- Heb. 10: 36. A that shall after ye
B C G H X that after ye
- 1 Pet. 1: 22. A C G X purified your soules
B H purified your selues
- Rev. 1: 5. A B G I vnto him that loued vs
X vnto him that hath loued vs
- Rev. 2: 12. A B G I saith hee, which hath
X saith hee, who hath

Though it may be impracticable to decide what edition was first given to the public by the editors of our present version, these examples of variations and of errata indicate that no copy was prepared with the accuracy which is requisite in a standard. And if it were possible to decide which sheets were first printed, it might still be urged that they should be regarded in the light of proof-sheets, from which errors and inconsistencies were to be removed as fast as they were discovered. In respect to italics, capitals, and orthography, neither of the editions has sufficient uniformity to entitle it to be followed exclusively. The usages of the age allowed far greater latitude and variety than would now be agreeable in printed works. The revision of the text by Dr. Blayney, in 1769, put a great many words into italic letters which had not been designated by a peculiar character in the early editions; but in those editions, no rule seems to have been constantly followed. E. g. in John 8: 6 we read: "But Jesus stooped down, and with *his* finger wrote on the ground, *as though he heard them not.*" This last clause has *nothing* in the Greek to warrant its in-

sertion, but it was originally printed in the same character as the first part of the verse. On the other hand, in 1 John 2: 23, the last clause was put in another character: "*but he that acknowledgeth the Sonne, hath the Father also;*"¹ though here the words were not supplemented to complete the sense, but *translated* from a reading which was considered somewhat doubtful. Yet in Luke 17: 36, a more doubtful reading is inserted, in *black letter*, with the marginal note: "*This 36. verse is wanting in most of the Greek copies;*" and in the *margin* of Luke 10: 22, we read: "*Many ancient copies adde these words: And turning to his Disciples he said.*" Another marked example of inconsistency is seen in comparing Matt. 20: 23 with Mark 10: 46. In the former passage, our present copies follow the earliest ones in saying: "*but it shall be given to them for whom it is prepared of my father.*" In Mark, where the Greek is the same, the italicised words were originally printed in black letter. Without any apparent cause, in Mark 11: 9, 10, *Hosanna* is printed in italics in A B G I, while it is in the ordinary type in the parallel passage, Matt. 21: 9.

It is obvious at a glance, that capital letters also were used with little or no system, and that uniformity in different editions was not sought for. E. g. in the Epistle to the Galatians, A frequently gives a capital to the word Spirit, but fails to do so in 3: 2. 4: 6. 5: 5, 16, 18, 22. and 6: 8, 18; and in 5: 17 uses both forms: "For the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the spirit against the flesh." In all these passages B has "spirit"; in all except 6: 18, G has "Spirit;" and in all but 5: 18, I has "spirit." In John 16: 13, A B and G have: "when hee the spirit of trueth is come." In Rom. 8: 15, 26, 27, they also agree in "spirit;" but G uses a capital letter where A B have a small one in Rom. 8: 9—"spirit of God, spirit of Christ;" 8: 11, 14 and 16—"The spirit it selfe." In 1 John 4: 2, the three have "spirit of God;" but in the next verse: "And euery Spirit that confesseth not," and in verse 13—"hee hath giuen vs of his

¹ B has *Eather*.

Spirit." G uses capitals more freely than A, but in Ps. 95: 3 and Gal. 4: 8 has "gods," where A B have "Gods." In Gen. 3: 5 the three have "Gods," but in many other places where the word occurs, agree in dispensing with the capital. This want of uniformity might be exemplified by other words.

The orthography of these early editions is very changeable. This is evident from the passages already copied. Such forms as *he, hee; she, shee; me, mee; shall be, shalbe; darknesse, darkenesse; bene, beene, bin; citie, city; carry, carrie, carie, carrie; thanks, thankes; perfit* (Ps. 138: 8), *perfite* (Job 22: 3), *perfect* (Ps. 18: 32. 1 Thess. 3: 10); *ginne* (Isa. 8: 14), *grinnes* (Ps. 140: 5. 141: 9 A B G); *sin, sinne; reigne, raigne; law, lawe; traouelling* (Isa. 63: 1), *trauailleth* (Prov. 6: 11), *traueileth* (Prov. 24: 34); *through, thorow* (2 Sam. 2: 29); *knownen, knowne; all, al; reproch, reproach; alient, aliens, aliant; mo* (Gal. 4: 27. G), *moe* (A B), *more*; are used interchangeably in the various editions, and sometimes even in consecutive verses of the same edition.

In the use of the forms *a, an; my, mine; thy, thine*; the editions are found, to a considerable extent, to agree with each other, but there is no rule which determines the form. So in A B G, we have *a hammer* (Jer. 23: 29), *an hammer* (Judges 4: 21); *a hand* (Ex. 19: 13), *an hand* (Ez. 2: 9); *a hard thing* (2 Ki. 2: 10), *an hard saying* (John 6: 60). In Isa. 30: 17 G has *an hill*; A B, *a hill*. These editions usually read *an hundred, an habitation, an hair, an half*. Our modern editions have deviated from the earliest in this particular, but without adopting and carrying out consistently a uniform rule. The revised standard, published by the American Bible Society in 1851, went so far as to reform the usage in respect to the indefinite article, by adopting the rule that "the form *an* be used before all vowels and diphthongs not pronounced as consonants, and also before *h* silent or unaccented; and that the form *a* be employed in all other cases."¹ But in respect to *my, mine; thy, thine*; this edition intro-

¹ Thirty-Sixth Annual Report of the American Bible Society, 1852, p. 32.

duced no change, but conformed to preceding ones; and in it, as in the originals, we find no established usage. E. g. before *abode*, *absence*, *acts*, we find *thy* or *my*; before *abominations*, *anger*, *adversary*, *enemies*, *thine* or *mine*; before *affliction*, both *my* and *mine*; and the same fact holds true of words beginning with *h*, a marked example of which is seen in Isa. 56:7 — *my house*, and *mine house*. But as this is not a *peculiarity* of the early editions, it need not be commented on further.

Although so much obscurity rests upon the work of the printers through whose labors the authorized version first came to light, we cannot but notice the rapidity with which successive editions were sent forth. Two editions in 1611, two probably in 1612, besides a separate edition of the New Testament alone, and two in the year following, indicate the energy with which "his majesties speciall commandement" was carried into effect.

To determine the comparative critical value of these early editions, would require careful and extended research. Enough perhaps has been said to direct attention toward the sources from which we are to learn the mind of the translators, as expressed in their work, and to show that in their day, the text, as it issued from the press, was by no means considered immaculate.

ARTICLE III.

WAS PETER IN ROME, AND BISHOP OF THE CHURCH AT ROME?

[Concluded from Vol. XV. p. 624.]

PART II. — THE TRADITION.

§ 22. *Opening of the subject.*

THE holy Scriptures thus not only furnish no proof that Peter was at Rome, founded the church there, and presided over it as bishop; but they beyond doubt prove the contrary.

If now, in spite of this, an attempt be made to save that position, the proof must be taken from tradition. And this has been done without further ceremony.

Had any of the Fathers, or of the authors of the first century, *unquestionably* testified to those pretended facts referring to Peter, weight might have been attached thereto, and it must be respected; but it is not so. The older witnesses, who are wholly unquestioned, proceed from the third century, and deserve not unconditioned belief. Let us see.

§ 23. *The Apocryphas.*

Already in the first century of the church, by pious fraud or the craft of errorists, a multitude of fables and inventions respecting the person of the Saviour, his blessed mother, the apostles, etc., were put into circulation and interpolated into the gaps which the holy Scriptures had left in their representations. Here belong also those writings which have come down to us under the names of Linus, Clemens, Prochorus, Marcellus, Dionysius the Areopagite; of which those of Linus and Dionysius contain a history of the sufferings and death of Peter and Paul; those of Clemens, namely his letter to James, and his Recognitions, similar

accounts ; but those of Prochorus, a history of the life and acts of John the apostle.¹ They are plain, open, and bold fictions, filled up with pious conversations, reflections, and fabulous, strange stories. Here, for instance, belongs the statement that John the apostle was a furnace-heater, and a water-carrier to a bath-woman at Rome. Among them are likewise to be found heretical opinions, for example, that the apostles persuaded many women to leave their husbands against the will of the same.

From these and similar corrupt sources, in the tenth century, a certain Metaphrastes composed a description of Peter's travels, in which are marked out all the places where he touched, the churches he founded, and his memorials and monuments, which he everywhere left behind him.

From these writings interpolated, or unworthy of credit, are taken all those data and special accounts, respecting Peter's life, and particularly of his abode in Rome.

These authorities are naturally precisely the most important legends, and they first spread abroad and established those stories, as they brought them out among the common people.

The first centuries of the church were extremely fruitful in such figments; the life of Peter afforded them the greatest room, as the holy Scriptures say so little of him from A. D. 45 and onward. As it was known from the holy Scriptures that *Paul* founded the church at Rome; as this when established at the capital of the world was the first and most distinguished; as the relations of rank in the churches began to be formed in the second and third centuries; so it was natural that they should make out the Romish church to have been founded by those two of the apostles who were regarded as the greatest.² Hence they placed Peter at Rome and made him bishop there.

It may be said that such a figment would not have been possible unless at least Peter's presence at Rome was a matter of fact, as its basis. This does not follow. James was

¹ They have been published by Galland.

² This began in the second half of the second century.

never in Spain, and yet that story was framed. Peter never was twenty-five years in Rome, and not so long as bishop there; and yet Eusebius mentions it, about A. D. 340, as an old report. Peter never was bishop of Antioch, to say nothing of his being so for seven years; and yet it stands as an old assertion in the Alexandrine Chronicle, and Eusebius reports it as an undoubted fact. The apostle Peter never was at Hierapolis, and yet Papias places him there together with his pretended daughters. John never was at Rome; the pseudo-Prochorus mentions it; and from him Tertullian, from whom other Fathers do the same.

Such stories easily originate. Paul died in Rome; his grave was there. When, a hundred years after, it came into the thought of some one to say that Peter too was put to death there, how soon an epitaph was found for him. Who of the members of the Romish church did not willingly hear such a report? Who wished to oppose it? And if any one did, what did it avail? The populace believed it; critical investigations were not at that time undertaken respecting such subjects; they were not expressed in journals and public papers. Like all stories, this also suddenly started, found fruitful soil, and at the end was spun out into a complete legend.

But we can best conceive all this, if, bringing before us the contents of those apocryphas, we here critically examine the traditional reports of the Fathers respecting Peter's abode at Rome.

§ 24. *Clemens of Rome and Ignatius.*

In his Epistles to the Corinthians, Clemens speaks of Peter and Paul. Of the latter (Edit. Oxon. p. 80), that he died after Peter's death; he had done most for the Gospel; was an apostle of the world, penetrating even to the bounds of the West; and was put to death for the faith, under Nero, at Rome. Of Peter, he mentions nothing of all these things, but this: "propter æmulationem non unum aut alterum sed plures labores sustulit, atque ita martyrium passus in debi-

tum gloriæ locum migravit" ("from emulation he undertook not one or another labor, but many labors; and so, suffering martyrdom, passed into the place of glory that awaited him") — an account which is contradictory to all the other stories of Peter's death. For, according to these, he was put to death by Nero on account of the *faith*, and in his death there was no *æmulatio*, i. e. no *envy*, no *rivalship*, the accusation against him in the church of Rome, as even Clemens supposes, since he holds forth this example to the Corinthians in order to warn them against rivalry, discord, and contention, and to bring them back to peace. When we remember also, that, according to Tertullian's account, Clemens was consecrated by Peter as a bishop of Rome, the strange way in which Clemens here mentions Peter is very remarkable, and renders the account suspicious. When Clemens says distinctly of Paul, that he came to Rome and suffered martyrdom under Nero, the same reason he had likewise in the case of Peter, if he really had been at Rome and was his friend and teacher.

Equally remarkable is the silence of Ignatius. As he nowhere hints that *he* was the successor of Peter, the first bishop of Antioch; so in his Epistle to the Romans, he mentions also not a word of Peter as the founder of that church, or as the first bishop at Rome.

This passage is indeed quoted from his Epistle to the Romans: "Not as Peter and Paul do I command you; they were the apostles of Jesus Christ, I am one of the least;" and from this the conclusion is drawn that Ignatius supposes the fact of Peter's abode at Rome. But this is most unwarranted. Ignatius, in using these words, asks the Romans to lay nothing in the way of his execution. "Yet," he proceeds, "this I do not *command* you, as Peter and Paul, but I only *entreat* you." Ignatius wishes here simply to say: I come to you not with the authority of an apostle; and so he names the two apostles whose activity and authority were most known, especially by their Epistles.

But higher than all this stands the question: Are the Epistles of Ignatius genuine? Is that, particularly, to the Ro-

mans genuine? And if it be genuine, is not that "*Petrus*" smuggled in, like so many other things of which criticism must clear these Epistles before they have their former shape? They can hardly serve as testimony in so important a matter; least of all can that passage, which in every aspect has nothing of evidence in itself, even if it be genuine.

§ 25. *Justin.*

Justin's silence is still more remarkable. If any one may object, in respect to Clemens and Ignatius, that there was *no occasion* to speak of Peter's abode at Rome; as to Justin, this reason utterly fails; for he had the most urgent cause. Justin relates in his Apology (also in Eusebius ii. 15), that Simon Magus journeyed to Rome, that he remained there, wrought wonders, and was honored by the Romans (who regarded him as a god) with a statue, which he himself had seen.¹ As now, according to the opinion of the opponents, the journey of Peter to Rome is placed *in connection with the abode of Simon*, and indeed so that Simon was vanquished by Peter; as, according to Eusebius's detailed account, this contest against Simon was precisely the object of his journey to Rome;² so, in case he knew that Peter had been at Rome, with the mention of Simon, Justin ought necessarily to mention Peter and that history. His silence contains the strongest proof that Peter's abode in Rome was wholly unknown to him, and that, at the time of Justin, the story of Simon Magus was only half-way developed.

§ 26. *Papias.*

The father of the story of Peter's abode at Rome is Papias, bishop of Hierapolis in Phrygia, whose works (except a few fragments which Eusebius only has preserved) are lost. Among these fragments is also the passage that testifies to Peter's abode at Rome.

¹ He regarded the image consecrated to the Sabine god *Semo Sangus* as one the Romans had set up to *Simo Sanctus*, i. e. Magus.

² Eusebius, II. 16.

Before we quote this passage, we will premise some things as to Papias himself, by which his credibility is illustrated.

He lived in the third generation after the apostles (Eusebius iii. 39), and he gives himself out to have been a hearer of their disciples. Jerome makes him the teacher of Irenæus, according to which he flourished in the middle of the second century (Jerome, Ep. 29). That John the teacher of Papias was not the apostle, but the presbyter, Jerome testifies (*Catalog. in Papia*), and Baronius proves it carefully (*ad d.* 118).

Papias, in respect to his capacity and credibility as a writer, stands in very poor repute. Eusebius, to whom we are indebted for all our information about him, says of him: "*Papias mediocri admodum ingenio, præditus, ut ex scriptis ejus conjicere licet*" (Papias was gifted with very moderate talents, as may be conjectured from his writings); he "has communicated many things from oral tradition, which in part were new and in part border on the fabulous. Here belongs his doctrine of the millennial kingdom, an error to which by means of Papias's age, he was also led.¹ Among the evident, we may say intentional, figments, belongs his story of the daughters of the *apostle* Philip, who remained perpetual virgins and lie buried at Hierapolis: he had known that they waked up a dead person." (Eusebius iii. 30, 31—39. v. 24.)

Papias has evidently confounded the *deacon and Evangelist Philip* with the apostle, of whom Luke (who, with Paul, abode in his house) really says, Acts 21: 9, "he had four daughters who were virgins and who had the gift of prophecy."

Here the fiction is too evident. It is the more remarkable if we reflect that these virgins, whom Paul knew as female prophets A. D. 57, when they were already in advancing years, must have been living in A. D. 130 to 140, some seventy or eighty years later.

¹ Eusebius, III. 39. If Eusebius (III. 36) calls Papias a very eloquent man, versed in the Scriptures, this phrase is not in the oldest manuscripts, and Valesius long since proved it to be interpolated.

And yet Polycrates of Ephesus, and Clemens of Alexandria, relate these fables after Papias (Polycrat. apud Euseb. v. 25. Clemens Alex. Stromat.); so little did they then trouble themselves about criticism.

We now come to the passage by Papias. This runs thus: "Tantus autem veritatis fulgor emicuit in mentibus eorum qui Petrum audierunt, *ut parum habentes semel audisse*, sed Marcum Petri sectatorem, cujus hodie extat evangelium enixe rogarent, ut doctrinæ illius scriptum monumentum apud se reliquerat. Nec prius destiterunt, quam hominem expugnassent, auctores scribendi illius quod secundum Marcum dicitur evangelii exstitissent. Quod quum Petrus *revelationem S. Spiritus cognovisset*, librum illum *auctoritate sua comprobasse*, dicitur, ut deinceps in ecclesia legeretur. Refertur id a Clemento in vi. libro institutionum cui testis etiam accedit Papias, Hierapolis episcopus. Porro Marci mentionem fieri aiunt a Petro in priore epistola quam Romæ scriptam contendunt, idque ipsum Petrum innuere qui figurate Romam Babylonem appellat his verbis."

We see that here is *hardly any passage from Papias*, but only a simple appeal to him; the passage itself belongs to Eusebius. We do not, by this, wish to deny that Eusebius drew the story from Papias; but it has little force of proof. It sounds too fabulous. Peter must have been *many years* bishop of Rome, and yet the Romans prayed Mark to point out his discourses, that they might not forget them *once* heard. Mark, *without Peter's* knowledge, had compiled his Gospel, which fact must have been first discovered to Peter by means of a divine revelation.

This sounds fabulous enough. Equally senseless and wholly fictitious is the following notice of Mark, which Eusebius repeats from Papias.

"Ajebat etiam, inquit Papias, presbyter ille Johannes, Marcum Petri interpretem, quæcunque memoriæ mandaverat, diligenter prescripsisse, non tamen ordine pertexuisse, quæ a domino aut dicta aut gesta fuerant. Neque enim ipse dominum audiverat, neque sectatus fuerat unquam, sed cum Petro postea versatus est, qui pro audientium utilitate,

non vero ut sermonum Domini historiam contexeret evangelium prædicabat." (l. c.)

This is the judgment of one who does not know. Mark's Gospel was written like those of the other evangelists; one feels that it is from an eye-witness. And why not? Mark was born at Jerusalem; his family were familiar with the apostles; his house was the place of assembly whither Peter betook himself when he came out of prison, Acts xii. (Epiphanius calls him one of the seventy-two. Hæres. Alog.) And this man was not in the company of the followers of the Lord, not an eye-witness of his miracles! The objection that he observes no definite order in his description, is untrue; there is in it the same kind of order as in Matthew, Luke, and John, as any one can convince himself by a cursory glance, even, into his Gospel. And now the folly, too, that Peter had approved and established Mark's Gospel, that it might be read in public in the churches. The book was written by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and *thence* derived all its credibility.

That Mark wrote his Gospel at the instance of Peter, at Rome, and indeed for the Romans, as Papias relates, is not very probable. Mark wrote in the *Greek language*, therefore plainly not for the Romans, who spoke Latin; and only the educated among them, and strangers from Greece, understood the Greek. Besides, the Romish church maintains that Mark was bishop of Alexandria; how could he then, at the same time, be Peter's constant companion? Finally, Irenæus maintains, as is well known, that Mark wrote his Gospel after Peter's and Paul's death (*μετὰ τὴν ἐξοδον*), an opinion which Baronius has endeavored in vain to weaken in favor of Papias (Bar. *ad. a.* 45).

If we take the above-mentioned circumstances closely into view, it will soon be clear enough, that Papias's testimony is absolutely of no weight, and can be laid aside as of no value. It transcribes nothing but an unwarranted story full of internal contradictions.

§ 27. *Clemens of Alexandria.*

Eusebius (vi. 14.) cites a passage from the last book of Clemens of Alexandria, entitled *Recognitiones*, in which *almost in the same words* which Eusebius, as we have seen, attributes to Papias, he repeats that Mark, the companion of Peter, wrote his Gospel at Rome; only Clemens varies from Papias in this, that he writes Mark had imparted to Peter his design, but that the latter had neither approved nor rejected it.

We see that Clemens merely transcribed from Papias, and indeed with not an exactly true memory; and on this account his testimony is of no more force than that of Papias.

That Clemens did transcribe from Papias without critical examination, need not be strange to us: how learned soever he was otherwise, he had a historical credulity which led him into many errors. According to him, Christ preached only *one year*; the apostle Matthew was Zaccheus; Matthew never ate flesh; Paul had a wife, and recommended the Sibylline *Oracles*; Peter is the author of a Revelation, and of many discourses from which he cites passages; Simon heard Peter preach according to Marcion, who lived under Hadrian and Antoninus; Philip married his daughter. He also holds the Gospel according to the Hebrews and Egyptians to be genuine. (Strom. L. I.—VII.) We see that he did not examine with historical accuracy; his testimony as to Peter's abode in Rome, will convince no one; it is but an echo of Papias." But we take higher ground, in opposition to his testimony. Though Eusebius ascribes the *Recognitiones* to Clemens, yet they are unquestionably interpolated. According to the extracts which Photius published (see *Natalis Alex.* iii. 424. col. 2.), they are so full of the *Gnostic and Arian* heresies, that, if they were genuine, Clemens would cease to be a Christian Father. Hence we have no doubt in regarding the work as one interpolated for Clemens in the third or fourth century, before Eusebius's time, and so wholly reject the force of that testimony.

§ 28. *Hegesippus.*

Still less weight is there in the testimony of the Syrian Hegesippus, who in his book *de excidio Hierosolymæ*, maintains Peter's presence in Rome.¹ This book, written in *Latin*, is drawn from the apocrypha, and falsely ascribed to Hegesippus, who lived in the second century. It proceeded from the fourth century, and Baronius and Labbe, in *Hegesippo*, T. I., admit this. A testimony taken from it is destitute of all force. The passages extracted from the genuine Hegesippus by Eusebius, make no mention of Peter in this respect.

§ 29. *Dionysius of Corinth.*

Of all the testimonies, that of Dionysius is the most important, and without doubt, too, is the most striking. For he was both a well-informed and a sensible man, and he lived near enough to the times of the apostles; for he died about the year A. D. 178.

He now writes to the Romans (Eusebius ii. 25) that they have, united in themselves, the seed of the apostles, sown by Peter and Paul. "For both apostles came into our city and instructed us, scattering the seed of evangelical doctrine; they at the same time went to Italy, and after they had in like manner instructed you, died at the same time the martyr's death."

This testimony of such a venerable man is so weighty, that it deserves a closer examination. It comprises three parts: First, that Peter was in Corinth; *then*, that there he met with Paul; and *thirdly*, that both together went from Corinth to Italy and were put to death.

If *any one* of these points is found to be untrue, then they

¹ Hegesippus has reported from the Pseudo Acts of Linus, Marcellus and Dionysius, the Areopagite, the story that, as Peter was leaving Rome, Christ met him at the gate, and to the question of Peter where he was going, answered: "To Rome to be crucified again." Et Peter conversus in urbem redit, Captusque a persecutoribus cruci adjudicatur (and Peter turning about went back into the city, was taken by his persecutors and condemned to the cross).

all fall; they have only one authority. We will therefore see whether Peter met with Paul at Corinth, and they together went to Italy. From the Acts of the Apostles, it is seen that Paul was several times at Corinth; but it is there clearly expressed that he *never* went thence into the *West* to Italy; but only that he travelled back to the *East*. Thus, Acts 18: 18, he went from Corinth, through Cenchrea, by ship, to Asia; 20: 1 etc. he came from Macedonia to Greece, but after three months he travelled again, through Macedonia, to the East, and then again to Jerusalem, whence he came as a prisoner to Rome. In this period, therefore, from A. D. 56 and 57, Peter could not have so met with Paul at Corinth, because Paul *never* did travel thence to Italy.

Paul made his *first* journey to Italy, not through Corinth, but as a prisoner, by ship, along by Crete and Malta, where they were driven by a storm, and to Sicily. (Acts, chaps. xxvii. and xxviii.) On this journey, also, Paul certainly had not Peter for a companion.

It only remains, therefore, to suppose this journey of Paul from Corinth to Italy occurred A. D. 65 or 66, and that he made it with Peter whom he met at Corinth. But possible as such a journey is, in itself considered, there is much that stands opposed to it.

1. Had Peter been in Corinth, he would, like Paul, have preached the gospel here; how is it, then, that Clemens of Rome, in his Epistle to the Corinthians, one hundred years before Dionysius, and, on this supposition, hardly ten years after Peter was in Corinth, says nothing at all about it? This silence, in case Peter was at Corinth, is not to be explained. *Clemens must have spoken of it.* For he points the Corinthians to all the holy authorities, that they should leave off their dissensions; to the holy Scriptures, to the example of the saints, to Paul's exhortations, to Paul's Epistles to them. Would he have passed over Peter, had he with Paul founded the church of Corinth and preached the gospel in it? Ought he to forget him, *his own* pretended *teacher* and *friend*, from whom he must have received the episcopal dignity at Rome?

2. It appears as if Paul had not travelled at all from Corinth to Italy. He writes to Titus, that he intended to remain the winter in Nicopolis (in Acarnania) and wait for him. It is very probable that he had shipped from there (Nicopolis) to Italy.

3. Dionysius is the *only one* who speaks of this abode of Peter in Corinth, and of his journey to Italy from Corinth with Paul; no one of the Fathers, no one of the apocryphas, mentions anything of it.

But that Dionysius has reported this erroneous story, ought not to excite surprise. In his time, the oldest churches everywhere were striving to deduce their origin from the most famous of the apostles. Had the Romans drawn Peter to Rome and associated him with Paul, Corinth did not wish to be left behind; it does the same thing. But the story found the easier reception, as we see, from First Corinthians; there really had been *followers of Peter* at Corinth, who had likewise formed a party there. Hence it was easily concluded that Peter himself had preached the gospel at Corinth. The journey with Paul was thus readily added to it of itself.

According to what has been said, it may now be easily decided, that the testimony of Dionysius deserves little credit. *But were it credible and certain, it would hence follow, that Peter did not come to Rome before A. D. 66, and as he was soon after put to death there, he had not been there above one year.* With this, therefore, all those stories about the founding of the church of Rome by Peter, of his bishopric there, tumbles to ruin of themselves.

§ 30. Caius.

Caius was a presbyter of Rome under pope Zephyrinus, about A. D. 200. He wrote his *διάλεκτις* against the Montanist Prochis, in which he says, according to the fragment from his writings transmitted to us by Eusebius: "I can show you the monuments (Trophäen) of the apostles; for when you go out to the Vatican, or on the road to Ostia, you

will find the same monuments of those who have founded this church." (Eusebius ii. 25.)

If we suppose this testimony to be authentic, it proves nothing at all. The monuments (or trophies) may signify graves; but who says that these "monuments of the apostles" were the graves of *Peter* and *Paul*? Those men are called Apostles, in the holy Scriptures and by the Fathers, not only who were the Apostles specially, but likewise their pupils and followers. Thus Luke, Acts 14: 13, names Barnabas an apostle; so Paul often calls Titus, Timothy, Silas, etc., his fellow apostles; so Clemens of Rome is called by Clemens of Alexandria, who was a contemporary of Caius, *an apostle*. (Stromata iv. 17.) Among the apostles, also, to whose graves Caius points, we may properly understand those of Paul and many of his companions who, with him, founded the church at Rome, and who died there with him, or after him, in the faith. The addition that they were the graves of those who founded the church of Rome, necessarily points to this interpretation; while it is a matter of fact, according to the holy Scriptures, that the church of Rome was *founded* by *Paul* and his disciples, but in no wise by Peter and his followers. Even if we receive Dionysius's testimony as true, Peter was at the utmost only a year in Rome, at a time when the Roman church needed no more *founding* by him.

But if we look at the testimony of Caius a little closer, it is evidently untenable from internal grounds. Whether those monuments signify *signs of victory* or *graves*; yet it is improbable that at the Vatican, near the tomb of the *Scipios*, that is, in the way to Ostia on the *public road*, there were the tombs of the Apostles, and decorated with inscriptions, at a time when the *persecutions raged*, when the *populace often destroyed Christian churches* as soon as they discovered them, and left nothing uninjured which was holy to them; at a time when the emperor and his officers commanded every one to blot out the Christian name.

§ 31. *Tertullian.*

We see that Tertullian read the apocryphas and believed in them; his accounts of the apostles are drawn from them. Probably the apocryphas of "Linus," "Marcellus," and of the "Areopagite," which are too affecting and too pleasing not to have found great applause with the Fathers, made their appearance at that time.

Tertullian mentions that Peter baptized in the Tiber (*de baptismo*, c. 4.); and there, he says, Peter was crucified. (*Scorpiæ*, c. ult. *De prescriptione*, c. 36.) This story, no doubt, was formed on John 21: 18 as its basis.

No Father of the church, before him, had related these things; Tertullian is the first. But Tertullian deserves little faith in this matter; we see that he drew from poor authorities, and from apocryphal stories and tales. We place little weight on it, when he maintains that Peter had consecrated Clemens as his successor, though all other authorities specify Linus. This difference merely shows how uncertain, how wavering, and contradictory already, at that time, were the traditions of the primitive period of the church of Rome.

But what renders Tertullian's veracity, as to this account of Peter, wholly suspicious, is, that he relates also that John the apostle had likewise been at Rome; that Nero cast him into a caldron of boiling oil; and, when he remained unharmed, banished him to an island (*de prescriptione*, c. 36). Jerome says of this report: "Tertullian reports that John was cast, by Nero, into a caldron of boiling oil and came out purer and stronger than he was before" (*in Jovin. L. i.*).

That is something entirely new: none of the Fathers had before mentioned it; hardly any transcribed it after him; and Jerome gives it only as a *statement* of Tertullian, which he doubtless had drawn solely from the book of the pseudo-Prochorus of the life of John.

That John was at Rome, that he there suffered martyrdom, is plainly a fiction. If it were not, then would Papias, Polycarp, Irenæus, especially Clement of Alexandria, who brings

forward so many particulars from the life of the apostle, have surely not been silent as to this; and particularly Polycrates of Ephesus (A. D. 196), in his contest with the Romish bishop Victor respecting the paschal feast, could not have passed over this event of John's life, if it was a fact.

Tertullian's account of John's abode at Rome, is therefore a fiction. This the Romish church also has seen, which never received it, as it would otherwise have not failed to do; because thereby a new weight would have been added to their authority.

As, now, Tertullian *places together* the account of Peter's and John's presence at Rome; and since the latter is found to be untrue, we may also set aside as false the former, *which absolutely has no better foundation.*

§ 32. *Irenæus (about A. D. 200).*

Irenæus says, plainly enough, that Peter and Paul founded the church of Rome, and that they made Linus the first bishop of the same.

How great soever may be the authority of Irenæus as a teacher in the church, in matters of this kind he is to be used with caution. He is often inconsiderate, and credulous. When he maintains (lii. 39) that Christ died at a more advanced age, between forty and fifty years old; when he says that all the Elders testify to this, and that the apostle John delivered it to them, the historic credibility of the man is greatly lowered.

If we look at his testimony as to Peter, the opinion that Peter with Paul *founded and built up* the church of Rome, is so erroneous, that it wholly contradicts the Acts of the Apostles and the Pauline Epistles; according to which, as we have proved above, this took place only through Paul and his disciples. Why should we not suppose that Irenæus drew these erroneous reports from Papias, from whom he took the fable of the thousand years' kingdom?

Not less inadmissible is it, that the apostles made Linus the first bishop of the Romish church; as it is proved, from

numerous passages of Scripture, that the apostles set at the head of the churches founded by them not a *single* bishop, but several *elders*, as bishops, i. e. overseers, as we have fully proved in our book respecting the primacy of the Romish bishops, in the last chapter.¹

It is therefore evident how little Irenæus's testimony amounts to.

§ 33. *Origen (about A. D. 252).*

The further the time advances, so much the more the Romish story of Peter is enlarged, and so much the more the apocryphal points of it stick out. Has Tertullian reported that Peter was crucified at Rome, so Eusebius already relates (L. iii. c. 1.), from Origen, that Peter at the end of his life (*ἐπὶ τέλει*) came to Rome and was crucified *with his head downwards*. We see the *passio Petri* of the pseudo-Linus had already gained an important publicity.

Besides, it appears from this passage how much Eusebius contradicts himself, who, in his *Chronicon* and in his *Church History* maintains that Peter came to Rome in the second year of Claudius; but here, according to Origen's statement, this journey is put off to the end of the Apostle's life; while Lactantius, who lived not long after Origen, places Peter's arrival at Rome in the beginning of the reign of Nero, and thus increases the discordance of the opinions.

§ 34.

After Origen, the story of Peter, upheld by the apocryphas and spun out into a complete legend, even in the minutest details, continually acquired more and more life, definiteness, and extent. It now soon became predominant in the whole church, and it is not to be doubted that the Romans, since they saw how important to them this story was, provided also for a tomb of Peter.

¹ See Notes, etc., at the end. — Tr.

For, as we have said, the story was now soon of importance; the Romans grounded on it their primacy. The Romish church, according to the economy of the empire, was the *first* in rank; next to it followed that of Alexandria; then that of Antioch. Now, indeed, must the higher principality (*potior principalitas*) of the founding come in. So they made out a *cathedra Petri* (see of Peter), the prince of the apostles. Irenæus names Peter and Paul as the *founders* of the Romish church: he does not say that they were *bishops* at Rome; they, as he supposes, had made Linus the *first* bishop of Rome.

How different it is in the middle of the third century. Then Paul is already shoved aside; then Peter is already made the *first* Romish bishop; then Stephanus seeks to sustain, against Cyprian, a primacy from the succession of Peter (*ex successione Petri*); then he already maintains that the Romish see is "Peter's see, the principal chair whence sacerdotal unity takes its rise" (*sedes Petri, cathedra principalis, unde unitas sacerdotalis exorta sit*).

And that merely was empty stuff, a patch from the story of Peter fastened on the pure robe of evangelical tradition. Now the legend rooted itself firmer continually; it became the sustainer of the primacy; in the fifth century, and not before, the popes, as an emanation of their *successio Petri*, gave it authority in the councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon. Later, when the primacy was immovably founded, they boldly drew the reverse conclusion: Because the Romish church had the primacy, therefore Peter must have been at Rome.

We conclude, therefore, with Origen, who reaches into the first half of the third century, our series of the witnesses; because all that follow are nothing but a repetition of the preceding given and expressed anew on his authority. When Baronius, in order to put the best face on his cause, says that the *whole* of Christian Antiquity believed in Peter's abode at Rome, and names fifty Fathers, up to within the sixth century, this gives to his cause a *fair show*; he might spare four-tenths of those names. His proof is exactly like that which Natalis Alexander uses in order to prove the genuineness of the works of Dionysius the Areopagite.

§ 35. *Rise of the legend of Peter.*

We have already remarked above, that the church, too, has had her time of fables; then the apocryphas shot forth like toad-stools; then writings were interpolated to the Saviour, to the Virgin, and to the Apostles; then the *Acta* and *Passiones*, the *Recognitiones*, *Constitutiones*, *Canones* of the same were invented. The period of these fictions belongs to the second and third centuries, and it coincides with that in which the witnesses above quoted lived. Their testimony is therefore, and so continues, very suspicious; the silence of the older witnesses, as Clemens of Rome, Justin, etc., has much more weight. The silence of the Acts of the Apostles, Paul's and Peter's Epistles, completely destroys the whole force of those witnesses.

It is interesting, now, to examine how this story of Peter's abode at Rome was formed. We will here briefly put it together.

These stories are formed where, in the history, there are large gaps; there they thrust in themselves, often being connected to most insignificant points, and frequently without the slightest supports. They are produced so much the easier, the more interest is brought into play. Thus originated the story of Peter.

The Acts of the Apostles only touches some prominent points of his life; the Epistles of Paul, his own Epistles, the writings of the oldest Fathers, are almost without any notice respecting him. This unoccupied soil the story took possession of. How it grew by cultivation, the *Passiones* of Linus and of the Areopagite, the *Acta Marcelli*, and the writings of Prochorus, bear witness.

Now, too, interest was not wanting. Many churches sought to derive their origin from the most famous apostles: these were Peter, John, James, and Paul. But Jerusalem only could lay claim to James: he was ever there; so there remained only three others. How they vied with each other for them! Then Antioch and Corinth laid claim to Peter

and Paul; Rome, to both of these and also to John. Probably the pseudo-Prochorus wrote his books solely to transplant John to Rome.

With the oldest Fathers, Peter was not at all regarded as the primate of the apostles, the head of the church. According to the "Galatians," Peter, James, and John were the pillar-apostles, the pillars of the church. At that time, certainly, no supremacy had yet entered into the church. In proportion as these distinctions were formed, ascending from the bishops, metropolitans, up to the primate and patriarch, also *the idea was developed that there was, too, a precedence among the apostles*; and, finally, they made Peter their head and leader. At the same time were likewise formed the patriarchal sees; and the three first cities of the empire, Rome, Alexandria, and Antioch, laid claim to them. Now they all three strove to secure Peter as their founder. Paul, who is the well-established founder, from among the apostles, of the churches at Rome and Antioch, was no longer found sufficient; they sought to lay claim to Peter. And as, now, Rome had gained the *first position* in the church, so Peter must be secured, *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, for Rome; he must be placed there, at whatever cost. With this story they filled the gaps in Peter's history.

A connecting point, too, was found: Peter's First Epistle is dated from Babylon. This Babylon, now, must be Rome; John had called it so, too, in the Apocalypse. They believed they now had firm bottom. The story grew, spread itself out into details; then, Peter soon became bishop of Rome; that an occasion might not be wanting, he came there, under Claudius, A. D. 42, in order to *vanquish Simon Magus*, and all sorts of rarities besides.

§ 36. *An objection.*

It is said that there must yet, necessarily, have been a fact lying at the bottom, for the manifold and diverse stories respecting Peter's journey to Rome, his abode, bishopric, suffering and death there; and that it must be *that Peter, at*

least, was in Rome. Without this fact, these stories could by no means have been formed or established.

But it is not so: thousands of stories have been formed and established without any historical foundation. Prochorus gives us an account, and in full details, of John's life and acts at Rome: that he was there thrown into a caldron of boiling oil and remained uninjured. Tertullian believed it all, and transcribed it; and, if we are not mistaken, it has been transferred to the breviary. And yet it is a fable: John never was in Rome.

We see how stories are often formed of mere air: Peter must have met with Simon at Rome and fought with him. The apocryphas relate it in details; Justin says, also, that the Romans erected a statue to Simon; he had, himself, seen it. He read the inscription: *Simoni Sango deo fidio*, i. e. it was dedicated to the Sabine god Semo Sancus or Sangus, and he made out of it, *Simoni Sancto*; and the story was fabricated *seventy* years after the event.¹ As Justin was a credible author, so he was believed without any doubt; the story had gained for itself a firm footing.² Soon they went further than Justin: they now made Peter come to Rome on purpose to fight with Simon. The origin of this story, as it happens, can be shown: Suetonius relates, in the twelfth chapter of Nero, that a certain Icarus had attempted to fly, publicly, but that he was dashed down the *Suggestus* of Nero and broken to pieces. This, now, must have been Simon (Baron. ad. a. 44 n. 34.): the statue puts it beyond doubt. But how was it possible that the Romans had erected a statue to Simon, who came to his death so miserably, and not to Peter his conqueror? of this they are silent. *Credat Judæus Apella*. Valesius felt just so.

The Apostle Philip, with his four daughters, must have been buried at Hierapolis in Phrygia: Papias, the bishop of

¹ This pillar with the inscription was found under Gregory XIII., on an island in the Tiber.

² Rigaltius, in his Notes to Tertullian's Apology (after the Notes to Cyprian), Petavius in *haeres*, Menandr. N. 5, and especially Valesius in his Notes to Eusebius, II. B. have together with Pagi discovered this blunder and the consequences drawn from it.

that city, relates it; he had known the daughters; Polycrates, bishop of Ephesus, related this after Papias; and it is universally believed. And yet Papias either invented it, or allowed himself to be somehow imposed on. He had confounded the *deacon* and *evangelist* Philip, of whom Paul speaks, with the *Apostle* Philip, and placed the latter, who lived at *Cæsarea*, at Hierapolis.

Since in general, in spite of historical probability, so much that is untrue has been fastened into the story of Peter — as Peter's journey to Rome in the second year of Claudius; his contest with Simon Magus; his journey back to Jerusalem; his bishopric in Antioch and in Rome; his travels to Britain; his execution together with Paul, etc. — there is nothing against regarding the *whole* story as of no higher value than its parts.

§ 37. *The contradictions of the opposers.*

Nothing more proves the falsehood of the story of Peter, than the numberless discrepancies with which it is propounded. Eusebius makes Peter come to Rome in the second year of Claudius; then he relates, according to Origen, that he *came to his death* there. According to Lactantius, this arrival occurred in the time of Nero; and indeed in his first year, according to the *Liber pontificalis*, which is falsely ascribed to pope Danaus. According to Eutychius of Alexandria (in originib.), Peter's death was in A. D. 54; according to Onuphrius, he reached Rome A. D. 69; the pseudo-Servius Dexter places his arrival in A. D. 66. The Chronicon of Alexandria assures us that he did not go from Palestine before the Council at Jerusalem. There are, besides, the variations of the apocryphas. And now for the other peculiarities which are drawn from this.

Thus, according to Metaphrastes, Peter went into Spain as vicegerent of Christ. From Antioch he brings thither an image of the blessed Virgin, which is now worshipped as the Virgin of Atocher, i. e. Antioch, at Madrid. There he left Epenetus behind as bishop at Sexifirmum in Bætica,

and travelled, in company with Marcellus, Eugenius, etc., to Africa and Egypt. Then the Maronite Abraham Echellensis knew accurately the places he touched at in Sicily and Italy, and the bishops he appointed there. Then Leo Allatius and Baronius are clearly informed that Peter, as a commander with a great retinue, marched through the whole earth to exercise everywhere his office of pope. And while, according to Dionysius, Peter came with Paul to Rome, through Corinth, these writers know, that *they met each other there from wholly different regions of the world.*

But enough of these contradictions, which form such a confused snarl that hundreds of the greatest of the Ultramontanists, up to this day, have not been able to disentangle it. When those pretended learned and famous men, Baronius, Allatius, Abraham Echellensis, and Natalis, without any exercise of criticism and selection, transcribe writings like those of a Metaphrastes, Flavius Dexter; when they have recourse to the most stale hypotheses in order to bring light into this darkness, it would be an insult to the civilization of the present century to wish longer to busy ourselves with them.

§ 38. *Conclusion.*

We will now, very briefly, sum up the results of our investigation.

1. That Peter was bishop at Antioch, seven years, is a fable.

2. It is a fable, that he came to Rome in the second year of Claudius, i. e. in A. D. 42, and was bishop there twenty-five years.

3. Peter was not in Rome in A. D. 42; nor in A. D. 44, 45, and 46; he was not there in A. D. 53 and 54; he was not there in A. D. 58; he was not there from A. D. 61 to 63; he was not there in A. D. 65 and 66; therefore he *probably* never was there.

4. The church at Rome was not founded by Peter; its foundation belongs solely to Paul and his followers; Peter had no part in it.

5. The holy Scriptures contain not only no testimonies of Peter's abode at Rome, but they clearly show the contrary.

6. Testimonies for Peter's abode in Rome are to be found only in *tradition*. Yet the two oldest and most important of the Fathers, Clemens of Rome and Justin, are silent, not only as to that abode, but they contain statements which contradict it.

7. The testimonies which seem to contain that abode stand in the worst contradiction to each other, and bear the stamp of incredibility on their front: their authorities are the apocryphas.

8. Precisely the most important and the most credible of these testimonies, that of Dionysius of Corinth, places Peter's arrival at Rome not before A. D. 66; and, if he is to be believed, proves that Peter was not there above *one* year; therefore, neither *had he founded* the church of Rome, nor *was its bishop*.

These, now, are the results of our investigation, which we lay before a public capable of judging, for a considerate and serious examination. Though the proofs which we have brought together for our view, from the most important and surest authorities — from the holy Scriptures — are strong enough to smite to the ground the arguments of the opponents, which are drawn solely from the apocryphas and the most untrustworthy accounts of the Fathers; yet we will not run into the faults of those opponents, and set down our view as that which is the only true one. We may grant that Peter *might* have been at Rome; it is possible that he was there about A. D. 65 or 66. When Paul wrote his Second Epistle to Timothy, from his second imprisonment, he was not yet there; but in the interval *which occurs after the composition of this Epistle*, shortly before Paul's execution, he *might* have come there: this view at least clashes with no statement of the holy Scriptures. But he did not come, together with Paul, as Dionysius reports; he was not bishop of Rome; he had not founded this church; he then merely died in Rome, as Eusebius indeed reports after Origen. But this, now, only remains forever nothing but an hypothesis; it cannot be proved; it is only *possible*.

Hence we conclude, that in spite of the *possible* correctness of this hypothesis, the opposite also is the probable; yea, is indeed the more probable, and that we cannot find fault with a Protestant, when, relying on the proofs which the holy Scriptures and the oldest Fathers, Clemens of Rome and Justin present, he holds the abode of Peter at Rome and all connected with it, for a tale drawn from the apocryphas. Thus much is certain: that no one of the arguments which can be opposed to him has so much weight that he is morally bound to acknowledge the story as truth. *Peter's abode at Rome* CAN NEVER BE PROVED; neither, therefore, can the *primacy of the Romish church, based on it, be so*.

The question whether Peter was at Rome, is the question respecting the life or death of the primacy. Granting, too, that Peter himself even held a primacy on account of his personal character, of what avail is that to the Romish bishops? For now arises the questions: Was Peter at Rome? was he the first bishop? — are the Romish bishops yet his successors? If this cannot be proved, decisively and beyond a doubt, then his primacy cannot be proved.

But the question whether Peter was at Rome, is a purely historical one. As it is not affirmed by the *divine authority of the Scriptures*, nor by an *infallible decision* of general councils — which, moreover, cannot decide infallibly on facts aside from the Bible; so it belongs exclusively to *historical* investigation, and is exactly parallel to the question whether, for example, Alexander was ever in India or Italy. History will never be withheld or restricted by the hierarchy nor the pretended Romish infallibility in her investigations, nor allow the answer to be prescribed, as to the story of Peter, by dictatorial authority and before all examination; but not caring for the *dogmas* of the *Romish court*, will take her course, perfect her researches, and maintain the freedom which is due to science. Though Rome by her own hand, or her councils ruled by her, and to which there were wanting knowledge and skill to set in order investigations,¹ by violence force the story of Peter

¹ That, alas, these have often been wanting to them, the management of the false decretals abundantly proves. Had there been, too, in the Catholic church,

into the rank of an historic event; though she has filled the Index with writings which maintain the contrary; these means are no longer of avail at the present day. Science will not, cannot, be prevented from examining that story, and she has freedom enough, likewise, to express this result through the lips of a *Catholic*. That such a point has been reached, is an immeasurable gain. The Catholic church will be delivered from the *Romish vicegerency of Christ*, and the absolute sovereignty deduced therefrom, whenever history, in her, attains to free power. To this power must Rome, some time, yield.

§ 39. *Additional Notes, by the Translator.*

There are several points which perhaps did not occur to the author of the Treatise, or to which at least he has not alluded, that might still further strengthen his argument, in its different parts; some of them we will briefly state.

1. On the supposition that Peter was bishop of Antioch, as claimed by the Roman Catholic writers, at the time they state, the question may be asked: Why should Barnabas go after Paul, to Tarsus? Paul was a recent convert, at least in comparison with Peter; and it was a most strange course to take, to go after him, when the chief of the apostles, as they say, had already taken charge of this church. Luke does not say it was at Peter's suggestion, as he must have done, if Peter had been there and found it necessary to summon in such aid. Besides, Paul expressly states, in Gal. 1: 18, that his first visit to Peter was at Jerusalem, and this, we see in Acts xi. and xii., was at the time of Peter's imprisonment by Herod. On this visit he was accompanied by Barnabas. Our author places it in A. D. 45.

2. In respect to the time of the Council at Jerusalem, and the gratuitous assertion that Peter came to it from Rome, made by Romish writers, it may further be said, the suppo-

the disposition for scientific criticism, and a general state of learning, that patch-work could never have attained to a canonical value and an authority of the primitive church.

sition is contrary to fact; because Peter's argument respecting the preaching of the gospel to Gentiles (Acts 15: 7, etc.), does not mention Rome, as he would probably have done, had he just come from that capital of the world. Could he have stated that, as they knew, he had organized a church there of Gentiles — for the names of the persons in the church of Rome (see Rom. xxvi.) were of such, and, from Acts xviii., the Jews there were ignorant of the gospel when Paul arrived there long after — could Peter have quoted this case, striking and decisive as it must have been, he would have done so. Instead of which he evidently points the council to his visit to Cornelius and his former vindication on that occasion. He says, Acts 15: 7, "ye know that a *good while ago*" (ἀπὸ ἡμερῶν ἀρχαίων — a stronger expression than our version) "God made choice among us that the Gentiles by my mouth should hear the word of the gospel and believe." The Roman Catholic writers, too, pretend that Peter had just been driven out of Rome by the decree of Claudius, and thus had returned to Jerusalem in time to be at the council. But from Acts 18: 2 we learn that Paul, when (after a tour through the churches in Asia Minor) he had been at Athens, came to Corinth, and found there Aquilla and Priscilla, who had *lately* been driven out of Rome by Claudius's decree. This was some time *after* the council at Jerusalem, and the whole account indicates that the event was quite recent, a fact wholly at variance with the supposition that Peter had been subject to this decree *before* the time of the council.

3. In addition to what our author states as to the evidence, from the Epistle to the Romans, that Peter was not and had not been in Rome when it was written, as there is no salutation to him or his particular friends — we might recur to the character of the argument and the nature of the instruction which it contains; which afforded occasion, and indeed furnished some peculiar reasons, why a reference should be made to Peter and his teaching, if personally known to those to whom it was addressed. Again, in the same Epistle we have, in chap. 15: 20, Paul's declaration to

them that he did not wish to preach where Christ had been named, lest he "should build on another man's foundation." Would he then have written as he did, to these very persons to whom he was making this statement, had they enjoyed the preaching of the great Apostle Peter? Could he have been guilty of so gross an inconsistency as to write a formal Epistle, and so preach to them? This applies equally to Paul's subsequent residence and preaching in person at Rome, in case Peter was or had been the bishop there, as claimed.

4. Had Peter gone to Rome (as assumed) from Antioch, his natural course would have been through Greece; and he would doubtless have been noticed, as having been at Corinth, in those Epistles as well as in the Acts, where that city is mentioned (Acts xviii.). But though his disciples are mentioned, he evidently had not himself been there. When Paul came to Corinth, the whole account indicates it was *new ground*. His Epistles were written but a few years after, and the divisions were caused by some zealot Jews who had followed in his track and who rested their claims on their acknowledgment of Peter; but Peter was not there, or Paul must have saluted him; and had he been there at any time, he would doubtless have alluded to it. There is no evidence that Peter ever followed in the track of Paul preaching the gospel, and thus as it were seeking to build on any other man's foundation. Luke mentions the fact of Apollos's being at Corinth (Acts 19: 1) *after* Paul; and no doubt would have done the same respecting Peter, had the fact been so.

5. The supposition that Peter was at Rome when Paul was there, and wrote thence his First Epistle, and so that the Babylon there mentioned is a figurative appellation for Rome, is shown by our author to be at variance with the internal evidence of the Epistle and common sense. Besides, the fact that there is no salutation from Paul, called here a "beloved brother," and so they could not be estranged from each other, shows decidedly that they were not there together. — The same thing is likewise proved by the man-

ner in which Paul, in his Second Tim. 4: 11, speaks of Mark, a friend of Peter. After he had said, "*only Luke is with me,*" he goes on: "Take Mark and bring him with thee; for he is profitable to me for the ministry." Had Mark been at Rome previously with Peter, as claimed, and Peter now there, would his coming have been requested now, without also the reason being assigned that he could be of comfort likewise to Peter, his other dear friend? Would not Paul feel, that at least he might wish to learn something about his early master and bishop, by whose direction at Rome, it is claimed, he wrote his Gospel? But there is not the slightest allusion to his coming to Rome for Peter's sake. No allusion to Peter, at all, in the whole Epistle.

As to the Babylon mentioned First Peter 10: 13, the argument that this is not a symbolic term, as in the Apocalypse, is further strengthened by the consideration that the Apocalypse is evidently a sequel to Daniel, who, as do Isaiah and the other prophets, predicts the fate of Babylon; so that in carrying out the historic times into the future, the apostle very naturally used the same name symbolically. Such is the view of Auberlen, in his able work on Daniel and the Apocalypse. If the Apocalypse was written towards the end of the life of John, as maintained, there is no reason to suppose that Peter ever saw the book, or knew of such a use of the word for Rome, but every reason to the contrary.

There is some diversity among the modern commentators and authors who have treated of the chronology of the primitive church, embraced in the Acts of the Apostles and the periods covered by the Epistles of the New Testament, as to the particular dates; though the best authorities concur, so far that Ellendorf's argument is not affected by these differences, in its main points.

One of the ablest writers, probably, is Wieseler (*Chronologie des Apostolischen Zeitalters*: Göttingen, 1848). He gives a tabular list of thirty authorities on the various dates mentioned, which is valuable for consultation. He himself places Stephen's death in A. D. 39 or 40; Paul's conversion in A. D. 40; the famine mentioned, in January, 41, etc.; Paul's

first journey to Jerusalem (Acts ix.), in A. D. 43; Peter's flight from Jerusalem, A. D. 44; Agrippa's death, Aug. 6 (14), A. D. 44; Paul's second journey to Jerusalem, A. D. 45; Paul's return to Antioch, A. D. 48 or 49; Paul's third journey to Jerusalem, to the council, A. D. 50 or 51; Paul's fourth journey to Jerusalem, at the Pentecost, A. D. 54; Paul at Jerusalem a prisoner, A. D. 58; Paul reaches Rome in A. D. 61, and is put to death there early in A. D. 64. This author holds to but one imprisonment of Paul at Rome.

Wieseler has an able excursus, in which he examines the question of Peter's abode and martyrdom at Rome; and, while admitting that Peter may have suffered martyrdom there—grounding his opinion on the traditions of Caius, Dionysius, etc., which Ellendorf has so thoroughly sifted—yet he says that Peter *could* not have come to Rome before A. D. 54, 61, or 63; and that, if he was there at all and died there, it must have been in the after part of the summer of A. D. 63, and he could not have been there a whole year. He also argues that the First Epistle of Peter must have been written at a late date, from Babylon *on the Euphrates*, shortly before Paul was put to death.

After disproving the argument from the Roman Catholic writers, for the primacy based on Christ's address to Peter, he says: "But though the correctness of the ideas respecting the constitution of the church which is its basis, should be admitted, it is a mere fiction that Peter was bishop in Rome and the *first* bishop. Even Eusebius, who had already reported many fabulous things respecting the Romish abode of Peter, knows nothing of the episcopal office of Peter at Rome. Compare Gieseler, *Kirchengeschichte*, I., p. 103, note 6. And might there have existed at that time generally bishops, in the sense of the Romish system, yet at least Peter, who came to Rome so late, both on account of the previous existence of the Romish church, as well as the longer blessed activity of the apostle Paul in the place and spot, must have already found an organized church, not have been the first bishop of it" (p. 592).

Similar are the opinions of others, among whom may be mentioned Fr. Baur, Lange, Delitzsch, Mayerhoff, etc.

Dr. E. T. Mayerhoff, in his "*Historisch-critische Einleitung in die Petrinischen Schriften*," after an elaborate examination of the question, covering some twenty octavo pages, in which he takes up the various traditional authorities cited in defence of the opinion of Peter's abode and bishopric in Rome, comes to the following conclusion, on p. 94: "The *historical contradictions, which are absolutely beyond solution*, render wholly suspicious that story of an abode and martyr's death in Rome; and if we regard, still more, the *mode of its rise*, the *late period* of its formation, the silence of the earliest accounts respecting the place of Peter's death, the *lively interest of the Romish church* for the presence of the Apostle there, and in general the *uncertainty of the tradition*, the *credulity*, and the *want of critical skill* in the Fathers, who heap up one error on another—we find it easy to be explained how so certainly unhistorical a story of an abode of Peter at Rome might be formed and be so generally spread abroad.

Windischmann indeed, in his *Vindiciæ Petrinæ*, attempts to sustain the Roman Catholic view; but the manner in which he controverts the arguments of Mayerhoff and others, speaks little for his coolness or soundness of reasoning, as he seeks to establish the traditionary authorities in their most enlarged form.

Ellendorf's work on the Primacy has an extended criticism of the passage (Matt. 16: 18), on which the Roman Catholic writers build their argument for Peter's supremacy among the apostles; and in a note, p. 10, he states, in relation to the explanation of the term "rock," as applied to Peter's confession: "Most of the Fathers are of this opinion, viz. forty-six, among the oldest and most famous; eight hold all the apostles and their successors for the foundation on which the church is built; sixteen, the Saviour alone; only seventeen decide for Peter. The learned and famous Launor, teacher of the Sorbonne, has brought together all the passages. (Opp. T. V. P. II. Ep. vii. p. 99, etc.) Compare Pinel, über den

Primat des Rom. Papstes, Deutsche von Breidenstein. Stuttgart bei Cotta, 1829."

After a most elaborate examination of the question historically, Ellendorf sums up his conclusion respecting the claim of the church of Rome to the primacy in these words, p. 243: "OF A ROMISH PRIMACY, OR OF A CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH OF ROME, THERE WAS YET, IN THE FIRST THREE CENTURIES, NO MENTION; THE ROMISH BISHOPS YET EXERCISED NOT A SINGLE ONE OF THOSE PREROGATIVES (RECHTE) WHICH TO-DAY FORM THE PRIMACY. BUT GRADUALLY THOSE FALSE HISTORICAL VIEWS, NAMELY OF THE BISHOPRIC OF PETER, OF HIS SEE AT ROME, OF THE SUCCESSION (SUCESSIO) OF THE ROMISH BISHOPS IN PETER'S BISHOPRIC, CAME INTO CIRCULATION, UPON WHICH THE PRIMACY FINALLY ERECTED ITSELF."

He then goes on, in the same masterly manner as before, to discuss the question: "What was the constitution of the church in the period indicated?" and more particularly: "What constitution had the church in the Apostolic age, i. e. in the first century after its foundation" (p. 244)? This is very thoroughly done by a particular critical examination, in reference, first, to Timothy and Titus, of all the passages in the Acts of the Apostles and Epistles throwing light on the subject, by which he reaches his conclusion (p. 249): "We see accordingly that the Christian church, first, was governed by the apostles and their helpers in the apostolic office. Every apostle entered directly upon the administration of all the churches founded by him, either personally or by epistles or by missions of fellow-laborers who were furnished by him with all plenipotentiary powers."

His next question is: "What church constitution did the apostles ordain?" Here he says (p. 250, 251), "The Catholic church says: These presbyters *were* not *priests*, but *bishops of the present day*. These are, *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, the successors of the apostles, appointed by them to be heads and rulers of the individual churches, and for this end entrusted with a special higher power, which was imparted to them by a peculiar consecration. Under them stand, as *subordinates*

of a lower order of rank, the *priests* properly, who were consecrated by the bishops, while the former could only be consecrated by archbishops. The latter have the exclusive right to administer the sacraments of confirmation and consecration. In every church there can and must be only *one* bishop; while the number of priests may be large. The bishops form the first order of rank, *appointed by God* in the church, while the *priests* make up the *second*.

"The inquiry now is, whether there were such bishops in the apostolical church as a specially appointed institution given by Christ?

"After we have carefully examined and compared all the writings of the New Testament, and have likewise consulted the oldest traditions after the time of the apostles, we see ourselves forced decisively to reply in the negative to this question, and to hold firmly by the view, that originally there were no bishops in the present sense; that from the beginning onward, bishop and priest formed *one and the same* rank and grade, *one and the same* dignity; that at first the priests were appointed by the apostles to be pastors of the church; and that they, as well according to the name as in fact, were bishops; that the present episcopate is not of *divine* but *historical* origin.

"*This our view*, which is a vital question agitated between the Catholic and Protestant church, *we will prove, by incontestable reasons, as the only true and correct one.*

"If the present episcopate is of divine origin, it must of necessity, according to its essence, show itself in the apostolical century, namely, in the time of the apostles themselves. Accordingly, the bishops of that period must be:

"a. Accurately distinguished from the priests, and be placed above them.

"b. They must have possessed and exercised a peculiar higher power above the priests: (*a*) special care for the preservation of doctrine and discipline; (*β*) the distribution of the sacrament of confirmation and the consecration of the priests.

"c. In every church there must have been only *one* bishop, and he must show himself, in every case.

"Yet of all these things there is not a single trace, but precisely the contrary, as we shall show."

This is done by a clear examination of the passages of Scripture bearing on the subject; and then Ellendorf goes on, in p. 254, to add :

"It is not to be conceived how, in spite of these expressions of the holy Scriptures, so clear and unquestionable, there could have arisen, in the Catholic church, the opinion that *bishops* and *elders* were different, and that the former constituted a rank, appointed by Christ, above the latter. But the grounds by which the advocates of the episcopate defend this as a divine institution, correspond completely to the utter baselessness of this view. Let us hear, once for all, Walter, who, at the present day, is the most powerful and skilful defender of the Catholic church constitution and hierarchy.

"Walter says that the bishops, by virtue of a divine and apostolic appointment, form the head of the ecclesiastical administration in every church; that to them *priests* and *deacons* are given as helpers; and that, accordingly, the hierarchy, in its essential grades, consists of bishops, priests, and deacons. In a book, in which Walter treats of the privilege of the church, of all acknowledged Christian confessions, and indeed with the avowed purpose of exhibiting the superior excellence and the divine authority of the constitution of the Catholic over every other — in this book Walter adduces, as his only proof of the legitimacy of this ecclesiastical constitution from divine right, the decree of the council of Trent (Sess. xxiii. c. 6. 7). With the unambiguous and most decisive expressions of the holy Scriptures, he deals by the most pitiable and superficial reasoning:

"The usage of language of the holy Scriptures, for the most ancient time, appears to be contrary to the distinction between bishops and elders; for in part the apostles frequently call themselves only *πρεσβύτεροι* (1 Pet. 5: 1. 2 John 1: 1); and in part the terms *ἐπίσκοποι* and *πρεσβύτεροι* are

often used promiscuously together (Acts 20: 17, 28. Tit. 1: 5, 7). But although the names, in the beginning, were not so accurately distinguished, *yet the Epistles of the apostles prove* that the things were distinguished, and that particular overseers, among the rest, were distinguished as the central point of the unity. So, for example, Titus himself had to appoint elders (Tit. 1: 5), and Timothy to receive accusations against the elders (1 Tim. 5: 19).¹ Thus Walter's proof.

"But Walter has only forgotten to add this, to wit: that the *elders*, of whom mention is made in both places, were designated by the apostles as *bishops*; that neither Titus nor Timothy were bishops, but helpers of Paul in the apostolic office, i. e. were themselves apostles, according to Acts 14: 13. This position of Titus and Timothy, we have heretofore proved beyond refutation."

Ellendorf then looks at the passages by Walter, and shows that they demonstrate the very contrary of what he wished to prove, or "that *elders* (priests) and *bishops* were *absolutely one and the same*," and thus reaches his conclusion:

"From these numerous witnesses, capable of no other interpretation, and that cannot be refuted, we draw the conclusion that in the apostolical church there were no bishops as a higher order of rank above priests, appointed by Christ; that, still more, bishops and priests were one and the same, and that, accordingly, in any church (*gemeinde*) were as many bishops as there were priests, who, united in a college — the *presbytery* — *in common* (or collectively), administered the highest government of the church."

Had we been able, we should have been glad to present Ellendorf's argument in detail; but it would occupy too large a space. It is well worth reading by any who have access to the original German.

Since Ellendorf's treatise appeared, Bunsen has published his "Hippolytus and his Times." In this book he

¹ Lehrbuch des Kirchenrechts V. Auflage, §§ 15, 16, 17, 24, not. m.

proves that Hippolytus, who was bishop of Novus Portus or Ostia, the harbor of Rome, wrote about A. D. 220 and suffered martyrdom, as he supposes, about A. D. 236 or 238; and that, at this time, nothing was known of any such primacy or supremacy of Peter or of the Roman church as is claimed. Had there been, Hippolytus could not but have alluded to it. Bunsen, vol. 3d, p. 223, says: "Thus we find the suburban towns incorporated with Rome: Tusculum and Preneste, Tibur and Velitræ, Ostia and Portus, each of them a bishopric. It is clear from the words of Hippolytus that there was no further extension of the Roman church in his time." Again, p. 224: "The Roman church, at the beginning of the third century, had not yet become the Italian (in our sense), still less the Latin church."

Speaking, too, of Eusebius, on whom the tradition impugned rests in so large a degree, Bunsen further says: "Eusebius was entirely a man of the East, and his literary knowledge of the Western church, in the second and third centuries, is most notoriously defective." The recent examination of this historian by Mr. Coleman, will no doubt be remembered, and his authority be duly estimated by the readers of the *Bibliotheca Sacra*.

A single author more may be mentioned here, as he is not perhaps so well known in this country as he deserves to be, Edward John Shepherd, rector of Luddesdown. In his "*History of the Church of Rome to the End of the Episcopate of Damasus, A. D. 384*," London, 1851, he closes with an "*Inquiry into the Authority for the doctrine of the Supremacy of the Bishop of Rome*," etc., in which he examines the question of the traditions respecting Peter at Rome. After a careful review of the pretended authorities, and arriving at a similar conclusion with Ellendorf, he comes to Clement, who, it is claimed, was the person "whom St. Peter himself ordained bishop of Rome;" and in relation to him he says: "I now put it to the reader's common sense to say whether, as Clement was the first recipient of this power, which was to remain in his successors forever, it is not one of the most unaccountable facts on record, that, knowing how impor-

tant these facts were, not only to his own church, but to the church at large, he should, in magnifying the apostles Peter and Paul, mention as a matter of glory St. Paul's preaching and martyrdom, in the West, which had no such results, and be silent on the same facts in St. Peter's case, which had such stupendous consequences.

"It seems to me that a person viewing this subject without prejudice, would come to the conclusion that Clement knew nothing of the country in which St. Peter died; or, that if he did, he judged it of no importance to be stated; and, consequently, that he was entirely ignorant of the present Roman theory; and that, in his view, St. Paul was a far more important personage in the Christian church than St. Peter. This, I have but little doubt, was his real opinion. That opinion was undoubtedly held by the ante-Nicene church, as, in their writings, St. Paul is generally styled 'the apostle,' without any reference to his name.

"The only ante-Nicene evidence for the fact of St. Peter's having died at Rome, rests on the same evidence as that Clement was ordained by him; and if he was, and wrote that letter, I think it is clear that he knew nothing of Roman supremacy; nay, that he did not even know that St. Peter had ever been in the West. In an oration, attributed to Gregory of Nanzianzum, Peter is distinctly confined to Judea (Orat. xxxiii. s. 11). Whoever wrote this oration, it is an oriental opinion of Peter's proceedings, very different from the Roman. The writer never could have had the slightest notion that St. Peter had ever been in Europe; and I believe that, in the fourth century, such was the general impression; it is mine, I confess, in the nineteenth."

Adverting further to what Eusebius says, Mr. Shepherd remarks: "The writer (it cannot be Eusebius) tells us that he 'adduces these things [the testimonies of Caius and Dionysius] that the history of Peter's dying at Rome may be the more accredited.' Accredited?—if the Roman theory be true, the supremacy, which was founded upon Peter's having died at Rome, had been a constant fact before the eyes of the church for the previous three hundred years.

The interference of the Roman church had been seen and felt, during these centuries, everywhere, on this very ground and only on this very ground—that St. Peter had died bishop of Rome.

Objectors, then, to believing that Peter had died at Rome, there could have been none. There might have been doubts, A. D. 70; but A. D. 330, after an admitted authority of three centuries, there could have been none, if the Roman story be true. But if unbelievers were so numerous as to attract the notice of the historian, or rather, if this is an insertion into the history of Eusebius, the supremacy founded upon St. Peter having died at Rome, must be a fable."

Mr. Shepherd regards very many of the authorities adduced by the Romish church, in support of their claims, as interpolated. In five letters, addressed to the Rev. S. R. Maitland, he calls in question Cyprian's letters; and, by a series of well-arranged and forcible historical arguments, sustains his position as to their falsehood. Indeed, he more than questions the very existence of Cyprian himself.

In his "History of the Church of Rome," he also adverts to the same subject, and, alluding to these "letters of Cyprian, bishop of Carthage, who is probably an imaginary personage," he says: "that until the middle of the third century there is not the least trace of any intercourse between the bishops of Rome and Carthage; indeed, we scarcely know anything of either church." "That during the short interval between A. D. 250—258, the two churches are seen in the closest possible intimacy." "The members of both churches are so intimately acquainted, that commentators are puzzled to distinguish Romans from Africans." "The curtain drops; and although Africa is described as in a state of fearful confusion in the fourth century, there is not, during the remaining half of the third, near the whole of the fourth, nor until the fifth, the slightest fragment of any intercourse between the orthodox churches of Rome and Carthage. During four hundred years there is no known voluntary intercourse between these two sees, except during these eight years in the middle of the period." The character of the

letters themselves are examined with no little acumen, and the conclusion reached seems justified by the facts adduced. In another portion of his History, Mr. Shepherd subjects some of the letters of Basil, bishop of Cæsarea in Cappadocia, to a similar trial and with a similar result. These two instances afford striking proof how little reliance is to be placed on a variety of the evidence on which the claims of the Romish church rest, and also serve to sustain Ellendorf's views as to their authority in the case of Peter's abode, bishopric, and martyrdom at Rome.

ARTICLE IV.

DEMONOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

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THE difficulties which invest this subject, all will admit; its importance cannot be over estimated. If it be true that the great adversary of our race is surrounded by an innumerable band of wicked spirits, to whose wiles and machinations we are constantly exposed, we ought to acquaint ourselves, as far as possible, with this great agency of evil.

Of the existence of a great and mighty intelligence, the impersonation of evil, and in a special sense its author and promoter, no one can doubt who reads and believes the Bible. Satan, the adversary of the Old Testament, and *διάβολος*, the accuser and calumniator of the New, from the opening to the closing chapters of revelation, from his triumph over man's integrity in the garden of Eden, to the awful overthrow predicted of him in the close of the sacred canon, is made the prime actor in all that is bad and subversive of God's authority among men. With those who can see no evidence, in the Bible, of the existence of such a malig-

nant and powerful being, we have at this time no controversy. We are to look at this subject in an aspect which has perplexed many good men who have no doubt of the existence of the wicked one. We refer to the inferior agents of evil, spoken of in Scripture under the terms *devil and his angels, the angels who kept not their first estate, demons, Beelzebub, the prince of demons*, and the like. These varied forms of expression refer, we believe, to the same order of wicked beings, viz. the angels who fell with Satan from their state of holiness and happiness in heaven, and who are declared by Jude to be "reserved in everlasting chains, under darkness, unto the judgment of the great day." In this same class of evil spirits are to be reckoned the *demons* of the New Testament, the ejection of whom from the persons they had been permitted to enter, constituted some of the most stupendous miracles wrought by our Lord while on earth.

The existence of evil angels has been a matter of doubt with some who are staunch believers in the existence of evil spirits, the agents of Satan, in leading men astray. These evil spirits they suppose to be those of wicked men, who after death are employed, as the ministers of the great adversary, to afflict men, tempt them from the path of duty, and oppose the progress of truth on earth. To this class they refer the demons of the New Testament, who are to be regarded as the spirits of the wicked dead, commissioned by Satan, their lord and master, to enter into and afflict the bodies of men. As the sources of proof, by which they endeavor to maintain this view, are much the same as those resorted to, by the infidel, to overthrow the reality of demoniacal possessions, we shall discuss the subject in reference to the common objections which infidelity opposes to our acceptance of this most important truth of revelation.

Of the miracles of our Lord, no inconsiderable portion consisted in the ejection of demons. The fulness of detail with which some of them are narrated, the astonishment of the people in reference thereto, and the increased rage of his enemies at each successive miracle of this kind, show clearly

that they are to be regarded as among the most wonderful exhibitions of our Saviour's power. What then were these *demons*, which our Lord cast out? Were they veritable existences, which had taken possession of men? and if so, were they evil angels, or the wicked spirits of dead men? These are the questions before us, which, divesting the subject of all extraneous matter, pertaining much of it to idle curiosity and vain speculation, we shall endeavor to answer as briefly as possible.

In order to clear the subject of some of the difficulties which have been made to invest it, we shall advert, at first, to what these demons have been claimed to be, by those who deny them to have been veritable evil spirits.

1. They have been claimed to be *natural diseases* of a very malignant type, which popular superstition attributed to the agency of wicked spirits. But that these were not diseases merely, the cure of which constituted all the casting out of demons there was in the case, is almost too evident to require proof. What kind of disease was that which cried out: "What have we to do with thee, Jesus, thou Son of God? Art thou come hither to torment us (i. e. the disease) before the time?" When was a bodily disorder known to have begged permission to enter, and to have actually entered, swine, causing the immediate destruction of two thousand of these animals? How was it that the miserable persons, racked and tortured by these remarkable diseases, were so much in advance of them in the enjoyment of health and a sound mind, as to recognize and acknowledge Jesus as the "Son of God," and "Son of David?" The notion that the demons of the New Testament were only personifications of violent and incurable diseases, is too preposterous for a moment's belief. It is true, indeed, that the possession of a human body, by one or more of these demons, was always attended, to a greater or less extent, with physical suffering. This is the reason why the word *cure* is so often employed to denote the dispossession of the demon. In every such instance, the bodily faculties were restored to their usual healthful functions.

But accumulative proof that these demoniacs were not simply maniacs, epileptics, hypochondriacs, and the like, is found in the direct address of Jesus to the demons themselves, asking their name, threatening them, commanding them to be silent, to depart from the possessed person, and afflict him no further. His statement respecting the return of an unclean spirit, accompanied by seven other spirits, more wicked than himself, to the house which he had previously left, making the last state of the man possessed, worse than the first, is wholly inconsistent with the theory that diseases are referred to. When the seventy returned from their mission, and expressed their joy that even the devils were subject to them, at the mention of the name and authority of Jesus, he replied: "In this rejoice not, that the spirits are subject unto you; but rather rejoice because your names are written in heaven" (Luke 10:20). The substitution of *spirits* for *devils* or *demons*, shows, beyond all question, that veritable spiritual existences are referred to, and not simply diseases. This appears the more conclusive when the eye takes in the previous context, especially v. 19. There is the promise of miraculous gifts, which our Lord cautions them, in v. 20, against regarding as the ground of their chief joy. They were to be endued with "power to tread on serpents and scorpions," the literal sense of which, as a promise of protection from all dangers, even those most imminent and perilous, while it is not to be rejected, does not fully meet the demand of the context, which is evidently concerning "the old serpent, which is Satan," and whose array of evil spirits and agencies for mischief may well be represented under the imagery of poisonous reptiles. That spiritual evil is mainly referred to, is evident from the next clause, *over all the power of the enemy* (i. e. of Satan, as is clear from the article in the original), which is both supplementary and explanatory of the preceding promise, including power over every form of evil. Then follows the words: *notwithstanding, in this rejoice not, that the spirits are subject unto you*; of which the latter clause is but a varied and epitomized form of the more expanded promise in v. 19, and clearly

shows that something far other than physical evil is referred to.

But an argument is sought for against the reality of demoniacal possessions from *lunatics* (literally, *moon-struck persons*). As these persons were not really *moon-struck*, this is advanced as a proof against the reality of the possession of persons by demons. But the cases are widely different. It is one thing erroneously to ascribe a disease to some agency of nature, and affix to it a name indicative thereof, which shall remain long after the error is exploded, as in the use of *lunatic*, and quite another to call a person *demon-possessed*, when we have the sure word of revelation that he was really thus possessed.

Closely allied to this averment, that demoniacs were such only as were afflicted with some strange and terrible disease, is the view taken by some, that the epithet *demon* was applied to the diseased person, when wrought up to so high a state of frenzy or mental hallucination, as to suppose himself possessed and controlled by another and more powerful being. This they seek to illustrate by the demoniac of Gadara. According to Mark (5 : 6), this maniac, when he came in sight of Jesus, having a sort of presentiment that help was nigh, ran and worshipped him. Olshausen and Alford regard this as the act of the man, in contradistinction from the demon within him, who would have sooner fled from Jesus, than come to meet him. But as soon as our Lord commanded the unclean spirit to depart from him, his condition was reversed. A violent paroxysm seized him, and, under its influence, he spake, with the suppression of human consciousness, in the character of the demon, and cried out : " What have I to do with thee, Jesus, thou Son of the most high God ? I adjure thee, by God, that thou torment me not," although he had just before sought Jesus with purely human feelings, seeking relief from his dreadful malady. Under the influence of this dethronement of reason, he fancied himself possessed by a legion of demons. The cure of this strange delusion, would be virtually the same, as the ejection from him of real demons.

But to this it may be replied, that, while in this paroxysm, in which he was so bereft of reason as, according to the theory above stated, to fancy himself the abode of a legion of evil spirits, he addressed Jesus as the "Son of the most high God," thus manifesting an acquaintance with his divine character, far in advance of the most pious and enlightened persons in the whole nation. This theory, too, leaves wholly out of account the entering of the demons into the swine, which transaction, of itself, is sufficient to show the absurdity of supposing the possession of the man to have been only an imaginary one.

We come now to the consideration of an objection, put forth with an assurance which seems to challenge all contradiction, viz. that the evangelists employed the words *δαίμων* and *δαιμόνιον* in accordance with the superstition of the times, to denote a violent disease, caused by the possession of some *departed human spirit*. Thus Farmer and others, who deny the existence of demons and demoniacal influences, assume that these words, in classical Greek, are never applied to inferior deities, as fallen angels, but to the spirits or *manes* of such as had once been men, and who, being advanced to the rank of gods and demigods, had the supposed power of entering the bodies of men and causing frenzy or distraction.

But assuming this definition to be correct, the doctrine of demoniacal possession as taught in the New Testament, would not thereby be invalidated. The word *θεός*, in Greek authors, is used of any and every divinity; and yet no one presumes to maintain that, in its transfer to the Septuagint or New Testament, it retains its polytheistic sense. In like manner, if it were true that *δαίμων* and *δαιμόνιον* were employed, in the Greek classics, only of the deified spirits of the heroic dead, it would furnish no proof that such is their signification in the New Testament, when transferred to denote existences which were as unknown to the Greeks as Jehovah himself.

But this assumption of Farmer's definition, which we have made for the sake of argument, has no basis in the

facts of the case. This will appear from the history of these words, as found in the best Greek authors.

There are two words in the New Testament, translated *evil spirit, devil*, viz. δαίμων and δαιμόνιον. The latter is a neuter substantive formed from the neuter of δαιμόνιος, *of or belonging to a δαίμων*. We shall therefore particularly consider the latter word, as containing the ground-signification of δαιμόνιον, etymologically derived from it. The etymological signification of δαίμων (a contraction for δαήμων, from δαήναι, δάω, *to learn*) is *one who is skilled, learned, knowing*. Thus Plato (Cratylus, p. 398. B) says: ὅτι φρόνιμοι καὶ δαήμονες ἦσαν, δαίμονας αὐτοὺς ὠνόμασε, *he (i. e. Hesiod) calls them demons because they are wise and intelligent*. So also Tzetzes (Hist. xii. 871 Δ).: δαήμων τις καὶ ἔμπειρος. Archil. ap. Plut. Thes. c. 5: ταῦτ' ἑς γὰρ κείνοι δαίμονες εἰσι μάχης. Hesychius defines: δαίμων, δαήμων. Some derive the word from δαίω, *to divide or allot destinies*. But this is supported by less worthy authorities, and furnishes a ground signification which does not ally itself so readily to the special uses of the word, as does Plato's definition above given.

With the generic signification *knowing, intelligent, skilled*, the word δαίμων is applied, as might be expected, to any and every Grecian divinity, from the highest to the lowest: from Zeus down to the least deified, fortuitous influence which acts upon the life of man, and helps to shape or modify his destiny. In Homer, it is applied to the Olympian deities, both collectively and singly, in a sense equivalent to θεός. Thus it is said of Athene (Il. i. 222): “ ἡ δ' Οὐλυμπόνδε βεβήκει δόματ' ἐς αἰγιόχοιο Διὸς μετὰ δαίμονας ἄλλους, *and she went to Olympus, to the mansions of the ægis-bearing Jove, among the other divinities*. So in Il. P. 98: ὅππότε δ' ἀνὴρ ἐθέλῃ πρὸς δαίμονα φωτὶ μάχεσθαι, ὃν κε θεὸς τιμᾷ κ. τ. λ., *when a man desires, in opposition to a demon, to fight with a hero, whom a god honors*. The word δαίμων here refers, most unquestionably, to the same deity as θεός in the relative clause, and is translated, by all the commentators, in the sense of θεός, *god*. Similar to this is its use in Thucyd. iv. 97: ἐπικαλουμένους τοὺς ὁμαχέτας δαίμονας καὶ τὸν

Ἀπόλλω, *invoking the demons* (i. e. gods) *worshipped in common there and Apollo*. The Scholiast explains ὁμοχέτας δαίμονας by τοὺς συμμετέχοντας τῶν αὐτῶν ναῶν καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἱερῶν, *sharers of the same temple and the same sacrifices*. So also Photius: συννάους θεοὺς, καὶ ὁμοροφίους, *gods dwelling together in the same temple and worshipped there in common*. There can be no doubt that Thucydides here uses the word δαίμονες for such of the higher divinities as, together with Apollo, were worshipped in the same temple; the expression, as both Suidas and Photius say, being in common use among the Bœotians, to denote associated deities. The word is used for θεοί in Æsch. Prom. 85: ψευδωνύμως σε δαίμονες Προμηθεῖα καλοῦσιν, *the divinities falsely call you Prometheus*. Plato calls the ruler or moderator of the universe μέγιστον δαίμονα, *the greatest god*.¹ Citations from the Greek classics might be multiplied, where δαίμων is used in the sense of θεός.

From the ground signification of the word, *intelligent, wise, prudent*, which renders it a fit and expressive term by which to designate the superior divinities, we shall not be surprised to find it employed, in the Greek classics, in more subordinate senses, such as *numen, divinity*, with the epithet καλός, ἀγαθός (Diod. 4. 51), *a good or propitious divinity*; or with κακός or στυγερός (Odys. K. 64; Soph. Aj. 1215; Plut. Cæs. c. 69), *an evil or adverse divinity*. These latter epithets do not imply what we mean by an evil spirit, but one who is adverse or unpropitious. Thus Virgil represents Æneas as saying, in reference to his neglect of Creusa: Hic mihi nescio quod trepido male numen amicum confusam eripuit mentem—"I know not what *hostile deity* deprived me of my prudence," etc. It should always be borne in mind that there was no divinity in the Greek which answered to the idea of Satan, or the evil spirits who fell with him.

¹ Plato here adds the epithet *greatest*, because he distinguishes the δαίμονες from the superior gods, or rather he includes the superior gods in δαίμονες as the more generic term. He therefore finds it convenient to represent the superior divinities by οἱ μέγιστοι δαίμονες, while the inferior deities he simply denominates δαίμονες.

Passing on to the remoter significations of *δαίμων*, we find it employed in the sense of *fortune*, which was always a deified personification, with both the Greeks and Romans. Thus in Hesiod. Sc. 94 : *αὐτὰρ ἐμοὶ δαίμων χαλεποὺς ἐπέτελλετ' ἄεθλους*, *but fortune has imposed upon me difficult labors*; Æsch. Pers. 601 : *ὅταν δ' ὁ δαίμων εὐροῇ*, *but when Fortune shall go on well* (i. e. be favorable); Plut. Æmil. c. 36 : *ἐδεδίων γὰρ τὴν μεταβολὴν τοῦ δαίμονος*, *for I feared the change of fortune*. Cf. Eur. Tro. 103; Eur. Alc. 561; Soph. Œd. Col. 1337, for this use of *δαίμων*, which is very common.

Akin to this is the use of *δαίμων* in the sense of *chance*, a meaning of such frequent occurrence, that it were useless to cite passages where it is thus employed.

This word is found in many passages where we are obliged to render it by the word *genius*. Thus Plutarch (Artax. 15) : *ὁ δαίμων τοῦ βασιλέως*, *the genius of the king*; (Cæs. c. 69) : *ὁ μέντοι μέγας αὐτοῦ δαίμων, ᾧ παρὰ τὸν βίον ἐχρήσατο, καὶ τελευτήσαντος ἐπηκολούθησε*, "*the great genius which attended him (literally, which he used) through life, followed him after death.*" In this, as well as its sense of *numen*, it is often accompanied by *ἀγαθός*, *καλός*, *κακός*, and *στυγερός*, according as the genius may be friendly or adverse to the person whom he attends. Under this head, in the sense of *prosperously*, we translate *κατὰ δαίμονα*, in Hippocr. Ep. ad Damag. p. 1279, 32, and *σὺν δαίμονι*, in Il. A. 792, and O. 403.

Denham (Kitto's Cycl., Art. Demon) says that *demons*, in the theology of the Gentiles, are middle beings, between gods and mortals; and adduces, in proof of this, Plato's observation, *πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον μεταξύ ἐστι Θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ*, *every demon is a middle being between God and mortal*. But Plato does not assert this of the whole genus, but of that species only to which the *δαίμων* of Socrates belonged, and who were regarded as the beings who mediated between the gods and men. Every demon of this kind was a being inferior to the gods, but superior to men; and hence occupied a middle station, and were the instruments by which the prayers and supplications of men were conveyed to the gods,

and the commands of the gods revealed to men. That the words of Plato are not to be taken in their strictest and most extensive sense, is evident from the application, in Homer, of *δαίμονες* to the great gods, such as Zeus.

Among these more remote significations of the word, and of much more infrequent occurrence, we find *δαίμων* employed to denote the *manes* or *shades of the dead*. Hesiod (Op. 121) calls the men of the *golden age*, who had departed life, *δαίμονας*, and says that they are *φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων*.¹ Æsch. Pers. 620 : τόν τε δαίμονα Δαρεΐον ἀνακαλείσδε; Luc. de luct. c. 24 : ἔασον ἀναπαύσασθαι τοὺς τοῦ μακαρίτου δαίμονας; Eur. Alc. 140 : μάχην ξυνάφας δαιμόνων τῷ κυρίῳ, where the Schol. explains : ἡ τῷ τῶν νεκρῶν κυρίῳ· φασὶ γὰρ τοὺς νεκροὺς δαίμονας. But our limits forbid our extending these citations any further.

We see from this hasty survey of the meanings of the word, as found in the Greek classics, that *δαίμων* is a generic term, applied to all the divinities, yet mostly to the inferior deities, since we find it used for *θεός*; but at no time, as far as our observation extends, *θεός* for it. In every instance where it is used, the etymological signification given it by Plato, is verified. It is employed always in reference to *beings of superhuman knowledge, or knowing ones*, sometimes of the great divinities; and at other times, and more frequently, of the lesser deities, such as presided more especially over the destinies of men, and among whom are to be classed, also, the *souls of departed heroes*.

In its numerous and varied significations, it is one of the most flexible and prolific words to be found in the Greek language; and to claim for it any prevailing or special sense, except such as may be fairly made out by the nature of the subject under discussion, and the *usus loquendi* of the writer who employs it, is a violation of every sound principle of interpretation.

¹ Here it is to be noted, that Hesiod refers to such persons of the golden age as were good and virtuous men, and not such monsters of wickedness that they cannot rest in their graves, but return, as evil spirits, to torment their fellow men.

It will be seen from this hasty glance, how unwarranted is the assertion that δαίμων and its kindred word δαιμόνιον, are employed primarily and principally of human beings, who were deified after their death. We have seen that this is a subordinate and comparatively infrequent use of the word, and more remote from its great and prevailing signification.

We find these words δαίμων and δαιμόνιον applied, in the New Testament, to spiritual existences of an unclean and malignant nature, who had taken possession of human beings, and who were thence ejected by the mighty power of Jesus Christ. Shall we resort to Grecian mythology, and seek to ascertain the character and grade of these demons from the various classes of divinities designated by these words in their original use? Shall we claim them to be paralleled by the greater Grecian divinities, because Homer tells us that Athene ascended to Olympus and sat among the other δαίμονες, such as Zeus, Here, Apollo, Ares, Poseidon, Aphrodite, and the like? Or shall we regard these New Testament demons as corresponding to the Greek *chance, fortune, fate*, in which senses δαίμων was so often employed by the Greek writers? Or, if this does not seem to suit their character, are they to be regarded as the counterpart of the household gods, the *lares*, those kind, benignant, genial companions of each family, who accompanied them from place to place as presiding, tutelary genii, far unlike the unclean, malicious demons brought to our notice in the New Testament? And once again, shall we presume to compare these demons, ejected by Christ, actuated by such restless and hellish malice, with the deified heroes and virtuous men of the *seculi aurei* of Greece? How utterly do we fail in tracing any resemblance between these crafty, malignant, and impure demons, and those beings to whom this name is applied in classical mythology! There is but one kindred or family lineament existing between them, and that lies in the generic sense of the word, which renders it applicable to any being, good or bad, who is superior in knowledge and, by implication, in power to man.

Why were these words selected for their New Testament

use? Evidently for the reason that *θεός* was already appropriated to designate *JEHOVAH*, the only living and true God; *ἄγγελος* was applied to those good superior beings, who are the attendants and messengers of Jehovah; *διάβολος* was the very translation of the Hebrew *יָצָן*. There were no words left to designate the evil angels, but *δαίμων* and *δαίμωνιον*, which, as we have seen, were employed in a variety of significations, yet all based upon the idea of beings of superior wisdom and intelligence.

We must not look, then, to the Greek uses of these words to ascertain their special New Testament sense, any more than to the Greek use of *θεός* to find out the character of Jehovah, to whom, in its transferred use, it is applied in the Septuagint and the New Testament. In both cases, their special meaning is to be learned from the Scripture itself. What, then, does the New Testament teach respecting those demons represented as under the authority and direction of Satan, who is styled their prince?

In the first place, we have no authority from Scripture for regarding them as the *spirits of dead men*, who, while living, were notoriously bad, and thus, after death, became the fit agents of Satan for carrying out his evil designs upon men. There is no intimation, in the Bible, that the spirits of wicked men revisit this earth on such an agency. The dead are represented as descending to Sheol or Hades, and there reposing in silence and forgetfulness (see Job 14:12, 21. Eccles. 9:5, 6). Such expressions as *to sleep with one's fathers*, *to be gathered to one's people*, *to go to one's fathers*, are not to be referred to the mere burial of the body, but to the state of rest and companionship which characterize the condition of the dead in Sheol. In Isa. 14:4—20, the mighty dead, who had been the chief ones on earth and kings of the nations, are represented as reposing in state, each in his own seat, and as being stirred up at the entrance of the king of Babylon into Sheol. Making all allowance for the boldness of the imagery, this passage is certainly opposed to the idea that the shades of these mighty dead are roving to and fro upon the earth, on their agency of mischief and ruin.

The rich man (Luke 16 : 19—31), whose antecedents upon earth were such as would have rendered him a highly suitable one to be pressed into this demoniacal service, is represented by our Lord as having his fixed and unchangeable abode in Hades, and so anxious for the welfare of his brethren as most earnestly to entreat that Lazarus might be sent to warn them of their danger. How opposed is this to the idea that he was possessed of that hellish malevolence which characterized the evil spirits of the New Testament.

That these demons were not the souls of departed men, appears very clear from their address to our Lord when coming into his presence : "What have we to do with thee?" What common interests have we, or why should we come together, there being no bond of intercourse between us? Could this be said by any of the human family, living or dead, who knew that the being whom they thus addressed, was the Son of God, who had become incarnate to save the race from eternal perdition? But hear them still further : "Art thou come hither to torment us before the time?" The word rendered *time*, is not χρόνος, but καιρός, a *fixed, convenient, suitable, appropriate time*. There can hardly be a doubt, that the time here referred to, is the judgment of the great day, to which Jude says the angels that kept not their first estate, are reserved, in everlasting chains, under darkness. At the approach of the Son of God, whom these demons well knew, they were seized with sudden fear, lest the time of their exemption from the full measure of suffering was to be cut short. This would be strange language to be used by souls of the wicked dead, but highly natural when regarded as spoken by beings who were under such fearful apprehensions of increased suffering.

We have thus endeavored to show upon how slight a foundation rests the theory that the demons of the New Testament were the *manes* of ungodly men. We venture the assertion that such a view would never have been broached and defended, had it not been regarded, by the enemies of truth, as throwing discredit upon the reality of demoniacal possessions. Infidelity seldom attempts to storm, openly,

the citadel of truth. Its more usual mode of attack is gradually to sap its foundations.

But what then were these demons, of whom we have been speaking? The only answer must be, *the evil spirits*, or *wicked angels* associated with Satan in his rebellion against God, and, since then, his agents and abettors in extending his pernicious sway over men. There is abundant evidence, in the Bible, of the existence of this order of wicked spirits. The "*devil and his angels*," in Matt. 25 : 41, is manifestly antithetic to *Jehovah and his holy angels*, implied in the words: "Son of man . . . and all the holy angels with him," in v. 31. This, however, is not the only antithesis in the passage before us. The wicked, on that day, are to be consigned to the place of torment, prepared for the devil and *his* angels; so that there is a double antithesis: one, as has been mentioned, between the *good* and *bad angels*; the other, between the *doomed souls* and the *wicked angels*, in whose torments they are henceforth to participate. The obvious inference is, that these bad angels belong to a different order of beings from the wicked dead, and are the attendants and ministers of Satan, as the good angels are of Jehovah.

In Ps. 78 : 49, the plagues and desolations of Egypt are referred to the agency of *evil angels*: "He cast upon them the fierceness of his anger, wrath, and indignation and trouble, by sending evil angels among them." The force of this remarkable passage is not to be evaded by regarding it as a varied form of expression for the plagues. These have been referred to specifically, and in their order, in the preceding verses; and to repeat them under a different term, in this verse, would be a flat tautology. But if it be so interpreted as to refer these plagues to the agency of evil spirits, sent by Jehovah to do this work of destruction, and to add to its horrors, then the sense is climacteric, and the passage becomes one of awful import. Besides, what license have we, from any well-established law of hermeneutics, to refer these evil angels, whom God is declared to have sent upon Egypt, to the plagues or agencies of nature, commissioned to do

this work of destruction? Ernesti says that we are not to depart from the literal signification of a word unless impelled thereto by a violent reason. Does any violent reason compel us here, to depart from the literal interpretation of the words *evil angels*? Is there anything more improbable that God should let loose the powers of darkness upon Egypt, than that he should commission one of his elect angels to destroy the host of Sennacherib (2 Chron. 32:21), or, at another time, to afflict with pestilence the city of Jerusalem (1 Chron. 21:15)? Would not the principle of interpretation, by which we refer these evil angels to the plagues brought upon Egypt, compel us to regard the good angels commissioned of God to execute his judgments upon Jerusalem and the Assyrian king, as mere personifications of pestilence, or the deadly blast of the simoom? How unsafe, as well as unsound, would be such an interpretation. It meets every sound hermeneutical law, to regard them as veritable evil angels, while the opposite view is a gross violation of the same.

An additional argument in favor of the literal interpretation of the passage above referred to, is drawn from the promulgation of the law on Sinai. As this event is related in Exodus, and subsequently referred to in Deuteronomy, nothing is said of the agency of angels; and yet in Acts 7:53. Gal. 3:19. Heb. 2:2. it is clearly intimated that such an angelic ministration was employed. Now who would venture to refer the word *angels*, in the text, "the law was ordained by angels in the hand of a mediator," to the thunderings and lightnings of Sinai, or to any of the dread manifestations of Jehovah's presence on that occasion? Is it not equally erroneous to pervert the expression *evil angels*, in the text before us, to mean simply the plagues which God brought upon Egypt? We cannot consent to surrender this great proof-text of the existence of evil angels, the more valuable as being found in the Old Testament, which has of late been discovered, in certain quarters, to be so very barren in all things pertaining to the unseen world, that we should scarcely wonder if Jehovah himself should be soon declared to be a mere myth, like the Grecian Zeus.

We might refer, in further proof of the existence of evil angels, to Rev. 12: 7—"And there was war in heaven: Michael and his angels fought against the dragon; and the dragon fought and his angels, and prevailed not; neither was their place found any more in heaven. And the great dragon was cast out, that old serpent called the devil and Satan (see Rev. 20: 2), which deceiveth the whole world: he was cast out into the earth, and his angels were cast out with him." Here two things are worthy of especial notice: (1) that the dragon is the same as Satan, the arch deceiver of man and enemy of God, who is so called from the form he assumed in the first temptation of man, or from the hideous appearance of the dragon, as described by Homer and other Greek poets, which renders it a suitable appellation for Satan; (2) that he is accompanied by angelic attendants, who fight for him and do his bidding, as their acknowledged head and chief. What becomes of the antithesis between the angels of Michael and those of the dragon, if the latter are the spirits only of the wicked dead? Does not this text array, in hostile opposition, the powers of light and darkness, existing before the creation of man, and fighting with fresh animosity to effect, on the one hand, the salvation, and on the other the ruin, of this more recent creation? And here with what force and appropriateness may be cited the great texts in 2 Pet. 2: 4, and Jude 6; texts so plain and direct as to place the existence of evil angels beyond any question. In Peter this great truth is thus referred to: "For if God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to hell, and delivered them into chains of darkness, to be reserved unto judgment." In Jude it is revealed with even greater fulness and explicitness: "And the angels which kept not their first estate, but left their own habitation, he hath reserved in everlasting chains, under darkness, unto the judgment of the great day." That the spirits of the wicked dead are not here referred to, is evident from the context in Peter, where the argument of the certainty of divine vengeance on the ungodly, is carried forward from the fearful punishment which overtook these angelic transgressors, to the destruction

of the old world by the flood, and of Sodom and Gomorrah by fire, being thus illustrated and confirmed by instances of divine retribution drawn from the whole history of God's dealings with the enemies of good, from the angels who first fell, to the wicked antediluvians and the inhabitants of the cities of the plain. With equal clearness does the context in Jude point to these "angels who kept not their first estate," as a higher and earlier order of intelligences, whose example and doom are brought forward together with that of the guilty inhabitants of Sodom, in confirmation of the certain punishment which shall overtake the ungodly in every age. Language more explicit, and confirmed and illustrated by a clearer context, can hardly be found in support of any biblical truth, than that employed by Peter and Jude in regard to the awful doom of the angels who rebelled and fell with Satan.

There remains, now, but one point to establish, and that is the identity of these evil angels with the demons of the New Testament. The fact which we hope we have established by our previous argument, that these demons were veritable spiritual existences, and yet not the souls of dead men, would of itself leave us no alternative to referring them to bad angels. But we have corroborative proof of this from the word of God. When the Pharisees accused our Lord of collusion with Beelzebub in the ejection of demons, he answered this malicious charge by showing its absurdity: "If Satan cast out Satan, he is divided against himself" (Matt. 12: 26). In the first clause Satan is, of course, the prince of demons; in the second, the word is put, collectively, for the demons under his control. If these were merely imaginary beings, and not veritable evil spirits, where would be the absurdity which our Saviour intended to fasten upon their charge? and how would the dispossession of these mere creations of fancy, be the division of the kingdom of Satan against itself? But, further: "If I cast out devils by the Spirit of God, then the kingdom of God is come unto you." Here two things are to be noted: (1) Our Lord avers that he casts out devils by the Spirit of God (i. e. by divine

power). This averment is, indeed, not directly made, but the supposition implies it; for the hypothetical form *if I*, etc., does not imply doubt or contingency, but the logical condition on which the result, stated in the next clause, depends. (2) The display of divine power, in the expulsion of demons, was unquestionable proof of the near approach of the kingdom of God, and that men were to receive Jesus as the accredited messenger of God and to obey his instructions. How could either of these assumptions be true, if the demons ejected were other than those mighty and malignant spirits banded together, under Satan, to destroy our race? As to the objection noted by Denham (*Art. Demon*, Kitto's Cycl.), that if this proves anything, it proves that Satan is equivalent to *δαμόνιον*, it makes our argument still stronger and more conclusive; for if Satan is a *demon*, it follows, as an irresistible conclusion, both that demons are not the spirits or souls of the wicked dead, but are of the same class of beings as Satan himself.

Equally explicit is the concurrent testimony in Luke 10: 17—20, when at the report of "the seventy," that in their missionary tour, even the devils were subject unto them through his name, he replied: "I beheld Satan, as lightning, fall from heaven;" which was in effect saying, that this expulsion of his agents was the precursor of the downfall of his kingdom, which would be as palpable and decisive as the falling of a thunderbolt from the skies. But how is the infliction of this blow upon the kingdom of darkness to be explained, if the demons which were dispossessed, were not to be reckoned with those malignant spirits which form the retinue of Satan, and are the arm of his power to do mischief? We find another instance, where Satan is used as a convertible term with "a spirit of infirmity," in Luke 13: 11—16, where our Lord, having released the woman from the diabolical agency which had bowed her together for eighteen years, said to the cavilling and fault-finding Pharisees: "Ought not this woman whom Satan hath bound, lo, these eighteen years, to be loosed from this bond on the sabbath day?"

We might refer to Peter's assertion (Acts 10 : 38), that our Lord "went about doing good, and healing all that were oppressed of the devil" (here *διάβολος*, which sets the matter at rest), but our limits will admit of no further quotations. Enough has been advanced, we think, to satisfy every intelligent and candid mind that Satanic agency, collectively considered, comprises an innumerable band of mighty spirits, who fell with their head and leader in his first transgression, and, under his sway and direction, are employed in leading astray from truth, and vexing in various ways, the human family; and that demoniacal possession, in our Saviour's time, was the entering into the human body, of one or more of these unclean and malignant spirits, to torment and, if possible, effect the final ruin of the unhappy subject of possession. This theory satisfies all the conditions of this moral phenomenon, and is the only one which will stand the test of a thorough biblical examination. There may be points of obscurity in this subject (as what subject relating to the unseen world, can be named, in which there is not much that is dark and mysterious to us in our present state?), but the great truth remains so intact as to challenge our full and hearty belief, and if we falter here, there are no limits to the downward tendency which will result from our scepticism.

The question may be asked: Why there were so many demoniacal possessions in the time of Christ, and none now? But how do we know that demons are not, at the present time, exercising their fell influence upon the physical condition of men? Why may not those strange and violent maladies, which we sometimes witness, be legitimately attributed to their agency? The knowledge of this does not fall within the province of our senses; and we can, therefore, indulge only in a conjecture of its truth. But in the light of revelation, it appears quite probable. The agency of Satan in afflicting Job, of which we should have been wholly ignorant, had it not been revealed to us; the delivering of an erring brother to Satan, at Paul's direction, "for the destruction of the flesh" (i. e. to be visited and

brought low by some fearful malady), "that his soul might be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus" (1 Cor. 5:5); the words of Peter, to which reference has already been made, respecting Christ's healing those that were oppressed of the devil; in short, the whole demonology of the New Testament, show that an untoward physical agency is exerted, by evil spirits, upon men. This physical agency is, indeed, restricted within proper and prescribed limits. Satan could do no more to Job, in the trial of his integrity, than he was permitted to do. But that such an agency, to a greater or less extent, is exerted by evil spirits upon men, no one who reads and believes the Bible can well deny.

But if this be deemed unsatisfactory, and the inquiry is still pressed, why so many were possessed with evil spirits in the time of our Lord, the same reply may be made as to the question why Pharaoh was raised up, "that God might show his power in him, and that his name might be declared in all the earth" (Rom. 9:17). It was to show forth the power of our Lord in destroying the works of the devil (1 John 3:8), and to illustrate and attest his divine mission. Every such deliverance from physical suffering produced by demoniacal agency, was an earnest of the greater deliverance from spiritual thralldom to the adversary, effected by Him who came to save, from sin and death, all who put their trust in him.

But that there were in reality more demons, engaged in the work of tormenting men in the time of our Lord, than at any other age of the world; or that they were then more active and malevolent, is a matter of conjecture, which, to say the least, is not very probable. Satan and his hosts are always active in the work of death. Of their spiritual presence and power, the Bible leaves no doubt. From the earliest history of man to the present time, they have been working in the children of disobedience. We are commanded to watch against them, to put on the whole armor of God, and especially to take the shield of faith, that we may quench all their fiery darts, to resist them continually, and to remember that our struggle is not with flesh and blood

merely, but with principalities and powers, with the rulers of the darkness of this world, and with spiritual wickedness in high places. No doubt should enter our minds, that we have a great adversary, who seeks every opportunity to lead us astray, and that he has at his command innumerable spirits, ready to do his bidding and further his wicked designs upon mankind.

ARTICLE V.

LATIN LEXICOGRAPHY.

BY PROFESSOR GEORGE M. LANE, HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

It is now more than twenty years since the first volume of Freund's *Lexicon of the Latin Language* was published. This work supplied a want that had long been felt, and its circulation has accordingly been very great. A *Lexicon* drawn in part immediately from the ancient authors themselves, with a judicious criticism of the materials, employing in its definitions the supple adaptation of the German, in place of ponderous Latin periphrasis, full enough for the ordinary scholar, and yet compressed into four volumes of moderate size, could hardly fail to come into general use, and crowd out its predecessors. The heavy *Thesauri* of former days were too bulky and inconvenient. The four folio volumes of Gesner, laden with a learning that reminds one of the Dutch philologists, were constructed on an antiquated plan. The *Lexicon* of Forcellini—an immeasurable advance on what had preceded it—still held ground, and is at this very moment printing in an extended form at Padua. Scheller's estimable work, which Ruhnken condescended to correct and superintend in a Leyden edition, held the first place in common use, with its modifications by Lünemann and Georges.

The favorable reception which the work of Freund has met with, is due quite as much to his theoretical exposition of the wants of Latin Lexicography, as to his practical execution. The Preface, in which he lays down his principles, is a masterly production. So too the lexical scholia on special words prefixed to the lexicon, are models of patient and thorough investigation. We may trace here the influence of Greek lexical studies: the plan of a Greek lexicon begun originally by Johann Gottlob Schneider and improved by Passow has undoubtedly contributed much in an indirect way to the adoption of just views in regard to the lexical stores of the sister language.

It was soon evident, however, that Freund's theory was in advance of his practice. The minute criticism to which the ancient authors had been subjected, the great range of reading required, the necessary concentration and condensation of the vast material, made the task too great for the powers of one man. Some of the articles are very thorough and satisfactory, others are slurred over imperfectly or copied. Some authors are treated thoroughly, or were treated thoroughly for the times, others are cited, but nothing more; in the study of Lucretius, for example, not much satisfaction will be found in Freund. In place of independent researches, we find appended to every Lucretian word merely an extract from the metrical version of Johann von Knebel.

Again, many traditional errors indicate that Freund has not always gone back to his authorities, and weighed the evidences judiciously. For example: every lexicographer, from Gesner down to Klotz, Ingerslev, Freund, and his translators, cites a verb *PERITO*, "a frequentative from *pereo*." If we look to the authorities adduced in support of this strange word, we find quoted Lucret. 3, 710, and Plaut. Capt. 3, 5, 32. Lucretius does not use the word: in the place quoted, *peritare* (if there were such a word) would be out of place, and secondly the codd. Lugd. give this line *ex illa quæ tum peritit partita per auras*. Plautus does not use the word; the line of the Capt. referred to reads, to be sure in the old editions, in Weise for instance, *qui per virtu-*

tem peritat, is non interit. The "peritat" here seems opposed to interit. But in reality it arises from an error in writing two words as one. Now the proof: Nonius de diff. verb. p. 422, quotes this very place under the word pereo, in order to explain the difference between pereo and intereo: "Plautus Captivis: qui per virtutem perit at non interit." PERITARE is a figment which is not found in any classical author; and strange to say, while lexicographers propagate it from age to age, they overlook the only place where it is intentionally used, viz., by the author of the Thesaurus, published by Mai, Auctt. Vaticani, VIII., p. 189, who says: "a pereo peritas, i. e., perire verb. frequent." But this writer betrays the blunder he has made by the example he quotes: "unde *Plautus in Captivis*: qui per virtutem peritat."

The same thing may be shown of not a few other words which Freund has embodied in his work. For most of these words he can hardly be considered answerable, since they passed unchallenged by the criticism of his times. Of a more serious nature, perhaps, is the omission of classical words: superfluity is more pardonable than deficiency. Here again Freund cannot be held answerable for words added to our lexical store since the publication of his work. For example, the noun efferitas, the existence of which might almost be assumed *a priori* from the adjective efferus, the verb effero, etc., has been proved by Klotz from external arguments to be not only a good, but a Ciceronian, word. But as its claims to citizenship have only recently been made known, it is of course not found in Freund's book.

We have spoken of Freund's sins of commission and omission, in which unhappily he does not stand alone. The same cleaving to tradition has propagated many errors in the definitions of words. Take for example *praecanus*. This word is used only once, and then by Horace in the description of his own person, epist. 1, 20, 24: *corporis exigui, praecanum, solibus aptum*. In all dictionaries, without exception, this is rendered "*prematurely gray*." Examining the authorities for this meaning of *prae* in composition,

we find it goes back in the last instance to the interpretation of the Schol. Cruq. ante tempus canus. But if we compare the usage of the language, we shall arrive at a different signification, *very* gray, as the *prae* does not refer to time, but to comparison with other men. Between prematurely gray and very gray there may not be a very great difference, but lexicography must to a hair divide.

To take another instance of traditional error. All dictionaries define *memoriter* "from memory, by heart." The opposite of this would be *de scripto*, as Nizolius gives it. This is as false as false can be. *Memoriter dicere* *never* means to *speak from memory* as opposed to speaking from notes or reading; it always refers to the memory as a mental faculty; *memoriter dicere* means to speak *with a ready and comprehensive memory*. This is so beautifully demonstrated by the citations of Madvig (Finn. p. 74) that it is strange lexicographers have not paid heed to it. And yet such is the conservatism of dictionaries, that it would be safe to predict that the erroneous interpretation will be found in lexicons published in 1879.

It was a step in the right direction for Freund to distinguish the words of different epochs and authors, by prefixing to each word the designation ante-classical, classical or post-classical, or poetical. This is particularly called for in a language which sunders by the sharpest lines poetry from prose; which confines itself in the golden age of its literature to a limited round of words, compensating by its intensity and energy for the budding fulness and the breadth of a former age. With many words the boundary-line is sharp and precise. With others it is less definite, fading away in imperceptible gradations. The danger in applying designations like those of Freund, is that of overshooting the mark, and generalizing from a limited number of examples. For the historical study of the language, Freund is unsatisfactory: he does not inform us with sufficient accuracy in what writer and what work a form first appears. Taking his authority, we should set down e. g. *glutio* as a "postaugustan" word: indeed, all the examples Klotz gives are

from Juvenal, Tertullian, Fronto and Pliny; but in Plaut. Pers. 94, stands *nimio sunt crudae, nisi quas madidas glutias*. So the noun *vernilitas*, where also Klotz is again deficient. This now stands at the beginning of the Bacchides. On the other hand, *edolo* appears as a Ciceronian word; but Cicero uses it in a gamesome way merely, in one of his epistles, as a quotation from a tragic poet. In other cases Freund is too apt to mark a word as poetical, which really makes a part of the prose of a later age; so *miseriter*, which is used by Appuleius.

From these passing strictures on the work of Freund, the inference is not to be drawn that we are disposed to slight his valuable services to lexicography. The additions he has made and the simplicity he has introduced must be gratefully acknowledged. Our object has only been to show that he did not come up to the ideal of himself or his age.

The lexicographical labors undertaken out of Germany since the beginning of this century, have been confined chiefly to the translating and compiling from German works. Mr. Leverett's accurate compilation from Scheller and Lünemann was a welcome substitute for the Ainsworth to which the preceding generation was confined. Mr. Riddle's modest work is favorably known as a school-book; and the translation of Freund, superintended by the late Mr. Andrews in America, and Mr. Smith in England, has brought a more copious mass of materials before the reading public, though it is to be regretted that they did not take the opportunity to make improvements that were obviously needed.

If we look back now twenty years and compare the present state of Philology with its condition at that time, we find great changes. The most important advance, which lies indeed at the bottom of all philological and historical studies, has been in the way of criticism. The eclectic method of former days, which coördinated all manuscripts of all ages and values, and from the diversity of readings thus presented, selected those which the majority of manuscripts or the whim of the editor might favor, is now happily exploded; the old tradition *editio princeps codicis instar*

is now set aside. A more rational method has been introduced, and the reading of one good manuscript is deservedly put before those of fifty bad ones. The great labor expended during the past ten or fifteen years in selecting and collecting the best manuscripts, has been attended with the best results ; and, aided by judicious and methodic emendation, it has furnished texts of most of the Latin authors in a state of great purity.

A second class of aids to lexicography consists in the lexicons to special authors. The unaccomplished here unfortunately preponderates over the accomplished. The ideal lexicon of the Latin language, towards which things seem to be slowly tending, can never be written till the usage of individual writers is carefully studied and thrown into a lexical form ; and already something has been done towards this end. We may notice here such works as Bonnell on Quintilian, and Bötticher on Tacitus, though the latter might with profit be considerably augmented. Valuable materials for the lexicography of the Dramatists, with the exception of Plautus and Terence, and for Ennius, may be found in the editions of Ribbeck and Vahlen. For Plautus we have the programme of Kampmann, *Res Militares Plauti*, a dictionary of the military terms used by Plautus, a sort of forerunner to a more complete *Lexicon Plautinum*. But for the great majority of authors nothing satisfactory is found. Even for Cicero we have only the meagre indices of Ernesti and Schütz, or the inconvenient collections of Nizolius. A *Lexicon Ciceronianum* suited to the age is an important desideratum.

In a third class we may put works bearing more or less directly on the subject of lexicography, such as works on Synonymes, Style, on Comparative Philology and History, Antiquities, etc.

With these means and appliances a new step has been taken, and a *Lexicon* prepared which bids fair to supersede Freund. The author is REINHOLD KLOTZ, well known from his edition of Cicero's Orations, his *Devarius* on Greek Particles, his connection with Jahn's *Jahrbücher*, and many

other literary undertakings. When the lexicon was begun, Professor Klotz was Extraordinary Professor of Philology at the University of Leipsic. Before it was completed he was promoted as the successor of Gottfried Hermann at the same university. The aims of the work are perhaps best given in the words of the programme:

"First, to embody in the work the substratum of the Latin language itself, i. e. the roots of the Latin language and the words derived from them, as fully as the narrow limits of a lexicon allow; to point out, so far as is possible, their derivation or connection, to fix their fundamental signification, and to define this more explicitly by their usage; furthermore, to develop the shades of meaning a word may have, from the fundamental signification, and arrange them in their natural order, with careful attention to the technical terms used by statesmen and diplomatists, jurists, rhetoricians, naturalists, physicians, agriculturalists, architects, etc., which had not hitherto been treated with uniform success."

"Secondly, to give the connections in which the words are found, if not with all the detail of a thesaurus, yet with greater completeness than had hitherto been done, and in a more perspicuous way than is done in the larger dictionaries; to point out accurately the grammatical constructions in which the words occur, and to pay special regard to the prepositions and other particles."

"For the attainment of the first of these two ends, it was necessary, in the first place, to make a careful use of Etymology, Synonymics and Antiquities, and to give at least the final results to which they lead. As to the Etymology, the author has endeavored to give his own views with all possible caution, and to note briefly the views held by the ancients themselves on the etymology of any word, although these views may, on investigation, prove untenable, as they generally aid in showing the idea which the ancients had of a word. Synonymics, i. e., the comparison of words of similar signification, so profitable for the understanding of the exact meaning of words, the author has deemed of greater importance, and has generally endeavored to confirm the

results attained, by appending words of the opposite signification; he has also briefly touched on the synonymics of forms, showing for example the difference between *abitio* and *abitus*, *abortio* and *abortus*, *actio*, *actus*, *actum*, and *agmen*, *discessio* and *discessus*, *scriptio*, *scriptura*, *scriptus*, and *scriptum*. And finally, as to the Antiquities, the author has thought them a fit subject for consideration only when necessary for the understanding of a word, or for the explanation of certain established phrases, while he has refrained from introducing them into articles of a purely historical or mythological nature."

"For the second end, it was furthermore necessary to pay more regard than has hitherto been paid to the Grammar of the Latin Language, both in respect to Etymology and Syntax; yet here also the author has always tried to separate the mere grammatical from the lexical grammatical, and to avoid unnecessary detail; yet it was occasionally necessary to show the difference in signification between different syntactical connections, e. g. between *manere aliquem* and *alicui*, *subire aliquam rem* and *alicui rei*."

"Proper names, so far as they belong in a dictionary of the Latin language, have been incorporated in the body of the work for various reasons; many of them, particularly the genuine Latin names, were originally appellatives, and constitute an integral part of the language; moreover, the forms derived from them are often to be discussed as synonymes, e. g. *Achæus* and *Achivus*, *Hispanus*, *Hispanicus* and *Hispaniensis*. The Geographical Names particularly have received careful attention on account of their various Derivatives."

The work was begun in this spirit more than ten years ago, but — *habent sua fata libelli* — various hindrances intervened, and it lingered along slowly. After a time the coöperation of two other scholars was secured, Dr. Lübker, of Parchim, and Dr. Hudemann, of Kiel, with whose aid the work was completed.

We have then in this work of Klotz a dictionary embodying the latest results of German patience and study, and representing, better than any other dictionary does, the

present phase and condition of Latin antiquity in Germany. To show its superiority by selecting a few articles from Klotz and Freund, and exhibiting them side by side, would be an easy and not unprofitable task, if space allowed. But what is aimed at in the following is rather to point out some of the deficiencies and errors still noticed in all our dictionaries. In doing this, Klotz is taken as the basis, because it is the best lexicon; and what holds with regard to this, holds *a fortiori* of others.

In regard to the number of words quoted and the range of authors included, a short inspection will show that Klotz is far more copious than his predecessors. The additions are made chiefly from later authors, who occupy the debatable ground between the genuine Latinity of the Romans and the barbarous Latinity of the Middle Ages. Strict theory may be inclined to reject these authors in a lexicon of pure Latinity. But, practically, it is no small convenience to have included those words and combinations which have sprung directly from the Latin of a purer age, even though the spirit which dictated them may not be the classical spirit of former times. Furthermore, these words may be of use in illustrating words and phrases of the classical period, as they occasionally betray a reminiscence of some classical author, or may now and then be genuine words of the classical age, which from accident or chance have not been used by writers of preceding ages, or have not come down to us in works preserved. Thus the verb *circumtero* is given by Freund as a ἀπαξ εἰρημένον, and is by Klotz said to be used only figuratively of the contact of one *person* with another, with the reference to Tibull. 1, 2, 72: hunc puer hunc juvenis turba circumterit arta; but we find it used in the primary sense, Myth. Vat. III. p. 183 of the sea, *wasting* or *rubbing* on the land. Again, Klotz asserts of the word *aspritudo* that it is used "only of a raw, inflamed or pustulous condition of body, e. g. aspr. similis pustulis iis; aspr. oculorum: linguæ." Yet App. Mett. 1, 2, 17, says aspritudinem jugi quod insurgimus. What is chiefly objectionable in Klotz's treatment of these words is a certain want of consistency.

The Latinized word hydromantia is given with a reference to Pliny and late writers, while aeromantia, chiromantia, geomantia, and pyromantia are not cited. The word demorsito is omitted (App. Mett. 2, 22, 144; 3, 25, 221), although the language of Appuleius belongs in the lexical treasury. The adverb *fixe* is given as occurring in one place only, and there in the comparative *fixius*; the positive *fixe* is used by Cassiodorus (fr. ap. Mai., Auctt. Vatt. III. p. 353), which should be given in the dictionaries. *Actualiter* and *imprægnò* are found in Klotz's, and perhaps in no other lexicon. But why they are more entitled to a place than hosts of other words from the same authors, it is hard to see. Altogether, for these late writers, more independent study is necessary to give greater symmetry to the work.

The remarks in the Programme on the propriety of adopting Proper Names in the Lexicon are very just. The English edition of Andrews's Freund is not improved by the omission of Proper Names. In the vocabulary of an ancient language, where they are of necessity limited, they may justly claim a place, at least in the present state of lexicography, and for other reasons besides those given by Klotz. The greater vivacity and transparency of a primitive language and the intimate connection between the name and the person or thing named, make it important that the etymological and lexical element they contain should not be overlooked. Every reader of the classics knows with what avidity the ancients seized on the meaning of a name, rang changes on it, and twisted it into fantastic puns, which in colder and less susceptible languages would seem tame and bald. Cicero does not shrink from going down to the root of his antagonist Verres's name, and in one of his most elaborate orations contrasts C. Claudius *Pulcher* with C. *Verres*, or speaks of him as *ex homine tanquam aliquo Circaeo poculo factus Verres*; or again he deduces the name from verro to sweep, and alludes to him under the name of everriculum, a drag-net.

The importance attached to the sound or the fancied etymology of a name is well shown in the changes of names

of towns ominis causa ; for instance, Maleventum is changed to Beneventum on account of the fancied derivation from male and venire : Dyrrachium is preferred to Epidamnus, to avoid the sound of ἐπί and damnum : Segesta is retained rather than Egesta, Ἐγέστα, which sounds too much like egestas. In innumerable other instances, the ancient interpretations of names are etymologically wrong ; for example, the Homeric derivation of the name of Odysseus, or the divinatory interpretation of the name of Helen in Æschylus, εἰλεῖν -ναῦς, instead of σέλας, σελήνη. Fanciful expositions like these are made for the need of the passing moment. It is perhaps the part of the special exegesis of a particular author to comment on Sophocles's derivation of Αἴας from αἰαῖ, or the exultant interpretation, αἰετός, the soaring, sweeping eagle. But even wrong interpretations show that the name was not regarded as a dead or abstract sign for the thing. It is a vital part of the organism of the language, always combining something of a general nature with the specific, and connected by roots and by inflections with its whole lexical and grammatical substratum. Adjective forms and compounds, which have been lost from the written language, may be retained in a name. Thus from the root niv- we find niveus, nivalis and nivarius ; from the root ninguo the lexicons cite only ninguidus. But another adjective of this later root may be added, *ninguarius*, which is found as the name of one of the Insulae Purpurariae in Plin. 6, 32, (37) 104, Ninguarua, which the lexicons omit. Or as an instance of a compound of vallis we find in the same place in Pliny *Invallis*, improperly quoted under Convallis.

For Fictitious names, indeed, there is obviously no place but the lexicon. In biographical, geographical or mythological collections, they are not in their place ; and fictitious names, particularly comic names, have a more palpable and significant lexical element than ordinary names. Klotz has wisely followed his predecessors and adopted them in his book. But in his treatment of these he has not always made use of the results of modern criticism and independent labors, and he omits many names simply because they are

not found in the works of his predecessors. Chrysopolis, the modern Scutari, is given because it is mentioned by Pliny and Ammianus Marcellinus. But why omit the fabulous Eldorado, Goldville, in Arabia, which now stands in the text of Plautus, Pers. 506 ?

Chrysopolim Persæ cepere urbem in Arabia,
Plenum bonarum rerum atque antiquom oppidum.

The punning names in the Captivi, 160 sqq., Pistorienses, Panicei, Placentini, Turdetani, Ficedulenses are very properly cited: but why omit the ominous list of boon companions in the Trinummus, 1821 ?

Chiruchus fuit, Cerconicus, Crimnus, Cricolabus, Collabus.

Surely Collabus, Grab, Grip, is not to be passed over, as it is something of a curiosity in the way of a lexical hybrid, con and λαβεῖν. Or further, why not cite Archidemides (Bacch. 250), a name which seems chosen for the sake of the pun (vs. 284) with demo ?

Quom mi ipsum nomen ejus Archidemidis
Clamaret dempturum esse, si quid crederem.

Gelasimus, the parasite of the Stichus, is overlooked ; and yet, vs. 174, we read :

Gelasimo nomen mi indidit parvo pater
Quia jam a pausillo puero *ridiculus* fui.

And honest Gripus, of the Rudens, has been slighted, although the name is obviously chosen with reference to his calling, and the city he proposes to found and call by his name, monumentum famæ et *factis*, refers to the Sicilian γριπεύς, fisherman. Further, the suggestive name of the place, Cryphiolathronia, is omitted.

Besides the etymological significance of most proper names, they are often worthy of notice as expressing a character, or as abstractions of personal attributes ; if Verres is said to

be *like* Q. Mucius, the latter name might not belong in the lexicon; but when he calls him *a* Q. Mucius, it is plainly used in a lexical sense. Clinia is a man's name, but in Pl. Bacch., 912, it denotes a phase of character.

Many important omissions of names are to be remedied in the dictionaries. On the other hand, many names that are found in the dictionaries are to be modified materially or to be entirely shut out. We find, for example, Arripides for Quodsemelarripides; Expalponides for Nummosexpalponides; Cluninstaridysarchides for Clutomestoridysarchides; the campi Gurgustidonii for Gorgonidonii. Idistavisus is given as the nominative of the German grove mentioned by Tacitus, A. 2, 16, instead of Idistaviso: cf. Nipperd. ad loc.

Under Megara, Klotz mentions the "Dat." Megaribus, but omits the nom. Megares, Plaut. Merc. 646, Proll. Trin. 152. In connection with the name Silenus, the femin. form should be mentioned, Silena, Lucret. 4, 1169.

To mention the changes to be made here in detail would be a thankless task. Some of these errors betray a carelessness of critical authority and inattention to grammatical forms. Klotz gives s. v. Dolo the form Dolum, as from Dulus, a metaplastic nom. of Dolo, with Plaut. Pseud. 1244, as his authority; but the true reading is *superavit dolum* Trojanum, the Trojan wile, fortified by Becker de comm. Rom. fabb. p. 64, with citations from Hom. Od. 8, 492, and Verg. Æn. 2, 264. All dictionaries give a word Cæligenus, Cælusborn. On what authority? Varro uses it of Victoria and Venus; Appulejus of stellæ: but this proves nothing for the nom. in *us*. Analogy points rather to a nom. -gena, as in Saturnigena, Terrigena, Janigena, Divigena, Martigena, Phœbigena, etc. And analogy is confirmed by its use in Ausonius, overlooked by the lexicons (Ecl. de Fer. Rom. 36), Falcigerum placant sanguine Cæligenam.

When proper names make an integral part of an adjective or verb, they come very clearly within the limits of the lexicon. A Greek lexicon would not omit such words as *δύσπαρις*, *αἰνόπαρις*. Nor should a Latin; Att. 561, Ribb.:

Pari dyspari. Charmides the lexicons give, and the verb charmidare; they omit *decharmido* to uncharmidge, Pl. Trin. 977, and quote the corrupt recharmido.

Under the head of Proper Names, we may perhaps include Greek titles of buildings, etc., or works of art, latinized; e. g. from book 34 of Pliny we may add to the lexicons *Epithyon*, Slayer, found only in the acc. fem. sing. *Epithyusan*; *Buthytes*, Oxen-slayer, the name of a statue of Isidotus; *Hageter*, an epithet of Hercules.

In connection with Greek names and appellations, we may notice the further omission of many Greek words, temporarily adopted into the Latin language, and written with Latin letters. Freund lays down the rule in the preface of his lexicon, that, in the older Latin authors, Greek words are more commonly given in Greek letters; in the later Latin as Latinized words with Latin letters. This may be true of technical terms of the Ciceronian age and the writers following that age, as compared with the later commentators and grammarians. But if we set aside technical terminology and look at the literature, we shall find the canon reversed, particularly if we take the dramatists into account. When the ancient Latin writers use a Greek proper name, they are inclined to latinize it as far as possible: later writers use the Greek form. The ancient writers unhesitatingly adopt many Greek words, and make Latin words of them, which later purists drop. The thing may perhaps better be stated thus: The older Latin authors use Greek words precisely as if they were Latin. These words are not so many dead things taken from books, but are, to a greater or less degree, familiar to the ear, are caught from the spoken word, and work their way up to Rome from Magna Græcia or Sicily: and before the complete establishment of a Roman literature and laws of criticism, they formed an organic part of the written language of that unconscious age. Then follows the period of reflection, of study and of conscious criticism; Greek words are banished by strict purists from literary productions addressed to the general public, from history, and oratory. They are used in

philosophy and criticism as technical terms, taken from books, familiar to scholars rather than to the public at large. As such, they are commonly written in Greek letters. Then follows the third period, when the feeling for purity is gone, and foreign words are unhesitatingly used.

Moreover, critical changes of texts, made since the publication of Freund's lexicon, extend somewhat the domain of lexicography in this respect. This may be illustrated by the examples, *instar omnium*, given by Lachmann, ad *Lucr.* 4, 1169. The text of *Plaut. Epid.* 5, 2, 17, gives *apolactizo inimicos* instead of *ἀπολακτίζω inim.*,¹ which Klotz does not notice. So also *traulizo* = *τραυλίζω balbum esse*, *Lucret.* 4, 1164, belongs in the Latin lexicon, even though the inflection is Greek, *traulizi*: and from the same place we may add the following euphemisms for personal defects: *melichrūs*, honey-colored = *nigra*: *acosmos* = *immunda et fetida*: *dorcas* (for which the lexicons give only the primary meaning) = *nervosa et lignea*: the combination *Chariton mia* = *parvula, pumilio*: *cataplexis* = *magna atque immanis*: *ischnos* in the neut. with *eromenion*, = *cum vivere non quit præ macie*: *rhadinus* in fem. *rhadinē* = *jam mortua tussi*: *philema* = *labeosa*. Under *satyrus* 2d, should be added that the fem. occurs *Lucr.* 4, 1169.

The following two, mentioned by Lachmann, also belong here: *zetematium*, *Lucil. ap. Non.* 359, 14; and *eupatereia*, id., the Homeric epithet of Tyro.

Plaut. Most. 595, latinizes the Greek *γρῦ*=grunt: ne *gry* quidem, or perhaps better, *gru*,=οὐδὲ γρῦ. *Chilōter*, *tri*, s., name of a garment, *χειλωτήρ*, is to be added from *Nov. ap. Non.* 148, 31, *Ribb.* p. 219.

Many changes are yet to be made in this part of lexicography, and the subject requires a careful and critical revision.

We notice now some of the omissions of compound words, beginning with Verbs. In compounds, consisting of a verb and a preposition, the first part is often uncertain,

¹ Unless we prefer to write with Fleckeisen, *Ep. crit.* p. xiii, *apolactisso*, which would also change the *badizo* of the *lexx.* to *badisso*.

owing to difference of texts, particularly with *dis-* and *de*, which are confounded in the manuscripts. For instance, *decerto* is a very familiar word: *discerto* no lexicon gives. The best authorities give it Plaut. Men. 809, *dic mi istuc quod discertatis ut sciam*. Here it is confounded with *dis-serto*.¹ On the other hand, *dejungo* is given as a Plautinian word: it should be *dijungo*. Of *despolio*, the lexicons say that it occurs once in a deponent form. Not so: in the supposed instance of this dep. the MSS. give us a different verb, wanting in the lexicons: *quos impune depopulatur* [et] *dis-polatur* *dedecus*, a compound of *dis-* and the root *polor*, found in *interpolare*: cf. Ribbeck, p. 146.

Other prepositional compounds, omitted by Klotz and others, are *amigro, as*, to move away, Liv. 1, 34: *adneo, es*, to sew on, Plin. 11, 2, (1), 3, *pinnae adnevit: attumulo, as*, to heap up: id. 9, 6, (5), 14, [orca] *attumulata fluctibus in tantum ut circumagi nullo modo posset: eccelebro, as*, Liv. 1, 45: *magnitudo victimæ eccelebrata fama* (cf. *ecnubo*, ibid. 4, 4 and Alschevski ad 6, 15): *injurgo, as*, id. 10, 35, *hæc injurganti increpantique*. *Supereo* may be added on account of Lucret. 3, 1031, *pedibus superire lacunas*, though it is somewhat doubtful whether it is a part of the verb. *Neparco* = *non parco*, is found in Plaut. Most. 124, *sibique aut materiae neparcunt*.

In verbs compounded with two prepositions, it is hard to say whether the first preposition is a constituent part of the verb, or whether it is to be taken adverbially or as a preposition with its case. The latest manuscript investigations, however, go to show that these double compounds occur oftener than we might infer from common editions and lexicons. *Circumaspicio* is a case in point; as the text of Pliny is now constituted we read, 8, 33, (51), 121, *totius oculi vervatione circumaspicit*; and if we should prefer with Hand, Turs. II., p. 70, to divide it, *circum aspicit*, the place should not be quoted, as Klotz quotes it, under *circumspicio*. But besides the double compounds furnished by the lexicons, cir-

¹ In Cato ap. Paul. Diac. p. 46, is *quid ego cum illo discertem* amplius perhaps to be read?

cumaspicio is well supported by *circuminspicio*, also overlooked in the lexicon: Liv. 1, 30, Sabini circuminspicere et ipsi externa auxilia: cf. Alschefski ad 1, 21: and by *circuminsto*: id. 3, 9: si consules circuminstarent et ipsi tribunum. We may add *adinsurgo*: Liv. 22, 4, colles adinsurgunt; *superincido*: id. 2, 10, multis superincidentibus telis; *adprocurro*: Plin. 10, 33, (51), 103. And to the late examples of *suberectus* should be added, Liv. 8, 8, hasta suberecta cuspidē in terram fixa.

We may include in the list of omitted compound verbs many others where the second or verbal part of the compound has brought the verb into a wrong place. *Deungo*, to rub one's self down, anoint, is now read in Plaut. Ps. 222, vino tu te deungis, where formerly the absurd devincis stood. *Decello, ere*,=declinare Lucret. 2, 219, corpora—decelere paullum: the dictionaries do not give this, though Klotz properly corrects himself, s. v. depello. We have the colloquial *gratulari*, and the more dignified *gratari*: the compound *congratulari* is quoted, but *congratari* overlooked, Plaut. Men. 129, conferre omnes congratantes. The frequentative *accusito* occurs perhaps only once, but *incusito* occurs in the same place, Plaut. Most. 713: nihil erit quod deorum ullum accusites: Te ipse jure optimo incusites licet. Another frequentative, *clarigito*, is now established by Lachmann, Lucret. 5, 946, decursus aquai Clarigitat late sitientia secla ferarum. This place Klotz quotes s. v. cito, with the misprint clavus citat for clarus. A more suspicious compound is *insolesco*, which may be added for Plaut. Men. 461: quoi tam credideram insoluisse=insuevisse. *Emino, -are*, found in the Vulg. N. T., hardly belongs here perhaps: but *eminor*, which the lexicons give, with Plaut. Capt. 4, 2, 11 for authority, does not exist; cf. Proll. Trin. p. 178: further, the citation Plaut. Capt. 799, quae illæc est minatio, should be added s. v. minatio, and the word *emination* struck out. In connection with this root, we may notice the spurious Plautinian word given by the dictionaries, *minaciae* for minae, which certainly does not occur in the places quoted by Klotz, and future criticism must decide whether it is in place, Truc. 5, 56.

992 : 995 : 1002 : 1052 : Næv. fr. 32 : Enn. 302, Ribb.; cf. Rhein. Mus. VII, p. 556.

Interutrāque, between both, Lucret. 2, 518 : 3, 306 : 5, 472, 476 and 839 : 6, 362 and 1062.

Not compound words alone do we look for in the lexicon in vain. The simple inceptive verb *certisco* = certum fieri, occurs Pacuv. 107, Ribb. : atque eccos unde certiscent. *Vectito*, frequent. of *vecto*, is not in Freund nor Smith, the former implying, and the latter (s. v. *vectitatus*) directly asserting with Gell. 9, 6, it to be obsolete. It is, however, used by Cato in Cæcil. : quem ego denique credo vectitatum iri ludis : Paul. Diac. s. v. *citeria*. So Scaliger : furthermore, the compound *circumvectito* should be inserted from Plaut. Rud. 933 : oppida circumvectitabor, incorrectly given under *circumvecto*.

Nouns. *Cucus*, cuckoo, Plaut. Pers. 174, whence *cuculus*, is correctly given by Forcellini and Gesner, but dropped by Freund, Smith, and Klotz. *Cepolindrum*, a fictitious spice, Plaut. Pseud. 832 : *sipolindrum* is to be expunged : the cook has possibly in his mind the word *κῆπος*. *Eugium*, Lucil. and Laber. ap. Non. 107, 30 : and Laber. ap. Non. 490, 22. *Vaso* = *vasatus*, like *naso*, *capito*, *fronto*, Pomp. ap. Prisc. as emended by Ribbeck II, p. 198. The collateral form of *femur*, *feminur*, should be quoted, Plaut. Mil. 27, and Rhein. Mus. 1850, p. 312. Two verbal nouns from Lucretius : *linctus*, from *lingo*, 6, 971, *nectari*' *linctus*, and *torres*, from *torreo* = ἀρόκανμα, 3, 917, *arida torres*. The dimin. *mammicula*, from *mamma*, *mamilla*, is found Plaut. Pseud. 1261 : ubi *mamma* *mammicula* opprimitur ; *crumilla*, from *crumina*, Pers. 687 : metuebas ne *crumillam* amitteres. *Sincipitamenta*, id. Men. 211, *sincipitamenta* *porcina*. *Ditiae*, a collateral form of *divitiæ*, Plaut. Trin. 682. *Sacrificiolus* rex, Varr. L. L. 6, 27, p. 84, Müller. The plural of *Collicrepeida* is to be added, (like *cruricrepeida*) Trin. 1022, and the senseless *Oculicrepeida* to be struck out.

Accipitrina is given by the lexicons as a substantive from App. Herb. 30. This is not quite correct. It is really the fem. of *accipitrinus*, an adj. formed regularly from *accipiter*,

like *caninus* from *canis*, *passerinus* from *passer*, *hædinus* (which Freund, Klotz, and Ingerslev by a strange error write *hædīnus*) from *hædus*, *formicinus* (also wrong in Klotz, "formicīnus") from *formica*, etc. The name of the plant *accipitrina*, sc. herba, is a translation of *ἰεράκιον* from *ἰεραξ*, just as *hirundinina* sc. herba is the Latin equivalent for *chelidonium*, *viperina* for *ἐχιδνιον*, or *siminina* for *πιδήκιον*. The lexicons should first give the only place where *accipitrinus* occurs as a real adj., Plaut. Bacch. 274, *accipitrina* pugna, which they omit, and then subjoin the substantive use of *accipitrina*.

In connection with this word, we may notice that the lexicon takes no account of the application of *accipiter* itself as the name of a fish; App. mag. 34, probably the *ἰεραξ* of Athenæus.

To the same class of adjectives in *īnus* omitted may be added *draconinus* from *draco*, Myth. Vat. Mai III, p. 227 B, and the comic word *mininus*, Plaut. Pseud. 329, where there is a pun on the two possible derivations from *mina* = *μῆνα*, and *mina* ovis, a smooth-bellied sheep, under which latter word the dictionaries omit Plaut. Bacch. 1129.

On the other hand, the lexicons give *fungīnus* as the adjective derived from *fungus*. But the text both of Ritschl and Fleckeisen in the only place cited for the word is at variance: Plaut. Trin. 851: *pol hic quidem fungīno generest, capite se totum tegit*. Which is right, the text of Plautus, or the lexicon? We are inclined to think the latter; analogy is decidedly in favor of *īnus* (for the *cucurbitīnus* and *suberīnus* of the lexicon are both spurious, and should be *īnus*.) and the line of Plautus may be remedied by a change in the order of the words: *Fungīno pol hic quidem generest, capite se totum tegit*.

Commodulus, dimin. from *commodus* (*commodum*), Plaut. Stich. 690, as restored by Ritschl and Fleckeisen: *pro opibus nostris satis commodulumst*. The lexicons give it under *commodule*, where Klotz further quotes strangely c. *esse* *alibubi*, Rud. 2, 6, (for 2, 5, 11) for c. *ludis*. *Artutus* from *artus*, like *cornutus* from *cornu*, Plaut. Asin. 565: *octo Artutos audacis viros, valentis virgatores*. *Astutos* is wholly out of

place here. *Vesculus*, dim. from *vescus*, = tiny, to be added : Plaut. Trin. 888, *vesculum vinarium*. Proll. p. 81.

Placidule, dim. from *placide*, ib. 726, *dormibo placidule* in *tabernaculo* : Proll. p. 81 : Rud. 426, *non licet te sic placidule bellam belle tangere* ? *Gravanter*, adv. from *gravor*, unwillingly, reluctantly, Liv. 21, 24, *haud gravanter ad Pœnum venerunt*. And why do the lexicons give only Ciceronian examples of *gravate* ? We should add Plaut. Cas. 5, 4, 26 ; Rud. 408 : Bacch. 532 : Stich. 763. An adverb from *nugax* in the superlative has also been overlooked, Plaut. Tr. 819 : *actum reddam nugacissime*.

Let us now notice some of the words which are imperfectly treated.

Under *abligurrio*, Smith quotes Cic. Cat. 2, 5, 10, *fortunas suas abligurierunt*, as an instance of the secondary use of the word, in the sense of *comedo*, waste, devour. In this sense it is colloquial, and not used by Cicero, and therefore properly rejected by Klotz. But Klotz and others overlook the passage in App. Met. 10, 14, 703, where it occurs in the primary sense, *lick, lick off, abl. dulcia*. *Fundator* : in the primary sense add a prose example, App. Dog. Plat. 2, 24, 250, *fundator urbium* : in the secondary sense, for which the dictionaries give only the authority of inscriptions, may be added App. *ibid.* 1, 1, 180 : *legum Atticarum fundator*. In connection with *infusco*, Smith very properly gives its application to sounds, which Klotz omits. But both omit the cases where the adjective *fuscus* is used in a moral sense, App. Dog. Plat. 2, 14, 229 : *animas fusciores* : *id. de mundo* c. 25 fin. : *quod sit curæ levioris fusciorisque*. Of *helix* only two significations are given : we may add that of orbit, from App. de deo Socr. 8, 140, *usque ad lunæ helicem*. Under *gestio*, Klotz quotes an example from Cicero only of the use of the word as applied to inanimate objects : we add Plaut. Mil. 8, *machæra . . . gestit stragem facere*. *Mustus*, young, fresh : an instance of the word applied to a person, Næv. ap. Non. 136, 7, (Ribbeck II, p. 13) *musta virgo*. *Cingulum* is applied metaphorically, App. de mundo 7, *constringitur Oceani cingulo*, unless indeed this is from *cingulus*. Of

caesim in the first sense the dictionaries give examples from husbandry only: add of architecture, App. Mett. 4, 1, 320, lapide pretioso *cæs*im diminuto. To familiar phrases like *fores crepuere*, under *crepo*, should be added the less familiar use with a personal subject: Plaut. Bacch. 833, *forem hanc pausillum aperi: ne crepa*, don't make a creaking. Under *dictum*, in the sense of command, order (to which should be added *Hinc in manipulis castrensibus sunt dicta ducibus*, Varr. L. L. 6, 61, p. 96, *dicta* = *παράγγελατα*, Müller), the dictionaries give the familiar *dicto audientem esse*, but omit *dicto obedientem esse* likewise with a dative, e. g. Plaut. Bacch. 439: *magistro desinebat esse dicto obediens*: Pers. 378: *Futura's dicto obediens an non patri?* Hence in the line of Att. ap. Non. 72, 2, which Ribbeck, p. 164, gives *Quam invita ancillans, dicto obediens viri*, we cannot but think there is an error, and that *viro* should be emended. *Duplus*, twice as large, twice as much: the meaning two-fold = *duplex*, should be noted: Plaut. Bacch. 641: *duplum hodie facinus feci, duplicibus spoliis sum adfectus*: App. Flor. 3, 16, 69: *duplam gratiam debeo*. If the neuter of *formidabilis* as an adverb, *formidabile ridens*, is properly quoted in the dictionaries, why omit the like use of *exitibilis*? App. Mett. 6, 16, 411, *exitibile renidere*. *Domus*: under the head of the idiomatic construction *domi est* or *domi habere*, in the secondary sense, we must add the ablative *domo*, used similarly, with the idea of source: Cic. p. Cluent. 8, 27: *domo sibi quærendum remedium*, i. e., from his own resources: Plaut. Amph. 637, *exerior domo atque ipsa de me scio*; or with the antithesis *foris*: Bacch. 648, *ut domo sumeret neu foris quæreret*: cf. the Greek *οἶκοθεν*, as Pind. Nem. 3, 31, *οἶκοθεν μάτερε*. *Manducus*: Munk, de Fabb. Atell., p. 39, and lexicographers overlook the definition given by Placid. Gloss. ap. Mai, III, p. 485: *laneam hominis figuram, quae solet circensibus malas movere, quasi manducandum*. So the MS. But we have here an evident corruption; an essential thing with the *Manducus* was the *noise* made with the teeth, the chattering or gnashing. This is clearly implied, Plaut. Rud. 535: *quid si aliquo ad ludos me pro Manduco locem?*

Quapropter? Quia pol *clare crepito* dentibus: so also in the definition of Festus, ire solebat magnis malis ac late dehiscens et *ingentem dentibus sonitum faciens*. Hence we may assume the true reading to be *ligneam* hominis figuram. *Consentaneus*: we may add to the dictt. App. Asclep. 1, where it is combined with a genitive: alterum alterius consentaneum esse dinoscitur.

Casso (caso) -are, frequentative from cado. Klotz quotes only Plaut. Mil. 852 and 856, and Freund says these are perhaps the only places where the verb occurs. Perhaps they are. But the verbal adjective *cassabundus*, assigned by Klotz rather inaccurately to cado, occurs, besides the three places quoted by Klotz, in the Gloss. Vat. C. ap. Mai, VI. p. 514, *casabundæ, saepius cadendæ: casabundus, instabilis, vacillans*: ib. VIII, p. 141, *cadabundus* (for *casabundus*), *crebro cadens*. Now as the verbal *cassabundus* differs but little from *cassans*, or "crebro cadens," the participle *cassans* has, with propriety, been restored in places which have been referred and are still referred by Klotz to an intransitive signification of quassare: e. g. Plaut. Bacch. 305: *capitibus cassantibus*, (cf. Ritschl ad loc.): Asin. 403. This will justify us in assuming that, in the imitative Appulejus, *casanti* or *cassanti*, and not *quassanti*, is to be read in the same phrase, e. g. 3, 26, 223: 4, 29, 303: 8, 19, 550, and perhaps 2, 24, 10. One manuscript in these places has preserved the true form.

To this somewhat indiscriminate list of words we add a few more verbs, the construction or signification of which is imperfectly treated in the dictionaries. We look in vain for an example of the accusative with *protendor*, as in Plin. 6, 30, (35), 194: *quæ supra syrtis majores oceanum meridianum protenditur*: and similarly *continuor* with an accusative: App. Mett. 1, 24, 74: *me continuatur*: so ibid. 5, 31, 378: 6, 18, 415. Of *deformo* we miss the pregnant signification *transform*, with *in* and the accusative: App. Mett. 1, 9, 39, *cauponem deformavit in ranam*: ib.: *alium in arietem deformavit*: Mythog. Vat. III, p. 237, B: *d. in animal latrabile*. *Existimo*: the lexicons overlook the meaning of value =

aestimo or puto with the genitive: Plaut. Most. 76: satin abiit neque quod dixi flocci existumat? See Ritschl ad loc.: Capt. 3, 5, 24: parvi existumo: Fest. p. 143: flocci existumo: Nepos, 24, 1: quod non minoris existimamus. With *circumspicio* Klotz makes a special division for *se circumspicere*: the same should be done with *circumspecto*, as in the first example which he gives incorrectly as an instance of the absolute use of the word: Plaut. Bacch. 279: dum circumspecto me: Trin. 863: circumspectat sese. *Detondeo*: the secondary comic meaning, fleece or deprive of, with the abl., is not given: Plaut. Bacch. 242, *detondebo auro usque ad vivam cutem*: (improperly referred to *tondeo*.) The construction with the infinitive should be added with the verbs *extorqueo* and *commoveo*: App. Mett. 1, 24, 76, *piscatori extorsimus accipere*: Herm. Tri. 6: *commoveor dicere*. With *admitto* the formula *culpam in se admittere* occurs in Plautus, but with it also a. c. *ad se*, Stich. 84.

The comic word *biclinium* is explained by Klotz, incautiously following Quintilian, as a hybrid word, from *duo*, *bis*, and *κλίνη*, instead of the Latin root *clino*, for which again he incorrectly refers us to Lucretius. *Biclinium* is no more a hybrid than *bisellium*. Many words thought to belong to this class are now corrected in the dictionaries; but Smith still holds to *inanilogus*, a spurious compound with *λέγω*, for the true form *inanilocus* from *loquor*, like *falsilocus*, *confidentilocus*, *mendacilocus*. For *adlaudibilis* Plaut. Pers. only is quoted, where now *adjutabilis* stands: but *adlaudabilis* is found Lucret. 5, 158, which is not quoted. The dictionaries still continue to quote Plaut. Trin. 239, as an instance of *elegans*, in the sense of particular, fastidious. Plautus nowhere uses the word, and in the place referred to it is a gloss for *cuppes*. *Dormitator* Plautus alone uses, and in one place only, Trin. 862: Klotz translates a *dreamer*, Smith a *dreamer*, *sluggard*: the context (*dormitator aut sector sonarius*) shows this cannot be the meaning. Lambinus illustrates it well by the Hesiodic *ἡμερόκοιτος*, i. e. a thief who sleeps in the daytime, and prowls in the night. On *ne* or *ne*, Klotz is far more satisfactory than any other lexicon. The English lexicons

still propagate the traditional errors about this word: Smith has rejected many of Freund's spurious examples, but retains two, one from Plautus, one from Seneca. The latter is instructive, as showing the way lexicons are manufactured. The passage is from De Ben. 1, 14. Freund, in quoting it, writes 1, 4 for 14: Andrews copies Freund, error and all: Smith copies Andrews, error and all: while the place has absolutely nothing to do with the word for which it is cited.

Under the adverb *false*, (where should be a reference to Charis. II. p. 179 P.) Klotz cites Plaut. Capt. 609: this example does not belong here, as the text reads ego te Philocrates *false* faciam ut *verus* hodie reperiare Tyndarus, where the vocative of the adjective is contrasted with *verus*. Again, s. v. *falso*, the Amphitr. 812 is given by Klotz and Smith, where the voc. sing. fem. of the adjective now stands: ne me appella, falsa, falso nomine. The first citation under this word, neque me habebis falso suspectum, does not belong Bacch. 3, 3, 70, but 3, 6, 41. And why should the superlative of the adverb be put under the rare form *false* rather than under *falso*?

The first two meanings given by the dictionaries of the word *numen*, viz., "a nodding with the head, a nod," and, secondly, "the inclination of a thing toward a place," are to be struck out, and the two citations to be put under *momen*.

Deprehendo is not connected with the ablative as the dictionaries make it, Plaut. Bacch. 950, but with the genitive, after the general analogy of verbs of accusing, etc., doli ego deprensus sum.

Diu: (the dictionaries should notice the form *dius*, given in the codd. of Plaut. Merc. 862, . . . neque quiescam usquam noctu neque *dius*, a form like *interdius*.) The usage *nec diu*, "not long ago," cannot be attested from Plaut. Rud. 210, because *nec dum* stands there. Further, the assumed connection with *quod* falls away, Amph. 302, where now stands jam diust *quom* ventri victum non datis, like Most. 470, septem menses sunt quom in hasce aedis pedem nemo intro tetulit. A real example of *diu* — *quod* is found in App. Mett. 1, 24, 74: sat pol diu est, quod intervisimus te. *Ædes*

or *ædis*. The authority of Plaut. Most. 474, given for the singular in the sense of house, is altogether spurious. The only *ancient* example is perhaps Asin. 220, and here probably it is questionable.

Many words have been referred to in the preceding, which have an existence only in dictionaries or in bad texts. A few more we add here, which should be expunged. *Appetisso*: given by Non. as used by Attius, is now emended to *appeto*: cf. Ribb. p. 132. *Barathrus* is a spurious word for *balatro*, Lucret. 3, 954: to the authorities quoted by Lachmann may be added Gloss. ap. Mai, Auctt. Class. VIII, p. 76, and id. p. 65. *Batiola* should be *batiaca*: Ritschl ad Stich. 694. *Coaccedo*, for which Pl. Curc. is quoted, should be struck out, as the true reading is *accedo*. *Columis* is given in the sense of *sanus*, or *salvus*, for which *incolumis* (Proll. Trin. p. 68) should stand. *Confirmitas* should be designated as a spurious word. *Curius*, said to be a derivative of *cura*, owes its place in the lexicon to a broken letter: Plaut. Pseud. 1143, CURI O infortunio, for CURVO. The example belongs under *curvus*. *Ebito*, Pl. Stich. 4, 2, 28, (not as in Freund, Andrews, and Klotz, 2, 4, 28!) should in all probability be the simple *bito*. In connection with the simple verb we may notice that the dictionaries give only the two forms *beto* and *bito*, overlooking a third form given by good MSS., *bæto*, on which cf. Ribb. I. p. 91. *Falsificus* and *falsijurius* should be struck out, and under *falsiloquus* the reference to Mil. Glor. Of the participle *fletus* Klotz gives first the proper passive use. To this he adds two other significations, a), "dripping;" sanguine; b), "weeping." Both the latter rubrics are to be struck out. *Illutibilis* should be changed to *illutilis*. *Immunificus*, *jureus*, *largitor* (-ari), *lascivibundus*, *nixo*, *revento* do not exist. Neither does *plagiger*, since the example cited belongs under *plagigerulus*; and similarly *parcipromus* is not found in Pl. Pseud.; whether in Truc., as stated by the dictionaries, remains to be seen. *Eleutheria*, æ, as a feminine noun = liberty, is now corrected, Pl. Stich. 422, to the neuter plural *eleutheria -orum*.

With respect to Orthography, a lexicon of moderate size

is hardly the place for discussions. But if it cannot discuss the relative merits of particular forms, it can at least present us with results, refer us to the literature on the subjects, or give a hint or two which may start a useful train of thought or study. And this is particularly desirable in the present condition of the Latin texts, which, under new and repeated castigations, exhibit an increasing richness and multiplicity of forms of words. In its attention to this branch of Lexicography the lexicon of Klotz is much superior to former works. But much must be added to make it complete; and, indeed, the investigations made since the publication of the first part of the lexicon, are alone enough to require many changes. We can only glance at one or two words where some principle is involved.

Cur, the interrogative from the root *quis*, is naturally subject to the same euphonic laws which are observed in that interrogative. We find accordingly not *quur*, the form given in old books, (any more than we find *quui* for *quoi* or *cui*,) but either *quor* or *cur*, just as we have the two forms *quom* or *cum*; but besides this is a collateral form, *cor*, attested by good MSS. of Lucret. 3, 476, (v. Lachmann,) and Mart. 11, 46, 8; also *qur*, Plaut. Merc. 471 bis, 503, 772.

Hau, the collateral form of *haud*, like *ov* and *ovκ*, found most frequently in the dramatists, is noticed by Klotz (not by Smith). Even the latest editor of Tacitus, Haase, has not observed the frequent recurrence of this form in the first six books of the Annals, although Gronovius, VI, 43, remarks that it is often found in MSS., but did not understand it: 2, 36, *hau dubium*: 2, 88, *hau dubie*: 3, 36, *hau dissimilia*: 3, 73, *hau dissimili*: 6, 20, *hau multum*: 6, 23, *hau dubium*: 6, 30, *hau sponte*: 6, 32, *hau sum*: 6, 38, *hau perpeusus*: 6, 45, *hau dedicavit*; in 6, 43, the MS. gives *HACI concelebraverant*, an error for *hau conc*. Singularly enough at first sight, these are the only places in Tacitus where *hau* is found (unless it be Ann. 16, 27, where the *HAD VENIRI* of the manuscripts points to *hau venir* rather than to the emendation of Acidalius and Döderlein, *haud adveniri*). This, however, is explained by the fact that the excel-

lent Codex Mediceus extends only to the end of the sixth book. From other authors may be added Liv. 1, 34, hau salubrem; App. Flor. 3, 16, 71, audum for haudum.

Smith gives (s. v. nosco) a citation from Plaut. Trin. 445, hau nosco tuum, in which he takes hau for the interjection hau!

As with hau, so with the form *exim*, for *exin* or *exinde*. Klotz gives references to this form, but does not notice how often it is used by Tacitus. The editors, however, have been more observant of this word than of hau. It is found both before a vowel (Ann. 14, 18), and before all classes of consonants; instances from the Annals are 2, 61: 3, 13: 3, 28: 3, 36: 3, 62: 6, 5: 6, 38: 11, 30: 12, 22: 13, 1: 13, 18: 14, 61: 15, 12: 15, 64: 15, 70: 16, 14.

Ōculto, restored by Ritschl, Proll. p. 124, is well authenticated by the inscription he quotes. The same orthography is further given by the Cod. P. of Liv. 1, 34.

For a complete history of Inflected Words, new and supplementary investigations are necessary. The comparison of adjectives is not yet worked out, nor have we authentic information in regard to the occurrence of many participles. Much is also to be added and emended on the forms of verbs; of many, we find no mention whatever made of irregularities in conjugation or of the older form of the perfect, e. g. like *perfodivi*, Pl. Mil. 142: *potivi*, Most. 791: *constitivi*, Ps. 549, and *institivi*, Most. 86; *conposivi*, Tac. Ann. 4, 32, etc. This can only be done by dividing the work of lexicography among a large number of laborers, and assigning to each his special department.

The somewhat desultory remarks here made on Latin Lexicography have been confined chiefly to the external part of lexicography. We have endeavored to indicate, by concrete examples—to which thousands more might be added—rather than by general statements, how much remains to be done, and to dispel the common idea that Latin Lexicography is a settled and finished thing. Much remains to be said on the general scope of lexical works, the etymologies, the derivations from the primary signification, the arrangement of the definitions. But this is too extensive a subject to be treated here.

ARTICLE VI.

DAVID TAPPAN STODDARD.¹

BY REV. JOHN P. GULLIVER, NORWICH, CONN.

THOSE who were connected with Yale College during the period included in the academic years 1837-38, will retain a vivid remembrance of the scientific *furor* which then pervaded that institution. It was the time when an honored Professor was specially engaged in verifying his theory of meteoric showers and of their periodical recurrence. The phenomena of the aurora and of the zodiacal light, called forth a vast amount of enthusiastic attention in the same connection. Not only the matured and well-wrought theories of Olmsted, but the tireless activity and most wondrous zeal of Herrick, afterward the well-known college librarian, and still more the genius of Mason, among the under-graduates, whose ardor in the pursuits of the observatory afterward brought him to an untimely grave, together with a notable development of scientific talent in other students, contributed to this result. That this scientific excitement always exhibited itself in severely scientific modes, could not be claimed. There was not a little of boyish sport mingled with the star-gazing of the devotees, who nightly lay upon their backs in the college yard to count the meteors which might cross their assigned sections of the heavens. And when the resounding cry of "aurora," from some midnight observer brought every sleeper to his window, and in case of the finer exhibitions called the whole body of students out upon the Green, we doubt not that the eyes of anxious college officers were occupied with other irregularities than those of the starry sphere. Still it cannot be doubted that much of

¹ Memoir of Rev. David Tappan Stoddard, Missionary to the Nestorians. By Joseph P. Thompson, D. D., Pastor of the Broadway Tabernacle Church. New York: Sheldon, Blakeman and Co. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. London: Trübner and Co. 1858. pp. 422. 12mo.

this interest was genuine and profitable, though in most cases it was of course transient. Many minds then received an impulse in scientific studies which affected their whole subsequent career as scholars.

David T. Stoddard will always be associated, by those who knew him in his college days, with these scenes. How far he should be considered as having been inspired by the prevailing enthusiasm, or how far he was the inspirer of it, cannot well be determined. Certain it is that he was one of the most prominent and zealous actors in those transactions, and that he soon rose to distinction in scientific pursuits. He was invited to make a free use of the college laboratory, and was appointed assistant in the observatory, a position which gave him access to the philosophical and astronomical instruments. A machinist in town granted him the privilege of using all his tools, "comprising those in almost every department of the arts." During his junior year he received the offer, from the U. S. government, of a post in the South-sea Exploring Expedition. During his senior year, he constructed, of very rude materials, a telescope of small size but of excellent quality. Not satisfied with this, he engaged in the manufacture of another, a reflector, having an aperture of five and a half inches and a focal length of six feet. In this most difficult mechanical operation, he became completely absorbed. His room was converted into a work-shop. He infringed upon other duties in order to find time to polish his "mirror." He could be seen, at almost any hour of the day, with his sleeves rolled up and with blackened hands; and, on one occasion, he received a severe reprimand from a college tutor for accidentally appearing, in this plight, among a party of merry companions in the hall. His fellow students were sometimes amused by his unflagging enthusiasm. He had a frank, child-like, unsuspecting way of expressing his interest, which made him an admirable target for the jesters, who gave him the title of "*speculum*." Yet he was universally loved and respected. His scholarship, both in the languages and mathematics, was of a high order. His scientific attain-

ments were unquestionable, and his telescope was a "*perfect success*." His joy at this result knew no bounds. His fine countenance would be overspread with a beaming expressiveness, more beautiful than the shifting, shooting, culminating aurora itself, as he described to his somewhat incredulous companions the powers of this wonderful instrument in resolving double stars and revealing the moons of Saturn. Troops of eager spectators were collected about the mystical black tube, every fine evening, and the praises of Stoddard were upon every tongue. All rejoiced in his success. He was not the man to provoke envy. He was so humble, so unpretending, so sympathizing, so frank, and at the same time so unquestionably superior in ability and attainment, that both respect and affection were bestowed upon him with a hearty good-will. Much, however, as we admired the man, and much as we praised his telescope, both were destined to a dignity of usefulness of which we had little conception. At his graduation he took a high rank in general scholarship; having, however, chiefly distinguished himself in the mathematics and the sciences to which they are applied.

Tracing still further his history as a scholar, as it is sketched by his biographer, we find him passing the first year after his graduation, as a tutor at Marshall College, Mercersburg, Pa. His duties here called his special attention to the Latin and Greek. The interest which he took in these studies, and the accuracy he exhibited in investigating the more delicate shades of grammatical and idiomatic usage, show that he might easily have taken a high rank as a linguist, although, to use his own words, "These were not my favorite pursuits in college, so that when I graduated, I understood telescope-making much better than Tacitus or Sophocles." During this year he received an invitation to take the professorship of natural sciences at Marietta College, Ohio. This flattering and attractive appointment was not declined without a severe struggle. His taste and talents peculiarly fitted him for such a position. But he had devoted himself to the ministry of the word, and he would

not turn aside. God was reserving him for a far grander work, though he knew it not. An invitation of a similar kind from Western Reserve College was declined on the same grounds.

At the close of this year, he entered the theological seminary at Andover. Says his biographer :

"At Andover we find him pursuing Hebrew grammar and New Testament Greek with the same zest with which he had pursued astronomy at Yale and Latin at Mercersburg. 'Our Hebrew,' he writes, 'is at present troublesome; however, I am resolved to master it, for I think that it is otherwise labor lost. Students spend six months or a year, often, in getting the elements of the language; and, as soon as they leave the seminary, throw up the study and sell their lexicons, grammars, and Bibles for a song. This is foolish — so says our Prof. Stuart — and so I mean *not* to do.

"Like every student at Andover in those days, Mr. Stoddard became greatly enamored of Prof. Stuart, both as a preceptor and as a preacher. His letters contain frequent references to the originality of thought, the enthusiasm of manner, the vivacity of speech, and the fervor of devotion with which the revered 'rabbi Moses' stirred the minds and hearts of his youthful pupils. So engrossed was he in the studies of the junior year, that he resisted the urgent appeals of his brother, Prof. Stoddard, to join him in his labors at Middlebury college." — pp. 76-7.

At the close of his year at Andover he returned to his Alma Mater as tutor. While discharging the duties of this office, he continued his theological studies under the venerated Dr. Nathaniel W. Taylor, whose system, without any servile imitation, he substantially adopted. After two years thus spent, he applied to an Association in western Massachusetts for a license to preach the gospel, which appears to have been most reluctantly granted, in consequence of the suspicions which were entertained of the New Haven divinity. A most striking example, surely, of the error of exalting the mere philosophy of a doctrine into the place of the doctrine itself! Says his biographer :

"Now that both the pupil and the master have passed from earthly studies and labors into the perfect knowledge and blessedness of heaven, it may be profitable for those who are called upon to examine candidates for the ministry, to remember that David Stoddard, with his intellectual culture, his mature piety, his ardent love of truth, his high-toned consecration to Christ, was well-nigh refused a certificate of approbation to preach the

gospel, because his metaphysical theory of depravity and regeneration differed, in points not affecting the integrity of the doctrines, from the theory of some of his examiners. He writes to a friend :

‘ Before we had been long together, I saw very plainly that I had a stiff set to deal with, who abhorred New Haven and New Haven divinity. They examined me two and a half hours, particularly on regeneration and total depravity. They then bade me retire, and after discussing nearly an hour over my case, called me in again. They had concluded to license me, but told me in substance that I was very heretical on some points, and that, as I was a young man, they hoped I would live to repent. I do not mean to ridicule them at all, for I must say they breathed a good spirit, and treated me very kindly ; but I think they were prejudiced, and inclined to be suspicious at the outset. I was *barely passable* in their view — not from a deficiency in knowledge, so much as from heretical notions.’ — p. 87.

Before advancing further in the history of Mr. Stoddard’s career as a scholar, we must retrace our steps, to observe the various stages of his religious progress, up to that turning-point in his life when he decided to become a missionary. The biography very properly opens with a full account of the “godly ancestry” of its subject, tracing this, on both sides, to honored names in the civil and ecclesiastical history of Massachusetts. We say that such an introduction is very properly given, not because it is a sort of biographical necessity, nor because a man is worthy of any special honor, on account of the excellence of his progenitors, but because it illustrates anew the grand declaration with which Peter opens the dispensation of the gospel : “The promise is to you *and to your children*.” In the brief chapter devoted to this spiritual pedigree, we have a new demonstration of the fact, that in Heaven’s book of heraldry there is “a chosen generation, a royal priesthood, a peculiar people.” The value of a cordial faith in this foundation truth cannot be overestimated, whether it be regarded in connection with the personal comfort of the believer, or as an incitement to prayer and faithfulness. Years afterward, when the dying missionary was struggling in the grasp of a typhus fever, he drew a heroic courage from the treasures of this “everlasting covenant.” These are his beautiful words : “Perhaps it seems strange to you that I think and say so little about my sins and unworthiness ; but I have no strength

to look over them now. I have given myself to Jesus, and I look upon him as a *family* Saviour. He was my grandmother's Saviour, my mother's Saviour, Solomon's Saviour, Harriette's Saviour, and I know he will be mine."

An interesting account of early religious impressions is followed, in the biography, by a narrative of the circumstances of his conversion. This occurred during his sophomore year, at Yale College, in connection with one of those powerful revivals which form so marked a feature in the history of that institution. He was then a stranger, having recently transferred his relations from Williams to Yale. In accordance with a plan adopted by the religious members of the class, he was visited by a friend, who called his attention to the subject of personal piety. This friend, who, as the reader will readily infer, is no other than the biographer himself, was cheered, a few days afterward, by the intelligence that, through the Divine blessing, his efforts had been made instrumental in producing a more marked change in Mr. Stoddard's religious feelings. The special exercises of his mind at that time are narrated, in a simple and beautiful manner, by Mr. Stoddard, in letters to his mother and brother. The change was evidently thorough, and the consecration which he made of himself to the service of God was unreserved and cheerful. As is usually the case, his conversion furnished the type of his whole subsequent religious life. One incident mentioned by his biographer is worthy of special note, as illustrating a point to which reference has already been made.

"The doctrines of the Scriptures concerning household consecration, the prayer of faith, and the influences of the Holy Spirit, are all strikingly illustrated in the conversion of Stoddard. *What* led one to whom religious truth and duty had been so long familiar, but who had been growing callous toward both, on a sudden to give his whole mind to the question of personal duty, and to yield his heart to the claims of Christ? It was not the influence of excitement—for he had been to no religious meeting other than the usual service in the college chapel, had heard no sermon with more than ordinary attention. Rooming alone, retired from college halls, he did not even partake of the measure of religious interest which began to pervade their atmosphere. There was nothing in the conversation of a classmate who

had but little experience in the Christian life, to give a new attractiveness or power to truths which he had heard from the lips of parents who honored and exemplified them in their lives. The Bible alone offers a satisfactory solution of such a change, regarded merely as a psychological phenomenon. 'The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth; so is every one that is born of the Spirit.' The result witnessed, the phenomenon itself of conversion, argues the supernatural operation of the Spirit of God.

"Why was that operation now induced, or for the first time made effectual? The ultimate answer lies in the gracious sovereignty of God. 'Of his own will begat He us with the word of truth.' But was there no human link in the chain of influences that now fastened conviction upon the child of many prayers, and drew him into the kingdom? The answer to this question was given in a letter from his mother which the young convert received the very morning after he had found peace in Christ. In that letter his mother, knowing nothing as yet of the change in his feelings, reminded him that in infancy she had consecrated him to Christ for the work of the ministry, and informed him that on the day of prayer for colleges, *she had spent a great part of the day in prayer for his conversion.*"—pp. 50-1.

The next point of prominent interest in the narrative is his decision to become a missionary. Dr. Justin Perkins, the honored pioneer of the mission to the Nestorian Christians of Persia, was then in this country, and had retired to spend a Sabbath of quiet and rest at Middlebury, Vt. Mr. Stoddard, an entire stranger to him, occupied the pulpit. His first impressions are best given in his own words:

"In the autumn I went to Middlebury, Vt., to pass a quiet Sabbath after protracted and exhausting labors. After I entered the meeting-house, on Sabbath morning, there came in a young man and ascended the desk, whose appearance was quite youthful, yet very mature, and whose whole air seemed to me more angelic than human. I was no prophet. But hardly could the mind of Samuel of old have been fastened more confidently on David, the son of Jesse, as the future king of Israel, than did my heart fix on *David T. Stoddard* from the moment my eye first rested on him, as the young man whom, of all I had ever seen, I could wish to have as our companion in the toils, and trials, and joys of missionary life, and whose prayers and labors here the Lord would delight to honor in the salvation of souls. In all the subsequent years of our intimate missionary connection, the vividness of that first impression has never faded from my mind."—p. 91.

An interview immediately followed, which is thus spoken of by Mr. Stoddard:

"This evening Solomon and I have made a very pleasant call on Mr. and Mrs. Perkins, who are here on a flying visit. Mr. Perkins is very anxious that I should go with him to Persia. I promised him that I would consider the matter, though I hardly think I shall go anywhere as a missionary."—p. 89.

These first faint impressions were deepened amid the glowing scenes of the missionary convocation at Norwich, Conn., soon after, when, under the influence of Dr. Perkins, he decided *with all his heart* to become a missionary — a decision which never wavered for an instant afterward. From the moment it was formed, it spread a cheerful light over his existence, and imparted strength to his whole being. He writes:

"The more I review my decision, the more does it stand scrutiny; and I do believe it will stand the test of the great day. My fear now is, that my motives will not be such as they should be. I want to feel as Paul did, that *the love of Christ* constraineth me. Love of novelty, romance, desire for the approbation of others, and even a hope of heaven, are low motives in the comparison. O let us never rest till in *all* our plans we can heartily say: "The love of Christ constraineth us."—p. 94.

He was soon afterward united in marriage with Miss Harriette Briggs, with whom he set sail from Boston for Smyrna on the 1st of March, 1843. The embarkation was an affecting scene. The wharf and deck were crowded with the friends of the six missionaries who were then going, together, to a land of darkness. A lowering morning and the pattering of a gentle rain, were in full accordance with the spirit of the occasion. The solemn services over, a tearful leave-taking followed. But in the midst of that absorbing scene, when, if ever, the missionary might properly be lost in the son and the brother, Stoddard, true to the passion which burned through his after life, seeing a college acquaintance standing at a distance, with whom he had before conversed on the subject of missions, pressed his way out from the group about him, and, calling his friend, with a warm grasp of the hand drew him on board, and said with deep emotion: "I want you to come out to Persia. I know you have weak eyes, but I will try to find a place in the mountains, if not

upon the plain, where you can labor. Promise me that you will come." And there he stood completely absorbed, during those precious moments while the crew were casting off the hawsers, the last connecting link with home and friends, apparently forgetful of all besides, and only able to say, as he returned to the impatient company of weeping relatives: "Wist ye not I must be about my Father's business?"

Such was the intellectual equipment which the young missionary took with him to his distant work, and such was the spirit with which he entered upon it. The people to whom he was destined were Christians; they had been missionary Christians; they were governed by an enlightened and powerful people, about whom history and romance had thrown their brightest fascinations, whose very name had become classic in missionary history from its association with the holy life and heroic deeds of Henry Martyn. To a man of such antecedents such a work must have presented the grandest outlines. We cannot wonder that Stoddard entered upon it with all the enthusiasm of his earnest nature. The tastes of the scholar, the sympathies of the man, the aspirations of the Christian, were brought to a focus in the thought, "I am a missionary!" From the commencement to the end of his career, this single idea burned in his soul. Whether crossing the ocean, while sad memories were yet green, or visiting from station to station of the Turkish mission, or climbing the weary mountains of Armenia, or stumbling through the early experiences of a missionary's life, when he is practically both deaf and dumb amid the surrounding activities of social intercourse, or standing before a group of noisy, half-clad children, teaching the veriest rudiments of knowledge, or proclaiming Christ with a faltering tongue in a strange language, never, even in these depressing and humbling circumstances, did he lose sight of the true sublimity of his work. He repeatedly declares that he would not exchange his position for any, even the most honorable, at home. "I feel as much pleasure in my work as if I was pastor of the Old South, or even bishop of New York." "I am teaching ten or a

dozen boys in my family with just as much interest as if I was a preacher in Park Street Church ; and I do not envy the situation of any living man." He joined the mission when several of its members were thoroughly discouraged. But even in the midst of the drudgery of his first year's labors, he can see only the cheerful aspects of affairs, and within six months after his arrival he preaches a Thanksgiving sermon to the mission, the object of which is to prove that "the prospects of our mission are decidedly favorable."

Mr. Stoddard's career as a missionary furnishes a decisive answer to those who assert that only inferior men should be sent to the heathen, superior scholarship and the gifts of eloquent speech, being demanded entirely for home use. We believe the assertion may be safely made, that none of the fields of intellectual and scholarly activity, which opened to him so invitingly in this country, would have given one-half the scope to his powers, as a man of learning, as a man of thought, or as a man of action, which he found in his missionary life. His first care, after his embarkation, was to acquire a knowledge of the Turkish language, to which study he devoted himself earnestly during his outward voyage. Most characteristically he unites with this the study of Geology. For he says: "It is very desirable that we should have a pretty good knowledge of this science, for we are going over one of the most striking geological countries in the world, and a country, too, very little explored. I am one of those who believe that science can be made subservient to the spread of the Gospel. And while neither this nor any thing else should divert us from our great work — the *one* great work of preaching Jesus Christ — I trust we shall do much indirectly to improve the Persians in civilization and comfort. The discovery of coal-beds would be an immense blessing to that country, and no one but a geologist could hope to find them."

A few weeks of delightful intercourse with the veterans of the Turkish Mission, during which he "feasted" upon the "surpassingly beautiful" scenery of the Bosphorus and the Ægean, were followed by the long and perilous overland

passage from Trebizond ; and the entrance, after a month's journeying, upon the magnificent plain of Oroomiah, over which they were escorted to their "home" by a cavalcade of rejoicing natives — "a triumphal procession." "Our company," he writes, "now consisted of forty or fifty horsemen, and it was a moving sight, I assure you, to look on such a company. We were riding over a magnificent plain, covered with the richest verdure. The day was beautiful though warm ; the natives' hearts were glad, and so were ours. We knew that friends were following us with their sympathies and prayers. We knew we went to a city whose name is dear to many a Christian heart. All behind was bright and cheering ; all before us full of hope."

The cordiality of the welcome which they received from the Nestorians made the heart of the Christian scholar swell with anticipations of coming achievements. He at once applied himself to the Turkish, the language of business in Persia, and to the Modern Syriac, the spoken language of the Nestorians. Almost immediately, "while he was yet a stammerer in the native dialects," his scientific attainments were brought into requisition in a most important direction, and the telescope which drew such crowds upon the porch of Yale College Chapel, was produced upon a mountain of Persia to lead one of the "Wise men of the East" to the true religion. This man was the chief astronomer of his province, and the author of the Persian almanac. He embraced the Ptolemaic system of the universe, though not unacquainted with that of Copernicus, simply because the *Koran* demands the former and rejects the latter. To convince such a man of his astronomical errors was therefore of great importance. A short extract from Mr. Stoddard's account of the exhibition of the telescope will set in a clear light the important relations of science to Christianity :

"I first pointed it at Saturn, which was near its culmination ; at the first glance, the menajim bashee declared that he saw neither satellites nor rings. At this I was, of course, not at all disappointed, and asked him to have a little patience and he would have his curiosity gratified. After a little, he obtained a good focus, and saw the ring. This almost made him leap for

joy. He looked again and again, and delighted me by his enthusiasm. Presently he exclaimed that he had a distinct view of the division in the ring, and one of the satellites. That night three or four were visible, but it was not strange that a novice should be unable to detect them. I had, however, a keen-eyed companion; for though disposed to make every objection, and admit nothing on testimony, he was satisfied that he saw the division in the ring and the shadow of it upon the planet. He tells me that there is a record, many years old, in their possession, which states that Saturn was once seen in the *shape of an almond*; but that they know nothing of any rings or any satellites belonging to it.

"We now turned to Jupiter; and he was lost in astonishment. There were its four moons, and several broad belts crossing the disc of the planet — all too plain to admit of a doubt. Looking up to me, the astrologer earnestly said: 'Tell me *anything* you please about these moons, and I will accept it.' You will readily believe I was exceedingly gratified. We next looked at Mars; the gibbous state of which he readily admitted. It was too near the horizon to be seen to advantage; yet some of the dark spots on its surface were discernible.

"At a late hour we retired to rest, promising ourselves the pleasure of seeing Jupiter and Venus the next morning. As soon as the menajim cast his eyes on Jupiter, he could hardly contain himself. One of the satellites was on the other side of the planet, and all had changed their positions. 'Jupiter then has moons,' said he, 'and they revolve around him — you are certainly in the right.'" — pp. 188-9.

At the same time a discussion arose concerning the approaching solar eclipse, which the menajim declared would be invisible in Persia, Mr. Stoddard maintaining the contrary. Mr. S. made the necessary calculations, and gave the menajim the time of the eclipse and the number of digits obscured. The result proved the accuracy of Mr. Stoddard's computation. He thus refers to the influence of this prediction:

"December 21st, 1843. Rose quite early that we might finish breakfast in time to see an eclipse of the sun. We took particular interest in it, because I had spent considerable time on the calculation, and the menajim bashee (the chief astronomer), had repeatedly said it would be invisible. Mr. Jones also is now lecturing to the seminary on this science, and has more or less inveterate prejudice to contend with. We, who have been taught from our cradles that the earth turns round and travels through empty space, can hardly realize how difficult it is for these rude people to admit it. It contradicts the *Bible*, which speaks of the everlasting foundations of the earth; it contradicts the old Syrian *melpanas*, who declare the

world is a plain, and rests on something, which rests on something else, which in its turn rests on something or nothing, just as you please. This is a caricature of their belief, but not a whit less rational. You will not wonder then that all of us felt much interest in the result. It was the first prediction of the kind made by the mission, and natives as well as our own company were eagerly on the watch. At the right time the sun rose eclipsed, as we expected, and assuming just the phases that I had before drawn on paper. I have no doubt this little circumstance, which would seem very trifling in America, will do much to open the way for science in our schools." — pp. 150-1.

Five months after his arrival, such had been his success in acquiring the language, he was put in charge of the male seminary. Mr. Perkins makes the following statement:

"As soon as his knowledge of modern Syriac was sufficient for the purpose, the male seminary was reorganized and committed to his care. We all felt that no living man could be found more competent to assume the very responsible task of rearing a generation of well educated and pious Nestorian preachers, whether we regarded the very high order of his own intellect, his finished culture, his moral character, or his holy walk or conversation. And the result has shown that we did not misjudge in the matter.

"He soon became able also to preach in the Syriac language, and whether preaching in Syriac or in English, how often have we been moved and thrilled by his affecting and powerful performances!" — p. 149.

In the seminary his scientific attainments and manual dexterity came at once into requisition. "I am trying," he writes, "to instruct my pupils in chemistry and natural science, and I hope to carry them through a full course of study for several years. We are furnished with some apparatus, and I am gradually making more. Recently, I astonished the natives by producing a solar microscope, magnifying fifty-four thousand times; and more recently still a camera-obscura." His biographer adds:

"In many ways the mechanical skill of Mr. Stoddard was of great service to the mission. At first he found it difficult to secure punctuality in the exercises of the seminary, and the religious services of the Sabbath, for want of a common standard of time. To remedy this, he constructed sun-dials at various points, so that all the pupils, and the different families on the mission premises, could have the same notation of the passing hours. 'In this sunny land,' he writes, 'these have served an admirable purpose,

and, I am of opinion, have saved us many hours of waiting for one another, and, I may add, a great deal of wear and tear of feeling, which even an angel would be liable to if his companion was not punctual. But the sun does not always shine, even here; and a sun-dial is, of course, a useless thing in the evening.' So he sent to America for a large plain clock for the seminary; this he learned to clean and regulate; and, as there was no competent watchmaker nearer than Constantinople, he wrote to a watchmaker in Northampton a series of questions for specific instruction in the care of watches, and thus became the regulator of time for the entire mission. 'Making telescopes and solar microscopes,' said he, 'is not cleaning watches; but he who has learned to do one may easily learn to do the other.' Mr. Stoddard was also as expert in repairing a wagon as in cleaning a watch, and was able to superintend and direct the unskilled Persian mechanics employed in erecting or repairing the buildings for the use of the mission." — p. 180.

The following extracts will give us a glimpse of his school-room:—

"April 23d, 1845. I have just opened the exercises of the day in the seminary, by reading the Bible and prayer, and am now seated with all my bees around me to write you a letter. And if there is no great logical order or clearness of ideas, you will please to remember under what circumstances it was brought into being. It is the universal custom in these countries for scholars to read aloud, and it is very difficult to break them of it. They will promise to try, but as soon as your back is turned and you are engaged about something else, there will be all the noise of a bumblebees' nest. So much by way of explanation of my present position." — p. 182.

"My assistant teachers are pious, excellent men, and, to a certain extent, to be fully trusted. But they are far from having our ideas of neatness, order, or systematic study. When I am absent a few days the pupils rise irregularly, the bell is irregularly rung, the classes are mixed up, and neither study nor recite with system, and though both teachers and pupils may be doing as well as they know how, *every thing goes wrong*. You can hardly conceive how wearing it is to keep up such an establishment, when I have to look after everything myself, be bell-ringer, teacher, superintendent, etc., all in one. My dear wife looks after the domestic department, and finds that also a very great care. I am often reminded of a wagoner, who is trying, with a crazy wagon and worn-out horses, to drag a heavy load up a muddy hill. The linch-pins fail, the tire falls off, the whipple-tree splits in two, the horses sink in the mire, and he is ready to give up all for lost. So we the past year." — pp. 248-9.

The institution grew upon Mr. Stoddard's hands until it became not only a scientific school of a high order, but a

theological seminary also, where native preachers were thoroughly trained for their work. This extended course demanded the addition of Biblical exegesis and of systematic theology to the studies at first pursued. Mr. Stoddard carefully prepared courses of lectures on these subjects in the native language. At the same time his fine scholarship was called into requisition in aid of the great work which Dr. Perkins had specially in charge, the translation of the "*Peshito*," the ancient Syriac version of the Scriptures, into the modern Syriac. The manuscript and proofs were all passed by the translator through Mr. Stoddard's hands. During the same period, while daily engaged in the study of the Turkish and Persian languages, he commenced the preparation of a grammar of the modern Syriac, which was afterwards published in the Journal of the American Oriental Society for 1856, a work which received a complimentary allusion from Rödiger, the first living authority upon the Semitic languages. In connection with this grammar, he makes the following remarks in a letter to a friend :

"I determined to make thorough work in my investigations, and have made a full and minute comparison of the modern Syriac, first with the ancient Syriac, and then with the Hebrew. It only remains now to give a careful attention to the Jews' language, the modern Chaldee, and trace it to its origin. As you may not possibly be aware of the interest which attaches to these inquiries, far beyond the mere aid they afford new comers and others in acquiring the language, let me say a word on this point. Of the three great branches of the Semitic family, the Hebrew, the Arabic, and the old Aramean, the first two languages are by far the best understood, and we have literary monuments, extending back, in the case of the Hebrew, to the Pentateuch, and in the case of the Arabic, to a time long before the birth of Christ. But, in regard to the Aramean, as it was originally, nothing has been known. Its literature was all supposed to have perished. This Aramean split afterward into two great branches and was developed in two different forms. 1st. The Hebraistic form, which we call the Chaldee, and which was the language of the Targums. 2d. The Syriac form, which developed, with an alphabet of its own, a Christian literature for a long course of centuries. From this no doubt the Modern Syriac was derived; but it probably retains many idioms and words in daily use from the old Aramean, which have never found their way into books or lexicons. As for the modern Jews' language spoken here, some have affirmed that it was derived directly from the ancient Chaldee, while others have main-

tained, with at least a show of plausibility, that the modern Chaldee and the modern Syriac were each derived from a common source, and that this proved the common origin of the Nestorians and the Jews. On this point I do not feel clear yet. If it shall appear that the modern Jews' language is no nearer the modern Syriac, than the ancient Chaldee is to the ancient Syriac, then one of Dr. Grant's strong arguments for the Jewish origin of the Nestorians will be undermined. Until recently, as I have said, it was supposed the old Aramean literature had entirely perished; but the researches of Colonel Rawlinson have shown that this Aramean, or, if you please, Babylonian, is substantially the language of the monuments. Now, would it not be most interesting if Colonel Rawlinson, on the one hand, should find certain words and phrases on those ancient monuments, which are to be found in no grammars hitherto extant, and we, on our part, should find those same words and phrases current among the Nestorians and the Jews around us?"—pp. 343-4.

While thus absorbed in the studies more immediately connected with his great work, this indefatigable scholar did not forget the physical sciences. He writes thus concerning some of his astronomical observations:

"I have written Sir John Herschel at length on these observations, and given him, in addition, a number of test-objects, that he may the better judge whether my account is entitled to credence. I wrote *him* rather than any one else, hoping he would interest himself to fit out an expedition to Oroomiah, and take advantage of this magnificent climate. It may be doubted whether there is a position in the world, at least one easily accessible, where a good astronomer, with good instruments, would reap such a harvest of discovery. You can hardly have an idea of the magnificence of our summer evenings. We are elevated more than a *mile* above the ocean, have no dew, and rarely see a cloud during June, July, August, and September. Stars do not twinkle when forty degrees above the horizon, and Venus is so brilliant that I have distinguished by its light, when fourteen feet from the window, the hands of a watch, and even the letters of a book.

"But I cannot dwell on this subject. Perhaps Professor ⁸⁰ Olmsted may like one or two of the test-objects which I gave Sir J. Herschel. In Ursa Major, two faint stars are seen ^{*} any favorable night, one on each side of ζ and 80, thus: ζ Can these *ever* be seen in America? Again, when I lie on my back, the view of 4 and 5 ε Lyra, as they pass near the zenith, is very similar to that I have often had of Castor in a good telescope. Again, the two small stars in the neighborhood of the pole-star, and in the general direction of γ caphei, thus (* *) are seen distinctly, and almost every night in summer, as a single point of light. Can these latter objects ever be seen in America? I shall be much interested to know."

Sir John Herschel very courteously acknowledged this letter in the following :

" Sir: I have received, and beg to thank you, for the interesting communication of your observations of the satellites of Jupiter, the oblong form of Saturn, and the small companions of certain stars — with the naked eye — in what you may indeed, by your account of it, most truly call a magnificent climate for astronomical pursuits. I think I shall best do justice to your communication by placing it in the hands of the Astronomical Society for reading at one of their meetings. Your account of the country, too, is most inviting. I think I may anticipate the usual vote of thanks on communication of observations to the Society, and I beg leave to add my own, and remain your obedient servant,

F. J. W. HERSCHEL.

" P. S. — I find it recorded, in Bessel's Life, as an extraordinary instance of his sharpness of eye, that he could see ϵ and 5 Lyræ as two separable stars. But I have never heard that Saturn had ever been noticed as oblong, before the invention of the telescope."

Upon this, Mr. Stoddard remarked to a friend: " I was, of course, gratified with Sir J. Herschel's letter, and, from the interest he manifests, hope to hear from him again, or some of his compeers. An expedition here would, I am sure, pay better, so far as science is concerned, than one to the North Pole." — pp. 350-51.

We know that we are doing injustice to this devoted student, by lingering so long upon his scientific attainments. He was indeed a scholarly man ; but he was more, — he was a holy man. He was, it is true, an inquisitive philosopher, but he was more, he was an ardent missionary. His brethren styled him the "*seraph* missionary." All his literary attainments were as nothing compared with his wisdom and zeal in the revivals of religion with which his mission was blessed so signally. His science as well as his whole soul were hid with Christ in God. The impression which he made upon public audiences and personal friends, during a visit of nearly three years to his native land, made necessary by impaired health, was such as might have been expected of Brainard or Martyn. He lived constantly in the higher regions of Christian thought and feeling. He lifted the assemblages which he addressed to an elevation where all the coming triumphs of Christ's kingdom could be seen as absolute verities, and often so brought down about us the glories of Heaven, that the spontaneous exclamation was : " It is good for us to be here." The close

of his life was in full harmony with its progress. Having spent six years after his return from America in still more important and successful labors than before, he was prostrated by typhus fever. An important and anxious mission to the Civil Functionaries at Tabreez, followed by increased labor in his seminary, seems to have been the immediate cause of the attack. He sunk gradually and was fully conscious of his situation. There were no raptures attending his last hours, but a calm, intelligent peace, the fitting close of the life of a thorough scholar and a holy man.

We need only add that the biography has been prepared in the best possible taste. It is clear, simple, concise. The reader is not wearied with details, and yet he rises from the volume, well possessed of the character and history of its subject. The biographer has attempted no labored analysis of character. He allows Stoddard to speak for himself. The narrative is transparent. We seem almost to hear the voice of our friend again, and to see the beautiful glow of his countenance as he greets us. This volume will be a precious keepsake to the early friends of Mr. Stoddard. Those who knew him best prize him most, and most unqualifiedly pronounce his eulogy. And it is a circumstance as rare as it is beautiful, that the most intimate companion of his college studies and sports, should have been made the instrument of his conversion to God, should have been permitted to witness his splendid career of usefulness from its commencement to its close, and finally should be able to give to the world the completed results of that single act of Christian faithfulness, in the biography of his friend.

Mr. Stoddard's remains were deposited upon Mount Seir, near the spot where, at the opening of his missionary life, he had pointed a representative of the ancient Magi to a "star of Bethlehem," and where, during the last years of his life, he had presided over his beloved "Seminary." There he sleeps well on the field of his battles and his victories. There, in the still clear night, the Nestorian youth gather about his grave, and fill the air with melodies of grief. There, will future disciples come, as to a holy shrine.

And when the millions of Asia shall again hear the gospel of Christ, that spot, not less than the tomb of Martyn at Tocat, will be visited with grateful veneration, as the last resting place of the "Seraph missionary."

ARTICLE VII.

HYMNOLOGY.¹

A good Hymn Book must be a good manual of religious experience. The Ideal of a perfect Hymn Book is that of a perfect expression of the real life of the church, in forms perfectly adjusted to the service of song. It excludes, on the one hand, lyric poetry which is *only* poetry, though it be on sacred themes; and, on the other hand, it is equally unfriendly to devotional rhymes which, though truthful, are so unworthy in respect of poetic form as to degrade the truths they embody; and yet again, it rejects, as unbecoming to the sanctuary, those religious poems which are both true to the Christian life and unexceptionable in their poetic spirit, and yet are of such rhythmic structure as to be unfit for expression with the accompaniment of music. Genuineness of religious emotion, refinement of poetic taste, and fitness to musical

¹ "The Sabbath Hymn Book: For the Service of Song in the House of the Lord." Edited by Edwards A. Park, Austin Phelps, and Lowell Mason.

The present Article is designed in part as a more extended Introduction of this volume, than could properly be published in a Manual of Psalmody for public worship. The writer of the Article is indebted for its historical notices to Warton's History of English Poetry; Burder's History of Music; Burnet's History of the Reformation; Holland's Psalmists of Great Britain; Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity; Milner's Life of Watts; Southey's Life of Watts; Conder's 'Poet of the Sanctuary'; Montgomery's 'Christian Poet'; Lightfoot's Temple-Service; Works of Isaac Watts; Carey's Early French Poets; Turner's History of England; Eusebius's Ecclesiastical History; Augustine's Confessions; Perthes's Life of Chrysostom; and Lateinische Hymnen und Gesänge — von Königsfeld.

cadence—these three are essential to a faultless hymn, as the three chief graces to a faultless character. Yet “the greatest of these,” that grace which above all else vitalizes a true hymn, is that which *makes* it true—its fidelity to the realities of religious experience. Every true hymn is a “Psalm of Life:” some soul has lived it. A manual of such psalmody is the guide which the church needs in her worship of God in song.

Such a manual must therefore be pervaded by a historic spirit. We must search for its materials along the track which a living church has trodden; and must expect to find them in the richest profusion, where the life of the church has been most intense. The search cannot disappoint us. It is a signal fact that the history of hymnology and the history of piety are synchronous in their development. Hymnology has not been swayed mainly by the mutations of literature as such, but by those of the religious vitality of the church. The rise and fall of the one have been the invariable exponent of the ebb and flow of the other. Hebrew piety created the Hebrew literature, and that found its chief expression in the Hebrew psalmody. The “Psalms and Hymns and Spiritual Songs” of the apostolic churches, were an out-gushing of the new spirit of Christianity, which does not seem to have restricted itself to the ancient songs of the temple, or of the synagogue. Even the miraculous endowments of the first Christian age, appear to have manifested one class of their phenomena in the inspired improvisation of psalms. The earliest Christian historians agree in affirming, that the Christian communities of their times employed in the worship of the sanctuary, not only the Psalms and other metrical passages of the Old Testament, but also hymns original to the age, and which the religious character of the age demanded for its own expression. Tertullian states that each participant in the ancient *agapæ* was invited, at the close of the feast, to sing as he might prefer “either from the holy Scriptures, or from the dictates of his own spirit, a song of adoration to God.” Contemporaneous heathen writers, also, recount in the same breath, the mild

virtues of the new sect and their custom of "singing hymns, of antiphonal structure, to Christ as to a God."

In the emergencies of the early church, the spirit of martyrdom found solace in hymns which the sufferers sung in dungeons, and on their way to the cross or the stake. Augustine speaks of the effect he experienced in listening to the psalms and hymns, on his first entrance into the church at Milan after his conversion. He says: "The voices flowed in at my ears, truth was distilled in my heart, and the affection of piety overflowed in sweet tears of joy." He adds that the custom of chanting hymns and psalms had been introduced from the East, among the Milanese Christians, "that the people might not languish and pine away in sorrow," under the Arian persecution by the empress Justina. Others of the Fathers remark that the singing of the ancient churches often attracted "Gentiles" to their worship, who were baptized before their departure.¹

An evidence of the pious usage, which must already have become general among Christians in the East, appears in the abuse of the usage in the time of Chrysostom, when bands of Orthodox and Arian choristers were organized to perambulate the streets of Constantinople, singing hymns upon the rival doctrines, in imitation of the processional singing of the pagans. Some of the hymns thus claiming for theology an alliance with song, Chrysostom himself composed. During the eclipse of faith which succeeded, the most conclusive token which remained, to come down to our day, in proof that the vitality of the church had not died out, was the voices from the cloisters, here and there, in spiritual songs which the church still welcomes as treasures. One might trace out, truthfully, both the corruption and the life of the church, through that whole night of the Middle Ages, by the line of hymnological literature alone. If indeed we must choose between the creeds and the songs of the church, for a test of her growth or deca-

¹ Upon this fact, an English writer of the last century observes: "The generality of *our* parochial music is not likely to produce similar effects; being such as would sooner drive Christians with good ears out of the church, than draw Pagans into it."

dence in spirituality, we would select her songs, as her most honest utterances.

The most remarkable, because the most sharply defined, illustration of the sympathy of hymnology with the piety of the church, appears in the history of the Reformation. One of the first symptoms of that great awakening, was the revival of a taste and a demand for religious songs in the vernacular tongues. The demand was sudden, and the result of no visible design. It does not seem to have followed the labors of the reformed clergy, so much as to have been simultaneous with them — the working of a hidden force which moved both the clergy and the people. Its first manifestation on a large scale, was attended by one of those anomalies by which the providence of God often attests its secret agency, in the selection of singular and improbable instrumentalities. The history of the phenomenon, already well known as one of the "*Curiosities of Literature*," is worthy of review. Clement Marot, "a valet of the bedchamber to king Francis the First, and the favorite poet of France, tired of the vanities of profane poetry, or rather privately tinctured with the principles of Lutheranism, attempted with the assistance of his friend Theodore Beza, and by the encouragement of the professor of Hebrew (Vatable) in the University of Paris, a version of David's Psalms into French rhymes." It was about the year 1540. The amorous ditties of the poet had previously been the delight of the French court; and in dedicating his version of the Psalms in part "to the ladies of France," he apologizes to them for the surprise they would experience in receiving from him such an offering to their literary taste. No evidence appears that the "tincture" of Lutheranism which, it is said, Marot had privately imbibed, was such as to give to this literary "coup d'etat" the character of a design to revolutionize the ballads of the nation, or to aid the dissemination of the reformed faith, or even to express his own. It was rather a freak of poetic license, sobered somewhat by the personal influence of Beza, who may have entertained more intelligent hopes respecting the result. But the most sanguine Re-

former could scarcely have indulged anticipations equal to the reality. The publication of Marot's Psalms marked an epoch in the history of the times. His previous contributions to the polite literature of the day were forgotten in the enthusiasm with which the court of Francis received the "*Sainctes Chansonnettes*," as the poet termed his versions from the Hebrew Psalter. No suspicion was, at first, awakened of the tendency of the work towards the heresy of Wittenburg and Geneva. The Catholics were among the most eager purchasers of the volume, and the press was overburdened to meet their demands. The doctors of the Sorbonne saw no reason for withholding their sanction from that which they seem to have regarded as only a literary innovation, bold and fascinating to the frivolous, but probably destined to a brief notoriety. The consequence was, that "in the festive and splendid court of Francis, of a sudden," as we are told, "nothing was heard but the Psalms of Clement Marot. They were the common accompaniment of the fiddle; and with a characteristic liveliness of fancy, by each of the royal family and the principal nobility of the court, a psalm was chosen and fitted to the ballad tune which each liked best. This fashion does not seem, in the least, to have diminished the gayety and good humor of the court of Francis." Such, regarded merely as a literary phenomenon, was the adventure of the ballad-singer into the field of Hebrew Psalmody, for the entertainment of the "ladies of France." But in the providence of God it had a deeper meaning.

The apostles of the Reformation were, just at this time, meditating improvements in their liturgical services. Luther in Germany and Calvin at Geneva, were intent upon abandoning the antiphonal chanting in which the people took no part. Before the publication of Marot's "*Chansonnettes*," Luther, in a letter to Spalatinus, had said: "I am looking out for poets to translate the whole of the Psalms into the German tongue;" and Calvin had proceeded so far as to project, with the advice of Luther, the translation of portions of the Psalms into the French language, and the

adaptation of them to melodies, by which all could share in the public service of song. The juncture of events was most opportune. Calvin, with characteristic promptness, availed himself of Marot's gallantry, and instantly introduced the poet's thirty metrical versions from the Psalter into the reformed church of Geneva. On a certain Sabbath of the year 1540, might have been heard, probably, the noble ladies and lords of the court of his most Catholic majesty, and the humble congregation of the heresiarch of Geneva, singing the same words from the new psalm book !

The fashion of the court was short-lived. Not so the usage introduced by the Genevan worshippers. Marot soon added twenty to the thirty versions of the Psalms which he had first translated, and the whole were published, with a preface written by Calvin, in 1543. The new movement by which the people were to be made participants in the service of song, by means of metrical psalms in their own language, was thus fairly inaugurated. Its effect was electric. The Scriptures, which had long been shut up in a dead language, were thus released, in part, to the understanding and heart of the worshippers, in metrical forms which, however rude, were not so to the taste of the age. They were welcomed with unbounded enthusiasm. That cardinal principle of the Reformation, by which responsibility was individualized, was thus infused into the theory and practice of worship, and the heart of the people opened to receive it, gratefully. The new method of worship struck deep to the supply of wants, of which nothing could have made the popular mind sensible, but a revived spirituality of faith. It spread itself like the light. The golden candlestick at Geneva sent forth its rays far and wide. In the language of Warton, "France and Germany were instantly infatuated with a love of psalm-singing. . . . The energetic hymns of Geneva exhilarated the convivial assemblies of the Calvinists, were commonly heard in the streets, and accompanied the labors of the artificer. . . . They found their way to the cities of the Low Countries, and under their inspiration many of the weavers and woollen manufacturers of Flanders left their

looms and entered into the ministry of the gospel." German, Dutch, Bohemian, and Polish versions of the Psalms, in metre, and both French and German hymns, were soon multiplied to an almost fabulous extent. The enthusiasm of Luther in the work is well known; and the popularity of his sixty-three hymns may be inferred from the fact that spurious Collections were hawked about the cities of Germany, under his name. Hymns in the vernacular dialects became a power in the Reformation, coördinate with that of the pulpit. Upon the masses of the people they were far more potent than any other uninspired productions of the press. At Augsburg, in 1551, "three or four thousand singing together at a time," was "but a trifle." The youth of the day sung them in place of ribald songs; mothers sung them beside the cradle; journeymen and servants sung them at their labor, and market-men in the streets, and husbandmen in the fields. At length, the "six thousand hymns" of a single poet, Hans Sachs, bore witness to the avidity of the demand and the copiousness of the supply.

Meanwhile the doctors of the Sorbonne had second thoughts respecting the Psalter of Clement Marot. They marvelled to see it published with the *imprimatur* of Calvin and affixed to the Catechism of Geneva. They bethought themselves of the peril of allowing the people to sing the word of God in their mother tongue; they induced the king to forbid Marot to continue his work; and the use of that and all similar versions of the Psalms was interdicted to the Catholics, under severe penalties. The use of metrical psalms, in the vulgar tongue, became a test of Protestantism. "Psalm-singing and heresy were regarded as synonymous terms." Marot himself was apprehended on suspicion of heresy, and thrown into prison, from which he was released only on condition of his renewed adherence to the mother church. Such was the Protestant reputation of his Psalms, however, in their proximity to the Genevan Catechism, that he found it necessary to retire from France, though he said of himself: "I am neither Lutheran nor Zuinglian. I am one whose delight and whose labor it is to exalt my Saviour and his all gracious mother."

The historian of English poetry ingeniously attributes this entire movement, and the rapid propagaation of Calvinism consequent upon it, to the address of Calvin in planning a "mode of universal psalmody," the rudeness of which could draw converts "from the meanest of the people," and which should take the place of the Catholic pageantries and pictures, in the indispensable work of "keeping his congregation in good humor by some kind of allurements, which might enliven their attendance on the rigid duties of praying and preaching." But a wiser criticism will discern in it no human strategy. It was the spontaneous uprising of a demand which the Spirit of truth had aroused by the revival of pious faith, and to which the providence of God responded, in such means for its supply as the literature of the times could be made to furnish. The quickened heart of the people awoke to an experience which they could express only in Christian song. They sung it because they must sing it; and as soon as they could find words and measures in which they *could* sing it with the spirit and the understanding, however uncouthly to the taste of a later age, when it required no superior literary discernment in Voltaire to say, that "in proportion as good taste improved, the Psalms of Clement Marot inspired only disgust." A living scholar has observed, more truthfully, that "the Divine Spirit has always employed the ministry of *that* poetry which was the poetry of the age as he has hallowed the prevalent dialects of speech." We probably shall not greatly err in believing, that those metrical versions of the Psalms which the Reformers commended to the use of their churches, were the best that could have been created by the taste, and appreciated by the piety, of that generation. They certainly did not offend the one, and they did express the other. All things considered, we may venture to think of them, as an old English critic said of an English metrical Psalter: "Match these verses for their age, and they shall go abreast with the best poems of those times."

Wherever the spirit of the Reformation went, there followed the new system of popular participation in the ser-

vice of song. It soon passed over from the Continent to England. And here its history is marked by the same sympathy with spiritual piety, that characterized its origin in the reformed churches of Germany and Switzerland. Two centuries before, the prelude of it had been heard in the psalmody of the disciples of Wicklif, and now as then the quickening of religious life uttered itself in the revival of sacred melodies. Among the dignitaries of the English church and state, the innovation was approved by those who were friendly to the spirit of reform, and opposed by the adherents of Rome. The people generally were jubilant at its introduction. Those refugees from the intolerance of queen Mary, whom the accession of Elizabeth had restored to their benefices, had returned full of zeal for the Genevan modes of worship, and especially psalm-singing, as well as for the Genevan theology. The sympathy of the people with the continental innovations in worship, is described by Thomas Warton as "this infectious frenzy of sacred song." Says bishop Jewel: "As soon as they had commenced singing in public, in one little church in London, immediately not only the churches in the neighborhood, but even towns far distant, began to vie with each other in the practice." At St. Paul's Cross, six thousand persons, of all ages, might be heard singing the new songs; which, in the shrewd judgment of the bishop, was "sadly annoying to the mass-priests and the devil." Puritanism, then in embryo, throbbed with the popular exhilaration. The church of England, with her characteristic spirit of compromise, retained the choral mode of singing in the cathedrals and collegiate churches, and continued the use of the liturgic hymns in her prayer-book; but provided for the popular demand by a metrical version of the Psalms, which were "set forth and *allowed* to be sung in churches of all the people together." Such was the origin of the metrical Psalter which still bears the names of its chief translators: "The whole Booke of Psalmes, collected into English Metre by T. Sternhold, J. Hopkins, and others, conferred with the Ebrue, with apt Notes to sing them withall." The use of metrical psalmody instantly be-

came the badge, and the test of sympathy with the new life which the Reformation was breathing into the churches of Great Britain. "It was a sign by which men's affections to the work of the Reformation were everywhere measured, whether they used to sing [David's Psalms] or not." As psalm-singing and heresy were synonymes on the Continent, so psalm-singing and Puritanism became synonymes in England. The Psalms in the vulgar tongue were, on the one hand, stigmatized as "Geneva Jiggs" and "Beza's Ballets," and on the other hand they were numbered among the national ballads, and at length among the war-songs of the people. The proclamation against the Queen of Scots, in London, in 1586, was received with the "ringing of bells, making of bonfires, and *singing of psalms*, in every one of the streets and lanes of the city." The forces of the Parliament "in Marston cornfield, fell to *singing psalms*;" and after the battle of Dunbar, the "republican soldiers, with their general Lambert, halted near Haddington and sung the one hundred and seventeenth Psalm." A comedy of the times represents the "Roundheads" as being "used to sing a Psalm, and then *fall on*." They were not only used with "ravishing effect," in the public worship of the sanctuaries, but were sung at weddings and at funerals and at national festivals.

It was in the public service of song on the Sabbath, however, that the spirit of the age proclaimed itself most vigorously on the vexed question of psalm-singing. We cannot more vividly picture it, than by citations (the length of which will be open to no censure, at least from the advocates of modern congregational singing) from the pen of George Wither, a poet of the seventeenth century, and one of its many versifiers on sacred themes. In 1623, he published a volume of "Hymns and Songs of the Church," for which he obtained a royal patent that sounds strangely enough to modern editors of hymnology. It not only gave to the author "full and free license to imprint said book," but it also forbade that any *other* English psalm book, in metre, should be "uttered or sold, unless these hymns were coupled with

it;" and he was at liberty to confiscate any metrical collection of psalmody which was found destitute of his hymns! In a "Preparation for the Psalter," which this privileged poet issued not long before the publication of his hymn book, he defends the rendering of the Psalms in metre, by argument which the sturdy convictions of the age appreciated "The Divell is not ignorant," he says, "of the power of these divine *Charmes*; that there lurks in *Poesy* an enchanting sweetness that steals into the hearts of men before they be aware; and that (the subject being divine) it can infuse a kind of heavenly *Enthusiasm*, such delight into the soule, and beget so ardent an affection unto the purity of God's Word, as it will be impossible for the most powerful *Exorcisms* to conjure out of them the love of such delicacies, but they will be unto them (as *David* saith) *sweeter than hony or the hony combe*. And this secret working which verse hath is excellently expressed by our *drad Sovereigne* that now is (James I.) in a *Poem* of his, long since penned:—

'For verses power is sike, it softly glides
Through secret pores, and in the senses hides,
And makes men have that gude in them imprinted,
Which by the learned worke is represented.'

By reason of this power, our adversaries feare the operation of the divine Word expressed in *Numbers*; and that hath made them so bitter against our versified *Psalmes*; yea (as I have heard say), they term the singing of them in our vulgar tongues, *the Witch of Heresy*." Thus were the early psalmists of Britain accustomed to contend for the popular participation in the service of song. The question, in their robust faith, lay between the pope and the "witch of heresy;" between a "heavenly enthusiasm" and "exorcisms" from the nether world; between "divine charmes" and the "Divell."

That the "divine charmes" had the best of the argument practically, will hardly be doubted by one who reads the testimony of Thomas Mace, a practitioner on the lute in the seventeenth century, distinguished among lovers of music in his day by a folio, whose title, for its entertaining egotism,

might stand as a model of a modern advertisement: "Music's Monument; or a Remembrancer of the best Practical Music, both Divine and Civil, that has ever been known to have been in the World." This simple hearted musician speaks of the siege of York in 1644, which continued for eleven weeks, and during which, on every Sunday, the old Minster was "even cramming or squeezing full." And "sometimes a cannon bullet has come in at the windows, and bounced about from pillar to pillar, even like some furious fiend or evil spirit." But "now here you must take notice that they had then a custom in that church, which I hear not in any other cathedral; which was, that always before the sermon, the whole congregation sang a Psalm, together with the quire and the organ; and you must also know, that there was then a most excellent, large, plump, lusty, full-speaking organ, which cost, I am credibly informed, a thousand pounds. This organ, I say, when the Psalm was set before sermon, being let out into all its fulness of stops, together with the quire, began the Psalm. But when that vast concording unity of the whole congregational chorus came, as I may say, thundering in, even so as it made the very ground shake under us; oh! the unutterable, ravishing, soul's delight! in the which I was so transported and wrapt up in high contemplations, that there was no room left in my whole man, viz. body, soul, and spirit, for anything below Divine and heavenly raptures; nor could there possibly be anything to which that very singing might be truly compared, except the right apprehension or conceiving of that glorious and miraculous quire, recorded in the Scriptures, at the dedication of the Temple."

Abating much from the religious character of the psalm-singing of England in the seventeenth century, on account of the political passions of the day, it still admits of no reasonable question, that the religious element prevailed over all others in introducing and *perpetuating* the innovation. For, the innovation has *lived*, as nothing of the kind can, which is not an exponent of religious vitality. The passions of that age have passed away, and with them the excres-

censes they created in and around the national psalmody; but that psalmody, improved by a purer taste, has become *popular* literature, to an extent which cannot be affirmed of any other department of English poetry. The ancient English and Scottish ballad can sustain no comparison in point of power over the national character, with the English hymn. Next to king James's version of the Scriptures, it has been the chief power in defining and fixing the English language. It has received the reverent labors of men whom the world delights to honor, — of such as Sir Philip Sydney, lord Bacon, Milton, Addison, of bishops and archbishops of the established church, as well as of men who loved to subscribe their names to their devout effusions, by the title of "some-time minister of the gospel." Wherever the English language has gone, it has carried with it the English hymnology, with the taste to appreciate it, and the heart to use it; and every new baptism of religious life, like that which resulted in the rise of Methodism, has given a new spirit to that hymnology, and enlarged its compass. To this day, in this new world, a "great awakening" never vivifies the churches, without renewing the ancient fervor in the service of song, and extending the range of hymnological literature, because of a new *experience* of evangelical life, which can express itself in no other way.

We illustrate thus, at length, the sympathy of hymnology with the vital condition of the church, because its recognition is elemental to the true theory of a manual of psalmody for the sanctuary. We turn, now, to the consideration of certain features of such a manual, which, if it be true to its aim, are necessitated by the principle we have observed. We employ the "Sabbath Hymn Book" as illustrative of the views we propound.

In the first place, the alliance of hymnology with the real life of the church, suggests the preëminence which must be given, in the truthful construction of a hymn book, to the choicest lyrical versions of passages from the Scriptures. Divine Wisdom has made the Bible a compilation of human experiences. This feature of its construction is signally ex-

hibited, in the proportion in which inspiration has adopted into its own service the devotional workings of the hearts of the writers, and of others whose experiences they record. Thus, truth is revealed not only through the medium of inspired histories and biographies, but of inspired autobiographies. The profoundest personal life of hearts swayed by divine grace, is expressed in the thoughts and language of minds inspired with divine truth, and speaking only as they are moved by the Holy Ghost. The inspired poems must therefore be the model of every good collection of devotional poetry; still more, of every such collection designed for the service of praise in the sanctuary. No other development of the life of the church has been so expressive of the depths of regenerate experience. No other is so affluent in suggestion of experiences which it does not express. No other penetrates so profoundly the individual soul, and yet no other is so comprehensive of multiform piety. No other could have illustrated so aptly the discipline of its own age; yet no other, as a whole, is so faithful a mirror to the spiritual consciousness of this age; and no other is pervaded by such truthfulness of proportion as to render it, like this, an epitome of regenerate life in every age. And no other has been authoritatively uttered and recorded. The church can never outlive it—it is for all time. Hymnology has thus a foundation and a model such as no other treasures of song, in any literature, can claim.

We affirm but truisms in speaking thus of the devotional poems of the Bible, and especially of the Book of Psalms. We can scarcely exaggerate the worth of these, as the church of Christ has *felt* it in every period of *genuineness* in her history, and has expressed it, saying with Augustine, “they are a kind of epitome of the whole Scripture;” and with Luther, “they are a miniature Bible;” and with Calvin, “they are an anatomy of all the parts of the soul, since there is no emotion of which one can be conscious, that is not imaged here as in a glass;” and with Hooker, “they are the choice and flower of all things profitable in other books;” and with Watts, “they are the most artful, most

devotional and divine collection of poesy, and nothing can be supposed more proper to raise a pious soul to heaven;" and with a living divine, "they are the thousand-voiced heart of the church."

Yet, an intelligent attachment to the devotional poems of the Scriptures, will discriminate in its use of them. Especially should we weigh well the relations of the Hebrew psalmody to hymnology in its restricted sense. We think it the most brilliant service of Dr. Watts, that he established the authority of a *hymn*, in the hearts of the churches, so as fairly to earn the title which Montgomery gives him, of "almost the *inventor* of hymns in our language." A vast advance was made in spirituality of attachment to the Scriptures, when the theory of Watts respecting the proper use of inspired poems in modern worship, obtained a lodgement in the English churches. Before that time, hymnology as distinct from psalmody, can scarcely be said to have existed in English literature; and psalmody itself changed its character in the hands of Watts, so that the etymological distinction was well nigh obliterated. The "frenzy of sacred song," which Warton lamented as an importation of fanaticism from Geneva, was confined, in England, almost wholly to translations of the Psalms and other portions of the Scriptures. The more literal the version, if it preserved the metrical structure requisite for the mechanism of song, the more truthful it seemed, in the judgment of the time, to the inspired model of worship. No such latitude of usage had been tolerated in England, as that which had flooded Germany and Switzerland with uninspired hymns. The religious temper of the times would have metrical versions of the Psalms, and nothing else. A relic of this feeling still exists in the well-known pertinacity of the Scottish churches, in resisting all inroads of hymnology upon their ancient psalmody.

Watts, as is well known, stoutly contended for the larger liberty. That was an innovation, the boldness of which it is difficult to appreciate now, in which Watts projected the publication of "The Psalms of David," not metrically trans-

lated, but "*imitated* in the language of the New Testament, and *adapted* to the *Christian* state and worship;" and bolder still was the previous publication of "Hymns and Spiritual Songs," avowedly for the purpose of meeting necessities of modern worship, which the letter of the Hebrew psalmody could not satisfy. He lamented that his predecessors "in the composure of song," had so generally imprisoned the spirit of Christian worship, in what he regarded as a superstitious reverence for the letter of the Jewish Scriptures. "Though there are many gone before me," he writes, "who have taught the Hebrew Psalmist to speak English, yet I think I may assume this pleasure, of being the first who hath brought down the royal author into the common affairs of the Christian life, and led the Psalmist of Israel into the church of Christ, without anything of a Jew about him." His "Hymns and Spiritual Songs," too, were composed because he could not understand why "we, under the gospel," should "sing nothing else but the joys, hopes, and fears of Asaph and David." He believed that "David would have thought it very hard to have been confined to the words of Moses, and sung nothing else, on all his rejoicing-days, but the drowning of Pharaoh, in the fifteenth of Exodus." The third book of his hymns was the fruit of his pain in having often observed "to what a hard shift the minister is put to find proper hymns at the celebration of the Lord's supper, where the people will sing nothing but out of David's psalm book;" and because he believed that even in those "places where the Jewish psalmist seems to mean the gospel, excellent poet as he was, he was not able to speak it plain, by reason of the infancy of that dispensation, and longs for the aid of a Christian writer."

We should be slow to subscribe to all the applications which Watts made of his theory, in the zeal of his honest heart, against its opposite. But the principle which lay at the bottom of his innovation was, beyond all question, true and vital to the spirituality of Christian praise. We state it at length, in the uncompromising language of its author, because it has a broader application than even he attempted to

give to it. The principle, reduced to its simplest form, is that the Scriptural Psalmody is not designed as a *restrictive formulary* of the worship of God in song. Not even the Psalms of David have any such office in the plan of inspiration. Watts applied the principle, and in the general we think justly, to a discrimination between the Psalms themselves. They are not all equally worthy of use in public Christian worship. We have no evidence that all of them *were* used in the ancient service of either the temple or the synagogue. The Psalter was the grand collection of Hebrew devotional poems, not the hymn book of the Hebrew sanctuaries. Lightfoot has collected the psalms used in the temple service, adopting as the basis of his calculations, the Scriptural account of that service, and the Rabbinical traditions. The result is, that the largest number of distinct psalms, of the actual use of which, in the temple service or in that of the synagogue before the coming of Christ, we have any record either scriptural or traditional, is less than forty. The introduction of the entire Book of Psalms as a book of song, into public worship of the Christian church, occurred at an uncertain period *after* the time of the apostles. The legitimate inference from these facts is, that the use of metrical versions of the Psalms in modern public worship, must depend upon the intrinsic fitness of them, severally, to such a use, and not upon any supposed prerogative appertaining to them in the mass, as an inspired formulary of worship in all times. We have no authoritative example in which any such prerogative is recognized. Watts, and other psalmists who succeeded him, were right therefore in omitting portions of certain psalms, and certain other psalms entire, because they are intrinsically inexpressive of Christian worship.

In vindication of this liberty, Watts puts the case, very forcibly, to the experience of "pious and observing Christians," who have been accustomed to sing the psalms of David indiscriminately: "Have not your spirits taken wing, and mounted up near to God and glory, with the song of David on your tongue? But, on a sudden, the clerk has

proposed the next line to your lips, with 'dark sayings' and 'prophecies,' with 'burnt offerings' or 'hyssop,' with 'new moons,' and 'trumpets,' and 'timbrels' in it, . . . with complaints . . . such as you never felt, cursing such enemies as you never had, giving thanks for such victories as you never obtained, or leading you to speak, in your own persons, of the things, places, and actions that you never knew. And how have all your souls been discomposed at once, and the strings of harmony all untuned!" Strict *versions* of *all* parts of *all* the Hebrew psalms cannot properly be employed in modern worship. The introduction of them must often depend on the freedom of departure from the original *thought*, as well as the original expression. Such departure may be so great that the poem ceases to be a psalm; it is only an uninspired hymn. In other cases, the admission of a strict version of a psalm, into a modern manual of song, must depend upon the lyrical quality of that version. We may not acquiesce in the severe judgment of the poet Mason, that "a literal (metrical) version of the Psalms may boldly be asserted to be impracticable;" but does not a meditative and didactic poem, like the first Psalm, require for use in English metre, a more mellifluous version, than a precative psalm, like the fifty-first? The poetry of *form* is more indispensable in the one case than in the other, to breathe into a translation the vivacity of song. He is a rare poet who can compose a spirited English hymn on the basis of the first Psalm. He is no poet who can compose any other, on the basis of the fifty-first.

It is a further inference from the principle of liberty in the use of inspired psalmody, for which the Christian world is indebted to Isaac Watts, though it is an application of his principle which does not seem to have occurred to him, that in the arrangement of a manual of hymnology, psalms and hymns need not be distinguished from each other. Aside from the obvious inconveniences of the distinction, it is not true to the facts of hymnology as now existing in the usage of the churches. The English lyrical poems which we call psalms and hymns, have no such uniform difference of char-

acter, as this distinction in title implies. The principle of "imitation," rather than of translation, which all our modern psalm books, except that of the Scottish churches, have inherited from Dr. Watts, virtually destroys the truthfulness of the distinction, by destroying its uniformity. On the contrary, certain so-called "Hymns" are more truthful versions of certain of the Psalms of David, than other so-called "Psalms" of the inspired lyrics which they profess to "imitate." The seventy-ninth Hymn of the first book of "Watts's Hymns" ("God of the morning, at whose voice," etc.), is a more accurate expression of certain verses of the Psalmist, than any version we have seen in modern use, of the fifty-ninth Psalm of David. The one hundred and thirty-sixth Hymn of Watts, Book I ("God is a spirit, just and wise," etc.) approximates more nearly to a version of the one hundred and thirty-ninth of the Hebrew Psalms, than Watts's own version of the seventy-fifth Psalm approaches its original. Why should we distinguish as a "Psalm of David," a poem which, as is the case with the seventy-fifth Psalm, Watts applies to "the glorious Revolution by King William, or the happy accession of King George to the throne;" and which Barlow, whose version is still used in some American churches, applies to "the American Revolution?"

The history of this distinction between psalms and hymns is most instructive. Its origin was very natural, almost inevitable. It grew out of a hostility to the use of *anything* in sacred song, but the language of the Scriptures. An indiscriminate reverence for the letter of the Bible, exhibited itself in a most determined opposition to the introduction of uninspired hymns, in the very earliest period of Christian hymnology. "Original hymns," as they were termed, were deemed, by many of the early Christians, a perilous innovation. The conflict for their exclusion, associated them with the introduction, also, of heathen tunes. We find very early evidence of a distinction, in the usages of worship, between the *singing* of hymns and the *chanting* of psalms. The admissibility of hymns, into the liturgy of the church, was con-

tested for several centuries ; and finally the dispute seems to have died away, partly through the triumph of some of the noble hymns of the ancient church, and partly through the gradual exclusion of the people from the public service of praise. But it was vigorously revived, with the revival of popular "psalm singing," which we have sketched. The musical German ear did not long tolerate the controversy Hymnology, as the correlative of psalmody, was overwhelmingly triumphant. It was not so in England, till the appearance of Dr. Watts; and to this day is not so, north of the Tweed. "Psalm singing" and "hymn singing" were, to the English and Scottish conscience, very different things. It was objected to George Withers, when he published his "Hymnes and Songs of the Church," that he had "indecently obtruded upon the divine calling;" to which he gave, in reply, the substance of the whole argument, when he said: "I wonder what 'divine calling' Hopkins and Sternhold had, more than I have, that their metricall *Psalmes* may be allowed of, rather than my hymnes."

The great achievement of Dr. Watts, was that of establishing the right of a hymn *to be, at all*, in the public worship of God. What, then, could have been more natural, and for the times more expedient, than this distinction between "Psalms" and "Hymns"? By this distinction the Psalms, of which that age had no conception as being any other than *paraphrases* of the inspired original, seemed to receive superior honor; the hymns being tolerated in supplementary collections. Watts himself published his volume of "Imitations of David's Psalms," piously hoping not only that "David [would be] converted into a Christian," but that the Psalms, thus christianized, would escape some of the objections to "Hymns and Spiritual Songs." Yet the principle for which Watts contended in his "imitation" of the Psalms, virtually abrogated the distinction, by destroying its uniformity, and in many cases its reality. The practice of modern churches, under the wing of Watts's muse, has reduced the distinction to a shadow. Why then retain it? We think it an advance in spirituality of reverence for the

Scriptures to abandon it. It is virtually conceded, by the sanction the church has given to the innovation of Watts upon the ancient psalmody.

Again, it follows from the views we have advanced of the relation of hymnology to the Scriptures, that a Hymn Book should comprise the choicest metrical paraphrases and "imitations" of other portions of the Bible, than the book of Psalms. The versification in English, of other than the lyrical compositions of the Scriptures, was a favorite project with many of the early Psalmists of Great Britain. It was often attempted with no regard to the fitness of the materials to poetic form, or to the service of song. Not only the historical but the statistical portions of the Old Testament were brought into subjection to lyric rhymes. One of the varieties in which the popular reverence for the letter of the Scriptures developed itself, was the favorable reception which many gave to the first fourteen chapters of the Acts of the Apostles, when, as Milton described some of his own versifications of the Psalms, they were completely "done into metre," and were sung in the royal chapel of Edward the Sixth. They were commended to other pious uses also by the title of "The Actes of the Apostles, translated into Englyshe metre, and dedicated to the Kynges moste excellent maiestye, by Christofer Tye, doctor in musyke, and one of the Gentylnen of hys graces moste honourable Chappell, with notes to eche chapter to synge and also to play upon the Lute, *very necessarye for studentes after theyr studye to fyle theyr wyttes*, and alsoe for all Christians that cannot synge, to read the good and godlye storyes of the lives of Christ hys apostles." The Books of Kings and Genesis were in like manner reduced to metre. There is still extant in the Bodleian Library, "The summe of every chapter of the Old and New Testaments, set down Alphabetically in English Verse, . . . By Simon Wastell, . . . Schoole-master of the Free Schoole in Northampton, 1623." We cannot but be amused at the imagination of the scene, in which a grave assembly must have sounded their way resolutely through the thirty-sixth chapter of Genesis — "Now

these are the generations of Esau," etc., or through the fourth chapter of the first Book of Kings, "so king Solomon was king over all Israel; and these were the princes that he had; Azariah the son of Zadok, etc.;" — the worshippers grimly resolute, the while, against the profanation of praising God by the singing of such "unauthorized" lyrics, as "Welcome, sweet day of rest" — "There is a land of pure delight," — "Great God! how infinite art Thou!" — "My dear Redeemer and my Lord."

But Dr. Watts was not deterred by the "mob of religious rhymers," from appreciating the richness of many portions of the Bible, abounding with the materials of lyric conception, though not inspired in lyric form. On select groups of inspired thoughts, he founded some of the choicest gems of song in the language. What would our modern hymnology have been, without the first Book of Watts's hymns! We might better retain all its excrescences, including its songs from the Canticles, than to part with some of its unequalled strains. Turning to the selection from this source in the Sabbath Hymn Book, our eye falls upon the following :

Hymn 89, "Come, dearest Lord, descend and dwell."

Hymn 337, "Behold the glories of the Lamb."

Hymn 338, "Come let us join our cheerful songs."

Hymn 342, "What equal honors shall we bring."

Hymn 504, "Come hither, all ye weary souls."

Hymn 724, "No more, my God, I boast no more."

Hymn 754, "Oh for an overcoming faith."

Hymn 797, "I'm not ashamed to own my Lord."

Hymn 886, "Let me but hear my Saviour say."

Hymn 1002, "Behold what wondrous grace."

Hymn 1266, "Lo what a glorious sight appears," —

and upon a multitude of others, which are either paraphrases or imitations of choice paragraphs of the Scriptures, not in the book of Psalms; and which must live, surely, while the language lives. They suggest the inexhaustible Scriptural resources, from which hymnology may yet gain expansion of range through the labors of future lovers of holy song. It is in this direction that we specially desire to see our psal-

mody improved. We believe that untold affluence of lyric thought yet lies in the word of God, unuttered in lyric verse. Volumes of Scriptural hymns are yet unwritten. Paraphrases, liberal versions, imitations, motto-hymns, replete with Scriptural thought, radiant with Scriptural imagery, and fragrant with Scriptural devotion, are yet to augment the opulence of our hymnological literature. Every new metrical paraphrase of such a passage, for example, as the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah, if it be worthy of its original, we welcome, as an addition to the Songs of Zion. Such a hymn *must* express with some new fidelity, the experience of Christian hearts. Christians will love it; they will sing it. It will become a joy to them in the house of their pilgrimage; it will linger upon their lips in their last hours.

The "Sabbath Hymn Book" is enriched by some such new treasures of Scriptural song. The first Hymn in the volume, is a new version of the Lord's Prayer, in which the very severity of its faithfulness to the original may conceal its poetic merits, till we reflect or rather *feel*, that fidelity to the original *is* the poetry of *such* a prayer. Hymn 245, is a paraphrase of the doxology to the Saviour with which the visions of the Apocalypse open. Hymns 313, and 321, are simple and touching versions of a portion of the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah. Hymn 339, is founded upon the "New Song," in which the four and twenty Elders worshipped the Lamb in the midst of the throne. Hymn 689, we think, is a beautiful expression of communion with Him, whom "having not seen, ye love." Hymn 779, is a versification, which some struggling disciples will welcome, of the prayer of Thomas. Hymn 868, is a faithful version of one of the most compact representations of the dignity of the Saints, found in the Epistle to the Hebrews. Hymns 1273 and 1275, are paraphrases of two very dissimilar passages suggesting the Resurrection. The one is the representative of the old dispensation; the other, that of the new. We do not know where to find hymns superior to them, on that doctrine. They illustrate so aptly the truthfulness of our faith that *new* paraphrases and imitations of

the Scriptures may be expected to increase the wealth of our hymnological literature, that we refrain from naming others which deserve attention in the Sabbath Hymn Book, in order that we may quote these entire. The first (Hymn 1273), is an imitation in Christian song, and as many interpreters would regard it, a paraphrase, of the literal meaning of Job, 19: 25, 26, "For I know that my Redeemer liveth, etc."

My faith shall triumph o'er the grave,
And trample on the tomb;
I know that my Redeemer lives,
And on the clouds shall come.

I know that he shall soon appear
In power and glory meet;
And death, the last of all his foes,
Lie vanquished at his feet.

Then, though the grave my flesh devour,
And hold me for its prey,
I know my sleeping dust shall rise
On the last judgment-day.

I, in my flesh, shall see my God,
When he on earth shall stand;
I shall with all his saints ascend,
To dwell at his right hand.

Then shall he wipe all tears away,
And hush the rising groan;
And pains and sighs and griefs and fears
Shall ever be unknown.

The other (Hymn 1275) is a paraphrase of 1 Thes. 4: 14—17, in which the apostle announces, in its fulness, the Christian doctrine of the Resurrection of Saints.

As Jesus died and rose again,
Victorious, from the dead;
So his disciples rise, and reign
With their triumphant Head.

The time draws nigh, when, from the clouds,
Christ shall with shouts descend;
And the last trumpet's awful voice
The heavens and earth shall rend.

Then they who live shall changed be,
And they who sleep shall wake ;
The graves shall yield their ancient charge,
And earth's foundation shake.

The saints of God, from death set free,
With joy shall mount on high ;
The heavenly host with praises loud
Shall meet them in the sky.

Together to their Father's house
With joyful hearts they go ;
And dwell forever with the Lord,
Beyond the reach of woe.

Such hymns, though they do not rise to the rank of the highest style of psalms of *worship*, appear to us to be among the noblest of meditative and didactic hymns. Are they not worthy to receive the apostolic commendation appended to the text on which one of them is founded : " Wherefore, comfort one another with these words ? "

Some approximation to an estimate of the Sabbath Hymn Book as a collection of Biblical Song, may be obtained from the fact, that more than five hundred and fifty of its pieces are composed of either the literal text or of paraphrases and imitations of the Scriptures ; and that nearly the whole number of its Hymns are referred in its Scriptural Index, by no fanciful resemblance, to inspired passages ; and that nearly two thousand such passages are thus illustrated in the volume, each being, in many cases, the centre of a cynosure of hymns which radiate the glow it has imparted to them. This is as it should be. The most hearty hymnology of any age, that to which the most genuine religious life will always respond feelingly, and which in return will be most tonic to any living experience in the church, must be that which is most intensely pervaded with Biblical thought. This should be exhaled from it everywhere, with richer than " Sabeian odor." It should be like the mist of Eden, which ' went up from the earth, and watered the *whole* face of the ground.'

The sympathy of hymnology with the religious life, sug-

gests further, the value of those uninspired hymns which time has *proved* to be truthful to the general experience of Christians. These may be emphatically entitled the Hymns of the Church; for, they are the production of the church, as distinct from the temple and the synagogue. As the Hebrew faith created the inspired psalmody, so Christianity as we have seen, very early began to create its own hymnology, and has refreshed itself by outbursts of lyric devotion, all the way down the ages of its pilgrimage. Many of these effusions from the heart of one age and country, have stood the test of time, and of migration to other lands. Different nationalities and different generations of Christendom have given their suffrage to the same strains. Some of them are from the very earliest periods of the church, and were first sung by voices which were almost the echo from apostolic lips. The earliest Greek poem on a sacred theme, from any writer whose name and writings have survived to this day, is a song of praise to "Christ the Redeemer." Others are hymns of the Reformation, on which the venerableness of age is fast gathering, and which are still sung affectionately by devout Christians in Europe, after the lapse of three centuries. Some are "voices of the night," from the Middle Ages, breathing a spirit like that of the old prophecies, anticipative of the time of the end. Reasoning *a priori*, one might say 'there surely must be some gems which the church of every age will delight in, in this treasury of old songs.'

Yet English Hymnology has not drawn very largely upon the resources of other lands and tongues. Cranmer expressed faintly the hope, that some future English poet would translate for his countrymen the hymns of the first Christian centuries. A very few, as we have seen, remained in liturgic form, in the English church. The Wesleys translated nearly thirty hymns from the German language, and some of these are among the most spirited that now bear their names. But, aside from this, the Ancient Hymns have but a meagre representation in the manuals of psalmody now used in the churches of Great Britain and America. Comparatively little of our hymnology, as actually used in the public ser-

vice of the sanctuary, with the exception of the Psalms by Tate and Brady, date back beyond the time of Watts and Doddridge. The bulk of sacred song in our language, is by at least two centuries, less ancient than that of Germany. Two causes have especially contributed to this result. One is the tendency of the English mind to *insular* tastes in literature and theology. The other is the peculiar intensity of the spirit of reform in Great Britain, in the sixteenth century. The religious spirit of the nation sprang with a rebound from the papal church, when once the bonds were loosened. A positive hostility was felt, not only as we have seen, to "uninspired hymns" in the general, but to the ancient hymns of the church in particular, because many of them had become identified with the Roman missal. The fire which inflamed the iconoclasm of the Scottish Reformers, burned out the leaves of the ancient hymnology from their liturgy. It was by dint of royal authority that the "Gloria in Excelsis" and the "Te Deum Laudamus," remained in the English church. The metrical version of the Psalms by Sternhold and Hopkins, met with stout resistance, from one party, *because* it would expurgate the church of many of the old liturgic hymns.

The same conflict over the ancient Breviary was waged on the Continent, but with this difference, that an original hymnological literature was speedily created there; and this was founded to some extent upon the old hymns of the church. Even before the Reformation, the germs of such a literature existed in the hymns of the Albigenses and the Bohemian brethren, whose *melodies* originated in the chants to which the Latin hymns of the West were sung. The current of Continental Protestantism was early and strongly *set* in the channel of an original hymnology, and that too a hymnology which made the Breviary and other collections of ancient song pay tribute to its own inspiration, long before English hymnology as distinct from psalmody was in existence; and when the religious mind of England and Scotland was agitated with the question whether psalmody had any *right* thus to expand itself beyond the books of Genesis

and the Revelation. Luther felt no scruples of this sort. The singing of the Hussite brethren had fixed his judgment of the value of original hymns, to the reformed faith. He not only set about the composition of hymns with his own pen, but urged his friends to do the same; and engaged the services of poets and the most eminent musicians of the time, to create the staple of Christian song. He would also *take* a good hymn or a good tune wherever he found it, though it were from the teeth of the Pope. "I am far from thinking," he says, "that the Gospel is to strike all Art to the Earth; but I would have all Arts . . . taken into that service for which they were given." He accordingly enriched the German psalmody with many reprisals, both of text and tune, from the Latin hymnology. He versified thus the "Te Deum," "Veni Redemptor gentium," "Veni Creator Spiritus," "Media Vita," "O lux beata Trinitas," and many others, some of which are still used in German worship. His example was followed by many of the multitude of German hymnologists who followed him in the seventeenth century; and this eclectic spirit has made the Christian song of Germany what it is.

Good reasons may have existed for the temporary insulation of the psalmody of Great Britain within the resources of her native poets. It is seldom that the taste of a nation is perverted, *all* things considered, under the influence of a quickening of religious faith. That faith has a certain regulative force, which tends to tranquillize those passions that lead to distortions of character, and to forbid the sacrifice of any good, unless the temporary loss be necessary to protection from a greater. We are not disposed, therefore, to mourn over the obduracy of our fathers in clinging to their own national literature, and seeking its growth from within itself, rather than by foreign accretions. We are inclined to regard it as one of the many phenomena which indicate a design of Providence in the tendency to *seclusion* existing in British character, of which the insular geography of Great Britain is an emblem and a cause.

But such reasons for segregation, in respect of religious

sympathy, must be temporary. Now that time has disciplined the mind of the Anglo Saxon churches, not to the toleration only, but to the enjoyment of "original hymns" in their worship, and has created a more discriminative spirit in its judgment of the Past, the old Hymns of the Church come back to us in their true dignity, as *representatives* of a religious life which the Spirit of God never suffered utterly to die out. They are utterances of the experience which "kings and priests unto God," of other times, have thought and felt, and struggled through, and suffered for, and *sung* in triumph. They are the hymns of the early sanctuary, sung by Christians whose fathers had joined with the apostles in psalms and hymns and spiritual songs. They are the hymns of the early morning prayer-meeting, in which the heathen overheard Christians "singing before daylight in praise of Christ as a God." They are the hymns of the early Christian homes, which were sung at marriage feasts, and over the cradles of children, and at the morning and evening fireside. They are the hymns of the Eucharist and of Baptism, in which the spirit of primitive consecration breathed the fragrance of its piety. They are the early pastoral hymns of the church which "you could not go into the country without hearing," says Jerome, from "the ploughman, the mower, and the vinedresser." They are the early burial hymns, sung beside the graves of the saints, young men and maidens, old men and children, by those who sorrowed not as others. They are the hymns of the Martyrs, sung by hunted worshippers, at midnight, in dens and caves of the earth, amidst armed men in ambush, and by prisoners in dungeons and in the flames. They are the battle-songs of the church, sung in hours of forlorn hope, and as the prelude and thanksgiving of victory. They are the claustral hymns through which Truth gleamed in upon "spirits in prison," who, like Luther at Erfurt, struggled with unseen foes. They are Pentecostal hymns, in which the voice of the church has broken out anew, in different ages and lands, whenever and wherever the place has been "shaken," where men were assembled, and they have been "all filled with the Holy

Ghost." They are some of them older than any living language, yet to-day they speak the life of Christian hearts as freshly as when they were first written. Devout men out of every nation under heaven may come together, and every man shall hear them speak in his own language. Some of these ancient hymns have probably been sung by larger numbers of godly men and women and children, embracing wider diversities of nationality, of social rank, and of Christian opinion, and extending over a longer line of ages, than any other uninspired songs. They more than realize the ideal of the "*Laus Perennis*," originated by the Monks of Antioch, whose discipline obliged them to preserve in their monastery a *perpetual psalmody*, like the vestal fire or the perpetual lamps of mythology.

Hymns so necessary as these to the embodiment of its real life in song, the church should not leave buried in dead languages, or secluded in any national literature. They are the rightful inheritance of all future ages, and should be world-wide in their usefulness. It is surely time that they were incorporated with English hymnology. The Sabbath Hymn Book has attempted a beginning of this work, and we hope that future contributors to our hymnological stores will labor in the same mine. Our space will permit us to extract but a few of these hymns, which we present with the Latin originals, and in some examples with the German versions. The first (Hymn 336) is a "Hymn to the Redeemer," the authorship of which has been contested, but is traced satisfactorily to Gregory the Great (A. D. 540 — 604). It was one of the favorite hymns of Luther, who pronounced it to be among the standard songs of the church, for, he said, it contained the very essence of Christianity.

O Christ ! our King, Creator, Lord !
Saviour of all who trust thy word !
To them who seek thee ever near,
Now to our praises bend thine ear.

In thy dear cross a grace is found —
It flows from every streaming wound —
Whose power our inbred sin controls,
Breaks the firm bond, and frees our souls !

Thou didst create the stars of night ;
 Yet thou hast veiled in flesh thy light —
 Hast deigned a mortal form to wear,
 A mortal's painful lot to bear.

When thou didst hang upon the tree,
 The quaking earth acknowledged thee ;
 When thou didst there yield up thy breath,
 The world grew dark as shades of death.

Now in the Father's glory high,
 Great Conqu'ror, never more to die,
 Us by thy mighty power defend,
 And reign through ages without end.

The following are the Latin original and Luther's translation.

Rex Christe, factor omnium
 Redemptor et credentium :
 Placare votis supplicum
 Te laudibus colentium !

Christ, König, Schöpfer aller Welt,
 Zum Heil der Gläubigen bestellst :
 O laß Dir gern der Demuth Fall'n,
 Und unsern Lobgesang gefall'n.

Crucis benigna gratia,
 Crucis per alma vulnera,
 Virtute solvit ardua
 Prima parentis vincula.

Du hast durch Deiner Gnade Kraft,
 Durch Deinen Tod am Kreuzes-Schaft,
 Der angeerbten Sündenhaft
 Der ersten Eltern uns entrafft.

Qui es creator siderum,
 Tegmen subisti carneum,
 Dignatus hanc vilissimam
 Pati doloris formulam.

Du schufst der Sterne gold'ne Reih'n,
 Und kamst mit uns ein Mensch zu seyn,
 Du duldestest, uns zu befrei'n,
 Des ird'schen Todes Schmerz und Pein.

Cruci, redemptor, ageris :
 Terram sed omnem concutis ;
 Tradis potentem spiritum :
 Nigrescit atque seculum.

Man schlägt's ans Kreuz Dich Heiland,
 an :
 Die Erde wankt in ihrer Bahn ;
 Der Geist entflieht ; „Es ist vollbracht“ !
 Und alle Welt deckt dunkle Nacht.

Mox in paternae gloriae
 Victor resplendens culmine
 Cum spiritus munime
 Defende nos, rex optime !

Bald aber steig'st aus Todesweh'n
 Du siegend zu des Lichtes Höh'n :
 So sey mit Deinem Geist nun dort
 Uns Schutz und Schirm, Du starker Hort !

The ancient and mediæval hymns are often marked by a subdued depth of pathos towards the person of Christ. This is the very life of them. Hence it is, that they are the voices of Christian hearts to Christian hearts, over continents and through ages. The following is a selection from one of this class, from the pen of St. Bernard (A. D. 1091 — 1153).

Jesus! the very thought of thee
With gladness fills my breast;
But dearer far thy face to see,
And in thy presence rest.

Nor voice can sing, nor heart can frame,
Nor can the memory find
A sweeter sound than thy blest name,
O Saviour of mankind!

O Hope of every contrite heart,
O Joy of all the meek!
To those who fall, how kind thou art,
How good to those who seek!

And those who find thee, find a bliss
Nor tongue nor pen can show:
The love of Jesus — what it is,
None but its loved ones know.

Jesus, our only joy be thou!
As thou our prize wilt be;
Jesus, be thou our glory now,
And through eternity!

The original of these stanzas, and their German version are as follows, viz:

Iesu, dulcis memoria,
Dans vera cordis gaudia,
Sed super mel et omnia
Eius dulcis praesentia.

Nil canitur suavius,
Auditar nil iucundius,
Nil cogitatur dulcius,
Quam Iesus, Dei filius.

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Dein Denken, Jesus, schon verleihst
Dem Herzen wahre Freudigkeit,
Doch mehr als jede Lust erfreut
Ach Deiner Nähe Süßigkeit.

Kein Liederstrom so lieblich fließt,
Kein Klang so freundlich uns begrüßt,
Und nichts so süß zu denken ist,
Als: Gottes Sohn ist Jesus Christ.

19

Iesu, spes poenitentibus,	Jesuf, der Sünder Hoffungsstern,
Quam pius es potentibus ?	Den Bittenden erhörst Du gern,
Quam bonus te quaerentibus ?	Dem Suchenden bist Du nicht fern,
Sed quid invenientibus ? !	Was dem erst, der Dich fand, den Herrn ? !

Nec lingua valet dicere,	Kein Wort genügend sich erweist,
Nec litera exprimere,	Und keine Schrift es würdig preist,
Expertus potest credere,	Nur fühlen kann's ein gläub'ger Geist,
Quid sit Iesum diligere.	Was es, Dich Jesum lieben, heist.

Iesu, dulcedo cordium,	Dich lieben ! süße Herzenspflicht,
Fons vivus, lumen mentium,	Du Lebensquell, Du Seelenlicht !
Excedens omne gaudium,	Das alle Lust, die in uns liegt,
Et omne desiderium.	Und alle Wünsche überwiegt.

It is refreshing to find in the very midnight of the Middle Ages, a gleam of spiritual light which gives promise of the morning. Such is the sacramental hymn of Thomas Aquinas (A. D. 1224 — 1274) — a name which we are glad to rescue, in our own minds, from its associations in dogmatic history, by means of so truthful an outburst of communion with Christ, as the following :

O Bread to pilgrims given,
 O Food that angels eat,
 O Manna sent from heaven,
 For heaven-born natures meet !
 Give us, for thee long pining,
 To eat till richly filled ;
 Till, earth's delights resigning,
 Our every wish is stilled !

O Water, life-bestowing,
 From out the Saviour's heart,
 A fountain purely flowing,
 A fount of love thou art !
 Oh let us, freely tasting,
 Our burning thirst assuage !
 Thy sweetness, never wasting,
 Avails from age to age.

Jesus, this feast receiving,
 We thee unseen adore ;

Thy faithful word believing,
 We take — and doubt no more;
 Give us, thou true and loving,
 On earth to live in thee;
 Then, death the vail removing,
 Thy glorious face to see!

The following original of this Hymn, and its German version, are from a collection of the few hymns certainly known as the productions of this author, of which the German Editor expresses the Christian judgment of his countrymen, by saying, that one of them would be sufficient to preserve the name of Aquinas through all time.

O esca viatorum!
 O panis angelorum!
 O manna coelitum!
 Esurientes ciba,
 Dulcedine non priva
 Corda quaerentium.

O lympha, fons amoris!
 Qui puro Salvatoris
 E corde profluus:
 Te sitientes pota!
 Haec sola nostra vota,
 His una sufficis!

O Iesu, tuum vultum,
 Quem colimus occultum
 Sub panis specie:
 Fac, ut remoto velo
 Glorioso in coelo
 Cernamus acie!

Labfal der Pilgerreise!
 O Brod, der Engel Speise!
 O Manna, Himmelsfrucht!
 Die Hungrigen ernähre
 Und Süßigkeit gewähre
 Dem Herzen, das dich sucht.

O Strom, Urquell der Liebe,
 Der rein, und niemals trübe
 Des Retters Herz entfließt:
 Die nach dir dürsten, tränke!
 Dem Wunsch Gewährung schenke,
 Der alle in sich schließt.

O Herr, auf den wir bauen,
 Den wir verborgen schauen
 In dieses Brodes Bild:
 Laß, wenn dies Band gefallen,
 Uns in des Himmels Hallen
 Dich sehen unverhüllt!

The Christology of the ancient hymns often exhibits an intense vividness of conception, in depicting the *individuality* of the relation between the Redeemer and his disciples. It is like that of a personal friendship. Some of the Passion-Hymns of the old hymnology are excessively theopathic, in their expression of this conception. But that hymnology contains also many which are only the natural embodiment

in song, of an experience in which the most eminent saints of all ages are "of one mind and one soul." Such is the well known hymn of Francis Xavier (A. D. 1506 — 1552) of which the following are the original, and the English version from the Sabbath Hymn Book :

O Deus! ego amo te,
Nec amo te ut salves me,
Aut quia non amantes te
Æterno punis igne.
Tu, tu, mi Jesu! totum me
Amplexus es in cruce;
Tulisti clavos, lanceam,
Multamque ignominiam,
Innumeros dolores,
Sudores, et angores,
Ac mortem; et hæc propter me,
Et pro me peccatore.
Cur igitur non amem te,
O Jesu amantissime!
Non ut in cælo salves me,
Aut ne æternum damnes me,
Aut præmii ullius spe;
Sed sicut tu amasti me,
Sic amo, et amabo te;
Solum quia rex meus es,
Et solum quia Deus es.

I love thee, O my God, but not
For what I hope thereby;
Nor yet because who love thee not,
Must die eternally:
I love thee, O my God, and still
I ever will love thee,
Solely because my God thou art
Who first hast lovéd me.

For me, to lowest depths of woe
Thou didst thyself abase;
For me didst bear the cross, the shame,
And manifold disgrace;
For me didst suffer pains unknown,
Blood-sweat and agony,
Yea, death itself — all, all for me,
For me, thine enemy.

Then shall I not, O Saviour mine!
Shall I not love thee well?
Not with the hope of winning heaven,
Nor of escaping hell;
Not with the hope of earning aught,
Nor seeking a reward,
But freely, fully, as thyself
Hast lovéd me, O Lord!

Luther surely was right, in his eclecticism towards the "Hymns of the Church," when such strains as these could proceed from the lips of a Jesuit missionary, his own contemporary. The vitality of some relics of the old Latin psalmody is finely illustrated in the history of the Hymn 1203, of this collection :

"The pangs of death are near."

The original of this was a Latin chant by St. Notker, a monk of St. Gall in the ninth century.

In media vita
In morte sumus, etc.

It was imitated in a German hymn which formed a part of the burial-service in the thirteenth century, and was then used also as a battle-song. Luther added to it several stanzas; from the Continent it passed over into England, and a remnant of it still exists in the Liturgy of the Church of England, and of the Episcopal Church of America — a remnant the familiarity and the value of which to the English mind are pleasantly illustrated by the fact, that Robert Hall once sought for it in the Bible, as the text of a sermon. So venerable does a Christian hymn become which has lived a thousand years.

Many others of this class of hymns in the Manual before us, have an impressive history. They not only *have been* the utterances of devout men in a remote age — they *are* on the lips of thousands in the living age. They are among the endeared hymns of Protestant Europe. They are sung often with voices which are, as Ambrose described the congregational singing of his day, “like the blending sound of many waters.”

Hymn 263: “All praise to thee, eternal Lord,”

is a version of one of Luther's favorite hymns on a favorite theme, on which he wrote several that are still used and loved by the churches of Germany, and one which is sung from the dome of the Kreuzkirche in Dresden, before daybreak, on every Christmas morning.

Hymn 899: “Fear not, O little flock, the foe,”

was written by Altenburg in 1631, with the title “A heart-cheering Song of comfort on the watchword of the Evangelical Army in the battle of Leipsic, Sept. 7th, 1631,—“God with us.” It was the battle-song of Gustavus Adolphus, often sung by him with his army, as the Puritans sung the inspired Psalms. One tradition affirms that he sung it before *every* battle, and for the last time before the battle of Lützen, in which he perished. A similar hymn by Lowenstern,

Hymn 1022: “O Christ, the Leader of that warworn host,”

was called forth by the sufferings of the Reformed Church in the "Thirty years' war." It was a favorite hymn of Niebuhr.

Hymn 1181: "When from my sight all fades away,"

is taken from a hymn written for his children, by Paul Eber, a friend of Melancthon. It has long been a favorite hymn for the death-bed. Grotius requested that it might be repeated to him in his last moments, and expired before its close.

Such are the rich memories that cluster around these hymns of the Past. Many, the history of which is not minutely known, bear internal evidence of being themselves a history of struggling or triumphant hearts.

The affinity of hymnology with the religious experience of the church suggests, still further, the value of the best modern contributions to the service of song. As in literature, art, and social civilization, so in religious life, every age has an individuality of its own. That individuality needs, and will have, in some form, an expression. Its normal development is to express itself in the psalmody of the church. If it be denied expression there, it will seek expression in a psalmody without the church. It will force itself into the purest lyric forms of thought, wherever it can find them; and these will be used, enjoyed, loved, as the representatives of an *existing* Christian life. That is an unwise restriction of a manual of sacred song, which admits *only* the familiar and tried hymns of the sanctuary. Especially is that a perilous restriction which is founded exclusively on the taste and the experience of a past age, and is aimed at a retention of all the accumulations of that age, by the force of endearing association. Such a principle must result in the compilation of many hymns which are intrinsically inferior to others of modern origin, and which will be felt to be so by the *heart* of the church, as well as pronounced to be so by the taste of the age. The consequence is conceivable, that certain classes of Christian mind, if not all, should find themselves omitting, or going through by routine, large por-

tions of their Sabbath psalmody, and reverting, on the week day, to "unsanctioned" lyrics, for the invigoration which the 'service of song in the house of the Lord' has not given them.

The same reasons which required the extension of hymnology, by the adventurous labors of Dr. Watts, beyond the letter of inspired poems, and which have again and again expanded its range by the supplementary labors of Wesley, Steele, Doddridge, and Montgomery, require also its further growth by the admission of the best productions of living hymnologists. The question involved is not a question of taste alone; it is a question of the adaptation of sacred song to a various, and a living Christian experience. There must be breadth of range in our hymnology, in order to flexibility in its expression of a diversified religious life. We need hymns for every existing mood of devotion; and for these we must be indebted, in part, to living poets. In no other manner can the *real life* of the church be symmetrically expressed in song.

This view is eminently truthful as applied to *English* hymnology, which, to an extent unparalleled in any hymnological literature but that of the Hebrews, owes its existence and its idiosyncracies to *one* man. The remarks we have already made indicate, we trust, that we yield to none in our reverence for Isaac Watts. Every student of hymnology knows the *refreshment* he experiences, in plodding through thousands of the lyrics of inferior poets, whenever he comes suddenly upon one of the sterling psalms or hymns of this prince of the house of David. How often has his voice been to us like a song in the night!

Still, we cannot but discriminate between the use and the abuse of his productions, in the construction of a modern manual of psalmody. Well-known facts in the history of English psalmody are often forgotten, which yet have an important bearing on the position of Watts among the poets of the sanctuary. He was the pioneer of hymnology in our language. He had no models that were worthy of his imitation. He wrote at an age when *anything* from such a pen as his, was superior to the standard psalmody of the

churches. We do not marvel at the enthusiasm, with which the humble worshippers at Southampton recoiled from the tasteless lyrics of the day, to welcome such a song of praise to "the Lamb that was slain," as the first hymn which the youthful poet composed for them at the suggestion of his father :

"Behold the glories of the Lamb!"

He wrote in an age when the poetic taste of England was unformed — its taste respecting religious poetry *deformed*. It was a period of literary struggle and transition. The public mind tolerated, even admired, conceits, affectation, coarseness, in the service of song. Watts did much to improve the literary temper of the times ; his genius, at the bidding of his piety, often soared above the taste of his contemporaries ; yet, he sometimes did so unconsciously, for he himself believed that in some of his compositions, now dear to the church and admired by critics, he was sacrificing literary excellence to pious simplicity. He expected to be censured, he informs us, for a too religious observance of the inspired word, by which the verse was debased in the judgment of literary criticism.

But, powerful as his influence was upon his age, the age had power also over him, and he often succumbed to it, by the production of lyrics which the church *has* practically been willing to let die. The immediate consequence, however, in part, of the transcendent excellences of his poems, and in part of the purblind taste of the age, was, that his "Psalms and Hymns" were received in the mass, by those who accepted them at all. Multitudes sprang to greet them, vaulting over from all the hymnology that had preceded them. Their faults were sheltered by their virtues, to a degree almost unprecedented in the history of our religious literature. They were embraced *as a whole*, in the affections of the church, and from that time to the present, "Watts entire" has been the household word of many lovers of holy song. Hymnologic taste, to this day, has been quickened by the breath of life which the whole body of devotional lite-

rature inhaled from the empyrean to which Watts taught it to soar, but its pulse has beat feverishly in the low grounds in which the pinions of his muse were sometimes dragged.

Meanwhile, our national literature, and especially our poetry, and still more essentially that class of poems which are nearest of kin to psalmody, have been undergoing improvement which our hymnology must feel — has felt. If we repel it or retreat from it, our service of song will be, so far forth, grooved into the past, and all other poetic literature will stride in advance of it, as that literature has done relatively to the psalmody of the kirk of Scotland. If we wisely but cordially welcome it, and try its spirit, and test the past in part by it, and use only that which is good, we shall expand the range of religious song, and keep it abreast with the noblest poetry of our language.

To mention but one fountain of the influence which is working a change in our literature, and which has created the taste that appreciates it — is it possible to believe that Wordsworth has done nothing to advance our national poetry? Has not his influence on *lyric* writers been positive and healthful? Hymnology is moving under an impulse which, so far as its literary character is concerned, owes much to him. We owe to him, indirectly, some characteristics of the poetic forms which modern Christian life needs, in order to express itself in the most becoming song. The impulse must be disciplinary to the public taste respecting the earlier poets. Its tendency is to prune away the excrescences of Watts's effusions, and to reduce the number of them, in our manuals of psalmody, to those which can *live* in the heart of our churches. The influence is salutary upon the reputation of Watts. He will live the longer; his truly vitalized hymns and psalms will be more permanent in the affections of the church, for their separation from those which are unworthy of him, or so inferior to later productions as to invite unfriendly criticism. Two hundred and fifty of Watts's psalms and hymns will live longer, by themselves, than any five hundred *can*. To set ourselves against this tendency to a cautious and reverent retrenchment of "Watts entire," is

to oppose our hymnology to the whole current of our national poetry, and to seclude our churches from the ripest fruits of poetic taste in the future.

This tendency to the displacement of the inferior hymns of the past, by the introduction of modern hymns of superior merit, is sanctioned by the practice of the church from time immemorial. In the English church, the Psalmody of "Sternhold and Hopkins," at first an innovation, became at length the "Old Version," and contested the ground stoutly with that of "Tate and Brady," which was opprobriously termed the "New Version," but which supplanted its predecessor, and in turn has been itself largely encroached upon in the affections of the church, by the popularity of Watts's Psalms and Hymns. These, no compiler of psalmody for public worship since his day, so far as we know, has desired to discard. But, practically, Watts is yielding somewhat in the usage of the churches both of England and America. Compilers of hymnbooks who now omit very many of his once revered songs, do not create, they only express, the existing custom of the sanctuary. Many of both his psalms and his hymns, are virtually laid aside. They are not read from our pulpits; they are not sung by our choirs and congregations. They could not be thus used, as they once were, without exposing the service of song to the incredulity of our children, and the ridicule of profane minds. Who reads them? Who sings them? Who values them for any other than their historic interest? Who that is familiar with the poems of Watts, has not observed how deceptive often are their *first lines*, as an indication of the quality of the subsequent stanzas? The opening couplets of his hymns and psalms often give brilliant promises. They seem to be the preludes of faultless lyrics — outbursts of genuine song, which need only to be *sustained* to be without superiors in uninspired verse. But often they are not sustained. They are followed by stanzas which doom them in every pulpit. A specious but untruthful method of judging of the omissions of the productions of Watts from a modern Collection of Hymns, is to designate them by quotation of the first lines alone. His

very questionable assertion respecting the Psalms of David, is far more truthful of his own. "There are a thousand lines in [them], which were not made for a church in our days to assume as its own." We are reluctant to illustrate this by examples, for we would not seem to subject sacred thought and specially inspired thought to parody. We but follow the example of the *real life* of the churches of our time, in quietly turning aside from such lyrics, and leaving them un-honored and unsung, forgetting the things which are behind.

There are other hymns in our modern Collections, which are retained only for the want of better hymns on the same themes. Every student of sacred song knows the difficulty of finding a variety of good hymns on *all* the topics of Christian experience, and of instruction from the pulpit. On some themes, our hymnology is meagre. The churches retain the hymns they have on those themes, not because they are good intrinsically, but because no others exist which are better. Every good Manual of psalmody, therefore, in the present state of this branch of our literature, must contain some hymns which we could wish to see improved, or displaced by their superiors. But who *has* improved these hymns, or written richer hymns on the same subjects? We must look to future poets of the sanctuary to supply the deficiency, and when it is supplied, we must not say "the old is better." Association alone ought not to perpetuate the life of a poor hymn; and Providence takes care that it shall not do so. For, in nothing is that binary economy which adjusts the laws of demand and supply in the life of the church, more signally illustrated than in the history of hymnology. The Christian life of any age is not long left to pine for a full expression of itself in song. The poet appears when the effusions of his muse are needed, and when the need is felt in Christian hearts. Thus St. Ephrem, Ambrose, Hilary, Clement, Gregory, sung the experiences of the ancient church, because those experiences must have an outlet in song. Thus Luther, Hans Sachs, Heerman, Gerhardt, John Frank, sung the life of the Reformation, because, as one of their successors said of himself, "the dear

cross *pressed* many songs out of them." In like manner Watts created English hymnology, at a juncture at which it is difficult now to see how the life of English Reform could have been developed without the moral forces of his Psalms and Hymns; and Toplady, Doddridge, Wesley, Cowper, Mrs. Steele, Montgomery, and others, have improved the heritage they had received, by accretions of which the modern Christian life has expressed its need, by accepting them.

If, then, we are true to the history of the church, we shall welcome new Psalmists, who express the real life of the church in "new songs." Such songs have no 'associations' to befriend them. They may not appear under the shadow of venerable names. They may be obliged to create the taste that shall appreciate them. A new hymn, like a new doctrine of religion, or a new law in science, or a new canon of taste in literature, may be compelled to abide its time. But if it be a *true* hymn, it need not contend for its existence. It has come into being because Christian hearts need *it* — not because it needs them. They will discover its worth, and will enshrine it. Their decision may be more truthful than that of much that passes for learned criticism. Criticism said of Wordsworth's poems, "this will never do;" but the verdict of the world is wiser. Watts's theory of psalmody was pronounced a destructive innovation; yet for that service to the church, the centennial Anniversary of his decease has been observed as a day of thanksgiving for his birth, by his countrymen.

The Sabbath Hymn Book illustrates, by its materials, in some measure, the views here advanced. While it retains more than two hundred and fifty of the Psalms and Hymns of Watts, and while the large majority of its selections are from the writings of such long-tried poets of the church, as Watts, Doddridge, Toplady, Wesley, Cowper, Mrs. Steele, and Montgomery, yet in addition to the revival of many of the more ancient hymns, it comprises many contributions from living hymnologists. Of these a considerable number have never before been published in a Manual of psalmody for public worship. Among the authors of these "new

songs," appear the names of Bonar, Conder, Elliot, Malan, McCheyne, Duffield, Palmer, and others well-known in the literature of our times. There are some anonymous hymns both in ancient and modern song, for whose authors we now search, as for the lost Pleiad. Some of the choice hymns of this Manual, it is impossible to trace with entire certainty, to their origin. Yet some of these, as well as others from living writers, we think will be accepted by the church as expressions of genuine religious life, which should have a permanent place in our hymnology.

We had designed to remark further, upon the true proportions of hymns on the different themes of a Manual of Song for the sanctuary; and also upon the character which the large majority of hymns should bear, as direct addresses in the worship of the Most High. Upon both these topics, the theory of hymnology as an expression of the real life of the church, suggests conclusions of vital moment. But we have already exceeded the limits allotted to this Article. We cannot more fitly close this review, than by recording a portion of the preface with which Dr. Watts, in the spirit of a true servant of Christ, and of the church, introduced the first Edition of "The Psalms of David, imitated and applied to the Christian State and Worship." "Whosoever there shall appear any paraphrase of the Book of Psalms, that retains more of the savor of David's piety, discovers more of the style and spirit of the Gospel, with a superior dignity of verse, and yet in the lines as easy and flowing, and the sense as level to the lowest capacity, I shall congratulate the world, and consent to say, 'Let this attempt of mine be buried in silence.'"

[To be continued.]

ARTICLE VIII.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

MUELLER AND DONALDSON'S HISTORY OF GREEK LITERATURE.¹

KARL OTFRIED MUELLER, who commenced the work before us, was born in 1797. He very early distinguished himself for classical scholarship. At the age of nineteen he became Doctor of Philosophy; at twenty-one, he was appointed Professor Extraordinary of Ancient Literature at the University of Göttingen. He was a brother of the distinguished Julius Müller of Halle. His principal works are *The Dorians*, two volumes; *The Etruscans*, two volumes, and *A Manual of the History of Ancient Art*. The present work was commenced by Müller at the request of the directors of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, in England. The manuscript furnished by the author was translated by George Cornwall Lewis and Mr. Donaldson. Müller's portion of the work thus prepared was published by the Society at whose suggestion it had been commenced. Early in 1840 Müller visited Greece for the purpose of studying its antiquities and monuments on the spot. The Prussian government furnished him a draftsman at their own expense. After a visit of some time at Athens, and a tour of forty days in the Peloponnesus, he started to explore northern Greece in the heat of summer. From exposure and fatigue, he was seized with a fever, brought back to Athens senseless, where he died on the first of August, 1840. His work on Grecian Literature was thereby left incomplete. Although an edition was published in Germany in 1841, the work remained unfinished for nearly twenty years. It seemed due, both to the memory of Prof. Müller, and to the public, that this History should not be left longer in its fragmentary form. Dr. Donaldson, who had translated about one-third of Müller's contributions to the work, was induced to undertake the completion of it. He is a distinguished classical scholar, and is well known in this country by his *New Cratylus*,² and his *Varronianus*.³ Professor Müller contributed a little less than one-half of the entire work. The plan of the whole, however, was sketched by him, and the subjects of the twenty-seven unfinished chapters written out. Dr. Donaldson has followed his plan with but slight variations. The portion of the work furnished by Professor Müller has already

¹ A History of the Literature of Ancient Greece. By K. O. Müller, late Professor in the University of Göttingen. Continued after the author's day by John William Donaldson, D. D., Classical Examiner in the University of London. In three volumes. 8vo. London: John W. Parker and Son. 1858.

² Contributions toward a more Accurate Knowledge of the Greek Language.

³ A Critical and Historical Introduction to the Philological Study of the Latin Language.

been received with decided favor. In scholarship he had scarcely a superior in Europe, and in a thorough appreciation of Grecian literature, probably no equal; and yet it was scarcely to be expected that a writer who held the Dorians to be superior to any of the other Greek races, would be prepared to appreciate fully the productions of the Attic writers. "He labored with great fidelity on these contributions." "He re-perused the whole of Euripides before he wrote his chapter on that poet; and any competent reader may see that he prepared himself by similar study for his examination of every considerable author."¹

Dr. Donaldson has done a valuable service in completing this History of Greek Literature. He had high qualifications for the work, both by his general course of studies and by his interest in the subject. His contributions have been faithfully elaborated, generally giving a clear and reliable view of the subjects on which he has written. He is not always equal to his theme; it now and then eludes his grasp; but, while the student will sometimes wish that the hand of the great master who originated the work, might have drawn some of the sketches, he will be thankful for the very valuable materials here furnished for the more successful study of the Greek authors.

The work covers the whole period of Greek literature, embracing the Byzantine writers. It was not intended, however, to be as voluminous as the excellent History of Mure; nor was it designed to be a mere compend; its aim was to do enough for the student, by indicating "how literature rose, grew, and declined among the Greeks," to stimulate his curiosity to do still more for himself.

We cannot withhold from our readers the following estimate of Müller's literary character, as given by Dr. Donaldson:

"As a classical scholar, we are inclined to prefer K. O. Müller, on the whole, to all the German philologists of the nineteenth century. He had not Niebuhr's grasp of original combination; he was hardly equal to his teacher Böckh in some branches of Greek philosophy, antiquities, and palæography; he was inferior to Hermann in Greek verbal criticism; he was not a comparative philologist, like Grimm and Bopp and A. W. Schlegel, nor a collector of facts and forms like Lobeck. But in all the distinctive characteristics of these eminent men, he approached them more nearly than most of his contemporaries, and he had some qualifications to which none of them attained. In liveliness of fancy, in power of style, in elegance of taste, in artistic knowledge, he far surpassed most if not all of them. Ancient mythology and classical geography were more his subjects than those of any German of his time; he will long be the chief authority on ancient art; and he laid the foundations for a new school of Latin criticism. . . . Both for the great qualities which he possessed, and for the faults which he avoided, we would concede to K. O. Müller the place of honor among those who, in the German universities, have promoted the study of ancient literature since the commencement of the present century."²

¹ p. xxvii.² p. xxxi.

The tomb of Müller is about a mile from Athens, near the site of Plato's Academy, on the top of a little hill rendered famous as being the place where Sophocles laid the scene of one of his finest tragedies, the *Œdipus Coloneus*. How fitting a resting-place for this great student of antiquity, within sight of scenes and monuments of unequalled interest!

CLARK'S PELOPONNESUS.¹

These "Notes of Study and Travel" are the result of a tour made in the Peloponnesus in the early part of the year 1856. Our acquaintance with the author in the field of his travels and investigations led us to expect valuable contributions to the topography and classical history of the Peloponnesus; these expectations have not been disappointed.

Mr. Clark had unusual qualifications for a successful survey of this field. He is an eminent Greek scholar; is familiar with the allusions made to celebrated localities by the poets: with the accounts given by the historians, and with the views of the prominent topographers from Pausanias to the present time. His knowledge of architecture and masonry is such that he is not liable to mistake the style of one period for another.

The work is written in an attractive style; it is not a mere dry itinerary; it abounds with sprightly narrative, describing with unusual clearness the general features of the country, the hills, plains, mountains, rivers, together with the agricultural productions, not even neglecting the flora. We have, too, the habits, general appearance, and condition of the people. The author makes us feel likewise the desolations which pervade many of the sites of former historic and poetic interest. Of Tegea not so much as a ruin remains; "the only living thing seen at Mantinea," that great centre of renowned battles, "was a peasant who brought with him a dead thing in the shape of a wild duck;" Sparta is gone,—only the Theatre can be identified; of all the Temples of Megara, once adorned with works of Attic art, not a trace is left; the long walls have disappeared; "the plough has passed two thousand times over their site;" no remnant is to be found of the white marble seats once crowded by the spectators of the Isthmian games; the "area is filled with fragments of pottery and overgrown with tufts of wild thyme, lentisk, and sage; the unbroken stillness of the desert now prevails from day to day, from year to year, in the spot which for so many ages, at each recurring festival, rang to the shouts of the eager crowd that thronged its marble steps;"—of the numerous monuments which crowded Olympia, not a trace remains but the ruins of the Temple of Zeus.

Our author everywhere shows an independent judgment; he sees things with his own eyes; and his views, indicating broad observation and sound reasoning, will generally compel the assent of the reader. He is a destruc-

¹ Peloponnesus: Notes of Study and Travel. By William George Clark, M. A., Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College, Cambridge. London: John W. Parker and Son. 1858. pp. 344. 8vo.

tive iconoclast amid the images which an unreasoning age had set up. What has no better foundation than the belief of a remote antiquity or an unbroken tradition, meets with no advocacy. The fictions of the poet's brain, which were never intended to have any actual counterpart, but which by ignorance or tradition have become associated with some actual occurrences, or with some particular places, he strips of the reality which has thus been given them. The river Styx in Arcadia was believed by Pausanias, and by all subsequent travellers and modern geographers, to be the river of the same name referred to by Homer. Pausanias says: 'This water gives death to man and every animal. Glass, crystal, agate, and earthenware are shivered, and horn, bone, and metals rotted by this water. The only thing which can contain it is a horse's hoof.' Mr. Clark shows quite conclusively that this never could have been the river had in mind by the Poet; that Homer's Styx had no existence except in his own imagination; just as his Scylla and Charybdis were "a mere brain-born phantasy, without the smallest nucleus of fact," but which a prosaic spirit, always seeking to give all such poetic creations "a local habitation," has placed in the straits between Italy and Sicily. So too of the reputed drive of Telemachus from Phærae to Sparta in one day;—this is shown to be a physical impossibility. Mr. Clark avers that "the Geography of Homer is full of similar difficulties." He believes that "the poet of the Iliad was familiar with the scenery of the plain of Troy," but does "not find any evidence that the poet of the Iliad or the poet of the Odyssey was personally familiar with the scenery of Greece."

Mr. Clark is no Homerolator; he does not believe in the universal infallibility of the great epic Poet; he is to be treated as a poet, not as a geographer, or as the exponent of all truth. In this Mr. Clark is not alone. "Eratosthenes declared that in matters of geography he was not to be trusted as a guide." Strabo adopted the same view when it suited his purpose. The views of Mr. Clark are often at variance also with those of Pausanias, as well as with those of the distinguished scholars of the present day, Colonels Leake and Mure. These differences are always respectfully expressed, while the reader feels that the opinions entertained and defended by our author, are not without good grounds.

The book is a happy refutation of the charge so often brought against the practical utility of classical studies.

THE THEOLOGY OF CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE.¹

In many respects, we are pleased with this volume. It avoids, in great measure, the technical language of theologians, and presents, in clear and

¹ The Theology of Christian Experience, designed as an Exposition of the Common Faith of the Church of God. By George D. Armstrong, D. D., Pastor of the Presbyterian Church of Norfolk, Virginia. New York: C. Scribner, 124 Grand Street. 1858. pp. 342. 12mo.

Biblical style, various doctrines of our common faith. In some respects, however, the volume may be improved.

It often fails in precision of statement, as is particularly apparent in its chapter on the sinner striving after salvation. Then, on the subject of the Atonement, it makes several indefinite remarks. It represents the principle of the Atonement as *substantially* "the same which God has incorporated in the structure of society, in consequence of which a nation or family is blessed in the virtue of its head, or suffers for its vices." p. 206. If these two processes of the divine government be *substantially* the same, then multitudes now believe in the Christian Atonement, who both intend themselves, and are thought by others, to reject the doctrine.

The volume, when controversial, fails to give a fair representation of the doctrines which it opposes. It even represents the Governmental Theory of the Atonement as implying, that Christ's "death was nothing more than a bloody tableau, enacted for the purpose of striking terror into the hearts of any of his subjects who might be harboring thoughts of rebellion against him." p. 224. We regret to find so unjust and irreverent a remark in a volume on Christian experience.

We think, however, that Dr. Armstrong deserves credit for his frankness in avowing his opinion on the extent of the Atonement. He says:

"The Bible discloses to us a way in which, consistently with strict justice, God may for a season spare and even bless our sinning race—may cause his 'sun to shine upon the unjust,' and his 'rain to descend upon the evil'—may, in this sense, become 'the Saviour of all men,' as well as bestow eternal life upon a part of the race, and, in this 'especial' sense, become 'the Saviour of them that believe.' But for this grace, this interposition of a Daysman, the same quick justice must have overtaken sinning man, which 'spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to hell;' and through this 'grace,' the intervention of this 'Daysman,' shall the 'redeemed of the Lord' ere long stand in heaven."

"Mortal life, and all its accompanying blessings, are granted to those who prove finally impenitent, for Christ's sake. As in the ruin which came through the headship of the first Adam, the curse did, as it were, overflow its banks and the brute creation, and even the earth itself were involved in its disastrous effects—and this for man's sake (Gen. 3 : 17), i. e. in consequence of their connection with man—so, in the redemption which we have in the last Adam, do the Scriptures teach us, that the whole creation shall be blessed (see Rom. 8 : 22); and in the parable of the wheat and the tares, when the servants ask, 'wilt thou that we go and gather them (the tares) up,' their lord answers, 'Nay, lest while ye gather up the tares, ye root up also the wheat with them. Let them both grow together until the harvest; and at the time of harvest, I will say to the reapers, gather ye together first the tares, and bind them in bundles to burn them, but gather ye the wheat into my barn' (Matt. 13 : 28—30)."

We need only say that these representations are in striking contrast with

the fact, that the Bible makes the impression on every one of its readers that the atonement was made for himself directly, not incidentally.

Dr. Armstrong speaks of Infant Salvation thus :

"It is in this view of redemption we have the most satisfactory answer, in any way to be obtained from Scripture, to the question, Are those who die in infancy saved? As they were lost in 'the first Adam,' without any personal demerit on their part, so may they be saved in 'the last Adam,' without any personal merit. The question of their salvation turns altogether upon how God—and especially, God in the person Christ the redeemer—regards infants. While he was on earth, 'God manifest in the flesh,' 'they brought young children unto him, that he should touch them; and his disciples rebuked those that brought them. But when Jesus saw it, he was much displeased, and said unto them, Suffer the little children to come unto me, and forbid them not; for of such is the kingdom of God. And he took them up in his arms, put his hands upon them, and blessed them.' (Mark 10:13—15.) In view of such a fact as this, the common faith of the church in the salvation of infants, dying in infancy, cannot be regarded as a faith without foundation in the word of God." pp. 211, 212.

In speaking of man's inherited sinfulness, Dr. Armstrong says:

"If then, man's moral condition be regarded as one of disease, we must regard that disease as a hereditary one; a terrible legacy, which has been inherited by the diseased child from a diseased parent. No other words will as well set forth the facts in our case, as we learn those facts in our own experience, as the words of David: 'The wicked'—and all are wicked—'are estranged from the womb; they go astray as soon as they are born.' And no other words will as well set forth the common and natural inference from these facts, as those other words of David: 'Behold I was shapen in iniquity; and in sin did my mother conceive me.'" p. 153.

Now if this *disease* of infants be truly *sin*, deserving of endless punishment, how can we infer from our Redeemer's statement—"of such is the kingdom of heaven"—that those who die in infancy will be saved? Is the hereditary sin of *all infants* cancelled? Are they *all* regenerated? What, then, if some do not die in infancy? Were the young children of whom our Redeemer spoke, *all* destined to an infantile death? How can this be proved? Can it be said that the kingdom of heaven consists of those who have never repented of their sin, and yet are guilty of a *real* sin, in a nature filled with "the lava stream which is flowing onward through time, scathing and scorching and consuming all of life and loveliness that is in its course, and leaving man's heritage a waste, howling wilderness?" p. 172. We think that this text, from which Dr. Armstrong infers so much, is pressed by him too far, and cannot be explained as he explains it, without endangering some important articles of our common faith.

RIGG'S MODERN ANGLICAN THEOLOGY.¹

THE author of this volume has been known as a contributor to the London Quarterly Review, to the American Methodist Quarterly Review, and to other Journals. He is an acute thinker and a vigorous writer. We have not read the whole of the present volume. We intend to notice it, in other connections, more fully hereafter. His first chapter on Samuel Taylor Coleridge merits careful attention. He attempts to prove, "that Coleridge's philosophy was a Neo-Platonized edition of Shelling's; that his theology has affinities with Popish rather than with Protestant doctrine, but is essentially rather a semi-pagan theosophy or mysticism, baptized with a Christian and Biblical nomenclature, than any system of doctrines directly derived from the Bible; that in intellectual and ecclesiastical sympathies, he was radically Protestant, though disposed to be highly reverent of ancient religious forms and ceremonies." Mr. Rigg regards the philosophy of Coleridge as the root of all the mysticism and error which pervade the school of Maurice and Kingsley. He is particularly severe upon Mr. Coleridge's view of Inspiration, of Justification, and of the Trinity. He says: Mr. Coleridge's "*idea* of the Trinity, when he was not avowedly a Christian Trinitarian, but a Unitarian Deist, accurately agreed with that which he afterwards held as a believer in Revelation. Such an idea can only, therefore, have been Sabellian, or (to use a name which in the present day will carry with it a plainer meaning, and which is substantially equivalent) Swedenborgian." p. 7.

After discussing the philosophy and theology of Archdeacon Hare, of Mr. Maurice, Mr. Kingsley, and Mr. Jowett, — a philosophy and theology the germs of which are traced to the writings of Coleridge, — Mr. Rigg closes his volume with four chapters on the Doctrine of the Atonement and of Sacrifice. He contends, earnestly, that the idea of animal sacrifices to God must have been suggested to the human mind by God himself; for he asserts that nothing could appear more improbable, *a priori*, than that the slaughter of an animal and the offering of it to the Supreme Being, could be acceptable to him or beneficial to the worshipper. The idea, being itself unnatural, must have been communicated by an inspiring and divine mind. This is a common mode of reasoning. At the same time our author quotes twice, and with obvious approbation, the celebrated remark of Madam de Stael: "Nothing, in effect, can obliterate from the soul the idea, that there is a mysterious efficacy in the blood of the innocent, and that heaven and earth are moved by it. Men have always believed that the just could obtain, in this life or the other, the pardon of the guilty. There are some primitive ideas in the human species, which re-appear with more or less disfigurement,

¹ Modern Anglican Theology: Chapters on Coleridge, Hare, Maurice, Kingsley, and Jowett, and on the Doctrine of Sacrifice and Atonement. By the Rev. James H. Rigg. London: Alexander Heylin, 28 Paternoster Row. 1857. pp. 392. 12mo.

in all times and among all nations. These are the ideas upon which we cannot grow weary of reflecting; for they assuredly preserve some traces of the lost dignities of our nature." p. 353.

If now the idea of animal sacrifices for sin be thus "*primitive*" in the mind, and (as Mr. Rigg himself affirms) "*ineradicable*," how can it be maintained that the idea is so unnatural as to demand an extraneous cause for even suggesting it? And if the idea must *necessarily* have been communicated from a higher Intelligence, how can it be termed a "*primitive*" and "*ineradicable*" idea of the mind? There is a want of consistency between these two theories. A possible modification of the two is thus suggested by our author, although in terms of disapproval: "To attribute it [the idea of piacular sacrifice] to what Michaelis calls a *sensus communis*, or, which is the same thing, to make it, as it would seem that Mr. Thompson is disposed to do, a primitive and necessary idea, proper to humanity, is in truth to derive its origin and authority direct from *God only*, not by outward revelation, but by inward and intuitive teaching." p. 354.

ALEXANDER'S DISCOURSES.¹

"THERE are, as every one knows, several clever sayings, which set aside the Sermon as a species characteristically dull and unreadable; and this has tempted not a few, in giving the matter of their preaching to the world, to use some disguise as to the original form." (Preface, p. 3.) We are happy to see that the author of this volume has retained the form of Sermons for the instructions which were given in that form originally; and which would lose somewhat of their practical influence, if they were now given in the form of Essays. The style of these Discourses is generally pure, although it is marred by some such phrases as "the trivial belongings of natural affection." It is generally accurate; although here and there we find such sentences as: "Every human life shall close; and most [?] close early." "The whole context shows it. Immediately before he [?] has been mentioning fear."—The style is often affluent and felicitous. Sometimes, however, we find a word needlessly inapposite. On page 179 we read: "Not that you or I, or angels above us, can take the gauge and dimensions of this divinity of goodness. With us they look into the chasm with folded wings, and murmur, Oh, the depth, the depth!" The word *murmur* is too nearly associated with an *unpleasant* state of feeling, and the word *chasm* with *vacuity*, to express happily the idea of this sentence. To murmur at the chasm of divine goodness is an ill-chosen act and expression.

The Discourses do not contain many statements which are controverted among evangelical men. On page 309, Faith seems to be described as an *intellectual* act or state. We there read: "Faith precedes love. We must

¹ Discourses on Common Topics of Christian Faith and Practice. By James W. Alexander. New York: Charles Scribner, 124 Grand Street. 1858. pp. 463. 8vo.

perceive the amiable qualities of divinity before we love them," etc. We *must* perceive them first; but is this *perception* the same with evangelical or holy Faith? On page 313 we read of some interpreters who, "in order to build up a metaphysical scheme of disinterested benevolence as the sole essence of virtue," "deny that our view of his [God's] love to us is a source of our love to him; they exclude all love of gratitude as selfish." But here is a misapprehension concerning the "interpreters" thus criticised. They do not deny that our view of God's love to us is a source of our love to him. They only deny that it is *the* sole or chief source. They do not exclude all love of gratitude as selfish; they insist on the love of gratitude as a duty; but they deny that the love of gratitude is the *sole* or the *chief* virtue, or source of the virtues.

If some other inaccurate statements had been expunged from these Discourses, the volume, which is now well fitted to foster an evangelical spirit, would have found still fewer obstructions in its passage to the heart of its readers. Its blemishes, however, are fewer than its excellences. We are particularly pleased to find in it several expressions which are inconsistent with the doctrine of a limited atonement. The dictates of a pious heart require that such an erroneous doctrine, if it be retained in the study, shall be banished from the pulpit.

PALFREY'S HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND.¹

THIS first volume of Mr. Palfrey's projected history of New England gives us the narrative of events to the year 1643, the time of the formal confederation of the four colonies, Plymouth, Massachusetts, New Haven, and Connecticut. Many able pens have been devoted to the Puritan and New England history during the last twenty years; but no one has excelled, if any have equalled, the present production. As Hutchinson has always been our favorite among all the earlier writers on this theme, so the volume before us gives unmistakable indications that Mr. Palfrey must be the favorite among recent writers. The same qualities which distinguish Hutchinson are also conspicuous in Mr. Palfrey, to wit, a thorough familiarity with his subject in all its parts, a truly philosophical and historical spirit, and an entire freedom from the influence of what Lord Bacon so appropriately and picturesquely calls the *idola speluncae*.

His account of the physical geography, etc., of New England, in the opening chapters of his work, his picture of the state of things in England which led to the Puritan emigration, his development of the controversies with Roger Williams and Mrs. Hutchinson, and his general estimate of the principles, motives, and conduct of the New England fathers, strike us as being more complete, philosophical, and accurate than any which we have seen before. His style is clear, simple, and impressive; and the whole tone

¹ History of New England during the Stuart Dynasty, by John Gorham Palfrey. Vol. I. Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1859. 8vo. pp. xxxi. 636.

of the work remarkably agreeable. The publishers, also, have done their part well, and both the material and workmanship of the volume are worthy of its contents. We hope Mr. Palfrey will be encouraged to continue his work and bring it down to the present time, in the same spirit with which he has commenced it. If he does this, his, we think, will be the standard history of New England.

BOISE'S XENOPHON'S ANABASIS.¹

WE have previously noticed this work; and we now introduce it, the second time, to our readers, for the purpose of corroborating our own opinion of its worth by the opinion of a distinguished German philologist. The work has been recently reviewed in the *Heidelberger Jahrbücher der Literatur*. The review was written by Dr. Ch. Bähr, Professor of Philology in the University of Heidelberg, and widely known from his edition of Herodotus. After alluding to the interest which European scholars naturally feel in the progress of classical learning in this country, Dr. Bähr adds:—"the editor, Professor of the Greek Language and Literature in the University of Michigan, himself trained in German Universities, exhibits a thorough philological culture, and an exact acquaintance with all which has appeared in Germany, not merely in the elucidation of Xenophon's *Anabasis*, but also in the entire field of classical philology." The typography is also spoken of as excellent, and "in no respect behind the best German copies of this author."

It will be a matter of general interest to scholars to learn, that Dr. Bähr has nearly completed a new edition of his Herodotus, in which a vast amount of valuable information relating to "the father of history" is collected and arranged, and for the first time presented in a form convenient for use. It has been a work of years, requiring the greatest patience and industry, as well as extraordinary learning. Many a scholar will congratulate the venerable philologist on having lived to see the completion of such a task.

COLEMAN'S TEXT-BOOK AND ATLAS.²

THE First edition of this work appeared in 1854. Since that time the

¹ Xenophon's *Anabasis* with Explanatory Notes, for the use of Schools and Colleges in the United States. By James R. Boise, Professor of Greek in the University of Michigan. With Kiepert's Map showing the entire route of the Ten Thousand, and an Introduction to the *Anabasis*, translated from Hertlein. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 346 and 348 Broadway. 1857. pp. 393. 12mo.

² An Historical Text Book and Atlas of Biblical Geography. By Lyman Coleman, D. D. New edition, carefully revised. Royal 8vo. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Co. 1859.

author has himself visited Egypt, Arabia, and Syria; and the new matter contained in the present edition is the result of personal observations and of a careful examination of those learned and elaborate works which had appeared since the first publication of the book; such as the Later Researches of Dr. Robinson, and Dr. Smith of the Beirût Mission, Stanley's Sinai and Palestine, Van de Velde's Narrative, Porter's Five Years in Damascus, Dr. Barclay's Jerusalem, and other more or less important contributions to our knowledge of these regions. It is well known that all the nations of the world, as it were, have combined, during the last ten years, to explore Syria and the Holy Land. Rich indeed are the fruits of these explorations by American, English, German, and French scholars. The example of Dr. Robinson, aided and guided by Dr. Smith in his investigations, has been enthusiastically and worthily imitated by the host who have followed in their footsteps and in some instances penetrated into other and more obscure regions, each succeeding traveller gathering new information or correcting or modifying the statements of his predecessors. But however interesting the accumulations of these *savans*, even in their minutest details, might be to men of learning and leisure for such studies, it was needful for the convenience and benefit of the general reader and young persons, that a digest of these voluminous works should be made. This task was attempted by Dr. Coleman, and has been accomplished in the present volume, in an entertaining and judicious manner. The work contains Seven Maps: I. Ancient and Modern Jerusalem; II. The World as known to the Hebrews, according to the Mosaic account; III. The Routes of the Israelites through the Desert; and, Canaan at the Time of the Conquest; IV. Palestine under the Judges and the Kings, with the Distribution of the Twelve Tribes; V. Palestine in the Time of Christ; VI. The Travels of our Saviour; VII. The Missionary Tour of the Apostle Paul. These Maps, which are executed in a style very neat and very pleasing to the eye, have been prepared on the basis of Kiepert's Bible Atlas, a work of very high authority, critically compared, by the editor, with that of Wieland, Ackermann, and the maps of Dr. Robinson, Dr. Wilson, Lieut. Lynch, Mr. Layard, Col. Chesney, and others. Facing the Maps are explanations of what they contain; and as these explanations are very full, they constitute an exceedingly useful feature of the work. To the Maps is subjoined a Chart giving the comparative elevation of various sections of the Holy Land and Arabia, taking the level of the Mediterranean as the point of departure. Then follows the text, which presents a valuable compend of Biblical geography, chronology, and history, all interwoven in a skilful and interesting manner; and, as we have said above, partly drawn from the best and most recent sources, and partly the result of the author's researches in person. In the excellent Chronological Table which follows the text, and which embraces the whole period of Inspired History, from the creation of the world to A. D. 100, Dr. Coleman has embodied the conclusions of the

Rev. Henry Browne, in his learned and valuable *Ordo Sæclorum*, lately published in London; and from the time of the Babylonish Captivity, he has continued the Table from Winer and other sources, inserting, as Winer had done, the contemporaneous events of pagan History. A complete Index of all the geographical names is added to the work, giving, under a single head, all the passages in Holy Scripture in which a word is to be found, the page of the text of this book where it is treated of, and the Map and the portion of the Map on which it appears; this Index includes, also, the proper names in general that occur in the book. It is obvious what special value such an Index possesses both for general reference and in its connection with this work. It must have cost great labor, and for the preparation of it the pains-taking author deserves and will receive the best thanks of the Biblical student. We bespeak the attention of all who carefully read and study the word of God to this volume, as an excellent compend of large and standard works; and we bestow on the Editor no common praise in this department of learning when we state that one of the very best manuals on this subject yet published in England, *Outlines of Scripture Geography and History*, by Edward Hughes, F. R. A. S., F. R. G. S., was based on Dr. Coleman's *Historical Geography of the Bible*; a treatise which our author published before the preparation of the present work.

KALISCH'S COMMENTARY ON THE OLD TESTAMENT.¹

WE have before us the first two volumes of this important work, comprising Genesis and Exodus. To form a just estimate of its merits, we must consider it first in its philological, and then in its theological aspects. So far as we have had leisure to examine its pages, they give abundant evidence of its author's learning and accuracy in the department of philology. The "Philological Remarks" are in general very satisfactory, embodying in small compass the results of the most recent investigations. For simplicity and adhesion to the pure English idiom, without affectation of novelty, the new translation contrasts very favorably with some others that we might name. In the first volume (though the second in order of publication) the original Hebrew Text, which is in large and clear type, is subjoined at the end; in the second, it stands opposite to the translation. The author's introductory remarks, prefixed to the several portions of the sacred narrative, contain treasures of biblical learning, however we may dissent from him in some particulars.

If we consider the work in its theological aspects, we cannot bestow upon

¹ A Historical and Critical Commentary on the Old Testament, with a New Translation, by M. M. Kalisch, Phil. Doc., M. A. שְׁמוֹרָה — Exodus. London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans. 1855. pp. xxxii. and 624. בְּרֵאשִׁית — Genesis. London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans, and Roberts. 1858. pp. viii., 780, and 88.

it the same commendation. The author takes, at the outset, the position that the statements of facts contained in the sacred record need not be, and are not always, "*historically reliable*." To reconcile this position with the authority of the Old Testament, he employs the principle, well known to our readers, that "their *moral and philosophical* truth is entirely independent of the materials from which it is derived;" in plain English, that moral and philosophical truth may as well rest on a foundation of *myth* as of *historical facts*. Looking at the statements of the sacred record from this position — "*standpunkt*" the Germans would call it, and it is preëminently German — he decides without hesitation that "with regard to astronomy and geology, the Biblical records are, in many essential points, utterly and irreconcilably at variance with the established results of modern science." The same position he takes, substantially, with regard to the Deluge. He holds (correctly, we think) that the author meant to furnish "an exact geographical description of Eden;" and yet was so ignorant of geography as to mistake the Nile for one of the four rivers (the Euphrates and Tigris being two of them) which united to water the garden. "Here," he says, "we must again refer to a principle urged in a former part of this volume, namely, that the Israelites did not surpass the other Eastern nations in secular knowledge." The account of the fall is of course with him a *myth*, in which the particulars of the narrative "serve to represent the ideas, but are not indispensable to them; they are the vehicles used to convey certain truths, but these truths might have been expressed in a thousand other shapes; the truths are unchangeable and necessary; the form, indifferent and accidental." If we inquire after the truths, "unchangeable and necessary," contained in the myth, we find there no real fall of the race, in the orthodox sense of the word, but only a transition of every individual man from the unconscious innocence of childhood to the warfare against sinful passion which succeeds.

From the author's general position we should not expect to find, and we do not find, in these volumes, the recognition of any real prophecy concerning the Messiah. Indeed, his position with regard to the prophecies recorded in the book of Genesis, is thoroughly rationalistic. The last address of Jacob to his sons, he represents to be an instance where "later historical facts are unmistakably represented in the form of prophecy, a mode of writing naturally chosen with predilection by epic writers of all nations; indeed the forty-eighth chapter [of Genesis], with its clearly defined history of the tribes of Ephraim and Manasseh, is alone entirely sufficient to illustrate the manner in which the Pentateuch, by obvious anticipation, transfers posterior events into the lives of the patriarchs." "By obvious anticipation" — he means that the history of the events was written after they happened in the shape of prophecy, and put into the mouth of the patriarch; and he compares, by way of pertinent illustration, Anchises's prophecy to Æneas in Hades. We need not extend these remarks any further. From what has been said the reader will see that, on the side of philology the work is very valuable; but on that of theology, far from satisfactory.

PROFESSOR FISHER'S HISTORICAL DISCOURSE.¹

THIS Discourse is written in its author's usual style,—clear, chaste, and attractive. In detailing the history of the church of Christ in Yale College, it incidentally gives a view of the religious and theological condition of the whole country, and especially of New England. It is impossible to write the Memoir of President Clap, without suggesting many incidents in the great Revival of 1740, and in kindred scenes. The biography of President Stiles illustrates the character and the aims of that large class of "old Calvinists" who opposed the introduction of the "new divinity." President Dwight was also a "representative man." The chief theological discussions of the past and the present century have been conducted, in no small measure, by the alumni of Yale College. The history of the College, while intimately connected with the progress of all the sciences, has been, in a peculiar degree, a history of *theological* investigation.

"The fathers of New England theology — Edwards, Bellamy, Hopkins, West, Smalley, Emmons, and Dwight — went forth from Yale. The first and most eminent of these, after taking his degree, remained here for several years as resident graduate, and afterwards as Tutor. Here, in his own judgment, his religious life began: here his principles were formed, and he received the discipline which prepared him to take the highest rank in the field of intellectual science. Bellamy, who was converted soon after leaving College, and Hopkins, were pupils of Edwards. From Hopkins, West derived his theology; Smalley studied with Bellamy, and Emmons with Smalley. These men, and especially the foremost one among them, who gave the impulse to all the rest, have strongly influenced the thinking of the age. Whatever is distinctive in American theology as contrasted with the general theology of the Church, may be traced to them. And they have not acted upon this country alone. The two men, who, considered as theologians, have perhaps enjoyed the highest consideration among the later English divines, — Chalmers and Andrew Fuller, acknowledge that they were taught their science by President Edwards. No work on systematic divinity has had such currency and authority in Great Britain, at least outside the established Church of England, as the Sermons of Dr. Dwight. In that country they have passed through not less than forty editions. So much has been done by the school of divines educated at this College, in moulding theological opinion. The leaders of the various parties in theology among us, who have contended in recent times, were most of them instructed by Dr. Dwight, and profess to deduce their views from his teaching."²

The preceding paragraph attests that the history of Yale College has

¹ A Discourse commemorative of the History of the Church of Christ in Yale College, during the First Century of its Existence. Preached in the College Chapel, November 22, 1857. With Notes and an Appendix. By George P. Fisher, Livingston Professor of Divinity. New Haven: Thomas H. Pease. T. J. Stafford, Printer. 1858. pp. 98. 8vo.

² Prof. Fisher's Discourse, pp. 36, 37.

been, in a signal manner, a history of *independent, original, and progressive* theological investigation. . This fact is attested by the record of the College creeds. During the presidency of Mr. Clap, "the Corporation ordained that every person chosen a Fellow, President, Professor or Tutor in College, should publicly give his assent to the Westminster catechism and confession of faith, and should renounce all principles contrary thereto, and undergo besides such an examination as the Corporation should order."¹ At the inauguration of Dr. Naphtali Daggett, as Professor of Divinity in the College, he "avowed his assent to the Westminster catechism and confession of faith, and to the Saybrook platform; declared his belief that the Apostles' creed, the Nicene creed, and the Athanasian creed agree with the word of God; assented to the ninth of the thirty-nine articles of the Church of England, being that which relates to Original Sin; and ended by presenting a full confession from his own pen, which covers five large, closely-written pages on the book of Records. Having set forth his positive views, he concludes this document with renouncing and abjuring, in detail, 'all the errors and heresies, which commonly go under the name of Arianism, Socinianism, Arminianism, Pelagianism, Antinomianism, and Enthusiasm.'"² On the accession of Dr. Stiles to the presidency, the Saybrook Platform was substituted for the Westminster confession, as the creed for the officers and guardians of the College, and in 1823 *this theological test was abolished*. It was never intended to be authoritative in the *minutiae* of its instructions, *in ipsissimis verbis*. Dr. Stiles and the dominant party who sustained him, were not rigid in their adherence to uninspired words, as a decisive test and law of belief. "He thus declares his aversion to sectarian bonds.

'There is so much pure Christianity among all sects of Protestants, that I cheerfully embrace all in my charity. There is so much defect in all, that we all need forbearance and mutual condescension. I don't intend to spend my days in the fire of party; at the most I shall resist all claims and endeavors for supremacy or precedence of any sect—for the rest, I shall promote peace, harmony and benevolence. I honor all Protestant Churches so far as they are reformed, and even the Church of England, as a sister, by no means a mother Church. But I conscientiously give the preference in my choice to the Congregational Churches as nearest the primitive standard, and most purified from the corruptions of the Latin Church.' Actuated by these feelings, Dr. Stiles followed his father in disliking creeds. Here he entirely dissented from his teacher and patron, President Clap. From annotations in a copy of Judge Darling's pamphlet against the President, which are in the hand-writing of Dr. Stiles, we should infer that he agreed with his friend in his vehement opposition to theological tests. In his sermon on union, he is quite explicit. He there complains of the desire of some to substitute 'human interpretations given by authority of councils and learned men, exacting that the sacred Scriptures be understood according to senses fitted and defined in human tests which all acknowledge to be fallible.' He demands unrestricted freedom of conscience. 'Not all the difference of sentiment, not all the erroneous opinions that have yet been started,

¹ Prof. Fisher's Discourse, p. 10.

² Ibid. pp. 11, 12.

afford just umbrage for its extinction, abridgment, or embarrassment. Have the Protestant formularies subverted the truth as it is in Jesus? Rather have they not in event proved new sources of religious dispute and undeterminable controversy? The following sentence evidently alludes to the position of President Clap: 'I am satisfied we shall err less if we make the Scriptures the only rule of faith, than if we depart from this and substitute another; or, as many do, who say they believe the Scriptures the *only* rule, and yet in all their judgments on Scripture, measure that *only* rule by *another* rule.' In accordance with his principles, Dr. Stiles did not accept the office of President, until he had obtained from the Corporation the abrogation of the tests instituted by President Clap, with the exception of an assent to the Saybrook Platform. This at least, is true of Dr. Stiles, that while neither lukewarm in his convictions of truth, nor reserved in the expression of them, he won the confidence of all parties, and his accession to the Presidency, as the successor of President Clap, created general satisfaction."¹

The Confession of Faith and the Covenant of the Church in College are framed on a different model from that of the scholastic creeds formerly prescribed for the officers of the college. They are as follows:

THE CONFESSION OF FAITH. — You [and each of you] solemnly profess your belief that there is but one God, in three persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost; self-existent, independent, eternal, unchangeable; infinite in power, wisdom, holiness, goodness, and truth: — that by him all things were made; and are preserved and governed according to his own most wise, holy and good pleasure; and that you are his creature, and under the most righteous and solemn obligations to serve and glorify him with all your powers while you live. You also profess your belief that the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament are the word of God; revealed to mankind by the Spirit of truth; and containing every rule of faith and practice which is obligatory on the conscience of mankind.

THE COVENANT. — You [and each of you] now solemnly avouch the Lord Jehovah to be your God; your Father, Redeemer, and Sanctifier; and do solemnly give up yourselves to him, as his children; purposing and engaging, so far as you know the state of your own minds, to obey, through his grace, without which you can do nothing acceptable to him, all his commandments and ordinances; and denying all ungodliness and worldly lusts, to live soberly, righteously, and godly in the present world.

Moreover, you covenant with the members of this church, to walk with them, through the influence and assistance of the same grace, in the order of the gospel; to submit, as becometh Christians, to the discipline prescribed by the Redeemer; to watch over your brethren; to instruct, reprove, admonish, comfort and strengthen them; and willingly to be instructed, admonished and reprov'd by them, with the meekness and humility of the gospel."²

The preceding Confession of Faith and Covenant "were introduced," says Prof. Fisher, "when Dr. Dwight became the pastor. The previous Confession, which was drawn by President Clap, was equally short and

¹ Prof. Fisher's Discourse, pp. 79, 80.

² Ibid. pp. 82, 83.

simple. The practice of incorporating an entire system of theology into the creeds of our Congregational churches, came into vogue with the dissensions that followed the great Revival. Our church has happily kept clear of this pernicious and unjustifiable custom. While it has properly required of its teachers, at their ordination, a full and satisfactory statement of their belief, it has also exacted of its communicants an assent to such articles of faith as lie at the foundation of Christian experience. In this way, it has excluded from communion few, if any, real believers. On this catholic and only lawful basis, may it always continue to stand!"¹

This mere abstract of the history of the New Haven creeds will, of itself, intimate the degree of intellectual activity and independence which has characterized that seat of learning. And what has been the result of this tendency to a free and full investigation of theological problems? In 1787, Dr. Stiles writes:

"The New Divinity gentlemen perceive some of the pillars are removed; President Edwards has been dead twenty-nine years, or a generation; Dr. Bellamy is broken down, both body and mind, with a paralytic shock, and can dictate and domineer no more; Mr. Hopkins still continues, but past his force, having been somewhat affected by a fit and nervous debilitation; Mr. West is declining in health, and besides, was never felt so strong rods as the others. It has been the *ton* to direct students in Divinity, these thirty years past, to read the Bible, President Edwards, Dr. Bellamy, and Mr. Hopkins's writings; — and this was a pretty good sufficiency of reading. But now the younger class, but yet in full vigor, suppose they see further than these oracles, and are disposed to become oracles themselves, and wish to write theology and have their own books come into vogue. The very New Divinity gentlemen say, they perceive a disposition among several of their brethren to struggle for preëminence; — particularly Dr. Edwards, Mr. Trumbull, Mr. Smalley, Mr. Judson, Mr. Spring, Mr. Robinson, Mr. Strong of Hartford, Mr. Dwight, Mr. Emmons, and others. They all want to be Luthers. But they will none of them be equal to those strong reasoners, President Edwards and Mr. Hopkins.' These reflections conclude with a prediction which time has not verified: 'President Edwards's valuable writings in another generation will pass into as transient notice, perhaps, scarce above oblivion, as Willard, or Twiss, or Norton; and when posterity comes across them in the rubbish of libraries, the rare characters who may read and be pleased with them, will be looked upon as singular and whimsical, as in these days are admirers of Suarez, Aquinas, or Dionysius Arcopagita.' This whole passage shows Dr. Stiles's distaste for the peculiarities of the new school of Divines; but it indicates clearly their activity, and the power they were gaining. At the death of Dr. Stiles, Dr. Dwight had become so eminent a man in the judgment of the public, that his election to the Presidency was in accordance with a general expectation. From that time the old Calvinism, as something distinct from the Edwardean Divinity, disappears from view. This result is owing very much to the personal influence of Dwight. He communicated to others the reverence he felt himself for the genius of President Edwards. He

¹ Prof. Fisher's Discourse, p. 27.

gained strength by discarding the eccentric theory of Hopkins and Emmons concerning Resignation, which he had espoused in early life, and especially by vigorously opposing their odious propositions relating to the Divine efficiency in the production of sin. His pupils, comprising in their number such men as Griffin, Beecher, Stuart, became distinguished preachers and rose to the position of leaders in the theological world. From the outset, indeed, the disciples of the New Divinity displayed superior energy, both in the investigation of truth and in practical enterprises for the spread of God's kingdom. A man like Bellamy or Smalley, was himself a host. They were naturally selected to preside over colleges and drew to themselves young men who were studying for the ministry. They were very active in the earlier undertakings in the cause of Missions. Their efficiency was seen in the revivals of religion which took place in New England from the closing years of the last century down to a recent period. By a variety of agencies, the party professing the ancient Calvinism and eschewing "the improvements" of the New Divinity, has been quite obliterated in New England. Eighty years ago, the followers of President Edwards among the Calvinistic clergy, were said by his son, the younger President, to be few in number. At present, there are some who are scarcely aware that there ever was a time, since his death, when the Calvinists of New England did not regard President Edwards as the most authoritative expounder of their principles. His theology, however, it cannot be denied, had from the beginning the respect of many who refused to adopt the additions proposed by his disciples. It is still a mooted point among the interpreters of his writings, whether he deviated from Calvin in anything, except in modes of statement."¹

The history of Yale College has been, also, a history of deep and extensive revivals of religion, of earnest missionary effort, and of general philanthropic movements. Such results may be expected, always, where free thought is sanctified by a spirit of prayer, and activity in investigating the truth is allied with a love to the character of the Redeemer. The Discourse of Prof. Fisher is replete with interesting incidents, illustrating the ardor of Christian life, the variety and extent of social, moral, and religious influence, which may be ascribed to the *alumni* of Yale College, and to the members of its venerable church.

The Discourse of Professor Fisher suggests the importance of giving more attention, than has been paid hitherto, to the Diary of President Stiles, which is deposited in the library of Yale College. We know, indeed, that some historians have availed themselves of this literary treasure, but it still remains in a great degree unexplored. It abounds with piquant sayings; plain, frank, childlike confessions; accurate and studied remarks, which often illustrate dark passages of New England history. Thus on pp. 378—380, vol. ii. of Dr. Stiles's *Itinerary* (written in 1763—1769), he makes the following eccentric and quaint, but instructive observations.

"EYE-SALVE.—The times of 1741 produced effects. When a church and con-

¹ Prof. Fisher's Discourse pp. 81, 82.

gregation became generally New-Lighted, a new minor Old-Light church has been gathered, as at Plymouth, Concord, etc. When a church remained Old-Light, there have been minor New-Light churches gathered, as at New Haven, Milford, Framingham, etc. When the latter, having led his church into New Light, began to preach against Excesses, new Separate churches have been gathered even in New-Lighted churches, as at Concord, Stonington North Parish, Providence, Mansfield, and Mr. Croswell's, Boston, etc., etc. These last could not get New-Light regularly ordained ministers to ordain their illiterate pastors-elect, and thence arose a new species of Ordinations begun by Mr. Pain : the churches were regularly gathered, i. e. by covenant, but their pastors irregular ; however, they pretend to keep up the succession by presbyterian ordination. When New-Light churches obtained New-Light candidates to be ordained by New-Light but regularly ordained ministers, they had opposition, etc. ; such as Mr. Bird of New Haven, Mr. Reed of Framingham, etc. ; whose churches would have been called Separates, had their ministers been ordained by Pain, etc. ; as Mr. Snow of Providence, Holly of Suffield, etc. ordained by Pain, etc. There is no difference otherwise.

"As the Old-Light minor church in Concord is dissolved, so the New-Light minor church in Framingham is dissolved. As the Old-Light standing church at New Haven suspended the members of and censured the New-Light church there, so the New-Light standing church of Concord censured the Old-Light Separate church there, when the former refused to acknowledge the members received by the latter.

"**REM. 1.** I think all the churches in essence true churches, whether gathered peaceably and with the concurrence of the mother-church, and under the presence of neighboring pastors — if embodied by the same covenant and confession of faith. They also ought all to be acknowledged as sister churches, if their members are generally of good morals, though enthusiastic. **2.** For a time they may have pastors, not of presbyterian ordination ; this, though not Scriptural, is according to the Congregational platform, which permits it. **3.** It may be wise to persuade these Separate churches to ask regular pastors to join in laying on hands, in future ordination of their pastors. I think I could lay on my hands in conjunction with Pain or a deacon, as at Weymouth, or delegates of the church. This, in time, would remedy the evil. **4.** As the New Lights led the people into these irregularities and separations, so, when they began in their own parishes, they opposed them. The ministers were fond of patronizing separatists in Old-Light parishes, and ordained ministers over New churches ; but when a New church, founded in Separation, was set up in the parish of a New-Light minister (as in Mr. Fish's of Stonington), they refused to ordain their ministers, under the pretext that they were illiterate ; when, in truth, they had brought these illiterates forward by making them public exhorters.

"I met with a young minister, perhaps aged twenty-five, who said he had heard of New Lights (meaning Separatists in his own parish), but never heard of 'Old Lights,' and knew not, did not understand, what the words or terms 'Old Lights' meant. And yet his father had been a mighty New Light in my sense, and called opposers Old Lights ; but I suppose had his eyes anointed before 1745, and might not communicate these epithets to his son. However, I suppose it was rather affectation of ignorance in the son, who wisely wishes to have the differences between the Whitefieldians and his opposers cease and be buried in oblivion."

ELLICOTT ON THE EPISTLES OF PAUL.¹

PROF. ELLICOTT has already published on the Epistles to the Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, 1st and 2d of Thessalonians, Philemon, 1st and 2d of Timothy, and Titus. His "Commentaries" are exactly what he styles them in the title-page, "Critical and Grammatical." His notes are brief, modest, unpretending, faithful, laborious, full of the most accurate and varied learning without the taint of pedantry, and always expressed in language of the utmost clearness and simplicity. He is as strictly philological and as condensed in style as De Wette; and he has what, alas! De Wette had not, a profound reverence for the Bible as the word of the living God. It is to be hoped that he will extend his labors over the whole of the New Testament, and thus deliver us from the necessity of so much dependence on De Wette, who, with all his accurate learning, continually plagues and disturbs us with his lean, dry scepticism.

Mr. Ellicott is the successor of Frederick Maurice in the Divinity Professorship at King's College, London, making certainly a very great change for the better in the theological tone of that institution. His labors also are most opportune in counteracting the unfortunate tendencies of the late commentaries of Prof. Jowett.

Mr. Ellicott has attended to every branch of his work with unwearied diligence and eminent success. His examination of the ancient oriental translations, and his critical revision of the text, give full evidence of his conscientious scholarship and the extent of his researches. He shows, most clearly, that Tischendorf has not yet reached the *ne plus ultra* of a corrected text, as some now seem disposed to believe; but that he is sometimes hasty and unreliable. Tischendorf works too rapidly and does too much. He cannot, with his haste and his restless versatility, assure us of the best results; though we give him full credit as one of the greatest of living writers. We shall be obliged carefully to compare the *completed* labors of Lachmann, Tischendorf, Alford, and Tragelless, and others still to come, and get an accurate reprint of the Vatican MS. and exhaust some of the yet unexplored treasures of Oriental *diplomatik*, before we shall be able to pronounce the Greek text of the New Testament completely and finally settled. Meanwhile, God speed Mr. Ellicott and all who are like him.

¹ A Critical and Grammatical Commentary on St. Paul's Epistles to the Thessalonians, with a Revised Translation, by C. J. Ellicott, B. D., Professor of Divinity, King's College, London, and late Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. London: John W. Parker and Son, West Strand, 1858. 1 vol. 8vo. pp. xi. 159. price 7s. 6d.

RECENT ENGLISH WORKS.

SEVERAL works in Church History by English writers have recently come to hand, of which we have space to give only the following brief sketches.

A very elegant and carefully edited edition of the *Adversus Hæreses* of Irenæus has been published, in two volumes, at the Cambridge University press, by the *Rev. W. W. Hervey*. The editor is favorably known by his work upon the Three First Creeds, which we have noticed in a previous Number of the *Bibliotheca*. The text of this edition is the standard one, collated afresh with that of the Clermont & Arundell MSS. It is enriched with additions of Syriac fragments which go to show, among other things, that the author of the old Latin version has clung very closely to the original Greek. It also contains the Greek fragments of the lost writings of Irenæus, together with a few morsels of an Armenian version. The work is prefaced by some "Preliminary Observations on the Gnostic System," is illustrated by a large amount of learned and pertinent foot-notes, and made easily accessible by several very full and well-arranged indexes.

The student in church history will find, in this edition of Irenæus, a very valuable addition to his literary apparatus. No work is more frequently cited for all purposes, doctrinal, practical, biographical, geographical, and archæological, than the *Adversus Hæreses* of Irenæus. In these days, when the student is overwhelmed with the second-hand information of manuals and histories, it is of the utmost importance that he verify and freshen it for himself by a reference to the immediate sources. This carefully edited and beautifully printed edition of a very sensible and judicious church-father, who stood upon the borders of the Apostolic Age, will be welcome to all enterprising scholars.

Of a very different order and range of English scholarship are the *Lectures on the Ecclesiastical History of the First and Second Centuries*, by *F. D. Maurice*. These are the rapid and fluent production of an author who writes too much and too fast. They are the reproduction of a series of extemporaneous lectures to the students of King's College, London,—at the earnest request, however, it ought to be added, of partial friendship. They may be read with ease, and with something of that sort of pleasure and profit with which the student in secular history runs over books like the "Child's History of England." For any higher purpose, we cannot recommend them. A list of historical works (on p. 163), to be examined by the class, indicates a narrow range of reading in King's College, so far as Ecclesiastical History is concerned.

The *Rev. John Edward Cox* has republished the reliable work of *James* upon the *Corruptions of Scripture, Councils, and Fathers, by the Church of Rome*. He has revised and corrected, from the editions of 1612 and 1688. The work has been difficult to obtain until now. It follows the Papal forger

from the beginning, downward, with the dogged pertinacity of a detective officer. Nothing escapes his sharp and honest eye. If any one wishes to be amazed at the effrontery and unscrupulousness of a certain class of Papal students, let him examine this book. The immediate occasion of its republication, in 1843, was to counteract the so-called Tractarian movement at Oxford,—a movement which rested very much upon a blind and indiscriminating scholarship in all that pertains to the Ante-Nicene Fathers.

The Primitive Doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration, is a scholarly and well-reasoned work, by J. B. Mozley, of Oxford, the author also of a work upon the *Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination*. Both of these treatises deserve to be carefully read by the student in doctrinal history. They are the result of a diligent study of the most distinguished of the Latin Fathers; and, what is yet more, of a patient reflection upon them. The author perceives that there was a system of doctrine in the patristic church, and endeavors, with good success, to enucleate it. We do not think that he always does justice to the full meaning of the metaphysical positions of some of the early theologians, particularly Augustine; but, with this exception, we know of no one of the present English laborers in the field of doctrinal history who is doing more to lay open the facts, in their real connections, than this "Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford."

A History of the so-called Jansenist Church of Holland, has recently been written by Rev. J. M. Neale. In the dearth of books relating to that most interesting reaction in the Papal church,—the Jansenist,—this work will attract attention, by the thoroughness and enthusiastic sympathy with which it is composed. The body of the work is confined to the Dutch Jansenism, which had its head-quarters at Utrecht; but it throws an incidental light over the French Jansenism, besides being prefaced by an Introduction which contains the best succinct statement of the Jansenist doctrine, as distinguished from the Molinists, that we have met with.

The first volume of Virgil with an English Commentary by John Conington, Professor of Latin at Oxford, has appeared in the series of the *Bibliotheca Classica*. This volume contains the *Bucolics* and *Georgics*; also essays introductory to these treatises, as well as on the later *Bucolic*, and later didactic poets of Rome. Professor Conington has studied his author thoroughly, and generally has given a very clear and reliable exposition of his meaning. The work honorably sustains the high character of the preceding volumes of the *Bibliotheca Classica*.

The second edition of the *Life of Michael Angelo*, in two volumes, by John S. Harford, Esq., has just appeared; the first edition was published a little more than a year previously. The work contains memoirs also of Savonarola, Raphael, and Vittoria Colonna. These volumes will add new interest to the study of the life and character of this great Artist. The editor says that it has been his object in the preparation of the work, to render it interesting, "not only to the artist, but to general readers, and to the literary world, by developing Michael Angelo's character, artistic and

social, political and religious, and by proving him to have been in each of these particulars equally worthy of esteem and admiration." While on some of these points there will be a divided opinion, the work is one of decided merit.

The extensive collections of ancient Pottery obtained by the opening of tombs, and the excavations of ancient sites, have given new interest to the study of antiquity by means of the materials thus furnished. The hieroglyphics, inscriptions, paintings or other figures on the articles of pottery found, illustrate mythology, manners, customs, literature, and sometimes history. The "*History of Ancient Pottery*," in two volumes, by Samuel Birch, Esq., F. S. A., presents this subject in a popular form, generally reliable, though not very scientific. The work embraces an account of the Egyptian and Assyrian pottery; the Grecian, Etruscan and Roman, as well as that of the Celtic and Teutonic nations. It is illustrated with colored plates and numerous engravings.

Travellers in Syria and Palestine have long felt the need of a suitable guide-book for these countries. Robinson's "*Researches*," which are regarded as of the highest authority, are too voluminous for ordinary travellers; so of Wilson's "*Bible Lands*," or Van de Veld's volumes; while most of the smaller treatises do not give the requisite information. The deficiency is now well supplied by the "*Hand-Book for Syria and Palestine*," prepared by Rev. J. L. Porter. Mr. Porter is well known to the readers of the *Bibliotheca Sacra* by the Articles he has furnished, on his tours, made in the vicinity of Damascus. He has travelled extensively in these regions, and is a close and accurate observer of whatever would be of interest to a traveller. He has brought together a great amount of valuable information respecting the places included in these countries. In the *Index* of places there is a reference to every passage of Scripture in which the place described occurs. Such an Index is a Concordance of Scripture Geography. Another Index contains a list of ancient places not yet identified.

The traveller will thank Mr. Porter for this trust-worthy "*Guide*;" we wish it had been our fortune to have had it as a part of our outfit for the same lands.

The "*Eighteen Christian Centuries*," by Rev. James White, is a series of panoramic views in history. Though comprised in a single volume, it is a well-studied and spirited view of the leading events of our era. The extent of history has become appalling, and it is rapidly increasing in every direction. We cannot all do all things. This is the principle which lies at the foundation of the book. A chapter is devoted to each century. The author's object is to "label the centuries with their characteristic marks." We know of nothing of the kind so good. The book is worthy of being republished in this country.

English "*Roots and Ramifications*," by A. J. Knapp, is a small volume containing much valuable information on the origin of certain words in our language, with some far-fetched and doubtful illustrations.

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ARTICLE I.

DR. HICKOK'S PHILOSOPHY.

THERE is given, below,¹ a list of Dr. Hickok's works, in the order of their publication. Unless we incorrectly estimate their intrinsic worth, they represent the highest attainments in speculative thought which the American mind has yet reached; and if we are not mistaken respecting the increasing force of their influence, they promise to found a school of philosophy with a prominent and permanent place in the history of the world's speculation. But that it may appear whether this is an undue judgment, we propose to furnish a summary of their leading principles. To obtain the clearest view and arrive at the most satisfactory decision

¹ RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY; or the subjective Idea and the objective Law of all Intelligence. By Laurens P. Hickok, D.D. Second edition. Schenectady, G. Y. Van de Bogert. 1853.

A SYSTEM OF MORAL SCIENCE. By the same. Third edition. New York, Ivison and Phinney, 321 Broadway. 1856.

EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY; or the Human Mind as given in Consciousness. By the same. Second edition. Same publishers. 1857.

RATIONAL COSMOLOGY; or the Eternal Principles and the Necessary Laws of the Universe. By the same. New York, D. Appleton and Co., 346 and 348 Broadway. 1858.

respecting them, we need to pass each work in review, in an order somewhat different from that of its publication.

The *Empirical Psychology* should be first noticed. This is the science of the human mind as given in consciousness. It is a science, because it presents us as objects of knowledge certain truths in an orderly classification; it is an empirical science, because these truths are the facts furnished by experience and observation; it is not a pure and exhaustive science, because the principles, whereby alone the facts can be rationally expounded, neither experience nor observation can give. The field of empirical psychology is thus limited altogether to the developed facts of mind. The developing principles can have no place nor be recognized here except as the actual exercises and convictions which they induce, may become phenomena within the light of consciousness.

In treating of the functions of the mind, there is one fact so immediately before us, and of such intimate relations to every mental exercise, that it claims our first attention. The mind, though supernatural, is mysteriously linked with the natural world. It is tabernacled in the flesh, possessing instincts, appetites, and emotions in perfect keeping with a fleshly or animal nature, yet never losing that rational endowment wherewith it is not only above nature but radically different from anything that the animal is, or can become. Where the point of union is, or in what it consists, we need not inquire; but that it is something which essentially modifies every exercise of the mind, is an all important fact for our psychology.

The mind united with the body is constantly receiving impressions and modifications from nature. The variations of climate and soil, the influence of food and dress and employment, habits of in-door confinement or outward exposure, and the social conditions in which man is placed, all induce peculiar varieties of mental experience. These influences are so great that mankind in different parts of the globe are not only separate in space, but have important distinctions in character. Thus we have different races of men, where the permanent type of humanity has assumed

phases greatly and permanently modified by the outward forces working upon it. The agencies which have thus divided the human family, together with the influence exerted upon each other by these divisions themselves, need to be clearly apprehended, that the mental phenomena induced by them may be rightly understood. Again, the particular bodily organization influences the individual mind. The difference of sex, the different prominence or force of the nervous, the muscular or the digestive organizations inducing the differences of temperament, will secure an equally prominent difference of character. Bodily weakness, as immaturity of development in childhood and youth, sickness and sleep, as well as the reaction of body and mind upon each other, are constantly varying the phenomena of mind, and must be taken into account in the solution of some of the most important problems of mental experience. These points are, therefore, the first topics of discussion in Dr. Hickok's *Empirical Psychology*.

Looking at the mind as thus connected with nature, and inquiring into its facts, there are certain truths which meet us at the threshold. While the mind itself does not appear in consciousness, its permanent existence and unchanged identity are facts which consciousness clearly reveals. The mind is, and though experience cannot affirm what it is, it declares it to be something more than an exercise or an idea. The exercises of the mind arise and depart; ideas come and go, but the mind remains a perpetual bond and receptacle, wherein all its exercises and ideas are connected and contained. Through all changes it abides the same, itself superior to every change. Again, mind is essentially self-active. Though bound to nature, and modified in so important a degree by this connection, yet consciousness testifies that its agency is properly its own. It originates its own exercises. If outward circumstances are the occasion of these, the mind is their originating cause. If in any case influences may be imposed upon it, whereby the mind undergoes changes in which itself is merely passive, it has still a capacity to act from its own causality and can spontaneously originate its

own changes. Still further, the mind is able to separate itself from all its objects. Besides the facts of its own permanent and self-active existence, it knows that something other than itself is, and that there is a separating line between them.

But these "General Facts" do not give us the mind at work. Preceding and conditioning all self-conscious activity, there must also be what Dr. H. calls "Primitive Facts of Mind." These are sensation, consciousness, and the mind's spontaneous production of itself into the general states preparatory to its specific activity. The mind as self-active produces itself into several different general states, each of which becomes a capacity for specific single exercises. These general states, are three: the intellectual, the sentient, and the voluntary. As every mental exercise may originate in one or another of these general states, and may thus be classified as an act of knowing, feeling, or willing, we have here given to the one mind, the three leading and comprehensive functions of the Intellect, the Susceptibility and the Will.

The Intellect has three distinct modes of knowing. These are the Sense, the Understanding, and the Reason; terms more precise and comprehensive, and hence better fitted than any others in use to express the facts of an intellectual agency. As each of these functions differs from each other in kind, so the objects attained by one can never be interchanged and must never be confounded with those cognized by another.

The Sense is more than sensation. The latter is simply the affection of the bodily organism, or the change therein which the action of some object induces. It is thus not a knowing, but merely a receptivity for something to be known. To know what is given in sensation, there must be some peculiar function, which should be recognized in empirical psychology as a distinct operation of the intellect. This is done by calling it Sense, which is, thus, the faculty for attaining cognitions through sensation. But as the bodily organism receives impressions from external objects,

so the mind affects itself in all its varieties of internal action. And as the affection, in a bodily organ, is an occasion for perceiving a color, a sound, or a smell, so it may be said that these affections in the mind furnish the intellect its proper means or occasion for the perception of a thought, an emotion, or a volition. The sense thus may be distinguished as external or internal, whereby respectively the phenomena of the outer and the exercises of the inner world become known.

All the objects of sense are directly known. The mind immediately beholds them. They are thus real and known in their reality. Yet are they only the qualities of things, not the things themselves. Though the appearance is real, nothing is known to the sense but that which appears. There is no similarity of a color and fragrance, or of a thought and emotion, which could suggest to the sense that the two might be connected in one. The objects of the sense are all single and separate and fleeting. They come and go, one after or with another, but there is nothing in any number which can bind them in unity, and nothing in any one which can perpetuate itself in an unvarying sameness. No thought or emotion can stay in the consciousness for any two moments the same; and no affection in the bodily organ can constitute a perpetual sensation without a perpetual repetition.

But it is a fact of consciousness that we know more than this. Phenomena and events are known in their connections. The fragrance and the color belong to the one rose. The thought and the emotion rise from the one mind. The phenomenon or exercise, though perpetually repeated, has a perpetually remaining ground. Though this never *appears*, it is known *to be*; and the mind which has this higher cognition needs, in order to attain it, some higher function of the Intellect, radically different from the Sense. This is given in the Understanding. This faculty connects, into their permanent substances or causes, the separate and fleeting objects of the sense. It is properly an understanding (*sub-stans, standing-under*), in that it furnishes a substantial sup-

port to qualities and events otherwise groundless. While the object of the sense is a mere aggregation, that of the understanding is an inherent coalition; while in the sense the object appears, in the understanding it is thought; while the sense perceives, the understanding judges. To carry out this work of connecting or judging, especially in the logical process that dispenses with all objects of sense and uses only the pure understanding, we need the use of various subordinate intellectual functions. Thus we have the Imagination, Memory, Conception, Association of ideas, Judgment, and the Faculty of logical inference, all of which are so many distinct modes wherein the understanding exercises its peculiar agency.

But there is a field of knowledge which the sense cannot enter nor the understanding survey. The very exercise of the understanding in *connecting*, ignores everything which shall *comprehend*. The qualities cognized by the sense are bound up, by the understanding, in their substances and causes, which it also, in turn, binds up together into one nature or universe. The understanding can know nothing above or free from the connections of nature. All its cognitions are but links in the endless succession, and it plods its weary way without ever attaining a first or a last wherein it can rest. While all the qualities for the sense must have their ground for the understanding, yet this ground is, to the latter, only something sufficient to explain the qualities, and needs also to be explained by something other than itself. The understanding can see in the soul only an assumed cause for its exercises, and in God only the soul of the world.

But the intellect calmly and clearly denies this limitation of its knowledge. It knows something free and divine, which is not merely in nature, but above it; which does not simply connect the world, but comprehends it; which does not need anything to stand beneath it, but is as self-supporting as it is all-embracing. The function of the intellect for attaining this knowledge is the Reason. This faculty, by an immediate insight, sees absolute and eternal principles,

and comprehends nature in the necessary laws which the principles determine. It is the organ for Art, Philosophy, Ethics, and Theology, not one of which could be a possible object of knowledge unless the intellect were gifted with some faculty higher and different in kind from either the sense or the understanding. Since these three functions are sufficient to account for all the facts of knowing, they comprise the full power of the intellect.

The susceptibility differs as radically from the intellect as feeling differs from knowing. Yet, like the intellect, it exercises itself in various modes, each of which differs in kind from the others. There are, first, the feelings which man has in common with the brute. Certain instincts, appetites, and natural affections, though greatly modified in the human susceptibility, are yet the same in kind with those which the animal possesses. Such are the instinctive shrinking from pain, the appetite for food and drink, the love of the parent for the child, and many others. Since all these grow out of our animal constitution, they may be appropriately referred to the Animal susceptibility. But the objects known by the reason, awaken peculiar feelings in which no animal can participate. As the animal has no endowment wherewith it can rationally know, so it cannot commune with man in any rational emotion. The beautiful, the true, and the right or good, have their absolute being in the reason, and the emotions they inspire are for rational beings alone. Such feelings can be appropriately referred to none other than to a Rational susceptibility. All the feelings, thus classified, belong to the constitution of man as animal or rational. He has them because he is made to have them from the original structure of his being. But there are others which do not inhere in any constitutional endowment, but belong only to the spiritual disposition which the rational being assumes. The intuition of the right will carry the feeling of obligation to the good and the bad man alike, simply because each is thus constituted; and yet how exactly opposite the love and the hatred with which it is also accompanied in either case, and which is not at all deter-

mined by the rational constitution, but altogether by the free disposition. An entirely distinct kind of feelings must thus be recognized, belonging, not to the rational spirit as directly beholding absolute truth, but as consciously disposed towards some end. The function of the mind exercised in these feelings may be appropriately named the Spiritual susceptibility. An objection¹ that these feelings are not found in the nature of the being, and ought not therefore to be classified under a distinct and separate division, is futile; for the spirit is itself supernatural, and hence must have experiences of feeling that are not constitutionally inherent, and are therefore forever distinct in kind from that which flows either from an animal or rational constitution. When a man, as a rational spirit, has disposed his spirit towards some end, he shall possess a new susceptibility for feeling, which can in no other way be attained; and as all men have such disposings, an empirical psychology must note and carefully distinguish the feelings which ensue. These prove to be among the most important and controlling in all human experience. They are none other than the feelings of the heart as distinct from those of the constitution. That such a susceptibility has not been accurately distinguished and classified, has vitiated, and must not only leave incomplete, but render incorrect, all psychological systems in which the analysis has been neglected.

With an intellect *to know* and a susceptibility *to feel*, we have the occasion given *to execute* in the attainment of ends. This introduces the third grand function of the human mind. The impulses of instinct and appetite may move towards specific ends, and, when under such motives one end is taken rather than another, the source of the executive act may be termed will. But if there be nothing but the impulses of appetite to prompt, and nothing but the end of happiness to be sought, the will can have no alternative in kind to its execution, and the whole is as really within the necessity of nature as any series of nature's causes and

¹ N. A. Review, April 1857, p. 369.

effects. Where the choice is only between degrees of happiness, there is no choice, but the highest degree must necessarily be taken. The brute will is as truly without *an alterum* as any mechanical power. But this is not so with man. He has the endowment of a rational spirit which can see what is worthy of itself as something altogether different in kind from the demands of animal impulse. With this capability to see what is due to his own excellency of being, there is in man the motive to secure it for his own worthiness' sake in the sight of himself and of other men and of God. This places within himself a counter-check to nature; it gives him an alternative in kind to all natural gratification, and though all of nature should be on one side and for eternity, man has in this, that which can take the other side and which enables him to gain and keep the worthiness and renounce and despise the happiness. Herein is a will in liberty and only in the possession of such an alternative in kind is there any conception of personality or any place for responsibility. The human will is thus in a true sense a capacity for election or choice. It places man above all animal and physical causes, and makes him as truly a person and an agent in liberty as an angel or as God.

The will is thus separate in kind from the intellect and the susceptibility. Though it cannot be said to have any distinct functions, there may be permanent distinctions in the forms of its working and the products it secures. Thus we have "immanent preferences" or inward choices that were never intended to be put into overt action; a "governing purpose," or that for which all subordinate volitions are exercised, and "desultory volitions" or such as come in, and for a period turn aside from, without renouncing the governing purpose. All these have responsibility; the first because they lie within the real character or disposition; the second because as it is, so is the character; and the third, because if against a good purpose, they show a deficiency of energy for the good, and if against a wicked purpose, they are but an action in mere constitutional humanity.

The end for which the mind exists is the perfection of its

own being and working, and thus the securing its own and its Maker's approbation. The end of the animal nature is happiness; the end of the spirit is spiritual worthiness or holiness; and the end of man as both animal and spiritual is to keep happiness always subordinate to holiness. The last general division of Dr. H.'s *Empirical Psychology* is occupied with the inquiry concerning the capability of the human mind to attain this end. After considering the whole subject of power, through all theories of cause and effect, the conceptions of necessity and contingency, and natural and moral inability, the conclusion is clearly sustained that the human mind is naturally competent and morally impotent to attain perfectly its end in the worthiness or dignity of its own character.

In preparing this work, Dr. Hickok evidently did not aim to furnish a series of essays upon Memory, Imagination, Association, Judgment, etc., wherein every function of the mind should be treated singly according to its comparative importance and use in human experience. Had this been his object, we should have expected a very different book from the one before us. His plan seems rather to have been to discriminate each fact of consciousness so clearly from every other that it shall stand out distinct in its own identity, and at the same time to reveal each in so harmonious a connection with all the rest that the vital unity of the mind's whole experience should be ever before us. It is equally the merit of the book that it has undertaken no more and accomplished no less than this. Anything narrower would seem obviously defective, while a wider discussion of the different mental functions, however interesting and valuable for other purposes, would be not only needless but an actual incumbrance in an introduction to the study of the human mind. Some prominent facts, as language and the enjoyment of the ludicrous, Dr. H. does not specifically notice. This is an omission which may profitably be supplied in future editions. Such a want, however, is not a serious defect, for the clear classification of mental phenomena here established is sufficient to teach the careful student how to identify and

how to connect these and all other facts which his consciousness reveals.

The attainments in Psychology prepare us for the study of *Moral Science*. What is the highest good for man? What are his rights and duties? These questions, which lie at the basis of ethics, cannot be satisfactorily answered without some accurate and profound knowledge of the human mind. Inextricable confusion shall ever prevail in ethical discussions where the clear distinction between the natural and the spiritual in man is not seen and followed. There can be no morality unless grounded in what is rational or spiritual. However earnestly the attempt be made to limit its particular province and find its ultimate ground in a nature whereof man and the animal alike participate, every such effort must everywhere and always be ineffectual. If man were only an animal of a higher type, and more refined degree than the brutes around him, he could attain no better good than the gratification of his sentient wants, and contemplate no other end than the happiness which such a gratification should bring. The supreme law which should then give him all his rights and mark out for him all his duties, should be the greatest amount of happiness to be gained for himself or for the whole of which he is a part. But can the validity and authority of such a law be urged? Not to dwell here upon the obvious and common objection that it makes virtue and vice mere matters of expediency, and resolves good and evil into a simple question of profit and loss, there is a profounder difficulty relating to the very basis on which such a law of prudence must rest. For if the question be asked: why this law? or in what ground does it inhere? no satisfactory answer can be given. The law of prudence can have no absolute principle. The happiness to which it directs must vary according to the constitution of the sentient nature which is to receive it, and this can be varied by infinite power to an infinite extent. Such a rule is therefore completely the product of power, and might makes all the right that it can reveal. A system of ethics derived from it can be only an economy for a par-

ticular class of constitutional beings, and must necessarily vary with the different subjects and different natures for which it is made. If they are so constituted as to be the most happy themselves in conferring happiness upon others, then benevolence should be the rule, but still only as prudential, and binding the subject only because he found himself in the midst of such a constituted nature of things. A code of morals resting upon such a ground is at the best only a calculation of expediencies, and the practice of virtue in its purest form is only the struggle after happiness as the highest good that can be attained. A brute does nothing less than this, and man if only animal can do nothing more.

But virtue, as its etymology imports, has a *worth* which belongs to itself, distinct from the advantages which it secures. Not only the profoundest thinkers of the race from Plato onwards,¹ but the race itself in its common consciousness has recognized a world-wide difference between what is right and what is expedient. There is a good of moral worthiness which is of wholly another kind than sentient happiness, a good which is absolutely *SUMMUM BONUM*, and with which no conceivable application of power can bring any other good in competition. But the knowledge of this as well as its attainment belongs wholly to what is spiritual. While a true psychology will reveal man's spiritual or supernatural endowment, a valid system of ethics will be grounded wholly within this higher sphere. Nothing has an intrinsic worth save what is spiritual; and nothing other than this can give rights and duties absolutely inalienable and inflexible. To be a spirit is to be a moral being, and to do

¹ "Virtue is independent of the desire of happiness, because, as Plato first remarked and Cicero repeated from him: The gods are not called good because they are happy, but they are happy because they are good. It is still more absurd to estimate virtue as mere utility, since it cannot receive its equivalent from any, not even a divine reward. Moreover, why should God reward virtue if it be not in *itself* good and worthy of desire? In this case He has delight in virtue only because he rewards it! And we, on the other hand, regard Him as worthy of adoration only because he arbitrarily dispenses reward and punishment!" — JACOBI, *von den Göttlichen Dingen*.

that and that only which is due to spiritual excellency, is the supreme rule for all moral conduct. To be worthy of moral approbation in his own sight and in the eye of every spirit, is man's supreme good. To fulfil the claims which the conscious demand of his own inherent dignity imposes, is his first and last and highest duty. Here is a rule which is moral and not prudential. It can urge its claims, if necessary, in the face of all prudence, and demand for its own sake that virtue be sought even if no other good should follow. If the soul were to seek to fulfil such a claim for the sake of some ulterior end, as though it would be holy, because and in order that it might thus be happy, the very claim, that holiness be sought as an end in itself, and not as a means to anything further, would be violated and the soul, instead of gaining its moral approbation, would be consciously degraded. Here is an absolute rule for the whole spiritual world. It does not change with changing circumstances. It is not subjected to diminution or increase of weight or authority by aught which could come in conflict with, or be added to itself. No power can make or modify it, for it must hold authority over all power. The Maker of man will find His rule for making and governing, in this same consideration of His own intrinsic dignity and glory.

This absolute rule Dr. H. applies to all voluntary action. and with it surveys the whole field of moral ends and uses. The "System of Moral Science" thus evolved is clear and full, but does not require a particular representation here. The great strength of the work lies in this attainment of the absolute and ultimate rule of right, and its chief beauty consists in the clear and constant application of this fundamental law to every human relation. The objections¹ to the rule, that it analyzes right into other elements simpler than itself, that it gives man an original merit, and that it makes the actual subjective feeling the sole test of right, have already been ably and conclusively answered,² and need no further notice.

¹ Biblical Repertory, Jan. 1855. Winslow's Moral Philosophy, p. 286.

² Presbyterian Quarterly, Dec. 1855.

The *Empirical Psychology* and the *Moral Science* are designed as text-books in academies and colleges, and, for teaching how the mental facts given in consciousness stand together and make a responsible agent, and how an absolute principle of right as a universal rule builds up a complete system of ethics, they contain what is needed and leave little else to be desired. They are no compilations of scattered facts and opinions, gleaned from different sources and held together only by some external bond of connection, but are the original embodiment of one living thought which pervades them both, and gives to each a true and vital unity. As text-books they are singularly adapted to quicken the student and give him mental breadth and vigor.

The *Rational Psychology* is in a higher field, and designed for a higher purpose. It aims at the effectual overthrow of all philosophical scepticism. Coinciding in some particulars with the *Critick of pure Reason*, — as every exhaustive treatment of the subject must do — it differs totally from that work in its grand result. While Kant affirmed that the peculiar problems of metaphysics lie outside the province of philosophical knowledge, and that thus the being of God, the soul, and the universe could never be positively proved, Dr. Hickok maintains exactly the contrary and presents a demonstration that these objects have a valid being and lie within the sphere of true knowledge. To show the success of this demonstration would require us to repeat the cardinal ideas of the *Rational Psychology*, but as this has already been done at considerable length and with great clearness in these pages,³ we may now omit it. For the same reason an extended notice of the work is not here needed. It is sufficient to remark that the groundwork of the whole discussion, which also gives to the philosophy its method, is the attainment of the idea how an intellectual agency must work in order to the various forms of knowing, and then the gathering of the facts of knowing in order to see that their actual law fully corresponds to this necessary

³ Bibliotheca Sacra, Jan. and April, 1851.

idea. The three forms of knowing, are the sense, the understanding, and the reason, and in each of these the necessary idea and the actual law are found in exact accordance. This rational determination of every intellectual process of knowing gives us a complete psychology whereby we come to the full knowledge of the knowing agent, and gain a position for determining the validity of all that is known and thus for excluding scepticism from the entire field of human speculation.

As the *Rational Psychology* stands at the head of Dr. H's productions in the order of their publication, so it lies at the basis of them all, in the establishment of the principles which have entered into the structure of each. The foundation and germ of all Dr Hickok's philosophy are seen in the third part of this book. It is here that he establishes the doctrine of the Reason, the highest faculty of the soul, whereby man comprehends himself and nature. In this comprehending power, there is the grand distinction between nature and the supernatural, and the infallible declaration of man's freedom, morality, and responsibility. It lies in the very being of Reason that there is a soul, a God and immortality.

There could hardly be a grander undertaking than that which the *Rational Cosmology* proposes to accomplish. It aims at the instauration of a new and true science of universal nature. Experience and observation can never furnish a pure and satisfying science. Great as are the merits of the inductive philosophy, and readily conceded as these should be, still, there belongs to it a two-fold and radical deficiency. On the one hand it has nothing to quiet the scepticism that may ever attach to any induction of the whole, where all the parts have not been attained, and on the other, its very induction cannot rationally expound the facts from which it is drawn, but is only another statement of them in a more general form. Thus, e. g. it is no rational explanation of the fall of an apple, to say that it follows a law which the tides and the planets likewise obey, for this is only a comprehensive affirmation respecting the whole of what had been

observed respecting the part, while it explains neither the part nor the whole. The connection of the terrestrial and celestial phenomena, thus discovered, is indeed of vast interest, yet this does not answer the inquiry of the rational mind, which still asks, not simply for the fact of such a connection but for the living principle which has made it so. If it be said, as the ultimate result to which science can reach, that the law of gravity means simply the uniform way in which God acts, and that a similar statement must be made for every law of nature, this is simply the conception of a *Deus ex machina*, which only removes the difficulty one step further, but does not destroy it. This introduction of the Deity to cut the knot which we could not untie, is a fact just as barren of all rational significance as the one we had before, and our question is still unanswered. When such a question becomes too pressing, it is very easy to try to evade it, by talking, on the one hand of the weakness of the human powers, as though it were presumptuous to push their inquiries so far, and, on the other, of the glory of experimental science, as though its results could promise the solution of every problem, yet it is not easy to quiet that rational seeking, which no greatness of human infirmity can stifle, and no attainments of experimental knowledge can satisfy. Reason can only rest in what is rational, but as the generalizations of the inductive philosophy approach no nearer a truly rational ground than do the particulars which they propose to explain, the human mind cannot desist from pushing its inquiries for something beyond.

It is the object of the *Rational Cosmology* to answer these inquiries by gaining the ultimate position for all science and philosophy. But what is this position? Obviously a sufficient explanation for the facts of nature must be found in something higher than the facts themselves. Facts cannot explain each other. Nature cannot expound itself. The light which shall make intelligible that which is made, can only come from that which is unmade. In other words, a true and satisfying science shall find a meaning for every fact in some rational principle, and a ground for all facts in

a rational author. While it is obvious that nothing but this could ever perfectly satisfy the inquiring mind, it is equally manifest that in this every question should be fully answered. The highest demands of the reason should rest in what is supremely reasonable. Can we then attain such a position? This is affirmed in the *Rational Cosmology*, and the position itself is not only sought, but is, we are confident, actually reached.

The introduction shows that no fact can be explained, except as determined through some rational principle, and then in a rapid review of the leading philosophic systems of the past, it is seen how completely the most of them have neglected this truth, and how from their point of view, no theology nor philosophy is really possible. "It is a marvel and a reproach" says the author in a vigorous passage, "that the world's philosophies are, to-day, all radically materialistic; holding all being as fact, or constitutionally natured; and are thus necessarily, in the end, Atheistic or Pantheistic. Seen from a comprehensive point of vision, they invariably and inevitably lead logically out to a complete exclusion of an absolute, personal, supernatural being from human knowledge and even from human conception. The reason of universal humanity calls for and acknowledges, an unbegun, unmade and supernatural Beginner, Maker, and Finisher of all that has a nature; and the Christian heart worships a Jehovah, whose sovereignty and authority lie underived and solely in the absolute behest of His own reason; while all speculative philosophy has come to ignore and deny every conception which cannot be brought within the connections of the logical understanding and subjected to the determinations of some constitutional nature. The conception of a Being who may begin from Himself, and create objectively to Himself, without finding Himself caused to do so by any previous conditioning, seems utterly to have fallen out of all philosophical intelligence. Where is the philosophy, which can logically from its method, present a God to our acceptance as a *causa causans*, without being thoroughly a *causa causata*? Who

seems to feel any shock at the absurdity and impiety of talking about the *nature* of God and the *nature* of the Divine Will, as if the awful prerogatives of the supernatural could be brought and bound within the conditions of the natural? Our religious consciousness is clear and complete for an absolutely supernatural; our philosophic consciousness is, dogmatically or in its own supineness, trained to the restrictions of a relatively conditioned nature of things. It is among the strongest evidences of the deep and permanent working of the immortal reason within the soul, that notwithstanding the wide-spread prevalence of a philosophy everywhere sinking the Deity to a fact, there is yet the growing power of a religion which worships Him as an unmade Spirit, in spirit and in truth. How much more rapidly may the knowledge and the worship of the true God spread, when philosophy herself shall become converted to, and baptized in, a Gospel theism!" "What then we need for a truly *rational theology* is the conception and complete recognition of an absolutely supernatural Being—a God for the rational soul, and not conditioned to the physical necessities of the logical understanding. . . . Such theology may then be safely laid as the starting point for a true *rational cosmology*, and in which may be embodied a thoroughly comprehensive and conclusive philosophy." ¹

As thus a clear idea of an absolute Creator and Governor is essential for any intelligent approach to a rational cosmology, the first chapter of the work is occupied with this. It is an independent demonstration of what was accomplished in a different form in the third part of the *Rational Psychology*. With a searching scrutiny, every attempt that has been or can be made to gain a conception of the Absolute, is here examined. All the efforts of the sense or the understanding, in this direction, are shown to be necessarily futile. The nature of the case *à priori* determines that "to both the functions of the sense and the discursive understanding, all attempts towards the conception of an Abso-

¹ *Rational Cosmology*, pp. 52, 53.

lute involve an absurdity and must ever rest under an utter impossibility, while the reason is directly competent to state and expound the whole problem."¹ The rational conception of the Absolute is that of a self-existent and self-determined Deity, who is absolved from all obligations to anything without Himself, and who is and was and is to come complete in His own fulness. Such a Being is able to create, not from the craving of a want, nor from the control of a necessity, but in pure freedom and out of regard for His righteous glory. While the understanding asks perpetually for some new link in its chain of endless successions, and traces up its train of causes, till it requires a cause for the Creator as truly as for creation, reason calmly rests in the knowledge of One who borrows no leave to be, nor to act, but who is and who works from His own self originating and self determining completeness. No explanation of nature will be satisfactory which does not recognize such a Being as its Absolute Originator, who, while the eyes of all wait upon Him in complete dependence, is ever supreme, and independent of all that is made.

Having attained this idea of the Creator, we are prepared to seek for that of creation itself. Can we gain this? In other words, is it possible for us to know how God has created the universe? Let us not be appalled by the grandeur of the undertaking, but reverently endeavor to know if He who has given us a reason that seeks, has not also endowed us with a power that shall find. The question is: how shall such a Being as we have conceived the Creator to be, make a world that shall have an objective and real existence in space and time? If we look at His own pure activity, we can see nothing in its simple exercise that can ever determine space or time. There can be no up nor down, no here nor there, no now nor then, except in reference to some point or limit through which all the relations of space and time must first be determined. But our conception of the Creator excludes all such points or limits from Him. To

¹ *Rational Cosmology*, p. 58.

make it otherwise, would be to bring Him into nature, and give to our philosophy, again, only a Deity who is deprived of His absolute being and throne. Is there, then, any conceivable way that there should be a creation in space and time, except as the pure spiritual activity of the Creator should be limited by Himself. Whether or not we can conceive of this, yet must we admit that in truth it has been done, unless creation be infinite. Let us then closely fix the eye upon this limitation, and see if it do not contain the solution we seek.

To make the conception more clear, let the simple activity of the Creator be considered as two-fold. The point is thus more readily apprehended, but is in no wise different. Let there be conceived two spiritual activities meeting each other in a direct antagonism. Each shall thus limit the other, and their meeting shall constitute a point of mutual resistance. This point, if clearly apprehended, is seen to be something fixed. As the activities which have caused it continue, other points gather around it as a centre, and may be determined in their positions by their relations to it. We can now speak of space and time; for, while every point that shall be generated by the antagonisms, has its place in relation to this centre, every movement that shall occur among them has its period in reference to this beginning. We may now also speak of creation as a fact. God may thus be conceived to have made something objective to Himself, and which has a real being in space and time. But what is this something? Are we thus aided at all in our knowledge of the actual world? A clear view of what is thus far before us shall answer this question. The conception of spiritual activity limiting itself, or of two spiritual activities meeting in direct counteraction, is the true conception of force. A force is either a dynamic which pushes or pulls, or a static which holds itself at rest, involving in both cases counteraction, complex action, action and reaction. This, however, is not involved in, but is even contrary to the conception of a simple spiritual agency. Such an agency has no "where," that it might be conceived to pull from; nor

"there," that it might be conceived to pull to; nor any "here," in which it might be conceived to hold itself at rest. "It could be determined neither to any time nor place; for it has no constant, from whence the determination might begin nor where it might end."¹ "It is only as it meets some opposing action, and encounters an antagonist, that we come to have the notion of force."² "In neither of the two activities can there be the notion of force, but at the point of antagonism force is generated and one new thing comes from the synthesis of the two activities. . . . In this, position is taken, and there is more than the idea of *being*, which the simple activities each have; there is being *standing out*, an EXISTENCE; being *in re*, *reality*, A THING. Let then, an indefinite number of such positions, contiguous to each other, be conceived as so taken and occupied, and a space will thereby be filled and holden; an aggregate force will maintain itself in a place; and a ground is given on which other things may rest. A substantial reality here exists. This antagonism may be conceived to be of any degree of intensity, and the substantial ground will hold its place with the same amount of persistency, and stand there permanent, impenetrable, and real. Nothing else may come into its place until it has itself been displaced. It is not *inertia*, but a *vis inertię*, a force resting against itself, and thus holding itself in place. It rests because it has intrinsically an equilibrating resistance."³

Such a force, thus originated, is matter in its simplest form. Matter is force, and not a mere dead something, into which forces are projected. Because, if we look closely, we shall see that this dead something, which fills out the ordinary sense conception of matter, must not only be forever unknown, but could never have a real existence. For how could it ever be known? Matter, in the common conception of it, could never make any impression upon an organ of sense. Such an impression must be from some efficiency; and it is this, and not the powerless matter, which

¹ Rational Cosmology, p. 93.² Ibid.³ Ibid. p. 94.

therefore becomes the object of perception and of knowledge. Neither could matter, as thus conceived, ever have a substantial existence. For, how could there be a substance, which yet has nothing that can *stand under* any quality? Or how could anything be said to exist, which has nothing that can *stand out* in any sense? If, then, we dismiss the ordinary conception and retain the notion of this efficiency, we shall find that such a force, which does all that matter is ever said to do, is matter itself. Matter is force, a definition to which we should also be led by a strict conformity to the etymology of the word.

But the question: how, where force is not, may it begin to be? has yet been only partially answered. "Force cannot come from utter emptiness. Nor is it now to be apprehended as produced from some antecedent force, and thus a propagation or production from some force already created. Forces may change their modes of manifestation indefinitely, and this will be but the progressive development or successive births and growths in nature itself; but we now want the conception of nature's origin."¹ "Take then the Idea of the Absolute, already attained, and within the pure spiritual agency of his being there is no force; no antagonism or counter agency. Simple spiritual activity takes no positions, fills no space, puts within itself no limits from whence we can begin to determine places and periods. Spaces and times are here wholly irrelevant, and as there is no fixing in place and moving in successions, so nothing of impenetrable substances and series of physical causes can be thought as lying and working on in the Godhead. But in the knowledge he has of his own supreme excellency of being, there is an end in his own dignity and glory ever before him. He knows what is due to himself, and nothing can intervene that he should not be true to himself. He remaineth faithful, he cannot deny himself. He sees that it behooves him, as a right consciously due to himself, to manifest himself in creation. Under such ethical behest,

¹ Rational Cosmology, p. 97.

and not at all before the impulse of any constitutional craving, God arises to the work of creation, and becomes a beginner and author of an existence which before was not. Solely from the reason, and not from any want as if he too had a nature, God puts his simple activity in counter agency. He makes act meet and hold act, and in this originates an antagonism which constitutes force; a new thing, a something standing out for objective manifestation, and holding itself in position as a reality distinct from his own subjective simplicity. This force fixes itself in position; holds itself at rest; and so far from being inert, its very existence is a *vis inertix*, or a force actively holding itself still. The simplicity of the spiritual works on still undisturbed within the Deity, for no conditions of the material reach back of the point of counter agency. In matter is force, or the physical, and all its necessitated efficiencies work downward in their destined sequences, but above matter all is still spiritual, supernatural, the free ongoings of spontaneous activity directed upon the end of its own dignity or glory. The creation of the material is from God; its genesis is in him; its perpetuation and sustentation is from the continual going out of his simple activity; but this material is not God, nor at all competent to rise, from its imposed conditions, into the place of the Absolute. The Logos, or Divine working word, is *in* the world; is the life and light of the world; and yet he was in the beginning with God, and ever is God, while the world is not he, but his creature."¹

It must be acknowledged that here is a complete science of what matter is, and how it began to be. There is no inquiry for the rational mind to make beyond this. Such a conception, if attained, is self-satisfying and self-sufficient. Reason can rest in the free originations and rational products of the Absolute Reason. It would extend our Article beyond proper limits, to follow out in detail the development of these principles, as exhibited in the work before us. We need only to say, in general, that to the antagonism

¹ Rational Cosmology, pp. 100—102.

already mentioned, Dr. H. adds what he calls a diremptive force, which acts at the same centre, with energies that work away from each other, and by combining with, and loosening or dissolving the antagonism, give occasion for the indefinite composition and resolution of forces, and thus for the perpetual modification of matter. As thus conceived, matter has within itself a law of progress and development, and the insight of the reason is directed to discover, from the eternal idea of working forces, what are the facts and laws which these forces must determinately bring out. In the primal idea of matter there are seen the determination of the principles of motion, the ensphering of matter, the ratios of gravity, the rate of falling bodies, the action of magnetism, electricity, heat and light, chemistry, crystallization, world formations, and stellar distributions, — all inherently given in the primal introduction of the material forces, and necessarily coming out in their progressive development. The addition of an assimilative force, which works in matter through successive superinductions, as vegetable, animal, and human life, gives us the complete attainment of the rational principles of an orderly material universe and its organic inhabitants. Having attained these, Dr. H., in the third chapter of the *Cosmology*, finds that the actual laws of the universe, as given in the facts of experience, are just such as are necessarily determined in these eternal principles. Thus with the laws of material sphericity, gravity, magnetism, electricity, heat, light, chemical and crystalline activities, solar systems, cometary movements and the galactic and nebular phenomena. Very extended, striking, and convincing conformities of principle and law are shown everywhere to abound through nature.

An Appendix discloses a striking conformity of the results of the *Rational Cosmology* with the Mosaic account of creation, showing that the successive epochs in the Cosmological generation of the heavens and the earth are, necessarily, in the same order as the work accomplished in the days of the Bible history.

It is thus seen that this work reconstructs the basis of all

science, or rather it furnishes a basis where there was no sufficient foundation before. Instead of experimental research, tracing one fact to another in the endless and unsatisfactory generalizations of the inductive philosophy, we have here the clear insight of the reason directed to the rational author who has made all things, and to the rational principles according to which they were made. It would be high praise to say of a book with such an object, that it has not palpably failed. But every careful student will be able to affirm more than this. We are greatly mistaken, if there be not found in the book itself the clear evidence that the author has been successful in his grand aim. Even if it shall appear that some of the facts adduced in the third chapter, do not warrant his interpretation, this could only prove an error in some particular employment of his principles, while it would invalidate neither the principles themselves nor their general application.

If we now ask for the general point of view in Dr. Hickok's philosophy, from which the whole field embraced in these works should be contemplated, we find it in his distinct and peculiar conception of spiritual activity. The understanding has to do with nature, and is bound within the necessities and connections of nature's causes and effects. All philosophical investigation by this logical function alone, must be partial, blind, and wrong. It can have no eternal principles for its facts, no liberty for its agents, no immutable rule for its morality, and no absolute personal God for its theology. In all the works of Dr. Hickok, the insight of the reason, as distinct from the deductive or the inductive logic of the understanding, is constantly apparent; and instead of an empty detail of facts barren of all possible explanation except as they are made to stand in a dry arrangement in some logical order of classification, we have here a psychology, a morality, and a cosmology for spiritual being and apprehension. The *Empirical Psychology* puts its facts together and shows us an organic and living personal agency in the one rational spirit that works in and through them all. The *Moral Science* has its immutable imperative in the in-

trinsic excellency of spiritual being itself, and a perpetual motive in personal worthiness of character that should and may hold in check all prudential motives in mere happiness. The *Rational Psychology* details the necessary elements *a priori* for such spiritual personality, and puts them together in the Idea of responsible humanity, and the Idea of absolute Deity, while it also finds the proof of such human personality in the free originations of man, and the proofs of the absolute Deity in the manifest originations of nature and in nature. And the *Rational Cosmology* determines, from such spiritual activity, both how matter can begin to be, and how it can orderly go on in intelligent development to an ultimate consummation of universal nature in the rational ends and uses designed for it. It remains now for Dr. Hickok to give us a *theology* whose principles shall be as absolute as those which prevail in the works already before us.

That Dr. Hickok represents the highest and most permanent type of American thinking we have little doubt. The deeply seated feeling of an increasing number, that his writings satisfy a want not otherwise supplied; the comprehensive range of his principles, and the facility with which their application can be carried to the highest problems respecting nature, the soul and God, as well as the singular accordance which his philosophic direction is seen, as soon as it is pointed out, to have with the profoundest drift of American activity in other respects, embolden the prediction that, if American philosophy is to have a history, the course of its stream and the bulk of its waters can appear in no other channel than the one he has indicated.

ARTICLE II.

THREE ERAS OF REVIVAL IN THE UNITED STATES.

BY REV. A. P. MARVIN, WINCHENDON, MASS.

THE history of our churches, from the early years of the settlement of the country, is illumined by the record of God's gracious dealings in the form of revivals of religion. In the darkest times there were tokens of the Divine presence. Towards the close of the seventeenth century, when the churches began to decline from their primitive purity of doctrine, and during the first quarter of the century succeeding, when the half-way covenant and the errors of the Arminian system had done their worst, and even after the Revolution, when infidelity of the French type was so prevalent, there were churches which enjoyed the special influences of the Holy Spirit. An account of these occasional works of grace will form an interesting chapter in some future history of revivals. They belong to the general life of the church, and illustrate it, showing how God kept alive the flame of piety in the wilderness, and during wars with savage tribes, and while, in opposition to French and British aggressions, our fathers were laying the foundations of a great Protestant and independent empire.

Some of these detached instances of religious awakening may be referred to, as they throw a few rays of light upon that dark period which lasted from about the time when the first generation of settlers had passed away, to the beginning of the "Great Awakening." There were several revivals in Northampton, under the ministry of Stoddard, during this season of decline. The first, according to Trumbull, vol. I. p. 135 *Hist. Conn.*, "was about the year 1679; a second was in 1683. Another was about the year 1696; a fourth, in 1712. In 1718 he had the happy experience of the fifth. These he termed his harvests. He was eminent and renowned, both for his gifts and graces; and his ministry

was, from the beginning, blessed with uncommon success. The revivals were, some of them, much more remarkable than others; but in each of them, and especially in those in 1683, in 1696, and in 1712, the greatest part of the young people in the town appeared chiefly concerned for their salvation." The town of Windham, Conn., was the scene of a remarkable work of grace in 1721. Though the population was not large, yet under the ministrations of Mr. Fitch, who was a "clear and powerful preacher of the doctrines of the reformation," as many as eighty persons were admitted to full communion in the church in the short space of six months. It appears that the first of the revival seasons in Northampton was in 1679. This was the year when the "Reforming Synod" met for the express purpose of discussing these two questions: "What are the provoking evils of New England?" and "What is to be done, that so those evils may be reformed?" This was a very important meeting, and was followed by lasting results. The recommendations of this Synod were carried into effect by the churches, in their own time and way. They held days of fasting and prayer, and had preaching adapted to the wants of the time. "Many thousands of spectators will testify," says Cotton Mather, "that they never saw the special presence of the great God our Saviour more notably discovered, than in the solemnities of these opportunities." And Increase Mather testifies that under some sermons, at this time, hundreds were savingly wrought upon by the Holy Spirit. The work, however, was not very general, and did not extend to the other colonies.

Passing these occasional cases of religious awakening, we call attention to the fact that there have been three marked periods in the history of our churches, both in New England and beyond its borders, which may be properly styled Revival Eras; periods when great numbers were converted in a comparatively short time, and when the cause of Christ rapidly gained great moral and spiritual power. The first period, heralded by the revival in Northampton in 1734, commenced

in the year 1740, and continued for several years. This is generally styled the "Great Awakening of 1740;" by Edwards it was called "The Revival of Religion in New England in 1740." But as it was not confined to the Eastern colonies, the former designation seems most appropriate. The second period began about 1797, and continued, with variable power, during several years into the nineteenth century. The third period witnessed its greatest triumphs in the years near the close of the first third of the present century; that is, between 1830 and 1835. Each period extended through several years, and it would be difficult to point out the precise time when either of them ceased.

Each of these seasons, however, had marked characteristics; each had its own special type; each was modified by circumstances; each had a doctrinal peculiarity. Though all had the same basis in the Gospel of Christ, and were carried forward by the Holy Spirit, yet a specific difference separated each from the others. The design of this Article is to note these specific differences, and the causes of them.

The first period, the era of Edwards, Whitefield, Bellamy, Parsons, and the Tennents, had for its dogmatic peculiarity the doctrine of Justification by Faith. The doctrine of the "new birth" was made prominent in the preaching of that time. Wherever Whitefield went, he told the "story of the cross," with endless variations. But it is nevertheless true that the great want of the times was met by Edwards when he preached on this subject: "We are justified only by faith in Christ, and not by any manner of virtue or goodness of our own." He and his followers, and in general the ministers who entered zealously into the great work of that day, spent much time in showing the desperate sinfulness of the natural heart; the condemnation of all men, without exception, because they have violated the law of God; the worthlessness of all the righteousness of men; the inadequacy of sacraments, of morality, and of good works, so called, to save the soul from the curse of the law, and to purify it from sin; and the absolute need of the atoning sacrifice of Jesus Christ. All the great doctrines of the Gospel were preached,

but the central doctrine of that revival was that of justification by faith in Jesus Christ, as the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world. The utterance of it fell upon the churches and the public mind almost as a new discovery, and produced astonishing results. There was an awakened interest everywhere. In those places where error had not obtained too firm a hold, the Christian people were revived, and sinners were converted. Errors were renounced, ordinances took their proper place, and the churches were built up in the faith. In other communities, where the ministers and the people had departed from some of the fundamental truths of the Gospel, there was opposition to the revival; and this was, in many cases, manifested in forms of peculiar and unchristian hostility. But the word of God grew mightily and prevailed. It is supposed by a careful historian, Tracy, in his valuable work, the "Great Awakening," that at least fifty thousand persons were converted, in all the colonies, and about thirty thousand in New England alone. A proportional addition to the church, at this time, would amount to nearly seven hundred thousand in the whole country, and to more than three hundred thousand in New England. These facts help us to estimate the relative force of the great reformation with which God is now blessing our land. The highest estimate does not make the number of converts greater than two hundred thousand; that is, in proportion to the whole population, the relative number of converted souls is only about two-sevenths as great as in the "Awakening of 1740." But we should remember that the "great awakening" continued for several years, while the present special religious interest has been enjoyed for a few months only. Perhaps there was no period of four months' duration, in the time of Edwards, when the results were so great and astonishing as during the four months which followed the opening of February, of the year 1858. And, as the present work is still going forward with power, may we not hope that its final results will mark it as the grandest since the planting of Christianity in the midst of pagan darkness and pollution?

Passing now to the second Revival Era, that of 1797, we find that the dogmatic peculiarity of it was the doctrine of Divine Sovereignty. Dr. Griffin was one of the honored leaders in this great work of grace; he was surrounded by such men as Mills, Hallock, Robbins, and Strong; and in the later stages of the work—the supplement, as it may be called, to the revival of 1790, Dr. Nettleton was a conspicuous and successful laborer. Now it is known by those who have only a superficial knowledge of those times, that these men insisted much upon the sovereignty of God. While they did not discard nor overlook the other doctrines of the Bible, they were very earnest and zealous in holding up God as an almighty Sovereign. The preaching of Bellamy, who died in the year 1790, was adapted to make his hearers feel that God was *great*, infinitely great—as the infinite, sovereign disposer of all events, and all men. He was identified with the revival of 1740, and died before that of 1797 commenced; but doubtless his preaching in his later years was adapted to the altered state of the times. It is interesting to read that Dr. Hopkins, who began his ministry in the Great Awakening, brought it to a close during a precious season of religious interest, among his own charge in Newport, while the second revival was in progress. Thus he who had seen in his youth the practical power of the doctrine of justification by faith, realized in extreme old age, that the doctrine of divine sovereignty has the same power to humble the pride of the natural heart. The younger Mills, during the period of conviction, was angry with the sovereignty of God. He could not endure the idea that God should do all things according to his sovereign will. This great truth roused up all the pride and stubbornness of his nature. But when his heart was subdued, he cried out with rapture: “Glorious sovereignty! glorious sovereignty!” His conversion was a type of that of thousands. Ministers dwelt much upon God’s sovereignty; praying Christians talked of divine sovereignty; in their prayers, God was addressed, and worshipped, and loved as a sovereign. The hearts of sinners, as this great truth was perceived, were enraged

against God as a sovereign; but when they were renewed by the Spirit, and had given up their rebellion, they rejoiced in the sovereignty of God. This was almost universal; so much so, that it is safe to say that the doctrinal basis of that great revival era, was divine sovereignty.

The history of this period, as compiled by the late Dr. Tyler, proves that one characteristic prevailed nearly all the revivals in the different towns throughout New England, which were then so highly favored. It was remarkable to see how much one revival was like another, and how different from those of the former period. While the great essentials of each were alike — in both cases, the Holy Spirit working with the truth, and turning sinners from the power of Satan unto God — yet each season of revival had a specific difference, which was so marked, that a person who is familiar with our religious history, could tell to which period the revival in any place belonged, even if the account of it made no reference to names, places, and dates. All the revivals of one period had a family likeness; all the revivals of the other period had also a family likeness. The great saving truth that animated the one, was deliverance from sin and hell, by faith in a sanctified Redeemer; the great saving truth that animated the other, was the cordial recognition of God as a wise, holy, blessed, but absolute Sovereign.

The third era of revival, which so many still remember with such hallowed interest, had its distinctive type. Its doctrinal basis was Duty; the duty of immediately giving the heart to God. Whoever can remember the preaching of that time, in those places where revivals prevailed, will testify, that, while all the great truths of the redemptive system were insisted upon, yet peculiar stress was laid upon the duty of submission. "You are a rebel against God by voluntary disobedience; you are able to abandon your sins; and it is your solemn, immediate *duty* to throw down your weapons of rebellion, and submit your heart, your will, your whole being, to God." Such was the strain in which impatient men were addressed. We do not mean to say that all preaching was of this kind, for some ministers were opposed

to it; but merely that this was the characteristic of the preaching of that time. The sinner's duty was stated, explained, and enforced with great clearness, pungency, and power. The results were great, and, on the whole, very precious. Churches were quickened, and many were added unto them of such as shall be saved. Throughout New England, the Middle and Western States, and in many portions of the South, the word of God had free course, and was glorified.

Turning our steps backward, we are now to inquire into the cause or causes which gave to each of these seasons of remarkable religious life and power a peculiar type, and to glance at the results of these several eras of revival.

Unquestionably the Holy Spirit was the primary and efficient Agent in all these seasons of awakening, but there were reasons why the Spirit made special use of particular truths or doctrines, at different times. Before Edwards entered upon his ministry, and even before he was born, certain errors and corresponding bad practices, had crept into the churches, and the public mind, to a considerable extent, was laboring under a deluding heresy. Moral persons were allowed to bring forward their children for baptism, provided they had been baptized themselves; and in time, such persons were admitted to the table of the Lord. It was even held by some, that baptism and the Lord's Supper were converting ordinances. Men were taught that the use of the means of grace was virtuous in the sight of God, even in the case of those who were not converted. By degrees, the idea of meriting divine favor, through religious exercises, grew up, and the country was becoming filled with pharisees. Hundreds, not to say thousands, who had never exercised saving faith in Christ, were received into the churches. Many unconverted men entered the ministry, who afterwards, under the scriptural preaching of Edwards, Whitefield, and Gilbert Tennent, renounced their hopes, and began anew, by bewailing their pharisaic hypocrisy, and by an act of personal trust in Christ as their Saviour. As a matter of course then, if there was to be a revival of pure religion, it must

needs be based on that particular truth or doctrine which strikes death to the heart of the errors that prevailed at the time. This doctrine was Justification by Faith in Jesus Christ, who died the just for the unjust. In the presence of this doctrine, the notion of human merit could not stand. Multitudes abandoned their false hopes, and crowds of sinners who had been expecting by a reform in their habits, and a timely use of ordinances, to merit heaven, were driven in despair to the cross of Christ. The Arminianism of the type that existed at that time, received a check; it was expelled from the great majority of the churches, and compelled to confine itself within those narrow limits, where it rotted away into the semi-infidelity of Unitarianism.

This season was attended and followed by incidental evils, but the general results were good. The church of New England, and of the land, was saved from total corruption, if not from extinction; the people were prepared to go through the the excitements that preceded the battle of Bunker Hill, the awful temptations and trials of the War of the Revolution, and the fiery ordeal of French infidelity. Our country was saved by the Reformation of 1740.

We come now to inquire why the Revival of 1797 took on a different type. What was the reason that the Spirit made prominent use of another great truth, at this particular time? The answer is forced upon us by the situation of things. In the first place, the people of the country had become exceedingly proud on account of their great achievements in the Revolutionary War. They had succeeded beyond their own expectations; had accomplished, in fact, what, in the beginning, the boldest of them had scarcely dared to imagine. By their heroism, their wisdom, and their endurance, they had drawn upon themselves the admiration of the civilized world, and were lauded to the skies by all the nations of Europe. They had been able to form a national union, and inaugurate a general government, under the presidency of Gen. Washington, the "foremost man in all the world." His term of office was drawing towards a successful issue, and the country was prosperous beyond

all experience. In a low state of piety, such as always attends and succeeds a time of war, these facts inflamed the pride of the people to a high degree. In addition, peculiar causes combined to introduce into our country, especially among our politicians and leading men, the philosophy of the French infidels. These, whether atheists or deists nominally, were, to all practical purposes, godless men, and their followers in this country, were like them. Strenuous endeavors were made to discredit the Bible, and to overturn Christian institutions. The great effort was to dispel the idea of God as a moral governor. The language of the hearts of thousands, in the army, in public life, and even in college halls, was "let us break their bands asunder, and cast away their cords from us." "Let us break away from God; he shall not reign over us." In this condition of things, what truth would the Spirit oppose to the prevalent form of ungodliness? What could it be but the doctrine of divine sovereignty? What did the people need so much as to see and feel that there was an infinite God above them, who could and would do all things after the counsel of his own will; who would make the wrath of man praise him, and restrain the remainder of wrath; who would raise up one, and cast down another, at his own pleasure; and who would finally, bring all men to judgment? What other truth could so well meet the moral malady of the times, and abate the bloated pride of a godless generation?

It is a matter of fact that this was the doctrine employed by the Holy Spirit, and that the results were wonderful. Great multitudes were converted in Connecticut, in Massachusetts, and other parts of New England; and the work extended, though with local peculiarities, to the south-western states. There was less fanaticism at this period, than in the great reformation which preceded it, and consequently the visible evils that followed it were less. By the perversion of men one evil result, which will be noticed below, grew out of this revival, but the general effect was such as to demand profound gratitude and praise to God. Infidelity received a blow, at this time, from which it has never recovered in our country. The prevalence of unbelief is a grief

to all thoughtful minds ; yet there has been a great improvement in this respect, during the last fifty years. In the beginning of the century, open or secret infidelity was the dry rot or the foul gangrene that corrupted a large proportion of men in public life ; while it is a rare thing to find, in these days, an avowed infidel among our leading men. Interpret this fact as we will, it proves a gratifying advance towards the truth, in the public sentiment. In bringing about this change, Dr. Dwight, whose influence on the general mind of our country, has never been fully appreciated by the public, was an honored instrument. The beneficial efforts of this revival era, have reached to our times in another form. Foreign missions, home missions, in the modern sense of the term, and nearly all of the benevolent movements of the day, grew out of this work of the Spirit. The church not only repelled the assaults of infidelity in a triumphant manner, but entered, as never before, since apostolic days, on her aggressive work. Since then, she has been going forth to the spiritual conquest of our country, and of the world.

When we come to examine the peculiarity of the third great era of Revivals in our country, the cause of it will be found, as we apprehend, without seeking very far. The doctrine of divine sovereignty had been abused and perverted. A feeling, if not a conviction, had grown up in many minds, that *nothing* could be done, to promote the cause of Christ and secure the conversion of sinners. In "God's good time," the Holy Spirit would be poured out, and men would renounce their sins. The accounts of the former revivals were often written in such a strain as to convey the idea that a revival was a mysterious movement, beginning without any regard to human instrumentality, remaining a certain time regardless of human exertion, and passing away, when its force was spent, without any regard to human obedience in the use of means. People began to feel that, though bound to live godly lives, they had very little if anything to do for the purpose of obtaining a gracious visitation of the Spirit. The impenitent learned to feel that they should be converted at the appointed time, and that they could only wait for God to renew their hearts, if he should ever see fit

to accomplish so great a work. And thus the idea of personal duty to labor for the conversion of souls became weak in the minds of Christians; thus the sense of duty to give their hearts to God, without the delay of a moment, became almost powerless in the minds of the unconverted. Not that this was universal, by any means, but that this state of mind was common, — so common that there was a lamentable and paralyzing absence of the conviction of personal duty.

The doctrine adapted to meet and remedy this state of things, is contained in these words of holy writ: "My son, give me thy heart;" or these: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart;" or these: "Wash you, make you clean; put away the evil of your doings from before mine eyes: cease to do evil; learn to do well;" or these: "Repent, and turn yourselves from all your transgressions; so iniquity shall not be your ruin. Cast away from you all your transgressions, whereby you have transgressed: and make you a new heart and a new spirit; for why will ye die, O house of Israel?" Duty to love, serve, and honor God, was the needed truth; and this was the truth which the Spirit employed. Sometimes it was expressed in one form, and sometimes in another. Now the direction was: "Give your heart to Christ;" and now: "Submit yourself to God;" and yet again, it was: "Throw down the weapons of your rebellion; repent of your sins; believe in the Lord Jesus Christ." But whatever the form of words, the great theme was the same, *duty*; personal duty to love and serve God. Other doctrines were not renounced, or omitted, or slighted, in the preaching of that day; but the prominent doctrine was the duty of submission to God. And the inquiry of the converted was: "Lord, what wilt thou have me to do?"

Evils attended and followed these revivals. One was a feeling of self-sufficiency on the part of impenitent men. The doctrine of human ability was unduly exalted by some, and they flattered themselves with the false notion that they were safe because they could repent and believe, at any time, without the in-working of the Holy Spirit. There is reason to fear that many have gone to remediless ruin under the

mistaken fancy that they should repent before death, simply because of their natural ability to obey the commands of God. Notwithstanding these evils, the general results of this revival era were favorable. Its influence is felt to this day, in hundreds of churches which were founded or strengthened during its prevalence ; and also in all the channels of benevolent activity. Indeed those revivals have been succeeded by these of our own immediate time, which in our opinion are the most free from fanaticism, from one-sidedness, and from liability to reaction, of any in the history of our country ; and it may be, of any, in the history of Christianity. The great revival of 1831 made practical Christians, as we might expect from its peculiar doctrinal type ; and ever since the question has been asked, with increasing earnestness : " Lord, what wilt thou have me to do ? " " What shall I do in regard to intemperance ? " for the great temperance reformation was synchronous with the revival. What shall I do in regard to Sabbath desecration ? What in regard to profaneness, to licentiousness, to slavery, and to war ? What in regard to the poor, to the foreigner, and the unfortunate of every kind ? There is a growing determination to apply the gospel to every form of evil, until human society is renovated. Meanwhile the benevolent operations which grew out of the great revival of 1797, have not been neglected. There is, as we might expect, a growing interest in the work of foreign and home missions ; in the conversion of Jews, Romanists, and other immigrants, and in the salvation of our native population. And generally, owing to these last two periods of revival, there is now, in spite of the immense immigration of foreign papists, rationalists, and infidels, a larger proportion of the people of our country in connection with evangelical churches, than there was at the beginning of the century. And what is of equal importance, the standard of piety has been considerably elevated during the last sixty years. Some are disposed to doubt this, because they judge of the piety of the past from a few picked specimens, as Baxter, Bunyan, Henry, Edwards, Brainard, and others of the same stamp, whose lives or writings form a part of our cur-

rent religious literature. Such a criterion is fallacious, and leads to an erroneous conclusion. We have not space to give a tithe of the proof that the state of practical religion has been improving, but will, in passing, refer the reader to those general facts, which bear on the point. In the first place, intemperance has been expelled from the church. There are very few members in evangelical churches who use intoxicating liquors as a beverage, or trade in them as an article of merchandise. This is an immense gain of power to the Christian cause, both as it removes a reproach, and as it takes away an impediment to the increase of piety. Again, the cases of discipline for scandalous conduct have greatly diminished, as any one may convince himself by the examination of ancient church records. And thirdly, the benevolence of former times can bear no comparison with that which has been developed since the coming in of the present century. These are pregnant facts to which must be added another, that the church has received a great access of courage. She is no longer on the defensive, but goes forth in the strength of her Leader, the Captain of her Salvation, to combat with every form of error, of vice, and of wrong, whether individual or organic; and is, without fanaticism, or presumption, bending herself to the great work of bringing the whole world into willing allegiance to Jesus Christ.

It did not fall within our original design to speak of the great religious movement of the past year, 1858, which will be memorable in all future time as the fourth revival era of our country. The time has not come for us to understand its whole significance. Being yet in progress, and destined to continue, as we hope, until still greater results are secured, it is too early to philosophize about it as a completed work. But it may not be out of place to offer some suggestions in relation to it, especially since others, both in the pulpit and the press, have made it the topic of remark. The chief value of every great work of the Holy Spirit is to be sought, of course, in the number of souls that have been converted, and in the increase of spiritual force in the

church of Christ. Every work of the kind, however, has its peculiarity. It originates, on the human side, in peculiar circumstances, and has a peculiar office to fulfil. What is there that distinguishes this movement? Some tell us that the design of it is to promote brotherly love within and between the various denominations of Christians; and they point to the numerous union prayer meetings which are held in most of our cities, towns, and villages, for the proof. It is one of the precious results of the revival, that the hearts of Christians are drawn out towards each other, to an uncommon degree; but this spirit of union has been growing for years, and has only gained a fresh development at the present time. Others seem to think that the characteristic feature of the revival is found in the readiness of the lay brethren to labor for its promotion. There has been, undoubtedly, a great gain to the force of the church in this respect. While the ministry have been devoted and efficient, they have been aided and cheered by the unwonted activity and coöperation of the brethren. And yet it may be said truly, that this result had been sought for by the pastors for several years past. One of the most common themes for discussion in ministerial and church conferences has been: How can we bring the latent power in the brotherhood of our churches into more efficient activity? As there was an awakened desire on this subject, when the Holy Spirit came with power, the natural effect was seen in the uncommon facility of private Christians in the work of leading sinners to Christ. According to our view, however, the significance of the revival is not seen in this result, though so beneficial in itself and so full of promise for the future. Others, again, speaking on the side of caution, allege as a peculiar feature of the present work of grace, and as they suppose its characteristic defect, that those who have been the subjects of it have not felt the deep conviction of personal sinfulness which is desirable. While not stigmatizing the work as spurious, they do not cherish very strong confidence that its results will be permanently beneficial; or, at least, they rejoice with trembling. They fear that many of

the supposed converts, even if really born again, will be weak and sickly.

If we would learn the meaning of a great spiritual reformation, if we wish to know what God designs to effect in a revival era, we must first ascertain the state of the church and of the public mind before the commencement of the work, and thus get a correct idea of the needed change. We must see the doctrinal errors, and the practical evils and defects that prevail. By this means we come to a knowledge of what is wanted. Then we must turn our attention to the means actually employed by the Spirit,—the doctrines, the measures, the Providential dispensations—to effect the change. In this way we may learn much of the significance of such a movement as the present, without waiting for the full development of its force in the final results.

What then was the peculiar sin, fault, or evil of the church, at the beginning of the present revival? There is but one answer to be thought of: it was *worldliness*. It was not heresy, nor intemperance, nor licentiousness, nor Sabbath desecration, nor war, nor slavery even, for the churches which have felt the chief power of this work were not cursed with this sin except by implication. The sin of the times was worldliness, which threatened to engulf the church. And this was natural, in fact inevitable, unless God had lifted up a barrier against the flood-tide of wealth. The power of man over nature has increased to an astonishing degree, since the revival of 1797; this increase has been far greater in proportion to the time, since the revival of 1830–35. Between these two periods, steam was applied to navigation, and to some extent to manufactures; but the great capabilities of this agent hardly began to be realized twenty-five years ago. Our ocean steamers, commercial as well as naval, have scarcely ceased to be a novelty. Machinery, in a thousand ingenious forms, has come to the aid of man in producing wealth. Nor is there any assignable limit to the progress of invention and discovery. Chemistry in its application to agriculture, will increase the productiveness of the earth, in the process of time, until swamps

and sandy plains will become as gardens. In the mean time the gold mines of California and Australia have been laid open to the search of that great race which is foremost in commerce, and in manufacturing industry. These mines are a real value, because gold is useful to man. It is money, or a medium of exchange, simply because it is an intrinsic value in a condensed and portable form. The prospect is now, that the influx of gold has but just begun, and that wealth in this form, as well as by the means above specified, will be increased a hundred, yea a thousand, fold. The church had already begun to feel its corrupting power. The Christian world needed a new enforcement of the words of the beloved disciple: "Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world. If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him. For all that is in the world, the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father, but is of the world." Fashion, luxury, and pride were fostered by every fruitful season, made more so by scientific cultivation, by every improvement in the arts, by opening new regions to commerce, and by the steady influx of the precious metals from newly discovered mines. What could save the church from corruption and prospective ruin, unless God should interpose in its behalf?

As the danger grew out of increasing wealth, it is easy to see where the corrective must be applied. The church needed to learn how to make a right use of riches. The remedy was not to be found in drying up the sources of wealth, for all things were made for man, and the "meek shall inherit the earth," with all its resources. It was to be applied rather by teaching us the true value of wealth in its useful employment. And the lesson to be learned was twofold. First, the right use of property in our own behalf. We have a right to enough for the supply of our proper wants; to enough, if we can obtain it honestly, to make us comfortable in life. But how shall we use the surplus, if anything remains after meeting our wants and supplying our comforts? How shall we distinguish between that which goes for show, fashion, and luxury, and that which

procures us the elegances of life, the beauties of art, the productions of genius? There is a broad distinction, though the defining line may be faintly traced. One disciple may waste an immense sum on entertainments, equipage, dress, upholstery, luxuries, without any addition to his comfort, but with a positive injury to his family. Another, with half the money, will fill his house with books, statues, pictures, with objects of beauty, and means of instruction, which will be his own solace, while they all contribute, by every-day association, to the education of his children and the comfort of his guests. This is a matter of much interest and importance, and it will assume greater prominence as riches increase, and the facilities for self-indulgence are multiplied. But it is almost insignificant compared with the question: How much shall we devote to benevolent purposes? The wealth in the church is increasing, and now what proportion of it shall be given to the poor, to sustain religious institutions, and to publish the Gospel among all the nations of the earth? If the rapidly accumulating wealth, and the growing power to create wealth, are made subservient to luxury, or pride, or ambition, the piety of the church will suffer a disastrous eclipse, while the nations will be left in their darkness, to go down to death. If this wealth shall be devoted to the cause of Christ, the piety of the church will be greatly augmented by the exercise of self-denial, and the means will be furnished for publishing the Bible in all languages, and supporting missionaries in every land. Thus worldliness will be avoided, and that which threatened the ruin of the church of Christ, will be made the instrument of the spiritual renovation of the world.

Such being the danger of the Christian world, and such the lesson it needed to learn, the question arises: How could the church, including the old members and the new converts, be taught the true value and use of property? In no way but by enforcing the truth or doctrine adapted to meet and remove the prevailing evil; since doctrine is the indispensable instrument in effecting all beneficial changes. The comprehensive truth is conveyed in such passages of inspi-

ration as follow: "Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth, where moth and rust doth corrupt, and where thieves break through and steal; but lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, and where thieves do not break through nor steal." "Take no thought, saying, What shall we eat? or, what shall we drink? or, wherewithal shall we be clothed? But seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness." "But what things were gain to me, those I counted loss for Christ; yea, doubtless, and I count all things but loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord; for whom I have suffered the loss of all things, and do count them but dung, that I may win Christ." Putting the doctrine into the form of a proposition, it might read thus: Christ as an object of love, and as the portion of the soul, is infinitely better than the world.

Such was the doctrine needed; how should it be preached? For preached it must be; either by the lips of man, or by the voice of divine providence. Reformations are generally secured through the instrumentality of men; but the present one found the ministry unprepared for the crisis, or unable to meet it. We do not mean to intimate that the evangelical clergy were less devoted to their work, or less sound in the faith, than in any former period. We believe, on the contrary, that there never has been a time since apostolic days when the prevailing theology was so scripturally symmetrical, or when there was so much biblical knowledge among church-going people. But this is the point. The time had come when it was necessary for the purity and growth of the church, that it should rise to a higher plane of action in regard to property. This was seen by many in the pulpit, by some who have the control of the religious press; but they could do very little to stay the tide of worldliness, which came in like a flood. And if they made an effort, perhaps the appearance of their own families, would laugh them to scorn. They felt the spirit of worldliness in common with other Christian families. It may be said that a large majority of these Ministerial families had very little wherewith to gratify the worldly spirit; very scanty means

to indulge the pride of life! True enough; but it is equally true, that this spirit was rife in the "shady-side literature" that deluged us a few years since, and gave it at least half its emphasis.

The truth — the needed doctrine, then, must be preached therefore by some other instrumentality. Or if this is going too far, let us say that the doctrine must be enforced by a power greater than that of the pulpit. Then came the tremendous stroke of providence by which thousands who were trusting in uncertain riches, were ruined in their business, and tens of thousands were thrown out of employment. To the great mass the blow came like a thunderbolt from a clear sky. To-day they were prosperous and hopeful; to-morrow they were buried under a heap of ruins, caused by a commercial earthquake. Winter was coming on, and multitudes knew not which way to turn for food, clothing, and shelter. Men were filled with distress, their hearts failing them for fear. They saw the vanity of the world; they learned to feel the need of a better portion. Then the Spirit was poured out from on high, and they began to inquire: "Who will show us any good?" As soon as this inquiry was raised, the ministers of Christ pointed to him as the only refuge, and exhorted men to heed his invitation: "Come unto me all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." They listened, and were persuaded; they believed in the Lord Jesus Christ, and found that he was the "chiefest among ten thousand," and that he was indeed, "altogether lovely." They found the world would not answer their purpose. It could not save from sin, nor give them rest. They viewed it in contrast with Christ, and deliberately chose him as the object of their supreme love, and the hope of their souls for time and eternity. With all deference to the opinions of others, we humbly suggest that such is the peculiarity of the present revival era. Will the results correspond to this view, and prove its correctness? We devoutly hope that they will. We believe that they will, if the ministry shall be prompt to follow up the work so well begun by the providence and the Spirit of God.

Already the signs are favorable. The past year was a disastrous period, as far as business is concerned ; and we are but just recovering from embarrassment, yet the institutions of religion have been better provided for than usual, and the contributions to benevolent objects, taken as a whole, have suffered scarcely any diminution. The recent converts connected with the churches which sustain the American Board, have undertaken, as a special effort, to pay off its debt of forty thousand dollars. With the returning tide of prosperity, we have a right to expect that the gifts will flow into the treasury of the Lord, beyond all precedent. And if this shall prove to be so ; if the power of covetousness, that subtle, respectable, deceptive sin, has indeed been in a measure broken ; if the church of Christ has thrust out, to any considerable degree, the worldly spirit ; if the recently converted members have, in choosing Christ, given him all they possess, then a new day has dawned upon the world. Mighty obstacles to the spread of the pure gospel will be taken away, and at the same time, the means will be secured to send the heralds of salvation to the ends of the earth.

In our view, therefore, each of these revival eras was designed by the Head of the church, to counteract a great evil and prepare the Christian community for an important work ; and in each case, a particular truth or doctrine was employed in producing the result. In the first, the prevailing evil arose from false notions of the ground of a sinner's justification before God. Good works and ordinances took the place of reliance upon Christ for salvation, and was turning the church into a herd of pharisees. The doctrine used to purify and strengthen the church, was Justification by faith in Jesus Christ. It was mighty through God to the pulling down of the strongholds of Satan, and it enabled the church to live through the terrible trials of the Revolution. The design of the second revival, that of 1797, was to enthrone Jehovah in the minds and hearts of a godless generation ; and the truth employed was the Sovereignty of God. Then the desire to establish the kingdom of Christ in all lands received a new impulse from the Spirit, and the

Missionary Enterprise began to be prosecuted with vigor, while kindred works of benevolence were set in motion. A kind of sanctified fatalism which had stealthily crept into the churches caused the demand for the great revival of 1831, and the Spirit removed the prevalent evil by enforcing the doctrine of personal duty to love the Lord our God with all the heart, and our neighbors as ourselves. As a natural consequence, the church has ever since been searching out practical evils, for the purpose of removing them. And now the great and alarming sin of worldliness has met with a terrible rebuke from the hand of God. Christians, old and young, have been called upon with unwonted emphasis, to consecrate themselves and their possessions, to the Redeemer of the World.

If the above views are correct, the lessons suggested by them are numerous, and of great practical importance. They are, however, too obvious, to require special remark, and it would be a sorry reward for the patience of any who have read thus far, to speak of them in detail. We feel constrained, nevertheless, to refer to one or two points, which are sometimes overlooked.

One of the lessons to be derived from this review of revival history, if we read it aright, is this: We should not condemn or undervalue one or another type or style of revival, because it does not square with our preconceived notions, or coincide exactly with our own experience. It is well to remember that though "there are diversities of operations," yet "it is the same God that worketh all in all." A minister of much experience once stated that the first religious awakening in his parish, after his settlement, was a "divine sovereignty revival." Each subject of the work had a contest more or less prolonged, with God. After conversion, the sovereignty of God was a precious fact. After a few years the parish enjoyed another season of refreshing, and the minister was led to preach much of Christ, and of the way of salvation. The sovereignty of God was scarcely referred to in the progress of the work. Many were led to

the Saviour, though the persons who were converted in the former period, could scarcely believe in the piety of the new converts, at first, because they had not quarrelled with the sovereignty of God. And yet, he remarked that these Christians wore as well as the former, and exhibited a rather lovelier type of piety.

The other lesson respects the relation truth holds to the increase and sanctification of the church. All the facts that have been presented, concur in proving that doctrinal truth is essential to spiritual life and growth. The Spirit works effectually by the use of truth, which is the sword of the Spirit. This point is so clearly illustrated by a passage in the life of Parsons of Lyme, Conn. (afterwards of Newburyport), that a brief recital of the facts will be pertinent. He was settled in 1731, at which time his theology partook largely of the Arminianism of the day. During the following year there was "a great effusion of the Holy Spirit upon the people. There appeared to be an uncommon attention to the preaching of the Word, and a disposition to hearken to advice; and a remarkable concern about salvation." Old and young inquired: "What must I do to be saved?" The young people turned "their meetings for vain mirth into meetings for prayer, conference, and reading books of piety." The result was, that, "in less than ten months, fifty-two persons were added to the church." Very few however continued to give evidence of piety. Speaking of them, some years later, he says: "I have no special reasons to make me think that many were savingly converted to God, in that season of concern." Somewhere about the year 1734, he renounced Arminian principles, and in his own words, turned "quite about in some of the most important doctrines of the Christian religion." This change in his views led to important results. At first, he aroused the opposition of many by saying that he could not consider all who joined the church to be sure converts, and that he feared "few had really been converted during his ministry." He was now prepared to welcome the news that came from Northampton, Hartford, and other places, of a wonderful

work of the Spirit. In 1741, Gilbert Tennent passed through the country on his way from Boston to the South, preaching as he had opportunity. Good effects followed his preaching in Lyme. Parsons had already prepared the way for a great work, and he continued to labor with great zeal and energy. He was now a decided Calvinist, and his preaching was after the manner of Edwards. A great revival followed, the account of which is one of the most interesting passages in our religious history. We have only room for the results. The larger portion of the converts were young; though three or four were upwards of fifty, two near seventy, and one ninety-three years of age. Reviewing the work, he says: "I have reason to hope, about one hundred and eighty souls belonging to this congregation, have met with a saving change, since the beginning of the late glorious effusion of the Holy Spirit among us, besides the frequent and more than common quickenings and refreshings of others, that were hopefully in Christ years before." One hundred and fifty members were added in nine months, ending February 4, 1742. Some of the converts were members of the church who had been received in the former revival. The great mass of these new converts remained faithful unto the end. What then made the difference between these two seasons of religious awakening? Why did most of the conversions in the former prove spurious, and why did most of the converts in the latter prove to be sound? Is not the cause of these different results obvious enough? Was not the truth present in one case, while it was obscured, or presented only in part, and with a mixture of error, in the other? In short, the *influence* of the Spirit must be attended by the *word* of the Spirit, in effecting the *work* of the Spirit. Now, as well as in apostolic days, the truth is just as essential in the regeneration of the soul as in its sanctification. Our Saviour prayed in these words: "Sanctify them through thy truth; thy word is truth;" and his apostle wrote: "Of his own will begat he us with the word of truth, that we should be a kind of first fruits of his creatures."

ARTICLE III.

PHILOLOGICAL STUDIES.

§ 1. *The Latin Negation.*

THE negation is of frequent occurrence in human language. To understand its nature and various forms is important for the grammarian and the philosopher.

The idea of negation, being a simple idea, is clear and distinct in itself. It is properly an affection of the predicative syntactical relation (see Dr. K. F. Becker on the three syntactical relations), through which it modifies the attributive relation, and also the subjective or subjunctive, interrogative, and imperative moods. This statement we suppose to embrace the whole circuit of the negation.

The appropriate form of the negation, when fully developed in language, is the negative predication, which constitutes the negative proposition. This presupposes the idea of an affirmative predication, without which the negative one would be unintelligible, and with which it is wanting neither in clearness nor intelligibility. Thus the negative predication: "*rosa non floret*," presupposes the affirmative one: "*rosa floret*."

It is admitted by logicians (see Mill's *Logic*, vol. i., p. 106) as well as by grammarians (see Weissenborn, p. 174; Kühner, vol. ii., p. 162), that a negative proposition is not strictly or simply the affirmation of a negative predicate (as held by Hobbes), but the actual denial of the connection between a predicate and subject; that is, that the negation falls on the predication, and not on the predicate. The negation runs parallel to the affirmation, and the negative mood to the affirmative or indicative mood.

In the negative proposition, however, the negation, for the sake of emphasis, or for some purpose not easily defined, often appears to fall on the predicate itself, on the subject, or on an object, either complementary or supplementary. But

these negative predicates, subjects, and objects, are evidently nullities.

1. Thus in reference to the negative predicate, the negation falls on the predication; as, "Caesar non-mortuus est," can only mean "Caesar mortuus non-est."

2. So in reference to the negative subject; as, "nemo vidit Deum," can only mean "homo non-vidit Deum."

3. So in reference to the negative complementary object; as, "Caius neminem occidit," can mean only "Caius hominem non-occidit."

4. So in reference to the negative supplementary object; as, "homo nunquam vidit Deum," can only mean "homo non-vidit unquam Deum."

But the other negations are modifications of, or developments from, the negative proposition.

The negative attribute, like the positive attribute, has lost the *moment* (momentum) of asseveration which belonged to the predication: it is not so much a negative, as a privative (see in a — d below), and, by an easy transition, passes into the antithetic or opposite idea (see in e, f).

a Non existentis nulla sunt jura.

b Non entis nulla sunt attributa.

c Alter alterius ignarus iniit.

d Evasit illaesus.

e Litterae tuae mihi non injucundae fuerunt.

f Quum in me tam improbus fuit.

NOTE. The privative, in many languages, takes a vowel before the negative element *n*; comp. Sansk. *an* privative; Gr. *ἀνόσιος*, unholy; Lat. *intonsus*; Eng. *unholy*.

The negation, like the affirmation, is affected by the moods subjective or conjunctive, interrogative, and imperative, with which it may be joined.

1. The negative subordinate proposition, which is employed *in conjuncto sermone*, and is merely subjective, as it really affirms nothing, is to be regarded as a negative *subposition*. The subject and predicate are united for the purposes of language.

Hoc te rogo, ne demittas animum.
Cicero timebat, ne Catilina urbem incenderet.

2. The negative interrogation seems to defy or challenge a negative answer. An affirmative answer is expected.

Nonne putas?
Quid? nonne canis similis est lupo?

3. The negative imperative or optative, as it proceeds from the will, and not directly from the intellect, is a prohibitive rather than a negative.

Ne time,
Ne sim salvus, si aliter scribo ac sentio.

The accumulation of negatives in the same proposition is easily explained. According to the doctrine now held, every negative has its proper force. See Ern. Lieberkühn and R. Klotz in *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und Pädagogik* (1849), vol. lvii. p. 116.

Hence a double negation, or the negation of a negation, is equivalent to a strong affirmation; for the two negatives in the same clause, acting reciprocally on each other, destroy the negation, and the mechanical weight of the particles gives emphasis or intensity.

Nemo non benignus est sui iudex.
Sapiens nunquam non beatus est.

Hence also when the negation is repeated, or re-assumed, as sometimes in Latin with *neque, nec, ne quidem*, the force of the negation falls on a new clause, and the whole negation is rendered more emphatic.

Nunquam Scipionem, ne minima quidem in re, offendi.
Nego hanc rem, neque mihi, neque tibi, gratam esse posse.

NOTE. This principle is to be applied to the accumulation of negatives in Greek and in Anglo-Saxon.

In the coördinate compound proposition, the negation occasions no special difficulty. Each negative, as it falls on

a different member of the whole compound, has its natural significancy.

The negation is sometimes attached to the copulative conjunction, and forms negative conjunctions; as *neque*, and *nec*, a contraction of *neque*.

We have here, as in affirmative propositions, three constructions: (1) the syndetic, where the two propositions are unemphatic, as in a; (2) the asyndetic, where the two propositions are both emphatic, as in b; and (3) the polysyndetic, where the emphasis lies on the combination of the propositions, as in c.

a Non imperium, neque divitias petimus.

b Non hoc dicet Chrysippus, non Thales.

c Neque consilium mihi placet, neque auctor probatur.

§ 2. On Interrogative Words in the Indo-European Languages.

Interrogative words in the Indo-European languages exhibit themselves in different phases, which, from their analogy to the logical categories, may be termed *grammatical categories*.

These grammatical categories are as follows: (1) substantive of person; (2) substantive of thing; (3) adjective of preference; (4) adjective of quantity; (5) adjective of number; (6) ordinal adjective; (7) adjective of quality; (8) adjective of the country; (9) adverb of place where; (10) adverb of place whither; (11) adverb of place whence; (12) adverb of place by or through which; (13) adverb of time; (14) adverb of manner; (15) adverb of cause or reason; (16) adverb of intensity or degree. But no one language exhibits all these categories.

It is a remarkable fact that one interrogative element, with slight phonetic changes, pervades the different Indo-European languages.

The original form of the Indo-European interrogative element, according to the latest view (see Prof. M. Rapp's *Grundriss der Grammatik*, Stuttg. 1855. Band II. Part ii p. 39), was *kw*, or, when vocalized, *kwa*.

In Sanskrit we have the following interrogatives : (1) *kas*, m. ; *kā*, f. ; with their inflections, who ? (2) *kim* (anciently *kat*), n. ; with its inflections, what ? (3) *kataras*, whether ? (4) *kiyat* (accus. *kiyantam*), how great ? (5) *kati*, how many ? (7) *kidriḥ*, of what quality ? (9) *kva* and *kutra*, where ? (11) *kutas*, whence ? (13) *kadd*, when ? (14) *katham*, how ?

Here the middle letter of the interrogative element has fallen out (except in *kutra*, *kutas*), and the *a*, although generally retained, is sometimes attenuated into *i*, as in *kim*.

In Zend we have : (1) *kaḡ*, ko, m. ; *kā*, f. who ? (2) *kat*, n. what ? (3) *kataras* (*katar*), whether ? (4) *tshvans* (accus. *tshvantēm*), how great ? (5) *kati*, now used to signify which ? (9) *kva*, where ? (10) *kuthra*, whither ? (13) *kudat*, *kudd*, *kudo*, when ? (14) *kutha*, how ? The resemblance of these interrogatives to the Sanskrit is very marked.

In the Persian cuneiform inscriptions we have : (1) *kas*, *kā*, m. who ? (2) *kat*, n. what ? The finding of these forms in the ancient cuneiform inscriptions, is an interesting circumstance.

In Persian we have : (1) *keh* or *kih*, who ? (2) *tsheh* or *tshih*, what ? (3) *koḏām*, whether ? (4) *tshend*, how great ? Here *k* of the interrogative element sometimes becomes *tsh* by assibilation which had already commenced in the Zend.

In Slavonic we have : (1) *kto* or *kŭto*, who ? (2) *tshito*, what ? (3) *kotorŭi*, whether ? (7) *kolikŭ*, how great ? *koji*, m. ; *koja*, f. ; *koje*, n. of what kind ? *kakovŭ*, of what kind ? (10) *kamo*, whither ? (11) *kongdu*, whence ? (13) *kogda*, when ? (14) *kako*, how ? Here *k* has preserved itself, except in *tshito*, what ? where it has assibilated.

In Lithuanian we have : (1) *kas*, who ? (3) *katras*, whether ? (4) *koks*, *koley*, how great ? (9) *kur*, where ? (10) *kur*, whither ? (13) *kada*, when ? (14) *kaipo*, how ? The form *katras*, whether ? in this uncultivated dialect, is very remarkable.

In the Greek we have : (1) τίς, who ? (2) τί, what ? (3) πότερος (Ion. κότερος), whether ? (5) πόσος (Ion. κόσος), how great ? (8) πηλίκος, how great ? ποῖος (Ion. κοῖος), of

what kind? (8) ποδαπός, of what country? (9) ποῦ (Ion. κοῦ), where? (10) ποῦ, πόσε, whither? (11) πόθεν (Ion. κόθεν), whence? (12) πῇ, πᾶ, (Ion. κῇ), which way? (13) πότε, πόκα, (Ion. κότε), when? (14) πῶς (Ion. κῶς), how?

The interrogative element in Greek has three forms, viz. : initial τ, which is found alone in the first and second categories; initial κ and π, which are found together in each of the other categories, and probably once existed in all of them. The oldest of these forms is κ or κο, which is retained in the Ionic dialect, and is found abundantly in the other Indo-European languages. A second form is π or πο, which seem to have usurped the place of κ or κο in all the Greek dialects except the Ionic. A third and later form is τ, which is now found in the first and second categories; as, τίς, who? τί, what? comp. Lat. *quis*, *quid*.

In Albanian we have: (1) *kush*, who? (2) *tshjũ*, *tshe*, *tshdo*, what?

In Latin we have: (1) *quis*, m. *quae*, f. who? (2) *quid*, n. what? (3) *uter* for *quater*, whether? (4) *quantus*, how great? (5) *quot*, how many? (6) *quotus*, what in number? (7) *qualis*, of what kind? (8) *cujas*, of what country? (9) *ubi* for *quabi*, where? (10) *quo*, whither? (11) *unde* for *quande*, whence? (12) *quã*, which way? (13) *quando*, when? (14) *quomodo*, *qui*, *quam*, *ut* for *quat*, how? (15) *cur*, *quare*, why? (16) *quam*, how?

The Latin presents the most beautiful system of interrogatives. The interrogative element is uniformly *qu*.

In Meso-Gothic we have: (1) *hvas*, m.; *hvô*, f. who? (2) *hva* for *hvata*, n. what? (3) *hvathar*, whether? (7) *hveleiks* or *hvileiks*, of what kind? (9) *hvar*, where? (10) *hvadre*, *hvad*, or *hvath*, whither? (11) *hvathro*, whence? (13) *hvan*, when? (14) *hvaiva*, how? (15) *hve*, why?

The Meso-Gothic system of interrogatives is nearly as complete as the Latin. The interrogative element is uniformly *hv*.

In German we have: (1) *wer*, who? (2) *was*, what? (3) *weder*, whether? now used only for *neither*. (7) *welcher*, of what kind? (9) *wo*, where? (11) *wannen*, whence?

(13) *wann*, when? (14) *wie*, how? The German has lost the guttural of the interrogative element altogether.

In Celtic we have: (1) *co*, m.; *cia*, f. who? (2) *ciod*, what?

In Armenian, an Indo-European family which has but lately received due attention from philologists, we have: (1) *i*, who? (2) *o*, *ov*, what? with loss of initial consonant altogether. Comp. Lat. *uter*, *ubi*, *unde*.

In our vernacular tongue we have the following interrogative categories: (1) *who*? (2) *what*? (3) *whether*? (7) *which*? now used as a pure pronoun. (9) *where*? (10) *whither*? (11) *whence*? (13) *when*? (14) *how*? (15) *why*? *wherefore*?

The interrogative element in English, although inverted in writing, sounds uniformly *hw* or *hu*.

In Scottish we have *qhwa*t, what? with preservation of the guttural.

Thus the interrogative element, which we utter on so many occasions, pervades, with slight phonetic changes, the different families of the Indo-European stock, as the Sanskrit, Iranian, Slavonic, Lithuanian, Greek, Latin, Teutonic, and Celtic; binds them together into one whole, and shows them to have been originally one language.

We have noticed, thus far, only the coincidences of form in the interrogative element with which these words commence. There is sometimes, also, an etymological coincidence in the other component part of the word; as,

Sansk. *kas*; Zend, *kag*; Lithuan. *kas*; Lat. *quis*; Meso-Goth. *hvas*, who? where the final *s* is an expression of the personal nominative in five distinct languages.

Sansk. *kat*; Zend, *kat*; Lat. *quid* or *quod*; Meso-Goth. *hvata*; Eng. *what*; Celtic, *ciod*, what? where the final *t* or *d* is an expression of the neuter nominative.

Sansk. *kiant*; Zend, *tshvant*; Pers. *tshend*; Lat. *quantus*, how great?

Sansk. *kati*; Zend, *kati*; Lat. *quot*, how many?

But the most remarkable instance is where we have three etymological elements combined in one word and in the

same order, namely, the interrogative element, the sign of the comparative degree, and the sign of the personal nominative, and that to express the same logical idea ; as,

Sansk. *kataras* ; Zend, *kataras* ; Slav. *kotorŭi* ; Lithuan. *katras* ; Greek, *kórepos* ; Lat. *uter* for *quater* ; Meso-Goth. *hvathar* ; Eng. *whether*, whether ? The sign of the personal nominative, to wit, the final *s*, shows itself in four of the Indo-European families of languages.

Whence did this wonderful coincidence arise, but in the original unity of the languages concerned ?

ARTICLE IV.

ON THE DESCENT OF CHRIST INTO HELL.

BY REV. JOSEPH MUENSCHER, D. D., MT. VERNON, OHIO.

“He descended into hell.”—*The Apostles’ Creed.*

THAT formulary of Christian faith which has been handed down to our times under the name of the Apostles’ Creed, has rightfully obtained, from its antiquity, scripturalness, simplicity, perspicuity, brevity, and comprehensiveness, the assent and veneration of the Universal Church. With respect to its author or the time of its composition, we possess no very satisfactory information. Its title and a general tradition of early date, would lead us to assign its authorship to the apostles themselves. Thus Ambrose in the fourth century declares, that “the twelve apostles as skilful artificers assembled together, and made a key by their common devices, i. e. the Creed.” Rufinus, in the same century, asserts, that the Christians of the period in which he lived, “had received by tradition from the Fathers that, after the ascension of our Saviour, and the effusion of the Holy Spirit, but before the apostles separated from each

other to go into the habitable parts of the world to preach the Gospel, they settled among themselves the rule of their future preaching in order to prevent their teaching different doctrines during their separation, unto those whom they should unite to the Christian faith. Whereupon they assembled together, and being full of the Holy Spirit, they composed the Creed, each one inserting what he thought convenient, and ordered it to be a test of their future sermons, and a rule to be given to the faithful." Not content with attributing the authorship of the Creed in general to the apostles, some of the Fathers alleged that each member of the apostolic College inserted a particular article, and hence the name *symbolum* which it received.¹ Now it is historically certain, that several articles attributed by these writers to the apostles, e. g. "the descent into hell," ascribed to St. Thomas, and "the Communion of Saints," imputed to Simon Zelotes, formed no part of any creed during the first three centuries. It is manifest, therefore, that the Creed, as it stands in its present form, could not have been composed by the apostles in the manner alleged. The silence of Luke, in the Acts of the Apostles, and the silence of ecclesiastical writers generally, for above three centuries, furnishes the strongest evidence that the Creed as such did not proceed in any form from the hands of the apostles themselves. But although no reliance can be placed on the tradition of the apostolic authorship of this Creed, it cannot be denied that the Creed itself, with the exception of a very few articles, originated in the earlier ages of Christianity, and that it contains the substance of all the primitive creeds, which have been transmitted to our times. It received its distinctive title probably from the circumstance that it was universally esteemed as comprising an admirable summary of those prominent facts and doctrines, which constituted the theme of apostolic preaching, and which were regarded from the first as requisite to be believed in order to an intelligent profession of the Gospel.

¹ This notion originated in a false inference from the word *apostoleo*, and from confounding *σύμβολον* (a test or token) with *συμβολή* (a collection).

Accordingly, although it never received the formal sanction of any ecclesiastical council, it early became and still continues to be the creed of Christendom. "This faith," says Irenaeus, "the Church guards carefully, *as if she dwelt in one house, believes, as if she had but one soul, and proclaims, teaches, and delivers, as if she possessed but one mouth.*"

In characterizing the Apostles' Creed as comprehensive, it is not intended to affirm that it embraces all the important doctrines of Christianity; but that it includes, either by direct affirmation or by obvious implication, all those leading truths which lie at the foundation of our religion; those truths which were classed among the first principles of the doctrine of Christ, in which Catechumens were particularly instructed previous to their admission by baptism to membership in the church. Hence it was early adopted as the universal confession of the baptized, — a position which it still occupies either in form or substance, in every branch of the one Catholic and Apostolic Church, whether Eastern or Western.

There are two articles in this venerable and scriptural symbol, however, which, as has been already intimated, cannot lay claim to the same antiquity or universality as the rest. They are the *descent of Christ into hell*, and the *communion of saints*. Neither of these originally formed a part of the creed of the Antenicene Church. Both of them differ in one important respect from the rest of the Creed; for while the meaning of the other articles is plain and perspicuous, as a creed should always be, of these it is equivocal, and liable to misapprehension. It is still an open question, whether "the Communion of Saints" is to be regarded as a distinct, independent article of faith, or as merely an explanatory appendage to the preceding article. Accordingly in some editions of the Book of Common Prayer it is separated from the antecedent clause only by a comma: while in others, by a semi-colon. Regarded simply as exegetical, the meaning of the whole article may be thus expressed: 'The holy catholic (universal) church, which is the communion, fellowship, or community of saints.' Thus

understood, the visible church is declared to be that society which embraces the community of pious persons, who acknowledge substantially the same faith, and hold fellowship with one another, and with Christ Jesus, their common spiritual head. But if the latter claim be viewed as a distinct and independent article of the Creed, then it dogmatically asserts that there exists within the body of the visible, universal church, a spiritual, as well as an outward union, communion and fellowship,—a communion of kindred minds, such as is found, and found only among real Christians.

In regard to the other article alluded to, viz.: "*the descent of Christ into hell,*" there is much more difficulty. The terms in which it is expressed are such as to render its meaning, especially to a mere English reader, very obscure and uncertain. And the learned are by no means agreed as to its true interpretation. In tracing the history of this article, we find that it had no existence in any creed or confession of faith, so far as we have any knowledge, which was drawn up prior to the council of Nice (A. D. 325); neither does it form any part of the creed set forth by that Council, nor of that more full and complete edition of it, which was adopted and set forth by the second general Council of Constantinople A. D. 381, and which was incorporated into the liturgy of the Church of England and of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States, under the name of the *Nicene Creed*.¹ Rufinus, Presbyter of Aquileia (Italy), who died A. D. 410, affirms that in his time it was contained neither in the Roman nor in the Oriental Creeds. It appears to have been first introduced into the (Apostles') Creed of the Church of Aquileia, about the year A. D. 400. Afterwards it was inserted in the creed commonly, though erroneously called the Athanasian Creed, which is supposed by some to have been composed by Vigilius, Bishop of

¹ The Nicene Creed in the Book of Common Prayer differs from the Constantinopolitan Creed only in the addition of the phrase "and of the Son" after the words "who proceedeth from the Father," which was inserted by the Latin Church.

Thapsus in Africa, about A. D. 485; though others assign to it a somewhat earlier, and others still a later, date. It was not generally adopted by the church until the seventh century, when it was classed together with the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds as an Oecumenical symbol. The Descent into Hell was not introduced into the Roman (Apostles') Creed, until the year A. D. 600: after which it was generally recognized as a part of that symbol. The church of England at the Reformation retained the three Oecumenical Creeds, and also made the Descent, the subject of one of the articles of religion drawn up A. D. 1552 in the reign of Edward VI., in which the doctrine was made to rest on the well-known language of Peter. It was reaffirmed in the Articles set forth A. D. 1562, during the reign of Elizabeth, with the omission, however, of the clause in which an authoritative interpretation is put upon it by an allusion to a particular text of scripture. This clause was left out in consequence of the animosity excited by the disputes which *this question* had engendered in some parts of England.¹

The Apostles' Creed was also received by the Lutheran and Reformed churches on the Continent, as a fundamental confession; and in the former it is used, as in the church of England and the Prot. Epis. church in the United States, not only as a confession at baptism, but as an integral part of the public liturgical worship. Among the acts of the general convocation of the Prot. Epis. church in the United States, held A. D. 1785, in which the initiative steps were taken towards the perfect and independent organization of that church, was one expunging the article relative to the Descent of Christ, from the Apostles' Creed,² and excluding from the Prayer Book the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds. When the proposed service-book, containing the alterations and omissions agreed upon by the convocation, came before the bench of English Bishops for their action, it was determined by that body to require of the American

¹ See Hardwick's History of the Articles of Religion, pp. 101, 132.

² "In the creed commonly called the Apostles' Creed, one clause is omitted as being of uncertain meaning." — *Preface to the Proposed Book.*

church the restoration of the Nicene Creed, as a very important safe-guard against the Arian and Socinian heresies. The omission of the Article "he descended into hell," in the Apostles' Creed, was strongly objected to by the aged and venerable Dr. Moss, bishop of Bath and Wells, chiefly on the ground that it was originally inserted in order to counteract the Apollinarian heresy, which consisted in denying a perfect humanity to the incarnate Saviour, and affirming that his divinity supplied the place of a human soul. The other bishops appear not to have been agreed as to the meaning of the Article, nor were they impressed with a conviction of its importance in a formulary of faith; and hence they were not at first inclined to press its restoration. But at length, out of regard to the feelings and wishes of bishop Moss, more than from any preferences of their own, they passed an order requiring its restoration.

In their official letter, addressed to the general convention, the two archbishops say: "Even in that (confession of faith) which is called the Apostles' Creed, an Article is omitted which was thought necessary to be inserted with a view to a particular heresy, in a very early age of the church, and has ever since had the venerable sanction of universal reception. We therefore, most earnestly, exhort you to restore to its integrity the Apostles' Creed, in which you have omitted an Article merely, as it seems, from misapprehension of the sense in which it is understood by our Church." The archbishops do not say, in this communication, in what sense the Article was, at that time, understood in the church of England. It had long ceased to have any authoritative interpretation, and the standard writers of the church were by no means agreed as to its meaning. The question was then, as it is now, an open one in that church, and the particular views respecting it, which happened to prevail at that time among the English divines, could have no binding force on the American church. In the general convention, held in 1786, the grounds on which the archbishops insisted upon the restoration of the Article, were subjected to a searching criticism. The subject was finally referred to a committee,

who, on the following day, reported in favor of the proposition to restore the Article.

After a warm debate, the report of the committee was at length adopted, and the clause re-instated; not, however, by the affirmative vote of an actual majority of the dioceses represented.¹ In the general convention of 1789, after the consecration of bishops White and Provoost had taken place, the Book of Common Prayer was subjected to a final revision, when a discussion again arose respecting the Article on the Descent of Christ. The House of clerical and lay deputies finally passed a resolution, ordering it to be printed in italics and between brackets, with a rubric permitting, instead of it, the use of the words: "He went into the place of departed spirits." When this resolution came up in the House of Bishops for concurrence, that body, in order more satisfactorily to obviate objections to the Article, proposed to substitute a declaration that its meaning was: "the state of the dead generally."² In consequence, however, of an oversight on the part of the President of the Lower House, the amendment of the bishops was not carried. Accordingly when the committee, appointed to prepare the book

¹ Five Dioceses or States were represented in that Convention: New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and South Carolina. On the Question, whether the words "He descended into Hell" should be restored to the Apostles' Creed, agreeably to the recommendation of the committee, the vote taken by Orders and Dioceses stood as follows: New York — clergy, *Aye*, laity, *No*; divided. New Jersey — clergy, *Aye*, laity, *Aye*; affirmative. Pennsylvania — clergy, *Aye*, laity, *No*; divided. Delaware — clergy, divided, laity, divided. South Carolina — clergy, *Aye*, laity, *Aye*; affirmative. Two Dioceses were in favor, and three divided; so that the proposition was carried by a minority of the Dioceses represented. The whole number of members composing the convention was twenty; eight clergymen and twelve laymen. Of the clergy, seven voted in favor, and one (Dr. Wharton) against the restoration of the clause; and of the laity, six voted in favor, and six against it. It is worthy of note, that the vote of the two largest and most important dioceses was divided, and that the opposition in the convention came chiefly from the side of the laity. — See *Journal of Convention*.

² The language of the Larger Westminster Catechism is similar to this, in the answer to Question 50: "Christ's humiliation after death consisted in being buried and continuing in the state of the dead, and under the power of death, until the third day, which hath been otherwise expressed in these words, 'He descended into Hell.'"

for the press, met for that purpose, they found to their surprise, that the two houses had entirely misunderstood each other. The committee decided, however, that it ought to stand as proposed by the Lower House, and it was, accordingly, so printed. But bishop White, who was a member of the committee, dissented from the views of the majority, and protested against their decision, on the ground that the Creed, as in the English church, ought to be regarded as the creed of the American church, until altered by consent of both Houses of convention, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, which in this case had inadvertently not been done. When the general convention again met in 1792, the subject came up the third time, and another effort was made to have the Article expunged altogether, but without success. It was ordered that the Creed should be printed in all future editions of the Prayer Book, with the Article inserted, not in italics and between brackets, as before, but with a rubric, leaving it discretionary with any churches to use or omit it, or to use, in place of it, the words, "He went into the place of departed spirits."¹ Of the two bishops who were present in the Upper House, viz. White and Seabury, the latter was strongly in favor of retaining the Article for the reasons assigned in the English Episcopal conclave by bishop Moss; while the former, though evidently disliking the Article, was disposed on the whole to retain it, on the ground that it would tend to promote peace, and be acting in good faith towards the English bishops, while at the same time a latitude would be left, by the proposed rubric, for understanding it as referring to the state of departed spirits generally, instead of the strict, literal sense. When the book came out, bishop Provoost, who was absent from the convention, expressed his disapproval of the form in which this part of it appeared, more than either of the Article itself, as it originally stood, or of its entire omission, on the ground that it exacted a be-

¹ From this rubric it is manifest that, whatever interpretation the Prot. Epis. church may authoritatively put upon the Article, she does not regard the doctrine of Christ's descent into hell as one of very grave importance.

lief in the conscious existence of departed spirits between death and the resurrection.¹ With these remarks on the history of the Article in the Creed, we proceed to the consideration of its interpretation.

"The intermediate state" is a form of expression used relatively of the human, rational soul, to denote its separate condition or state during the period intervening between the death of an individual and his resurrection from the dead. At death a separation is believed to take place between the immaterial and material part of man; at the general resurrection a reunion will take place between them. And the interval of time which elapses between these two events, be it shorter or longer, is the intermediate state of the soul. The idea of an intermediate state is obviously grounded on the doctrine of a future literal resurrection of the body. Those of course who reject that doctrine, or who adopt the notion of a figurative, spiritual resurrection only, which takes place at death (e. g. the Gnostics, in the first period of the church, the Bogomiles, Cathari, and other heretical sects, in the Middle Ages, and the Swedenborgians, Unitarians, and Pantheists in modern times), discard the idea of the state in question. The point when this state of temporary disunion between the soul and body begins, is the moment of the individual's death: the point when it terminates, is that of his rising again at the general resurrection of the dead. As the doctrine of a literal resurrection is maintained by nearly all professed Christians, however they may differ in respect to the nature of the resurrection-body, so that of an intermediate state is generally admitted. According to this view, two changes are allotted to mankind, with the exception of such as shall be alive on the earth at the time of our Lord's second advent: the first, the act of passing from the present life to the state, whatever it is, which immediately succeeds it; and another, from that state to the one which is to take place at the resurrection. What, then, is the *condition* of the soul during this intermediate period? Is

¹ See Bishop White's History of the Protestant Episcopal Church.

it in a state of perfect insensibility? of unconscious repose? Are all its faculties suspended, so that it is utterly incapable of action, of enjoyment, or of suffering? Or does it exist thus separated from the body, in a state of consciousness and activity, and sensibility to pleasure and pain? It has been supposed by some professed Christians, that at death there is a suspension of *rational* as well as of *animal* life. This opinion appears to rise naturally out of the system which maintains, that the human being is entirely material, and that thought and feeling are only qualities of organized matter. Of course we might expect that such materialists as Dr. Priestley would advocate this opinion. Believing, as he did, that as the whole man died, so the whole man would be called again to life at the appointed period of the general resurrection, he regarded the intermediate portion of time as a state of utter insensibility; as a profound sleep, from which the man would awaken, when called on by the Almighty, with the same associations as he had when alive, without being conscious of the portion of time elapsed. But this sentiment is not confined to the materialist. It has been held by some who admit the immateriality of the soul, that it is distinct from the body, and that during the intermediate state it is separated from the body. These do not deny the possibility of the soul's separate existence in a *conscious* and *active* state, but they question or disbelieve the *fact* of such existence. This opinion has been lately advocated with much ingenuity and plausibility by Archbishop Whately, in his "View of the Scriptural Revelations concerning a future State." The principal reasons assigned for this opinion are the frequent application in scripture of the term "*asleep*" to the deceased, as characterizing their state, and the allusions to a particular day of judgment in which every man's condition will be finally fixed, and with which his happiness or misery is connected. The Greek verb *κοιμᾶσθαι*, *to sleep*, is frequently used in the New Testament as an elegant euphemism for *to die*. See Jno. 11: 11. Acts 7: 60. 13: 36. 1 Cor. 7: 39. 11: 30. 15: 6, 18, 20, 51. 1 Thes. 4: 13-15. 2 Pet. 3: 4. Comp. Matt. 27: 52.

The noun *κοιμησις* is used instead of *death* in Sir. 46 : 22. 48 : 14. The application of the term *sleep* to *death* in the New Testament, is evidently taken from the Old. See Job 14 : 12. Ps. 13 : 3. In Jere. 51 : 39, 57, the phrase *perpetual sleep* occurs in the same sense. Now, as a mere poetic euphemism, the word proves nothing in regard to the state or mode of the soul's existence after death. It sheds no light on the question of the sensibility or insensibility, the consciousness or unconsciousness of the soul. Indeed its use is quite compatible with an entire disbelief in the separate existence of the soul, and even of its immortality. Thus Dr. Priestly represents the dead soul as asleep. The image was also very common among the Greek poets. Homer, narrating the sudden death of a warrior in battle, calls it "the iron sleep of death." Moschus in the following passage on the death of Bion (Epitaph. v. 105) represents death as *an endless, hopeless sleep* — ἀτέμνονα, νήγρετον ὕπνον.

"The meanest herb we trample in the field,
Or in the garden nurture, when its leaf
In Autumn dies, forebodes another Spring,
And from brief slumber wakes to life again;
Man wakes no more ! Man, peerless, valiant, wise,
Once chill'd by death, sleeps hopeless in the dust,
A long, unbroken, never-ending sleep."

So Horace :—

Nobis, cum semel occidit brevis lux,
Nox est perpetua una dormienda —
"To us, when life's brief day has once declined,
One night, one sleep eternal, lurks behind."

Lucretius is full of the same simile. Thus, Lib. iii. 1100 :

"E'en could we life elongate, we should ne'er
Subtract one moment from the reign of death,
Nor the deep slumber of the grave curtail,
O'er ages could we triumph — death alike
Remains eternal — nor of shorter date
To him who yesterday the light forsook,
Than him who died full many a year before."

Sometimes, indeed, the heathen poets speak of death as a *sacred sleep*, but in a manner which leaves it doubtful whether they alluded to a future state. Callimachus Epigr. 10. Τῇδε Σάων ὁ Δίκωνος, Ἀκάνθιος, ἱερὸν ὕπνον κοιμᾶται. *Δυήσκειν μὴ λέγε τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς.*

The external similarity between a corpse and the body of a person asleep, doubtless gave rise to this *usus loquendi*. And it is certainly a very natural and beautiful poetic analogy. Whether the term *sleep* imports anything more than this in the passages of scripture referred to above; whether it is designed to intimate the actual condition of the soul in the intermediate state, and if so, in what *sense* it is used, and what is it intended to import, are questions not easily answered. While on the one hand, some allege that it is designed to convey the idea that the deceased person is *spiritually* (i. e. as to his soul) in a condition resembling sleep, namely, in a state of insensibility; on the other hand, others, with far greater probability, imagine that the figure applied, as it is, to believers, is intended to convey the idea, that their souls are in a state of rest, — of repose and freedom from sin, temptation, toil, pain, and weariness. Applied to the departure and subsequent condition of a child of God, it is thus linked with peculiarly peaceful and tranquillizing associations. The idea of the total insensibility of the soul in its separate state can hardly be reconciled with the plain teachings of such passages as the following: "To-day shalt thou be with me in Paradise." "Whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die." "The God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, — he is not a God of the dead, but of the living, for (they) all live unto God." "Having a desire to depart, and to be with Christ." "To me to live is Christ, and to die is gain." "We are confident, and willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord." "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it." The appearance of Moses and Elijah on the Mount of Transfiguration certainly affords strong support to the hypothesis of a state of activity and

consciousness after death and before the final resurrection.¹ But while the intermediate state is one of consciousness, as opposed to a state of profound insensibility, it is *not* one of trial, probation, or preparation, in which an opportunity is afforded to rectify the errors committed here, and to work out a salvation, which we neglected here to secure. It is a state of enjoyment and suffering, of reward and punishment, respectively to the pious and the ungodly. To this view Whately opposes the unquestioned doctrine of the general judgment at the last day. If every man immediately at death, and *before* the general resurrection enters upon a state of reward and punishment, what, it is asked, is the necessity of a day of judgment *after* the resurrection? It may not be possible to give an answer to this inquiry that shall be perfectly satisfactory; for the scriptures shed but little light upon the point, and it would therefore ill become us to speak confidently, in relation to it. But admitting that the condition, as well as the locality of the soul, is substantially the same in its general character, as it will be after the general resurrection and judgment, and differing from it only so far as it may be affected by the reunion of the soul and body, it does not follow that the

¹ The English reformers were so firmly persuaded of this truth, that they put forth the following declaration in the reign of Edward VI, as one of the Articles of the Church. It is the 40th of the *forty-two* Articles of 1552: "The souls of them that depart this life do neither die with the bodies, nor sleep idly." "They which say that the souls of such as depart hence do sleep, being without all sense, feeling, or perceiving, until the day of judgment, or affirm that the souls die with the bodies, and at the last day shall be raised up with the same, do utterly dissent from the right belief declared to us in Holy Scripture." Now, although in the revision to which the Articles were subjected in 1562, this Article was omitted, there is no proof that the omission arose from any change of views which had taken place in regard to the subject-matter of the Article. When Archbishop Whately, therefore, appeals to the expression "*those who sleep in him*," in the Burial Service of the Episcopal church, as, in its most obvious and natural sense, favoring the doctrine of an unconscious intermediate state, he certainly mistakes the import of the phrase as employed in that service. Otherwise it would be inconsistent with the introductory clause in the prayer which precedes it, quoted in a subsequent part of this Article. Indeed, the Archbishop admits that the authors of the Church-Services, at least of the Burial-Service, appear to have adopted the opinion, that the intermediate state is one of enjoyment and of suffering, respectively, to the faithful and the disobedient.

judgment, thus partially forestalled will be unnecessary or attended with no important effects. Ends and purposes under the divine government may be accomplished by it, of which we can form no adequate conception. So that if our imperfect and limited reason should entirely fail us on this point, and we were unable to suggest even a plausible conjecture in reference to it, it would not necessarily follow that departed souls are in a state of profound insensibility, and incapable either of enjoyment, or of suffering. Though the general judgment may not materially change the previous condition of *human beings* in the future world, it may have an important bearing on the character of the *divine Being*. It may indeed be thought that the ends of justice are answered, when individuals are treated according to their deserts; and as this is done, or supposed to be done, immediately after death, that no further procedure is necessary. It is true that justice, as it respects *private persons*, consists in regulating their conduct by its dictates, in their transactions with their fellow beings; and if they uniformly preserve inviolate the rights of others, all its demands are fulfilled. But the justice of a *Governor* belongs to the public, and it is expected of him, that he not only execute the laws with impartiality, but that his justice be exercised in such a manner as is most conducive to the general good. Now as Jehovah is the moral governor of the world, it is not enough that he *is* just; he must *appear* also to be just. The retribution which takes place immediately after death is unknown. The grounds on which the condition of each individual is determined, are not apparent to us, and it may be entirely beyond our power to discover them. The grounds on which the particular condition of each individual is determined, are not apparent to others, and it may be wholly beyond their power to discover them. Hence a general judgment, at which all the descendants of Adam shall be present, and everything pertaining to the moral character of each other shall be disclosed, appears to be necessary to the perfect display of the justice of God; to such a manifestation of it, as will vindicate his moral government from

all suspicion of injustice and partiality, and impress the conviction on the minds of all intelligent beings that he is righteous in all his ways and holy in all his works. — Now in whatever state the disembodied souls of all men are, in the same state we may presume that the rational soul of our Saviour was during the interval between his death and resurrection. If theirs is a conscious state, then such was his also. But *where* was that conscious state passed? It is to this point that the article in the Creed relates. We proceed therefore, to inquire into its meaning. In order to a comprehensive view of the subject, it will be necessary to examine some of the most prominent interpretations which have been given of it.

I. There is the metaphorical interpretation, first proposed by Calvin. According to this, "the Descent into Hell" does not refer either to the body or the soul of Christ in the intermediate state, but to a period antecedent to his death. It is figuratively descriptive of his extreme mental sufferings and agony in the garden and on the cross.¹ This interpreta-

¹ The theory of Calvin has been frequently misunderstood and misrepresented. Bishops Horsley and Henshaw, and others, have charged the Reformer with holding that our blessed Lord actually went down to the place of torment, and there endured the pains of a reprobate soul. Thus Bishop Henshaw says: "the learned Genevan reformer, John Calvin, the celebrated father of a system of religious faith which goes under his name, — in conformity to the rigid features of his Creed, — believed that our Lord Jesus Christ, having died as a surety and substitute for sinners, went down to the place of punishment prepared for the wicked, and underwent for the benefit of the elect the actual pains and torments of the damned in hell." (Henshaw's Theol. for the People, p. 134. See also Horsley's Ser. vol. 2, p. 93.) A writer in the Church Review for July, 1857, gives a similar representation of Calvin's opinion. "Calvin, who supposed this passage (1 Pet 3: 18, 19) to refer to our Saviour's going into the state of the dead, while his body was buried, feeling the force and acknowledging the true meaning of this word "prison," is more consistent; and although the supposition was awful, yet he faced it honestly, and supposed that our Lord in his Spirit and soul, spent the three days while his body lay in the grave, in the Gehenna, or Hell of Torments, working out the full condemnation and literal torments of the lost in the prison of despair." Calvin's sentiments in regard to the descent are found in his Institutes. Lib. ii. ch. 16. sec. 10. His language is: "Si Christus ad inferos descendisse dicitur, nihil mirum est, cum eam mortem pertulerit, quæ sceleribus ab irato Deo infligitur." — "If Christ is said to have descended into hell, it is no wonder, since he suffered that death which is

tion became quite prevalent, for a time, in the different branches of the Reformed church. It is found in the Confession of Faith, which was adopted by the English congregation at Geneva, and received the approval of the church of Scotland. That Confession consists of a Paraphrase on the Creed; and on the clauses, "dead and buried; he descended into hell," it says: "suffered his humanity to be punished with a most cruel death, feeling in himself the anger and severe judgment of God, even as if he had been in the extreme torments of hell; and therefore cried with a loud voice: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" The Heidelberg Catechism, which was published in 1563, and is the manual of instruction for the German and Dutch Reformed churches, expresses the same view. Question 44 asks: "Why is there added, "He descended into-hell?" Answer: "That I may be assured and wholly comfort myself in this, that my Lord Jesus Christ, by his inexpressible anguish, pains, terrors, and hellish agencies, but especially on the cross, hath delivered me from the anguish and torments of hell."

It cannot be denied that the language of the Article is, *per se*, fairly susceptible of such an interpretation. The expression, "to descend into hell," may very well be employed to describe, in a bold, figurative manner, the extremity either of bodily or mental anguish, or of both combined. As men who have attained the summit of their ambition and reached the highest pinnacle of earthly glory, are poetically described as boasting that "they have reached the stars," and that

inflicted on the wicked by an angry God." "Cum duros in anima cruciatus damnati ac periti hominis pertulerit." — "Since he suffered in spirit the direful torments of condemned and lost man." The language of Calvin is obscure and liable to misconstruction. But its import is fully established by contemporaneous history. Indeed the Reformer was so far from holding the opinion frequently imputed to him, that, according to Dr. Hey, it was the increasing popularity of his views, as we have represented them, which induced Archbishop Parker and the other Bishops in the reign of Elizabeth to omit that clause in the third article of religion, set forth in Edward's reign, in which the *locus veratissimus* in 1 Peter, is applied to the literal descent of Christ into hell, because it was not acceptable to those who embraced the opinion of the Genevan Reformer. See H. Browne's *Expos. of the xxxix Articles*, p. 93.

"they strike the stars with their lofty heads," so it may be said, in reference to the indescribable anguish to which our Saviour's soul was subjected in Gethsemane and on Calvary, that "he went down to hell," or "to the lowest depths of hell." We find a similar poetic hyperbole in Isa. 14: 11—15, where the prophet depicts the elevated political condition of the proud and arrogant king of Babylon, and contrasts it with his subsequent fall. We give the passage as translated by Dr. Henderson :

11. Thy pomp is brought down to *sheol* (*ᾗδης*),
And the sounding of thy harps ;
Under thee is spread putridity ;
And the worms are thy covering.
12. How art thou fallen from heaven,
Illustrious son of the Morning !
How art thou felled to the ground,
That didst discomfit the nations.
13. Thou saidst in thine heart, *I will scale the heavens ;*
Above the stars of God I will raise my throne ;
I will sit on the mount of the assembly, in the recesses of the north ;
14. *I will ascend above the heights of the clouds !*
I will make myself like the Most High.
15. But thou art brought down to *Sheol* (*ᾗδης*),
To the recesses of the pit.

A similar hyperbole is employed by our Saviour when he says of Capernaum that, although at that time "exalted to heaven," in respect to privileges, it should be "thrust down to hell." Comp. also Ps. 88: 3, 6. 18: 4, 5. 116: 3.

But although the words, taken by themselves, will bear the construction put upon them by Calvin, this cannot be their meaning in the Creed as it now stands. The connection obviously forbids it. The relative position which the clause occupies, after the burial and before the resurrection, compels us to understand it as referring to some event which transpired subsequent to the interment and not prior to the death of Christ. There are, moreover, insuperable objections to this interpretation. Such a bold, figurative mode of interpretation is wholly out of place in a document of this kind, and inconsistent with the general character of the Creed.

A confession of faith, designed to receive the assent and credence of all classes of people, should doubtless be couched in literal terms, and expressed in as plain, simple, and perspicuous a manner as possible. We do not look for figures of speech in such an instrument. They would be inappropriate and incongruous. Now the Apostles' Creed corresponds, in this respect, to what a creed should be. Nothing can be plainer and more easily comprehended, for the most part, than this ancient symbol.

Besides, it is fatal to this interpretation, that doctrinally it has no scriptural basis to rest upon. Where, within the Sacred Volume, is it said that Christ suffered the torments of the damned, either on the cross or in the abode of lost spirits? Indeed, it would seem to be inconceivable that he should have suffered them. For the worm that never dies could not possibly have gnawed his sinless soul; remorse of conscience, a capital ingredient in the misery of the lost, he could not have endured.

Nor would it seem to be at all necessary to the work of atonement, that he should thus suffer. The mediatorial sufferings of Christ were not strictly penal, but simply vicarious. They were an equivalent substitution for the penalty due to sinners, but not the penalty itself, either in kind or quantity. They answered the same purpose, and accomplished the same righteous ends, in the moral government of God; and that was all, in the way of equivalency and substitution, which the nature of the case required, or which the sinless Jesus could render. If, in order to render the substitution undertaken by our Saviour in behalf of sinners effective, it were necessary that he should endure the literal penalty of the law, the very punishment denounced upon transgressors, then we might be compelled to admit that he must have suffered the torments of the lost, either on the cross or in Gehenna.

II. The descent of Christ into hell is supposed, by some, to import nothing more than that *he went into the state of the dead*. This appears to have been the prevalent opinion among the Westminster divines; for in the Shorter Cate-

chism, appended to the Westminster Confession, there is inserted the Apostles' Creed, and to the clause "he descended into hell," is annexed the following explanatory note: "that is, continued in the state of the dead, and under the power of death, until the third day." This explanation appears also in the answer to question 50 of the Larger Catechism: "Christ's humiliation after death consisted in being buried and continuing in the state of the dead and under the power of death, until the third day, which hath been otherwise expressed in these words: "He descended into hell." If this means simply that Christ was dead for the space of three days, or a part of three days, the fact will not be disputed; but can the Hebrew word *Sheol*, or the Greek *Hades*, or the English *Hell*, be made to signify a *state* or *condition* of being? We think not. The Hebrew word, when used in a literal sense, always imports a *place*, a local habitation, and never a *state*. So it has been generally understood, both in ancient and in modern times. Besides, the phrase *he descended into the state of the dead*, can properly signify only, *he died*; a fact which had been already declared in a previous Article of the Creed. This, then, cannot be the meaning of the clause; for it would be not only tautological, but out of place, to affirm the death of Christ here.

III. Beza and others maintain that this Article refers to the dead body of Christ, and is equivalent to *he descended into the grave*. This is the interpretation of Dr. Barrow and Wm. Perkins. It is a remarkable circumstance that in the early creeds in which this clause is found, the burial of Christ is not mentioned. Thus in the creed of the church of Aquileia, the words are: "crucified under Pontius Pilate, he descended *ad inferna*. The same remark applies also to the Athanasian Creed, which has the descent, but not the sepulture: "who suffered for our salvation, descended into hell (*εις ᾗδου*), rose again, on the third day, from the dead." The omission of the burial, in these creeds, could hardly have been undesigned, inasmuch as it is found in all, or nearly all, previous creeds and confessions. Hence there would seem to be force in the remark of Rufinus, that "though the Ro-

man and Oriental churches had not the words, yet they had the sense of them in the word *buried*.”¹ The Latin *infernum* or *inferna* properly signifies *the lower parts*, or what is beneath the surface of the earth; and is synonymous with the Greek *καταχθόνια*, SUBTERRANEAN, which is found in the creed of Ariminum, A. D. 359. So *infern*i and *ὑποχθόνιοι* are applied to those who inhabit the abodes of the dead. In the Athanasian creed, the word *ᾗδης* was first introduced in the place of *καταχθόνια*. The word *κατώτατα* is found in some creeds instead of *ᾗδης* and *καταχθόνια*, with evident allusion to Eph. 4 : 9, where the phrase *τὰ κατώτερα μέρη τῆς γῆς*, *the lower parts of the earth*, has been understood by many commentators to denote the grave. (Comp. the Heb. קַדְמוֹת אֶרֶץ, Sept. *κατώτατα τῆς γῆς*, Ps. 63 : 10.) In further support of this interpretation, it has been alleged that the Heb. *Sheol* (שְׁאוֹל, LXX *ᾗδης*), in Ps. 16 : 9, a passage on which the Article in the Creed is chiefly founded, signifies *the grave*. That the word *Sheol* (שְׁאוֹל), which commonly signifies *the region* or *abode of the dead*, is sometimes employed with specific reference to the *grave* or the receptacle of the dead body, cannot well be doubted. See Ps. 6 : 5. 141 : 7. Isa. 38 : 18, 19. Ezek. 32 : 27. Eccl. 9 : 10 (comp. Sirac. 17 : 27).

An account, however, of the origin of the clause in the creed of Aquileia has been given which, if correct, would militate against this interpretation. It is said that the Article was introduced for the purpose of counteracting the Apollinarian heresy. This heresy took its name from Apollinaris the Younger, bishop of Laodicea (Syria), who died between A. D. 380 and 392. The time when he first promulgated his heresy is not precisely known. He was not anathematized by name till the second general council of Constantinople, A. D. 381; but nineteen years before (A. D. 362) his heresy was condemned by a synod at Alexandria,

¹ In a note in the Preface to the proposed Episcopal Prayer Book we find the following remark : “In the first creeds that have this clause or article, that of Christ’s burial not being mentioned in them, it follows that they understood the descent into hell only of his burial or descent into the grave, as the word is otherwise translated in the Bible.”

without mentioning the name of the author; also by another at Rome, A. D. 373. This heresy consisted in denying to Christ the possession of a human rational soul, and maintaining that its place was supplied by his divine nature. To bear testimony against this heresy, and virtually to affirm that Christ Jesus was a perfect man, composed of body and soul, the Article, it is said, was inserted, declaring his descent, as to his rational soul, *ad inferna*, into the abode of departed souls. That the Article in question was subsequently appealed to by the orthodox, in refutation of this error, cannot be disputed; but if it were originally inserted for this purpose, it is quite extraordinary that Rufinus, in his exposition of the Creed, does not allude to it. But whatever may have been the occasion of its insertion, or whatever the sense in which it was originally understood, it is plain that ever since its introduction into the Roman Creed, where it was first appended to the *burial*, it must have a meaning distinct from the *sepulture* of Jesus.

IV. Another interpretation which has been given of this Article is, *that Christ descended into the place of future punishment (Gehenna)*. This view was adopted by some of the later Fathers, and prevailed quite extensively during the Middle Ages in connection with the doctrine of purgatory. By the Protestant Reformers the notion of purgatory was universally rejected; but their views with respect to the intermediate state, and the descent of Christ into hell were very diverse and unsettled. That our Lord went down to the abode of condemned spirits, however, was very generally entertained by them, though they differed considerably as to the object of his mission. Some thought it was to suffer the punishment inflicted on the lost in their own miserable abode. Others, that it was to display to those who were consigned to everlasting punishment, and even to the fallen angels themselves, the power of his kingdom and the victory which he had obtained over sin, and to triumph over Satan in his own peculiar dominion. Others, that it was for the purpose of preaching the Gospel to lost Spirits, and especially to the impenitent who were swept away by the Noah-

chian deluge, to whom he announced the atonement which he had made for men, offered them pardon through his merits, and invited them to share in the blessings of salvation. By the church of England the strict literal sense of the descent into the place of punishment was first adopted. In the Book of Common Prayer published in the fourth year of Edward, A. D. 1552, the third article of religion reads as follows: "As Christ died for us, and was buried, so also is it to be believed that he went down into hell; for his body lay in the grave till his resurrection, but his soul being separate from his body remained with the spirits which were detained in prison, that is to say in hell, and there preached unto them." In the short Catechism set forth by royal authority in the following year, the descent is thus explained: "That he truly died, and was truly buried, that by his most sure sacrifice he might pacify his Father's wrath against mankind, and subdue him by his death, who had the authority of death, which is the Devil; forasmuch as not only the living but the dead, were they in hell or elsewhere, they all felt the power and force of his death, to whom lying in prison (as Peter saith) Christ preached, though dead in body, yet relieved in spirit." In a synod which was held ten years after (A. D. 1562), in the reign of Elizabeth, the explanatory clause was stricken out of the article of religion. The precise import of Christ's descent was thus left indeterminate, and it has ever since remained an open question in the church of England. Archbishop Parker is supposed to have been induced to omit the explanatory clause in consequence of the representation of the Bishop of Exeter, who in a paper prepared for the synod declared, that there had been "great invectives in his diocese between preachers on this article; some holding that the going down of Christ to hell was nothing else but, that the virtue and strength of his death should be made known to them that were dead before; others maintaining that it only means, he sustained upon the cross the infernal pains of hell, when he cried out: *Why hast thou forsaken me?* Finally, there are persons who preach, that this Article is not contained in other symbols;

and all these sayings they ground upon Erasmus and the Germans, especially Calvin and Bullinger; the contrary side bringing forward to their support the universal consent of the Fathers of both Churches."¹ The effect of this omission of the reference to Peter's Epistle appears to have been to allay for some time the controversy which had arisen on this subject. The extreme view, however, continued to be held by some. It is strongly advocated by Dr. Fiddes, and by Bishop Beveridge, in his Exposition of the xxxix Articles. In support of this interpretation, appeal is made to the plain, literal meaning of the Article itself. And it must be confessed that, if the language be construed according to its customary use at the present day, the Article does obviously imply two things. 1. That Christ went as to his human soul to the place of punishment, and 2. that this place of punishment or hell, is situated beneath the earth. Such is the meaning which every English reader would naturally put upon it. No doubt the Saxon word *hell* was originally employed in the general, comprehensive sense of the Greek *Hades*, and was appropriately adopted to represent it. But such is not now the case. The word *hell* has ceased to be used in the wide, indefinite sense once attached to it, and is now employed specifically and exclusively to designate the place of future punishment. Thus far, then, the advocates of this opinion have *terra firma* to rest upon. But in further support of this view they appeal to 1 Peter 3: 19, 20. (Comp. ch. 4: 6.) Col. 2: 15. Eph. 4: 8, 9. (Comp. Ps. 68: 18.)—Rom. 10: 6. and Ps. 16: 10. (Comp. Acts. 2: 31.) That these passages of scripture do not prove the doctrine which they are here adduced to establish, will be shown under another head. Suffice it to say, that the Descent of Christ into Hell, as thus explained, is now universally abandoned. We know of no respectable writer who would now advocate this extreme opinion, notwithstanding its accordance with the literal and obvious construction of the Article.

V. Another interpretation which has been given of the

¹ *Stripes' Annals*, I. c. 31; and *Life of Parker*, I. 513. *Hardwick*, p. 132.

Descent of Christ into hell, and which is entitled to particular notice, is developed in the following theory. There is in addition to, and distinct from, heaven and hell, a *third place* or *locality* of departed souls in the invisible world. This particular locality is called in Hebrew *Sheol*, in Greek *Hades*, and in Latin *infernus*, *Orcus*, and is situated under the ground, somewhere beneath the surface, or as some suppose, in a cavity at the very centre of the earth. This is the peculiar abode of the disembodied souls of all those who have departed this life, whether good or bad, during the intermediate state, where they respectively enjoy comparative happiness or endure comparative misery. At the general resurrection, they will leave this temporary abode, become reunited to their former bodies, and either ascend to heaven or go to hell (*Gehenna*), according to the decision of the final judgment, when the felicity of the pious and the misery of the wicked will be complete. This subterranean abode is supposed to consist of two distinct compartments, having no connection with each other, but separated by an impassable gulf. One of these, called *Paradise* and *Abraham's bosom*, is the abode of the *pious* dead; the other, denominated *Tartarus*, *the Abyss*, *Gehenna*, or else without a specific name, is the abode of the ungodly. Now it is alleged that the rational soul of our Saviour descended to this general locality of souls, and remained during his intermediate state in that department of *Hades*, which is occupied by the pious dead. Hugh Broughton, a learned Oriental Scholar of England (A. D. 1597) appears to have been among the first to advocate this opinion in that country, which at first gave great offence to the older divines who had embraced the views of Calvin; among whom was Archbishop Whitgift. At length, however, the Archbishop abandoned his former opinions and adopted those of Broughton. Since that period the views of the distinguished Orientalist have been gaining ground in the Church of England. One of the most distinguished and ingenious advocates of this theory in recent times is Bishop Horsley,¹ whose views were

¹ In his *Sermons*, originally published in 1810.

embraced by Bishop Hobart, and reproduced by him in a "Dissertation on the State of the Departed" originally published in 1816. — "He, (i. e. Christ) descended to hell properly so called," says Bishop Horsley, "to the invisible mansion of departed spirits, and to that part of it where the souls of the faithful, when they are delivered from the burden of the flesh, are in joy and felicity."

In regard to the *local situation* of *Hades*, the Bishop says, "it is evident that this must be some place below the surface of the earth; for it is said that He (Christ) 'descended,' i. e. went down to it. Our Lord's death took place upon the surface of the earth, where the human race inhabit; *that*, therefore, and none higher, is the place from which he descended; of consequence, the place to which he went by descent, was below it; and it is with relation to those parts below the surface, that his rising to life on the third day must be understood." In reference to the same point, Gresswell, a learned living divine of the church of England, in his elaborate work on the Parables, undertakes to show: 1. that *Hades* is under the ground; and 2. that it is the deepest point within the earth. With regard to the latter point, he comes to the sage conclusion that the locality of *Hades* is at, or about, the centre of the earth. "For since," says he, "it must be equally true of the relative position of *Hades* to all parts of the surface of the earth, that it is alike within the earth, alike beneath in reference to all parts of the surface, and alike at the same point of extreme depth beneath, in reference to the surface; it does not seem possible to explain this community of relation in the position of *Hades* to all parts of the earth's exterior surface, consistently with a well-ascertained physical fact, the spherical form of the earth, except by supposing its true position to be at or about the centre of the sphere itself." The same writer proceeds to show that *Hades* is divided into distinct regions, relatively situated with respect to each other, as a higher point in regard to a locality would be to a lower; and then, that though the souls of all men pass into *Hades* by death, as the common receptacle of the dead, they do not all pass into the

same *locality* of *Hades*, but the souls of the good are received into one locality, viz. the higher or upper region, and the souls of the bad into another, viz. the nether region. Thus we have the map of this imaginary country spread out before us, and the whole delineated with as much minuteness as if the learned author had himself been a visitant and eye-witness of it.

The *object* of Christ's descent into *Hades* is thus described by bishop Horsley: "That he should go to this place was a necessary branch of the general scheme and project of redemption, which required that the divine Word should take our nature upon him, and fulfil the entire condition of humanity, in every period and stage of man's existence, from the commencement of life in the mother's womb to the extinction and renovation of it. The same wonderful scheme of humiliation which required that the Son should be conceived, and born, and put to death, made it equally necessary that his soul, in its intermediate state, should be gathered to the souls of the departed saints." This theory, in regard to the intermediate place and the Descent of Christ into hell, is alleged to be the doctrine of scripture, of the early church, and of the Protestant Episcopal church.

1. The passages of Scripture which are chiefly relied upon to sustain this view are five, viz. Psalm 16: 9. Luke 23: 43. 16: 23, 24. Eph. 4: 9, 10 and 1 Peter 3: 18—20.

Ps. 16: 9, "Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell; neither wilt thou suffer thy holy one to see corruption." There can be no reasonable doubt among all those who hold to the inspiration of the apostles, that this passage is prophetic of the Messiah. For Peter and Paul both refer it to Jesus of Nazareth in proof of his Messiahship, and show that it was fulfilled in him and in him alone (Acts 2: 25—31. 13: 35—37). It is, moreover, generally regarded as the principal passage, if not the only one, on which the Article of Christ's Descent into hell was originally founded; and there can be little doubt that the word *ᾗδης* was inserted in the Athanasian creed, in the place of *καταχθόνια*, to make it

more nearly conform to this place. The only question, then, is with respect to its meaning. In its most comprehensive sense, it includes the entire domain of death: the locality of the body, and the locality of the soul. It occurs sixty-four times in the Old Testament, and in several instances it appears manifestly to be used with special reference to the locality of the body, i. e. the *grave*, the *sepulchre*; and so the learned translators of our Authorized Version understood it, for in thirty-one instances (*viz.* Gen. 37:35. 42:38. 44:29, 31. 1 Sam. 2:6. 1 Kg. 2:6, 9. Job 7:9. 14:13. 17:13. 21:13. 24:19. Ps. 6:5. 30:3. 31:17. 49:14 (twice), 15. 88:3. 89:48. 141:7. Prov. 1:12. 30:16. Eccl. 9:10. Cant. 8:9. Isa. 14:11. 38:10, 18. Ez. 31:11. Hos. 13:14 (twice), they have rendered it *grave*; and in three instances (Num. 16:30, 31. Job 17:16), *pit*.

That pious men among the ancient Hebrews entertained not only a hope, but an influential belief in a future conscious state of existence, seems clear from many passages of scripture, both in the Old and New Testament. They looked forward, at death, to another and a better country, even an heavenly. At the same time it is manifest that their views and conceptions, in regard to that future state of immortality, the condition of the soul in that state, its precise locality, etc., were exceedingly vague, indefinite, and obscure. The whole subject was involved in a dense cloud, which they were unable to penetrate. They knew not what became of the rational soul after its separation from the body; but as the body was deposited in the grave, so they imagined that the soul might descend with it, and occupy a place more or less remote from it. Hence the word *Sheol* was employed to denote, generically, the *entire region, the subterranean dwelling-place, of the dead*; not exclusively or chiefly, perhaps, the receptacle of the dead body, but also the abode of the disembodied souls of all those who had passed through the gates of death, irrespective of their previous character or their present condition as happy or unhappy. They had no idea of an *intermediate state* or an *intermediate place*, because they had no idea of a resurrection and trans-

ference to another abode, unless the celebrated passage in Job 19:25 be thought to intimate the contrary. They appear to have regarded *Sheol* as the *final* abode, both of the righteous and the wicked. To the one it was supposed to be a place of happiness; to the other, of misery. It covered all they knew about futurity. It was their heaven and their hell. It was not, then, such a place, according to the conceptions of the early Hebrews, as the advocates of this hypothesis represent it to have been.

Now the word *Sheol* (or *Hades*) occurs in the passage from the Psalmist under consideration; and the inference deduced from it is, that our Saviour, as to his rational soul, went down to the general receptacle of souls, situated somewhere under the earth, or as Gresswell says, in a hollow cavity at the centre of the earth, and there took up its abode during its separate state. On this passage we remark: 1. That the general and comprehensive term *Sheol* may be here employed with particular reference to the receptacle of the body, *the grave*, as one department of the invisible world, or world of the dead.

The Hebrew term employed by the Psalmist and here translated *hell*, is *sheol* (שְׁאוֹל) which the authors of the Septuagint Greek version have uniformly (with only one or two exceptions) represented by *Hades* (ᾍδης). The etymology of the word is uncertain. Some lexicographers derive it from שָׁאַל, in the sense of *to ask, crave, demand, require, seek for, etc.*, and they suppose that it is employed to designate the *grave*, or the *region of the dead*, as *rapacious, craving, never satisfied*, like the *orcus rapax* of Catulus, the ἀπαραίτης of Callimachus, and the English phrase *insatiable sepulchre* (see Hab. 2: 5 and Prov. 30: 15, 16, where there is thought to be an allusion to this derivation). Others derive the word from שָׂוַל in the sense of *to excavate, to hollow out*, like the obsolete root שָׂוַל, and put for שְׁאוֹל, *a cavity, a hollow, subterranean place*, just as the German *hölle, hell*, is originally the same with *Höhle, a hollow cavern*; — and the Latin *cælum* is from the Greek κοῖλος, *hollow*. The etymology is not of much importance, since use, and not derivation, is the true standard

by which the meaning of a word is most properly ascertained. At the same time the etymology of the word, whether we derive it from אָשַׁל, taken in the sense of to *ask*, or in that of to *excavate*, would justify us in supposing that it might appropriately be employed to designate the *grave*, notwithstanding the existence of a less poetic, more limited and specific term (קֶבֶר) to denote the locality of the dead body. The term *sheol* is clearly of a generic character, and signifies *the world, or region of the dead*. It cannot be shown from the word itself merely, that it refers exclusively to the locality of the soul. 2. That such is the meaning here is rendered quite probable, if not certain, from the parallelism. Gesenius, De Wette, Hengstenberg, and others maintain that שְׁחָרָה in the following hemistich translated after the Septuagint (διαφθορά) *corruption*, signifies *the pit*, which is but another name for *the grave*. The noun occurs twenty-two times in the Old Testament; thirteen times it is rendered in our authorized version, *pit*; once, *grave*; twice, *ditch*; twice, *destruction*, and four times (Job 17 : 14; Ps. 16 : 10; 49 : 9; Jonah 2 : 6) *corruption*. By comparing the passages any one can see that in two of the places in which it is translated *corruption* (Psalm 49 : 9; and Jonah 2 : 6), it might more properly be rendered *grave* and *pit*. But whether we render it here by *pit* or *corruption*, is immaterial to our argument; for, in either case, it refers to the *body*. 3. If it could be shown that *sheol* must here denote specifically the *abode of the rational soul*, it would not follow that this is located under the earth. For the mere circumstance that such was the popular belief or conjecture of the ancient Hebrews, would not prove this to be the fact. There is no evidence that they obtained this information from direct revelation. On this point the Hebrews may have been, and doubtless were, mistaken. 4. There is no proper antithesis between נַפְשׁ (soul) in the first member of the verse and the corresponding word קָדוֹשׁ (holy one) in the second, which requires us to understand the former of the rational soul. The word נַפְשׁ may be here, as it often is elsewhere, an idiomatic periphrasis for the personal pronoun and equivalent to אֲנִי

me. If so, then the distich forms a synonymous parallelism, and may be rendered,

"Thou wilt not leave (abandon) me to the grave;
Thou wilt not suffer thy Holy One to see (experience) corruption."

To this it has been objected that Peter, in quoting the passage as prophetic of the Messiah (Acts 2: 25—31), lays an emphasis on the word *ψυχή* (*soul*), and that consequently he designed to discriminate between the *soul* and the *body* of Jesus, as if the one were in the *receptacle of Spirits*, and the other in the *grave*. But it cannot be satisfactorily established that such emphasis exists. Indeed the reading *ψυχὴ αὐτοῦ* of the Textus Receptus in v. 31, is a very doubtful one. The words are not found in several of the oldest and best Mss. (A B C D), nor in the Vulg. Syr. Copt. Sahid, and Arab. (Erpenian) versions; and are either cancelled or bracketed in all critical editions of the New Testament. That no emphasis is to be sought in the word, is clearly manifest, we think, from the manner in which both Peter and Paul refer to the passage. Paul does not quote the first member of the verse at all (Acts 13: 35), but *does* lay an emphasis on the word *διαφθορά*, (ῥῥῥ), *corruption*, in the second clause: "For David, after he had served his generation by the will of God, fell on sleep (i. e. died), and was laid unto his fathers, and *saw corruption*. But he, whom God raised again, *saw no corruption*" (vs. 36, 37). The sole purpose, moreover, for which both the apostles appeal to the passage, is simply to show that the resurrection of the Messiah from the dead was the subject of ancient prophecy, and that Jesus by rising from the dead without experiencing corruption or the destruction of his body, was consequently the Messiah. They direct particular attention to the death, burial, and resurrection of the uncorrupted body of Jesus, and pass over the intervening period and all that related to it, with the least possible notice. (See Acts 2: 29.) Paul also in his first Epistle to the Corinthians, makes distinct mention of the death, burial, and resurrection of Christ, as topics upon which he had frequently dis-

coursed to them (15 : 3, 4), but passes over his intermediate existence in the world of spirits in silence. On the whole, then, we think that this *locus classicus* affords very little support to the theory which it is brought to sustain.

2. Another passage which is relied upon to establish the theory of a third subterranean place of the departed, is the declaration of our Saviour on the cross to the penitent robber: "This day shall thou be with me in paradise" (Luke 23 : 43). It is alleged that the paradise here spoken of could not have been heaven, because our Saviour said to his disciples after his resurrection: "Touch me not, for I have not yet ascended to my Father," *i. e.* to heaven. Hence it is inferred that paradise is the name given to the upper compartment in *Hades*, or the underworld. And in support of this view an appeal is made to the *usus loquendi* of the sacred, the Jewish, and the early Christian writers. It becomes necessary, therefore, to examine these sources of evidence. And, first, what is the Biblical use of the word *paradise*? The word is of Eastern origin. It was a name common to several of the Oriental languages (e. g. the Sanscrit, Armenian, Arabic, and Syriac), but especially current among the Persians. From these it passed into the Hebrew, the Greek, and the Latin, and subsequently into all the Western languages. Its proper signification in the East was a *beautiful garden*, a *park*, a *pleasure ground*. The earliest instance that we have of it in Greek (*παράδεισος*) is in the Cyropædia and other writings of Xenophon, about 400 years before Christ. The circumstance which has given to this term its extensive and popular use is its having been employed by the Greek translators of the LXX. and afterwards in the Syriac version, and by Jerome in the Latin Vulg. as a translation of *the garden* (גֶּן) in which our first parents were placed. The word belongs to the Later Hebrew and occurs (גֶּן עֵדֶן, *pardees*) only in three places in the Old Testament (Neh. 2 : 8; Eccles. 2 : 5; Cant. 4 : 13). In the first of these it is rendered *forest*; in the other two, *orchard*. In the apocryphal book of Susanna, the word occurs constantly in the sense of *garden*. So Sirac, 24 : 30. Josephus calls the

gardens of Solomon in the plur. *paradises* (Ant. VIII. 7, 3). From a literal sense it came at length to be used metaphorically to denote the abstract idea of *exquisite delight* (Sirac 40: 17, 27); and then it became a symbolical name for *heaven*, the *happy region of the blessed*, the *dwelling-place of God*, of Christ, of holy angels, and of the Spirits of the just make perfect,—the house of many mansions which Jesus has gone to prepare for his faithful followers. In the New Testament the word occurs *three times* (2 Cor. 12: 4; Rev. 2: 7; and Luke 23: 43). In the first passage, Paul speaks of himself as having been caught up into paradise.¹ In verse 2, he says that he was caught up into the *third heaven*. The two, then, are identical. Some commentators, it is true, seek to prevent this inference by alleging that the Apostle refers to two separate visions occurring on different occasions, in one of which the scene is laid in *Heaven*, and in the other in *Hades*; and that consequently paradise and the third heaven are not the same. But this allegation is incapable of proof, and altogether improbable. There can be no reasonable doubt that verses 2 and 3 contain, not a fresh assumption, but merely a solemn repetition of what is affirmed in verse 2, with the additional particular of Paul's having had unspeakable revelations made to him. Even Olshausen, who makes a distinction between the upper and the lower paradise, and supposes the latter

¹ Our argument does not require that any stress should be laid on the particle *up* in our English version. The verb ἀρπάζω (v. 4) does not of itself indicate the direction of motion, but only the suddenness of the action, and the passiveness of the object. We may therefore translate *was snatched, caught or carried away* into paradise (see Matt. 13: 19. Acts 8: 30). The same word, however, occurs in v. 2, and undoubtedly in the same sense, where Paul is said to have been *caught up* (ἀρπαγέντα) *into or unto* (ἔως) *the third heaven*. Now if ἔως τρίτου οὐρανοῦ is identical in import with εἰς τὸν παράδεισον, or at least so far equivalent to it, as to be a general local description of a situation, in which ὁ παράδεισος is found, as seems to be quite certain, then *paradise* cannot be the happy region or side of the underworld, as is imagined; for no biblical writer with whom we are acquainted, has ever thought of placing the *third heaven under the earth*. Forasmuch, then, as the third or highest heaven has been always understood and represented to be far *above* the earth, and beyond the siderial heavens, so ἀρπάζω may here in both instances of its occurrence very properly from the adjunct acquire the meaning of *to catch or snatch up*, as it is rendered not only in our English Bible, but by most translators (see also 1 Thess. 4: 17. Rev. 12: 5).

to be situated in the happy portion of *Sheol*, maintains that, in this place, the two expressions used by the Apostle refer to the same thing, and denote the most exalted region of light, the immediate presence of God. The same remark applies to Alford.

In the second passage (Rev. 2: 7.) we find the following declaration. "To him that overcometh will I give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the *midst of the paradise of God.*" In this place the word *paradise* is universally admitted to signify without doubt *heaven*, considered as a place of exquisite delight. The usage of the term in the two passages which have been considered, warrants us in putting the same interpretation upon it in the only remaining passage in which it occurs, unless there be something special and peculiar in it which requires a different construction. But we can discover nothing of this sort. The objection that our Saviour did not ascend to heaven until some time after his crucifixion, is more specious than solid. It is true that, as to his human body, of which he was speaking, he did not immediately ascend; but he certainly did as to his divine nature, and so also, as we think, as to his human soul. Let us now inquire into the Rabbinical use of the word *paradise*. The language of Paul and of John, not to say of our Saviour, implies a prior belief among the Jews, or at least of some among them, that paradise was in heaven. Without this the apostles would hardly have been understood. This statement is corroborated by one of Witstein's quotations appended to Luke. 23: 43. Chagiga. fol. 14. 2. "Four have entered paradise by the hand of God."¹ The application of this term to denote the happiness of the righteous in the future state, originated according to J. Pye Smith (Kitto's Cyc.) with the Jews of the middle period between the Old and New Testament. "In the Chaldee Targums 'the garden of Eden' is put as the exposition of heavenly blessedness (Ps. 90: 17, and other places). The Talmudical writings, cited by the elder Bux-

¹ See Huidekoper. "The Belief of the First Three Centuries concerning Christ's Mission to the Underworld." p. 107.

torf (Lex. Chald. et Talm. p. 1802) and John James Witsstein (N. T. Gr. Vol. I. p. 819), contain frequent references to *paradise* as the immortal heaven, to which the spirits of the just are admitted immediately upon their liberation from the body. The book of Sohar speaks of an earthly and a heavenly paradise, of which the latter excels the former as much as darkness does light. (Schoettgen, Hor. Hebr. Vol. I. p. 1096)." There can be no doubt, therefore, that the word was used by the Jewish doctors in the time of our Saviour, in the sense in which it is used in the New Testament to designate the heavenly world. We now turn to the *Patristic use* of the word. The following passages will show how the Antenicene Fathers were in the habit of employing the term. Origen believes in a twofold paradise. The former he located in the *third heaven*; the other *on earth*. Of the former he affirms that Paul heard in the third heaven what, according to his own quotation immediately preceding he heard in paradise.¹ In this paradise Adam had originally been. "The Lord God," says Origen, who was a believer in the pre-existence of souls, "cast him out of paradise and placed him over against the paradise of delights, and this was the punishment of his fault, which has certainly passed upon all men."² Of the earthly paradise he says: "I think that whoever departs this life in holiness will remain in a certain place on earth which the scriptures call paradise, as in a place of instruction. If any one is clean in heart, and particularly pure in mind and quick in the use of his faculties, he will depart at an early day, and ascend without delay to the region of the air, and will finally arrive at the kingdom of the heavens."³

Tertullian represents *opponents* as maintaining the soul's direct departure at death to *paradise*, which he meets by the question: "How will the soul be exhaled into *heaven*" prior to the judgment?⁴ It would seem then that these opponents, whoever they may have been, placed paradise

¹ Fragmenta, Vol. IV. p. 694. A. See Huidekoper, p. 108.

² Comment. in Rom. Lib. V. 4. Opp. Vol. IV. p. 556.

³ De Principiis, II. xi. 6. Vol. I. p. 106.

⁴ See Huidekoper, p. 111.

in heaven, not in the under world. Tertullian himself sometimes places paradise in heaven; into which, however, he contends that only martyrs are transferred immediately after this life. "No one," he says, "on leaving the body dwells immediately with the Lord, unless he who by the prerogative of martyrdom shall go to *paradise* instead of to the under world."¹ In other places Tertullian places paradise *on* the earth, but not *under* it.

Cyprian places paradise in heaven, or identifies it with heaven. "Let us embrace" he says, "the day which assigns to each his abode; which when we are taken thence (out of the world by death), restores us to *paradise* and the *celestial kingdom*."² These quotations are sufficient to show that the early Fathers placed paradise either in heaven or upon earth, or else held to a twofold paradise, the one celestial, the other terrestrial; but that they carefully avoided the location of it in the under world.³ No doubt paradise is a part of *Hades*, taken in the wide, etymological sense of *invisible world*, but not in the special sense of *under world*.

3. The next passage relied upon to prove the existence of an intermediate, temporary, and subterranean locality of souls, is the parable of Lazarus (Lu. 16: 19—31). It is undoubtedly the fact that, in the time of our Saviour, the popular notions of the Jews with respect to *Hades*, bore a near resemblance to those of the Greeks and Romans. And the costume of this parable is made to conform to the opinions which then prevailed. But it is difficult to perceive how it furnishes any support to the theory which it is adduced to support.

It is confidently affirmed that Lazarus and Dives went to different compartments of *Hades*. But the parable does not say that Lazarus went to *Hades*; but was *carried by angels into Abraham's bosom*. This is a figurative expression, denoting nearness to Abraham, and a participation in his felicity. True, the early Christian Fathers commonly placed

¹ De Resurrect. carnis, c. 43, p. 411.

² De Mortalitate, p. 166.

³ See Huidekoper, pp. 105—117. Also Hagenbach, History of Doctrines, Vol. I. pp. 235, 236.

the locality of Abraham's bosom in the under world. And this they were probably led to do from the use of the expression in this parable. But the respective abodes of Dives and Lazarus were far apart, and separated by an impassable gulf. "Nor is it likely," says bishop Pearson, "that the angels, which see the face of God, would be sent down from heaven to convey the souls of the just into that place, where the face of God cannot be seen. When God translated Enoch, and Elias was carried up in a chariot into heaven, they seem not to have been conveyed to a place where there was no vision of God; and yet it is most probable that Moses was with Elias as well before as upon the mount; nor is there any reason to conceive that Abraham should be in any worse place or condition than Enoch was, having as great a 'testimony that he pleased God' as Enoch had."¹ But even if we suppose, with some, that the story of this parable was a Rabbinical one, applied, according to our Saviour's custom, to his own instructive purposes; and that the phrase "Abraham's bosom" was employed by the Rabbins to denote the happy side or upper region of the under world, we are not compelled to admit the truth and reality of the representation. The object of parables is the inculcation of important doctrinal or moral truths, in the most pleasing and impressive manner. The story may be founded on fact, or be entirely fictitious; and, provided the doctrines designed to be inculcated be true, the terms in which they are inculcated may be adapted to the prevailing ideas of those to whom they are addressed, whether true or false. It may, indeed, be often difficult for us to separate the drapery from the truths which underlie it, and to discover the precise point or points which a parable is designed to illustrate. The context, which is our principal guide, may fail to give all the information required, and we may be left to gather the scope from a careful examination of the parable-itself. Still, nothing can be more evident than that, in compositions of this kind, a literal interpretation of the whole would often

¹ Pearson, Exposition of the Creed, Art. V.

lead to the greatest absurdities and contradictions, and that consequently we must discriminate between the truths designed to be inculcated and the costume and drapery in which they are clothed. The leading truths which appear to be enforced in this parable are these: that the soul is immortal, and exists in a separate and conscious state after the dissolution of the body; that the future condition of men will be according to their real character, and not according to their outward circumstances in this world; and that that condition, whatever it may be, whether happy or miserable, will be unchangeable and eternal. The parable furnishes no support to the theory of an intermediate state and temporary abode of the soul after death, which is to be exchanged, at the general resurrection, for another. It contains not the slightest allusion to anything of the kind.

4. Eph. 4: 9, 10. "Now that he ascended, what is it but that he also descended first into the lower parts of the earth? He that descended is the same also that ascended up far above all heavens, that he might fill all things." This passage, in its application to Christ, is susceptible of three interpretations. "The lower parts of the earth," may be used for the *earth itself*, in opposition to heaven (Isa. 44: 2), and would then refer to the incarnation of Jesus, including his entire mediatorial work on earth; or, it may denote *the grave*, and then it would refer to the burial of Jesus and his descent into the sepulchre (Ps. 63: 9. Matt. 12: 40); or, it may signify the same as *Hades*, and then it would have reference to the *descensus Christi ad inferos*, taking the word *Hades* either in its more general sense of the *under world*, including the local habitation both of the body and the soul, or in its more restricted sense, of the soul. Against the last interpretation, it may be urged that the idea of a descent into a subterranean region is entirely foreign to the meaning of the passage in the Psalm (lxviii) on which the apostle is commenting; that the only descent of which the context speaks is opposed to the ascending to heaven; and that this is the opposition so often expressed in other places and in other forms of expression (e. g. John 3: 13. 6: 38. 8:

14. 16 : 28).¹ It is most probable that the genitive τῆς γῆς, as Winer thinks,² is the genitive of apposition, and exegetical of τὰ κατώτερα μέρη, and that the expression means "the lower parts," viz. "the earth" (see 2 Cor. 5 : 5. Rom. 8 : 23. 4 : 11, etc. Comp. Acts 2 : 19, where the heaven above is apposed to the earth beneath ; and John 8 : 23). If this be the meaning of the passage, then it lends no support to the theory we are controverting. Indeed, so doubtful is its meaning, that some of the advocates of the theory place very little reliance upon it. (See Browne's Exp. of the xxxix Articles, p. 88.)

(5) The last passage which we shall notice, as relied upon to prove the existence of an intermediate, subterranean receptacle of disembodied souls, is 1 Pet. 3 : 18—20. "Being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the spirit; by which also he went and preached unto the spirits in prison, which sometime were disobedient, when once the long-suffering of God waited in the days of Noah." This is confessedly a very obscure and difficult passage, and perhaps no interpretation which has been given of it is entirely satisfactory. The view generally adopted by Protestant divines at the present day is, that by "the Spirit" in this place is meant—not the human soul of Jesus, but either *the Holy Spirit*, the third person of the Trinity, or the *divine nature* of Christ,—the "Spirit of holiness," according to which he is "the Son of God," in contradistinction to his being "the Son of David according to the flesh;" *i. e.*, as to his human nature. In or as to this divine Spirit he preached through the instrumentality of Noah to the antediluvians, none of whom, however, so far as we know, believed, except the small number who were saved in the ark. Another interpretation has been propounded by Doctors Skinner and Browne.³ According to these critics, the phrase, "quickened in the Spirit," signifies *spiritually quickened*, and refers

¹ See Hodge's Commentary on Ephesians.

² Grammar of N. T. § 48. 2.

³ See Biblical Repository for April 1843, p. 470, and Bibliotheca Sacra for Nov. 1847, p. 708.

to the moral power and results of Christ's mediatorial work, "the spiritual life and power conferred on the Saviour as the reward of his disinterested labors in the cause of God's honor and man's salvation," which "was illustriously manifested in that wonderful quickening of his apostles by the communication of the Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost, and in communicating, through the instrumentality of their ministry, spiritual life and all its concomitant and following blessings, to a multitude of souls dead in sin." By "the spirits in prison," we are to understand, sinful but living men, righteously condemned for their guilt and depravity; the slaves and captives of Satan, shackled with the fetters of sin. The coming and preaching describe, not what our Lord did *bodily* (σαρκικῶς or σωματικῶς), but what he did *spiritually* (πνευματικῶς); not what he did personally, but by the instrumentality of others. According to the first interpretation, the preaching of Christ refers to a period long anterior to his incarnation; according to the latter, it refers to a period subsequent to his resurrection and ascension into heaven. It is not necessary to our present inquiry to determine which of these is the true or more probable meaning of the passage. They are both equally opposed to the notion that Christ's mission and preaching were to disembodied spirits in Hades, which is the sense in which it is understood by those, whether in ancient or in modern times, who appeal to it in support of the Article in the Creed. These differ as to the particular compartment in *Hades* intended by φυλακή, *prison*. Some suppose it to denote the *unhappy side* — the *lower region* — the special locality and abode of the wicked and impenitent = τάρταρος, γέεννα, ἄβυσσος. Others make it refer to the *happy side* — the *upper region* — *paradise* — *Abraham's bosom*, or the Limbus patrum of the Romanists. The latter view is ingeniously advocated by Bishop Horsley, and has been adopted by Hobart, Bloomfield, H. Browne, and many others, especially in the Episcopal church. The learned Bishop maintains that the Greek word φυλακή, translated *prison*, simply denotes a *place of safe-keeping*, and accordingly proposes to render the clause in Peter thus:

"He went and preached to the spirits in safe-keeping." He thinks that the persons in safe-keeping, to whom the Apostle particularly refers, were the antediluvians, who had been disobedient, but who before their death, were brought to repentance and faith. And he supposes that Christ in his disembodied state went to this subterranean φυλακή, not for the purpose of preaching repentance or faith, because the preaching of either comes too late to the departed soul, and because these souls had believed and repented, or they would not have been in that part of the nether regions which the soul of the Redeemer visited; nor with a view to announce any liberation of them from we know not what purgatorial pains, of which the scriptures give not the slightest intimation; but he went to proclaim to them the glad tidings that he had actually offered the sacrifice of their redemption, and was about to appear before the Father as their intercessor.¹

This hypothesis of the Bishop is, we think, liable to serious objections, both philological and theological. We wait for the production of a single passage from the New Testament which sustains him in the interpretation which he has put upon the word φυλακή. This word, which properly signifies *watch, guard*, is applied to the act of keeping watch, *guarding* (Luke 2: 8); to the persons who are set to watch, a *watch, guard* (Acts 12: 10); to the place where a watch is kept, a *watch-post, station* (Rev. 18: 2); and to the place where any one is watched or guarded, *ward, custody, a prison*. The signification of *prison*, as denoting a place of penal confinement, is unquestionably the predominant one in the New Testament. It is the meaning in at least thirty-five instances out of forty-seven in which it occurs; whereas not a solitary instance does the Bishop appeal to in support of the signification which he assigns to the word. A slight analogy to the signification advocated by the Bishop, may be thought to exist in Luke 2: 8, where the shepherds at Bethlehem are said to have been "keeping watch over their flocks by night;" but it is one which will not hold on close

¹ See Bishop Horsley's Sermon. XX. Vol. II.

comparison, "safe *custody* or *keeping*," which is equivalent to *protection*, implies the presence or probability of *danger*; but what further danger is to be apprehended by those who have passed their present probation? What is the class of enemies from whom the spirits of departed saints or penitents need to be guarded? On what side is it that they are threatened with assault? Of what nature are those attempts on their happiness against which vigilance has to be exercised? *Saints are kept*, and need to be kept, by *the power of God only unto the salvation* (1 Peter 1: 5) which awaits them on their release from this world."¹

The reason also assigned by the Bishop for the mission of Christ to the under world, can scarcely be called anything but puerile. It had no important object, and was followed by no results. He went, it seems, to announce to the antediluvian penitents the great fact that he had completed his work of redemption. But why was his preaching or announcement confined to them? Were not the souls of the post-diluvian penitents equally interested in the joyful tidings? Why then are they passed by in silence?

An angelic choir was deputed to give information to the living inhabitants of earth, of Christ's incarnation to enter on his work of mercy. Could not the same angelic messengers have proclaimed to the antediluvians in paradise the completion of his work?

What scriptural authority is there moreover, for the assertion that the antediluvians or any considerable portion of them repented at the preaching of Noah? It is indeed possible that some of them might have repented at the last moment, when it was too late to escape the threatened destruction, but there is not a shadow of proof of it. Indeed, the contrary seems to be distinctly implied in such passages as Luke 17: 27; 2 Pet. 2: 5; Heb. 11: 7. The assumption, therefore, is entirely gratuitous, and the whole theory is consequently baseless. That the souls of the pious on leaving the body pass immediately to heaven, we think is perfectly clear from the declaration of Paul (2 Cor. 5: 6—8):

¹ Kitto's Journal of Sacred Literature for Jan. 1853, p. 451.

“We are always confident, knowing that whilst we are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord (for we walk by faith, not by sight); we are confident, I say, and willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present (lit. *to be at home*) with the Lord.” This passage manifestly teaches that, when the soul of the Christian departs from the body, it lives with Christ, dwells where he dwells, and enjoys intimate familiar intercourse with him there: it goes to its home, its everlasting home. But to be present or at home with Christ is certainly to be in heaven, for it is there in his glorified human nature, that Christ now is, and not in the under world. Comp. also 2 Cor. 5: 1, 2.

Philipp. 1: 23, 24. “I am in a strait betwixt two, having a desire to depart and *to be with Christ*; nevertheless, to abide in the flesh is more needful for you.” It cannot admit of a doubt that *to be with Christ* in this passage is a phrase of the same import as *to be present* (or at home) *with the Lord* in 1 Cor. 5: 8. Paul then here reiterates the declaration which he had made in the Epistle to the Corinthians. From these passages it seems impossible to come to any other conclusion than that Paul expected immediately after death to enter upon the enjoyment of heavenly felicity with his Saviour. Comp. John 17: 24. Stephen, Acts 7: 55, 59.

That this is the doctrine of the Protestant Episcopal church, will clearly appear, we think, from the following passages. The doctrines held by that church are to be learned from the Articles of religion, the Liturgy, and the Homilies. In reference to the subject under consideration, the Articles are silent. Not so the Liturgy and Homilies. There is the negative testimony arising from the fact that, in no part either of the one or the other, is there any allusion to a third or intermediate place of abode — a subterranean locality — for the soul after death. And it is somewhat remarkable that except in the Apostles’ Creed and Art. III. of religion, there is a studied silence in regard to Christ’s descent into hell. Thus in the Litany the following obsecrations are put into the mouths of her members. “By thy

cross and passion ; by thy precious death and burial ; by the glorious resurrection and ascension." Here the descent into hell is passed over in silence. Again, in the consecration prayer in the Communion service, the following passage occurs : " having in remembrance his blessed passion and precious death, his mighty resurrection and glorious ascension." But there is positive testimony to the belief of the Episcopal church in the immediate transition of the soul after death to heaven. Thus in the prayer for a sick child, in the office for the visitation of the sick, the worshippers are instructed to pray : " Or else receive him into those heavenly habitations where the souls of those who sleep in the Lord Jesus enjoy perpetual rest and felicity."¹ In the prayer for a sick person the following petition occurs : " Yet, forasmuch as in all appearance the time of his dissolution draweth nigh, so fit and prepare him, we beseech thee, against the hour of death, that after his departure hence in peace, and in thy favor, his soul may be received into thine everlasting kingdom." So in the Occasional prayer for a sick person : " Or else give him grace so to take thy visitation, that after this painful life ended, he may dwell with thee in life everlasting." In the Burial service we read : " Almighty God, *with whom* do live the spirits of those who depart hence in the Lord ; and *with whom* the souls of the faithful, after they are delivered from the burden of the flesh, *are in joy and felicity.*" The language of the Homilies is very explicit on the subject. In the second part of the Homily against the fear of death the following passage occurs : " Let us be always of good comfort ; for we know that so long as we be in the body, we be as it were far from God in a strange country, subject to many perils, walking without perfect sight and knowledge of Almighty God, only seeing him by faith in the Holy Scriptures. But we have a courage and desire, rather to *be at home with God and our Saviour Christ, far from the body ; where we behold his Godhead, as he is, face to face, to our everlasting comfort.* These be Paul's

¹ The same language occurs in the Occasional prayer for a sick child.

words in effect; whereby we may perceive, that the life in this world is resembled and likened to a pilgrimage in a strange country, far from God; and that death, *delivering us from our bodies, doth send us straight home into our own country, and maketh us to dwell presently with God for ever, in everlasting rest and quietness.*"

Again, in the third part of the Homily on prayer, there occur the following passages: "The scripture *doth acknowledge but two places after this life*; the one proper to the elect and blessed of God, the other to the reprobate and damned souls, as may be well gathered by the parable of Lazarus and the rich man," etc. — "Where is then the *third place*, which they (the Romanists) call purgatory? Augustine doth only acknowledge *two places after this life, heaven and hell*. As for the *third place*, he doth plainly deny that there is any such to be found in all scripture." — "As the scripture teacheth us, let us think that *the soul of man passing out of the body, goeth straightways either to heaven or else to hell*; whereof the one needeth no prayer, and the other is without redemption."¹

Such being clearly the doctrine of the Protestant Episcopal church in regard to the future state, it only remains to reconcile this with the Article of Christ's descent into hell. We cannot suppose that she designs to teach one doctrine in her Liturgy and Homilies and another in her Creed and Articles of religion. The two can be harmonized only by putting a liberal construction on the creeds. And this has been done by the American church herself, in the Rubric prefixed to the Creed, in which she substitutes the words: "He went into the place of departed spirits," as of equivalent import. The terms in which this substitute is couched are quite general and indefinite. By employing the verb *went* in the place of *descended*, she virtually repu-

¹ In the Articles of religion, probably drawn up by Usher, and agreed upon by the Archbishops and Bishops and the rest of the clergy of Ireland, A. 1615, we find the following declaration on this subject: § 101. "After this life is ended the souls of God's children will be presently received into heaven, there to enjoy unspeakable comforts; the souls of the wicked are cast into hell, there to endure endless torments."

diates the hypothesis of a subterranean cavity as the receptacle of disembodied souls. And the phrase "place of departed spirits," *determines nothing* as to an intermediate locality, separate and distinct from both heaven and hell. It merely affirms that the soul of Jesus at his death went to its appropriate place in the invisible, spiritual world. Thus understood the dogma of Christ's descent into hell, is freed from all difficulty and mystery, and made plain to the comprehension of every mind, as well as consonant with the general tenor of scripture. — The results to which we are brought by the preceding remarks are :

1. That the soul of man does not die or sleep with the body, but immediately after the dissolution of the latter, passes into a separate disembodied, conscious state, and into its appropriate place (so far as spirits may be supposed to occupy place), either of enjoyment or of suffering, — its heaven or its hell, — according to the moral character which it may possess.

2. That there is no third intermediate place of spiritual existence; no subterranean habitation of disembodied souls, either of probation or of purgation; no imaginary paradise in the under world where the souls of the pious are preserved in safe keeping; no limbus patrum, no limbus infantum, no purgatory.

3. That our Saviour, according to the Creed, was perfect man as well as perfect God, having a human soul no less than a human body.

4. That when crucified he died in reality and not merely in appearance (syncope), since there took place an actual separation of his soul and body.

5. That the idle and unprofitable question as to the object of Christ's descent into Hades is precluded; a question which greatly perplexed the fathers, the schoolmen, and the Reformers, and led to the invention of many absurd and unscriptural theories.

ARTICLE V.

THE THEOLOGY OF ÆSCHYLUS.

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THERE could be no greater misapprehension of the ancient Greek drama, than to judge of it by the modern theatre. They have little in common but the name. The points of contrast are more numerous and more striking than the points of resemblance. The modern drama is exhibited within doors, in the night, and by gas light or candle light. The ancient was by day, in the open air, and beneath the broad, pure light of heaven. The modern theatre is a common building; and though of extraordinary size and splendor, yet enclosed by walls and roof, and capable at most of containing only two or three thousand people. The Greek theatre was hewn out of the solid rock in the side of the Acropolis, or built up with quarried stone on a scale of similar magnificence; and it counted its audience by tens of thousands. The spectators in a Parisian theatre can see nothing but the theatre, with its temporary and insignificant adornings. The Acropolis, the Agora, the porticoes, the temples and altars of the gods, all the architectural splendors of Athens, clustered around those who gathered in the theatre of Dionysos; all the natural and historical glories of Attica were spread before them. As they had no covering but the blue sky, and no light but the bright sun, the singularly *deep, liquid*, blue sky, and the wonderfully *bright* sun of *Greece*, so the horizon was the only limit to their field of vision.

The modern theatre is a private speculation, patronized it may be by royalty, and sometimes attended by the aristocracy, where monarchy and aristocracy exist, but for the most part filled and supported by the lowest and the worst of the population. At Athens, the theatre was a public institution, the expenses were paid, directly or indirectly, out

of the public treasury ; the government was the proprietor and manager, and the audience was the enlightened, the refined, the sovereign people of Athens, together with the *elite* from all the principal cities of Greece. The theatre, as it now exists in the cities of Europe and America, is generally, if not universally, a school of vice and crime, in which bad men and women teach other men and women, not quite so bad as themselves, to gratify their appetites and passions, and to become the pests of society. The theatre, as it was in its palmy days in the Grecian cities, was a school of good morals and religion, taught by the wisest and best men of their times ; for such were the tragic poets in the age of the immortal triumvirate of Greek tragedy ; and the poets themselves were not only the authors but the actors, or at least the *trainers* of the actors, of their own dramas ; and as tragedy was the consummate flower of Greek poetry, the epic and the lyric, the objective and the subjective, united in one perfect blossom, so was it also the opening bud of ethical philosophy and theology. As it was taught in the school of Homer and Pindar, so was it the teacher of Socrates and Plato, and of the great Athenian orator, in whom the ethics as well as the eloquence, the practical philosophy as well as the elegant literature of Greece culminated. Such is the rank which Milton assigns the tragedians in his splendid description of Athens in the *Paradise Lost* :

“ What the lofty, grave tragedians taught
In chorus or Iambic, teachers best
Of moral prudence, with delight received,
In high sententious maxims, while they treat
Of fate, and chance, and change in human life,
High actions and high passions best describing.”

The modern drama aspires only to amuse the theatre-going multitude. The ancient was designed, not more for entertainment than for instruction. Modern theatrical entertainments, if not in open hostility to religion, are habitually irreligious. Greek tragedy grew up in connection with religious worship, and constituted not only a popular but a sacred

element in the festivals of the gods.¹ "The theatre was invented," says an old Roman writer, "for the worship of the gods, and for the delight of men."²

In short, strange as it may sound in modern ears, the Greek stage was, more nearly than anything else, the Greek pulpit. With a priesthood that sacrificed but did not preach, with few books of any kind and no Bible, the people were, in a great measure, dependent on oral instruction for knowledge; and, as they learned their rights and duties as citizens from their orators, so they hung on the lips of the "lofty, grave tragedians," for instruction touching their origin, duty, and destiny as moral and immortal beings. As the Pnyx was their legislative hall, and the Bema the source of their deliberative eloquence, so their demonstrative eloquence, the eloquence of the pulpit, proceeded from the stage and resounded through the theatre. Greek tragedy is essentially didactic, ethical, mythological, religious. It was the express office of the chorus, which held the most prominent place in the ancient drama, to interpret the mysteries of Providence, to justify the ways of God to men, to plead the cause of truth, virtue, and piety. Hence it was composed usually of aged men, whose wisdom was fitted to instruct in the true and the right, or of young women, whose virgin purity would instinctively shrink from falsehood and wrong. The chief end of tragedy, according to Aristotle, is to purify the heart and regulate the passions; to which end, the rhythm of the choral dance, the harmony of the music, and the metre of the verse conspired with the moral lessons more directly taught by the characters, the chorus, and the plot. Tragedy, in its very nature, as conceived by the Greeks, transported the hearer out of himself and away from the present. It carried him back towards the origin of our race, up nearer to the providence and presence

¹ It may be said, that the modern drama had a similar *origin* in the Mediæval "Mysteries." But it has quite forgotten its original.

² *Theatra excogitata cultus deorum et hominum delectationis causa.* Valerius Maximus, as quoted by Blackie, who places the passage on the title-page of his translation of Æschylus into English verse.

of the gods, and on toward the retributions of another world. With few exceptions, the subjects are mythological. The characters are heroes and demigods, monsters, it may be, in crime, but their punishment is equally prodigious: sin and suffering always go together. They illustrate, by their lips and in their lives, the providence and the retributive justice of God. The plot turns on some great principle of the divine government, which is further explained and enforced in the sublime strains of the chorus. The myth, out of Homer or Hesiod — no myth, but a sacred reality, to the audience — is the text; the corypheus is the preacher; and the choir repeat the doctrine, investing it with all the sanctity and majesty of their sacred lyrics. Nor is prayer wanting in these ancient *liturgies* (λειτουργίαι), since the choruses consist, in no small part, of direct addresses to the deity.

While this is more or less true of all the great masters of Greek tragedy, Æschylus is preëminently the theological poet of Greece. The gods themselves, the *inferior* gods, are not unfrequently the actors as well as the subjects of his dramas; and they handle the grand themes of theology very much as they are handled by the good and evil angels in the *Paradise Lost*. His human characters, even though stained with blood, breathe sentiments of piety; or if they dare utter proud or rebellious words, it is but a prelude to their certain and dreadful overthrow. The great problems which lie at the foundation of religious faith and practice — the same problems which are discussed by Job and his three friends — are the main staple of nearly all his tragedies. With him, these were not idle speculations. They were practical questions, with which his own mind had manifestly struggled, on which his own destiny was suspended, and into the solution of which he enters with not a little of the earnestness of a personal religious experience. The earlier poets, Homer, Hesiod, the sacred poets, and the authors of the so-called Homeric hymns, had looked at them in their more purely poetical aspects, had believed the myths, perhaps, with a more literal and implicit faith. The

subsequent philosophers, Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, developed them more fully in a system of doctrines. Æschylus stands on the dividing line between them, no less poetical than the former, scarcely less philosophical than the latter, but more intensely practical, personal, and theological than either. The poet, who most resembles him in modern times, is the Puritan poet of Old England. A believer in metempsychosis might well maintain that the same soul dwelt in them both. To say nothing of the obvious resemblance between the Prometheus of the former and the Satan of the latter, which was in part, doubtless, the result of intentional imitation; and not to speak of a similar license in coining or rather forging ponderous poetical epithets; both were characterized by the same matchless sublimity, both possessed by the same strong political and patriotic sympathies, and both fired with the same intense earnestness of religious feeling. Dante was another kindred spirit. The *Inferno*, the *Paradise Lost*, and the *Prometheus Bound*, should be read and studied together. The *Agamemnon* is often and justly compared with *Macbeth*. But the English tragedy illustrates more the workings of the human soul, while the Greek leads us to think almost entirely of the providence of God. In this respect, perhaps, the tragedies of Æschylus find their nearest counterpart in the *Book of Job*. On the whole, there is no other book, of which the reader of Æschylus will be more frequently reminded. The form of both is dramatic. The scene in both is primitive. The characters are the patriarchs and princes of an early age. The interlocutors discuss the same subjects. The same sublime and awful mystery casts its dark shadow over them. They grapple with themes too vast for their comprehension. They wrestle with beings too mighty to be resisted. They are overwhelmed with the contrast between the littleness and vileness of man, and the majesty and glory of God. And they cry out: "What is man, that he should be pure? How shall man be just with his Maker? Who, by searching, can find out God? Lo! these are parts of his ways; but the thunder of his power, who can understand?" It is

not, then, a misnomer, to speak of the *theology* of *Æschylus*; nor can it fail to be a question of deep interest: What were the theological opinions of such a mind, so far removed from the light of revelation?

I. *Sources of Religious Knowledge.*

One of the first questions which naturally arise in considering such a subject, is the source or sources from which the thoughtful and devout, who lived before the dawn of revelation, derived their religious faith, and what the authority on which it rested.

The most fruitful of all these sources is *tradition*; tradition, however, having its origin, according to the common opinion, in a primeval revelation or direct communication from God. They received their religious opinions and observances,—the religion of the family and the religion of the state—as an inheritance from their fathers, who, in like manner, had received the same bequest from theirs; and thus it had come down, like the heir-looms in their families, like the blood in their veins, from their earliest progenitors. Nor did they deem this mere blind credulity, trusting in a long line of ancestors each as ignorant as themselves, and therefore the entire chain hanging without any support. They claimed not to rest on human authority as their ultimate reliance. The higher and better classes, the aristocracy of wisdom and goodness as well as of birth traced their religion, as they did their race, back ultimately to the gods, or to men who walked with the gods and talked with them face to face, like our first parents and the patriarchs of the Old Testament. The universality of this persuasion would, of itself, entitle it to no small credit as an instinctive belief, if it were not expressly sanctioned by revelation; and corrupt and erroneous as many of the *superstitions* (that is, *surviving relics* of the earliest times) are, which the different heathen nations thus hold in common, yet there is enough of general resemblance, both in the form and substance of these traditions, to justify the belief that they did originally

proceed from the same source, and that a primeval revelation or direct communication from heaven. On the subject of future punishment especially, the Greek poets and philosophers are in the habit of appealing to tradition. Thus Plato habitually throws his descriptions of a future state into the form of a *myth*, as he sometimes calls them, though at others he is careful to declare, that they are not *μῦθοι*, but *λόγοι* (cf. *Gorgias*, 523), whose truth he does not indeed know, but he believes them to be true, and insists that they are entitled to universal belief.¹ In reference to the gods, also, he says (*Timæus*, 40, D.), that "the subject is too great for us, but we must believe those who have spoken of it aforetime, who, being, as they said, the offspring of the gods, doubtless knew their own sires, and must not be disbelieved when they tell us, as it were, things pertaining to their own household." And so Æschylus, when he speaks of a great truth in reference to the unseen world, or a great law of the divine providence and existence, very often refers to it as a *λόγος* (*Suppliants*, 230; *Eumenides*, 4, etc.),² or a *μῦθος* (*Choephoræ*, 312, etc.), and often applies to it an epithet, such as *γέρων*, *τρηνέρων*, *παλαιφάτος* (*Ibid.*; *Ag.* 750), expressive of its antiquity and sacredness.

Nearly allied to these sacred traditions are those world-old and world-wide maxims of wisdom, virtue, and piety, which being the voice of mankind, are also the voice of God: *vox populi*, *vox Dei*; which Æschylus delights to honor, like the old English poet,³

"The people's voice the voice of God we call,
And what are proverbs but the people's voice,
Coined first, and current made by public choice?
Then sure they must have weight and truth withal."

¹ Compare the Seventh Epistle, where it is said: "We ought always to believe those ancient and sacred words, which declare the soul to be immortal," *πειθεσθαι δὲ οὕτως αἰεὶ χρὴ τοῖς παλαιοῖς τε καὶ ἱεροῖς λόγοις, οἳ δὴ μηνύουσιν ἡμῖν ἀθάνατον ψυχὴν εἶναι*.

² The citations are made according to the Leipsic edition of Tauchnitz. The arrangement differs much in different editions.

³ Cited by Trench in his *Lessons on Proverbs*.

Oracles are another source of religious knowledge, and especially of guidance in religious duty, to which *Æschylus* often alludes, and generally in terms of profound respect. Thus Inachus, father of Io, sends frequent messengers to Pytho (Delphi), and to Dodona, to learn what he must do or say to please the gods, and receives in return "ambiguous answers, obscurely worded and hard to be understood." (*Prometheus Vincetus*, 660, seq.). But at last there came a clear and distinct response, commanding the father to banish his daughter from home and country, and let her wander an exile to distant lands, under penalties so frightful as to enforce an instant though reluctant obedience. Jupiter is the original source of oracles. They are communicated, however, for the most part, through Apollo, Jupiter's son and prophet (*Eumenides*, 18), who derives his surname *Loxias* from his prophetic office, being as it were the λόγος, word of Jove,¹ and who, from his prophetic seat, never gives forth a response which his father, and the father of the Olympian gods, has not commanded him to give (*Eumen.* 616).² Apollo, of course, ordinarily speaks through the lips of his inspired priestess, who is *his* voice, as he is Jove's; though in the *Eumenides*, Apollo is represented as appearing in his own person as one of the characters of the drama, and pleading with his own lips the cause of Orestes. *Æschylus* never intimates a doubt of the inspiration of the priestess. He is manifestly a sincere believer in the divine authority of oracles. So were all the wise and good in the wisest and best ages of Grecian history. And ambiguous as they often were, perverted as they sometimes were to partisan and selfish purposes, their influence was, on the whole, on the side of truth and justice. Greece, and the ancient world, were the better for their existence. What forbids us to suppose that they were in some sense directed and overruled by Providence, and instead of being under the control of evil spirits, which was the prevailing theory among the Christian

¹ According to another interpretation, this surname denotes the *ambiguity* of the oracles. See Liddell and Scott, *sub voce*.

² Cf. John 7: 16. 8: 28.

Fathers, were intended to be the forerunners among the heathen, as the prophets were among the Jews, of the Christian revelation? With this supposition accords the fact, observed and explained by Plutarch, as best he could, that the heathen oracles died away as that revelation was dawning upon the world.¹

Lots (Septem contra Thebas, 55) ; auguries (*oracular birds with unerring art*, *Ibid.* 26), and other omens ; dreams and visions (Prom. 646 : Persæ 176, et al.) ;

For the mind's eye looks clearly out from sleep,
But mortals have no foresight in the day : (Eumen. 104.)

these are all so many different means by which the gods reveal the future, or make known their will to men.

There are also prophets — Calchas (Agamemnon, 248), Cassandra (*Ibid.* 1073), Amphiaraus (Theb. 568), whom Apollo inspires directly, without the intervention of omens, oracles, or sacrifices, breathing into them his own prophetic spirit, which, like a tempest, tosses their agitated minds, or burns like a fire, in their bones.

Ah, what a sudden flame comes rushing on me !
I burn, I burn. Apollo, O Apollo ! (Agamem. 1256.)

Woe, woe is me ! Again the furious power
Swells in my laboring breast ; again commands
My bursting voice, and what I speak is fate. (*Ibid.* 1215.)

Such are the cries of Cassandra, as she comes again and again under the frenzy of inspiration, and sees, as if they were before her eyes, all the past and future calamities and crimes of the house of Atreus.

¹ See Plutarch, de Defectu Oraculorum. As this may be a point of some interest to some of our readers, the writer may perhaps be excused for referring to an Article on Plutarch's Theology in the Methodist Quarterly for July 1852. In this prince of Grecian moralists, we see the Ultima Thule of heathen morality and theology.

² I have used the metrical versions of Potter, Blackie, and Chapman (in Blackwood's) at pleasure, as they seemed most faithfully to represent the original.

II. *Existence, Nature, and Attributes of the Gods.*

Æschylus is not always consistent with himself in his representations of the gods, especially of the Supreme Divinity. In his *Prometheus Bound* he seems to fall in with those anthropomorphous conceptions of the Deity, which so disfigure the poems of *Homer* and *Hesiod*. The *Jupiter* of this tragedy is an arbitrary despot, who has usurped the throne of his father, and is destined in turn to be dethroned by one of his descendants, who is ignorant of the future, which is known only to *Prometheus*, oppresses the inferior deities, and is intent on the destruction of miserable mortals, — lustful, tyrannical, unjust, and cruel alike to the victims of his appetite and the objects of his displeasure, and lording it over the universe with the morals and the manners of a lawless usurper. But it is not quite fair or safe to take these as the sentiments of the poet himself. We do not gather the theology of *Milton* from the rebellious ravings of *Satan* in the *Paradise Lost*, nor the doctrines of the Bible from the mouth of the Adversary in the *Pentateuch* and the book of *Job*.¹

The character of the Supreme Deity, as it is generally represented in the other tragedies, and as it appears especially in the epithets by which he is addressed by the chorus, corresponds much more nearly with our ideas of the true God. He is the universal father — father of gods and men — the universal cause (*παναίτιος*, *Ag.* 1485); the all-seer and all-doer (*παντόπτης*, *πανεργέτης*, *Ibid.* and *Supplices*, 139); the all-wise and all-controlling (*παγκρατής*, *Sup.* 813); the just and the executor of justice (*δικηφόρος*, *Ag.* 525); true and incapable of falsehood,

Ψευδγορεῖν γὰρ οὐκ ἐπίσταται στόμα
τὸ δῖον, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ἔπος τελεί· (*Prom.* 1031) *

¹ This one-sided view was doubtless balanced and corrected in the concluding piece of the trilogy, the *Prometheus Unbound*, which was exhibited at the same time with the *Prometheus Bound*, and served to complete it, but which is now lost.

* Cf. *Tit.* 1: 2, which God, that cannot lie, promised.

holy (ἁγνός, Sup. 650), merciful (πρηνένης, Ibid. 139); the god especially of the suppliant and the stranger (Supplices, passim); the most high and perfect one (τέλειον ὑψιστον, Eumen. 28); "king of kings, of the happy most happy, of the perfect most perfect power, blessed Zeus:"

ἄναξ ἀνάντων, μακάρων
μακάρτατε, καὶ τελείων
τελειότατον κράτος, ὀλβιε Ζεῦ· (Sup. 522.)

Such are some of the titles by which Jupiter is most frequently addressed; such the attributes which are most commonly ascribed to him. How unlike the *acts* of lust and violence which are imputed to the same divinity by the Greek mythology, and which are alluded to by *Æschylus*, and that not merely in the *Prometheus*, but in the very same chorus which commences with the above sublime invocation! Does not this palpable inconsistency lend confirmation to the idea of a primitive revelation? Must not these truly divine epithets have proceeded originally from a higher and purer source, than the corrupt and corrupting fables which have attached themselves like barnacles to the wrecks of primitive truth that have floated to our shores across the sea of ages?

The general resemblance, suggested by these attributes, between the Supreme God of the Greek tragedies and of the Hebrew scriptures, derives additional force from the frequency with which, as we shall see, he is spoken of as a jealous God, visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children; one who will by no means clear the guilty; whose mysterious providence is an unfathomable abyss, and before whose irresistible power the heavens and the earth are shaken, and gods and men are as nothing.

As Moses inquires the name of the Being who commissions him to deliver Israel, so the chorus of Argive senators in the *Agamemnon* (160) hesitates by what name to invoke the Supreme Deity:

Ζεῦς, ὅστις ποτ' ἔστιν, εἰ τόδ' αὖ-
τῷ φίλον κεκλημένῳ
τοῦτό νυν προσενέπω.

And in accordance with these early tendencies of the Hebrew and the Greek, or, if you please, the Shemitic and Japhetic mind, Paul finds at Athens an altar inscribed "TO AN UNKNOWN GOD," and substantially justifies our mode of interpreting these resemblances by saying to the Athenians: "Whom therefore ye worship unknowing, him declare I unto you" (Acts 17: 23).

We are, however, effectually prevented from placing the notions and traditions of Æschylus on the same level with Revelation, by the low and unworthy, the degrading and demoralizing conceptions of the Deity, which intermingle, even in the best tragedies, with these just ascriptions of truly divine honor and majesty; such for instance as his dethronement of his father (Eumen. 641), his quarrels with his own wife, and amours with the wives and daughters of men (Sup. 162—174, et al.), and the fraud and treachery with which he flatters poor mortals, and lures them on to their own destruction (Pers. 93):

δολόμητιν δ' ἀπάταν θεοῦ
τίς ἀνὴρ θνατοῦ ἀλύξει; κ. τ. λ.

But when the gods deceive,
Wiles which immortals weave,
Who shall beware?
Who, when *their* nets surround,
Breaks with a nimble bound
Out of the snare?
First they approach with smiles,
Wreathing their hidden wiles:
Then with surprise
Seize they their prey; and lo!
Writhing in toils of woe
Tangled he lies.

Jupiter is the invisible deity of the Æschylean pantheon. The other gods — Apollo, Athena, Hermes, Hephæstus, etc. — appear as personages of the drama, and take part in the dialogue; Jupiter never. In accordance with the popular ideas of the good old times in which the scene is laid, *they* walk the earth in human form, and participate directly

in the affairs of men; he sits on his throne and rules over all; or, if he comes down to earth, it is in a more disguised form, as in some myth which we *hear* from the lips of the actors, or in the display of his mighty power, as we *see* it in the storm and the earthquake with which he overwhelms Prometheus. Indeed, as Müller has well remarked in his learned and profound dissertations on the *Eumenides*:¹ "With Æschylus, as with all men of profound feeling among the Greeks, from the earliest times, Jupiter is the only real God in the higher sense of the word. Although he is in the spirit of ancient theology a generated God, arisen out of an imperfect state of things, and not produced till the *third*² stage of the development of nature, still he is, at the time we are speaking of, the spirit that pervades and governs the Universe." As in the epithets applied to him we seem to see the relics of a primeval revelation, so in his immense superiority to the other gods, we see the primitive monotheism often breaking through the clouds of polytheistic error and superstition.

Besides the Most High and Universal Father, the Greek mythology recognizes an indefinite number of inferior deities, subordinate to his supreme authority, the messengers of his will, and the agents of his universal providence. These appear, in the tragedies of Æschylus, in the most real and practical light, now as direct actors in the drama, now as objects of fear or trust, supplication or deprecation to mortals, and now as the acting deities of this lower world; and we seem to see the process still going on before our eyes, by which they came into so real an existence.

The analogy of human life is the fruitful source from which many of them sprang. They wear the human form. They exhibit human appetites, desires, and passions, at the same time that they are invested with more or less of the attributes of divinity. They stand in the ordinary relations of human life to each other and to the Supreme. It is not

¹ Cambridge edition, 1835, p. 223.

² The reigns of Uranus and Cronus have preceded; Jupiter's is the *third*. Cf. Ag. 168 seqq.

good for man or god to be alone ; so Jupiter must have his wife and children — daughters as well as sons — who, of course, partake of his nature ; and they, in turn, have their children, who are at a still greater remove from the perfection of their first father. He is a sovereign, and must have his court, his messengers, and his ministers, though this is represented much less *pro more humano*, in Æschylus than in Homer. Among the “scraps from the banquet of Homer,” to which the father of Greek tragedy modestly likens his plays, he gives us none of those tragi-comic, those almost burlesque scenes on Mount Olympus, at which the readers of the Iliad and Odyssey scarcely know whether to laugh or weep. When the gods are the actors, the scene is laid on earth ; and they appear chiefly as the direct agents and visible representatives of the invisible government of Zeus. As his realm is vast, he must not be burdened with the immediate administration. His brothers may preside over the sea and the under world, and his children and children’s children may have each their particular province among men ; while he exercises a general superintendence from his throne on high. The characters of the several subordinate deities must, of course, correspond with their offices, and so be as various as the departments of the divine government. There must be gods of the sea and gods of the land, gods of the forest and gods of the field, gods of war and gods of the several peaceful occupations. There must be a god of commerce, a goddess of agriculture, a goddess of science and the arts, a god of music, poetry, and prophetic inspiration. There must especially be a god of war, a god of wine, a goddess of love, and gods or goddesses of the sensual, selfish, and malign passions ; since to refer these directly to the Supreme, were scarcely compatible with his goodness, and yet to exempt them from all control by him, or connection with him, were inconsistent with his universal sovereignty. By a still more natural and obvious process, those human *virtues* and all those moral elements in the soul of man, which are but the offspring and image of the divine attributes, assume a concrete form, and put on a more than human au-

(thority and power. Dike, Themis, Nemesis, the Eumenides, and the Mœræ — Justice, Law, Retribution, the Furies, and the Fates — are not mere abstractions, not mere personifications, but truly divine beings and dread realities to the ancestors and the contemporaries of Æschylus. Even Kratos and Bia — Strength and Force — are brought upon the stage in the Prometheus, and are seen in the process of deification; and this process, passing so visibly, as it were, before our eyes, helps us to understand how the fertile imagination of the Greeks, which not only clothed and adorned, but animated, whatever it touched, gradually peopled heaven, earth, and hell with the innumerable deities of the Athenian Pantheon.¹

These last are preëminently the divinities of Greek tragedy. With the exception of the sea-nymphs, who constitute the chorus in the Prometheus, we see nothing in the extant pieces of Æschylus, of the gods of the outer, material world. But these gods of the moral universe, whose seat is by the throne of Jupiter or in the world of spirits, whose sceptre is the conscience, and whose province is the soul of man, — these are the ruling powers in the realm of tragedy. Themis (Law), daughter of heaven and earth, and goddess of law and order in both worlds, companion of Jupiter and sharer in his counsels, primeval prophetess and voice of God to man, gives right counsels, protects the needy and the defenceless, and maintains the harmony of the moral universe (cf. Prom. 18; 209; Eum. 2; Sup. 358, et al.).² Dike (Justice), the renowned and triumphant (*νικηφόρος*) daughter of

¹ Petronius says, it was easier to find a god at Athens, than a man. Hence the *κατεδωλον* and the *δαισιδαίμονεστέροις* of Paul in his address to the Athenians on Mars Hill (Acts xvii.). The Greeks regarded different countries as having different gods; and as Pharaoh refuses to obey Jehovah, because he is the God of the Hebrews and not of the Egyptians, saying: "Who is Jehovah, that I should obey his voice? I know not Jehovah;" so the herald of the sons of Ægyptus does not fear the gods of Argos (Sup. 890, 919), though he reverences the gods of the Nile. Cf. Ex. 5: 2. Also 1 Kings 20: 23, where the servants of the king of Syria say to him: "Their gods are gods of the hills, therefore they were stronger than we," etc.

² Compare Hooker's magnificent and oft-cited personification of Law, her voice the voice of God, her seat the throne of the universe, etc.

Jupiter and Themis, stands on a lofty and immovable foundation, holding in one hand a balance, wherein she weighs, impartially, the character and conduct of men, and in the other a sword, wherewith, sooner or later, she strikes through the heart of the wicked; while Fate (*Ἀλσα, Μοῖρα*) and Wrath or Vengeance (*Ἐρινός*) stand on either side of her, the former to forge and whet her sword, and the latter to insure the infliction of deserved punishment (cf. Choephoroe, 59; 146; 644–50; Ag. 1535). Nemesis, kindred in name and nature to *Νόμος*, is the goddess of retribution, or more literally of distributive justice,¹ who visits upon mankind their just deserts, and since there is no escape from the penalties which she visits upon the guilty, she bears the name of *Ἀδράστεια* (the Inevitable, the Unescapable); they, therefore, are wise who do her reverence (Prom. 935). The Furies and the Fates (*Ἐρινύες, Μοῖραι*) are sisters (Eum. 962) and joint rulers (gubernatores, *οἰακοστροφοί*, Prom. 515) of the moral universe. They are daughters of Night (Eum. 416), and have their abode in the dark world below (*κατὰ χθόνος θεαί*, Eum. 115, et al.); yet have they great power in heaven and on earth, as well as under the earth (Ibid. 950). They are represented as old, black, like Gorgons and Harpies (though without wings), hags, hateful to gods and men (Eum. passim). Yet, like their mother Night (*Νύξ φιλία*, Ag. 355), they have their bright and cheerful side towards the good and those who propitiate their favor; hence the name Eumenides, and the epithets *σεμναί* and *εὐφρονες*, by which the Furies were known, especially at Athens (Eum. 373; 992, et al.), as not only *euphemistically*, but when appeased, *truly* the kind and gracious as well as the venerable and awful deities. By a conception as just as it is profound, the Fates and the Furies are habitually associated with Justice, as her companions, ministers, and executioners.² The Fates are *δαίμονες ὀρδονόμοι* (Eum. 963), justice-dispensing deities; they personify and preside over the unchangeable moral laws and necessities of the universe, and unite with

¹ *Νόμος* distributes, or allots to men their duties; *Νέμεσις*, their dues.

² See passages cited in reference to Dike above, and very many others.

the Furies and with Justice herself in securing the certain inevitable punishment of transgressors. There is, however, this difference, that while Dike weighs character and discriminates motives, the Fates and the Furies are blind powers, capable of discerning only overt acts, and demanding the punishment of the perpetrators, without regard to justifying motives or palliating circumstances. The Fates are *triform*, though *Æschylus* does not, like *Hesiod*, distinguish them by their several names. The Furies are indefinite in number. Each distinct relation, if not each individual person, who is wronged, has his separate *Erinnys*; there is the *Erinnys* of the father and the *Erinnys* of the mother, the *Erinnys* of the son and the *Erinnys* of the daughter, the *Erinnys* of the fellow-citizen and the *Erinnys* of the stranger, who pursues the wrong doer to the death and into the eternal world; the *Alastor*,¹ who drives the guilty person, like Cain, a fugitive and a vagabond on the face of the earth, and even follows him into the dark realm of Hades (cf. *Ag.* 1433; 1501; *Theb.* 70; 720, et passim). In their subterranean abode, the *Erinnyes* are called *Aræ* (*Eum.* 417), since just indignation at sin often vents itself in imprecations, and the curse of an injured father, mother, or other friend, is often the bitterest ingredient in the punishment of the injurer.

Ate, in the tragedies, is essentially another name for *Ara* and *Erinnys*. This name, however, denotes especially the bewitching and bewildering power of sin, and that judicial blindness, that almost supernatural frenzy, which sometimes impels individuals, and sometimes whole families, generation after generation, as if by an irresistible and fatal necessity, to the perpetration of enormous crimes, and thus involves them irretrievable and overwhelming calamities. In this point of view, the blinding and avenging deity is often conceived of as an evil demon (*ἀλάστωρ ἢ κακὸς δαίμων*,² *Pers.* 354), hate-

¹ *Ἀλάστωρ* (from *ἀλάσσειν*, to wander). The Avenging Deity, that causes to wander, and the wretched Cain-like wanderer himself, are both called by the same name. Cf. *Ag.* 1501, and *Eum.* 236.

² Cf. also *στυγνὴ δαίμων*, 472; *δυσπρόηγε δαίμων*, 515; *δολίαν ἔτην*, *Ag.* 1523, etc.

ful and powerful, falling upon guilty individuals, families, and nations, taking possession of them, depriving them of their senses, and preying upon them like a blood-thirsty tiger upon his victim, or an odious raven upon a carcass, till there is nothing left to prey upon (*Pers.* 472 et passim ; *Ag.* 1468, etc.), till the ill-starred, or rather *evil demoned* (*κακοδαίμων*) family or race is extinct. It was by the association of such ideas as these with the word *δαίμων*, which was originally almost synonymous with *θεός*, that the way was gradually prepared for its appropriation, by the sacred writers in the New Testament, to express those *demons* which possessed the bodies as well as the minds of men at the opening of the New Dispensation, and for its use by Christians generally as nearly a synonym with devils. The *κακὸς δαίμων* of *Æschylus* and the Greek tragedians, however, is never the *διάβολος* of the scriptures, the accuser of the saints, the universal tempter, and the prince of a kingdom of darkness hostile to the kingdom of light ; but always an avenging, cursing, and bewildering *deity*.

There is, however, a class of gods, who are represented as hostile to Zeus : the gods of the old regime, who were dethroned by Jupiter, when he first came into possession of supreme power, or who conspired against his government when it was already established, or who resisted his will though he was acknowledged sovereign. But all, alike, are now overthrown and suffer the vengeance of the conqueror. Prometheus is chained to a cliff or chasm in the Scythian desert, while a vulture preys perpetually on his vitals (*Prom.* 1020). His brother Atlas, bound in adamant, is doomed to sustain the heavens on his shoulders, while the ocean boils around him, and the dark vault of Hades groans beneath his feet (*Prom.* 425). The hundred-headed and impetuous Typhon, stricken with the thunder-bolt of Jove, lies scorched and crushed beneath the roots of *Ætna* (*Ibid.* 353). And the ancient Saturn, with all his Titan allies, is sunk in the deep and dark abyss of gloomy Tartarus (*Ibid.* 220). So, we are told in the epistles of Peter and of Jude, " God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to Tartarus

(*ταρταρώσας*, 2 Pet. 2: 4), in everlasting chains under darkness."

Not unlike these Titanic sons of heaven and earth, and sometimes classed with them, though of less prodigious power, and not so dreadful a doom, are the heroes and demigods, offspring of gods and men, some of whom, indeed, are the good angels of their age and race and the benefactors of mankind, but others are demons, monsters at once in crime and in calamity. Such are not a few of the Theban heroes (*Theb. passim*), the descendants of Tantalus (*Ag. 1468*), and the other mythical characters, who form the favorite subjects of tragic verse. They remind the reader of the Jewish scriptures, very forcibly, of the description given of the world before the flood in the book of Genesis: "There were giants in the earth in those days; and also after that, when the sons of God came in unto the daughters of men, and they bear children unto them, the same were mighty men which were of old, men of renown. And God saw the wickedness of man, that it was very great upon the earth." Many of the heathen fables are, doubtless, the facts of revelation and of primeval history in disguise. The Pantheon of the Greeks takes the place of the angelic hierarchy. The Titans are the fallen angels. The inferior deities of Olympus perform not a few of the offices of the good angels, though they partake much more largely of human passions and frailties; and yet—a fact, which indicates how much the scriptures have done to elevate our ideas of deity—the occupants of Olympic seats were *gods*, while those who stand and serve around the Most High in heaven, are his creatures; and, though they rise rank above rank, angels and archangels, thrones, dominions, principalities, and powers, still the highest archangel, who stands nearest the eternal throne, presumes not to accept the worship of men, but says: "See thou do it not, for I am thy fellow servant; worship God."

This parallel between the fables of heathen mythology and the facts of the Christian revelation, might perhaps be carried still further; though here, we are conscious, we tread

on holy ground. The Athena of the Greeks cannot but suggest to the classical scholar the personified and almost embodied Wisdom of the Old Testament. The Loxias of the Greek tragedies is a somewhat remarkable foreshadowing of the name and some of the offices of the Logos of the New Testament.¹ Even those myths that narrate the intercourse between gods and men, carnal and corrupt though they be, dimly project a great truth, namely, the love which the Most High bears to men, and preserve, while they pervert, the memory of that intimate converse, which he held with the patriarchs and first parents of our race. May they not also be regarded, like the avatars of the Hindoos, as "fleshly anticipations,"² or "unconscious prophecies,"³ of Christian truths?

III. *The Character and Condition of men.*

The Prometheus of Æschylus represents mankind as having been in the condition of helpless infants and degraded savages (443 seq.), without fire and without houses, dwelling in caves of the earth, ignorant of the arts and destitute of the comforts of life, with reason, speech, and the senses themselves so imperfectly developed, that seeing, they saw in vain, and hearing they heard not:

βλέποντες ἔβλεπον μάτην,
κλύοντες οὐκ ἤκουον. (447, cf. Mat. 13 : 13.)

And in this sad condition they continued, till Prometheus stole for them fire from heaven, taught them the useful arts, inspired them with hopes, delusive hopes, however, as he himself confesses, and revealed to them the way of divining the future and propitiating the favor of the gods (Ibid. 460—507). Whether this was their original state, the state in which they were created, Æschylus does not expressly say. But he implies, and doubtless held, the doctrine of Hesiod and other poets, that under the reign of Saturn, the

¹ See these offices in a subsequent page.

² Schaff.

³ Trench.

golden age of the world, a better race inhabited the earth, the companions of the gods and the favorites of heaven; and the present race of men were fallen, degenerate, depraved, and hence obnoxious to the displeasure of the deity. Accordingly Jupiter was, for a time, bent on their extirpation,¹ and the creation of a better race in their stead (232). Hence, too, he punishes Prometheus for imparting to them knowledge, and strikes with thunder Æsculapius, for having restored mortal man to life (Ag. 1022); even as our first parents were forbidden to eat the fruit of the tree of knowledge, and, when they had sinned, were driven out of the garden, and cherubim were placed at the entrance, and a flaming sword which turned every way to guard the way to the tree of life (Gen. 3:24). "Alas! the fates of men!" exclaims the prophetess (Ag. 1327):

Alas! the fates of men! their brightest bloom
A shadow blights; and in their evil day,
An oozy sponge blots out their fleeting prints,
And they are seen no more. From bad to worse
Our changes run, and with the worst we end.

Such, not unfrequently, are the strains in which the chorus laments the deeds and the sufferings (*ἔργα καὶ πᾶθος*, Choeph. 1014 seq.) of men, and the whole series of tragic plots is but an illustration and expansion of this melancholy idea; as the history of the Bible is but a running commentary on the sad strains, in which the prophets and singers of Israel deplore the brevity, sinfulness, and wretchedness of human life.

IV. *The Providence and Government of God.*

We have already seen, that Jove is conceived of as the original cause and author of all. All events proceed from his will, and are brought to pass by his agency. "Wo! wo! 't is by the will of Jove, cause of all, worker of all. For what is accomplished among mortals without Jove?"

¹ Cf. Gen. 6: 6.

What of these things (the crimes and calamities of the house of Atreus) is not wrought of God?"

ὡς ἢ διὰ Διὸς
 παναίτου, πανεργέτα·
 τί γὰρ βροτοῖς ἔνευ Διὸς τελεῖται;
 τί τῶνδ' οὐ δεόκρατόν ἐστιν. (Ag. 1485.)

Nay, his word is deed; he speaks, and it is done: *πάρεστι δ' ἔργον ὡς ἔπος* (Sup. 595):

No force he wields; his simple will,
 His quiet sentence blasteth. (Sup. 97—100.)

He is sole monarch, and irresponsible, and gives no account of his matters; to resist his will is only to kick against the pricks (Prom. 323). Men strive in vain to disturb the execution of his purposes:

Their counsels never can transgress
 The settled harmony of things,
 The wisdom of the King of kings. (Prom. 852.)

At the same time, everything is declared to be subject to the control of an invincible destiny (Prom. 105). "Things are as they are, and are surely brought to their destined issue" (Ag. 67). In answer to the question, who is the guide (gubernator, *οἰακοστροφός*) of necessity, Prometheus says, "the triform Fates and the vengeful Furies." When further asked, if Jove is less powerful than these, he answers, that Jove cannot escape destiny (Prom. 515). According to the prevailing doctrine of the other tragedies, however, the will of Jove is superior to or identical with fate, and that with justice;¹ and this is made a reason for worshipping him: "Let us worship the God of strangers, the great, the supreme Jove, who by hoary law directs fate:" *ὃς πολλὰ νόμῳ αἴσαν ὀρδοῖ* (Sup. 679). Hence, while the Fates are invoked as justice-dispensing deities (Eum. 963), Jupiter also is represented as having justice with himself (Prom. 187). So, not unfrequently, justice and fate are used inter-

¹ See above, p. 363.

changeably, as almost synonyms (Ag. 1535), and both are spoken of as the appointment of the gods, *τεταγμένα ἐκ Θεῶν* (Ag. 1025), or *τὸ μέλλον ἐκ Θεῶν* (Pers. 373). And Jupiter is invoked with Might and Right, as a three-fold power, of which Jupiter is the greatest (Choeph. 242), whose will, guided by justice and clothed with power, will infallibly bring out the right issue. "Whatever is fated, that will take place; the great unbounded mind of Jove cannot be overpassed."

Comes fated good or ill,
Wait we in patience still
No power may thwart his will,
Jove, mighty Jove. (Sup. 1045.)

Such is the juxtaposition into which the three ideas of fate, justice, and providence, are constantly brought to each other.

As to the relation of the divine purposes, or the decrees of destiny, to the freedom of human actions, Jupiter alone is, in the highest sense, free (Prom. 50). Still the divine purposes are not altogether irrespective of human agency. Sooner or later, in some way and by some person, they are certain to be fulfilled. But the time and manner of their accomplishment, and if they relate to families, races, and nations, the individual by whom they are accomplished, may depend on the wisdom or the folly, the piety or the impiety of men. "Ah!" mourns the shade of Darius, as he sees how soon after his death his son Xerxes brought destruction on the armies, and almost on the empire of Persia:

Ah! on wings how swift, the issue of the ancient doom hath sped!
Thee, my son, great Jove hath smitten. Long-drawn years I hoped would
roll,

Ere fulfilment of the dread prophetic burden should be known.

But when man to run is eager, swift is the god to add a spur.

(Pers. 739, seq.)

The spirit of this last line is, as Blackie well suggests, essentially the same with the old Latin proverb, *Quem Deus vult perdere, prius dementat*; and it is the prevailing senti-

ment of the Greek tragedies: Men go to destruction under the impulse of their own folly and madness, and an angry Deity has only to "add the spur."

No prayers or tears can avail to break the chain that links suffering to sin.

But things are as they are: the chain
Of fate doth bind them; sighs are vain.
Tears, libations fruitless flow,
To divert from purposed ire
The powers whose altars know no fire. (Ag. 67, seq.)

Yet the very thing which is fated may come in answer to prayer; and this belief is urged as an encouragement to pray (Choeph. 462):

The tremulous fear creeps o'er my frame to hear
Thy words; for though long-dated,
The thing divinely fated
Shall surely come at last, our cloudy prayers to clear.

Or more literally rendered, "that which is fated abides from of old, and may come to you praying;" that is, on condition of, or in answer to, your prayers. The dramas of Æschylus are, in their whole structure and contents, a standing witness to a belief in the efficacy of prayer, as a general thing, notwithstanding the fixed decrees of fate or providence. No Calvinist was ever a more strenuous assertor of the "doctrine of decrees," than the chorus in these dramas. At the same time, no Methodist ever offered more frequent or more fervent prayers. Prayer, however, does not supersede the necessity of exertion, or the use of suitable means. "Pray," — such is the spirit of the reproof which Eteocles administers to the chorus, as they pray for the safety of beleaguered Thebes (Theb. 216), "pray indeed, but look well to the fortifications;" or, in the language of a modern proverb, first addressed by Cromwell to his Ironsides, "trust providence, but keep your powder dry."

The mystery of divine providence is a frequent subject of remark. The ways of the Deity are dark, thickly shaded, difficult to trace, past finding out (Sup. 92):

Oh! would that Jove might show to men
 His counsel, as he planned it;
 But ah! he darkly weaves the scheme,
 No mortal eye hath scanned it.

His purposes are an unfathomable abyss (*Ibid.* 1055). Clouds and darkness are round about him. But the poet, like the Psalmist, connects with this the assurance that justice and judgment are the habitation of his throne (*Ibid.* 86—99). He sits upon his holy seat (*ἑδράνων ἐφ' ἁγνῶν*, 103), and thence executes all his righteous and steadfast purposes. He holds in his hands the scales of equal and universal justice (*Ibid.* 819), and causing the balance to preponderate according to his righteous will, distributes evil to the evil and good to the good (*Ibid.* 401).

Where kindred with kindred contendeth in war,
 Jove looks on the strife and decides from afar,
 Where he holdeth the scales even-banded;
 Oh, why wilt thou doubt to declare for the right?
 He blesseth the good, but in anger will smite,
 Where the sons of the wicked are banded.

He awards to every man that which is due (*τοῦφειλόμενον*) for his deeds, measure for measure, speech for speech, blow for blow, according to that thrice hallowed and venerable saying, *he that has done evil must suffer for it* (*Choeph.* 304–13).¹ It is from Jove that this great law of moral necessity proceeds; and it is for him to provide that things *end* in accordance with this rule of exact distributive justice (*Ibid.* 304–6). And so long as Jove remains, it remains an eternal law, that the doer shall receive according to what he has done (*Ag.* 1563). The choral song, or rather prayer, above referred to (*Choeph.* 304 seq.), brings together so many of the ideas respecting fate, justice, providence, and prayer, which we have been endeavoring to illustrate, that we quote it entire, in the spirited and substantially correct translation of Blackie:

¹ *Comp. Matt. 7: 2*, "With what measure ye mete," etc.

Mighty Fates, divinely guiding
 Human fortunes to their end,
 Send this man, with *Jove* *presiding*,
 Whither *Justice* points the way.
 Words of bitter hatred duly
 Pay with bitter words: for thus
 With loud cry triumphant shouting,
 Justice pays the sinner's debt.
 BLOOD FOR BLOOD, AND BLOW FOR BLOW,
 THOU SHALT REAP AS THOU DIDST SOW;
 Age to age with hoary wisdom,
 Speaketh thus to man.

Jupiter is especially jealous for his own honors and prerogatives. Wo to the man, or the god, who invades or encroaches on them. Prometheus, chained to the rocks and torn by vultures, pays the penalty not only of assuming too much to himself, but of lavishing undue knowledge and power on mortals (Prom. 29). Xerxes, though a mortal, thought to surpass Poseidon and all the gods, and soon met with a dreadful overthrow (Pers. 749). Agamemnon has been fortunate quite beyond the ordinary lot of men. The choir therefore fear for him the envy of the gods. "To have an exceedingly high reputation is exceedingly hazardous. For the thunderbolt from Jove smites such in the face." Hence *they* prefer only that degree of happiness which does not excite envy, and pray never to be sackers of cities (Ag. 468-72). Agamemnon himself is conscious of the danger, and strives to avert it by humility and moderation. He refuses at first to tread on the purple which Clytemnestra has spread before his feet, and bids the obsequious attendants to honor him as a man and not as a god (*κατ' ἄνδρα μὴ θεόν*). But his treacherous and crafty wife, who seeks in this very way to provoke the jealousy of the gods against him, lures him on through pomp and pride to destruction. The Theban heroes, undaunted by the omens and prohibitions of the gods, go against the city boasting that they will destroy it with or without the consent of Jove; and with a single exception, they all perish before the gates (Theb. 440, 529, etc.). This *envy* of the gods (for such is the ordinary mean-

ing of the word (τὸν θεῶν φθόνον, Pers. 362, et passim), is one of the most tragic elements in the tragic drama of the Greeks, often remarked upon by the characters and the chorus, and often the pivot on which the catastrophe turns. Hence it became a proverb among the Greeks, τὸ θεῶν φθονερόν (Herod. III. 40) — God is *envious*. As it is expressed by a word of lower moral significance, so is it a less pure and elevated characteristic, having more reference to mere outward prosperity, and less to the feelings of the heart, than that jealousy which Jehovah asserts for himself in the Decalogue. Still it is manifestly a kindred attribute to that which guards the incommunicable prerogatives of the Most High, and which says: "I will not give my glory to another."

Another attribute, which is asserted with great frequency of Jupiter, and which is also a special characteristic of the God of Israel, is his regard for the poor and needy, the suppliant and the stranger. Not a few of the epithets most frequently applied to Jupiter, express this character. He is *Zeus ἀφίκτηρ, ἱκέτης, ἱκεσίος, ἱκτήρ*; and "dreadful is the anger of Zeus, the protector of suppliants" (Sup. 344). "It is necessary to dread the anger of Zeus, the protector of suppliants, for it is the highest fear among mortals" (Ibid. 566). He is also *Zeus ξένιος* (Ag. 362), *ξυνέστιος* (Ag. 703), the guardian of the stranger and the rites of hospitality; and they who do violence to the stranger on the one hand, or to the host who renders hospitality on the other, shall see his bow and feel his thunder-stroke (Ag. 364). The whole drama of the Suppliants is an intentional illustration of this principle in the divine government. The daughters of Danaus, fleeing from the abhorred nuptials which were to be enforced upon them at home, land on the shores of Argos, and cast themselves on the altars of the country for protection; and their prayer is: "Behold me a suppliant, a fugitive, a wanderer (347). Spurn not my petition, lest you rouse the anger of the gods." For not Jupiter alone, but the other gods befriend the suppliant stranger. Themis is the goddess of suppliants (358). Apollo, an exile once him-

self, will pity exiles (215). The land will be defiled and cursed of all the gods, if it refuse shelter to those who have fled to it for safety in the hour of need. And though the Argive king foresees a war with Egypt as the consequence of harboring the fugitives, yet a war with the *gods* is more to be dreaded (437); though the enemy plunder the house, yet the god of the hearth and the household (*Ζεὺς κτησίος*) can more than make up the loss; and he resolves to be their protector.¹

The delay of the Deity in punishing the wicked — a subject which occasioned not a little perplexity to the Sacred writers — was also the subject of one of the most instructive and profound theological treatises that have come down to us from pagan antiquity. “The mills of the gods grind late, but grind to powder” — ὄψε θεῶν ἀλέουσι μύλοι, ἀλέουσι δὲ λεπτά — is a proverb which is often repeated by the moralists of Greece. And the subject is one of frequent recurrence in the tragedies of Æschylus. There is in the Choephoree (58—60), a striking passage illustrative of the different times and ways in which punishment comes upon transgressors; “some in the light of day, others in the dark twilight of life, a lingering but overflowing flood of pains; while for others is reserved the endless night of future retribution.” Paul, in his Epistle to Timothy, draws a similar distinction. “Some men’s sins are open beforehand, going before to judgment, and some they follow after.” But in time (*χρόνῳ*; *ἐν χρόνῳ*; *ἐν χρόνοις*).² Justice steals upon the wicked, and exacts of them the full penalty of their crimes (Choeph. 650, 954):

Her from his shrine sent the rock-throned Apollo,
The will of her high-purposed sire to obey,
The track of the blood-stained remorseless to follow,
Winged with sure death, though she lag by the way.

¹ So according to the *Odyssey* (XIV. 57), all strangers and poor beggars are from Zeus.

² These words are the standing limitations of the rule of retribution; well rendered by Blackie: “though she lag by the way.”

At the set time, yes, on the appointed day (*χρόνω τοι κυρίῳ τ' ἐν ἡμέρῃ*, Sup. 729), whoever dishonors the gods shall pay the penalty to divine justice.

Prosperity, whether individual or national, is the gift of God (*Θεοῦ δῶρον*, Theb. 625). Prayer is not without efficacy in procuring it (Ibid. 626). It is also the reward of justice and piety (Eum. 550):

The man without compulsion just,
Who by these rules preserves his trust,
Unprosperous shall never be;
At least, ne'er ruined utterly.¹

Who fears the gods is fearful to oppose (*δευὸς δὲ Θεοῖς σέβει*, Theb. 596). The city which *they* preserve is impregnable (Pers. 247). It is taken only when the gods forsake it (Theb. 218). *They* send forth the conqueror, and *they* bring him back again victorious (Ag. 1853); and in the conquest and destruction of empires, he is but the agent of divine justice (Ibid. 812). But when success becomes a god, and more than a god, to mortals, then divine justice watches its opportunity to descend upon them (Choeph. 57). Jupiter is ever at hand, as the severe judge and punisher of proud thoughts (Pers. 827). It is an old saying, uttered in ancient times, that great and entire prosperity does not die childless, but begets as its legitimate offspring insatiate calamity (Ag. 750). Hence the chorus are led to offer a prayer kindred to that of Agur, that neither poverty nor riches, neither conquest nor captivity, may be their lot (Ibid. 472, cf. 1341):

Who of mortals will not pray,
From high-perched Fortune's favor far,
A blameless life to spend.²

As prosperity has its dangers, so the idea is not unknown, though less familiar, that adversity has, or may have, its blessings. It, too, is of divine appointment. It must be

¹ Cf. Ps. 37: 24, "Though he fall, he shall not be utterly cast down."

² Cf. also Eum. 529: "By God's decree the mean is best," etc.

borne with patience, when the gods give it (*θεῶν διδόντων*, Pers. 294). It teaches wisdom to the wise, and sometimes purifies even the polluted (Eum. 276). "It is good to grow wise under sorrow" (*ἐνμυέρεαι σωφρονεῖν ὑπὸ στένει*, Eum. 520). It is the prerogative of God, who has attached instruction to suffering (*τὸν πάθει μάθος δέντα*), thus to guide them, though against their wills (*ἄκοντας*), to wisdom (Ag. 176 seq.).

For Jove doth teach men wisdom, sternly wins
To virtue by tutoring of their sins ;
Yea, drops of torturing recollection chill
The sleepers ; 'gainst man's rebellious will
Jove works the wise remorse :
Dread Powers, on awful seats enthroned, compel
Our hearts with gracious force.¹

There are not wanting, in Æschylus, indications of a belief in special providences, reaching even to the elements and the changes of the weather. The messenger who announces, to the queen mother at Susæ, the overthrow of Xerxes' forces, in describing the return of the shattered remnant, says that, on the very night when they reached the banks of the sacred Strymon, the deity raised a wintry storm, *out of season*, and froze the whole stream, so that as many as availed themselves of the providence before the rising sun, passed over safely on a bridge of ice ; but when the sun rose, it soon melted the ice, and "man upon man, in crowded ruin, fell ;" thus men, who had never before believed in the existence and providence of the gods, believed and worshipped (Pers. 498 seq.).²

V. *Sin, its Penalty, and Expiation.*

The sins, with which the tragic poets have to do, are chiefly, as might be expected, such violations of the law of

¹ *Xáρις* is the Greek word, and it is used in a sense strikingly similar to the usage of the New Testament.

² As to the credibility of this miracle, as a matter of fact, compare Thirlwall and Grote, Vol. V. p. 191.

nature as murder, incest, undutifulness to parents,¹ inhospitality to strangers, sacrilege, superhuman pride and arrogating divine prerogatives. These are, emphatically, the crimes that characterize the Greek drama; these, and such as these, the sins which stain with their guilt, or involve in their consequences, the individuals and families set apart, as the favorite themes of the tragic muse; these the very atmosphere and element, darkened with clouds and agitated by storms, in which tragedy lives and moves and has its being. The drama, called the Suppliants, starts from that aversion to intermarriage with near blood relations (cousins in this instance), which is so nearly universal that it may be called an instinct, an intuition, and turns for its *peripeteia* on the sacredness of the domestic and the public altar, and the inviolability of those who have fled for refuge to these sanctuaries of the gods. Murder, incest, violation of filial and fraternal duty, and other unnatural crimes, are fundamental ideas in the Seven against Thebes. The divine displeasure at those who arrogate to themselves that which belongs to God only, which is also prominent in the Seven against Thebes, is the main subject, or at least the chief tragic element, in Prometheus, and the Persians. And in the remaining three of the seven extant tragedies of *Æschylus*, the Agamemnon, the Choephoroe, and the Eumenides which together constitute a magnificent trilogy, the only trilogy that has come down to us entire — hands red with blood, with *kindred* blood, are ever before the spectator's mind; and the great question, which agitates spectators and actors is: How can that stain be washed away? If there were any room to doubt the genuineness and authenticity of the Pentateuch, the doubter might find an antidote to his scepticism in the bare fact, that the same subjects which constitute the staple of the epic and tragic mythology of the Greeks, are also among the earliest and most prominent subjects of Mosaic history and legislation. The histories of

¹ "Honor thy parents," is the *third*, or as we should say the *first*, the *prime* commandment (Sup. 704), and is often accompanied with a *promise*.

Cain and Lamech,¹ the laws of murder and incest, the altars and the cities of refuge, the sacrifices and rites of purification, the ideas of expiation and reconciliation, which make up so large a portion of the Old Testament, reappear on the tragic stage, and constitute the very warp of the Greek drama.

And the first great law which the tragedians recognize — a law written in the hearts of men and sanctioned by divine authority — is, that the sinner must suffer for his sin :

δράσαντι παθεῖν
τριγέρων μῦθος τάδε φωνεῖ. (Choeph. 311.)

“For him that hath done the deed to suffer for it — thus cries a proverb (or tradition) thrice-hallowed by age.”

Moreover, the great primary law of retribution is expressly the *lex talionis* : like for like, and measure for measure. “Ye have heard that it hath been said *by them of old time*, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth.” We have this *ancient saying*, standing out with great prominence and repeated again and again on the pages of Æschylus :

’Tis robber robbed, and slayer slain ; for, though
Oft-times it lag, with measured blow for blow,
Vengeance prevaieth,
While great Jove lives. Who breaks the close-linked woe
Which heaven entaileth ? (Ag. 1562.)

The Greek of this passage reads as follows :

φέρει φέροντ’, ἐκτίνει δ’ ὁ καίνων.
μῖμνει δὲ μῖμοντος ἐν χρόνῳ Διός,
παθεῖν τὸν ἐρῶντα· δέσμιον γάρ, κ. τ. λ.

And it may be literally rendered thus : “He spoils the spoiler, and the slayer pays the full penalty. It remains so

¹ Ixion, the first murderer (Eum. 718), was purified by Jove himself, but proving ungrateful, was doomed to endless punishment. Cf. Gen. 4: 15, 16. The lament of Lamech (Ibid. 23, 24) is the lament of Orestes and of many an unwilling homicide in the Greek poets. He had slain a man in *self-defence*; and if Cain was protected by divine interposition from the avenger of blood, much more Lamech; “if Cain shall be avenged seven-fold, truly Lamech seventy and seven fold.”

long as Jove remains, that he must suffer who has done the deed ; for it is an established law." Who can read this, and the many kindred passages of our poet, without being reminded of that primeval law of the divine government, which was promulgated to the second universal ancestor of the human race, as he went forth from the ark to repeople a depopulated world : " Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed." And the principle is not repealed, but repeated and recognized as a general law of Providence, in that saying of our Lord : " They that take the sword, shall perish by the sword."

This law is recognized as a law of nature, and therefore (so far as any of the laws of nature may be said to execute themselves) self-executing. The connection between sin and suffering is constantly represented as a natural and necessary connection, like that between sowing and reaping, parent and offspring :

Blood for blood, and blow for blow,
Thou shalt reap as thou didst sow. (Choeph. 310.)

A haughty spirit,¹ blossoming, bears a crop
Of woe, and reaps a harvest of despair. (Pers. 821.)

Lust and violence beget lust and violence, and vengeance too at the appointed time (Ag. 763).¹ Impiety multiplies and perpetuates itself (Ibid. 788). The sinner pays the debt he contracted, ends the career that he began (*τίσας ἄπερ ἡρξεν*, Ibid. 1529), and drinks to the dregs the cup of cursing which he himself had filled (Ibid. 1397). But so far from the atheistic idea, that these laws are in such a sense self-executing as to dispense with a personal God, a divine governor and judge, the laws themselves become real, living, divine persons, the agents and executioners of the Most High ; so far from the conscience being the sole power of judgment and retribution, the conscience itself is only an in-

¹ In one of these passages, *ὑβρις* is the root or the seed, and *ἄρη* the fruit or the harvest. In the other, *ὑβρις* is the parent, and *ὑβρις* the immediate, and *ἄρη* the remote offspring. See a similar genealogy of Lust, Sin and Death, in James 1 : 15.

strument in the hands of Justice and Vengeance, and the Most High directs and controls all these inferior agents and instrumentalities. It is in reference to this very matter of punishment for sin, that the question already cited is asked: "What is accomplished without Jupiter? What of *these* things is not wrought of God?"

With the general doctrine: "The soul that sinneth, it shall die," the scriptures connect another, which seems at first view to conflict with it, namely, that God visits the iniquities of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation. These same apparently inconsistent doctrines lie, side by side, at the very foundation of Greek tragedy. Æschylus repeats, again and again, with all the earnestness of the prophet Ezekiel (ch. xviii.), the law, *δράσαντι παθεῖν*. But he is equally explicit in declaring that an old transgression sometimes abides till the third generation, as illustrated in the unhappy family of Laius:

παλαιγενῇ γὰρ λέγω
 παραβασίαν ὑπέποιον·
 αἰῶνα δ' ἐς τρίτον μένει.

(Theb. 742.)

With urgent force the Fury treadeth,
 To generations three,
 Avenging Laius' sin on Laius' race.

In all cases, however, in which the children suffer for the sins of the parents, they are themselves not innocent. The sin is hereditary as well as the suffering. The guilt and the punishment are propagated together, from generation to generation. It runs in the blood. Like begets like.

One base deed, with prolific power,
 Like its cursed stock, engenders more;
 But to the just, with blooming grace,
 Still flourishes a beauteous race.

(Ag. 758—62.)

Thus by the laws of nature son succeeds
 To sire; and who shall drive him from the house?

(Ibid. 1564—5.)

Or, to render this passage more literally, as it is amended by Hermann and Bloomfield: "Who can expel the brood of

curses from the family ! The race is wedded (glued) to Ate." A kind of judicial blindness and madness not only comes over the heinous transgressor himself, but cleaves to the accursed race. They are given over to the power of an avenging demon, the demon, the Ate, the Asa, the Erinnyes of the race, who involves them, one after another, by their own acts, and yet almost in spite of themselves, in guilt and ruin. To illustrate this were simply to unfold the plot of the several dramas, and to repeat the history of blood and crime familiar to every one who knows anything of classical mythology, of the house of Pelops, and (to carry it back to its root) of Tantalus himself (Ag. 1469). The Agamemnon is a *locus classicus* on this subject. It paints the power and sway of the avenging deity, in the same dark and fearful colors in which the retributive power of conscience is drawn in Macbeth ; and while the resemblance between the two plays is thus striking, a careful comparison would also illustrate most clearly the difference between the theology of Æschylus and the theology, or more strictly the anthropology, of Shakespeare. Under Jove, Ate or Erinnyes, two names for one and the same power, is the divinity of the Agamemnon ; and the characters of the play are but her ministers. " Say not," cries Clytemnestra, with a grandeur and steadfastness in wickedness surpassing even that of Lady Macbeth, and with an element of justice to which that Lady had no claim :

Say not that I, that Agamemnon's wife,
Did it. The Fury fatal to this house,
In vengeance for Thyestes' horrid feast,
Assumed this form, and, with her ancient rage,
Hath for the children sacrificed the man. (1498.)

By that revenge
Which for my daughter I have greatly taken ;
By the dread powers of Ate and Erinnyes,
To whom my hand devoted him a victim,
Without a thought of fear I range these rooms.
etc. (1432.)

Ægisthus, too, puts on a moral dignity foreign to his nature, claims to be but the avenger of his father's wrongs,

and heaven's executioner of justice, and welcomes the doom which in turn awaits him :

Now I know that the just gods
Look from their skies, and punish impious mortals,
Seeing this man rolled in the blood-wove woof,
The tissue of the Furies, grateful sight !
And suffering for his father's fearful crimes . (1578.)

And then he goes on to describe the horrid banquet of Thyestes, spread by the sacrilegious Atreus beneath his own roof, for his own brother (the father of Ægisthus), and the curse which Thyestes, when he discovered that he had been feasting upon the flesh of his own children, pronounced upon Atreus (father of Agamemnon) and all his race : " Thus perish all the race of Pleisthenes " (1602). And the chorus, possessed with the same thought of a race doomed to calamity and crime, and hunted by an avenging deity, exclaims :

O God, that o'er the doomed Atridan halls
With might prevailest,
Weak woman's breast to do thy headlong will
With murder mailest !
O'er his dead body, like a boding raven
Thou tak'st thy station,
Piercing my marrow with thy savage hymn
Of exultation. (1468.)

To which Clytemnestra responds :

There's sense in this ; now hast thou touched the key
Rousing the Fury, that from sire to son
Hath bid the stream of blood, first poured by her,
Descend. One sanguine tide scarce rolled away,
Another flows in terrible succession.

And the chorus in reply, while acknowledging the agency of Erinnyes, recognizes also the hand and will of the Highest :

Ah, 'tis a higher power
That thus ordains ; we see the hand of Jove,
Whose will directs the fate of mortal man.

The consequences of great crimes, especially in high places, extend to every person and every thing that has any connection with them. The country and country's gods are polluted (Ag. 1645 : χώρας μίasma καὶ θεῶν ἐγχωρίων). The army and the people share in the curse (Pers. passim). The earth itself is defiled by pollutions of ancient blood (Sup. 265). Even the innocent and the virtuous who share in the enterprises of the wicked, may be involved in their ruin, as the pious man must sink with the ungodly, when he embarks in the same ship with them (Theb. 602). This doctrine of *social liability* is illustrated by this striking simile in the case of Amphiaraus, of whom a character is drawn, than which nothing more beautiful has come down to us from ancient times — "a discreet, upright, good and pious man, who wished not to *seem* but to *be* good," and "a great prophet," who foresaw the disastrous issue of the Theban expedition, and forewarned the leaders ; but, led on by a high sense of honor, he went with them and fell like them.

Death's unblest fruit is reaped
By him who sows in Ate's fields. The man
Who, being godly, with ungodly men
And hot-brained sailors, mounts the brittle bark,
He, when the god-detested crew goes down,
Shall with the guilty, guiltless perish. (Theb. 601.)

The pollution and curse of sin (μίasma, μύσος, ἄγος), when once contracted by an individual, or entailed upon a family, will rest upon them and pursue them, till the polluted individual or the hated and accursed race (στυγγῆδεν, δύσποτμον γένος, Theb. 691, 813) is extinct, unless in some way the sin can be expiated,¹ or some god interpose to arrest the penalty. Some sins are inexpiable. Prayers, tears, sacrifices, are all in vain. The criminal must die by the hand of justice, and even in Hades, vengeance will still pursue him (Sup. 227). Others may in time be washed away by ablutions, worn away by exile and pilgrimage, and expiated by offerings

¹ The *expiation* requires the intervention of some friend, a god or a prince, who is clothed with more or less of divine authority.

of blood (Eum. 445 seq. et al.). "It is enough," pleads the chorus in the Seven against Thebes, "for Thebans to come to blows with Argives, for such blood admits of expiation (*καθάρσιον*), but the death of own brothers thus mutually wrought by their own hands, this pollution never grows old" (Theb. 678). Indeed, the presumption in regard to great crimes is, that they cannot be expiated. The blood cannot be washed away (*αἷμ' ἀνιπτον*, 1459).

All ocean poured in offering
For the warm life-drops of one innocent man,
Is labor lost: Old truth thus speaks to all.¹ (Choeph. 518.)

"For what expiation is there for blood, when once it hath fallen upon the ground?" (*τί γὰρ λύτρον πεσόντος αἵματος πέδῳ*, Choeph. 47.)

What hath been, and shall be ever,
That when purple gouts bedash
The guilty ground, then BLOOD DOTH BLOOD
DEMAND, AND BLOOD FOR BLOOD SHALL FLOW.
Fury to Havoc cries; and Havoc,
The tainted track of blood pursuing,
From age to age works woe. (Choeph. 898.)

Thus the law (*νόμος*), for so it is expressly called, rolls on reverberating its thunders and threatening vengeance, from act to act, and chorus to chorus of that grand trilogy of which we have spoken, through the Agamemnon, through the Choephoroe, and far into the Eumenides. And the history of blood and crime follows close upon the law, like the rain-storm after the boding thunder. In the Agamemnon — the first of the trilogy — the crimes of former generations, of Tantalus, of Pelops, and of Atreus, gathering blackness as they descend, are often alluded to by the chorus, as ground of fearful foreboding. Then Cassandra sees them in frightful visions, and sings them in prophetic frenzy as a bloody

¹ Compare Shakspeare's Macbeth :

Will all Neptune's ocean wash this blood
Clean from my hand ?

prelude to the vengeance which is just ready to fall upon the proud Achæan king. Moreover, that monarch's own crime in the sacrifice of his weeping, pleading daughter, though committed under the heavy yoke of necessity, and the hardening influence of frenzy (218), still haunts the memory of the people as the sure precursor of coming evil, while it goads on the bereaved and outraged mother to her long cherished and now soon to be accomplished vengeance. She lures him on over purple tapestries to the luxurious bath, where she throws a net over him, and slays him with repeated strokes of her own hand; and this play ends with threats of vengeance on the murderess at the hand of his and her son, the absent Orestes.

In the *Choëphoroe* those threats receive their accomplishment. Orestes returns, under the guise of a messenger sent to announce his death, unites with his sister Electra in tears, prayers, and vows at the tomb of their father, and then slays Clytemnestra and Ægisthus, who perish by treachery, just as they had treacherously slain Agamemnon (886). But no sooner has he imbrued his hands in his mother's blood — though he did it by command of the oracle, under threats of dire calamity if he disobeyed — than his thoughts begin to wander, like horses without a charioteer; doubt, fear, and frenzy seize upon him; and he sees the Furies — the angry hell-hounds of his mother (*μητρὸς ἔγκοτοι κύνες*, 1052) — in Gorgon form, in sable vestments, and entwined with snakes, who pursue him as he flees to find a refuge at the altar of Apollo.

But after the law comes the gospel. First the controversy, then the reconciliation. Such is the natural order of the ideas; such the actual sequence of events: and a dim consciousness of the former as a fact, and of the latter as a want, if not also as an object of faith and hope, seems to have revealed itself to the human mind, even in the darkest period of its existence. Something like this seems to underlie not a few of the Greek trilogies. The *Prometheus Bound* was followed by the *Prometheus Unbound*, reconciled and restored to the favor of Jove through the interven-

tion of Jove's son (Prom. 767-9).¹ The Œdipus Tyrannus of Sophocles was completed by the Œdipus at Colonus, where he dies in peace amid visible tokens of divine favor. And so the Agamemnon and Choephoroe reach their consummation only in the Eumenides, where the Erinnyes themselves are appeased, and the Furies become the Gracious Ones. This is not, however, without a special divine interposition, and then only after a severe struggle between the powers that cry for justice and those that plead for mercy. The law still thunders its dreadful sentence; the avenging goddesses come into the very sanctuary, and threaten vengeance in the very presence of "great Loxias," Orestes' advocate, "the healing prophet and the seer," and "the cleanser (*καθάριος*, 63) of the house."

The scene opens at Delphi. Orestes is seen sitting on the Omphalos:

His hands with gore are dripping, and he holds
A sword drawn newly, and an olive branch
Chastely enwrapt with wool of whitest fleece. (40.)

Apollo stands by his side, and Hermes, messenger of Jove, in the background. The Furies sit all around him, sleeping and snoring under the power of the suppliant-protecting god. Their form is the same in which they first appeared to Orestes, immediately after the murder of his mother. Hideously grim and black, from their eyes they distil a deadly dew. Hags, antique maids, they are fit only to dwell in subterranean Tartarus. Apollo encourages Orestes, sends him under the conduct of Hermes to the feet of Athena at Athens, and there promises to find out means for his deliv-

¹ Hermes declares to Prometheus, that he shall not be released, till some god appear a successor (*διδόχος*) to his sufferings, and willing to go down to Hades and Tartarus for him (Prom. 1026); Apollodorus says, that Hercules, after freeing Prometheus, delivered up the Centaur Chiron to Jove, willing though immortal to die in his room (*δρῆσκειν ἀντ' αὐτοῦ*, Apol. II. 5, 11, 12). See Blackie's note in loc., where also see the extent to which the idea of vicarious sacrifice has prevailed among the heathen nations. The Druids, according to Cesar, held the doctrine: *Pro vita hominis, nisi hominis vita reddatur, non posse aliter deorum immortalium numen placari arbitrantur* (Bell. Gall. VI. 16).

erance. No sooner has he gone out, than the ghost of Clytemnestra rises and rebukes the Furies for their inertness. Thus awakened to their duty, and quickened by the scent of blood, they pursue after him, muttering as they leave the temple of Apollo:

Such things our young gods do, by might
Prevailing ever over right :
Apollo, stern to me, shall never save him,
Nor under earth shall he be free ;
Another blood-avenger there shall have him,
And cling unto him after me. (160, 177.)

The scene is now shifted from Delphi to the temple of Athena Polias at Athens. Scarcely has Orestes arrived at the house and image of the goddess, and offered his prayer for reception and protection, as a suppliant polluted indeed, but whose pollution has been worn away by long and weary wanderings, when the Furies overtake him, and renew their threats of vengeance in language and imagery most frightful:

But thou must give thy living limbs to me
To suck the marrow out — may I from thee
The odious draught as food receive ;
Thee, while alive, I will bereave
Of all thy pith, and take thee downward hence ;
This the tributary recompense,
Thou art in thy person paying
For thy impious mother-slaying.
And thou shalt see if any other,
To god or stranger, sire or mother,
Hath done despiteous wrong, how he
Must pay the penalty, like thee.
For Hades, underneath the ground,
A strict examiner is found ;
And all the deeds of mortal kind
He sees, and writes them in his mind. (264-75.)

To which Orestes replies :

My mother's blood, that was upon my hand —
'Tis there no more — the stain, washed out, is gone.
While fresh, it was removed at Phœbus' hearth,
By purifying blood of slaughtered swine. (280 seq.)

The Furies, to whom Æschylus with characteristic boldness has assigned the sacred and venerable office of the chorus in this piece, now close in, as it were, around their victim, and join in singing a hymn of curses, in which they magnify their own powers and functions as the avenging deities appointed by the eternal law of Fate, and imprecate the direst woes on all offenders, and especially on those who shed kindred blood:

When Mars, grown tame to touch and sight,
In social life shall slay a friend,
Then we pursue him to the end,
And hunt him down, though he be stout,
Nor leave him till we blot him out. (354 seq.)

For we are skilful to devise
And can effect whate'er we plan;
Of ill deeds, awful memories,
And hard to be appeased by man. (381 seq.)

Athena soon appears in person, and the two parties plead their cause before her, Apollo appearing openly as the advocate of Orestes. The Furies urge the overthrow of ancient laws as the inevitable consequence of acquittal. Orestes, in person and through his advocate, pleads duty to his father, the sanction of Apollo, and the expiation, which, under Apollo's teaching, he has made. Athena summons about her a council of the oldest and wisest of the citizens, — the original of the famous council and court of Areopagus — and takes their votes; and when, so difficult and doubtful is the question, they are equally divided, she throws her casting vote in favor of Orestes. For a season, the Furies are frantic at the indignity, and threaten dire revenge on the people and the very soil of Athens:

Ye younger gods have trampled down
Old laws, and wrested them from me;
Amerced of office and renown,
I will, for this indignity,
Drop, from my heart's wrath-bleeding wound,
A blight — a plague-drop on the ground.

A lichen fatal to the trees,
 To children, shall invade the soil,
 (Hear Justice!) and inflict disease
 On men — the blotch and deadly boil. (778 seq.)

But Athena finds means to appease and reconcile them, and gives them a sanctuary at the very base of Mars' Hill, hard by the court of Areopagus. The Dreadful Goddesses, having now become the Venerable and the Gracious-minded, invoke their sister Fates to join them in blessing, instead of cursing, the land; and as they are conducted with great pomp to their new seats of just but benignant power, all the people unite in a general song and shout of rejoicing.

Such is an imperfect outline of this most interesting and instructive drama. It is not denied that much of all this is earthly, civil, and political, in its primary intention. But the presence of the gods, and the constant references to a future state of just and inevitable retribution, forbid any restricted application. The ideas are founded deep in the religious nature of man. They set forth the *theology* of Æschylus and the better part of his contemporaries. And it must be confessed, that that theology is surprisingly healthy, sound, and truthful, in its essential elements. The great doctrines of hereditary depravity, retribution, and atonement, are there in their *elements*, as palpably as they are in the Sacred scriptures. Would that much of modern poetry were equally true to the soul of man, to the law of God, and to the gospel of Christ!

The offices and work here ascribed to Apollo, taken in connection with what has been said of the same god under a former head, must strike every Christian reader, whatever may be his explanation of them, as remarkable resemblances, not to say foreshadowings, of the Christian doctrine of reconciliation. This resemblance or analogy becomes yet more striking, when we bring into view the relation in which this reconciling work stands to *Ζεὺς Σωτήρ*, Jupiter the Saviour — *Ζεὺς τρίτος*, Jupiter the Third, who in connection with Apollo and Minerva, consummates the reconciliation. Not only is Apollo a *Σωτήρ* (Ag. 512), who, having himself

been an exile from heaven among men, will pity the poor and needy (Sup. 214). Not only does Athena sympathize with the defendant at her tribunal, and, uniting the office of advocate with that of judge, persuade the avenging deities to be appeased (Eum. 970) ; but Zeus is the beginning and end of the whole process. Apollo appears as the advocate of Orestes, only at his bidding (Eum. 616). Athena inclines to the side of the accused, as the offspring of the brain of Zeus, and of like mind with him (664, 737). Orestes, after his acquittal, says that he obtained it :

By means of Pallas, and of Loxias,
And the third Saviour, who doth sway all things.¹

And when the Furies are fully appeased by the persuasion of Athena, she ascribes it to the power of *Zeus ἀγοραῖος*, Zeus the master of assemblies :

Jove, that rules the forum, nobly
In the high debate hath conquered.
In the strife of blessing now,
You with me shall vie for ever.²

In short, "throughout the *Oresteia*, Æschylus exhibits dimly and mysteriously in the background, but with all the more poetical effect on that very account, the idea of Zeus Soter, the *Third*, as the power that pervades the universe, and conducts the course of things, gently (slowly ?) indeed, but eventually to the best possible issue."³

VI. *A Future State of Rewards and Punishments.*

'The immortality of the soul is nowhere taught by Æschylus, as an abstract and general truth. Still less does he

¹ Τοῦ πάντα κραίνοντος τρίτου σωτήρος (975.)

² Chapman's version is more striking, but less true to the original :

But Zeus prevails ; the power of mercy still
Predominates — good doth o'er-master ill.

³ C. O. Müller on the *Eumenides*, p. 219, where see also his remarks on the wide diffusion through Greece of the conception and cultus of Jupiter Soter, as the *Third*.

know anything of the doctrine of the resurrection. That struck the philosophers at Athens as a novelty and an absurdity, when Paul preached it, five or six centuries later, on Mars' Hill. But a future state of existence is everywhere taken for granted, as it is in the Old Testament. It is implied in prayers and offerings to the dead. Thus Electra invokes Agamemnon to send blessings on herself and Orestes, and to appear as an avenger of his murderers (Choeph. 140; 480, et al.). And Atossa, by advice of the Chorus, makes her prayer to her departed husband Darius, whom she had seen in vision the previous night, that he would avert all evil omens and bring to pass all that was good (Pers. 220, etc.). It is implied also in the evocation of departed spirits, who even make their appearance on the stage, in the tragedies of *Æschylus*. Thus Clytemnestra comes up from the abodes of the dead to goad on the Furies to avenge her murder, and declares that she wanders in disgrace, not only unavenged, but perpetually dishonored and reproached among the dead for the murder of her husband (Eum. 95). Darius, evoked from the under world by the queen-mother and the Persian nobles, appears to counsel them, after the overthrow of Xerxes (Pers. 680). And the living Clytemnestra, with hands yet dripping with her husband's blood, with biting sarcasm avers, that Iphigenia, the victim of her father's unnatural cruelty, shall meet him, as is fit, at "the Ferry of Sighs," greet him *lovingly*, throw her arms about him, and kiss him (Ag. 1555).

The place of the departed is called Hades, or the unseen world. It is *ὁ νεκροδέγμων*, the receiver of the dead (Prom. 153); *ὁ πάνδοκος*, the all-receiver (Theb. 860); it is the realm of the most hospitable Zeus (*τὸν πολυξενώτατον Ζῆνα*, Sup. 157), the entertainer of most numerous guests. It is situated under the earth (Prom. 152, et al.). It is a dark and gloomy abode (*ἀναύγητος*, Prom. 1027), untrodden by Apollo, uncheered by the light of the sun (Theb. 859). Men are conveyed to this sunless, all-receiving, invisible shore, across Acheron, by an ill-omened boat with sable sails, filled by a breeze of sighs (Ibid. 854-60). It seems to be conceived of

often as one vast *sepulchre*, where are gathered all the dead of all ages; often as a subterranean *world*, the image of this, only excluded from the light of day; an *empire* with its infernal sovereignties (*νεπτέρων τυραννίδες*, Choeph. 403); a *city*, with its counsellors sitting at the gates (Ag. 1291), and its inhabitants with characters and pursuits not unlike those in the present life.

Tartarus is a part of Hades, or rather a dark, deep dungeon (*μελαμβυδῆς κενδρόν*, Prom. 219); sunk far beneath it (*νέρθεν Αἴδου*, Ibid. 152), in whose dismal depths (*κνεφαῖα βάθη*, 1028) the enemies of Zeus are kept in indissoluble chains (*δεσμοῖς ἀλύτοις*, 154), and from which there is no way of escape (*ἀπέραντον*, 153, cf. 1077).

The character and condition of the departed corresponds, in a great measure, with their character and condition here. The same distinctions of rank hold there as here. Darius rules in Hades; nay, ranks among the gods of the lower world (Pers. 691), even as the Persians honored their kings as gods on earth (Pers. 156). And Agamemnon, not less distinguished below than above, is honored and revered as a king and a minister of the greatest subterranean powers (Choeph. 253, seq.); *for* (such is the argument of *Electra*) thou wast a king, when thou wast living. Yet wealth is of no avail to the dead, and earthly pleasures are not there to be enjoyed; and on this ground Darius exhorts the Persian nobles, even in their defeat, to make the most of the pleasures of the present life (Pers. 840).

Still more certainly will the distinctions of character, which exist on earth, continue also in another world. The good and happy here will be good and happy hereafter, though comparatively little is said in Æschylus of the blessedness of the righteous. It is the punishment of the wicked, on which the tragedians chiefly insist, for the obvious reason that this falls in more with the plan and idea of tragedy. Death is no escape, to the wicked, from their sins or the consequences of them. Their crimes will follow them into another world. The same Furies that pursue them on earth, unless appeased and reconciled, will follow them in Hades

nay, in Tartarus, which is their fit and favorite abode (*Eum.* 72). In Hades also there is a tribunal, which the wicked cannot escape, and a faithful record of their lives, and a just judge, who will certainly bring them to judgment and punish them according to their deeds. For example, Danaus encourages his frightened and desponding daughters with the assurance, that the wretch who would fain force upon them an incestuous marriage, without their own or their father's consent, cannot be pure in the sight of God. Not even in Hades can he, who does such things, escape guiltless and unpunished. For there, as the saying or tradition is (*ὡς λόγος*), another Zeus judges crimes and awards to the departed their final sentence (*Sup.* 227):

Who does these deeds
Will find no refuge from lewd guilt in Hades ;
For there, as we have heard, another Jove
Holds final judgment on the guilty shades.

And the Argive king fears to deliver up the fugitive suppliants, lest he bring upon himself, as an avenger, the all-destroying god, who does not even let go free the dead in Hades (*Ibid.* 414):

ὅς οὐδ' ἐν Αἴδου τὸν θανάτῳ ἐλευθεροῖ.

In the *Eumenides*, as we have seen on a former page, the Furies declare to Orestes that they will not only waste his body and suck his blood here ; but, after having hunted him through life, they will drag him away to the lower world, there to pay the full penalty for his mother-slaying. And like certain and condign punishment awaits every other sinner, whether against God or man :

For Hades underneath the ground
A strict examiner is found ;
And all the deeds of mortal kind
He sees and writes them in his mind.

*μέγας γὰρ Αἴδης ἐστὶν εὐδυνος βρυτῶν,
ἐνερθε χθονὸς,
δελτογράφος δὲ πάντ' ἐπωπῆ φρενί.*

(273-5.)

And this punishment is not only certain, but remediless and endless. Though he flee beneath the earth, he shall never be set free from the demands of justice (175). "And where shall be the end of the murderer's punishment?" "Where joy is never known" (422). Such are the ideas of future punishment, which are perpetually recurring in the *Eumenides*. From the beginning almost to the end of this magnificent drama, eternal retribution hangs like a gloomy cloud in the distance; and it is on this dark background, that the poet has painted, in bright and beautiful contrast, the bow of reconciliation.

In conclusion, should we attempt to express our views of the Greek Drama, and the Old Paganism generally, in its relation to Christianity, we could hardly sum them up better than in the words of the learned and devout American historian of the church, Dr. Schaff: "Its polytheism rested on a dim monotheistic back ground, subjected all the gods to Jupiter, and Jupiter himself to a mysterious fate. It had at bottom the feeling of dependence on higher powers and reverence for divine things. It preserved the memory of a golden age and of a fall. It had the voice of conscience and a sense, obscure though it was, of guilt. It felt the need of reconciliation with deity, and sought that reconciliation by prayer, penance, and sacrifice. Many of its religious traditions and usages were faint echoes of the primal religion; and its mythological dreams of the mingling of the gods with men, of Prometheus delivered by Hercules from his helpless sufferings, were unconscious prophecies and fleshly anticipations of Christian truths."

Is not the summary we have given, of the theology of Æschylus, sufficient to demonstrate the above conclusions, as a matter of fact? And why should we fear or reluctantly to receive them; as a matter of doctrine? Paul, while he censured the idolatry of the Athenians, did not hesitate to recognize an element of truth in their ideas, of devoutness in their spirit, and even of authority in their poets, and to build upon this foundation his masterly discourse on the Areopagus. So likewise in his Epistles, whenever he can seize upon any-

thing truthful, which the heathen "prophets" have said, he presses it into the service of Christianity. There certainly is, in the poets and philosophers of ancient Greece, not a little of truth and of resemblance to the great central facts of Christianity, mixed up with gross superstitions and hurtful errors; and why should not this, like all other truth, be referred to God as its source? Does not God rule in history? Has he not always had his witnesses in the world and in human hearts? Does God, in his word, contradict his works; or are his works of creation and providence the scaffolding wherewith he built — the mould wherein he cast — his word? Is Christianity at variance with history, or is it rather the consummate flower and fruit of all God's dealings with mankind? And if it is, must there not be some type and promise of its coming in all his previous dealings with men, even as in every tree which he has made, the type of the flower and fruit is found in every leaf and twig and branch, and the whole stock even to the root? He who made the pre-Adamite earth an "unconscious prophecy" of man, and formed the lower orders of animals types of the higher, and planted the seeds of each succeeding age of human history in that which preceded it, and filled the outward world and the soul of man with types and shadows of coming events, even as he filled the Old Testament with types and shadows of the New — has he planted no seeds of Christianity in human hearts; caused no types of the highest truth and life to grow in the literature and religion of the ages; cast no shadow of the greatest event, that is ever to transpire in our world, on the previous history of that world; created no unconscious prophecies of his last and best dispensation in the brightest and best minds of antiquity? If we believed this of Christianity, we could not believe it came from God, because it would want the stamp of all his other works. But when we see all literature, and history, as well as external nature and the soul of man full of prophecies and preparations for its coming, then we cannot resist the evidence, that he who made and governs the world is the author of Christianity.

There are two extreme views of the theology of the old Greek poets and philosophers. The one, held without due consideration by too many mere theologians, who regard every ray of truth and excellence discovered in classical literature, as so much subtracted from the brightness of Christianity. As if the Logos were not the light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world! As if, in order to add to the glory of the sun, the stars must be extinguished!

The other, assumed without proper examination by too many mere scholars and free thinkers, denies, like Buckle in his History of Civilization, that Christianity has added anything to the sum of moral and religious truth known to the ancients. As if our very children did not understand the chief end of man and the way of salvation better than the wisest of pagan philosophers! As if there were, in pagan literature and biography, any near approximation to the life and teachings of Jesus of Nazareth! As if unbelievers themselves could really know him, without exclaiming: "Never man spake like this man;" "his life was more than human" — "his death was the death of a god!"

Between these extremes, there is a middle ground, taken after the fullest and freest investigation by such Christian philosophers and scholars as Schaff, Trench, Neander, and Cudworth, not to say such sacred writers as Paul, who see in Christ "the desire of all nations," and in Christianity that towards which human history has been tending, and for which human hearts have been longing in all ages. In medio tutissimus ibis.

ARTICLE VI.

ON THE VEDIC DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE LIFE.

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THE design of this Article¹ is to exhibit an interesting feature in the ancient religion of India, and, at the same time, to furnish an illustration of the manner in which the Veda is made to contribute to the history of Hindû creeds and institutions, and of the character of the light which it sheds upon them.

What has been for more than two thousand years the prevailing belief in India respecting death and a future life, is so well known, that it is not necessary here to do more than characterize it briefly and generally. It is the so-called doctrine of transmigration. It teaches that the present life is but one of an indefinite series of existences which each individual soul is destined to pass through; that death is only the termination of one, and the entrance upon another, of the series. Further, it holds that all life is one in essence; that there is no fundamental difference between the vital principle of a human being, and that of any other living creature: so that, when a soul quits its tenement of flesh, it may find itself next imprisoned in the body of some inferior animal; being, in fact, liable to make experience of all the various forms of life, in its progress toward the final consummation of its existence. The grade of each successive birth is regarded as determined by the sum of merit or demerit resulting from the actions of the lives already past: a life of exceeding folly and wickedness may condemn one to be born for myriads of years in the shape of abhorred and grovelling animals, or among the depraved, the ignorant, and the outcast among men; on the other hand, it is possible to attain to such an exalted pitch of wisdom and virtue, that

¹ First read before the American Oriental Society, at its meeting in New York, November 3, 1858.

the soul escapes the condemnation of existence, and sinks into the void, or merges its individuality in the universality of the world-spirit. It is held also—although rather, it would seem, as a relic of creeds which have preceded this, than as any properly organic part of it—that, in further recompense of past actions, an intermediate period may be spent, after death, in enjoying the delights of a heaven, or suffering the torments of a hell, before the weary round of births is again taken up. But this is a feature of the creed of only minor consequence: the inexorable fate which dooms each creature to a repeated entrance upon a life full of so many miseries in the present, fraught with such dangers for the future, is what the Hindû dreads, and would escape: he flies from existence, as the sum of all miseries; the aim of his life is to make sure that it be the last of him. For it is virtual, if not defined and acknowledged annihilation, that the Hindû strives after; it is the destruction of consciousness, of individuality, of all the attributes and circumstances which make up existence.

The antiquity of this strange doctrine, and its dominion over the popular mind of India, are clearly shown by the fact that even Buddhism, the popular revolution against the creeds and the forms of the Brahminic religion, implicitly adopted it, venturing only to teach a new and more effective method of escaping from the bonds of existence into the longed-for freedom of nonentity. Yet, in spite of this evidence of its great age, we should be led to suspect, upon internal grounds alone, that it was not the earliest belief of the Hindû nation. It has that stamp of elaboration, of a subtle refinement of philosophy, which is not wont to characterize the creeds of a primitive period; it is in harmony rather with the other Brahminic institutions in the midst of which we find it, and which speak plainly of a long previous history of growth and gradual development. There are also external evidences pointing us to the same conclusion, in the elaborate system of funeral rites and ceremonies practised by the Hindûs. These seem not only not to grow out of the doctrine of transmigration, as its natural expression, but

even to be in many points quite inconsistent with it. Thus, to insist upon only a single instance : it is the duty of every pious Hindû to make upon the first day of each lunar month an offering to the Fathers, as they are called, or to the manes of the deceased ancestors of his family. Food is set out for them, of which they are invited to come and partake, and they are also addressed with supplications, in a manner which supposes them to be glorified spirits, capable of continuing in their condition after death intercourse with those whom they left behind, and of exercising over them a protecting and fostering care. As we look yet further into the forms of the modern Hindû ceremonial, we discover not a little of the same discordance between creed and observance : the one is not explained by the other. We are forced to the conclusion, either that India derived its system of rites from some foreign source, and practised them blindly, careless of their true import, or else that those rites are the production of another doctrine, of older date, and have maintained themselves in popular usage after the decay of the creed of which they were the original expression. Between these two opinions we could not hesitate which to adopt. We know with what tenacity once-established forms are wont to maintain themselves, even when they have lost their living significance ; we know how valuable an auxiliary, in studying the development of a religion, is its ritual ; and we could even proceed, by the aid of the Hindû ceremonies, comparing them carefully with what we know of the doctrines of other ancient religions, to reconstruct in part the general fabric of the earliest Hindû belief.

Fortunately, however, we are not left to this uncertain and unsatisfactory method of investigating the religious history of India. In the hymns of the Veda we have laid before us a picture of the earliest conditions, both civil and religious, of the country. They exhibit the only partially developed germs of the civilization, the creeds, the institutions, which we are wont to call Indian : in them we read the explanation of much that would otherwise have remained always an enigma in Indian history. They show

us that the inconsistency of the rites with the doctrines of later times is indeed only a measure of the deviations of the latter from their ancient standard.

We will proceed to state, as briefly as possible, the views of the ancient Hindûs upon the important subjects of life and death, and the life beyond the grave, and will then illustrate them by extracts from the hymns of the Veda, whence the knowledge of them is drawn.

The difference between the modern doctrines and those by which they were preceded is one, not of detail merely, but of the whole spirit and character. The earliest inhabitants of India were far enough removed from the unhealthy introversion of their descendants, from their contempt of all things sublunar, from their melancholy opinion of the vanity and misery of existence, from their longings to shuffle off the mortal coil forever, and from the metaphysical subtlety of their views respecting the universe and its creator. They looked at all these things with the simple apprehension, the naïve faith, which is wont to characterize a primitive people. They had a hearty and healthy love of earthly life, and an outspoken relish for all that makes up the ordinary pleasures of life. Wealth, and a numerous offspring, are the constant burden of their prayers to their gods; success in predatory warfare, or in strife for consideration and power, is fervently besought. Length of days in the land, or death by no other cause than old age, is not less frequently supplicated: they clung to the existence of which they fully appreciated all the delights. Yet death, to them, was surrounded with no terrors. They regarded it as only an entrance upon a new life of happiness in the world of the departed. Somewhere beyond the grave, in the region where the gods dwelt, the children of men were assembled anew, under the sceptre of him who was the first progenitor of their race, the divine Yama. No idea of retribution was connected with that of the existence after death. It was only a prolongation of the old life, under changed conditions. They who partook of it were not severed from intercourse with those whom they had left behind upon earth, nor were they even exempt from

the material wants of their earthly life. They were capable of deriving pleasure from the offerings of their descendants; they were even in a measure dependent upon those offerings for the comfortable continuance of their existence. The ancestral feasts, which it was the duty of each head of a family to provide from time to time for the deceased progenitors of the family, were not only a means of gaining the favor and protection which they, in their disembodied state, were held capable of extending, but were a pious duty toward them which might not be neglected. In this respect the early Hindû doctrine resembled the Chinese; and traces of a similar creed are found among the religious observances of many other nations.

The funeral ceremonies to which such a creed would lead need not be otherwise than simple. To illustrate those of the ancient Hindûs, we will first offer the translation of a hymn from the concluding book of the Rig-Veda (x. 18), which places before our eyes the whole series of proceedings at a burial in that early period. The passage is one of more than usual interest; it has maintained, down even to the present day, an important place in the Hindû funeral ceremonial; it has also attracted especial attention from modern European scholars, and been more than once translated.¹ We present here a new version, made with all the literalness which the case admits, and in close imitation of the metrical structure of the original hymn.²

We are to suppose the body of the deceased brought forth to the place of interment, surrounded by his friends and

¹ See an interesting and valuable Article by Roth, on a subject closely akin with that of this paper, in the *Zeitsch. d. Deutsch. Morg. Gesellschaft*, viii. 467, etc.; and another by Müller, in the following volume of the same series, for 1855: the only English translation which we know is that of Wilson, in the *Journ. Roy. As. Society of Gr. Br. and Ireland*, xvi. 201, etc.; this latter, like most of Wilson's translations from the Veda, is made rather from the native commentary than from the Veda itself, and neither in spirit, nor as an accurate translation, fairly represents its original.

² Like almost all the Vedic hymns, it is in a simple iambic strain, dependent for its movement upon the quantity of the syllables, but far from strict in its construction, and changing, often within the limits of a single verse, from a half-line of eleven syllables to one of twelve, or of eight.

family. These have come out to take their leave of him, and to see him consigned to the keeping of the earth. He is cut off from among them, and they who have been his companions and intimates hitherto, are to continue so no longer. They have no idea of sharing his fate, or of following him: life, and the love of life, are still strong in them; it is their special care that death shall be content for the present with the victim he has already seized, and shall leave them to the happiness of a prolonged existence. It is clear that they are not free from that uncanny feeling at having to do with a corpse, and that dread of evil consequences to result from it, which is so natural and universal, and which in so many ancient religions led to the regarding of the dead as unclean, and to the requirement of purificatory ceremonies from those who had approached or handled them. No small part of this hymn is taken up with enforcing the totality of the separation which is now to take place between the living and the dead. It commences with a deprecatory appeal to death itself:

Go forth, O death, upon a distant pathway,
 one that's thine own, not that the gods do travel ;
 I speak to thee who eyes and ears possesseth,
 harm not our children, harm thou not our heroes.

In the second and third verses, the spokesman and conductor of the ceremony addresses the assembled friends, dwelling upon the difference of their condition from that of him whom they accompany to his last resting-place, and upon the precautions which they have taken against following him further than to the edge of the grave. In explanation of the allusion in the first line, it should be remarked that other Vedic passages show it to have been a custom to attach a clog to the foot of a corpse, as if by that means to restrain death, of whom the dead body was the possession and representative, of his freedom to attack the survivors. Such a naïve symbolism is very characteristic of the primitive simplicity of the whole ceremony, and of the belief which inspired it.

There remains now with the deceased only his wife ; she too is summoned away, the last ; the person whose duty it is to be henceforth her support and protection, to sustain the part of a husband toward her, — a brother-in-law, the rules say, or a foster-child, or an old servant — grasps her hand and leads her after the rest, while she is thus addressed :

Go up unto the world of life, O woman !
thou liest by one whose soul is fled ; come hither !
To him who grasps thy hand, a second husband,
thou art as wife to spouse become related.

Hitherto the deceased has carried in his hand a bow ; that is now taken from him, to signify that he has done forever with all the active occupations of life, and that those who remain behind have henceforth his part to play, and are to enjoy the honors and pleasures which might have been his.

The bow from out the dead man's hand now taking,
that ours may be the glory, honor, prowess —
Mayest thou there, we here, rich in retainers,
vanquish our foes and them that plot against us.

The separation between the dead and the living has thus been made complete, and this part of the ceremony concluded with the benediction to both parties, the prayer that both, each in his own place and lot, may enjoy success and happiness. And now, with gentle action and tender words, the body is committed to the earth.

Approach thou now the lap of earth, thy mother,
the wide-extending earth, the ever-kindly ;
A maiden soft as wool to him who comes with gifts,
she shall protect thee from destruction's bosom.

Open thyself, O earth, and press not heavily, .
be easy of access and of approach to him ;
As mother with her robe her child,
so do thou cover him, O earth !

May earth maintain herself thus opened wide for him ;
a thousand props shall give support about him ;
And may those mansions ever drip with fatness ;
may they be there forevermore his refuge .

Forth from about thee thus I build away the ground ;
as I lay down this cover may I take no harm ;
This pillar may the Fathers here maintain for thee ;
may Yama there provide for thee a dwelling.

The funeral hymn properly closes here ; but in its form as handed down to us, there is yet another verse, of somewhat obscure import, but which seems to be an expression of the complacency of the poet in his work ; it may or may not have belonged originally to this particular hymn. It reads as follows :

They've set me in a fitting day,
as one the plume sets on the shaft,
I've caught and used the fitting word,
as one a steed tames with the rein.

There can be no question respecting the interpretation of this interesting relic of Hindû antiquity, nor respecting the character of the action which it was intended to accompany. The record is too pictorial to be misapprehended ; the ceremony is set plainly before our eyes, in all its simplicity, as a leave-taking and an interment, and nothing besides. One or two things especially strike us in connection with it.

In the first place, we note its discordance with the modern Hindû practice of immolating the widow at the grave of her husband. Nothing could be more explicit than the testimony of this hymn against the antiquity of the practice. It finds, indeed, no support anywhere in the Vedic scriptures. The custom is of comparatively recent introduction ; originating, it may be, in single instances of the voluntary self-destruction of wives who would not survive their husbands ; a devotion held to be so laudable that it found imitation, gained in frequency, and became a custom, and then finally an obligation ; the form of voluntary consent being kept up even to the end. Authority has been sought, however, for the practice in a fragment of this very hymn, rent from its natural connection, and a little altered : by the change of a single letter, the line which is translated above : " the wives may first ascend unto the altar," has been made to read : " the wives shall go up into the place of the fire."

Again: the funeral ceremony here depicted is evidently a burial of the body in the earth. Not a few passages might be cited from other hymns which show that this was both permitted and frequent among the more ancient Hindûs. Thus we read:

In earth's broad, unoppressive space,
be thou, O dead, deposited;
The offerings thou hast made in life,
let them drip honey for thee now.

In another verse we have a hint of a coffin, of which no mention is made in the hymn translated above:

Let not the tree press hard on thee,
nor yet the earth, the great, divine;
Among the Fathers finding place,
thrive thou with those whom Yama rules.

Indeed, in the freedom of that early period, any convenient method of disposing of the worthless shell from which the spirit had escaped, seems to have been held allowable. Thus a verse says:

The buried and the cast away,
the burnt, and they who were exposed—
Those Fathers, Agni, all of them,
to eat the offering, hither bring.

Again, we find the general classification made, of

Those burned with fire, and those whom fire hath not burned.

Considering, however, what the belief of the Hindûs was in certain other points, it is not a matter for surprise that the method of incremation came by degrees to prevail over all other forms of burial. Agni (Latin, *ignis*), the fire, and the god of fire, was to the Hindûs, as to other primitive people, the medium of communication between earth and heaven, the messenger from men to the gods, and from the gods to men. Whatever, with due ceremony and invocation, was cast into the flames on Agni's altar, was borne away upward and delivered over to the immortals. To burn

the body of a deceased person was accordingly an act of solemn sacrifice, which made Agni its bearer to the other world, the future dwelling of its former possessor. There was less of spirituality, doubtless, in this doctrine, than in that which regarded the body as of no consequence, and the soul alone as capable of entering upon the other existence; but it seems rather to have gained in distinctness and in currency, and it was quite in harmony with other parts of the Hindû belief respecting the condition of the departed, which we shall notice later. There are passages in which the assumed importance of the body to its old tenant is brought out very strongly and very naïvely. Thus a verse says :

Start onward ! bring together all thy members ;
 let not thy limbs be left, nor yet thy body ;
 Thy spirit, gone before, now follow after ;
 wherever it delights thee, go thou thither.

Again :

Collect thy body, with its every member ;
 thy limbs with help of rites I fashion for thee.

Once more, the necessity of making up any chance losses of a part or member, is curiously insisted upon in the following passage :

If some one limb was left behind by Agni,
 when to the Fathers' world he hence conveyed you,
 That very one I now again supply you,
 rejoice in heaven with all your limbs, ye Fathers !

Before the final adjusting of the orthodox Hindû ceremonial, in the form which it has ever since maintained, it had thus become usual to dispose of the bodies of the dead by incrimation only ; and this is accordingly the sole method which the sacred usages of later times contemplate as allowable. And yet the hymn of which we have given the translation in full above, although originally prepared, in all probability, to accompany the celebration of some special funeral ceremony, had gained such consideration and currency as to have become inseparably connected with the

general funeral service ; of which, as already remarked, it even now forms a part. Its verses, in order to adapt them to their new uses, are separated from one another, and from their proper connection, and are more or less distorted in meaning : a part of them are introduced in connection with the ceremony of incremation, a part with that of the later collection and interment of the relics found among the ashes of the funeral pile. It would carry us into too much detail to enter in full upon the subject of this modern transfer and alteration ;¹ our present purpose is answered by directing attention to this departure also, less violent than the other, but no less a departure, from the usages of the olden time, and to the force put upon the sacred writings to make them conform to and support the new customs.

In the hymn translated, there is but the briefest reference, at its close, to the new life upon which the deceased is supposed to have entered. We will go on to illustrate, by citations from other hymns, the doctrine which this one assumes, but does not exhibit.

Another hymn in the last book of the Rig-Veda (x. 14.) commences thus :

Him who went forth unto those far-off regions,
 the pathway thither pointing out to many,
Vivasvant's son, the gatherer of the people,
 Yama, the king, now worship with oblations.

A somewhat different version of the first part of this verse is found in the corresponding passage of the Atharva-Veda :

Him who hath died the first, of living mortals,
 who to that other world the first departed, etc.

The same hymn continues :

Yama hath found for us the first a passage ;
 that's no possession to be taken from us ;
Whither our fathers, of old time, departed,
 thither their offspring, each his proper pathway.

¹ We refer those who are interested in the subject to the articles of Roth and Müller, already alluded to in a former note.

The subject most enlarged upon in connection with the Fathers is, naturally enough, the relation in which they still stand to their living descendants, and the duties of the latter growing out of that relation. Both have been briefly characterized above; we now present passages which illustrate the character of the rites practised, and of the belief upon which they were founded.

The Fathers are supposed to assemble, upon due invocation, about the altar of him who would pay them homage, to seat themselves upon the straw or matting spread for each of the guests invited, and to partake of the offerings set before them.

Hither with aid ! ye matting-seated Fathers,
these offerings we have set for you ; enjoy them !

Rise and go forth, ye Fathers, and come hither :
behold the offering for you, rich with honey ;
We pray you graciously to grant us riches ;
bestow upon us wealth with numerous offspring.

Come here, ye Fathers whom the fire hath sweetened ;
sit each upon his seat, in loving converse ;
Devour the offerings set upon the matting here ;
bestow upon us wealth with numerous offspring.

It is customary, in the modern ceremonies, to invite especially to the feast the ancestors for three generations back, bestowing upon the rest the remnants only of the repast. This was also the ancient usage, as is shown by the following passage, among others :

This portion is for thee, great-grandfather, and for them that belong
with thee.

This portion is for thee, grandfather, and for them that belong with
thee.

This portion is for thee, father.

It was already usual, as later, to make the offering to the Fathers monthly :

Go forth, ye Fathers
Then, in a month, unto our dwellings come again,
to eat the offering

It would be easy greatly to extend this Article by additional citations; but enough has been already presented, it is believed, to illustrate all the main features of the ancient Hindû belief respecting the life after death. Any further passages which might be adduced from the Vedic texts would be of a character akin with these; there is nothing in the Veda which approaches any more nearly to the dogmas of modern days. The Vedas — understanding by that term the original collections of hymns, and not the mass of prose literature which has, later, attached itself to them, and is often included with them under the name of Veda — the Vedas contain not a hint even of the doctrine of transmigration; it is one of the most difficult questions in the religious history of India, how that doctrine arose, out of what it developed, to what feature of the ancient faith it attached itself.

The discordance thus shown to exist, in respect to this single point, between the sacred scriptures of the Hindû and his actual belief, is in no small degree characteristic of their whole relation. The spirit of the primitive period is altogether different from that of the times which have succeeded: the manners, the creeds, the institutions, which those ancient texts exhibit to us, are not those which we are wont to know as Indian; the whole Brahminic system is a thing of later growth. And yet the Vedas still remain the professed foundation of the system, and its inspired authority. The fact is a most significant one, as regards both the history of the Hindû religion and culture, and the character of the Hindû mind. It shows that the development of the former has been gradual, and almost unremarked, or at least unacknowledged. There have been in India no violent movements, no sweeping reformatations, no lasting and successful rebellions against the constituted authorities, civil and religious, of the nation. The possession and custody of the ancient and inspired hymns laid the foundation of the supremacy of the Brahmans; they have maintained and strengthened their authority, not by adhering pertinaciously to the letter or to the spirit of their scriptures, and attempting to check the natural growth and change of the national charac-

ter and belief, but rather by falling in with the latter, leading it on, and directing it to their own advantage. Thus, while the sacred texts have been treated with the utmost reverence, and preserved with a care and success which is without a parallel in the history of ancient literature, they have exerted comparatively very little restraining or guiding influence upon the moral and spiritual development of the people of India. Each new phase of belief has sought in them its authority, has claimed to found itself upon them, and to be consistent with their teachings; and the result is, that the sum of doctrine accepted and regarded as orthodox in modern India is incongruous beyond measure, a mass of inconsistencies. In all this is seen the terrible want of logic, the carelessness of history, the boundless subjectivity, which have ever characterized the Hindû people.

Herein lies no small part of the value and interest, to us, of these venerable relics of a remote antiquity. They exhibit to us the very earliest germs of the Hindû culture, allowing us to follow its history back to a period which is hardly to be reached elsewhere: but this is not all; they are the oldest, the most authentic, the most copious documents for the study of Indo-European archæology and history; and that for the reason that there is so little in them which is specifically Indian; that they are so nearly a reflection of that primitive condition in which there was no distinction of Indian, Persian, and European.

ARTICLE VII.

EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE

TRANSLATION OF A TABLET RECENTLY DISCOVERED IN GREECE.

In the middle of September last, the inhabitants of a small place called Constantini, in Messenia, Greece, while seeking for marble for the door-posts of their church (St. Constantine's), discovered among many interesting ruins two square tablets, the sides of each of which measured a French metre, containing very lengthy inscriptions regarding the exoteric rites pertaining to the Mysteries of the Great Goddesses. The two tablets had been originally one.

The place where these were found is undoubtedly the site of the Carnasian grove (Pausan. IV. 33. 4. 5.), where the mysteries of Demeter and Coré were solemnized and considered second only to the Eleusinian in sanctity. It is only a mile distant from the ancient Andania, which Pausanias identifies with the Messenic Oechalia of Homer (II. 2. 596). I offer the following translation of the inscriptions:

TABLET I.

Concerning the Priests and Priestesses. Let the scribe of the councils swear straightway (unless any be sick) those who have become holy officers, as they pour out the sacrificial blood and wine, the underwritten oath: "I swear by the deities to whom the mysteries belong, to have a care that everything pertaining to the ceremonial be conducted in a godly and righteous manner, and that neither shall I myself do anything unseemly or wrong to the injury of the mysteries, nor shall I allow any other so to act, but shall follow the prescribed rules, and shall swear both the priestesses and the priest according to the established order. May I obtain the rewards of the pious, if I keep my oath, and the contrary, if I break my oath. And if any one will not swear, let him be mulcted in a thousand drachmas, and let another be chosen in his stead from the same tribe. And let the priest and the holy officers swear the priestesses in the temple of Carneius on the first day of the mysteries the same oath, and let them add the following: 'and I have passed my life as towards man holily and justly.' And her who will not swear let the holy officers mulct in a thousand drachmas, and let them not permit her to perform the sacrificial duties or to participate in the mysteries, but let those who have sworn perform these rites. And let those who have become holy officers and priestesses in the fifty-fifth year, swear the same oath in the eleventh month before the mysteries.

Of Transmittal. And the pot and books,¹ which Mnesistratus gave, let

¹ See Pausan. IV. 26. 7, 8.

the holy officers transmit to their successors, and let them transmit all else which may have been prepared for the mysteries.

Of Fillets. And let the holy officers and priestesses wear fillets of white wool, and those initiated in the first mysteries wear a stlengis; but when the holy officers make proclamation, let them all lay aside the stlengis and crown themselves with laurel.

Of Garments. Let the initiated stand barefoot, and wear white garments, and the women not wear transparent ones, nor fringes in their robes broader than a half-finger, and let the uninitiated women wear a linen tunic and a robe worth not more than a hundred drachmas, and the girls a calasiris or sindonites, and a robe not worth more than a mina, and the female servants a calasiris or sindonites and a robe not worth more than fifty drachmas, and the priestesses, the women a calasiris or hypodema without gathers and a robe not worth more than two minas, and the girls a calasiris and a robe not worth more than a hundred drachmas. And in the procession let the priestesses, the women wear an under garment and robe of wool with fringes not broader than a half-finger, and the girls a calasiris and robe not transparent. And let no women wear gold or rouge, or white paint, or chaplet, or braided hair, or shoes, except such as are made of wool or the skins of sacrificed animals. And let the priestesses have chariots round and—— and on them pillows or cushions white, without fringe, or purple; and let them who are to be prepared for the service of the deities have their garments as the holy officers may ordain. And if any have a garment other than that required, or do aught else that is forbidden, let not the officer of the women permit her to pass, and let her have an opportunity to cleanse herself, and let her be holy before the deities.

Oath of the Officer of the Women. And when the holy officers themselves swear, let them swear the officer of the women before the same holy officers: "I swear that I shall have a care concerning the garments and the rest of the matters commanded in the rules."

Of the Procession. And in the procession let Mnesistratus lead; then the priest of the deities, to whom the mysteries belong, after the priestess; then the judge of the games, the sacrificers, the flute-players; and afterwards the holy virgins, as they may be chosen by lot, leading the cars with the chests holding the holy mysteries upon them; then the female ruler of the feast of Demeter and those who are attached to her as assistants; then the priestess of Demeter by the hippodrome; then the priestess of Demeter at Aegila; then the priestesses one by one, as they may be chosen by lot; then the holy officers, just as the ten may ordain. And let the officer of the women allot the priestesses and virgins, and have a care that they take their place in the procession as they may be chosen by lot. And let the sacrifices be borne in the procession and let them sacrifice to Demeter a pregnant sow, to Hermes a ram, to the great deities a young female pig, to Apollo Carneius a boar, to Hagna¹ a sheep.

¹ Coré or Proserpine. (Paus. 4. 33).

Of Tents. And let not the holy officers allow any one to have a tent in the square larger than thirty feet, or to place either skins or curtains around the tents, and let them not allow any of those who are not holy officers to have a tent where the holy officers wear their fillets, and let no one of the uninitiated approach stealthily the place where they wear their fillets. And let them provide vessels for purification. And let them record both from what one must purify, and what one must not have to enter, and what one must have in the tents. Let no one have couches in the tent, nor silver vessels worth more than three hundred drachmas, and if otherwise, let not the holy officers permit it, and let the surplus be holy to the deities.

Of the Disorderly. And when the sacrifices and mysteries are performed, let all keep silent and hear the instructions, and let the holy officers scourge and drive from the mysteries the disobedient or misbehaving.

Of the Police. And let twenty of the holy officers stand as a police and obey those who officiate in the mysteries, and let them have a care that all things be done with propriety and order by those present, even as those appointed over these announce, and let them scourge the disobedient and misbehaving. And if any one of the police do not as is written, or act improperly in any other way to the injury of the mysteries, let him be judged by the holy officers, and if he be condemned, let him not participate in the mysteries.

Concerning the Income. And the received income of the mysteries let the five appointed by the deme collect. And let the rulers bring in (not twice the same persons) each worth not less than a talent, and let the senate of the appointed registers record the value of his property. And in like manner also the worth of the introducers; and let the treasurer administer the finances with the collectors. And when the mysteries are completed, let them calculate the sum total at the first regular meeting of the councils, and let them give an account to the steward immediately, writing in full the income produced from the purification, and the maintenance from those initiated in the first mysteries and any other revenue, and the defrayed expenses and so forth, and let them immediately make their reckoning to the receivers and let them give bonds, if they may be found defaulters—.

(The rest of the first tablet is defective.)

TABLET II.

(The first part of the second tablet is defective).

Of Offences. And if any one, in the days in which the sacrifices and the mysteries take place, be caught either having committed theft or any other offence, let him be brought to the holy officers, and let the freeman, if he be condemned, pay double, and let the slave be scourged and pay double the amount of the theft, and let the fine for the other offences be 20 drachmas; and if he do not pay straightway, let the master deliver the servant to the party wronged for his use, and if not, let him be responsible for double.

Concerning those who steal in the Temple. Let no one steal from the holy place. And if any one be caught, let the slave be scourged by the holy officers, and let the freeman pay as much as the holy officers adjudge, and let the discoverer bring them to the holy officers and let him receive——.

Concerning the refuge (?) for slaves. Let the holy place be a refuge for slaves, as the priests may appoint the place, and let no one receive the fugitives—— or give them employment. Let him who acts contrary to the rules be responsible to the master—— to the sum of 500 drachmas.

Concerning the Fountain. And of the fountain¹ called Hagna in the old inscriptions and the image¹ near the fountain let Mnesistratus have charge, so long as he lives, and let him participate after the holy officers in the sacrifices and the mysteries, and as much as the sacrificers may place upon the table near the fountain; and the skins of the victims let Mnesistratus take, and of the income, as much as the sacrificers present by the fountain and cast into the treasury when it is prepared, let Mnesistratus take the third part. But let the two parts and any special offering of the sacrificers be holy to the deities. And let the priest and the holy officers have a care that from the income offerings be prepared for the deities, whatever may seem best to the councils.

Of the preparation of the Treasuries. Let the holy officers who may be in office in the fifty-fifth year have a care with the architect that two closed stone treasuries be prepared, and let them place one in the temple of the great deities and the other by the fountain, in such place as shall seem safe to them, and let them make keys, and of the one near the fountain let Mnesistratus keep the one key, and the holy officers the other; and of the one in the temple let the holy officers keep the key and open them yearly at the mysteries, and the counted income from each treasury separately let them record and take, and let them give also to Mnesistratus the part of the income belonging to him, as is written in the rules.

Of the Holy Banquet. Let the holy officers take from the victims led in the procession from each that which belongs to the deities, and use the rest of the flesh for the holy banquet with the priestess and virgins, and let them join with them the priest and the priestesses and the priestess of Carneius and Mnesistratus and his wife and family and of the artists those that perform duty in the dances and render service to them——.

Of the Market. Let the holy officers appoint a place in which all commodities shall be sold, and let the overseer of the market who belongs to the city have a care that the sellers sell honestly and fairly, and use weights and measures agreeing with the standard, and let him order the prices and let no one buy on time or connect usury with his bargain (?), and with regard to those who do not sell according to these rules let him scourge the slaves and mulct the freemen in 20 drachmas and let the fine belong to the holy officers.

¹ See Pausanias, 4 33.

Concerning Water. And let the overseer of the market have a care also about the water that at the time of the great assembly no one injure either the ——— or the conduits or any other part of the water-works in the temple, and that ———; and if he take any doing aught that is forbidden, let him scourge the slave and mulct the freeman in 20 drachmas, and let the fine belong to the holy officers.

Of Uncction and Bathing. Let the overseer of the market have a care that ——— charge the bathers no more than two chalcoi, and furnish fire ———, and that the furnisher of wood for the anointing room furnish wood both dry and sufficient for those using the unction daily from the fourth to the seventh hour. And let no slave be anointed. And let the holy officers give out the furnishing of wood for the anointing room. And if any of those thus appointed or of the bath-attendants do not according to the rules, let the overseer of the market scourge the slave, and let him mulct the freeman for each fault in 20 drachmas, and let the fine belong to the holy officers.

Of the Record of Judgment. When they (?) make any regulation in the great assembly or condemn any, let them bring the judgment in the prytaneum. And let them record ——— in the temple whom they may condemn and for what cause ———.

Of the Rules. Let those appointed to write the rules as they may be determined give a copy to the law-expounders, and let them take and show it to him who has need, and in the mysteries let there be joined in service to the priests the herald and flute-player and prophet and architect——.

(The rest is defective.)

As a distinction is constantly made between *δ ἱερεὺς* and *οἱ ἱεροί*, I have translated the latter "holy officers." Perhaps consistency would demand that *ἱερά* be translated "holy women" rather than "priestesses." I have copied from an Athenian newspaper (*Φιλόπατρις*), and doubtless some of the *lacunae* are attributable to it rather than the condition of the tablets. I make no comment, but call the attention of those interested in archaeology to this very interesting discovery.

HOWARD CROSBY,
New York University

Feb. 3, 1859.

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ARTICLE VIII.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

1.—NATURE AND THE SUPERNATURAL.¹

Dr. Bushnell has written this volume in his usual style; startling, suggestive, brilliant, rich, fresh, variegated. He has given us an imposing octavo, abounding with thoughts which quicken and invigorate the mind. Many of his descriptions, especially those of our Saviour's life and virtue, are eloquent,—some of them sublime. His entire volume is inspiring and affluent.

His main design is to confront the naturalism of the day, as it is more prominently exhibited in the writings of Strauss, Hennel, Parker, et al. He aims to promote a faith in the Divine Supernatural Government of the world. In order to promote this faith, he gives us such a definition of the word *supernatural* as lessens at once the improbability that the world is governed in a supernatural way. "That is supernatural," he says, "whatever it be, that is either not in the chain of natural cause and effect, or which acts on the chain of cause and effect, in nature, from without the chain" (p. 37). Hence he says, "It is only the will that is not under the law of cause and effect; and the other functions [of man] are, by their laws, subordinated, in a degree, to the uses of the will and its directing sovereignty over their changes and processes" (p. 40). "Man, as a being of free will, is no part of nature at all, no arc in the circle of nature. He belongs, we have abundantly shown, to a higher kingdom and order; having it for his prime distinction that he acts supernaturally, acts upon the circle of nature from without, and never as being determined by the causalities of nature" (pp. 340, 341). "The very idea of our personality is that of our being not under the law of cause and effect, a being supernatural" (p. 43). All the acts of will, then, are supernatural. Man, as an agent who wills, is supernatural. On p. 346, we are told to "consider how near the fact of sin, which is the act of a supernatural human agency, approaches to the rank of a miracle." Of course, then, the improbability that the world is governed supernaturally is, on these definitions, reduced to a *minimum*.

There would be, doubtless, one great advantage resulting from this Coleidgian use of the term *supernatural*. It is a good rhetorical device to illustrate the antecedent probability of a supernatural government of the world. But *has* this use *been* sanctioned by the requisite authority? *Will* it be

¹ Nature and the Supernatural, as together constituting the one System of God. By Horace Bushnell. New York: Charles Scribner, 124 Grand Street. 1858. pp. 528. 8vo.

sanctioned? Has not an entirely different use of the word become established in language, and is it wise to attempt a revolution which will occasion an ambiguity in the prevailing, well-nigh universal style? The word *supernatural* is ordinarily used to denote the *interposition* of a power superior to the power of the matter and the mind of this world, and men will never speak habitually of their own volitions as being all supernatural, because free. Accordingly we find that Dr. Bushnell very frequently uses the word *supernatural*, and we infer from pages 38—41, that he *intends* to use the word, in a sense different from that which his definition gives it. He cannot, and does not profess to, resist the prevailing very convenient usage of the term, as denoting an element *necessarily* superhuman; not only above nature, but also above the human will. He speaks of a "rival Gospel," which "proposes to dispense with all supernatural aid, and to restore the disorders and the fallen character of man, by a self-cultivated or self-originated virtue" (p. 234). Now this self-originated virtue is itself *supernatural*, in Dr. Bushnell's view, and of course is not dispensed with in the "rival Gospel." On page 449, he speaks of a supernatural power, not in the sense of a free power, but in the sense of a power above all human free-will. So on page 459, he speaks of "supernatural gifts" in the sense of gifts from God, and not merely from a free agent. He also includes a *superhuman* element in the word *supernatural*, on pages 493, 500, 506, 507, 508 (where, as on p. 414, we read of "supernatural machineries").

But even if Dr. Bushnell's favorite use of the term *supernatural* could be generally followed, it would be attended with some special inconveniences. One of these would be the fact, that we should be left without any unambiguous and simple term to express the *sanction* of a divine interposition. When, in our present use of language, we speak of a *supernatural* event, we imply that it is an event which God prefers, on the whole, to have take place. He even interposes to produce or permit the event. If it be supernatural, the occurrence of it is, on the whole, better than the non-occurrence of it would be. But if the new transcendental terminology should prevail, the word *supernatural* would cease to suggest to us an idea that the supernatural event is a right, fit, or useful one. Thus we read in the volume before us: "To violate the law of God is itself an act supernatural, out of the order of nature, and against the order of nature, as truly even as a miracle, else it is nothing" (p. 143). If all the free acts of man be supernatural, and if all our sins be free acts, then all our sins must be supernatural (pp. 340, 345), indeed, almost miraculous (p. 346). But this mode of speech would be especially inconvenient, as we need some generic term, like the term *supernatural*, to suggest unambiguously the great facts of Regeneration, Sanctification, Miracles, etc., as distinct from mere, and especially from sinful, acts of will.

But here is another inconvenience attending Dr. Bushnell's nomenclature. The terminology implies that the very phenomena which it is most convenient to *distinguish* as supernatural — *i. e.* Regeneration and Sanctification — ought rather to be distinguished as partly supernatural and

partly natural. While sin, viewed as a mere personal act, is wholly supernatural, Regeneration and Sanctification, being results of an extrinsic power, are not *wholly* supernatural. "Manifestly," says Dr. Bushnell, "none but God can restore the lapsed order of the soul. He alone can reconstruct its crystalline unity. Which if He does, it will imply an acting on those lines of causes in its nature by whose penal efficacy it is distempered; and that is, by supposition, a supernatural operation" (p. 236). It is supernatural, viewed as an *act* of God; but viewed as a result in "the nature" of man, it must be natural, according to the implications of Dr. Bushnell's theory. For that theory implies, whatever its author may assert, that Regeneration and Sanctification are *produced* by an extrinsic power, since they cannot be produced by the man's own power. Then there is no alternative; they are *effects*, for they are not "self-actings." Therefore, so far forth as they are *effects, results, produced* by an extraneous, a divine cause; just so far forth are they within the domain of cause and effect, and therefore within the sphere of nature. For this volume admits that the supernatural agent has a *nature*. On page 517 we read that if a man "is not a sinner, then he exists normally, and what he is in his action he is in his nature;" but, "on the other hand, if he is a sinner, acting against God, acting as he was not made to act, then he is by the supposition, a disordered nature, a being in the state of unnature." In regeneration, this disordered *nature* is changed into an orderly nature. The act of God is supernatural; but the change of nature, as a subjective result, must be natural. For the strictly supernatural is always that which *acts*, not that which is acted upon. "The supernatural is that which acts on the chain of cause and effect from without the chain (p. 335). "Man himself acts supernaturally, in all his free, accountable actions. That is, he acts upon the chain of cause and effect in nature, uncaused himself in his action" (p. 345). The *action* is not an *effect*, but the *nature* is an effect; and when a supernatural agent produces an effect in the nature of man, that effect, viewed *as such*, is natural. "Accordingly," says Dr. Bushnell, "every result produced in this [supernatural] manner, whether by God or by men, represents nature supernaturally acted on, not nature overturned; that is, it is natural in one view, in another supernatural; natural as coming to pass under and by the laws of nature; supernatural as coming to pass by new conjunctions of causes, which are made by the action of wills upon nature" (pp. 251-3). It is commonly said that sin is natural, and the new birth and the new life are supernatural. Dr. Bushnell's *theory* implies, whatever *himself* may teach, that sin is supernatural, and the new birth and the new life are supernatural *so far forth* as they involve free agency, but are *natural* so far forth as they are effects produced *by* free agency. This inversion of the usual forms of speech is, at least, an embarrassment.

We have still other objections to our author's use of the word *supernatural*. But let us pass to his method of using the word *miracle*. A miracle, he says, "is a supernatural act, an act, that is, which operates on the chain

of cause and effect in nature, from without the chain, producing, in the sphere of the senses, some event that moves our wonder, and evinces the presence of a more than human power" (p. 336). A miracle "is in the sphere of the senses, for, though the regeneration of a soul may require as great power as the raising of Lazarus, it is yet no proper miracle, because it is no sign to the senses" (p. 336). But is it essential to the idea of a miracle that it be exhibited to the senses? Dr. Bushnell teaches that Christ "is superhuman;" "is in the world as a miracle" (p. 351). He speaks of "the spirit of Jesus," and affirms, "That, unabridged, is itself the grand miracle of Christianity, about which all the others play as scintillations only of the central fire" (pp. 364, 365). But if the moral person of Christ—his spirit, his life—be a miracle, then the miracle cannot be limited to the senses. The person, the spirit, the moral grandeur of Christ, are not his body, and are not within the sphere of sense. We are willing to admit that Dr. Bushnell is speaking figuratively when he alludes, on p. 363, to our great *soul-miracle*," and when, on page 355, he calls *sin* a "miracle;" but we do not understand him as designing to employ a metaphor when he repeatedly affirms that Christ is a "miracle in his own person, his works are miracles, and his doctrine quite as truly" (p. 412). There may be a difference of opinion with regard to the relations in which the *doctrine* and *moral excellence* of Christ can be termed miraculous; but there should be no difference of opinion with regard to the general fact that there *may* be miracles not obvious to the senses, and that no definition of them should be given which limits them necessarily to the physical sphere. There can be an intellectual and a moral miracle, which are invisible and intangible.

Is it essential, moreover, to the idea of a miracle that it do, in effect, "move our wonder"? (p. 336.) If men should cease to wonder at an event, would that event, on that account, cease to be miraculous?

What, we may further ask, is the distinction between a superhuman phenomenon and a miracle? From Dr. Bushnell's words, on pp. 43—45, 59, 60, 218, 336, 500, we infer that, in his view, the action of a *superhuman* power in one event makes it a miracle; the absence of the *superhuman* power in another event, which is out of the sphere of causation, leaves it merely supernatural. The nature of the phenomenon *may* be, in either case, precisely the same. In neither case is there any suspension or violation of the laws of nature (p. 338—9). "Miracles are nothing but acts, every way similar to ours, of God, or superhuman agents" (p. 345). It is not, therefore, necessary that the *supreme God* interpose in order that a miracle be wrought. But does not established usage require us to maintain that in a *miraculous*, as distinguished from a merely *supernatural* phenomenon, there is a suspension of all those laws of nature which are affected by the interposition of God, and which are always observed to operate in events not produced by this interposition? Dr. Bushnell is very correct in asserting that a miracle is no violation of the laws of the *universe*, as such; but must we not distinguish between the laws of the universe including God, and the laws of mere matter? Dr. Bushnell is accurate in asserting

that a miracle is no violation of the laws of matter, as matter is related to the interposing volition of Jehovah; but must we not distinguish between matter viewed as subject to a divine interposition, and matter viewed as having laws which it ordinarily and necessarily obeys? Is not a physical miracle a suspension of those physical laws which *ordinarily* operate, which *always* operate where God does not introduce the new law of his interposing and omnipotent volition? If we deny that the commonly observed laws of matter are suspended, and this by the wonder-working energy of God, we shall be tempted to swing too wide open the door of miraculous interventions, and to indulge too easy a faith in the current rumors of them. A miracle must be such an event as requires an *act* of God, and an *occasion* *worthy* of God; else we make miracles too facile, and lessen their importance. In refusing to discriminate between the nature, not merely the *cause*, but the *nature*, of a miracle on the one hand, and the *nature* of a merely supernatural event on the other; also in refusing to distinguish between the cause of a *supernatural* phenomenon and of all mere *human* or *material* phenomena, we lose sight of the real intent of miracles, we cheapen them as signs of truth, and we impair the dignity and the significance of the whole supernatural element in the history of the world. Thus, in harmony with his definitions, Dr. Bushnell affirms: "There may be false miracles" (p. 360). "There is no certain proof that miracles have not been wrought in every age of the Christian Church" (p. 361). "Probably enough, therefore, there may just now be coming forth a more distinct and widely-attested dispensation of gifts and miracles than has been witnessed for centuries" (p. 458); and forty pages of this eloquent volume are devoted to an argument in favor of miracles performed in all ages, and abundantly in our own age. In a logical consistency with such statements, we read that perhaps "the canon of scripture" itself is not yet closed, and "no one can be sure that other books of scripture may not some time be necessary" (p. 447). We regard these statements as the natural result, and therein a probable refutation, of Dr. Bushnell's main theory of the miraculous, as related to the supernatural.

The design of our author's elaborate volume, compels him to notice the subject of free moral agency. Perhaps we differ from him in regard to the meaning of President Edwards, but we understand the President as teaching, that the will is not strictly necessitated, forced, compelled, but that it is determined, in the sense of certainly persuaded, by the greatest *apparent* good, and we are sorry to understand Dr. Bushnell as denying this truth (p. 47). We cannot exactly adopt our author's unqualified style; still, in *one* sense he may be accurate in asserting, that man "is under no law of cause and effect in his choices. He stands out clear and sovereign as a being supernatural, and his [man's] definition is, that he is an original power, acting not in the line of causality, but from himself" (p. 51). "All free intelligences, it was shown, the created and the uncreated, are, as being free, essentially supernatural, in their action; having all, in the matter of their will, a power transcending cause and effect in nature," etc. — "They are

powers, not things; the radical idea of a power being that of an agent, or force, which acts from itself, uncaused, initiating trains of effect that flow from itself." These powers, these free intelligences, all men of course, "acting in liberty are capable of a double action, to do or not to do (God, for example, in creating; man, in sinning); things can act only in one way, viz. as their law determines." *Powers*, as distinct from *things*, of course all free intelligences, all men *as free*, — "powers, as governed by the absolute force or fiat of omnipotence, would in that fact be uncreated and cease" (pp. 85, 86; see, also, pp. 57, 92, 93, 95). Dr. Bushnell asserts, often and rightly, that "a consenting obedience" implies a "power of non-consent, without which the consent were insignificant" (pp. 92, 93). "There is, then, such a thing inherent in the system of powers, as a possibility of wrong; for, given the possibility of right, we have the possibility of wrong" (p. 96). "If there were any natural necessity for sin, it would not be sin" (pp. 108, 109). The will causes its own acts, and the will acts by no causation, but is able to act or not (pp. 252, 263).

If now Dr. Bushnell admits, that a *person*, as such, has the power to choose or to refuse a proffered good; and that "man in sinning" has a power "to do or not to do;" and that right action involves the possibility of wrong; he virtually admits that wrong action involves the possibility of right, and that if God and the world be presented to a free intelligence for its choice, that intelligence being able to refuse, would also be able to choose either. Else it could not be what Dr. Bushnell terms a *person*, a *free* intelligence. Does now the advocate of the premises deny the conclusion? At first sight, he appears to do so; for he teaches "that man has no ability in himself, and by merely acting in himself, to become right and perfect" (p. 52). For a sinner to keep the law, "is impossible, for the struggle is only a heaving under self-interested motive, to get clear of a state whose bane is selfishness" (p. 120). "If man can raise himself, by his own will, that is, by his humanly supernatural force, then plainly there is no need of a divine intervention from without and above nature, to regenerate his fallen state." p. 234.

In view of such assertions, in a volume advocating the theory that a person, as such, must have the power to act or not to act in every alternative, and that "a soul is a power capable of character and responsibility, as being clear of all causation, and acting by its own free self-impulsions" (p. 95), we may ask, first: Does Dr. Bushnell suppose that the unregenerate sinner has lost a power which once belonged to man? No. For he says: "Not that any law of the soul's nature is discontinued, or that any capacity which makes one a proper man, is taken away by the bad inheritance" (p. 173). If, then, man once had the power to be holy, he has it still.

Secondly. Does Dr. Bushnell believe, that the impenitent sinner is not a *person*? We are indeed told, that "separated from God, he is a monster and not a proper man, however plausible the show he makes" (p. 389). But this is doubtless a mere figure of speech, for the whole volume teaches that sin is a personal act or state, and that if it be necessary and yet personal, it is no longer sin.

Thirdly. Does Dr. Bushnell simply mean to teach that the unrenewed man retains his divinely preserved power of free moral choice, but yet is unable, without aid from God, to will into existence a renewed nature, which will develop itself in holy act; that man's free will has yet a divinely preserved ability to choose either way, right or wrong, but has not executive force enough to produce, without divine help, a good effect upon his natural powers and sensibilities? If this is all that Dr. Bushnell means, he is doubtless, so far forth, accurate. And sometimes this appears to be the sum of his doctrine of our natural impotence. Thus we read: "At the point of the will itself, we may still be as free, as truly original and self-active as if we could do or execute all that we would; otherwise freedom would be impossible, except on the condition of being omnipotent" (p. 52). "Mankind, as being under sin, are under limitations of executive ability, unable to do and become all that is required of them" (p. 53). In these and other passages, Dr. Bushnell implies that the disability of the will is not a disability of the *choosing*, but of the *executive* power. His illustrations imply the same. He compares the sinner's inability to the inability of a "man who has disorganized his brain by over-exertion, or by steeping it in opium, or drenching it in alcohol, to take hold, by his will, of the millions of ducts and fibres woven together in the mysterious net-work of its substance, and bring them all back into the spontaneous order of health and spiritual integrity" (p. 173). Here is no inability of the will as a power to choose, but merely an inability of the will to execute what it has chosen. On pages 173, 174, 219, 235, 236, 435, are illustrations, all of which imply that the author of them is speaking of a weakness in the will as an executive, not as an elective power. But the morality of a man lies in his *election*, not in his *execution* of what he elects; in his choice, not in the consequences of his choice. So far forth, the reasonings of Dr. Bushnell do not affect the question of man's power of *moral action*, but only the question of man's ability to secure certain results of moral action. If an agent chooses holiness, he is holy. If he really electively prefers for his portion, God as a holy God, rather than the world, he has complied with the conditions of salvation.

Fourthly. But does not the volume before us go further than this, and teach, sometimes at least, that there is a kind of holiness distinct from the free acting of the will, and that the unrenewed man has no power to become holy, so far forth as holiness is a state rather than act, and that this holy state must be a *result*, an *effect* of an extrinsic causative agency? We do not affirm that Dr. Bushnell personally believes this theory, but does not his volume, with or without his personal intention, imply that the theory is true? Certainly it does not *always* imply it. Certainly it sometimes teaches the opposite. Indeed the main design of its discussions is to show that personality lies in the will, that virtue consists in a personal act, therefore in a free choice, and not in anything *produced*, *effected*, by an outward causative energy. This *product*, this *effect*, is natural; but virtue is supernatural. As sin must be a free act and supernatural, and therefore not *produced* as a result; as it cannot be within the sphere of cause and effect; so must holiness,

the correlate, the exact opposite of sin, be free, unproduced, uncaused. This is the prevailing spirit of Dr. Bushnell's volume.

Still it must be confessed, that as the volume seemingly contravenes its main principle, and sometimes concedes that there is in sin something more than wrong choosing, so at times it contradicts its fundamental theory, and admits that there is, in holiness, something more than right choosing. It affirms: "Holy virtue is not an act, or compilation of acts, taken merely as volitions, but it is a new state, or *status* rather, a right-disposedness, whence new action may flow" (pp. 239, 240). "This truth of regeneration supposes a loss, out of human nature, of the seed-principle of a good and holy life; such that the subject has really no good in his character, and never can, by himself, generate or set himself in the principle of good" (p. 388). Once, then, there was a seed-principle in the *nature*, not the personality but the *nature* of man. But man is "uncentralized by sin, dead at the core. The seed-principle of eternal life and beauty and order is gone. He centres in himself, gravitates downward into, collapses in, himself; and he could as easily leap out of the Maelstrom, as set himself in the true liberty and seed-principle of holiness" (p. 389).

At one time, then, our author, or we prefer to say his volume, implies that all holiness is a supernatural act, in which the agent cannot be controlled; and at another time, that all holiness is a state into which an agent can no more transplant himself, than a man who has once broken an egg or a crystal can restore it to its original soundness (pp. 174, 219). That the book advocates two irreconcilable theories, is evident from the manner in which its author stirs up the unregenerate to their duty. "Do we then affirm, it will be asked, the absolute inability of a man to do and become what is right before God? That is the Christian doctrine, and there is none that is more obviously true. Wherein, then, it may also be asked, is there any ground of blame for continuance in sin? Because, we answer, there is a living God engaged to help us, and inviting always our acceptance of his help" (p. 237). "This is the power of the will as regards our moral recovery. It may so offer itself, and the subordinate capacities to God, that God shall have the whole man open to his dominion, and be able to ingenerate in him a new, divine state or principle of action" (p. 240). Man "must offer up himself to the divine will and to all the approaches of the divine love, and this includes much — a removal of all obstructions, a renunciation of self, a free commitment of all things to Christ, and a pliant, unequivocal, and humble faith in him. But none of these are, by themselves, regeneration. That is of God, and is, in fact, the soul's assumption or resumption by God" (p. 390; see, also, p. 117).

The soul, then, can and should "obey God's invitation," and "accept of his help," "offer itself to God," "renounce self," "commit all things to Christ," "exercise a pliant, unequivocal, and humble faith in Christ," etc., etc. Now all these acts are either neutral, or sinful, or holy. Dr. Bushnell cannot consistently say that they are neutral, for he affirms that man "has, at every moment, a complete power, as respects doing what God re-

quires of him at that moment, and is responsible according to his power" (p. 239). Man, then, is *responsible* for these acts which are within his power, and no man can be *responsible* for acts which involve no right or wrong. Responsibility, of course, *implies* right or wrong action. As Dr. Bushnell cannot term these acts neutral, much less can he term them sinful; for he urges, and represents God as inviting man to perform these acts, as necessary to holiness; but he would not exhort man to perform sinful acts, even if they were advantageous. He is a decided opponent of the utilitarian scheme, but there is no form of utilitarianism so degraded as to recommend sin itself — *acknowledged* sin — on account of its beneficial consequences. Then he must admit that these acts — this "faith," this "humility," this "renouncing of self," this "removal of all obstructions," this "acceptance of God," all these acts being free, supernatural, not neutral, not sinful — are holy. Then he must admit that there is a kind of holiness before regeneration. Then he must admit that regeneration is an *effect*, a *result*, and so far forth not supernatural; also that regeneration is not necessary to all holiness; and that some of the unregenerate keep themselves clear from *total* depravity at the very instant of their remaining unregenerate.

The eloquent author of this volume will disclaim some of these consequences. He will deny, he does deny, that these acts of the unrenewed soul are holy. But his main theory implies that they are holy; that they are what God requires, and *all* that God requires at the instant preceding regeneration (pp. 239, 240); that they are free, supernatural, necessary for salvation, and may be called a trustful appeal to the Divine Helper (p. 240), and a humble faith in Him (p. 390). These acts are what the Bible denominates "coming to Christ," "going to Him," "seeking," "knocking," "striving," etc. Are not these biblical duties holy? Dr. Bushnell, describing the Spirit's operation on the soul of man, says: "All this, of course, is not without consent in the subject, probably not without some deep and violent struggles on his part, to make way for the divine revelation" (pp. 389, 390). *Consent*? Is not this voluntary? And is it selfish? There is before regeneration "a renunciation of self," Dr. Bushnell teaches on p. 390. "Even the sceptic who has come to such a state of intellectual disease that he can no longer find how to believe anything, is filled and flooded with the light of God, in Christ and the Spirit, as soon as he can heartily ask it, with a will to be taught" (p. 442). Is not this "heartily asking," this "will to be taught," the very duty which the Holy Spirit requires? And is not the performance of this duty a holy act? And does any holy act precede regeneration? "Salvation is by faith, or there is none," says Dr. Bushnell (p. 240); but is salvation by a sinful faith, or by a neutral faith, which is neither for God or against him? Or is it by a holy faith, which is the gift of God, and which is involved in regeneration, but cannot precede it?

These remarks on Dr. Bushnell's theory of the Supernatural element, and of Miracles, and of Moral Agency, suggest the prominent fault of his interesting volume. We do not say the fault of the *man*, for a man is often more accurate than his books; but we say of the *volume*, that it does not

distinguish between things that differ, and therefore sanctions various theories antagonistic to each other.

It does not distinguish between things that differ. It condemns, for example, the whole doctrine, in all its meanings, that man has ability to keep the law. In this sweeping condemnation it confounds different theories. Thus, it is one imaginable theory, that man can be holy apart from God, without any divine aid, in utter independence of a Supreme Being. This theory Dr. Bushnell rightly condemns (pp. 237, 238). It is a second imaginable theory, that men can be holy apart from all the motives to holiness, without any attractive influence from these motives, by mere arbitrary self-determination. This theory Dr. Bushnell rightly condemns (pp. 238, 239). It is a third conceivable theory, that man, without any influence from God, has power not only to put forth right preferences, but also to change, by his executive volitions, the disordered state of his nature. This theory, also, Dr. Bushnell repeatedly condemns, as on pp. 237—240. And, perhaps, these are all the theories which he means to condemn on this subject. But there is a fourth theory, that in the circumstances in which God places man, with the powers and the motives which God gives him, man is made able by the God of nature to do all that the God of nature commands him to do. This theory Dr. Bushnell nowhere distinctly and definitely states. Many of his remarks imply that this theory must be true. Some of his remarks are so undistinguishing and sweeping, as to suggest the idea that this theory is rejected by him as false.

We are thus led to repeat the clause, that the volume before us *sanctions theories antagonistic to each other*. Thus it reaffirms the principle that the will is not determined by the strongest motive (pp. 47—50), and yet the volume favors the hypothesis, "that there is some antecedent necessity, inherent in the conception of finite and begun existences, that in their training as powers they should be passed through the double experience of evil and good, fall and redemption" (pp. 107—137). One reason for this necessity of sin is, that a certain amount of knowledge is "needful to the strength of virtue;" the safety of the redeemed is that, "having been dreadfully scorched already by it [evil], they have thoroughly proved what is in it, and extirpated all the fascinations of its mystery;" the standard ideas of justice and right "require a process or drill in the field of experience, in order to become matured into character, or to fashion character in the moulds they supply" (pp. 116—118; see also p. 104). But if the will be not as the strongest motive, why does Dr. Bushnell search for so strong motives to holiness from the experience of sin? The hypothesis that an experience of sin may be *necessary* to a confirmation in holiness, is antagonistic to the doctrine that the will is not swayed by the most powerful motives. If the weakest motives do often secure the choice in their own favor (pp. 47—90, 93), why does Dr. Bushnell propound so hard a theory in order to secure the strongest motives for holiness? Why not labor equally to secure the weakest motives as able to "*fashion* the character?"

Again, this forcible volume sometimes favors the theory that moral

character does not consist in mere choice; that holiness is a "seed-principle," and not a voluntary act; therefore we infer that sin may be a "seed-principle," and not a voluntary act; but at other times the volume advocates the hypothesis (a false one, we think), that omnipotence cannot prevent sin in a moral system (p. 91, seq.). But if holiness be a "seed-principle," can it not be planted in the mind by omnipotence, and retained there to the exclusion of every hostile "seed-principle?" Or cannot every opposing seed-principle be eradicated? The hypothesis that God cannot prevent sin depends upon the first truth that all character, good and bad, is a free elective preference; and the theory that moral character may be a passive state, not an active elective preference, is inconsistent with the hypothesis that God cannot entirely control the character. But the volume before us sometimes favors both of these antagonistic theories.

We say that it sometimes *favors* both of the theories. It does not unequivocally affirm, that sin is a state or *status*, a "seed-principle," distinct from the free acting of the soul. We read on page 178 of our distempered organization, as something which "the Scriptures, in a certain popular, comprehensive way, sometimes call '*sin*,' because it is a condition of depravation that may well enough be taken as the root of a guilty, sinning life;" and on the same page we read: "It is no sufficient answer, to say that no blame attaches to the mere depravation supposed, whether it be called sin or by any other name." See also page 381. And on page 141 we read: "In discussing this question, I abstain altogether from any close theologic definition of sin. Undoubtedly there is something called *sin* in the Christian writings, which is not action or wrong-doing; something not included in the Pelagian definitions of sin, as commonly presented." We honor Dr. Bushnell too highly to suspect that he here descends to the artifice, so frequent with some men who may be classified as *diminutive divines*,—the mean artifice of stigmatizing as *Pelagian* the Edwardean principle, that all sin is elective preference. We admire Dr. Bushnell's elevation above the stratagems of minute theologians, who, failing in an argument, flee to a nickname. We value his brilliant volume, as often illustrating (though it often overstates) the great truth, that all moral character must consist in the free acting of the power of choice. Still, we do not see the consistency of our author's distinctly abandoning, sometimes, his main principle, that *holiness* consists in active preference, and his not *as* distinctly abandoning his main principle, that *sin* consists in active preference. We think that we discover an antagonism between his fundamental theory of virtue, and his concession that virtue is not always an acting of the will; and we also think that we descry an inconsistency between his occasional readiness to a vow that the restored *order* of the soul is holiness, apart from voluntary action, and his want of readiness to avow that the inherited *disorder* of the soul is sin, apart from voluntary action. We may be wrong, but we cannot avoid the inference that he does occasionally deviate from his own principle of *supernatural* sin, and reason on the hypothesis that there may be a passive sin which is *natural, produced, effected*; and which, on this account as well as on others,

may be as easily prevented by omnipotence as any other effect can be prevented.

We had intended to insert in the last number of the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, a lengthened Article on Dr. Bushnell's volume; but we are now compelled to reduce that Article into the present notice, by omitting the remarks which we had prepared on Dr. Bushnell's statements, that all created moral agents may in fact have fallen into iniquity, and that the Holy Spirit is a "divine force," a "deific agency;" and on various other statements respecting "law and grace," "justification," "inspiration," "the uses of natural theology," etc. We cannot see the justness of his reasoning on these themes. But we fear that by devoting so large a space to criticism on the faults of his volume, we have made the impression that its excellences are fewer than they really are. The readers of a review are apt to be influenced by the number of pages devoted to censure, as these are compared with the number of pages devoted to the praise of a work. We cannot, therefore, dismiss the present volume without adding, that while it is defaced by here and there a serious blemish, it is yet a bright and costly gift to the most precious of all sciences.

2.—THE LAND AND THE BOOK.¹

MUCH has been said, and justly said, of the reactive influence of Christian missions on the churches at home. Among the indirect revenues, which thus "flow back," as all streams of benevolence do, and enrich the hearts "where they began," not the least valuable are the contributions which missionaries have made, in a great variety of ways, to a better understanding of the scriptures, and a deeper conviction of their truth and divinity. Besides the renewal of the internal evidences of Christianity in the lives of these "Christian heroes" and martyrs, and in a reproduction of the scenes, the experiences, and the triumphs of the primitive church, missionaries in the East find themselves moving amid the same state of society, witnessing the same manners and customs, and listening to the same peculiar ideas, idioms, and forms of expression which are reflected from every page of the Sacred Volume. And missionaries to the lands where the Bible was written, breathe the same air, look on the same earth and sky, traverse the same mountains and vallies, and fields and forests, visit the same lakes and rivers, and, to some extent, the same cities and villages which were trodden by the feet, or seen by the eyes, of prophets and apostles, and the Son of God himself. And their letters, and journals, and books have made the Christian world familiar with those sacred scenes; have carried back Christians of the Occident and of modern times nearer to the standing point of those

¹ *The Land and the Book; or Biblical Illustrations drawn from the Manners and Customs, the Scenes and Scenery of the Holy Land.* By W. M. Thomson, D. D., Twenty-five years a Missionary of the A. B. C. F. M. in Syria and Palestine. Maps, Engravings, etc. In two volumes. pp. 560, 614. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1859.

to whom the word of God first came, to see as it were with their eyes, and hear with their ears, yet without losing any of the advantages of living in these "latter days" of the history of the church. The reading and interpretation of the scriptures have thus become another thing, and the Bible itself another book from what it was half a century ago, before the establishment of modern missions.

If the Syrian mission had produced no other fruit than the two rich volumes before us, the churches which have supported that mission, though their Christian benevolence would not have been satisfied, would have received an ample return for all the money they have expended. They are the work of one who has been twenty-five years a missionary in Syria and Palestine; who knows the languages of the country, and is intimately acquainted with the manners and customs of the people; who has traversed the length and breadth of the Holy Land repeatedly, in different years and at different seasons of the year, till every *'ain* and *wady* and *tell* and *jebel* is almost as familiar to him as the lakes and rivers and mounds and forests of his native Ohio, and the language and dress and ideas and usages of the people are as well known to him as those of his countrymen. They are also the work of a scholar, taught in the Greek and Latin classics, acquainted with the physical sciences, well-read in history, and combining a taste for antiquarian researches with the sympathies of a *real, live man*, who has a work to do in his own day and generation. Add to all these a faculty of observation which nothing great or small, animate or inanimate, can escape; a taste for natural scenery, especially when hallowed by historical and sacred associations, which is ever fresh and yet never unseasonable; and a power of description so graphic and at the same time so just as to produce the very impression of the reality; and it will be seen that Dr. Thomson cannot but have made a book of rare interest, as well as of substantial and enduring value.

He does not aspire to rival Dr. Robinson in the extent and thoroughness of his geographical and antiquarian researches; though he has contributed valuable corrections even to his maps and descriptions; identified not a few names and places, which have escaped the observation of previous travellers, and added not a little to the accuracy and completeness of the geography of the Holy Land. Among the places for whose identifications, we are indebted to Dr. Thomson, *Gath*, *Gergesa*, and *Harosheth of the Gentiles*, are particularly worthy of mention. Chancing to see him at "his own hired house" in Sidon, on the very evening of his return from a tour about the Sea of Tiberias, we had the pleasure of hearing, from his own lips, an account of his observations at *Gersa*, as also at *Gamala*, on the eastern shore. They struck us, at the time, as not only extremely interesting but highly important in the elucidation of the story of the Demons and the Swine. We are glad to see these observations brought out in so full and so attractive a form in the volume before us. Their value and interest will be acknowledged even by those who do not agree with the author in his conclusions. At p. 500, Vol. II., there are some very good remarks respecting Ramah. We, too, heard of

"a heap of old rubbish, not four hundred yards from Rachel's Tomb, called Ramah," and we were inclined to attach even more importance to it than our author does. Not only the Ramah of the prophet Jeremiah (31:15) and the Gospel of Matthew (2:18), but also the Ramah where Samuel dwelt (1 Sam. 7:17), must have been near the tomb of Rachel, as any one will see from the account of the finding of Saul's asses (1 Sam. 10:2); and Rachel's Tomb is absolutely fixed at or near the site which now bears that name, in the vicinity of Bethlehem, by Gen. 48:7. Dr. Thomson differs from Dr. Robinson in identifying Chorazin with *Khorazy*, and in finding Capernaum where Dr. Robinson at first found it, at *Tell Hâm*. Dr. Robinson's fellow-traveller and helper, Dr. Smith of Beirût, though very reluctant to dissent, *withheld*, as we happen to know, his full assent to the last opinion of his companion in travel, and the reasons which led him to change his mind, respecting the site of Capernaum. Dr. Thomson's forte does not lie, like Stanley's, in original and profound reflections on the physical geography of Palestine, and its necessary connection with the character and history of the chosen people. Yet no one has traced more carefully than he, battle-scenes and the course of sacred history, especially in the north of Palestine; no one has illustrated, so fully and faithfully, the phenomena of the weather, the seasons, the fruits, and the crops. The actual and indissoluble connection between the land and the people, as well as between the people and the Revelation that was made to them, and through them to the world, underlies the whole work; and it well deserves the quaint and peculiar but highly characteristic title which it bears: "the Land and the Book." The entire volumes inculcate one lesson. It cannot be better expressed than in the words of the author: "The Land where the Word-made-flesh dwelt with men, is and must ever be, an integral part of the Divine Revelation. Her testimony is essential to the chain of evidences, her aid invaluable in exposition. Mournful deserts and mouldering ruins rebuke the pride of man, and vindicate the truth of God; and yawning gulfs, from Tophet to the Sea of Death, in its sepulchre of bitumen and brimstone, warn the wicked, and prophesy of coming wrath. Even the trees of her forests speak parables, and rough brambles have allegories; while little sparrows sing hymns to the happy, and lilies give lessons to comfort the poor. The very hills and mountains, rocks, rivers, and fountains, are symbols of things far better than themselves. In a word, Palestine is one vast tablet, where-upon God's messages to men have been drawn, and graven deep, in living characters, by the great Publisher of glad tidings, to be seen and read of all to the end of time. The Land and the Book—with reverence be it said—constitute the ENTIRE and ALL-PERFECT TEXT, and should be studied together."

Others, like Burkhardt or Stevens, may have travelled more extensively in countries bordering on Palestine, and interwoven more of incident and personal adventure in the narrative of their travels; but we know of no book that will compare with this in thorough personal acquaintance with Palestine itself, and in the number and variety of its "Biblical illustrations,

drawn from the manners and customs, the scenes and scenery of the Holy Land," either new, or if not new, original and independent, resting on long continued and repeated observations. To make room for these, personal experiences (of which "the author has had his full share during his long residence in the East") are intentionally sacrificed. And Dr. Thomson divests the Arabs of the Desert of not a little of the poetry and romance which such writers as Burkhardt and Stevens have thrown around them, by showing their cowardice and meanness, as well as their filth, falsehood, and entire want of honesty. "They are a nation of universal liars, thieves, and robbers. Their ever boasted virtue of hospitality is a mere social regulation, and without something of the kind, these troops of *land-pirates* could not carry on their detestable vocation — could not even exist."

Hackett and others have gone abroad with a larger *capital* of biblical, classical, and historical learning; but the time during which they employed it in gathering up the riches of Palestine, was very limited. In short, other books may have surpassed this in some special and distinguishing excellences; but while this combines, in no small measure, all these excellences, it has this great characteristic merit above them all, that from beginning to end it is the testimony of an eye-witness, candid, truthful, intelligent, who has had the best possible opportunity of knowing the facts, and is manifestly disposed to state the facts just as they are; and his testimony all bears on one point — the truth of the sacred scriptures. And it is truly wonderful, how fully the observation and experience of a quarter of a century confirm that truth in the smallest details. It is most instructive and delightful to go along with the writer in the examination of nearly a thousand different passages of scripture, and while he does not hesitate sometimes to say: "I have not seen this," and "I have been unable to find that," yet to hear him say, so decidedly, as he constantly does: "it is just so," "I have seen that a hundred times," "that must have occurred just as it is written, and must have been written by one who had been on the spot and seen it with his own eyes." "We have the *original* [of our Lord's illustrations] before our eyes: they could not have been uttered anywhere else." Dr. Thomson never dodges or disguises a difficulty. With an unwavering faith and a profound reverence for the scriptures, which satisfies the simplest believer, he unites a sincere and honest inquiry for the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, which commands the respect and confidence of the sceptical. Intelligent and critical readers of the scriptures will be surprised to see how many of the most difficult passages, when examined on the ground, are cleared of their difficulties; how many blind and apparently unmeaning passages of "the Book," when seen in the light of "the Land," become not only plain to the understanding, but luminous with divine truth and radiant with celestial beauty. It is adapted to be a popular work, beyond perhaps any that has preceded it. It is a book for the Biblical scholar, the pastor, and the teacher. No one who wishes to gain accurate knowledge of Syria and Palestine can dispense with it. But it is pre-eminently a book for the masses, interesting in its narrative, perspicuous in

its language, graphic in description, transporting the unlettered reader into the midst of Bible scenes, and causing the men and the events of sacred history to live and move again before his eyes.

The plan of the book is quite unique. It is a book of travels, a book of conversations, a running commentary on the scriptures, and a pictorial geography and history of Palestine, all in one. The string on which the whole series of incidents, conversations, and illustrations is strung, like a necklace of pearls and precious stones of divers sorts, is the Itinerary of a tour performed, with an American friend, in 1857. It commences at Beirût, comes down along the seacoast and the sides of Lebanon, as far as Tyre; thence across the country to Laish (Dan) and Banias (Cesarea Philippi), and round by the Hêûleh (Lake Merom), back to the seashore at Acre and Carmel; then, by another zigzag circuit, across the country to Lake Tiberias, completely around it, and back again by Nazareth, Tabor, Endor, Jezreel, Jennin, and down the river Kishon, thence along the coast to the ruins of Cesarea. The state of the country forbade their visiting Nablous (Shechem) and Samaria; but the deficient link is supplied by graphic descriptions of these most interesting localities, interspersed with pleasing narratives of former tours. Resuming their journey at Cesarea, they go down the coast (with frequent detours inland) through Jaffa (Joppa), Ludd (Lydda), Ramleh (Arimathea?), Ashdod, and Askelon, as far as Gaza; then eastward, via Lachish, Eglon, and Eleutheropolis (Gath), to Hebron; and thence, by way of Santa Saba, the Dead Sea, the Jordan, and Jericho, up to Jerusalem; thus, with excursions from the holy city to Bethlehem and other places in the vicinity, completing the circuit of Palestine. At each stage of the journey, all the *lacunae* of places unvisited, are supplied by conversations, or journals of former, and in many instances repeated, visits. The conversations, which the author assures us are real (meaning, doubtless, for *substance of doctrine*), also occupy the time while they pass over ground devoid of interest, or sit at their lunch by the way, or rest in their tents at night, thus filling up, with a kind of Homeric skill and fidelity, the intervals, and sustaining a perpetual interest. As they thus converse by the way and journey towards Jerusalem, events are constantly occurring, and objects constantly meeting the eye, which remind them of those who have gone over the ground before them, hundreds and even thousands of years ago, yet travelling in the same manner, following essentially the same track, and not only beholding the same scenery and phenomena of nature, but continually falling in with the same or similar classes or races of men, with features, costumes, forms of speech, and modes of living unchanged since Abraham came from Mesopotamia to sojourn among the sons of Heth. Dr. Thomson suggests, that amid all the confusion of races and languages, there still remain distinct traces, not only of the Jews and Bedouin Arabs, but of the Phoenicians, Philistines, and Canaanites, who were the original inhabitants of the land.

We may perhaps be allowed to conclude our notice with a word or two of criticism. The conversations sometimes betray the author into

the use of colloquialisms and careless expressions, which do not appear well on the printed page. For instance, the expression "every which way," occurs two or three times in as many pages, near the beginning of the second volume. Sometimes there is a want of consistency between the book and the map; as, for example, the waters in the neighborhood of Samaria are said, in the book (Vol. II, p. 198), to "form part of the river which, at the south of Cesarea, is called Abu Zabūra," while, on the map, they flow into the Faledj, further south. There is a contradiction (probably arising from the incorporation of accounts written at different times) respecting the boat on the lake of Tiberias. - On the fifty-ninth page of volume second, the author says: "There is not, at this hour, a boat of any kind upon the lake;" while, on the eighty-first page of the same volume, we read: "there is but one small boat on the lake," and in this one boat our travellers have "a charming sail on Gennesaret."

But such blemishes are few, and of trifling account, in comparison with the substantial merit of the book. The maps are prepared with much care, and the illustrations with immense painstaking. There are some two hundred and fifty woodcuts and engravings, beautifully executed, many of them original, and others corrected so as to be more true to nature. The indexes are all that could be desired. The book is issued in a style which does great credit to the publishers.

3. — FAIRBAIRN'S HERMENEUTICAL MANUAL.¹

What is wanted, above all things else, in a Hermeneutical Manual of the New Testament, is the clear statement and unfolding of those great principles of interpretation which must guide the student in the study of the New Testament, considered both as a supernatural revelation from God, and as a continuation and higher development of a previous supernatural revelation. No stores of learning, however rich and varied, and no minute accuracy in the exposition of particular passages, can be a compensation for the want of such comprehensive views of revelation as a whole. He is the true expositor who sees the divine word in its unity, and in the relation of its several parts to each other.

Here we think that Mr. Fairbairn has been very successful. The first part of the work is occupied mainly with the discussion of general principles and their varied applications. These are stated clearly, and unfolded with sound judgment. Here the reader will find such fundamental questions as those of False and True accommodation; of the proper influence to be allowed to the Analogy of Faith; of the relation of the Old to the New

¹ Hermeneutical Manual: or, Introduction to the Exegetical Study of the Scriptures of the New Testament. By Patrick Fairbairn, D. D., Principal and Professor of Divinity in the Free Church College, Glasgow; Author of "Typology of Scripture," etc. Philadelphia: Smith, English and Co., No. 40 N. Sixth Street. New York: Sheldon, Blakeman and Co. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 1859. pp. x. and 526. 12mo.

in God's dispensations; of the proper interpretation of the Tropical parts of the New Testament, satisfactorily examined. The second part contains dissertations on various interesting topics connected with the exegesis of the New Testament, among which are the two genealogies of Christ; the doctrine of Angels, the import of the terms βασιλεῦς, ἄγγελος, διαθήκη, etc.; while the third part is devoted to the consideration of the use made of Old Testament scripture in the writings of the New Testament. We trust the work will find that extensive circulation which its intrinsic worth merits.

4.—MASSMANN'S *ULPHILAS*.¹

SEVERAL things conspire to give unusual interest to this volume. It comprises all that remains of the Bible which the various branches of the Gothic family and even the Vandals, a kindred tribe, carried with them into all the countries which they conquered: into Italy, France, Spain, and Africa. It contains the earliest documents to be found in any German dialect, and throws a broad and clear light upon the relationship of the ancient German dialects, especially the Gothic, the old Saxon, the Anglo-Saxon, and the old Norse. It is said to be the best of all the ancient versions for settling the true readings of the New Testament, on account of the flexibility and fidelity with which the Greek text is rendered.

It is not surprising, therefore, that this remarkable specimen of a language otherwise almost unknown and yet so intimately connected with many dialects that are well known, should, from the time that the far-famed *Codex Argenteus* was known to be actually in existence, attract the attention of the learned and appear in print under various forms. The history of this silver-lettered manuscript is not a little singular and mysterious. The earliest knowledge we have of it is, that it was in the Benedictine Abbey of Werden in Westphalia. Neither the time nor the manner of the acquisition is known. The first notice of it is found in a letter of Conrad Gesner in the year 1563. As early as 1599, and probably earlier, it had, in a manner wholly unknown, been conveyed to Prague. That it was carried thither for safety, by the monks, during the Thirty Years' War, as they maintained, cannot therefore be true, for that commenced in 1618, nineteen years later at least. It is true that just before the close of that war, the victorious Swedish army took it as booty, and carried it to Stockholm. In 1655, Isaac Vossius brought it with him on his return to the Netherlands. The suspicion that he took it without leave, Massmann treats as improbable. There is no positive evidence to that effect; and, as it is well known that he was on good terms with Christina, queen of Sweden, the inference drawn is, that it was a present from her. But Massmann can hardly have read

¹ *Ulphilas*. Die Heiligen Schriften alten und neuen Bundes in Gothischer Sprache, mit gegenüberstehendem Griechischem und Lateinischem Texte, Anmerkungen, Wörterbuch, Sprachlehre und geschichtlicher Einleitung von H. F. Massmann. 8vo. pp. 312. Stuttgart, 1857.

Grauert's Life of Christina, published a few years ago. After stating that complaints were made against her for carrying away to Rome and squandering her cabinets of art, her manuscripts and books, he adds: "she left to scholars whom she trusted the packing and shipping of these articles. These gentlemen made good use of their opportunities, and appropriated what they liked. Vossius had his full share. He justified himself on the ground that the queen was indebted to him. Forty manuscripts on chemistry, which had been brought from Prague, were afterwards found in his library, besides many manuscripts of Petavius, which she had purchased."¹ This is a curious bit of literary history.

One good result of this last migration of the *Codex Argenteus* is, that it found an able editor in Francis Junius, and, after his death, was published in 1665. This is the basis of Lye's edition, published in Oxford in 1750. The next important edition was that published at Weissenfels, in 1805, by Zahn, with Ihre's revision of the text, and a grammar and glossary by Fulda.

Since the time of these older editions, five in all, two things have occurred, giving an entirely new aspect to the subject. The first is the introduction of a new era in regard to a knowledge of the ancient German dialects, by the school of criticism founded by the two Grimms. Bopp's comparative grammar did not produce a greater revolution in the study of language in general, than Grimm's German grammar did in regard to the study of all the languages of Teutonic origin. In fact, the old German was never really known before. Neither its organic laws, nor its historical changes, had been studied. The whole body of old German, as then known, is not a tythe of what is now contained in the Library of old German, published by Basse in Quedlinburg. Wackernagel's *Altdeutsches Lesebuch* would have astonished even Adelung himself, who was so much in advance of his age. With this new world of knowledge laid open by the discovery and publication of so many manuscripts that had slumbered in monasteries for ages, and by a most successful study of the age and dialect of each, we cannot read, without a smile, the old controversies about the reality of the Gothic character of the translation attributed to Ulphilas. The Swedes maintained that it was the peculiar Gothic of their country. Hickes said it was old German and not Gothic. Croze contended that it was Frankish. Wetstein and Mosheim entertained the same view. Michaelis, who originally defended Croze's opinion, abandoned it in the third edition of his Introduction. Nothing better marks the progress of the age in these studies, than the fact that such points could not now be discussed at all.

The second circumstance above alluded to, is the discovery made by Maio, at Milan, in 1817, of Gothic manuscripts, over which Latin had been written, containing all the epistles of Paul, and even duplicates of several parts. The publication of these was commenced in 1819, and completed in 1839. This large addition of material, amounting to more than two-thirds

¹ Vol. II. p. 94.

as much as the Gospels themselves, greatly increases the vocabulary and adds to the means of grammatical explanation. The text of the Gothic version now occupies nearly three hundred octavo pages, printed in Roman type.

With such an amount of matter in a language in which nearly every word has a representative in some kindred dialect, or in the Greek or Latin, and with the original book before us of which this is a translation, there cannot remain any great obscurity respecting either the lexicography or grammar of the language. This is made very evident by the two last editions, and the only complete ones, of the work: that of Gabelentz and Löbe (1836—46) and that of Massmann. Dr. Löbe made a journey to Upsala, where the silver codex has finally found a resting place, for the purpose of rendering his edition as accurate as possible. That great work, completed thirteen years ago, contains all the fragments of Ulphilas, with a glossary and grammar appended. Massmann's edition is more compact, being a cheap edition for students, but highly critical in its execution, though sparing in words. Indeed, the condensation of matter in the very elaborate introduction, and in the glossary and grammar, is one of its most marked features. The work of Gabelentz and Löbe is in Latin; that of Massmann, in German. The former has a literal translation of the text of Ulphilas in Latin; the latter has the Gothic version confronted with the original Greek and with the Vulgate. The aim of the former is merely to explain Ulphilas; that of the latter is also to elucidate the Greek text, as well as the Latin standing with it, by Ulphilas.

5.—LIFE AND SELECT WRITINGS OF PETER MARTYR.¹

THIS *Life of Peter Martyr* is one of the volumes belonging to the series of the *Lives and Select Writings of the Fathers and Founders of the Reformed Church*, edited by Baum, Christoffel, Hagenbach, Pestalozzi, Schmidt, Stähelin, and Sudhoff. The attempt to give a complete portrait of all the men of the Reformed or Calvinistic church, who acted a leading part in the reformation of the sixteenth century, is a most laudable one. Of Zuingli and Calvin much is known; of Ecolampadius, Bullinger, Bucer, and Beza, something; of Myconius, Capito, Leo Juda, Peter Martyr, Olevian, and Ursinus, little or nothing beyond the merest incidental notices. Of the leading characters of the reformation it is difficult, now, to say much that is new. The interest we take in them does not arise so much from novelty as from the solemn tragic scenes with which they were connected. In the lives of the secondary men of the Reformation, we often find the materials of a most pleasant biography, an early literary life, connected with the whole intellectual movement of a country, as of France in the life of Beza; of Italy in that of Peter Martyr; and of Germany in

¹ Peter Martyr Vermigli. *Leben und ausgewählte Schriften*. Nach handschriftlichen und gleichzeitigen Quellen; von Dr. C. Schmidt, Professor der Theologie zu Strassburg. Elberfeld, 1858. 8vo. pp. 296.

that of Ecolampadius; and a later religious life, in close connection with the Reformers, widening our horizon in respect to the latter, and affording many new and interesting details in regard to the principal actors whose lives have already engaged our attention. Thus those who are interested in the life of Calvin, will find a double interest in the life of Beza. All these circumstances conspire, in a high degree, to render the life of Peter Martyr attractive. Every successive scene is a new one. Till forty-two years of age he is in Italy, one of its brightest ornaments, a leading spirit both in literature and religion. Next, he is five years in Strasburg, completing his theological development and shining as a brilliant professor and lecturer. The next six years, he is at Oxford with Bucer and others, aiding in carrying through the English Reformation. Again he is at Strasburg, being obliged to flee from England, on the accession of Mary to the throne; and, three years after, on receiving a call to Zurich, he settled in the latter place as professor of theology, and spent the last six years of his life among warm friends in usefulness and honor. In these five acts in the drama of his life, what a wide range is opened for incidents to enliven biography! How new and varied each successive scene! And in all, how complete the unity, not only from the unbroken thread of the individual's life, but from the one grand movement proceeding from Switzerland and reaching southward to Italy, and northward to England.

This is not one of those worthless biographies made up of common-place materials, decked off with rhetorical flowers. The author, a practiced historian, has added to our stores of knowledge by drawing his facts from original sources, from unprinted documents as well as from rare books. He appears like a Roscoe in his familiarity with the authorities of Italian history, and is more at home than even a McCrie among the religious men of that country during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

Peter Martyr, "the wonder of Italy," as Calvin called him, was born in Florence, the city of great men, in 1560. His father, who had heard the fiery discourses of Savonarola, never lost the impression which they made upon him. His mother, one of those distinguished Italian women who, in the newly awakened enthusiasm for classical learning, became adepts in these studies, trained her son in the Latin language, and, to give him a mastery over the colloquial Latin, so necessary in that age, taught him the comedies of Terence. The elegant latinity acquired thus early in life, was of the greatest use to him, when he was called to exert his rare powers of eloquence in foreign countries, in Strasburg, Oxford, and Zurich. He afterward pursued his Latin studies, with several young men of distinguished families, under Vergelio, secretary of the Florentine Republic. Here he acquired that grace of manner and gentlemanly dignity which never afterwards forsook him. At the age of sixteen he entered the monastery of the Augustines at Fiesole, where he so distinguished himself that, after three years, he was sent to the university of Padua. Here he attached himself to three Greek professors who taught in the university, and read Aristotle in the original, and became a skilful logician and disputant. Longolius, Bembo,

Reginald Pole, and Vergerius, afterwards so celebrated, were students in Padua at the same time. When he had finished his theological studies, the superiors of his order sent him out to preach. Not satisfied with the Latin text, he went back to the Greek for the New Testament, and acquired the Hebrew, that he might also read the scriptures of the Old Testament in the original. He preached with great popularity in Brescia, Mantua, Pisa, Venice, Bologna, and even at Rome. In Padua he gave lectures on philosophy and literature, and at Vercelli lectured on Homer. His order, proud of so distinguished a member, appointed him to reform several convents, that had fallen in their character. He was afterwards appointed Prior of a monastery in Naples, where, it is said, the spirit of the Reformation first appeared in Italy. There was a distinguished circle of cultivated gentlemen and ladies in Naples, which met stately for religious conversation under the influence of Juan Valdes, who was familiar with the writings of Tauler and of the German Reformers. Peter Martyr immediately joined this circle. Here he saw those two Italian ladies, so distinguished for their learning and talents, Giulia Gonzaga and Vittoria Colonna. Peter Martyr became so popular as a preacher in Naples, that persons of all classes thronged to hear him. It was soon perceived by the Catholics that the preaching of this Prior and of Ochino, who had also been preaching in a similar spirit and with equal success, and the influence of Valdes, were dangerous for the church, and Peter Martyr found it necessary to apply to his order for permission to return. He was therefore elected *Rector Generalis* of his order, and afterwards made Prior of St. Fridiam, at Lucca. In the latter he began by making the monastery a school of sound learning, relying on the younger generation, who should be trained in it, as his chief hope. Martinengo of Brescia he made teacher of Greek; Lacisio of Verona, well skilled in ancient learning and in Hebrew, he appointed teacher of Latin. Tremellio gave instruction in Hebrew. Such efforts to promote true learning procured for him the friendship of Robertello the philologist. The Prior himself, in a daily lecture, explained the Epistle to the Romans. Bucer's, Melancthon's, and Bullinger's works were read there, as well as Calvin's Institutes. As a public preacher, he soon attracted general attention. As scholars and patricians attended his daily lectures, so crowds of people came to his chapel to hear his Sunday discourses. In short, the way for adopting the doctrines of the Reformation was fully prepared, and nothing but the papal authority could check this longing of the people for knowledge and for the word of life. But here again the power of Rome interposes, and Peter Martyr must become a martyr indeed, or flee his country. Thus prepared for future life, a fugitive presents himself first at Zurich, and then at Strasburg, for a place in which to serve the cause of learning and religion.

We cannot follow the author through the remaining scenes of the reformer's life. Enough has been said, we trust, to show what he who makes such a beginning, while in the Catholic church, may be expected to be and to do, when united in heart and in action with the other reformers. In learning, he is superior to Calvin; in clearness of intellect, fully his equal;

inferior only in boldness and in subduing energy. Though not of the commanding influence of the first class of reformers, yet all that he has written would receive the assent of thinking men of the present day far more than the writings of Zuingli, Luther, or Calvin. In comprehensiveness, clearness, and judiciousness, he resembles Melancthon, without any of his wavering and timidity. Of the three leading reformers, he resembles Zuingli most, and Luther least. We may add, that for particular reasons, this volume is a biography proper, the views of the reformer being interwoven in the narrative, rather than given in selections from his writings. We regard it as an interesting and valuable contribution to our knowledge of the period to which it refers.

6. — LIFE OF JOHN GERSON.¹

It is not a little remarkable that a person holding such a place in history as Gerson does, should not sooner have found a biographer. The great chancellor of the University of Paris has not, indeed, been entirely neglected; but nothing worthy of his great eminence appeared till Dr. Schwab produced his "monograph." Lecuy's *Essai sur la Vie de Jean Gerson*, in 1832, was a superficial production, written in a state of ill health that did not allow of thorough preparation. Professor C. Schmidt's *Essai sur Gerson*, 1839, was what might be expected from so able an historian; but it is a mere pamphlet, furnishing only the outlines of a biography. Thomassy's *Jean Gerson*, 1843, is said to give an interesting view of Gerson's popular writings, and to assign them their proper place in the history of French literature. But his other writings are passed over, and the biography itself is as meagre as any of its predecessors. The present is the first work undertaken with a comprehension of the subject in all its bearings, and executed with a diligence and persevering industry that leaves nothing to be desired. Eight hundred closely printed pages, with proof passages and references to original authorities at the foot of every page, remind one of Hurter's elaborate *Life of Innocent III.* in respect to the labor of preparation. It has been said that Hurter made himself a Catholic by writing that *Life*. It is much more probable that he chose his theme with reference to his tastes; and that the feelings with which he began the work proved him a convert at heart at the outset. Schwab has performed a similar labor of love; only he is openly a Catholic. Though the period of the papal schism was one of the greatest humiliation to the Catholic church, and Gerson appears great from his honest opposition to men highest in power, his biographer takes evident delight in bringing out, in full relief, the great qualities of his hero. Indeed, as nearly all the controversies of the chancellor were with Catholics

¹ Johannes Gerson, Professor der Theologie und Kanzler der Universität Paris. Eine Monographie von Dr. Johan Baptist Schwab. 8vo. pp. 808. Würzburg, 1859.

themselves, there is little room for party biases against Protestants. Such a spirit is apparent only in treating of Gerson's relations to Huss, and Jerome of Prague, at the Council of Constance. Here he takes peculiar ground, differing alike from Catholic and Protestant writers. While others have seen an inconsistency between Gerson's published opinions and his action in regard to Huss, Schwab denies that Gerson is the author of the celebrated treatise, *De Modis Uniendi et Reformandi Ecclesiam*, which has always been attributed to him, and thus reconciles his doctrines with his practice. We expect this point, now first made by an able historian, will be earnestly discussed by the critics till it is settled. It will be somewhat surprising, if Von der Hardt, the first editor of the work, Dupin, a Catholic writer of rare learning, Neander and Gieseler, who are generally so cautious in respect to the genuineness of their authorities, Böhlinger in his life of Huss, Schmidt in his Essay, and Hasemann in his admirable article on Gerson, in Ersch and Gruber's Encyclopædia, are all mistaken. The evidences, adduced by Schwab, against the common view of the authorship of this treatise, are wholly internal: first, that it contains doctrinal statements at variance with those which were made by him elsewhere; secondly, that there are moral principles laid down in this treatise which are irreconcilable with what is otherwise known of Gerson's principles; thirdly, that there are political, historical, and local allusions, which could not have been made by Gerson, nor by any other French author. If the historical view here presented shall be sustained by further critical investigation, an important service to learning will have been rendered by the author of the work before us. We confess we have not yet reached that conclusion.

We have compared the work of Schwab, in point of learning and ability, with that of Hurter on Innocent III. There is a resemblance in another respect. In both there is a panoramic view of the whole Catholic world in a time of intense religious activity. But under Innocent III. it was the Catholic world at the height of its grandeur; at the time of Gerson, it was Catholicism torn with the most violent schism and dissension, pope anathematizing pope, kingdoms contending against kingdoms, and universities and councils arrayed against each other with the utmost bitterness and rancor. It was the period of the dissolution of the absolute authority of the pope. From that time to this, there could no more be a Gregory VII., an Innocent III., or a Boniface VIII., than there could be a Great Mogul in the nineteenth century.

What gives special interest to the life of Gerson is the fact, that it presents fully to our view the University of Paris in the period of its greatest glory. Its political and ecclesiastical influence was immense; and it held a language to popes and princes which would have been perilous in the extreme, but for that lofty intellectual and moral position which commanded universal veneration. First among its great men were D'Ailly, Gerson, and the Clemanges; and of these Gerson was *facile princeps*.

In reading a life of Gerson by a German Catholic, it is quite natural to

turn, with no little curiosity, to the chapter on the trial of Huss. It is gratifying to observe, not only a feeling of humanity, but a strong sense of justice, in the biographer. Huss's theological and ecclesiastical doctrines are philosophically analyzed, and presented with great clearness and fairness. Indeed, there is a relative justification of his course, similar to that which does Wessenberg so much honor in his history of the councils of the 15th and 16th centuries. He is represented as acting as he honestly believed he was required to act by the highest authority he acknowledged, the Bible. Even the most recent investigations by Protestants, showing the unfairness of the trial, are brought forward with evident signs of approval. Those who condemned the Bohemian reformer to the flames are excused, in part, on account of the sentiments of the age in respect to heresy. At the same time, it is admitted that there were personal interests, and motives of worldly policy, which tended to pervert justice. How entirely different is this from the tone of the early Catholic writers on the death of Huss!

It would be interesting to follow Gerson through all the scenes of the Council of Constance, where, by the splendor of his eloquence, he sustained himself as the guiding spirit in that assembly of great men, and pushed the work of reform over the heads of prelates and pontiffs. The greatness and courage which he manifested on those occasions entitle him to be ranked as the first and most influential man of the Church. But how miserably were his hopes disappointed in Martin V. as they had before been in Alexander V.! The plans of the great reforming Councils were prostrated by the shameless treachery and falsehood of these newly-elected vicars of Christ.

Gerson has often been considered as the author of the *Imitation of Christ*, generally attributed to Thomas à Kempis. Though this point is now given up—especially since Ullmann's conclusive investigations—the interesting fact remains, that Gerson possessed those spiritual qualities, and that contemplative turn of mind, that rendered him capable of writing such productions. Like Augustine, he was as much a spiritualist as logician. The scholastic and mystical elements were combined in him as they were in Bonaventura. In spiritual exercises and contemplations we find in him the same excellent spirit as in Hugo and Richard à Victoire.

7.—VISCHER'S AESTHETICS.¹

HERE we have a work designed to be used as a basis for a course of lectures on aesthetics, making six large 8vo. volumes, containing in all 2557 pages. The author studied the subject many years, and wrote several preparatory works, before he entered upon the composition of his chief work, and on this he has expended nearly twelve years of hard labor since the publication of the first volume. In ability and learning the production

¹ *Aesthetik oder Wissenschaft des Schönen, Zum Gebrauche für Vorlesungen*; von Dr. F. T. Vischer, Prof. der Aesthetik und deutschen Literatur zu Tübingen, in 6 Theilen: Reutlingen, 1846. Stuttgart, 1858.

equals the outlay of time and labor. There is no work to be compared with it in any language, ancient or modern. No one man has brought so much philosophic power and various and well-arranged knowledge to the elucidation of this subject. Rothe's *Ethik* is the only modern book that resembles it in spirit and execution. This is one of the few instances in which a great book is not a great evil. There is not a single topic discussed which might be omitted without injury. The truth is, there is no book extant that discusses thoroughly all the points of this great and difficult subject, on which we so much need further light. Almost every treatise we have is either meagre, or is a jumble of heterogeneous principles. Here, at least, is a rigid and complete system. It is pervaded by one leading principle, whether it be true or not. No branch of the subject is passed lightly over. Everything is in its appropriate place, and in just proportion. Nothing extraneous is admitted, nothing essential is excluded. Indeed, all the features of the severe logical analysis which characterizes the better class of Hegelian writers, are apparent in this work.

And yet we do not undertake to say that this is the true theory in all its parts, or that the thousands of details which are involved in the discussions are all correct. But it is our deliberate opinion that no other work has ever been written, embodying so much that is true on the subject at large. The plan of the book is comprehensive beyond all former example. Every principle is ably and fully discussed. In the various divisions of the general subject, the fundamental principles are laid down in distinct propositions, systematically arranged, constituting separate paragraphs, and distinguished from the rest by a peculiar type. All the miscellaneous discussions, which are very ample, are contained in notes under their appropriate heads. The first division is devoted to the metaphysical view of the subject, or to the theory of the beautiful in general; the second to objective beauty in all its actual material forms, from inorganic matter up to man, followed by an admirable historical sketch of the ideas of beauty in the age of classical antiquity, in the mediæval or romantic period, and in modern times. Next comes the subject of the imagination, the counterpart to the author's theory of the beautiful, which, if separated from the other topics, would form a most valuable treatise of itself. Then follows a discussion of the subject of art in general. The remaining divisions treat respectively of architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and poetry. It would be difficult to find a more complete and exhaustive discussion of these last two topics than is here given by the author, on poetry, and by his friend, Prof. Köstlin, on music.

8. — VON ROCHAU'S HISTORY OF FRANCE.¹

We have now a better history of France in German than in any other language, — the history of France up to the time of the revolution, in four

¹ Geschichte Frankreichs vom Sturze Napoleons bis zur Wiederherstellung des Kaiserthums, 1814–1852; von A. L. von Rochau, in zwei Theilen, s. 386 and 330. Leipsic, 1858.

volumes, by Schmidt; the history of France during the revolution, in four volumes, by Wachsmuth, and the work named above. Every one of these three works, which are designed to be connected, is written with distinguished historical ability. Schmidt has all the research and documentary knowledge of a Michelet, and, moreover, what the latter has not, the true sobriety, dignity, and candor of a historian. Wachsmuth does not yield in any particular to Carlyle in his intimate knowledge of the public and secret history of the revolution, and gives a much more complete picture of the grand movement as a whole. Von Rochau seems to be scarcely less at home in Paris, where he resided during nearly the whole of the reign of Louis Phillipe, than Thiers, and is to be compared rather with him than with Louis Blanc and Lamartine, who have no claim to be considered as historians. Though treating of a later period than Thiers, he manifests a similar knowledge of his subject, without being quite so much under the influence of the *destinies* of France. He has more of the descriptive power which characterizes the French writers than Schmidt or Wachsmuth, but is free from that flippancy, and oracular and solemn tone in glorifying France, with which even Michelet, otherwise an able writer, sometimes disgusts his readers.

As the first two of the works named above, forming connected parts of the history of France, belong to Uckert and Heeren's series of histories, so the third is the beginning of a series, edited by Prof. Biederman, of histories of the most recent times, to be followed immediately by Dr. Reuchlin's Italy, Prof. Arendt's Belgium, Prof. Wurm's England, Dr. Buddeus's Russia, and Dr. Wortmann's Turkey. These supplementary histories are to extend to sixteen of the most important states of modern times. If they shall all be executed with as much brilliancy as this first specimen, it will prove a most successful literary enterprise.

9. — ENCYCLOPAEDEM OF EDUCATION.¹

THE volume before us contains about one-fourth of the whole work. It is designed to embrace all the topics pertaining to the principles and theory of education in general; to schools of every description, from the primary school to the university, their organization, arrangement, and division of studies, and the method of instruction adapted to each; to the history of education, and its eminent promoters; and to school statistics for all countries. The general plan has been most skilfully carried out in the part already published. We have seen no similar work in which the subject of education in all its branches has been discussed with such judgment, ability and learning. It contains a fund of rare, valuable, and profound knowl-

¹ Encyclopädie des gesammten Erziehungs- und Unterrichtswesens bearbeitet von einer Anzahl Schulmänner und Gelehrten, herausgegeben unter Mitwirkung von Prof. Dr. v. Palmer und Prof. Dr. Wildermuth in Tübingen; von K. A. Schmid, Rector des Gymnasiums in Ulm, Gotha, 1859. Erster Band. A. — Dinter. pp. 958.

edge, on a subject that is almost without a literature, at least in the English language. A large body of eminent schoolmen are uniting their efforts to produce an encyclopedia of education which shall be worthy of the age; and a comparison of the result thus far with Hergang's work, the best hitherto known, will show that not only a highly gratifying, but even surprising progress has been made.

10. — BIOGRAPHICAL AND LITERARY DICTIONARY FOR THE EXACT SCIENCES.¹

THE object of this biographical dictionary is, to furnish a convenient manual for the lovers of inductive science, in which they shall find satisfactory information on the chief points relating to the lives and works of persons who have contributed to the advancement of this branch of knowledge. The biographical notices, though necessarily brief, are very satisfactory. The account of the works of each author includes a complete list of all treatises which have a permanent value. The author, who has been employed ten years, under the most favorable circumstances, in the preparation of this work, has shown great knowledge of his subject, and a sound and discriminating mind in his selections. The four numbers, two of which have already appeared, will constitute one large octavo volume. It is highly recommended in the scientific journals, and will undoubtedly become a standard authority.

11. — OUTLINES OF GREEK ETYMOLOGY.¹

THIS is the kind of book the classical scholar has long needed. It fills a gap in our literature. There has been a two-fold difficulty in using the materials furnished by comparative philology for illustrating Greek etymology; the one is the labor and expense of collecting and culling them from such a mass of Sanscrit learning; the other, the vagueness and uncertainty of many of the results to which these researches conducted the student. The necessity of studying kindred dialects in order to find a sure guide in etymology, is now fully recognized. The old writers, having no guide but their own fancies, constructed their theories at will, and filled out the details with conjectural criticism and much useless learning. Of this the Dutch school of criticism, represented by Valcknaer, Lennep, and Scheide, furnish a warning example. Lobeck and Döderlein, in their etymological

¹ Biographisch-Literarisches Handwörterbuch zur Geschichte der exacten Wissenschaften, enthaltend Nachweisungen über Lebensverhältnisse und Leistungen von Mathematikern, Astronomen, Physikern, Chemikern, Mineralogen, Geologen, u. s. w. aller Völker und Zeiten, gesammelt von J. C. Poggendorff, Mitglied der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Erste Lieferung 1858. Zweite Lieferung 1859, Leipzig.

² Grundzüge der griechischen Etymologie von S. Curtius. Erster Theil, Leipzig, 1858. pp. 371.

researches, are much more careful and sober. They reward the reader with accurate collateral information, even when they are wrong in their conclusions. The work before us will enable the student to correct their errors. The whole compass of pertinent matter in various cognate languages, is brought together in a compact form, to explain the roots of the Greek language. A small group of kindred words is presented and treated in a short, distinct article. First, references are made to Bopp, Benfey, Pott, Grimm, and all the other authorities of high rank, and then the result to which the author has come is stated with only a few words of explanation. Each article is comprised in a single paragraph, averaging about twelve or fourteen lines. Another excellence of the work is, that it omits all doubtful etymologies, and limits itself to that which may be regarded as clear and certain. In the introduction, the author presents a luminous view of the principles which should guide the etymologist, and a good critique of the labors of his predecessors.

12.—THE GREEK THEATRE.¹

AMONG the many excellent works which of late years have appeared on the Greek theatre, such as Strack's *Altgriechische Theatergebäude*, Geppert's *Altgriechische Bühne*, Witzschel's *Tragische Bühne in Athen*, and Wiesler's *Theatergebäude*, this careful and minute treatise deserves a distinguished place. In his preparation for it, the author made two journeys to Asia Minor, where he examined all the remains of the ancient Greek theatres. Although the whole structure of the theatre came under his consideration, the scene, or the stage, properly so called, and its decorations, being the part least understood, received his particular attention. The work is divided into two parts, the first being devoted to the accounts which the ancients give of the form of the theatre, and the comparison of those accounts with the ruins which the author had examined; the second, to the various passages in the Greek tragedies which illustrate the view given, and which are illustrated by it.

13.—SCHAFF'S CHURCH HISTORY.²

THE author of this volume was, as is well known, born and educated in Germany, and wrote the present History in his mother-tongue. He was a pupil of Neander, Tholuck, and Hengstenberg, but has been for many years a successful teacher of theology in the United States, the country of his adoption and of his hearty love. His style of writing is fresh, genial, ear-

¹ *Die Skene der Hellenen, ein Versuch* von A. Schönborn, Leipzig. 1858. pp. 361.

² *History of the Christian Church.* By Philip Schaff, D. D., author of the *History of the Apostolic Church* From the Birth of Christ to the Reign of Constantine, A. D. 1—311. New York: Charles Scribner, 124 Grand Street; Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 38 George Street. 1858. pp. 535. 8vo.

nest and fascinating. We cannot name a translation from the German which bears so few marks of having been transferred from another language, as are found in this volume, and the volume on the History of the Apostolic Church; both works being from the same author and the same translator. There is sometimes a simplicity and naïveté in the style of Professor Schaff which we greatly admire, and which we seldom find united with such rare and varied learning as is exhibited in all the productions of his pen.

The principal merit of these productions, it seems to us, lies in the ardor with which Prof. Schaff exhibits, from a wide course of reading, the more fresh and popular aspects of his subject. His studies range over the whole field of secondary and mediate sources, particularly as they have been prepared by the patient study and systematizing talent of modern Germany, and out of this mass of materials he combines and expands for the general reader, in a highly interesting manner. Trained in the best schools of historical investigation in his native land, familiar with the rubrics of the best historiographers, and with a memory and note-books stored with the best results of historical investigations for the last thirty years, the author's enthusiastic mind reproduces these materials in a form particularly attractive to the English and American student, to whom this mass of information is, for the most part, new and strange.

Dr. Schaff does not lay claim to any especial eminence as an independent investigator of historical problems, or as a familiar student of the church Fathers. Still he is not peculiarly deficient in original investigation, and he has an intimate acquaintance with the more important of the ancient writings. We regard it as now, more than ever, the duty of an ecclesiastical historian to familiarize himself with the ancient documents; not to borrow his quotations from his predecessors, and to marshal the oft-repeated extracts against or in favor of a particular theory; but to ascertain the true place, relations, and meaning of these excerpts, and to connect them with other quotations which modify and in some respects contradict the first. An ancient writer is often represented as advocating consistently some one dogma, which he in fact opposes as often as he advocates. A series of second-hand quotations is brought forward from his pages; but a thorough perusal of those pages discloses many instances in which he wavered in his dogma, or expressly abandoned it, or insisted on some other theory in irreconcilable antagonism to it.

Dr. Schaff is frank in expressing his own belief, even on controverted topics. Thus he says, on page 84, that the inspiration of the New Testament "is concerned only with moral and religious truths, and the communication of what is necessary to salvation. Incidental matters of geography, history, archæology, and of mere personal interest, can be regarded as directed by inspiration, only so far as they really affect religious truth." On pp. 124, 125, he enforces the Biblical arguments in favor of Infant Baptism, and asserts that the rite "needs to be completed by a subsequent act like confirmation," the earliest traces of which "are supposed to be found in the

apostolical practice of laying on hands, or symbolically imparting the Holy Ghost, after baptism." On page 403, he says : "In an infant, in fact, any regeneration but through baptism is inconceivable. A moral regeneration, as distinct from sacramental, would imply conversion, and this is a conscious act of the will, an exercise of repentance and faith, of which the infant is incapable." In many similar passages, Dr. Schaff avows his Sacramentarian and High-church tendencies. These open-hearted avowals are intimately conjoined with his genial simplicity of style, and perhaps if he should tear away the vines, he would injure the stock itself, around which they entwine themselves and flourish.

14.—STUART ON THE ROMANS.¹

WHEN we compare the style of commentary at the present day, with that which prevailed thirty years ago, we are surprised at the difference, and we are prompted to a new gratitude for the labors of Professor Stuart. He, more than any other one man, has contributed to this improved style of interpretation. He, more than any other man, has been the occasion of introducing American scholars into the treasure-house of European learning. He has started on their career of usefulness, several Biblical interpreters, who have accomplished a great work for their age and the world. It may be said, indeed, that his exegetical labors have awakened the mind of English as well as American scholars, and performed a good work for men who are not familiar with his history. His opponents have directed their arrows against him, by feathers drawn from his own wing.

His commentary on the Romans is the most elaborate of all his works. It has elicited more discussion than any of his other exegetical volumes. It is the result of long continued, patient thought. It expresses, in clear style, his maturest conclusions. It has the animating influence of an original treatise, written on a novel plan, and under a sense of personal responsibility. Regarding it in all its relations, its antecedents and consequents, we must pronounce it the most important Commentary which has appeared in this country on this Epistle.

In its original form it contained many sentences and paragraphs which are unnecessary at the present time. Professor Robbins has condensed the work with admirable skill and sound judgment. He says, at the close of his Preface :

"In the preparation of the present edition, use has been made of most of the commentaries which have appeared, for the first time, or in new im-

¹ A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. By Moses Stuart, late Professor of Sacred Literature in the Theological Seminary at Andover. Edited and Revised by R. D. C. Robbins, Professor in Middlebury College. Fourth edition. Andover: Warren F. Draper; Boston: Gould and Lincoln; New York: Wiley and Halsted; Philadelphia: Smith, English and Co. 1859. pp. 544. 12mo.

proved editions, since the publication of the second edition, some of which are of much value. Rückert, Meyer, Alford, Olshausen, De Wette, and Philippi, all have their excellences, and are occasionally referred to, especially in the foot-notes. I have, however, been careful to introduce nothing into the body of the commentary, that is at variance with the Theological or Exegetical views of Prof. Stuart. Whenever I have been led to a different view of any passage, I have either indicated it in the notes, or simply satisfied myself with giving the view of the author, as it appeared in the previous edition. I have endeavored to keep in mind that my province was that of an editor merely. Besides, the desire to reduce the size of the work, prevented me from making as many additions as I should otherwise have been inclined to.

"It seemed desirable to change the Introduction more than the body of the Commentary. A considerable part of that has accordingly been rewritten. Condensation, with occasional verbal alterations, has been my main object throughout the body of the work. Some of the Excursus, especially the V., have been abridged more freely, as the subjects there discussed were subsequently more fully developed by Prof. Stuart in Articles in the Biblical Repository and elsewhere."

For the *ordinary* use of students, the Commentary is now more valuable than ever before. It is more simple, more direct, of easier consultation and readier reference. The historical philologist would prefer the Commentary unabridged; but for practical service, the abridged form is more convenient and attractive.

15.—DR. J. A. ALEXANDER'S COMMENTARIES.¹

Dr. Alexander's Commentaries on the Gospel of Mark, and the Acts of the Apostles, exhibit his usual characteristics as an interpreter. They are written, however, in a style more condensed than that of his Commentary on Isaiah; and more felicitous and original than that of his Commentary on the Psalms. They disclose his acquaintance with the most learned philologists of Germany, and his good judgment in resisting many of their fanciful interpretations.

Often, however, his commentaries betray an unwarranted tendency to make the inspired word bend to uninspired theories, and also a want of strict logical consistency. We had intended to specify in the January number of the *Bibliotheca Sacra* several instances of these faults, but we are obliged now to curtail our proposed review of Dr. Alexander's Commentaries, and we confine ourselves to his remarks on Acts 13: 22—37. The progress of thought in Paul's speech in the synagogue at Antioch, is

¹ The Gospel according to Mark, explained by Joseph Addison Alexander. New York: Charles Scribner, 124 Grand Street. 1858. pp. 444. 12mo.

The Acts of the Apostles, explained by Joseph Addison Alexander. In two volumes. New York: Charles Scribner, 124 Grand Street, corner of Broadway. 1858. pp. 462 and 498.

itself a commentary on the meaning of it; and we wonder that Dr. Alexander was not influenced in his interpretation by this regular, onward movement of the Apostle. Let us begin the speech at the twenty-second verse: "And when he [God] had removed him [Saul], he raised up *ἤγειρεν* unto them David to be their king; — "Of this man's seed hath God according to his promise, raised (*ἤγαγε*) unto Israel a Saviour, Jesus." After this reference to the incarnation, and to some events in the *life* of Christ, we are brought in regular order to his *death and burial*, "the Jews fulfilled [the word of the prophets] in *condemning* him." "They desired Pilate that he should be *slain*." "And when they had fulfilled all that was written of him, they *took him down* from the tree and *laid him in a sepulchre*." Having proceeded thus regularly from Christ's death to his entombment, Paul continues his progress thus: "But God raised (*ἤγειρεν*) him from the dead." And while the Apostle is dilating on the visible appearance of the risen Jesus, he adds: "And we declare unto you glad tidings, how that the promise which was made unto the fathers, God hath fulfilled the same unto us their children, in that he hath raised up Jesus again (*ἀναστήσας Ἰησοῦν*), as it is also written in the second Psalm: Thou art my son, this day have I begotten thee. And as concerning that he *raised* (*ἀνέστησεν*) him up from the dead, now no more to return to corruption, he said on this wise: I will give you the sure mercies of David. Wherefore he saith also in another Psalm: Thou shalt not suffer thine Holy One to see corruption. For David saw corruption. But he whom God *raised again* (*ἤγειρεν*), saw no corruption." Through all these gradations of our Saviour's history, it is obvious that the Apostle moves onward steadily, and never retraces his steps; but, having spoken in the thirtieth verse of Christ's resurrection, he expresses in the thirty-second and thirty-third verses the joyfulness of that same event, as a fulfilment of the divine promise made in Psalm 2: 7. This was a promise of the resurrection, and of the glories involved in it. Continuing his remarks on the resurrection, the Apostle, in the very next, the thirty-fourth verse, adds the idea, that it was a final release from all subsequent death; and, keeping the same idea in his mind, he reiterates it with a Pauline emphasis in the thirty-seventh verse. The promise in Psalm 2: 7, to which Paul refers is: "I will declare the *decree*, [not the mere eternal intention of God, but the statute, the ordinance, that kind of decree which has the force of *law*, *ῥῆν*], Thou art my Son; this day have I begotten thee." The phrase "this day" refers not to the period of making the statute, but to the period of begetting the Son. This period was not in eternity but in time. It was a point of time which was *promised*, and therefore *future* at the date of the promise. Even the statute (*ῥῆν*) is not *spoken* of as eternal (although it was eternally intended, as are all the laws of God, even the law prescribing the sacrifices at the temple); but it is *spoken* of merely as a law, to be proclaimed at a *future* time, when "He that sitteth in the heavens *shall* laugh," etc., etc. The Apostle says, Acts 13: 33, that the time of fulfilling this statute was at the resurrection of Christ. He says the same in Rom. 1: 2—4, where the promise concerning Christ was fulfilled in the fact, that

he "was made of the seed of David, according to the flesh; and declared [proved, shown] to be the Son of God, with power, according to the spirit of holiness, *by the resurrection from the dead*" (ἐξ ἀναστρέψεως νεκρῶν)."

Agreeably, then, to this natural and easy interpretation, the momentous words of the second Psalm do not teach, that the divine nature of the Second Person in the Trinity is begotten from the divine nature of the First Person, *eternally* begotten, because begotten in the eternal day, *this day*, the day when the beginningless decrees were formed. On all the principles of consistent exegesis, the metaphysical theory of the Son's eternal generation loses the second Psalm as its boasted proof-text, and the passage simply means that Christ shall be established, manifested and known as the Messiah, the King peculiarly dear and intimately related to God. The Apostle in Acts 13: 33, as in Rom. 1: 2—4, designates the resurrection of Christ, the rising so as to reign forever at God's right hand, as the time of this emphatic, predicted manifestation of Christ's Messiahship.

But Dr. Alexander remarks on Acts 13: 33, "To-day refers to the date of the decree itself; but this, as a divine act, was eternal, and so was the sonship it affirms." Then this second Psalm should have been written thus: "I will declare the decree of this day: Thou art my Son; I have begotten thee." Then Acts 13: 33 should have been written thus: "The eternal decree of the begetting of the Second Person from the First Person is fulfilled through eternity, and at no one time more than another. But we read, instead, in Paul's speech, that the *promise* of the Son's being begotten of the Father was *made* to the Jewish ancestors, and was *fulfilled* to the descendants, "*in that* he [God] hath raised up Jesus again, as it is also written in the second Psalm: Thou art my Son; this day have I begotten thee."

The interpretation which Paul gives of Psalm 2: 7, — referring it to the climax of proof that Christ is the Messiah, this proof being found in his rising from the dead, to act and manifest himself in an unprecedented degree as Head of the Church, — is of itself sufficient to undermine the Biblical argument for the metaphysical theory of an eternal begetting of Christ's divine nature. But Dr. Alexander's Commentary does not admit that the phrase, God "hath raised up Jesus," means, "God hath raised him from the dead." We learn from this Commentary, that in the thirty-third verse the Apostle breaks up the beautiful order of his speech, and recurs to a topic which he had already mentioned, and to which we can see no propriety in his reverting. We here learn that after the Apostle had spoken of the incarnation, of God's calling Christ into existence, verse 23; and of Christ's condemnation, verse 27; and of his death, verse 28, 29; and of his burial, verse 29; and of his resurrection, verse 30; and of his appearance to "his witnesses," verse 31; the apostle then suddenly turns back from the last to the first, and resumes in verse 33 the already dismissed subject of the incarnation, and then *as* suddenly comes back, in the very next verse, 34, to the resurrection again, and continues to speak of this theme from verse 34 to verse 37. Thus the word ἀναστήσας in verse

33, refers to the incarnation; and the word ἀνέστησεν, in the very next verse, 34, refers to the resurrection, and there is a loss of the unity and the beauty of the Apostle's progressive speech. Still, even here, Dr. Alexander virtually abandons the phrase "begotten thee," as a proof of *eternal* generation; for he refers the words to the *temporal* incarnation, to the "raising up" of the incarnate Jesus, or the bringing of him "forward in our [the Apostles'] day and to our view." He supposes, indeed, that the words teach the Son's "community of nature" with the Father. And it is doubtless true that the Son is God, and has the same nature with the Father; and this community of nature may be intimated in the words, "Begotten Son of God," when these words are taken in all their relations, and it may give emphasis to the *other* reasons why he is called "Son of God." But the words, "begotten Son of God" although in their connections they may *intimate* the divine nature of Christ, do not teach it directly; they may *imply*, but they do not primarily denote it; and they do not even imply that the second divine distinction is generated by the first. On every hypothesis, the phrases must be understood as figurative; and the extent of the figure must be learned from the nature of the case, and from the analogy of other Scriptures. We commend the candor of Dr. Alexander, in allowing that the Psalmist's word "begotten" does not mean an eternal begetting; but we wonder at his inconsistency in claiming that the words "this day have I begotten thee," have any reference to the eternity of Christ's *sonship* as distinct from the eternity of all Christ's attributes.

ARTICLE IX.

THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

GERMANY.

As the year 1858 completed the decennial period that has passed since the German revolution, some of the German periodicals, very naturally, at the close of the year, took a retrospective view of that period. We have observed this especially in the *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, published at Jena, and in Ewald's *Jahrbücher der biblischen Wissenschaft*. The agitation of ecclesiastical questions has most engaged the public attention during this time. In Germany the church and state have always been united. The creeds of the church have a legal force. But for a century past there has been a steadily advancing departure from the symbolical books. The rationalists refuse to acknowl-

edge the authority of creeds in which they have no faith. Many evangelical Christians, while they do not object to the substance of the standards of the church, nevertheless maintain that creeds are imperfect at best, and therefore it is not right that they shall hold a place which is due only to the Bible. At the revolution of 1848, there was an effort made to separate the church from the state. But the revolution passed away; and men, who were in theory still in favor of the separation, saw practical difficulties in the inseparable connection subsisting between the state and the universities, where all the clergy received their education. If the church should withdraw from the state, it must educate its own ministry, and the theological faculties in the universities must be broken up. The government and the people are agreed in the expediency of leaving the church in the hands of the state. But what shall be the creed legally imposed upon the clergy? To this question three different answers are given. The rationalists require that no creed shall have binding authority. The rigid old Lutherans demand that the symbolical books be strictly adhered to. A very numerous intermediate party, outnumbering all the rest, desire that the creeds be retained and adopted in their substance, leaving room for such variations of belief as are necessary where the science of theology is free, and the Bible is the only book absolutely authoritative.

The men who have been leaders in reviving the absolute authority of the reformers, and carrying back theology to precisely what it was three hundred years ago, and who have, by their extreme views, created a powerful reaction against their party, are Stahl and Hengstenberg, of Berlin; Harless, of Erlangen; Vilmar, in Hesse; and Kliefoth, in Mecklenburg. To name all the controversial works that have been written on these questions would be an endless task. Bunsen is one of the ablest writers in favor of orthodoxy and liberty. Indeed, he may be regarded as the representative of the party that is now in the ascendant. The intolerance of the old Lutherans towards so evangelical and excellent a man as Professor Baumgarten, in Rostock, aroused the just indignation of all moderate and liberal-minded men. Probably nothing has done so much to open the eyes of all to the bigotry of those in power as this one instance of unjust and bitter persecution. It is the theme of earnest discussion in nearly all the journals, and has called forth many a pamphlet from able and judicious theologians. The result will undoubtedly be good. Already has it fixed and settled many minds that were wavering before.

J. Overbeck, who recently published the best work, in a cheap form, on the antiquities of Pompeii, with illustrations, has just completed, in a similar form and style, his *Geschichte der griechischen Plastik für Künstler und Kunstfreunde, mit Illustrationen*. Those who desire an accurate work on this subject, with ample and faithful illustrations, executed in the best style, at a moderate expense, will do well to examine these two volumes.

The admirers of Schleiermacher,—and there are many such—will be

pleased to learn that at length two volumes of his correspondence have appeared, under the title: *Aus Schleiermacher; Leben in Briefen*. But those who expect to see the scholar and the philosopher in the outpourings of his heart in private correspondence, will be disappointed. An intimation is made that a third volume may soon appear, containing his literary correspondence. In the letters already published we see the warm-hearted man in the circle of his nearest friends. Of the purity of his heart, and of the elevation of his moral and religious sentiments, it is truly refreshing to see such ample evidence. This feature constitutes the principal charm of the letters that are now published.

Zimmermann's *Geschichte der Aesthetik als philosophische Wissenschaft*, in one large octavo volume, is a welcome contribution to the history of the various theories of art. His own theory, differing widely from Vischer's, is occasionally indicated in what he has already written, but will appear more fully in a subsequent volume, devoted expressly to the subject. The history, the only one that has been published, appears to be complete and well executed. We have been able to give it only a hasty examination.

The philological student will be gratified to know that the *Grammatik der Romanischen Sprachen*, by Diez, is passing through a second and greatly improved edition. Few scholars may have the requisite knowledge to follow Bopp in his comparative view of the Indo-Germanic languages. The old dialects of Germany may be too remote from the studies of most men to allow of much sympathy with Grimm, in his immense labor employed upon the grammatical forms of the old German. But what scholar has so forgotten his Latin, or is so unacquainted with the French, Italian, and Spanish, as not to be interested in knowing how the Latin, by regular and organic changes, passed into the latter? The object of the *Grammar of the Romanic languages* is to show at large, and on strictly philological principles, the connection between the Latin and the languages descended from it. If a Latin scholar wished to learn all these modern languages, he might obtain an etymological and grammatical knowledge of them all by studying Diez, in the same time that would be requisite to learn as much of any one of them from the books ordinarily used. After studying Diez, it would be necessary to use other books to learn the usages of language. But the structure of these languages in the skeleton form can be best learned from him.

In 1837 we purchased the first volume of Grässe's *Lehrbuch einer allgemeinen Literärgeschichte aller bekannten Völker der Welt von der ältesten bis auf die neueste Zeit*, and after more than twenty-one years of patience and hope, we have received the last part of the last volume. Only the index remains, and that is promised during the present year. We have now, in some six or seven large volumes, as complete a survey as the nature of the case admits, of the history of literature, "from the creation of the world" to the middle of the nineteenth century. The author transcends his limits

in respect to the close of this period, frequently quoting works published in 1858, although no instance has been observed of a similar license in going beyond the other limit. In an undertaking of this kind, where the way has been so little prepared by the labors of others, it would be unreasonable to expect either absolute completeness, or equal success in all parts of the work. An acquaintance with such an immense field of knowledge must, from the nature of the case, be general and somewhat superficial. We believe, however, that the researches of the author have been immense, and that they will satisfy all reasonable expectations. The great convenience of such a book for reference is obvious; and its superiority to all others of the kind will not be questioned. With Wachler's *Geschichte der Literatur*, hitherto considered the best manual, it cannot be compared, as it embraces three or four times as much matter. It is a vast repository of knowledge in respect to books on all classes of subjects. His *Trésor de Livres Rares et Précieux* may be regarded as a supplementary volume.

We have on our table the *Neue Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*. Auf Veranstaltung des deutschen Zweiges des Evangelischen Bund. No. 1, 1859. Berlin. This weekly organ of the German branch of the Evangelical Alliance is a pleasing indication of the liberal and enterprising spirit which animates that body. The object of the paper, like that of the Alliance, is to strengthen the bonds of union among all evangelical Christians, and to maintain and defend the great principles of a common Christianity against the attacks of those who seek to undermine it. Among the many excellent men, in various public positions in different parts of Germany, who united to establish this periodical, we are pleased to see the names of Hoffman, Nitzsch, Snethlage, and Carl Ritter, of Berlin; of Tholuck, Müller, and Hupfeld, of Halle; of Heinrich Ritter, Dörner, Ullmann, Schenckel, Vogt, Stier, Hundeshagen, Ebrard, and Krummacher. Such names give ample assurance of the solidity of the enterprise. From the specimen which we have seen, we anticipate that this religious paper will be one of decided ability and excellence.

We have before us the second volume of Julius Braun's *Geschichte der Kunst in ihrem Entwicklungsgang durch alle Völker der alten Welt hindurch, auf dem Boden der Ortskunde nachgewiesen*, 1858. pp. 748. As is indicated by its title, it is a complete history of ancient art, in a form that might properly be called the geography of art. It contains an account of all the monuments of art, as they lie distributed over those countries where the ancient arts flourished. The author has visited most of these places more than once, and has arranged his materials in the order of travels, or of the various tours which he made in visiting and examining these remains of ancient splendor. With this special preparation, which occupied many years, he has connected that of the thorough study of all the literature pertaining to the subject. The first volume, which appeared in 1856, treats of the ancient arts in the valley of the Nile, in Mesopotamia, Media, Persia, and the countries to the west of these, bordering upon the Mediterranean. The

volume before us relates to Asia Minor and Greece, and is particularly attractive to the classical scholar. The third and last will present a view of Etruscan and Roman art.

Gfrörer, the historian, has commenced an elaborate and exhaustive work on Papst Gregorius VII. und sein Zeitalter. The first volume, just published (1859), is preliminary, giving a complete view of the civil and religious state of Germany, about the middle of the eleventh century. It is truly a book of German industry, and promises well. The author seems to think it safest not to commit himself to any definite limits. He makes no promises, and gives no intimations in respect to the extent of his work. We are glad to see that this controverted subject is to be treated, on strictly critical grounds, by an able historian. Since Voight's Hildebrand als Papst Gregorius VII., several biographies of this wonderful man have been written; but none have been quite satisfactory to the historical student.

H. Ritter has just published the first volume of his valuable new work: *Die Christliche Philosophie nach ihrem Begriff, ihren äussern Verhältnissen und in ihrer Geschichte bis auf die neuesten Zeiten*. This is entirely distinct from that part of his general history of philosophy, which is called the *History of Christian Philosophy*. It is designed for a wider circle of readers. The writer here breaks away from the restraint of measured paragraphs and careful citations, and pours out a fresh stream of thought that hurries the reader along with him. In his general view of the influence of Christianity upon human thought and human destiny, he gives a splendid defence of Christianity, and shows the shallowness of the irreligious philosophy of the eighteenth century, with great skill and power. The author has never written a more interesting volume.

Since the death of Schwegler, chiefly known in this country as the author of a good manual of the history of philosophy, a *History of Grecian philosophy* (*Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie*) has been published, being edited from his manuscripts by Prof. Köstlin. It makes a volume of about the same size as that of his *Geschichte der Philosophie im Umriss*, translated by Prof. Seelye. Though not quite so warm and inspiring as the latter, it is well proportioned, nicely accurate, calm and luminous. It is an excellent summary of the history of Grecian philosophy, and, of course, is a great expansion of the sketch contained in his other work. It is no hasty or imperfect production, but is founded on a course of lectures given, for a series of years, in the University. In fact, he died only a few minutes after finishing a lecture on the philosophy of Plato. He had also employed several of the last years of his very active life in preparing his excellent manual of Roman History (*Römische Geschichte*), of which the third volume has appeared, edited by F. F. Baur.

Among the many works called forth by the tri-centennial celebration of the founding of the University of Jena, held Aug. 15, 1858, the most important are: 1. *Lebensskizzen der Professoren der Universität Jena, seit 1558 bis 1858* von J. Gunther, pp. 294, — notices of individuals tolerably complete and good, but necessarily somewhat dry.

2. Geschichte der Jenaischen Studentenlebens von der Gründung der Universität bis zur Gegenwart von Rich. Keil und Rob. Keil. pp. 668.

3. Biedeman's Universität Jena nach ihrer Stellung und Bedeutung in der Geschichte deutschen Geisteslebens von ihrer Gründung bis auf die Gegenwart.

A new and enlarged edition of R. Schmid's *Die Gesetze der Angelsachsen*, text, German translation, notes and glossary, has been published by Brockhaus in Leipsic.

The third and last volume of L. Döderlein's *Homerisches Glossarium* has finally made its appearance.

Koberstein is approaching the end of the third edition of his most valuable *Grundriss der Geschichte der deutschen National-Literatur*. A part of the third volume is already out. In the first edition, the work, one of the best of its kind, consisted of but one volume.

Paldamus has commenced a work somewhat resembling Johnson's *Lives of the Poets*, entitled *Deutsche Dichter und Prosaisten von der Mitte des 15ten Jahrhunderts bis auf unsere Zeit nach ihrem Leben und Wirken* geschildert.

Adolph Stahr, who was formerly so much occupied with the life and writings of Aristotle, has just published a *Life of Lessing*, under the title: *G. E. Lessing: Sein Leben und seine Werke*. 2 Theile. pp. 715.

Ewald, in his *Jarbücher der biblischen Wissenschaft*, speaks very highly of Van de Velde's *Plan of the Town and Environs of Jerusalem*, calling it the most accurate view which has yet been given. This commendation is very refreshing in a work which, in reviewing the O. Test. commentators for the past ten years, does not find one to commend, and which, in speaking of D. Strauss and his *Life of Ulrich von Hutten*, calls him an atheistical biographer of an atheistical reformer.

We have before us 200 *Bildnisse u. Lebensbeschreibung berühmter deutscher Männer*, 2te. verbesserte Auflage, Leipzig, 1857.

This book is better than would be inferred from its title. The 200 portraits, well engraved on wood, make up the staple of this cheap volume. As to the *Lives*, they are admirably brief, occupying but ten lines under each portrait. As it is pleasant to sit in one's library, and think of the distinguished men of all ages, while the eye runs over their names on the back of the volume, so it is particularly pleasant to the German scholar to look upon the faces of the great men whose names have given renown to the German people. Here we see Luther, Melancthon, and Zuingle, the leading German reformers, with their associates, friends, and contemporaries, Justus Jonas, Bugenhagen, Casper Aquila, Pontanus, Bucer, Camerarius, Paul Eber, Reuchlin, Hutten von Sickingen, Eobanus Hessus, Pirkheimer, and Peutingen. Among the rulers, we have the emperors from Maximilian and Charles V., down to recent times; all the Electors of Saxony in its earlier and more glorious period of the sixteenth century; among the painters, Cranach, Albert Dürer, Holbein, Vischer, and Mengs. Among the composers, Handel, Haydn, Mozart, T. Bach, Beethoven;

and among the scientific men, Herschel, the elder, W. Humboldt, Bessel, Gauss, Copernicus, Kepler, Blumenbach, and von Buch. Glancing over this gallery of pictures more in their chronological order, we notice, among many others, the following splendid characters: Sebastian Brant, the moralist and keenest satirist of the fifteenth century; Bugenhagen, the Wittemburg preacher; Arndt, the genial author of "True Christianity;" Albert Dürer, the great painter; Paracelsus, the mystic and medical reformer; Jacob Böhm, the theosophist; Aventinus, the author of the *Annales Boiorum*; G. v. Berlichingen, whose celebrated autobiography furnished such dramatic materials for Goëthe; Sebastian Frank, and Sebastian Münster, the cosmographers; Spengler, the lyric poet of Nuremberg; Paul Eber, the theologian of Wittemburg after Luther; Fischart, the scourge of titled fools, of priests, and of feminine weaknesses, and the bold and successful innovator in language; Opitz, the learned, rhetorical, servile poet, and founder of the first Silesian School of poetry; Paul Flemming, the poet of real life, who wrote the best odes and sonnets of that age; Paul Gerhardt, the best hymnologist of his century, and second only to Luther; Andreas Gryphias, "the father of German dramatic poetry;" Abraham Santa Clara, the pulpit wag and court preacher at Vienna; Spener, the prince of the Pietists; Francke, of "Orphan-House" memory; Zinzendorf, the founder of the Herrnhuters; Leibnitz, the father of the German philosophy; Thomasius, the first professor who dared to lecture in German; Christian von Wolf, the demonstrative, dogmatic metaphysician; Hagedorn, the "Poet of the Graces;" Gellert and Rabener, of the Leipsic club of young poets; Gleim, "the *accoucheur* of the Prussian poets;" Spalding, one of the trio of Berlin pulpit orators nearly a century ago; Mendelssohn, the Jewish philosopher and belles lettres scholar; Justus Möser, author of the *Osnabrückische Geschichte*; Winckelmann, the first great critic of ancient art; Lessing, the acute critic both in art and literature; the great poets of the Sturm und Drang period, Herder, Goëthe, and Schiller; Bürger, the author of *Leonore*, Hüly, Voss, and Stolberg, of the Göttingen Hainbund; Mattheson, the mosaic poet; Kotzebue, murdered by Sand; Jung-Stilling, the autobiographer; Campe and Salzmann, the philanthropist educators; J. v. Müller, the historian of Switzerland; Jean Paul, the great humorist; Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, authors of the Ego philosophy, the Anschauung's philosophy, and the Begriff's philosophy; Tieck, the greatest of the Romantic school; Körner, the patriot-poet. All this for a dollar and a half is certainly a cheap luxury.

The *Handbuch der Kunstgeschichte* (Manual of the History of Art), by F. Kugler, is advancing towards its completion. The first edition, which appeared in 1841, was the first work of the kind which reduced to order and symmetry the great mass of miscellaneous matter that had accumulated under the various labors of modern writers on art, and presented a clear outline to guide the student through all the intricacies of this extensive subject. The author is best known to the English reader by his *Handbook of*

Painting, a work which places him in the first rank of authors, both as a critic and as a historian of art. A second edition of the first-named work appeared in 1847, incorporating the new materials which had been brought to light during the interval of six years. The elaboration of this work was undertaken and successfully executed, not by Kugler himself, but by his friend, so favorably known in the history of art, F. J. Burckhardt. In 1855, when a third edition became necessary, Kugler, who had devoted all his time to the study of his subject, had made so much progress that he could not be satisfied with making additions, as had been done in the second edition. He therefore earnestly set himself about a reconstruction of the whole work according to his present views. The result is a much more complete presentation of the subject, and a more perfect arrangement of the materials. Here, in the first volume, are found, beautifully elaborated, the results of all the discoveries recently made in respect to ancient art in Egypt, Assyria, Asia Minor, and in different parts of Europe and America. In the second volume, which treats of mediæval art, the new matter introduced is equally rich and various. But, deeply to the regret of all the lovers of art, the author, just before finishing this part, was suddenly removed from his labors in the midst of his days. The second volume will be completed, and the third prepared on the same plan, by Mr. Burckhardt, partly from materials left by Kugler, and partly from those furnished by himself. Although this manual has an accompaniment of illustrations, it is so far supplied with plates and cuts of its own as to be easily intelligible without that expensive accompaniment.

The author's *Geschichte der Baukunst*, an entirely new work, on which he expended a great amount of labor, was interrupted at the same point, that is, near the second volume, which also extends to the close of the Middle Ages. It is to be completed, with the third volume, by another hand. The last edition of the *Handbuch der Kunstgeschichte* is enriched by a summary of the materials, and by a copious selection of the illustrations taken from this *History of Architecture*.

UNITED STATES.

From time to time we have announced to our readers the more important volumes coming from the press of Gould and Lincoln, Boston, Mass. They have published various works by Hugh Miller, Dr. John Kitto, Dr. John Harris, Peter Bayne, M. A., Dr. Horatio B. Hackett, and others. We have now the pleasure of announcing that this enterprising house will speedily publish the *Lectures of Sir William Hamilton on Metaphysics and Logic*. We have examined the sheets of the first volume of these *Lectures*, which is devoted to *Metaphysics*, and have been highly gratified with the typographical appearance of the volume, and the internal character of the discussions. The *Lectures* are edited by the Rev. Henry Longueville Mansel, B. D., Oxford, and John Veitch, M. A., Edinburgh.

They will be prized as a rich treasure by all who are interested in philosophical study.

Gould and Lincoln have also published the first volume, and intend to publish the succeeding volumes, of "The Life of John Milton: Narrated in connection with the Political, Ecclesiastical, and Literary History of his time. By David Masson, M. A., Professor of English Literature in University College, London. With Portraits and Specimens of his Hand-writing at different periods." The present volume of 658 pp., 8vo., details the history of Milton from 1608 to 1640. The second volume will be devoted to his life from 1640 to 1660; and the third from 1660 to 1674. The first volume is one of rare interest and importance.

The same house have also published recently, "The State of the Impenitent Dead, by Alvah Hovey, D. D., Professor of Christian Theology in the Newton Theological Institution;" pp. 160, 18mo. This volume is written in defence of the doctrine of endless punishment. It is a lucid, powerful, and eminently Biblical argument.

Dr. Hovey, the author of the above-named volume, has also written "A Memoir of the Life and Times of the Rev. Isaac Backus, A. M.," pp. 369, 12mo. This volume is also from the publishing house of Gould and Lincoln. It is attractive in its typography, and instructive in its historical details. It illustrates not only the growth of the Baptist Denomination, but also the principles of the "New Lights," and "Separates" among the Congregationalists, and the general progress of opinion in New England with regard to civil and religious liberty.

Messrs. Gould and Lincoln have very recently published an 18mo. of 208 pages, entitled: "Christian Brotherhood: a Letter to the Hon. Heman Lincoln. By Baron Stow, D. D., Pastor of the Rowe Street Church, Boston." The volume unfolds, I. The union that is desirable. II. Considerations that render Christian union desirable. III. Some methods by which the Baptist denomination may probably contribute to the promotion of Christian Brotherhood. The volume is well fitted to promote a spirit of Christian love among the different denominations of Christians.

We have been interested in an edition of the New Testament, published by Collins and Brother, New York, which omits the old divisions of the text into chapter and verse, and divides the text into paragraphs according to its apparent meaning. It designates by quotation points the distinct speeches and conversations, and also the quotations found in the New Testament. It is a valuable edition.

We are pleased to learn that Dr. John J. Owen is soon to publish the second volume of his Commentary on the New Testament. This volume comprises the Gospel of Luke.

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ARTICLE I.

VISCHER'S AESTHETICS.¹

BY REV. DR. SEARS, PRESIDENT OF BROWN UNIVERSITY.

THE best theory of the beautiful found in any ancient writer is that of Plotinus. It is substantially as follows: The divine reason is in itself perfect; but when it comes to act upon matter, which is by nature intractable, its work is imperfect. It were a contradiction to affirm that perfection could be realized in matter. The very nature of matter interposes insuperable obstacles. In the divine reason, therefore, there is a perfection not to be found in any of its material works, just as there is in the mind of an artist an idea which can be only imperfectly realized in any outward form. The human mind is kindred with the divine, and naturally conceives those ideas which flow from the latter. Not only does it see forms in nature which are more or less expressive of such ideas, but it has the power of conceiving of a *beau idéal*, that is, of ideas which are far above visible

¹ Aesthetik oder Wissenschaft des Schönen zum Gebrauche für Vorlesungen von Dr. F. T. Vischer, Professor der Aesthetik und deutschen Literatur an der Universität zu Tübingen, in sex Theilen, 1846—1858. (See the Number for April 1859, p. 450.)

forms, and can be only intimated by them. Beauty itself consists, not in outward forms, though these are necessary as a medium, but in the ideas which these forms imperfectly convey. Whenever the mind discovers in matter the expression of anything kindred to itself, such as spiritual ideas, it experiences great delight. This is what we mean when we say that a perception of beauty is attended with an agreeable emotion. Now there is a continual effluence of such ideas proceeding from external objects and passing into the human soul. When art comes to the assistance of nature, and removes its imperfections, and brings out the idea in its primal purity, it satisfies a natural longing of the soul, and becomes a source of exalted pleasure.

In nature, the idea and the form are not in a state of equipoise; they do not perfectly correspond to each other. The idea surpasses the form, and carries the susceptible mind away with it beyond and above the form. But nature repeats her efforts, and, by multiplying similar forms, makes up in individual varieties what is wanting in any one specimen. The artist, in contemplating beautiful objects, must, by an act of his own, elevate each one to the perfection of its class. The whole realm of any one kind of beauty, which is restricted in any single form, must be made to cluster about this single form, and constitute a halo around it. It is thus that the imagination is both true to nature and still creative. Spiritual ideas are beautiful in themselves; physical objects are beautiful only as they participate in their corresponding ideas. What, then, is the essence of physical beauty? In what does it consist? Not in symmetry of parts, for that would require that all beautiful objects be complex. Besides, may there not be symmetry without beauty? May not base and wicked plans and designs be symmetrical? No; the idea of beauty lies deeper. Whenever an external object evidently partakes of the formative idea, it has what we call physical beauty. Matter, as such, has no definite form or arrangement. It is merely capable of form, which always comes from mind or thought. Uninfluenced by mind, it has in it nothing that is

beautiful. Particles of matter are arranged according to some idea. Unity, as an element of beauty, is not in the matter itself as such, but in the arrangement of its particles, which is the result of intelligence, and is in conformity with a plan. Thus beauty is not inherent in matter, but is super-induced. Herein consists the unity and beauty of the world. It is not matter that pleases, but form. That which enters the mind is not matter, but form, which may exist apart from matter, and belongs rather to space than to matter. Matter cannot be reduced without essential alteration; form can be, and the beauty of the image remains the same. If matter itself were beautiful, the formative idea could not be so; for beauty cannot have two such independent sources.

Here, then, in fact, is a three-fold correspondence; the idea in the divine mind, the same awakened in the human mind, and the object on which the idea is impressed. This last finds a correspondence in the mind, and another in the archetype. It is this mirroring both the divine and the human, when we are moved by beauty, that gives to aesthetic pleasure its pure and exalted character.¹

We will not pause to point out the truth and error that are mingled in this statement, but will content ourselves with a few casual observations.

The first thing that strikes us, is the Platonic mould in which the thought is cast. That philosophy in its ancient form has passed away forever. The ideal philosophy, however, under forms less objectionable, not excluding realism, but existing side by side with it, has not only adherents still, but is the prevalent philosophy of the present times. Without entering into a discussion of the merits of the system, which would require much more space than could be allotted to it here, it is enough for our purpose to inquire whether there are any primitive types of things, whether in the mind of the Deity any plan exists antecedent to the actual forms of outward objects. If every organized form of matter reveals some thought of the Deity; if the Great

¹ See E. Müller's *Geschichte der Theorie der Kunst bei den Alten*, Vol. II. pp. 289—302.

Artist works after models existing in his own mind, then, however difficult it may be for us to reach those thoughts with our philosophy, and reduce them to a system, the thoughts, the plans, the types themselves, exist, and glimpses of them may be caught by the aesthetic faculty, and they may hold some connection with what we call the creations of genius. There may be a great truth involved in the conceptions of Plotinus, notwithstanding the questionable manner in which he endeavors to set it forth.

The chief merit of his theory is, that it opens the way for reducing all the principles of beauty to unity, for finding a common basis on which they all rest. If, as Lord Jeffrey maintains, there is no essential unity in the principles of beauty; if under this term we comprehend an aggregate of the most heterogeneous things, having only this in common, that they all please, then either there can be no such thing as an aesthetic science, or that science must embrace all the pleasures associated with the contemplation of objects. A bond or mortgage is beautiful to a miser, an ale-house to an inebriate, an ugly Ethiopian nurse to a helpless child, an old shoe to a man who has corns on his toes. In short, all the pleasures associated with ideas of the utility of objects are by such a principle converted into pleasures of taste.

But while Plotinus laid down a broad principle to which all ideas of beauty may be referred, his Platonism led him into the error of extending the domain of beauty altogether too far. Is the production of beauty the chief object of the visible creation? May not utility be the leading object, and beauty be incidental? And may it not furthermore be true, that beauty is more frequently interfered with than utility? A scar upon the human face may not be a sign of physical weakness. A wound may be so healed that the body shall be restored to its full strength, and to its perfection so far as utility is concerned, and yet its beauty not be restored. What is wanting in the theory of Plotinus is an exact boundary line between ideas of beauty and ideas of utility. If under certain conditions there is a coincidence between them, then those conditions should be pointed out, and the

relations of the two principles to each other clearly defined.

Before considering particularly the constituent elements of beauty according to the author's analysis, to which we now pass, and going through a long process in order to reach a final result, it will be convenient, at the very beginning, so far to anticipate the result as to give a bird's eye view of his system. This will enable the reader, as he proceeds from topic to topic, to interpret each part in the light of the whole. It will furthermore afford the means of comparison between his system and that of Plotinus, showing what they have in common, and wherein they differ. Beauty is not produced by the imitation of nature in its accidental, imperfect and partial forms, nor by the imagination, breaking away from nature, and creating what is unreal. Beauty is nothing more nor less than nature in its true, ideal forms, — nature according to its pure, original design, unobstructed and unmarred. Every such form carries with it a divine thought. All approximations to it are so many efforts of nature, more or less successful, to give an outward reality to the divine conception. An object is beautiful, not so much from what it is, as from what it *appears* to be. In order to appear, it must have a definite form; it cannot be merely ideal, it must be real also. But an object that represents no idea, that has no individuality as the product of thought, that is totally devoid of an organizing principle, cannot be beautiful. A beautiful object cannot be abnormal, cannot depart from the general law which regulates the form of its species. Whatever breaks over the limit of its species is deformity. But strict conformity to the species alone would produce uniformity. Hence must be added the element of individuality as the source of variety. These two apparently contradictory, but really reconcilable elements, each in a high degree of perfection, must be united in order to produce beauty. This is the law of unity and variety, so often repeated and so little understood. The instances of beauty in any high degree are rare; first, because the intentions of nature in respect to perfection of form are, by a multitude of

untoward accidents to which both matter and mind are subject, more frequently thwarted than otherwise; and secondly, because the blooming period of living things is ordinarily very brief. Ideas of utility are, by a wise and beneficent Providence, generally realized; those of beauty, which are secondary and incidental, relating not to things themselves, but to their outward appearance only, are less frequently realized. It may be said that the intention of beauty, which requires both favorable circumstances and favorable moments, are everywhere apparent in nature, while, in point of fact, the end contemplated is rarely reached. Hence the necessity of art, whose object it is to do away with the opposition between the ideal aims of nature and its actual productions, by freeing individual forms from all accidental injuries and imperfections, and raising them to the purity and perfection of their original types. Thus artists are aesthetic interpreters of nature, which bring individual things and their primitive types into harmony with each other, and represent them in solid materials, or colors, or tones, or words and actions; and these varied means of representation constitute the ground of the division of art into its several branches.

It is sometimes said that this modern theory, introduced in some of its peculiar elements by Kant, and more fully elaborated by Schiller, his disciple; enlarged by Schelling, and by Solger, his disciple, put in a still better form; and theoretically completed by Hegel, but corrected, arranged, and systematically carried out in all its details by Vischer, his disciple, is objectionable, not only because it is ideal, but because its idealism is Platonic in its character. This is a misapprehension, which a careful study of his work could correct. Plato himself had no clear and well-defined system of aesthetics. With him, the beautiful, being identical with the good, belonged to ethics as much as to art, and perhaps even more. Plato's eminence does not rest on his philosophy of art. In his theory of ideas, however, there was a groundwork for the philosophy of the beautiful, which, as we have seen, was used for this purpose by Plotinus.

Aristotle, having but a slight sympathy with idealism, founded his useful and practical treatises on some of the arts upon purely empyrical principles, or upon the facts of experience and observation. A distinct and avowed realism was substituted for Plato's idealism. Most of the English and Scotch writers on the principles of beauty have followed his example. Not one of these has been able to construct a philosophical system of aesthetics. System there is not, and indeed cannot be. A conglomerate of disconnected principles and observations, with no definite limits, no necessary point of termination, is all that there can be. Vischer does not belong to either of these schools. He combines them both. He makes the first his organizing and guiding principle, and under it arranges, in their respective places, all the facts furnished by the second. Idealism and realism are put together like two hemispheres, thus forming a whole. The vagaries of a fanciful idealism are guarded against by making outward forms, or objective beauty, in all cases the starting point. He always begins with facts. The imagination can be trusted only when its point of departure is some beautiful object which addresses itself to the senses. From the imperfect and faulty forms necessarily furnished by pure realism, the mind frees itself by the inherent power which it possesses of looking beyond the gross realities before it to the ideas which they were intended to embody, but of which they have failed to give a complete and faultless expression.

With this faint outline before us, to serve as a general guide in the series of views to be taken, we proceed to the representation of the several parts of the author's theory of the beautiful.

He first takes a metaphysical view of beauty, that is, of beauty in itself, according to its necessary laws, and apart from the objects in which it resides. Beauty is the union of the real and the ideal, or is the idea expressed in form. The idea may be said to have had an absolute existence from eternity, and to have duplicated itself in two ways, in the world of matter, and in the world of mind. The mind, hav-

ing within itself undeveloped principles of beauty, discovers in objects that which corresponds to these principles, and thus ascends towards that ideal beauty which is revealed both in matter and mind, and which, when discovered, gives pleasure to the mind by the recognition of what is kindred to it. These three elements must be combined, inasmuch as they exist, not separately, but as counterparts of each other. No theory of beauty is complete which omits any one of these three elementary parts. The objective and the subjective in beauty are inseparable. Just as sound and the ear exist only for each other, and neither would produce any effect without the other, so beauty in objects exists only for the mind, and the mind, in turn, brings as much to the objects as it receives from them. The absolute idea, the source of both, and the aim and the standard of art, is necessarily presupposed, and is seen only dimly, and known but approximately even by the most gifted minds. It is the divine, which can be neither denied nor perfectly known. When, therefore, we speak of any one of these three aspects of the subject, we must keep in mind the other two, or we shall fall into error or confusion. There can, consequently, be no dispute whether beauty be objective or subjective; it must be both, otherwise it could not be either.

In this metaphysical view of the subject, the author treats first of the Idea, secondly of the Form, and thirdly of the union of both.

The absolute idea, or the infinite, must, so to speak, be resolved into finite forms before it can be apprehended by finite minds. It can be seen only as it is revealed in parts, just as the Deity cannot be contemplated in his absolute nature, but must be resolved into attributes to be contemplated separately. Even the individual parts of beauty, the limited and relative forms which it assumes, are never revealed fully to us in any one object. They are to be found only in the infinite number of objects belonging to the same class. No one man represents the beauty of the species. This beauty, imperfect in every single instance, is infinitely repeated and varied. Its real perfection exists in two ways,

first in the unending series of actual forms, and secondly in the mind which can grasp this idea by an idealizing energy of its own.

The beautiful, objectively, is the appearance or manifestation of the beautiful in an individual outward form. Subjectively, it is the union of these two, the pure idea and its imperfect manifestation in the mind; or, more properly, the latter modified by an apprehension of the former.

The general idea of any kind of beauty is incapable of being made known directly as such. The medium of its manifestation is necessarily a definite individual form. But every such form carries with it, as a kind of luminous atmosphere, the idea of the beauty of the whole class to which it belongs. Mediatly, therefore, the generic idea is present to the mind of an artist with the particular form. In other words, by a natural mental process a subjective element is added to the objective. The mind seizes upon the original ground-plan of a particular form, sees that it has been interfered with by some obstacle that has been interposed. Some peculiarities are perceived not to have come from the original germ, but from hindrances that have prevented its complete development. These peculiarities are set aside, and the primitive plan is eliminated. The individualities arising from defects, the results of accident, are removed. A more generic type is brought out by this idealizing process, without which observation is more mechanical than artistic, and the mind more a machine than a soul alive with conceptions of the beautiful. Thus objective beauty is more defective than subjective, because more exclusively specific, or limited to some actual outward form. The true beauty is that which is both objective and subjective; which originates in the form, but receives its completion from a supplementary act of the mind, removing all accidental injuries by which the form has been marred, and restoring the parts so affected to their original design.

The idea, as applied to beauty and as used in art, is, therefore, very far from being an abstract idea, with which philosophy is chiefly concerned. The latter has no reality

corresponding to it. It is produced by combining together in the mind qualities which do not exist together in nature. In the beautiful the idea is the perfection of the concrete form. It is the image of what would have been realized had no accidental causes intervened to prevent it. It commences with the first act of nature, and carries out its intentions. The world of ideas, and consequently of beauty, begins with the living and most real things in nature, and rises by a spiritual agency to the highest freedom and perfection, whereas abstract ideas produce the birth of philosophy only by the death of nature.

The idea, with reference to organized forms, is generic, and the higher and more comprehensive the class, the fuller, other things being equal, is it of the elements of beauty. The idea may be regarded as that spiritual force, which restrains all the individual forms it creates within certain limits, and preserves the order of the vegetable and animal world. The highest idea is that which attains to personality. The animal is higher than the plant, and man is higher still. The highest beauty is personal, and all other beauty is more or less perfect as it approaches personality, or is preparatory to it and involved in it. Every individual idea embraces several parts which either coexist or follow each other in succession. The idea of vegetable life includes inorganic matter; that of animal life, the vegetable; and that of man includes them all. The gradations of beauty correspond herewith. In personal or spiritual beings, the beautiful and the good may be the same in substance, but, as will be shown hereafter, they are different in form.

A similar distinction exists between the true and the beautiful. Truth addresses itself to the understanding, and can be expressed only in logical forms. These forms are always abstractions, and never concrete things. The same thing may, under different aspects, be both true and beautiful, just as fruit may be both beautiful and sweet; but these two qualities are perceived through different media.

Form, as the individual appearance representing the idea,

must contain the whole generic idea of the class to which it belongs. While the species is fixed in its general characteristics, the individual is infinitely variable, being dependent on innumerable fortuitous circumstances. The species is the direct product of the divine idea, which would be uniform were it not for the operation of other causes. The accidents to which the material is liable produce the individual varieties of form. Beauty results from this play between the uniformity of the idea and the ever-changing individuality of the form. Therefore no exact canon of beauty can ever be laid down. No measurement or proportions can be given, from which minor deviations may not be a grace instead of deformity.

The statement of Plato and Aristotle, that beauty consists in unity in the midst of variety, where order and symmetry are preserved, embraces too much. All this is indeed true of the beautiful, but is not limited to it. The statement is in another sense too limited. While this enters into beauty, it does not constitute the whole of beauty. The same remark applies to the sensualistic school of English philosophers, who specify the proportions, the lines, and the kinds of surface which they regard as the essential characteristics of beauty. Such forms are not always beautiful, and there are, moreover, other forms, which are nevertheless beautiful. All these errors spring from contemplating the subject from an external point of view. It is only the unity of the *idea* that is essential to beauty. There may be a mathematical, moral, philosophical, mechanical, or natural unity, which, though accompanied with variety, may or may not be beautiful. Aristotle rightly limits the rule in respect to tragedy, and the remark applies equally to all works of art, that the object must have a given extent; that, if it be too small, it cannot be conspicuous enough to make the most favorable impression; and that, if it be too large, it cannot be clearly taken in at one view. Plato sometimes abandoned his own principle, that beauty was to be sought in the unity *within* an object, or an outward form as growing out of an inward principle, and spoke of it as consisting of certain external

characteristics, admitting of harmony indeed, but being also beautiful in themselves as single parts, prior to their composition according to the laws of harmony and proportion. This beauty he attributed directly to the idea underlying it, as though the idea could lend beauty to the form in any other way than by pervading it and giving it shape.

The English sensualists, abandoning the principle of internal unity, began on the outside, and made beauty to consist wholly in individual external characteristics, forgetting that these features are beautiful only in their concrete assemblage in objects, and that they are powerless alone; that symmetry may pertain to beauty, and yet of itself not constitute beauty. Around symmetrical forms must play the free and flowing lines of individuality, which are to be referred to an entirely different principle. These philosophers merely observe how certain objects affect the senses, without considering how the mind thus moved casts its own reflection back upon the object. Thus they do not go back of the external qualities of the object, which affect the senses to the inner idea, which is the cause that produces them. Such observations are, however, not without their use. Inadequate as they are to ground a theory upon, they belong to the subject, and have their place among other details. Hutcheson did not carry the sensualistic tendency to this extent, but in explaining the Platonic theory of unity in variety, he lost the spiritual point of view, fell from "unity" to "uniformity," and landed in a geometrical symmetry. Of course the crystalline forms were the most perfect, and to these the human form approached by having its members in equal pairs, and its different parts in mathematical proportions. He overlooks the fact that this only gives a skeleton around which the free and waving lines of beauty may be drawn. It is not the uniformity, but the mingling of it with accidental variety that constitutes beauty.

Hogarth, in his singular but not ungenial book, showed that the principle laid down by Hutcheson was nothing more than an indispensable condition of beauty. But he goes confusedly to work when he speaks of correctness, va-

riety, uniformity (as in mathematical parallels), simplicity, "or clearness," without any philosophic method or order.

As to his celebrated theory of "the waving line," there is a certain foreshadowing of a principle in it which deserves attention. This, when fully brought out and explained, is the line of individuality, or the line of variation, distinguishing the individual from the general type of its species. His theory is defective, in not showing how the waving line, which is but one ingredient in the composition of a figure, stands related to that other system explained by Hutcheson, and admitted as a part of a true theory by himself.

In Burke we find an anticipation of much that was afterwards said by Kant. He successfully controverted the point that beauty had its foundation in proportion. This only fixes the general type or essential form of the species, which is not in itself beautiful. There are certain limits beyond which the individual may not deviate; but within these limits deviations are among the sources of beauty. Individuals of the same proportions may differ widely in beauty, and those of equal beauty may differ widely in proportions. A figure of exact proportions may be ugly, and one whose proportions are not exact may be attractive. The male and female form differ in their proportions, and yet both may be beautiful. The cause of beauty is not in quantitative proportions, but in *quality*. The opposite of beauty is not disproportion, but ugliness. The former is opposed to completeness and correctness of form. Proportion is only a negative condition of beauty. Without it there cannot be beauty; with it there may or there may not be beauty. Had Burke pursued this line of investigation to its last results, he would have made important contributions to the science. But he fell into the worst sort of sensualism, into a physiological view of the effect which objects make upon the nervous system, confounding the agreeable with the beautiful. Lord Kaimes so confounds ideas of utility with those of beauty, as to destroy the value of his speculations for philosophical purposes. All these systems are faulty, partly because they include much that does not belong to

beauty, and partly because they omit much that does belong to it.

Beauty does, indeed, as Plato taught, appear in color, but not as a single color, which is simply agreeable, nor as a combination of colors merely, but this as existing, or appearing to exist on the surface of a body. Form, too, is beautiful not merely as such, but when it presupposes a body expressive of an idea, or has itself life, action, and expression.

Any other attempt to find out the fundamental principle of beauty than that of studying the specific manner in which the uniform type of the species is blended with the variable and accidental individual form, will prove fruitless. Here let it be observed, that both the generic idea and the individual form pass through a series of gradations from the lower and more defective to the higher and more perfect, for each of which there must be a different standard of beauty. The utmost confusion has resulted from overlooking this obvious truth. Burke well observes that each kind of beauty has its own peculiar relations. He failed however to point out how every grade presents a rich variety of definite forms, as well as to recognize the gradation itself.

It might hence appear that the whole matter might be rendered simple and plain, by establishing for each kind a separate, independent standard. But just in proportion as regularity increases in the ascending series from the lower to the higher orders of existence, the free play of the accidental causes which produce marked individuality, increases. In man we have greater uniformity in the proportions of the figure, and in the distribution of the members of the body, than in the lower animals. Hence artists have often laid down particular canons for the proportions of the human body. No animal varies so much in outward form as a plant or tree. But with a general outward uniformity in man, there is an internal individuality and variety of temperament and of character, which give peculiarity of expression in an almost infinite degree.

But we pass to speak of the union of the idea and the

form. Between the archetype and the outward form representing it, there are accidental influences that disturb the order of nature, and prevent the former from being realized in the latter. We see a marked example of this when a frost appears in May, and injures the blossoms and flowers. In most cases the injury, though not less real, is less perceptible. These collisions of the laws of nature, belonging to entirely different spheres, such as the laws of physics, and the laws of vegetable and animal life, are of constant occurrence. The recognition of this disturbing force of accident is necessary even in other sciences, but especially in the science of the beautiful.

The error of Baumgarten in the treatment of this general subject is, that with him the idea, instead of being a living formative principle in nature, ever reproducing the species within the limits of its primitive type, was degraded to the rank of a lifeless, unreal abstraction, a thing that does not exist at all in nature, but has its being only in the mind of the philosopher. This abstract idea, as entertained by Baumgarten, included the end for which an object was made. On such a theory, as Kant justly remarked, nothing could appear beautiful until the purpose for which it was made was understood, a consideration that lies quite out of the sphere of the beautiful. It was furthermore affirmed by Kant, that the end for which a thing was made, was not to be sought out of itself, in something else to which it is subordinated as a means, but within itself. Had he proceeded one step further, and connected the end for which each object was made with its visible appearance as pleasing to the eye, he would have seen that there is in nature a true foundation for objective beauty. As it was, he failed to make that discovery. His strength, therefore, does not lie in this direction, but in the clear analysis of the subjective element of beauty. This element, which was true only in connection with the objective as its necessary counterpart, being separated from that, led directly to the idealism of Fichte, according to which beauty has no existence except in the mind. Schiller's excellent treatises are founded upon

the philosophy of Kant. But his artistic mind seized upon that theory in its nearest approximation to the truth. Consequently, in his discussions as well as in all his poetry, he blended the real with the ideal, form with substance, freedom with necessity, and the finite with the infinite.

Schelling was the first clearly to open the way to a new and more comprehensive philosophy of the beautiful, by insisting on the union of the ideal and the real. This principle was carried out by Solger in his system of aesthetics. Going back to the doctrine of Kant, that an object has its end within itself, he maintained that a living thing, being formed according to its design or end, does not fall *without the circle* of the species to which it belongs. The individual is but the realization of the idea in a material form, and this constitutes its beauty. Had he not satisfied himself with the general statement that an individual form is beautiful because it is the expression of an idea, but added that the expression must be *pure and faultless*, he would have hit exactly upon the true principle of beauty. Indeed, he seems, at times, by accident as it were, to say almost as much as this. "Beauty," he says, "is the indwelling of the idea in individual forms in all its normal varieties." This variety is nothing but the general type, differently developed. The idea, or primitive form, is the standard of all its varieties. "Beauty is that pure union of essence and form which finds its perfect expression in an individual; or it is the perfect interpenetration of the idea and the visible form." Thus he was the first to develop a complete system of aesthetics from a single principle, comprehending all the parts separately treated by others. The view to which he was verging, without quite reaching it, is that in which the defect in Plato's system of ideas is supplied by connecting with it Aristotle's true principle of the reality of ideas as founded on the *reality of things*. The defect of both systems is remedied by the element of subjective beauty, established upon a firm basis by Kant and succeeding philosophers. These, then, are the three points which may now be considered as settled: 1. The ideas or types of things

precede the existence of material forms, which is the Platonic element. 2. Those ideas or types are accessible to us only through the medium of material forms, which is the doctrine of Aristotle. 3. There is in the human mind an innate or natural idea of *perfection* in respect to form, by which it is enabled, under given circumstances, to remove, in its own conceptions, all the actual defects that are found in natural objects. This is the part of Kant's theory of subjective beauty which is now, with good reason, generally adopted as true.

What needed still further elucidation was the way in which the primitive type impresses itself upon the individual, or, as Plato would say, the idea upon the form. The individual truly represents the species, and in fact is the product of it, or of that energy which works in and through it. The producing cause, as a fixed order of creation, is permanent, but the conditions of its activity are occasional. Whenever all the necessary conditions exist, the cause is always operative. In the lower orders of being, individual peculiarities are, for our purpose, less important. In the higher orders, especially in those in which mind is manifested, individual peculiarities increase just in proportion as the representation of the species approaches completeness in the individual. The more nearly the whole species is revealed in the individual, the more marked is the individuality. Shakspeare is highly individual, because his mind is so generic in its character. The human character of Christ differs from all other human characters in that everything truly human in others finds something answering to it in him. He who unites in himself the greatest number of individualities existing separately in others, is himself the most individual and unique. While in some one respect he resembles a greater number of men than others do, he differs from them all more than they differ from each other. His individuality consists in the rare assemblage of qualities, blended in him in a peculiar manner, which places him far above others.

In vegetable life the individual is more dependent on

numbers for artistic effect, as with the verdure of the fields, the flowers of a garden, or the trees of a forest; or on being properly associated with other objects. A tree, in order to be represented by an artist, must be associated with something else, whereas the picture of a man may stand alone. Animals will bear to be represented alone, but have their full effect only when represented in connection with man.

We have said that the imagination must remove from beautiful objects all imperfection. We may add that it is equally necessary that it view things, not in their real, but in their artistic connections. Those things must be grouped together which give harmony and unity to the effect. As it is with the appearance only that we are here concerned, the grouping is not actual and physical, but exists merely for the eye. In a landscape, things that exist together in nature, and are even connected in respect to utility, often need to be separated in art. A quarry that furnishes stone, or a slough that furnishes manure, is useful to the husbandman, but is not available to the artist. Again, things are not to be viewed with reference to their physical qualities chiefly. The clearest skin has impurities, which, if seen, would be disagreeable to the eye. A beautiful tree has insects living upon it, which do not disturb us because they are unnoticed. Here a proper distance preserves that appearance of beauty which a microscopic view would destroy. The internal structure is to be excluded both from the sight and the imagination. When we see a fine head, we do not wish to think of what the dissector's knife would reveal, but that part merely which the sculptor would represent. That which is within must in some way show itself on the surface before it deserves the artist's consideration. Thus the eye and the countenance may be expressive of a healthy physical condition, or of intelligence and emotion. Hence a twofold purification of form is necessary, first from all accidental blemishes, and secondly from such conceptions of internal organization as occur to the mind of a naturalist. Göthe and Schiller were the first to set this forth in all its importance. The latter says: "It is the object of art to an-

nihilate matter through form." Hegel as enigmatically and as truly says: "The ideal sets its foot into the real, into nature, but immediately withdraws it again."

If pure form, or the complete harmony existing between the outward object and the idea which it represents, constitutes the essence of beauty, then the difference between the beautiful and the good is plainly distinguishable. The good aims to give reality to that which does not now exist; and when a good act is accomplished, we consider its character merely, and not its *appearance*, as in beauty. The more splendor and show there are in a moral act, the more suspicious we are that it is not genuine. Solger truly says: "In the activity of the will, wherein the goodness of an act lies, the result, so far as it manifests itself in *appearance*, is of no consequence. Only as it is *in reality* conformed to the divine idea, has it any worth." Wirth, therefore, in his system of speculative ethics, properly places morality far above art. The former realizes its object only by strenuous and repeated efforts of the will, whereas the latter appears as a work of magic. The former achieves its work by overcoming all the obstacles to virtue in the whole world of experience, while the latter creates its ideal at once, receiving its impulse from a single specimen of beauty. Morality has a much more earnest character, a deeper penetration, and a wider range. Its work is never finished; and for the very reason that it is still in the act, it is capable of representation. The highest beauty of a moral character is seen while the struggle against evil is going on, and is consequently unfinished. But it is the weakness of the *bel esprit* to loosen beauty entirely from its connection with morality. The wit finds beauty in his own brilliant sallies, which scorn the restraints of morality. But beauty of character *presupposes* morality, and is one of its accidental aspects. Now to dispense wholly with that which is necessarily presupposed as a condition, is an absurdity in philosophy. This mistake is not made by men of the greatest genius. They, unconsciously perhaps, have in the background morality, towering high like a distant mountain-range, in com-

parison with which the mere rules of art are trivial and insignificant.

There is a certain dualism in morals. That which is, and that which ought to be, are in conflict. There was an original harmony, a state of primeval innocence; and the result of the successful struggle will be a restored harmony. Of these three states, primitive innocence, the moral struggle, and the final victory, morality is chiefly concerned with the second. Beauty has something to do with all the three, but is most concerned with the first and the last. This shows both the connection between the beautiful and the good, and the difference there is between them. The good furnishes the substance or matter on which beauty rests as its drapery. The good is the bony frame of the body; beauty is its soft flesh and covering.

There are other illustrations of the dependence of the beautiful on the good. If the matter of a poem be bad, morally corrupt, it will show itself in the plan and structure. So it is in Göthe's questionable works. The want of a sound moral basis is the grand fault of Wieland's frivolous spirit. Says Schiller: "I am persuaded that a work of art is accountable only to itself, or rather is subject to the laws of beauty alone, and that no other demand can be made upon it. But I believe as firmly that by following the laws of beauty, it will mediate satisfy all other demands, that beauty itself will harmonize perfectly with all truth. The artist may seek first for the beautiful, and be sure that all other good things will come of themselves."

We must next consider, a little more at length, the nature and origin of the subjective element of beauty. After discussing the general principle of beauty, we found it necessary to examine it in its manifestation in individual objects. But this implies a subject to whom the manifestation is made, a person with organs of sense in whose mind the idea of beauty is awakened by the object. Beauty waits for its complement in the mind of the beholder. Ruge, in his admirable analysis, has shown that there can be no beauty but in the union of object and subject, just as, in arithme-

tic, two factors are necessary to a product. The material objects which produce in the mind the idea of pure form exist, indeed, in themselves; but they are beautiful only to a mind in which the idea of beauty, or a capacity for it, already exists. Hence he aptly remarks: "Beauty is like a draft payable *at sight*. It appears in its completeness only at the moment it is honored." A thing is pronounced beautiful when it is seen. Apart from sight it is merely an outward, but as yet inoperative, cause of the idea of beauty. From those senses which act by contact, and produce mere sensation, as touch, taste, and smell, beauty is excluded. It pertains to the senses of sight and hearing, because both are productive, not only of sensations, but of ideas. When, like the other three senses, they give merely agreeable sensations without sentiment, the objects which affect them are agreeable, but they are not beautiful. The two artistic senses present their objects, not as gross matter, acting physically upon them, but as form standing out distinctly before the mind for contemplation. The beauty which is addressed to the mind through the ear, as in music and poetry, has form and proportion, although the parts do not appear simultaneously, but in succession. These nobler senses are internal as well as external, and therefore can present imaginary as well as real objects. Objects of sight, though absent, can exist in the imagination; and we can hear music and poetry mentally, without the intervention of sound.

In organized beings, the distinctness of the ideal form is nothing but the transparency of the object revealing the in-working and indwelling idea. This idea comes out of the object, as it were, to meet the mind; and the mind, in turn, seeks for it in the object. When the idea and form are so blended as to appear in harmony, the result is what we call grace of form. The beautiful does not produce its effect upon the sense as such. Beauty has to do with the mind, and the sense is merely the mediator between the object and the mind. The idea which is embodied in the object meets, through the sense, with a corresponding idea slumbering, or existing potentially in the mind, and by awakening this ef-

fects the union of external and internal, of objective and subjective beauty. Ruge observes, that the idea which is expressed in outward form is beauty. But an idea expressed is an idea received. Whether we say that beauty is the idea going from the object to the mind, or from the mind to the object, we say the truth; but the whole truth is, that it is both. No perfect beauty comes from without; every beautiful form needs the perfecting act of the mind. The aesthetic state of the mind is that in which there is a perfect reflection of the ideal form of the object.

In order to make this principle perfectly clear, it will be necessary to go still further into particulars. In the part which the imagination has to act in rendering beauty perfect, we begin with an objective cause of beauty, with a beautiful object; but the mind instinctively enhances the beauty of the object, and renders it perfect by idealizing it. Beauty is not only imperfect, and often almost as transient as a gleam of light upon a landscape, but it is relative to the state of the mind. The mind is not always in a poetic mood, or highly susceptible of ideas of beauty. It needs, at times, to be seized, as it were, by a beautiful object, that the imagination may be aroused and put into a genial state. The mind must observe such an object with the eye of genius in order to observe it truly. The object must be seen in its ideal as well as real form. Its imperfections must be removed by a corrective principle or impulse received from nature itself, and not originating in any fancy or conceit of ours. It must be viewed not merely as it is, which would make an artist a mere copyist, — but as it would have been, had it never in its whole history been subject in the least degree to any unfavorable influences. The process of idealization must begin with an impulse received from the object. When the mind so affected passes to the contemplation of another beautiful object, it comes to it in a favorable state. It sees all things through a poetic medium. But this subjective state, which idealizes all beautiful forms, was itself produced by objective beauty. Thus following out the impulse of nature, the mind is true to nature. No natural

object is perfectly beautiful ; yet it truly exists as a beautiful object, and has the power of acting upon the mind in such a way as to produce in it an ideal or perfect image as its counterpart. While the mind is a mirror that gives back nature, it at the same time mingles with the images which it reflects the soft tints of the setting sun.

I look upon a person evidently formed by nature for beauty, but some unfortunate accident has checked or limited his physical development. I have the power to see in him what he would have been but for this misfortune. The image existing in my mind is not independent of the form which gave rise to it, nor is it an exact copy of that form. It is the joint result of the form and of the activity of my imagination. Thus my mind is both receptive and creative at the same time. What I create is different from what I see, and yet is dictated by it. Says Göthe, " whoever really seizes a beautiful object in nature, makes it his own by an artistic act of the imagination.

To avoid misapprehension, we must remark, by the way, that the imagination has another and higher office. The images of objects thus received and thus idealized, sink into the abyss of the mind and are lost ; but they afterwards reappear in the form of new creations. Images are to the imagination what words are to the intellect ; they are its language. As the impassioned orator instinctively combines letters, syllables, and words which he had before learned, so the artist uses the images with which his mind is stored, in giving form to his ideal creations.

We have thus far taken a metaphysical view of aesthetics, and given an analysis of beauty, resolving it into its objective and subjective elements. To prevent misunderstanding in respect to the application of this theory of the beautiful, it will be useful to take a rapid survey of the physical world, to see how its different parts stand connected with our subject. Here it will be found that the science of aesthetics and the natural sciences go hand in hand. The union of these sciences in the same person would be required to give a complete physiognomy of nature.

The forms of the various classes of organized objects lie widely scattered in space and time, or are in a state of confusion in the same space and time. But limitation and unity are essential to beauty. The universe is too large to be seen aesthetically. Even the imagination cannot compass it. Our senses impose a limitation. Only that which can be taken in at one view can be pronounced beautiful. Hence only a fragment of what is indefinitely spread out in space, can be seen at once, and this must be arranged in order around some one central point. The same is true of history, stretching out through many ages. Hence time must also be limited, so that all the events may be simultaneously comprehended by the mind; and in a work of art these must constitute a harmonious whole. There are happy points in space, and happy moments in history in which a beautiful fragment is thrown before the eye in a manner that is to us purely accidental. From a certain point of view a perfect landscape is seen. Change your position and the unity and proportion are lost. There are certain points in history, hinges of great events, where the fortunes of a people are concentrated. These furnish themes for the dramatist and poet. Accident, therefore, is the first artist, nature's great artist, and man, seizing upon it, and using its bold, rough sketches, becomes himself an artist.

The formative idea appears most perfectly in personal existence. It also appears in individual beings that fall short of personality. In matter not formed into individual organized beings, there can be only a dim foreshadowing of ideas, as it is preparatory or relative to them. Minerals, indeed, have the limitation necessary to beauty; but as they are lifeless and motionless, they, of themselves, hardly belong to the class of objects properly called beautiful. The whole world of inorganic matter seems too far removed from life and personality to be beautiful, except as it is subordinated to something else, and comes in as a means to a higher end. Add plants, trees, animals, and man, and then inorganic nature comes in as a condition of existence, as a necessary background. Still, when parts of lifeless nature are so combined as

to produce action and reaction, and to constitute a larger organism, as a scene of land, water, clouds, and light, with their waving motions and varying hues, they produce an artistic impression. Indeed, whatever strikingly *resembles* personality, individuality, organic unity of action and form, partakes so far of the beautiful. The secret powers of nature may be conceived of poetically, as living beings, as they were by the Greeks who deified them, and thus be rendered beautiful in imagination. In all these and other similar instances, the subjective element of beauty is very prominent, that is, the beauty which the creative fancy brings to the object.

Light is to be regarded rather as a condition than as an object of beauty. By light and shade we discover the outlines of objects, and give a certain connection to those that are grouped together. By the management of light a figure is separated from a dark background and set forth in bold relief. Light, proceeding from the point of the observer, gives prominence to the nearer objects, and throws the more distant ones into greater obscurity; or coming towards the beholder, subdues the tone of the nearer objects by throwing the side towards him into the shade, and thereby separating them from the illuminated ground. By a unity of light, the separate figures of a group are made to appear as parts of a whole. By double lights this unity may be relaxed, and yet preserved, in a lower degree, by the predominance of one light over the other. Thus light has a modelling or plastic power, and, as such, is a means of beauty, an important instrument of art. Light, moreover, in a certain dependence upon other objects, is itself beautiful. The sun, moon, and stars are beautiful more on account of the poetical conceptions which they awaken, than as single physical objects. We associate certain magical and personal qualities with the sun and the moon. The stars, too, viewed not astronomically, which would give their actual distribution in space, but aesthetically, which is an optical illusion, present a broad canvas full of illuminations and transparencies. Light also gives coloring to the seasons, to different days and nights, to morning, noon, and evening. There is, fur-

thermore, the play of gleams of light, its reflection, and transparencies, giving it a magic and apparently vital power.

Colors are separate parts of light, and charm, not so much by themselves as by being attached to the surface of bodies, and appearing as a part of them. So color appears in flowers and fruits, and in the plumage of birds. The mind lends to physical colors a certain symbolical import, and they often please by association. Hence, the beauty of colors is partly objective and partly subjective. A single color, without the variety produced by outline and contrast, might be agreeable, but would hardly be beautiful. The principal charm of colors lies in their artistic combination.

In the motion of water, whether running, pouring, or undulating, the waving line resembles that which constitutes the grace of living forms. Lines in themselves, though they may be agreeable, can be called truly beautiful only as they mark the surface of bodies. Bodies bounded by certain lines are beautiful. In a sketch or outline, the imagination supplies the body of which the drawing is but a symbol.

The lines which mark the forms of water are, if beautiful, always easy and graceful deviations from mathematical forms. The smooth surface of the ocean, whose shore is not seen, is a desert; but it becomes beautiful when seen winding around its shore. The free and irregular undulation of water, its graceful and ever-changing motion, its breaking and combing waves; or its clear and pellucid nature in tranquil lakes, its enchanting border of shore and trees, and winding hills, its play of light, and its mirrored forms, give it a fancied vitality, and render it attractive as a kind of organism, as well as from its various relations to man.

To the forms of the earth, its mountains, crags, hills, valleys and plains, the same general principle applies. The mineral masses furnish the only individual forms, which approximate to organic nature, by the laws of crystalization. But its laws are mechanical, its lines and angles uniform and mathematical. They are totally deficient in the rounded and varying forms of organic life. The beauty of a mineral does not spring from its essential form, but from

its accidental qualities of flashing light, transparency, and color.

Plants are the lowest forms of *organic nature*, and are the first in which beauty has a positive seat without the magical influence of the imagination. Here is the first *real* individuality. It is an end for which other things exist. Earth, water, heat, air, and light are its ministers. But wanting a soul, and being bound fast to the earth with but limited action and motion, the individuality of the plant is much lower than that of an animal. Still in its growth, and health, and successive changes, and susceptibility of injuries, it rises far above the crystal. It approaches towards animal and even human life. It has its laws of form, and also its thousand graceful deviations. Its fixed laws are those of the perpendicular direction of the trunk, the horizontal direction of the branches with definite angles, the regular position of the leaves, the rotundity of the trunk and branches, and the round, oval, or conical form of the crown. But to how many accidental varieties is it subject? The constant change and even loss of certain of its parts, as flowers, seeds, and leaves; the variable mass of its foliage; the slight deviations from mathematical proportions, the individual forms and motions of the leaves, and the infinite diversity of contour, give to trees and plants the loose and flowing lines of grace. To all this is added the charm of an infinite variety and blending of colors, which is apparent in the bark and foliage, but reaches its perfection in the blossoms and fruit. Besides the individual beauty of trees, there is another kind of beauty in the grouping of them, in the mixture of different kinds, and the relief furnished by rounded hills, and valleys, and the contrast between the forest or grove and cultivated fields.

In the *animal* there is a living and animating spirit. It is an individual that lives and acts for itself, and uses the various means provided for its sustenance and support. It is itself a living centre of action, and moves in obedience to its own will. If plants give beauty to the naked earth by their rich and varied drapery, animals, by their presence, heighten that beauty. There is a bird to sit and sing in the branches

of the tree, a goat to climb the rocks and feed upon shrubs, wild animals to fill the forest, lowing herds to crop the grass or lie in the fields, fishes to glide through the smooth waters, and a winged creation, from the eagle to the insect, to fill the air. The wonderful structure of the animal is highly complex compared with that of the plant. Without the majestic elevation of the tree, it has organs of the body adapted to a great variety of motions. Not only is the form in itself rounded and well proportioned, but it is infinitely varied by movement and action. Back of the motions themselves, lie passions and various mental operations, which bring the animal much nearer than plants to man in sympathy.

In *man* is summed up all the complex perfection of form, the elements of which are scattered through all lower orders of animals. Nature seems, by a succession of efforts, to have ascended, step by step, from the lowest order of living beings till it crowned its work by reaching perfection in man. In him beauty exists in its highest perfection. We can never go beyond the human in form. Even spiritual beings must be clothed in human forms by the artist. In man the correspondence between the inward spirit and outward form, is more perfect than in any other being. In human consciousness the formative idea is most perfectly manifested, shining, as it does, through the human form. Such a perfect expression of the spiritual, beaming from the eye, from every feature, and from the whole mien and bearing of the person, produces a higher order of beauty than any that has been hitherto noticed. It is the soul, intellect, will, inclinations, passions, sentiment—that give beauty to the human face and human form.

The individual springs from the people, and is affected by race, nationality, climate, occupation, government, moral state and culture. Both body and mind are subject to these influences. No animal is capable of receiving so many peculiarities from the circumstances of its birth and training. Temperament, intellect, feeling, what is original and what is acquired, exert a moulding influence over those parts of the body which have the greatest power of expression. In the

whole structure of the body, as thick or lank, elastic or heavy, compact or loose, there is ordinarily to be observed something which fits it to be the companion of the mind. Without the possibility of any exact science in respect to the form of the head or face, as furnishing the means of prognostication, on account of the innumerable variations from accidental causes, there is, for aesthetic purposes, a world of meaning in the forms of this leading organ of the body. Still more definite is the language of the soul as expressed in the general mein and action of the body. This is observed partly in the ease and grace of conventional signs, and partly in the unconscious peculiarities of posture and movement, which are natural symbols of the workings of the spirit within. The same outgoing of the soul is observed in the quality, volume, tone, and pitch of the voice. How the passions, love, hate, pity, terror, shame and the like, paint themselves on the face, and send a corresponding influence through all the nerves of the body, is known to every one. By habit, the muscular expression of these various feelings may become fixed; and on this principle certain kinds of beauty may be traced to character. But we cannot further enlarge upon a topic so wide in its range.

Thus, instead of running hastily over the numerous subjects discussed in this voluminous work, we have given a tolerably full view of one selected from the whole number. The task was a difficult one, and may not have been accomplished with perfect success. We have, as far as possible, left out the Hegelian form and the Hegelian terminology of the original. In translating the language of philosophy into common language, there is, of course, some sacrifice both of system and of accuracy. Besides, it has been a matter of great difficulty to recast and put into one continuous train of thought, a series of abstract propositions and a large body of explanatory notes, broken up into innumerable fragmentary forms. This will sufficiently explain, as we hope, the occasional repetitions and want of strict connection in our statement of the author's theory. So far as this theory is founded upon the Hegelian philosophy, we regard it as unsound.

But its leading aesthetic principles may be engrafted upon almost any of the systems of the spiritual philosophy, which prevail in the present century. The effects which the author attributes to the power of an idea, or primal spiritual type of things, others may attribute to the Deity continually reproducing his works after one comprehensive, unchangeable plan. Then the plan of the creation existing in the divine mind, will take the place of ideas, and the power of God ever exerted in producing living things after their kind, will take the place of the energy of a formative idea, or of the power of the species in keeping all the individuals belonging to it within certain limits. We must confess, however, that, while we see much to admire in the theory, we are not quite satisfied with it. Whether the beauty of inorganic forms is sufficiently explained by saying that they bear some analogy to living organic forms, and that their beauty is inferior because the objects themselves are only analogous to the latter, may be questioned. In the lowest organizations we are to expect only the lowest order of beauty. The author admits that a poor specimen of a higher class of beings is inferior to a good one of a lower class. On the same principle, he must admit that inorganic beauty is sometimes superior to that of even highly organized forms.

He meets the most obvious objections to which his theory is exposed by saying that beauty is not the direct aim of organic life, and that the idea of utility is almost universally realized, while that of beauty is but rarely realized. Furthermore, utility attends every step of the life of living things, whereas beauty is limited to the brief moment of the flowering period. The facts are undeniable. Do they leave the theory in its full integrity? Or is the alleged limitation possibly a *contradictio in adjecto*? We cannot resist the conviction that this point needs further discussion. If some great writer should yet appear who should advance upon this author as much as he has advanced upon Plotinus, and in the same direction, the public mind would be satisfied that, if there is not yet a clear and well-established theory of the beautiful, there is a very hopeful movement in that way.

ARTICLE II.

UNION OF THE DIVINE AND THE HUMAN IN THE EXTERNALS OF CHRISTIANITY.

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It is the object of this Article to trace and illustrate *the mingling of the divine and the human in some of the externals of Christianity.*

Christianity does indeed, as a life in the soul, work itself out in external results, in which results and process also there is a certain blending of the divine and the human. But it is not this part of its exterior which we are to consider. In addition to these lodgements of Christianity in the domain of sense, standing between Christians and the world, there are lodgements in it, standing between them and God, channels through which he communicates spiritual good. Among these are the Sacred Scriptures, the Church, and the Sacraments. It is the vital union of the agency of God and the agency of man in the production of this section of our religion, which furnishes the object and scope of this discussion.

It may be readily admitted by all, that there is some connection between these two agencies, in the sphere contemplated; that God furnishes an element, and man an element, in these externals. At the same time, there is no very general definite conception of the way in which these diverse forces work together to secure the desired result; nor in what proportions; nor to what extent; nor where the one leaves off, and the other begins. Some give the superiority to the divine agency, and only a subordinate, mechanical agency to the human. Others reverse the order, magnifying man's part, and depreciating God's. Others conceive of them as acting side by side, conspiring to one result, but disconnected, with an unappreciable but real gulf between them; and others, as consecutive, joining together, or seeming to do

so, — for they do not absolutely touch — endwise ; the one doing its part, and abruptly terminating, and then the other taking up the work and finishing it.

The true conception, as we shall endeavor to show, is very unlike any of these. According to this, the divine and the human interpenetrate and blend dynamically, in the production of the established outward elements and facts of Christianity between God and man, but in such a way that neither loses its nature or integrity. Neither overlies or crushes the freedom of the other. Each acts, and acts freely, according to its own laws ; and yet both act together, interpenetrating but not fusing, one but two, two but one. The divine agency is everywhere present, but it does not extinguish or overshadow or crowd the human ; and the human is equally present, but it does no violence to the divine. The divine is in the human, yet is not lost in it ; the human is in the divine, yet it is still human. Their union is vital, not mechanical.

Its type is the union of the Son of God and the Son of man in Christ. He is the great fundamental, external element of Christianity between God and man ; and in him perfect and complete divinity and perfect and complete humanity, each in its integrity, meet and blend in one person. The divinity does not exclude everything corporeal, and make the life of Christ a continued theophany ; that is Docetism.¹ It does not crowd out the rational human soul ; that is Apollinarianism.² The divinity and the humanity, though side by side and joined by contact, are not separate and independent ; that is Nestorianism.³ The divinity does not absorb the humanity, so that the two, though distinct and separate in origin, are in manifestation confounded, having but one nature as well as one person ; that is Eustychianism,⁴ or the Monophysite doctrine. Nei-

¹ Neander, *Church History*, Vol. I. p. 386 ; Hase, *Church History*, § 37 ; Hagenbach, *History of Doctrines*, § 98.

² Hase, § 104 ; Hagenbach, § 99.

³ Neander, Vol. II. p. 450 ; Hase, § 113 ; Hagenbach, § 100.

⁴ Neander, Vol. II. p. 506 ; Hase, § 114 ; Hagenbach, § 101.

ther does the humanity expel the divinity, and leave Christ a mere man, however miraculously endowed; that is Socinianism.¹ Nor does it, in any way, emphasize itself at the expense of the divinity, producing a doctrine lying anywhere between the wide extremes of the highest Unitarianism and the lowest Rationalism. All these errors, one after another, has the church thrown off as unscriptural and unsound, as it has steadily but slowly gravitated through the conflicts of opinion towards the true doctrine, under the influence of the Spirit, who is promised² to guide into the whole circle of gospel truth; and it rests in the position that both natures interpenetrate and coöperate, each in its integrity, in a living, personal union. The divinity and the humanity are fused into one person, not one nature, in such a way that, without substantial change, in either, of any kind, of addition or abatement, the divinity is divinity still; the humanity, humanity still.

With what propriety, therefore, are the subordinate, impersonal, external elements of Christianity, the institutions between God and men for the delivery of spiritual blessings from the former to the latter, produced in a similar way, by a vital union and coöperation of divine and human forces; each losing nothing of its identity or individuality. They are, in this respect, like their Head—and it is meet. In them, as in Christ, two diverse forces, a divine and a human, coalesce and retain their individuality, by one of those mysterious vital processes by which elements of a different kind are taken up and held together in a living union.

But there is something more than correspondence and propriety, that furnishes the ground for this mingling of the divine and the human in these outward and established elements of the gospel. The ground is deeper, and is substantially the same—with the exception of the relation of this latter to an atonement—as led to the incarnation of the Son of God. “The fact of God’s becoming man,” says Neander,³ is in order to the humanization of the divine, and the

¹ Hase, § 372; Hagenbach, § 234.

² John 16 : 13.

³ Church History, Vol. I. p. 507.

deification of the human ;" by which he evidently does not mean a result involving the loss or absorption of the properties of either the divine or the human — his whole theology precludes this supposition — but their most intimate union, under a vital bond. It is the very object of religion itself to bridge over the separation between God and man. It is evident, therefore, that, while one of the piers must be in heaven, and the other on the earth, there must be a mingling of the divine and human agencies by which the material structures are thrown over from the one to the other. There is, thus, in the highway between the parties, along which devout exercises and gracious influences are intended to travel up and down, something belonging to each of them, blended inseparably together ; a symbol of the nature of the gospel itself ; a prophecy of its results. It would be unnatural and incongruous, a procedure torn away from the analogy and fitness of things in the kingdom of God, if he should cause the organs of communication between him and men to be, either wholly the product of one of the parties, or of the two joining their efforts mechanically and separably ; so that, on the one side or the other, the communication should fall bluntly upon a channel, in origin and structure wholly unlike itself ; — the influences from God, issuing from the world of pure spirit, and abruptly striking on organs entirely human ; or the aspirations and exercises of man, impinging suddenly on media having nothing human about them, nothing to graduate and ease the transition. These externals must be born of God, that the Spirit of God may be at home on them ; of man, that he may find in them his own kindred ; of God and man, in vital concert, that there may be no difficult and abrupt transition from the part contributed by the one to that by the other, defeating or impairing either of these results.

The ground of this union, therefore, is in the nature and object of religion itself, which is, to unite God and man.

There is an additional reason for this union. It lies in the effectiveness of the instrumentalities. There must be a divine element in them to win respect, confidence, rev-

erence, and secure permanence. If only man appeared in their production, they could have no hold on the heart of the race. We could see in them no binding force, no authority, no special advantage. They would be simply towers which men have erected towards heaven, the tops of which we could see, and should see that they do not lodge in it. We should spurn them, and laugh at the folly of those hoping to ascend thither in that way. The consequence would be, each would erect his own tower; and though we, standing under it, might not see its top, others would, and would pass it by. We should say: We want something to be the organs, and give assurance of the presence, of a Power able to raise us above ourselves naturally, to a better estate; these are man's creations, playthings; we cannot trust our immortal hopes to them; away with them.

Equally necessary is a human element to awaken sympathy, and attract. The weak, shy, perverse faith of man would be slow indeed to approach God over organs wholly unhuman and uncongenial. It needs to be drawn "with cords of a *man*, with bands of love."¹ Men would not contemplate passing abruptly from human to divine instrumentalities, without a chill and a shudder. If the bridge between God and them confronted them with a dazzling divine end, few would have the boldness to place their feet on it, or approach it. A human look is necessary to win, and a real human element to retain sympathy.

These two elements must blend together and be inseparable, else the purpose for which they exist will be defeated. The divine will be repulsive, the human without authority; and men will separate them, throwing away the human as spurious, an addition, a worthless fabrication, and shunning the divine as bald, cold, awful. They must both intertwine, and interpenetrate, and grow together in the product, as the different elements in a living organism lap around and embrace one another, and are inseparable save by its destruction. The one is necessary to give character,

¹ Hosea 11: 4.

the other attraction; and as character without attraction is ineffective, so is attraction without character. And when both blend in these externals, causing them to be at once truly divine and truly human, they are influential,—commanding respect and winning. They are of men, and men can approach them; but they cannot trifle with them, for they are seen to be of God also. They are of God, and men reverence them; for they are of men also.

Thus, to make these elements of Christianity designed for its conservation and diffusion effective, this union is necessary.

It is evident from what has been said, that any misconception or misplacement of the relation of the two agencies employed in their production, must be attended with fatal consequences. And one of the permanent problems for solution is their right adjustment and equilibrium in faith and practice. If undue emphasis is laid on either side, the delicate balance which God intended to be maintained between them is disturbed; and as most persons seem to be constituted with an inability to grasp equally both poles of a dual fact, this tendency is constantly occurring; few have that largeness of faith and comprehension which enables them to do equal justice to both sides. A similar divergence from the centre is observable here, as in relation to the doctrines of grace. We have, in these externals of Christianity, a Calvinism and an Arminianism, Augustinism and Pelagianism, Divinism and Rationalism, Fanaticism and Indifferentism. Some crowd out the divine element, and leave only a hollow, unsubstantial human residue; that is Rationalism. Others expel the human, and leave only the divine, which they almost worship,—as the Ephesians did the image of Diana, which they alleged “fell down from Jupiter;”¹ that is Divinism. Between these there are intermediate shades of opinion of almost every hue. All persons, however, are not consistent with themselves. Some maintain the just balance in relation to the

¹ Acts 19: 35.

word of God, and disturb it in the church. Some magnify the divine element too much in the church and the sacraments, and curtail it unduly in the scriptures. Some claim too much for God in baptism, and not enough in the Supper. Others preserve the proper wedlock in the scriptures and the church, and effect a divorce by carrying the human relatively too far in all beyond it. And others jostle the just equipoise in each of the externals, but in no two in a similar manner, or to the same extent.

It is the peculiarity of the view we present, that it preserves throughout the just balance and coördination of the two. It crowds neither; it honors both. It regards each as a positive, free, self-moving agency, and the two, while such, as coalescing, vitally and dynamically, in securing the desired result.

And this view, while true in itself, and on *à priori* grounds, we regard as having additional confirmation, when we come to apply it and test it in detail, by bringing it to each of these objective facts of Christianity, both from the many corroborations it at once receives, and the many difficulties of which it at once relieves us. A true theory elucidates facts, while at the same time it is confirmed by them, and thus proves itself, and is proved: like a light among reflectors, gives light and receives it.

It is now our purpose to take this light, and with it examine, somewhat rapidly, and only so far as the claims of the subject in hand demand, the relation of these two agencies in Sacred Scripture, the Church, Baptism, and the Lord's Supper.

SACRED SCRIPTURE.

The agency by which the scriptures were produced is called Inspiration. Our attention, therefore, is confined to this subject. The term *Revelation*, is used to designate the disclosures made by the divine mind directly to the mind of man. Inspiration is that infallible agency by which matters contained in the revelations, or historical facts, or

the knowledge and judgments of the sacred writers, were embodied in language.¹ The exact function of inspiration, in relation to the scriptures, may be conceived of in this way: There were many revelations to individual minds, many historical facts, and much human knowledge, which God desired to have gathered up and embodied in a written, divinely authenticated, and infallible record for the religious instruction and direction of the race; and inspiration was the peculiar instrumentality devised and employed for effecting it.

Now, what are the agencies that enter into that instrumentality and how do they do it?

There must be a divine agency to determine the selection and guide the record, else the result could have no divine authority; and there could be no written word of God; and the end, which makes a revelation from God to man a moral necessity and a certainty, would be defeated. Moreover, the sacred writers claim this divine authority for their teachings, and bear witness to the truth of this claim in the case of one another; and as we know, both from internal and external evidence, that they were good men and competent witnesses, their testimony cannot be impeached. We adduce another proof, Christian consciousness, and emphasize it as being absolutely conclusive. Christians in all ages, who have the greatest sympathy and susceptibility for revealed truth, have had, in the self-evidencing light of the scriptures of the Old and the New Testament, a clear intuition of a divine element in them. They, in whom the

¹ This distinction agrees with that made by Lee, in his valuable and scholarly work on Inspiration: "By Revelation I understand a direct communication from God to man, either of such knowledge as man could not of himself attain to, because its subject-matter transcends human sagacity or human reason (such, for example, were the prophetic announcements of the future, and the peculiar doctrines of Christianity), or which (although it might have been attained in the ordinary way) was not, in point of fact, from whatever cause, known to the person who received the Revelation. By Inspiration, on the other hand, I understand that actuating energy of the Holy Spirit, in whatever degree or manner it may have been exercised, guided by which the human agents chosen by God have officially proclaimed His will by word of mouth, or have committed to writing the several portions of the Bible."—Lecture I. pp. 40-41.

faculty correlate and responsive to God has been awakened and restored to its normal action, recognize the unmistakable voice of God. "The Spirit itself beareth witness with" their "spirit." This is the testimony of Christian consciousness, the intuition of the church in all ages; and this evidence is as germane here, as that of astronomers in relation to any fact in astronomy, or of philosophers in philosophy, even though they should be equally unanimous.

There is evidently a human agency also. This is apparent in the whole costume of scripture; the individuality of each of the writers; the correspondence of his style with his character, culture, and circumstances. This is also seen in the fact that God employed men at all; for, if the object were not to employ them as *men*, but to use them mechanically, he might just as well have made anything else his machine, or given the Bible already made: it would have been no greater miracle, and would not have arrested and suspended man's freedom, which God always respects. Moreover, the writers often speak in their own name, refer to matters of private interest, and in many ways leave the impression that they desire us to understand that they wrote freely.

Now, on these two classes of facts have arisen two opposite theories of inspiration: those who start from the agency of God, and reason from that towards the agency of man, following the logical consequences, leave it little more than the form of anything human. Justin Martyr seems to have held this view. He represents inspired men as having nothing to do but to present themselves, in a pure state, to the energy of the Divine Spirit, in order that that, descending as a divine plectrum from heaven, just like the instrument with which a harp or lyre is played, may use them, and disclose to us the knowledge of divine and heavenly things.¹ Gausen sums up his theory in this way: "Such, then, is the

¹ His words are: 'Ἀλλὰ καθαρὸς ἑαυτοὺς τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ πνεύματος παρασχεῖν ἐργεῖα, ὡς αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον ἐξ οὐρανοῦ κατὶν πλῆκτρον, ὥστερ ὄργανον κινῶντις τινὸς ἡ λύρας, τοῖς δικαίοις ἀνδράσι χρώμενον, τὴν τῶν θεῶν ἡμῖν καὶ οὐρανίων ἀποκαλύψαι γνώσιν. Cohort. ad Graec. § 8; History of Doctrines, § 32, note 4.

word of God. It is God speaking in man, God speaking by man, God speaking as man, God speaking for man." To the same school belong Calamy and Haldane, and all whose views, consistently and philosophically carried out, result in a *mechanical*, verbal inspiration.

Those, on the other hand, who give more prominence to the facts showing the agency of man, reach various conclusions of an opposite character, just in proportion as they magnify the human data, and overlook or suppress the divine. They may believe, with Henderson,¹ that there are different degrees of inspiration, the Spirit doing only what was necessary to make a divinely authoritative record, and leaving the rest to man, — such as the use of historical matters, and the choice of words ; or, with Kant,² that parts of scripture only are inspired, those in accordance with the pure *moral ideas of the practical reason* ; or, with Schleiermacher and that school,³ that the writers were inspired subjectively only, and wrote in the same way, and under the same general influences of the Spirit, as they performed other religious duties, — inspiration, in the words of Morell,⁴ simply being "a higher potency of a certain form of consciousness, which every man, to some degree, possesses ;" or, with Paulus and Eichhorn,⁵ that they mistook and recorded their impressions and their subjective states for objective facts, and that the divine and miraculous element of the record is purely imaginary ; or, with Baur, Weisse, and Strauss,⁶ that in accordance with the habits and wants of the age, they clothed their religious teachings in myths, and that the historical element, the objective facts of scripture, are a human fabrication, — affirming with Strauss,⁷ that "the divine cannot have taken place in such a way — or that which has so taken place cannot have been divine."

But when we plant ourselves on both of these classes of

¹ Kitto, Art. Inspiration, by Dr. Woods.

² Davidson, Sacred Herm. pp. 193, 7 ; and Knapp's Th. p. 70.

³ Morell, Phil. of Rel. Chap. VI.

⁴ Phil. of Rel. p. 159.

⁵ Davidson, Sacred Herm. pp. 197, 9.

⁶ Idem, pp. 206, 17.

⁷ Idem, p. 214.

facts, and do equal justice to the divine and the human agency ; when we conceive of them as interpenetrating and coöacting freely, and each in obedience to its own laws ; as being taken up, each in its individuality, to that living, personal unity, analogous to the union of God and man in the person of Christ — we avoid both of these extremes, and the dilemma of tending to the one or the other, or of being logically inconsistent ; and have a theory which meets all the exigencies of the case, and honors all the facts. “ According to this theory,” says Lee,¹ its most earnest and successful advocate, “ the Holy Ghost employs men’s faculties in conformity with their natural laws ; and at the same time, animating, guiding, moulding them so as to accomplish the divine purpose ; just as in nature, the principle of life, when annexed to certain portions of matter, exhibits its vital energy in accordance with conditions which that matter imposes ; while it governs and directs, at the same time, the organism with which it is combined.” Thus the Spirit of God and the spirit of man wrought together and jointly, in the whole process of making the sacred record, alike, whether the subject-matter of the record was made known to the sacred writers by revelation, historical accounts, tradition, personal observation, or experience. Although the operation of the Holy Spirit is objective, and different in kind from his ordinary influence in the heart, yet it does not act exteriorly and mechanically, in prompting, restraining, and guiding the spirit of man, but in vital and dynamic union with it ; so that we may say, not in the *formal* sense in which Gaussen uses the words, but in their highest and most real import : “ It is God who speaks to us, but it is also man ; it is man, but it is also God.”² The divine penetrates and informs the human, and directs it to its own ends ; and the human, following its own laws and preferences, and the circumstances about it, writes as if it were alone. And this coöperation, from the very nature of the union of the two agencies, must continue throughout the process, from

¹ The Inspiration of Scripture, pp. 141, 2.

² Kitto, Art. on Inspiration, by Dr. Woods.

the conception of the subject, and the selection of the materials, to their arrangement and expression—even to the choice of the words; leaving us, in this high and vital sense, with an inspiration not only plenary, but also verbal.

This theory, it is believed, explains the diverse human and divine aspects of scripture. It takes up the half-truths on which the partial theories are based, gives them their full value, and restores them to their natural relations. It leaves in our possession an authoritative word of God; and while inspired from within outwards to the very surface, yet kindred and genial and attractive. It furnishes, through the principle of adaptation, which it maintains the Holy Spirit adopts towards the inspired writers, an easy explanation for the progress in the revelation of truth; and also for the diversities and apparent discrepancies in their accounts of the same things. It has fewer objections than any other theory; none that are fatal; none that are not inherent in a written revelation designed to have practical power among men.

THE CHURCH:

While we must distinguish, as an ideal conception, between those who are spiritually united to Christ and serve him, and those who profess his name before men, and may for convenience call the former the *invisible* and the latter the *visible* church, yet we must remember that the two are in fact inseparable; that, taken as a whole, the invisible church does not and cannot exist without visibility, nor the visible without invisibility.¹ Hence, in our remarks, we shall speak of the real, concrete, objective church, involving both the visible and the invisible, as in fact there is no other on earth.

It is a noticeable circumstance that, while "Christ, during his ministry on earth, laid the foundation of the outward structure of the church,"² he nowhere prescribes or intimates

¹ Says Kurtz, Sacred History, § 191, Obs.: "While this distinction is made, the fact ought, under no circumstances, to be overlooked, that the invisible church has no existence without the visible church, and that it is not separate from, or above the latter, but exists in it, and in it alone."

² Neander, Planting and Training, p. 1.

its form or organization. This indicates, very significantly, his intention that two elements, a human and a divine, should enter into its organism.

By looking at the church, as it first issued from the hands of the apostles, as an outward institution — the only light in which we are viewing it — and as it exists now, we are struck with the prominence of the human element. From the first, individual Christians, prompted by the church-spirit in them, associated together, and drew around them, freely, and as their own wants and circumstances suggested, the organization of a church. The organization was not a prescription, but an outgrowth, standing in living and organic relations to the religious community, and varying its forms and its methods, in different places and times, as the free life of Christians and their necessities demanded. Even archbishop Whately remarks :¹ “ While, by the inspiration of Him who knew what was in man, they [the apostles] delineated those Christian principles which man could not have devised for himself, each church has been left, by the same divine foresight, to make the application of those principles in its symbols, its forms of worship, and its ecclesiastical regulations ; and, while steering its course by the chart and compass which his holy Word supplies, to regulate for itself the sails and rudder, according to the winds and currents it may meet with.” Hence the outward diversity which now everywhere exists between particular churches, in structure, forms, methods, — the result of the designed free and spontaneous action of the human element.

This element crowds on the notice. But there is another, deeper and equally essential to the production of the church. It is the presence and activity of the Spirit of Christ. The apostle Paul brings it out very clearly. The church is the *body* of Christ, he is *in* it. He is “ Head over all things to the church, which is his *body*, the *fulness* of Him that filleth all in all.”² “ *In* him “ all the building, fitly framed together, groweth unto an holy temple *in* the Lord.”³ Hav-

¹ Annotations on Bacon's Essays. Es. III. p. 26.

² Eph. 1 : 22, 23.

³ Eph. 2 : 22.

ing, in another place, compared his relation to it to the divine idea of the marriage institution, by which "they two shall be one flesh," the apostle adds: "This is a great mystery; but I speak concerning Christ and the church."¹

This underlying, encircling, divine element, is not to be confounded, however, with that presence of Christ in the hearts of individual believers, by which he bestows spiritual blessings on them according to their *personal* wants, though founded upon this. It is that peculiar *social* operation of his, by which, going beyond their individual and personal wants, he acts on them as a *community*, awakening in them a religious community-feeling, a church-impulse; drawing them together by spiritual cords and attractions; endowing each according to the wants of the whole; supplying in these the deficiencies in those; and effecting, by the varied distribution of his gifts, and the mutual interdependence of his people, a real though not a formal unity. He is, indeed, in individuals, as units, and in their disconnection; he is also in communities, animating and guiding their social life. It is this pervading presence of his in them, that causes them to be his "one body." And it is this diffused agency of Christ, which furnishes the divine element necessary in constituting the church. And, further, after the organization is completed, there can be no church without membership, without men; that furnishes a permanent human element; nor without the Spirit of Christ in them; that furnishes a permanent divine element.

There are thus two agencies, that of man, and that of Christ. But these two must coöperate, causing the result to be their joint act, else there can be no true church of Christ. The Lord must be its builder; man must be its builder also. And so intimately must the streams of their united energy flow together, that you cannot separate them and say: This is man's work with nothing of Christ in it; or, This is Christ's with nothing of man. The church is a divine institution, and a human institution; but with the divinity and hu-

¹ Eph. 4: 16.

manity blending together. If the act of man were not prompted, or appropriated and sustained, by that of Christ, there would be only a human *society*. If there were only the act of Christ, the church would be a phantom; it could have no concrete form or existence. These two agencies, in their vital union are thus described by the apostle:¹ "*from whom [Christ] the whole body, fitly joined together and compacted by that which every joint supplieth, according to the effectual working in the measure of every part, maketh increase of the body unto the edifying of itself in love.*" He is the source, the prompting and guiding spirit; his people the executive actors; but if they put themselves under his guidance, he does not leave them to do any part of the work alone, but is with them prompting and directing still, even to the minutest details. The church organization, in so far as it grows up naturally from the church-impulse awakened and guided by Christ, is thus, whatever its form, all alive with divinity, divinity embodied in humanity. Hence all churches, however diverse their organizations, in so far as they have been true to the spirit of Christ, are divinely authenticated, even in their form, and to its minutiae.

It is true, this ideal is only in part realized in any case, because all Christian communities, like all individual Christians, are but imperfectly responsive to the promptings of Jesus; and this is so, because it does not consist with the divine purpose, that Christians should be at once perfect, or the church infallible. Yet, in every true church, the ideal is proximately reached, and the human and divine are so interwoven, even in the outmost exterior, that you cannot separate them, without disintegrating and destroying the fabric.

This theory commends itself alike by the consequences it avoids, and those which result from it.

It saves from the abhorrent logical conclusion of those who press the divine so far as to suppose that Christ prescribed the outward form of the church, that there is no other church than the one having that form, and that there is no

¹ Eph. 5: 32.

salvation except in outward connection with that. Cyprian developed this theory fully.¹ He even denies that one "can be a martyr, who is not in the church. Such an one may be slain, he cannot be crowned."² Augustine says: "No one will be able to have Christ the Head, unless he has been in his body, which is the church."³ And this is the present doctrine of the papacy. It saves us, also, from the more moderate notions of high-churchmen, in whatever denomination found, who regard the church as the only way of access to Christ, instead of Christ as the only way of entrance to the church; and who think that the church is so saturated with the divine, that grace gushes out to the physical touch, and accompanies outward connection with it. And, on the other hand, it arrests and prevents the destructive result to which Pelagians,⁴ Socinians,⁵ Unitarians, and Rationalists have generally come, who have magnified the human agency and denied the divine; and having broken up the foundations of the church, converted it to a *society*, without character, or respect, or influence.

But, while it avoids the destructive consequences in these opposite directions, and embraces what of truth there is underlying them, it at the same time explains the diversities of the particular churches, and throws around them the bond of a common unity. It regards them, in their relation to one another, much like the different books of scripture in relation to the whole canon, and their diversities like the diversities in the style of the sacred writers. It makes of *many members one body*. It secures the result of which Lord Bacon speaks:⁶ "As it is noted by one of the Fathers, Christ's coat indeed had no seam, but the church's vesture was of divers colors; whereupon he saith, 'In veste varietas sit, scissura non sit,' — they be two things, unity and uniformity." It makes room for all true churches, all in which "the word of God is purely preached and heard, and the sacraments administered according to the institution of

¹ Neander, Ch. Hist. I. p. 210.

² Idem, § 135, (5).

³ Idem, § 254, (2).

² Hag. Hist. of Doc. § 71, (3).

⁴ Idem, § 135, (1).

⁶ Essay on Unity in Religion.

Christ,"¹ in the one brotherhood of the members of his body. It enlarges Christian charity, raises our view of the cause of Christ to a higher point than that of our denomination or church, and causes us to see them, as he does, as one whole, supplementing the deficiencies of one another, and moving on in their different paths, giving and receiving reciprocal moulding influences meanwhile, towards one grand millennial result. And it gives us a church beautiful and attractive, and at the same time dignified and invested with divinity, worthy of being the Bride of Christ, that *Mother* church, which, in virtue of the fact that it is the great organ through which God dispenses spiritual blessings to the world, justifies the description of it by Calvin:² "There is no other way of entrance into life, unless we are conceived by her, born of her, nourished at her breast, and continually preserved under her care and government, till we are divested of this mortal flesh, and become like the angels."

BAPTISM.

There is in this sacrament evidently something human, and something divine. At least, there is a human element in the baptismal act, and a divine in the institution of the rite, and in accepting and blessing its observance. But do these two lie over against each other in this way, — the divine quite off on one side, and the human on the other? Is their only correlation that of antecedence and consequence, or cause and effect, or, *you do this and I will do that*? Do they act in essentially different spheres, and only come in contact on the margins? Or is the divine in the human, and the human with the divine, at every step of the baptismal transaction? Is this involution not physical or mechanical, but spiritual and necessary, in every instance of true baptism? Are the two so intermixed and blended, — the divine being let down into the human, and the human taken up into the divine, — that though each loses nothing

¹ Calvin, *Institutes*, B. IV. Ch. I. 9.

² *Institutes*, B. IV. Ch. I. 4.

of its own nature, there is virtually but one baptismal energy? This is what we maintain.

Baptism is the consecration of one to the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, by the use of water.¹ Now

¹ In the last October number of this Journal was an Article, headed "Baptism a Symbol of the Commencement of the New Life," suggested by one in the previous January number, in which the view of the import of baptism which we here state was maintained. We add a few words in reply. As, however, the writer does not base his theory immediately on any portion of scripture, but assumes it, thinking that it furnishes an easy explanation for all the facts on the subject; and as he does not refer directly to the scriptural, historical and other arguments with which we maintained that consecration is the predominant idea of this rite—especially the irresistible exegetical force of *ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος*, in the baptismal formula, the fundamental passage on this subject, as pointing to the end or object to which the person is set apart by baptism, though admitting this as a subordinate idea—but is content to reason more generally; it will not be necessary to notice his Article further than to show how he has succeeded in the specific object he has undertaken. The mind of the writer evidently has two different ideas before it, which it does not clearly discriminate between. It hovers obscurely around both, in the premises, reasoning as if they were one and the same; but in the conclusion—or, which is the same thing, the original position—separates between them. His position is that baptism "is intended to symbolize the commencement of the new Christian life;" his arguments only go to show that it symbolizes the *new Christian life itself*. This incoherence runs through the Article. Thus the first argument, that the magnitude of the change in conversion deserves an appropriate rite to celebrate it, does not show that that rite should be a symbol of the change as an *act* or *transition*, but of the change as a *result*, of the changed state. There is nothing in Christianity that would lead it to raise a monument to the transitional process. And the ceremony with which "a servant of a foreign potentate" renounces his allegiance, does not *symbolize*, though it may designate in point of time, the *commencement* of his new citizenship, but his *new citizenship*. Its *import* reaches into the future, and is not limited to the present or past, though its *use* may be at the beginning of the new allegiance. This creeping in of the *new life*, in the place of the *commencement* of it, appears on almost every page in specific statements. Thus, Christian baptism "symbolized the more thorough and radical cleansing which the Holy Ghost should effect." "We baptize into a life of obedience to the Father, of faith in the Son, and of sanctification by the Spirit." "Baptism (that is, the purification which it celebrates)," etc. etc. Now this divergence of the reasons from the position neutralizes the argument, and damages the two principal inferences. The first inference is that baptism "should be coincident in time with the occurrence of the moral change which it symbolizes; and in default of this, that the two should be separated by as brief an interval as possible." But as the arguments only show that baptism points to the new life, and not to the beginning of it, this inference falls. The second is that there is "a beautiful significance," in the mode of baptism by immersion, "if it be a rite of inauguration." But the arguments would only

no real consecration can be made without the Spirit of God cworking with the spirit of him who makes it. Nor can it be made without faith, and faith cannot be exercised apart from the presence and help of Him who is its author and finisher. Again, it is the result of true baptism to change the *status* of the subject in relation to the kingdom of God. It brings him—whether an adult, who in this sacrament surrenders himself to God, or a child, that is surrendered by its responsible representatives—into real external covenant-relations to God. God throws around the person the folds of his covenant, by which he promises to be in a special sense a God to him. But this cannot take place unless the transaction itself be a covenant one, one in which both of the covenanting parties participate; and no one can thus in reality contract with God without his help. God must certainly *work in* him here, “to will and to do of his good pleasure,” as well as elsewhere.¹ Thus man, God helping him, takes hold on God; and God, man seeing and believing in him, enters into man; and by both, in this spiritual union, the transaction is completed. Throughout the whole of it the two agencies interpenetrate. It is a divine-human transaction. There is the free faith and surrender of man, inwrought and sustained by the divine energy, and the free acceptance of the consecration and establishment of the covenant, by God, desired and appropriated by man.

As such, as the united and inseparable act of God and man, as an actual blending of human and divine agency in putting one in external covenant-relations to God,—in the state of being actually consecrated to him,—baptism has real virtue, inherent and positive influence. And as such, its efficacy does not exist in it as an *opus operatum*, or

show this “beautiful significance,” in case the rite were one of purification, not inauguration. If it only points to inauguration, or the beginning of the Christian life, and not to purification, a result of its beginning, and its standing quality, immersion, even in the mind of the writer, should be no more significant than sprinkling.

¹ Phil. 2 : 13. Compare Augustine’s proposition : “Sine Illo vel operante ut velimus, vel co-operante cum volumus, ad bona pietatis opera nihil volumus.”—De Gra. et Lib. Arbit. § 33 I. X. p. 735.

mechanical, ecclesiastical act, but in the genuine, human and divine elements entering into it.

Now, those who tear these elements apart, land in practical error, or absurdity. The Fathers generally fastened on the agency of God, and often gave only a mechanical part to man. If the external act was performed in due ecclesiastical order, it was regenerative. Chrysostom, as we see by a Latin translation of his works, says :¹ "Per rem, nempe sensibilem aquam, donum confertur." Augustine maintained² that "baptism is the only and necessary condition of salvation." High-churchmen, in the Papal, Lutheran, and English churches, perpetuate this doctrine in various modified or unmodified forms, in modern times. Luther even, though giving so much prominence to faith as the only condition of justification, ascribed, in his usual bold, figurative, sensuous words, a kind of divino-physical virtue to this sacrament : "The blood of Christ is so intimately mingled with the water of baptism, that we should neither regard it as merely clean water, but look upon it as water beautifully colored and reddened with the precious rose-colored blood of our dear Saviour."³ All such tendencies generate superstition, false confidence, deceitful hope.

And as we saw in relation to the church, that one form of the supra-divine tendency was manifested in believing that Christ has prescribed a rigid and inflexible church-organization, and in unchurching all who are not connected with that ; so here another form of pressing the divine at the expense of the human, is seen in those who think he has fixed the form of baptism, instead of having left it to the free life of his people to mould and adapt it to their circumstances and wants, under the direction of his Spirit ; and who require all to adopt their form, else deny their baptism. This, however, is not made a *principle* ; they are not consistent with themselves ; for they admit of and practise,

¹ Opera, T. 5. 1079. a. Comp. Idem, T. 2. 611. b : "Qui enim baptizatur in nomine Christi, utrumque baptismum habet, et aquæ et spiritus : quia Christus spiritus erat, et corpus suscepit, ut et spirituale et coporale baptismum daret."

² Hagenbach's History of Doctrines, § 137, (6).

³ Idem, § 269. (5).

themselves, all manner of minor deviations from their ideal mode, — which is irreconcilable with having the principle of a fixed form. They in fact, in their own practice, adopt the principle of deviations, while towards others, who do not come within the range of their deviations, they hold the denominational tenet of one mode. Denominationally, therefore, they act on the principle of deviations, and the principle of no deviations; and as these principles annihilate each other, their action is based on no principle, but on arbitrary opinion and rule.

Those, on the other hand, who give undue prominence to the agency of man, see no more efficacy in this ordinance than results from a conscientious endeavor to obey any other command of God. There is no peculiar energy or blessing of God manifested in it. The gift results purely from the faith, in no measure from the baptismal institution. Baptism may be a means of grace, but it is no more so than anything else involving the same amount of faith. It has no special divine depth of meaning. Socinians, Unitarians, and Rationalists adopt this view; and virtually drive God from the ordinance, and convert it to a mere ceremony. It must be confessed, also, that there is a tendency among evangelical Christians, in modern times, to divorce these two elements, by making the human the condition, and the divine the consequence. The result is, the rite degenerates into a mere act of obedience, a means of grace, on a level with ordinary Christian duties and observances; and the prominence which Christ and the apostles gave it is an unaccountable mystery, and the speedy development of baptismal regeneration, in the primitive church, an inexplicable problem in history.

The dynamic theory, according to which there is a spiritual coöperation of God and man, avoids these one-sided tendencies. It shuns the rock, on the one hand, that there is any inherent virtue in the baptismal act itself, only as it is jointly animated by the Spirit of God and the spirit of man; and hence does not oblige those adopting it, like the advocates of baptismal regeneration, in order to explain the case of those

baptized persons who subsequently show no signs of spiritual life, to resort to the absurd fetch and after-thought, first, of a sleep, and then of a syncope, and then of the death and final extirpation of the imparted, regenerate principle:¹ and the whirlpool, on the other hand, that there is no virtue in it whatever, save as an act of obedience and faith. It furnishes a reasonable and safe ground for the belief in its efficacy — the concurrence in it of divine and human activity — an efficacy which is not regenerative or saving, but which consists in the individual being truly consecrated to God, and put into actual external covenant-relations to him. It explains scripture and history. It harmonizes with the great doctrines of the gospel, and with the facts of Christian experience. And it justifies its institution, and the place it was designed to hold in the observances of the church.

THE LORD'S SUPPER.

The supper, whatever particular view is taken of it, stands in some kind of relation to the death of Christ, and the objects for which that death occurred. The death of Christ has made positive spiritual blessings possible for man, though it has not put him in possession of them; and man needs those blessings. How shall the two be brought together — the supply and the want, the purchased good and the needy soul? By what instrumentality, or through what channel, shall the benefits of redemption reach man? Now the supper stands in some way between these two, as one of the organs of transmission. So far all agree. But in what way does it fulfil this office? Is it a simple *memorial*? Is it a picturesque and demonstrative exhibition, by means of *symbols*, to enliven faith, and nothing more? Is the spiritual blessing *physically incorporated* with the bread and the wine, so that in receiving the one the other also is received? Or are the material elements changed in their nature, and, while retaining their former appearance and sensible qualities, actu-

¹ Kurtz, § 189, and § 189, Obs. 4.

ally converted into the body and blood of Christ, with all its atoning and saving efficacy? Or further, intermediate between these extremes, is there, in the right observance of the supper, a *real* — not corporeal, or physical, or mechanical. — but a *real, spiritual* meeting of the benefits of Christ's death and the soul of man?

To answer these questions, we must consider the nature and relation of the agencies necessary to its right observance.

Here also the human agency is prominent, and first strikes attention. There is the procuring of the bread and the "cup," the giving of thanks, the breaking of the bread, the distribution of the elements, the partaking of them, and the choice of the time, way, and circumstances; these externals, at least, being purely human.

But no less real and essential is the divine agency. It is seen in the institution of this sacrament, in the right preparation of those who partake of it, and in the assistance granted them while in the act. And here we adduce, in proof, a remark of our Saviour, which we think may have been hitherto generally misunderstood. At the conclusion of the supper, having given the cup to the disciples, he says: "I will not drink henceforth of this fruit of the vine, until that day when I drink it *new with you* in my Father's kingdom."¹ Christ evidently did not himself partake of the bread or cup used at the institution of the supper. The remark: "This is my body," and "This is my blood," makes the supposition too violent. Besides, we are expressly told that he gave each "to the *disciples*." Nor are we to expect that he designed ever to partake of the sacramental emblems, in his own person. Now, if we understand by the expression, "in my Father's kingdom," what the expression, "in the kingdom," — which is the one employed by Mark,² in the corresponding passage — often means, viz. the kingdom of God on earth, then the meaning is clear; and Christ informs his disciples that he will not drink henceforth of the fruit of the vine until, in virtue of his spiritual union with them, he drinks it in a new way, *with them*, in that kingdom which

¹ Matt. 26: 29.

² 14: 25.

was not to be fully come till after his death. Here, then, through this union of Christ *in* and *with* his disciples when they partake of the elements of the supper — a union so intimate that he acts *with* them; justifying even the remark, “*I drink it new with you*,” we see the presence of a divine agency, as well as of the human, in the proper observance of this sacrament.

Nay, more: this passage shows us that these two agencies are taken up into a living coöperation,¹ — the disciples acting with Christ, and Christ acting in them; or, as he himself expresses it:¹ “He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood, dwelleth *in me* and *I in him*.” Their act alone would be bald, frigid, unspiritual; his alone, spiritual, unproductive, without body. But the two, penetrating, completing, and sustaining each other — their wills and spiritual energy coinciding with his — supply all the conditions of the right observance of the supper.

We are now prepared to return to the question: In what relation does such observance stand to the benefits of Christ’s death, and the need of man?

We explain the matter thus: When the Christian, pervaded with the spirit of Jesus, partakes of the emblems, the possible blessings procured by the death of Christ, pardon, justification, sanctification, spiritual life, are, to an extent, actually transferred to his soul, in and with the partaking of the elements, and thus made his. There is, then, in the supper, an actual participation of the benefits of the atonement, resulting from the observance itself, not merely from the faith called into exercise by it, though conditioned on faith. The emblems, when thus received, are one of the special channels through which God communicates the purchase made by the sacrifice of Christ; the medium of an actual transmission; a bridge on which those spiritual blessings descend to the soul; a point where the redemption of Christ and the want of man meet. The apostle emphasizes this design and effect of the sacrament:² “The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not

¹ John 6: 56.

² 1 Cor. 10: 16.

the communion" (*κοινωνία*, the *participation*)¹ "of the *blood* of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the *body* of Christ?" And when one, thus exercising his own free faith, and filled with Christ's presence, commemorates his death, the act of partaking of the elements becomes like an actual eating of the body and drinking of the blood; and to such the bread and the cup, as one of the means of putting them in possession of the advantages of the great Sacrifice, illustrate and verify the compact and profound words of Jesus at the institution of the rite:² "This is my body," and "This is my blood."

The view here presented is in substantial agreement with that of the church of England, as stated in the 28th Article, and also with that of Calvin. The doctrine of the former is this: The supper "is a sacrament of our redemption by Christ's death; insomuch that, to such as rightly, worthily, and with faith receive the same, the bread which we break is a partaking of the body of Christ; and likewise the cup of blessing is a partaking of the blood of Christ. . . . The body of Christ is given, taken, and eaten, only after a heavenly and spiritual manner. And the mean whereby the body of Christ is received and eaten is faith." . . . "By which," says bishop Burnet,³ summing up his own view of this Article, "we assert a *real presence* of the body and blood of Christ; but not of his body as it is now glorified in heaven, but of his body as it was broken on the cross, when his blood was shed and separated from it: That is, his Death, with the Merit and Effects of it, are offered in this Sacrament, to all worthy Believers." Calvin says:⁴ "I grant, indeed, that the breaking of the bread is symbolical, and not the substance itself; yet, this being admitted, from the exhibition of the symbol we may justly infer the exhibition of the substance; for, unless any one would call God a deceiver, he can never presume to affirm that he sets before us an empty sign.

¹ Bengel in loc. says: "He who drinks of this cup is a partaker of the blood of Christ. . . . The highest degree of reality is implied."

² Matt. 26: 26, 28.

³ Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles, p. 397.

⁴ Institutes, B. IV. Chap. XVII. 10.

Therefore if, by the breaking of the bread, the Lord truly represents the participation of his body, it ought not to be doubted that he truly presents and communicates it. And it must always be a rule with believers, whenever they see the signs instituted by the Lord, to assure and persuade themselves that they are also accompanied with the truth of the thing signified. For to what end would the Lord deliver into our hands the symbol of his body, except to assure us of a real participation of it? If it be true that the visible sign is given to us to seal the donation of the invisible substance, we ought to entertain a confident assurance, that, in receiving the symbol of his body, we at the same time truly receive the body itself."

Our position in relation to the union of the divine and the human in the supper—according to which they not only blend, in the act of partaking of the elements, but also in that act bring the advantages of the atonement and the needy soul into a living, spiritual connection—will receive additional confirmation by glancing at the entire insufficiency or falseness of all theories leaning to the one or the other of these two agencies. The extreme, on the divine side, is the theory of the Roman church, which denies the reality of the bread and the wine, asserting that they are converted to the actual body and blood of Christ, retaining only the hollow and delusive form of their previous nature. The divine wholly absorbs or crowds out the human in the elements, and is physically transferred to the recipient by the outward act of consuming them.

This theory is so clearly and fearlessly presented in what is commonly called The Catechism of the Council of Trent, that we transfer the passage: "The Catholic church firmly believes, and openly professes, that in this sacrament the words of consecration accomplish three things: first, that the true and real body of Christ, the same that was born of the virgin, and is now seated at the right hand of the Father in heaven, is rendered present in the holy eucharist. Secondly, that however repugnant it may appear to the dictates of the senses, no substance of the elements remains in the sacra-

ment. Thirdly, a natural consequence of the two preceding, and one which the words of consecration also express, that the accidents which present themselves to the eyes, or other senses, exist in a wonderful and ineffable manner, without a subject. The accidents of bread and wine we see, but they inhere in no substance, and exist independent of any. The substance of the bread and wine is so changed into the body and blood of our Lord, that they altogether cease to be the substance of bread and wine."

The objection to this theory is twofold, and may be briefly stated. It is contradictory to the whole spirit of the teachings of the gospel in reference to the conditions on which grace is conferred; and it makes God lie to us through the senses, in order to transfer a blessing to our spirits — in such a way, moreover, as to overthrow the spirituality of religion.

The Lutheran is a milder theory. According to this, in and with the visible sign, which retains intact all its natural properties, the body and blood of Jesus is corporeally present. The two are inseparably and objectively united, irrespective of the will of the partaker. In the words of Kurtz,¹ an advocate of this doctrine: "That which is heavenly is received, both by the believer and by the unbeliever, *in, with,* and *under* the terrestrial elements." The objection here is, that, while it admits the most intimate blending of the heavenly and earthly in the elements, the union is arrested there; in partaking of them, the two are widely divorced: the divine is held off at a distance from the human, and made to operate independently of man — yea, when he only mechanically receives them — though it is alleged that it will act to his disadvantage and condemnation, unless he believes.² It is thus at war with the very genius of Christianity, in binding the reception of the gift of God to an outward act, to work either life or death; whereas Christianity ascribes such a result only to the highest freedom and agency of man. It violates, too, the teaching of the apostle in this passage: "He that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eat-

¹ Sac. Hist. § 190, Obs.

² Idem, § 188, Obs. 3.

eth and drinketh damnation to himself, not *discerning* (*διακρίνων*) the Lord's body."¹ For it is evident here, that the judgment spoken of does not come from the malign effect of the presence of the body of Christ, unworthily and physically received in the elements, nor from not discerning that the Lord's body is truly in them; for such a perception is beyond the possibilities of human "discernment," and hence cannot be required; but from not discerning it *anywhere*, from want of spiritual apprehension of Christ as the atoning sacrifice, and faith in him as such. The whole sin is evidently the want of a spiritual and possible discernment and trust, not of an impossible discernment.

The extreme, on the human side, is the view of those who deny the divinity and atonement of Christ. In their case the supper becomes absolutely robbed of meaning. Nay, worse: it calls on us to celebrate, not the birth, but the *death* of Him whose only benefits to the race were by his life and example! to celebrate the very event which arrested the only stream of good which was flowing from him! It goes so far in crowding out the divine, that it both logically and historically destroys the human also, and the supper ceases to be observed.

The more moderate theory on this side, and the one extensively adopted by Protestants, is that advocated by Zwingli. Those adopting it so draw apart the human and the divine as to hold that the bread and the wine are mere symbols or signs of the body and blood of Christ. The supper is a demonstrative memorial, addressed to the senses and the imagination, designed, by reproducing to the thought the scenes of Calvary, to aid faith in fastening on the atoning Sacrifice, and promote Christian growth; and it is nothing more than this. The whole benefit comes from the spiritual exercises, which indeed may mount somewhat higher by climbing on this trellis; but there is no peculiar and independent good gushing into the soul from the supper itself, rightly observed. And the objection to this, as the ex-

¹ 1 Cor. 11 : 29.

clusive theory, is, that it is superficial and barren. It does not exhaust the words of Christ at the institution of the sacrament: "my body . . my blood;" nor the remarkable words with which he had foreshadowed it; such as "who-so eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life;"¹ nor the description of it by Paul: "The communion of the blood of the body of Christ." It destroys everything peculiar and distinctive in the design of the supper; makes its import and object the same in kind as those of a sermon commemorating the death of Christ, with this inferiority, however, that, whereas the sermon sets it forth with lively and intelligible words, the supper speaks only in mute symbols. It fails to furnish an adequate reason for its appointment, and the prominence given it in the scriptures and the apostolic churches; leaves Christians with the half-conscious thought or feeling that usage makes more of it than experience derives from it as a mere remembrancer; and while, by diverting thought and faith from its higher to its lower uses, it diminishes those uses, it at the same time often awakens in communicants a painful sense that they have not partaken worthily, or that they were mistaken in their estimate of its benefits. It attaches great importance to its observance, and yet eviscerates it of its meaning, thereby plunging those adopting it into a felt or unfelt contradiction.

All these partial theories, therefore, fail. Only that one which gives equal integrity to the divine and the human elements, and which regards them as meeting and acting in vital union; which represents the faith of the believer as fastening directly on Christ, and Christ as entering into the heart and stimulating the faith of the believer, while partaking of the elements, and which brings the advantages of the atonement into the actual possession of the believer, in that act, — can meet all the necessities of the case; and this one, we believe, does. It gives character, profound meaning, to the eucharist. It honors its institution, and prominent observance, and the scriptural references to it. It does not

¹ John 6 : 54.

trifle with Christians by putting in their hands a dumb show of Christ's death, a pictorial representation of it by means of symbols, and little more. It takes up this view but adds to it. It presents to them a transaction pregnant with spiritual life, actually communicating the advantages of Christ's death. But it does not undermine virtue or the spirituality of religion. It requires the free, spiritual activity of man, and does not hold the blessing in outward union with the elements, to be received by any who partake of them, but in receiving them with a spirit in inward union with the Spirit of Christ. It exalts the divine, but does not foster superstition, and an outward observance of the rite, and a false confidence in its mechanical efficacy. It exalts the human, but does not detract from the efficacy or worth of the sacrament. It exalts the human and the divine, the divine and the human, in living and inseparable union, and thus honors morals while it promotes religion.

ARTICLE III.

THE ETERNAL LIFE AND PRIESTHOOD OF MELCHISEDEK.¹

[Condensed from the German of Auberlen.]

BY REV. HENRY A. SAWTELLE, M. A., LIMERICK, ME.

Introduction; Historical Notice of Opinions.

The declarations concerning Melchisedek, in the seventh chapter of the epistle to the Hebrews, have afforded interpreters much difficulty. Particularly has this been the case with the third and eighth verses. The peculiarity in the latter verse is, that the Priest-king of Salem, in the char-

¹ The original Article may be found in the *Theologische Studien und Kritiken* for 1857, pp. 453—504. Its author is Carl August Auberlen, Dr. Phil., Licentiate and Professor *Extraordinarius* of Theology in Basil.

acter of one who lives, is opposed to the Levitical priests who die,—a contrast unwarranted unless Melchisedek have a being superior to the ordinary existence of man. And this supposition is favored, if not in fact demanded, by the former verse, in which arises the new difficulty of a mysterious man possessing an eternal priesthood opposed to the Levitical, and like that of Christ.

In this matter even our better expositors have resorted to strange assumptions and expedients. There are two classes of the older opinions,—the one assuming for Melchisedek a nature in some way supernatural, the other escaping this by exegetical evasions. In the former class, Ambrose and others, held Melchisedek to be a manifestation of the Logos; Hierax, and others, of the Holy Spirit; while Origen supposed him to be an angel. If he were a man, still something supernatural must belong to him. Hulsius thought him the returning Enoch, and Kloppenburg considered him a man immediately created by God. He has been identified with some better known personage. Thus Jurieu hits upon Ham; while the Rabbinical opinion that it was Shem is favored even by Luther, Melancthon, and others, and is not yet entirely discarded by Stier.

Among the exegetical evasions or shifts resorted to, is that of Storr and others, who assume that in v. 8 Christ is the one who *lives*; they supply in v. 3, before *abides*, a subject relating to Christ, and thus escape the difficulty of the only reasonable reference to Melchisedek. The view of L. Bos belongs here, namely, that the word “forever” expresses only the unbroken continuance of Melchisedek’s priesthood until his death; in which case he would be like others. But more than a mere evasion is the explanation of Theophylact, Oecumenius, Calvin, Bengel, and others, who say that the expression that Melchisedek lives, and the one about his being priest forever, both relate to the silence of scripture respecting his death, the end of his priesthood, his successor and the like. This accounts for the negative predicates (v. 3). But the positive expressions plainly refer to something about which scripture is not silent, but entirely ex-

plicit; for the words "abides a priest forever," are taken nearly word for word from Ps. 110, and in fact the "witness" in v. 8 is this same psalm. Nor less inadmissible is the view of others, that the priesthood of Melchisedek continues on in Christ, as the type is carried on in the anti-type. Bleek's remark is good against this, that in that case Melchisedek would not have directly and independently the very peculiarity on account of which he may be a type of Christ.

The later exegesis does not exceed the old. Bleek, whose commentary is unsurpassed in our exegetical literature, in point of profoundness and thoroughness of verbal explanation, says that, according to the writer to the Hebrews, "Melchisedek had in fact no human parents, or predecessor, but by immediate Omnipotence was placed on the earth, and afterward borne away, as an incarnation of the divine Spirit, or, at least, of a celestial existence." But could our inspired author seriously have thought of a celestial being as king on earth, and as such remaining so wholly unknown as only once opportunely to emerge from his obscurity? Such a mythical representation would depreciate the canonical value of our epistle.

Stier,¹ DeWette, Tholuck, and Ebrard, take Melchisedek to be simply a historical person. Tholuck brings into connection with his view the explanation of the Peschito, namely, that the priesthood of Melchisedek is made perpetual by passing upon Christ. Stier and DeWette express themselves in harmony with Theophylact, by understanding that Melchisedek represented an eternal priest simply by virtue of what the scripture says, or rather does not say, of him. Similar is the view of Ebrard, who formerly advanced hopefully towards a deeper apprehension of Melchisedek's relation both to the Levitical priests and to Christ. He observes that the person of Melchisedek, and not the office,

¹ Stier's thirty-six meditations on the epistle to the Hebrews occupy a prominent place among his exegetical works; and, besides being characterized by the author's well-known mental depth and fulness of thought, evince a validity of representation formerly unusual with this interpreter.

but yet the conception of that person as formed in the Psalmist's mind, and not the real individual, was the type of the Messiah. To this *conception* of Melchisedek is ascribed an eternal priesthood, because mention is nowhere made of a successor in the priestly office; and eternal life is ascribed, because his death is not related. But, were this the proper view, Melchisedek could be termed only a single, abiding priest, not an eternal one. Ebrard would derive the eternity from the singleness; but the epistle (v. 23, 24) plainly derives the singleness from the eternity, and so makes a contrast with the plurality of the Levitical priests. Furthermore, it is impossible for the person to be sundered from the actual individual, and fade away into a mere conception. It is equally impossible, as Ebrard justly confesses, that the priesthood of Melchisedek be superior to the Levitical, simply on account of not resting on mere descent and legal order. Ebrard is right in giving prominence to the view that the *person* must be concerned in exalting the priesthood. But he should have gone more deeply from this point. There is something in the actual person of Melchisedek fully explaining the difficult expressions which concern his actual life and priesthood.

In proceeding with our investigation we begin outside and come in narrowing circles to the very passages in dispute. We shall offer, first, some remarks on the general character of our epistle, and the course of thought as a whole, in order to learn what place in the general organism our particular expressions hold. Secondly, we shall present an analysis of the particular section bearing on Melchisedek's priesthood. Thirdly, we will explain the disputed passages themselves, together with their nearest connection. Finally, we shall add a division respecting the advantage our view holds over other explanations.

§ 1. *General View of the Epistle to the Hebrews.*

Every one knows the depth and energy of thought peculiar to our epistle. If the thought is shaped in a way that

is unusual with Paul, it is yet unmistakable that the author, whoever he is, is penetrated with that apostle's deepest ideas; and the ancient view, which has recently attracted so many friends, namely, that Paul must have shared in the composition of the letter, will ever obtrude itself afresh. The emancipation of the new covenant from the old, which was the great life-task of the apostle, forms also the theme of the epistle to the Hebrews; and we shall see that the section to be treated derives its chief light from a comparison of Pauline passages. Our epistle is also Pauline in aiming to prove the abrogation of the old covenant through Christ, substantially from the Old Testament itself. Possibly in this respect it goes beyond the apostle. Hebrew readers are argued with from the old scripture ground. The reader is overcome with his own weapons; as it was when our Lord said to the Jew, "If ye believe Moses, then believe also me, for he wrote of me," — a passage which would afford an excellent motto for the section referring to Melchisedek. It is remarkable that those writers who represent the O. T. law as carnal, and the old sanctuary as earthly, bowed implicitly before the O. T. as the word of God, thus imitating the course of our Saviour. Our author, in particular, follows closely in the O. T. track. He either speaks fully in the O. T. language, or else takes an O. T. passage for his text and theme, and then presents it on all its sides. Scripture is for him God's truth, the Spirit's word descended from the celestial height. The passage in Genesis relating to Melchisedek comes to him in this light; and the brief language in Psalm 100, in which he finds an actual Messianic prophecy, is for him strong and full enough to embrace in its bosom an entirely new order of things. Having made his quotation, he goes round it on all sides, and while he does not weary in repeating it, he is all the time giving something new upon it. He does not force it, he lays nought in it; he only spreads it before us, and discloses its spiritual depths. For a sentence from God embraces much, and inspiration doth not consist in being able simply to make, but also to read, a holy writing.

The author proceeds with the greatest logical precision as to the whole and as to parts. Of all the books in the New Testament, the epistle to the Hebrews is most systematic. His way of taking a text and theme and developing it, reminds one of the preacher's habit. Some may miss of discovering the clear arrangement, but the fault is not the author's. His habit of nicely connecting things together follows him, as we shall see, into the finest veins of detail.

The letter to the Hebrews, like that to the Romans, and like others, falls into two divisions, one dogmatical and the other hortatory; though confessedly hortatory portions appear distinctly in the course of the former division. The dogmatic division, with which alone we have here to do, reaches on to 10: 18, and itself falls into two parts; the first of which (1: 1 to 4: 13) we call the common, and the second (4: 14 to 10: 18), the special.

The contents of an epistle are determined by its object. As to the object of our epistle there is now very general agreement. It is designed to warn Jewish Christians in Palestine against relapse into Judaism. They had become inclined to this, as circumstances tended to shut them out from the society of Israel, the national sanctuary and temple-worship; which caused them to fear lest the promises made by God to his people should be forfeited.¹ Against this apprehension the author shows that participation in the blessing of the promises is conditioned above all on a faith in what is promised; and, moreover, he furnishes the proof that it is not allowable to yield up the new on account of the old, but rather the old for the sake of the new.

He proceeds with great wisdom and caution, letting his points develop with gradually increasing force. At first, merely the superiority of the new to the old is brought to view; but, as he proceeds, the old begins to look obsolete, and is finally broken up and altogether displaced by the

¹ On the historical occasion and position of our epistle, compare the fine observations of Thiersch (*Church in Apos. Age*, p. 188 seq.); in regard to whose correctness our confidence is not shaken by the opposite remarks of Köstlin (*Theol. Annual of Baur and Zeller*, 1854, p. 375 seq.).

new.¹ And so the dogmatic division is able to close with that simple but deeply-stirring language: "There is needed now no more offering for sin." For the sake of affording a deep view of the majestic incoming period, the author shows, first, simply the elevation of the Messiah above angels; and thus the author's aim is not perceived till in 2: 1 a key to it is laid in the reader's hand. See similar course of Paul in Rom 2: 1 seq., as compared with Rom. 2: 17 seq.

The first part of the dogmatic division shows that the Messiah, who bears the N. T. revelation, is higher than both instruments of the O. T. revelation, whether (spiritual) angels, or (earthly) Moses, in virtue of being Son of Jehovah, and so Jehovah himself manifest on earth. From both these considerations are derived hortatory remarks. As it regards the superiority of Christ to angels, it is in particular shown that no doubt should be reflected on it by his fleshly humiliation, or the offence of the cross. This point had special pertinence to the Hebrews (1 Cor. 1: 23).

The second part takes up the subject of immediate practical importance to the readers, namely, the Levitical worship and the nature of priest and offering. The author, bringing into a nutshell what was earlier said by way of preparation, and carrying it over to introduce a new section, lays down as his theme: Jesus is our High Priest, exalted as he is compassionate. Through his mediation, and by no other (as afterwards appears), we are able to approach the throne of grace with confidence.

In order to prove Jesus now the true High Priest, first his likeness to the O. T. high priest must be shown, and then his superiority to the same; just as in another connection his likeness and his superiority to Moses are both shown. Accordingly he appears, first as Priest after the manner of Aaron, and then after the manner of Melchisedek; and he founds also the new covenant by the offering of himself. By the one comparison he appears humiliated and therefore compassionate; by the other he appears the exalted, eternal, and heavenly High Priest.

¹ Auberlen's references here are very ample and interesting, but, as often in other connections, are necessarily omitted. — TR.

Thus the comparison of Christ with Moses (chs. iv. and v.) is happily succeeded (ch. v.) by his comparison with Aaron. It was necessary, first of all, to prove him a real, legitimate priest, according to the order of the O. T. itself. Two qualifications for this are named, which, if not associated and expressed in so many words in the O. T., are by no means arbitrarily adduced, but rest directly on the nature of the subject, and the relation of men to God. First, a high-priest must be a real representative of men, familiarly acquainted with their burden of sin for which he is to atone. Secondly, he must be acceptable to God, and set apart by Him, for his offering to be acceptable. Thus are expressed both relations which the priest has to represent. It is then shown, in the inverse order (5:5-10), that Christ was truly fitted for both relations.

It being shown that Christ may be priest after the O. T. order, we are next led to see how his priesthood surpasses the Levitical, and even sets it aside. Here the author aims his chief blow against the Judaistic prepossessions and scruples of his readers. Here he lays the axe to the root of the tree. Hence he prepares the way beforehand by an earnest and confident exhortation (5:11 to 6:20). Nor is this drawn from what goes before, as with the other hortatory portions, but beats the track for what comes after. The author's succeeding treatment, also, falls into two sections, distinguished by having two different portions of the O. T. for text and subject. Interpreters have overlooked this. Ps. 110:4 governs 7:1 to 8:6. Then enters a new passage, Jer. 31:31-34, which is not simply a citation for confirming 8:6, but governs what succeeds to 10:18. The subject of the first of these sections is the priesthood of Christ as typified by Melchisedek. Of the second section the new covenant is the subject, which is as clearly adduced in 8:6 as the first subject was in 6:20. The former verse (8:6) bears a striking similarity to 1:4 in point both of language and position. In both instances a new thought, answering to what has gone before, is stated as the theme for the succeeding treatment. It being clear that the idea of the covenant takes the

lead of ch. ix., we may learn why the closing sentences of the entire section, compacting and confirming all at once, refer to the passages in Jeremiah. It is plain that nothing could so make clear the abrogation of the old covenant, as a proper notion of the new; and hence no passage could so well serve our author, in closing up his dogmatical division, as this very Messianic prophecy in Jeremiah.

We do not have to deal with the second of the sections now distinguished, but with the first (7:1 to 8:6), to a closer analysis of which we now turn.

§ 2. *Analysis of the Portion regarding Melchisedek.*

In showing that, as high-priest, Christ is raised far above Aaron and the Levites, whose priesthood was abolished, the author takes a course similar to that of Paul in his letter to the Galatians. The occasions of the two epistles are very similar, and hence the doctrinal development in each seems kindred. The Galatians had allowed circumcision and the law to assume prominence; the Hebrews were returning exclusively to the temple-service of the O. T., and were thus, in effect, denying Christ. It is shown, in both cases, that the older institution had only a passing significance, and was abrogated by the new covenant. In both epistles the author goes back of the law to Abraham's time, and there raises an element superior to the law. In the former epistle, he recalls the promise to Abraham, which pointed away, over the law, to Christ. The basis, back of the old covenant, would be connected with the new, as promise and fulfilment; and the law would come temporarily between. The latter epistle goes a step further back to the lofty, mysterious form of Melchisedek, who, as not belonging to the covenant people, stands out in the Abrahamic history like a higher manifestation from the enigmatic world of revelation. Abraham appears before Melchisedek as father of the stock of Levi, and thus represents the legal order of the Israelites. Melchisedek stands just as high above Abraham and the Levitical priesthood, as the promise appears above the law. The

promise and the typical Melchisedek are alike answered in Christ.

The fact that in *Hebrews* as in *Galatians*, Abraham represents also another idea, will not mislead us. There are points where he occupies the very same position which Melchisedek does in contrast with him in our section. Now he represents the system of grace; and again, the legal ordinance. He can be identified with the patriarchs of faith; or the Israel of law. Melchisedek and Levi are the opposites, and Abraham takes alternate sides. In our section, the latter represents the law, but in another place in the same epistle (6:13 sq.), he represents the side of promise, grace. Both his fleshly and his spiritual attitude are thus recognized.

We see how capable our author is of leading us into the deepest ideas concerning Abraham, and into the very kernel of ancient redemptive history. Nor is it otherwise in what he says of Melchisedek. But it is clear that he follows no rigid typical idea of that priest, wonderful as he is. What he follows is, for the most part, given in the Psalm, which Stier well calls the most mysterious and deep-meaning of all the Messianic psalms. Christ is here, by God's oath, designated as "priest forever after the order of Melchisedek." And this is the passage which is, more than once, repeated as the theme of our section. Assisted by the original passage in Genesis, the author presents it in all its aspects and relations.

The section now to be analyzed has three parts, as follows: 7:1—10; 7:11—22; 7:23 to 8:6. In the course of thought there is a beautiful progress, a steady swell through the three stages from the primitive type to the majestic Anti-type. Over the first part we might write, "Melchisedek;" over the second, "Melchisedek and Christ;" and over the third, "Christ." The first part, by aid of Genesis, describes the priest-king of Salem and his relation to Abraham; the second, by aid of the Psalm, points out the parallel between Melchisedek and Christ; the third, after the full N. T. manner, presents Christ as the eternal, holy, heavenly High Priest,

set free from the type. The peculiar import of the Psalm-passage in the middle part, sends its light back to the first part (see vv. 3, 8), and furnishes likewise the ground tone of the third part. It thus works, as does the idea of the contrast of the Levitical priesthood, in all three parts.

The first part is divided into two unequal portions; of which the first (1-3) describes Melchisedek as an ever-abiding priest; the second (4-10), his relation to Abraham, and through him to Levi. The first portion consists of a single period, whose subject, after being defined by a series of appositional phrases, takes at the close a verb and predicate supplied from the Psalm. The appositional words fall into three groups. (1) Those derived from Genesis: (a) belonging to Melchisedek's double office, and (b) relating to his singular meeting with Abraham, at which he blesses the latter on his return from conquest and receives back the patriarch's tribute. (2) Explanations and observations concerning the type: (a) positive, relating to Melchisedek's official position, as king of righteousness and peace, and (b) negative, relating to his person, as being of unknown origin and end. (3) The Psalmist's witness to the high dignity of Melchisedek, as being like the Son of God. The third group emphasizes what is barely suggested in the second.

The second *portion* gives evidence of the priest's greatness in the fact that the illustrious patriarch should give him the tenth. From this fact are derived three points wherein Melchisedek excelled the Levitical priests (vv. 5, 8, 9). Characteristic of the author, these points form a climax by which the subordination of Levi to the priest of God appears greater and greater. The author touches, first, the point in respect to which the Levitical priests and Melchisedek stand on a level. They receive, alike with him, a tenth. On a level with their brethren in point of fleshly descent, they yet, above them, receive a tenth solely on account of their office. At this very point the superiority of Melchisedek is also shown; since the prerogative of the Levitical priests rested on descent from Levi as a legal ordinance, while that of Melchisedek was had in virtue of his inner, personal worth,

his true priestly appearance in himself, without any legal advantage whatever. In the latter case, the right is grounded in the free, living, spiritual nature. And, in fact, the prerogative of Melchisedek is exercised in behalf of Abraham himself and not his descendants. It is a great thing that the Levitical priests should be allowed to take a tenth from Abraham's seed; it is far greater that one should be allowed to take the same from the patriarch himself. The superior estate of the priest-king is seen, further, in his blessing Abraham who was already the object of promise, and, by eminence, the blessed of God as well as the bearer of the blessing to all generations. Thus, while the author recognizes the full greatness of Abraham, Melchisedek is still greater. For he is able to *bless*; he has in keeping, and is able to impart, the divine gifts first promised to Abraham.¹

If such a difference already appears in what is common to Melchisedek and the Levitical priests, that difference is much increased when we turn from what is received by both to the recipients themselves. In one case, we have dying men; in the other, one who lives, in the full sense. This point will, however, be more carefully considered below.

The great subordination of the Levitical priests is seen still more clearly in another point of view. They indeed received a tenth; but they themselves, it may be said, give a tenth to Melchisedek, and thus testify to their own inferiority. For if Abraham was inferior to Melchisedek, then all in him, his future descendants, including Levi and his priests, were inferior. If the head bowed itself, then also the members. The old covenant of the carnal law, in its first representative, deferred to that which was free and spiritual in the relation of God and men which Melchisedek represented. Thus at the first, in the singular meeting of the patriarch and priest, it might be known that the entire legal order was something mediate and temporary. At the last, also, the final representative of the old covenant, John the Baptist, bowed before Christ, as Abraham before Melchisedek.

¹ On the full idea of the Blessing, see Stier on the passage. Compare also Hoffmann, *Prophecy and Fulfilment*, I. p. 101 seq.

The author now proceeds, in the second part (11—22), to the comparison of Melchisedek and Christ; or, in other words, to a careful view of the passage from the Psalm. He considers the passage in its several elements, but in the reversed order; thus, (1) "after the order of Melchisedek," (2) "a priest forever," (3) "the Lord hath sworn and will not repent." The author takes this course to secure a more natural connection with the preceding part of his subject. After describing Melchisedek, he must first apply what is said of him to Christ; which leads him to show what there is embraced in the words that Christ is priest after the order of Melchisedek. Thus indicating a general parallel between Christ and the priest-king, he passes to the main point in the comparison, namely, the eternity of their priesthood. Finally, the mode of promising a priesthood like Melchisedek's to Christ, namely, by the powerful oath of God, furnishes proof of the excellence of that priesthood above the Levitical. Taking a minuter view, we find then the following argument:

1. The simple fact that another priest is appointed, after the order of Melchisedek and not Aaron, suggests the insufficiency of the Levitical priesthood. We thus go beyond what is said in 5:1-10. The entire law is thus changed, so far as it presupposes a priesthood of Levi. For he to whom a priesthood like Melchisedek's is promised, is descended, not from Levi, but from the unpriestly stock of Judah (11—14).

2. This priest is priest forever. He exercises his priesthood, not by carnal commandment, but by virtue of an indissoluble life in his person. The carnal commandment, unable to give a word concerning eternal life, and in its entire fleshly nature weak, and so useless, is not simply changed, but entirely set aside (15—19).

Taking this view of the course of thought, we call *περισσότερον*, in v. 15, an adjective, thus: "And, further, still more is clear, when," etc.; i. e. something much more important follows evidently from another priest being established after the similitude of Melchisedek. The author says here, "after the similitude," instead of the usual, "after the order," in order thereby, as also by the position of the words

(see the Greek), to mark more strongly the likeness with Melchisedek. What this similitude consists of, viz. his eternal life, suggested in v. 8, is now expressly stated in v. 16, and confirmed in v. 17 by the oft-cited words of the Psalm. Thus the emphasis at this point lies on the word "forever." It appears in vv. 18, 19 in what the *περισσότερον* consists, and for what these verses are joined with the foregoing by the causal particle, namely, that the Psalmist's words involve not merely a change of the law (v. 12), but the entire abrogation of it. On account of this is inferred the introduction of a better covenant, as a third point (20—22). Hence appears a climax in the three points of the argument, which is indicated by *περισσότερον*, if our understanding of the word be correct.

The progress from the first to the second point, or from the change to the abrogation of the law, is nearly as follows: The fact that one of the stock of Judah is priest, like Melchisedek, and not Aaron, points to a change in the law as being involved in Messiah's coming. Now if this might happen in regard to him without abandoning the carnal foundation of the law, then Messiah would be merely a Reformer of the law. Christianity would be an improved outgrowth of Judaism. But the priesthood of Messiah, like Melchisedek's, carries us exceedingly far beyond (*περισσότερον*). He is priest forever. This view takes us above the law, which acts with reference to the dying flesh, into the bright region of spirit and imperishable life. For only at this height can be justified the deep reference of "forever." Some compare 9: 12—15, where the new covenant contemplates participation in the eternal inheritance discovered through Jesus Christ, and hence may be called "eternal." By the word "forever," the entire province of the carnal commandment is superseded. We may remark that the deep meaning of the author's language throws much light on the Messianic prophecies generally, with many points of which the language has an intimate connection.

In the word "forever" (v. 17), lies the disannulling of "an earlier commandment," just so far as the idea of eternity

is opposed to that of perishableness. And here the "earlier commandment" may have its most extensive reference, as applying to written statutes and flesh. With Paul the "spirit" has a twofold antithesis: (a) the objective and divine (the revealed letter), and (b) the subjective and human (the flesh); so that the flesh and the statutes of the law belong to the same general class. On this view is founded the idea that the same carnal commandment embraces both the statutes and the flesh. But the spirit is life, eternal and continuous, consisting not in outward prescriptions but in power. Nothing could be more interesting than to pursue the antithesis of "law" and "power," in v. 16, in connection with the Pauline doctrine.¹ The passage was, with good reason, the key-text of *Ættinger's Life-theology*.

From what has been said, it seems that the second point in the comparison of Christ and Melchisedek corresponds with the second in the preceding part. Both turn on the

¹ Auberlen here makes the following in valuable note, which, so far from being foreign to the investigation before us, actually throws light upon it: The divine revelation has two elements, separated by sin but united again in Christ, viz. communication and requirement, grace and law (righteousness). In Christ grace rules in the midst of righteousness. In him grace and truth become one (Rom. 3: 24. 5; 21. John 1: 14, 17). But in the old covenant they come in succession, as promise and law, law and prophets. The matter of grace is chiefly future, as the very idea of promise and of prophecy shows. Law prevails, in the Old Testament, though grace is, however, by no means wanting. This view is implied in Heb. vii.—x. Gal. 4: 24 seq. 2 Cor. 3: 6 seq. John 1: 17. The revelation of God by nature and conscience has the same two elements. In nature power reveals itself (Rom. 1: 20), in conscience the law of God (Rom. 2: 14). Physical life implies continual giving of power by him who clothes the lilies, who bestows upon this sphere life and breath, as upon the regenerate, life and spirit. After the fall, in the moral province there are no divine powers apart from redemption, only there is requirement, law witnessed by conscience. Conscience is a point of connection for the revelation of redemption, and that is all. Scripture knows nought of laws of nature, but only of divine powers, life-principles in nature. Hence its view of the world allows of miracles. Again, the scripture knows nothing of a spiritual power in man as he is, by which he may do good of himself and work out his own salvation. It knows simply a law in the conscience which we must obey, while unable to fulfil it. Hence the scripture not only allows, but requires miracles. For only by a redemption coming from without, can one reach the bound written in his conscience (Rom. 7: 24 seq.). Therefore, that theory which drives nature into simple laws, and ascribes spiritual powers to the natural man, is a plain subversion of the truth.

word "forever," in the Psalm ; both are founded in the idea of eternal life. Also the first points, in each part, correspond. Both treat of one having an un-Levitical origin, and form the lowest steps in the ascending development. The developments in the two parts regularly correspond, till, in the last verse of the second, the correspondence is exceeded, and there strikingly appears, for the first time, the positive idea of a new and better covenant between God and man.

3. In vv. 20—22 the author, for the first and only time, takes up the clause, "The Lord hath sworn," etc. The institution of the Levitical priesthood was not confirmed by an oath of God, but Christ's priesthood is thus confirmed; hence he is the surety of a better covenant. Man's oath is given on the weightiest occasions; much more the oath of God. His oath lends peculiar force to all its sanctions. God confirmed his Messianic promises with an oath (6:13), because they had an abiding part in his kingdom, unlike temporary legal ordinances. Accordingly, the oath-clause, in v. 28, stands over against the law, as the promise does in other cases.

In v. 22 we come to the theme of the following section (8:6 to 10:18); just as, in 5:10, was found the theme of our present section. As, in the latter case, a hortatory address came in before the expansion of the theme, so now some freer remarks on the subject in hand, come in to prepare for what comes after. • The theme is then (8:6) discussed.

The word "Jesus," in v. 22, furnishes the point of transition to the third part (7:23 to 8:6). The author omits it in the chapter until now, to show that now he has arrived on N. T. historical ground and abandoned the typical Melchisedek, whose name is, before this, mentioned for the last time. The writer can then speak of Christ's superior priesthood in a freer way. While, as he proceeds, he may lean towards the Psalm, he yet adduces points wherein the Prototype transcends the type. Hence the first point, in the second part, of itself falls out of view, while the other two become the subject of renewed remark (23—25, 26—28). A new third point, that of Christ sitting at God's right hand, is super-

added (8:1-6) from the Psalm, so making three points also for our third part. Christ is presented as the eternal, holy, heavenly high-priest.

Here we present barely the course of thought. The O. T. priests are many, since they continually pass away by death; but Christ has an unending priesthood, by which he is able, as an ever-living advocate, to save unto the uttermost, and bless, those who accept him as a Mediator. For we should have a priest complete, sinless, and exalted above all. The law made weak men priests, who needed continually new offerings for themselves; but the word of oath and promise made priest of one perfected, in eternity, as God's Son. (In 1:2, 5 Christ is opposed to the prophets, as here to the priests.) But that, in which all these excellences are included, is this: We have a high-priest who sits at God's right hand, performing his office in the true heavenly, and not typical earthly, sanctuary. And because he has entered into the full presence of God, and substantially participated in the divine life, above earthly nature and its shadow-work, he is able to represent, in the perfect way, the entire relation of God to man.¹

§ 3. *Explanation of what is said of Melchisedek.*

After our necessary survey to ascertain our position, we come now to consider the particular expressions concerning Melchisedek. In order to understand the difficult verses (3, 8) in the seventh chapter, an entire picture of the man is requisite; and hence we shall consider certain expressions in the opening verses of the chapter, more extensively than we otherwise should.

Melchisedek is called, first, "king of Salem." That Je-

¹ Auberlen here devotes a couple of pages to an exposition of 8:3, which must be omitted entirely. It is a fine sample of exegesis, of itself fully justifying a critic's remark concerning the entire essay, that it seems to "furnish an example of a more profound method of interpretation than we often meet with among the exegetes of the modern school, superadding to philological knowledge and critical sagacity a profounder philosophy, and especially a deeper insight into the relation of the Old Testament to the New." — *Tr.*

Jerusalem is here to be understood by Salem, even Kurtz¹ now argues. The appearance of Adonizedek, in Josh. 10:1, as king of Jerusalem, points loudly to this. Melchisedek and Adonizedek were alike common names of the kings of Jerusalem, as Pharaoh of the Egyptian kings, and Abimelech of the Philistine kings. Stier well shows how this circumstance makes the comparison of the Messiah with Melchisedek so much the clearer in a Psalm of David. David had conquered Jerusalem, and had put here the sanctuary of the most high God, and also the throne of Israel in the same neighborhood. Thus was he another Melchisedek, and Christ is Antitype at the same time. These three kings, Melchisedek, David, Christ, appear in Jerusalem a thousand years apart. The Spirit of God, with whom a thousand years are as a day, sees and embraces them all together.

Again, Melchisedek is called "priest of the most high God." The Greek expression for "most high" here, is a Hebraism, and is not to be understood as a superlative. The expression means "priest of God in the high place," i. e. God in the heaven (comp. Matt. 6:9; Lu. 2:4), and so, in fact, the true God, as opposed to the gods of earth and nature; just as in Dan. 2:28, 45; Neh. 2:4, the expression, "God of heaven," is used in contrast with the heathen gods. The meaning of "God," here, differs from the Israelitish sense of "Jehovah." Melchisedek nearly defines it when he blesses Abraham in the name of "the most high God, Possessor of heaven and earth." It is not the covenant God of peculiar O. T. revelation, but the God of universal natural revelation, whom Melchisedek serves. Hence, in blessing Abraham, he tenders him bread and wine, the simple gifts of nature. His priesthood is the original one of creation and nature, before heathenism entirely defaced them. Melchisedek's history is opposed to any perversion of nature-revelation into nature-worship. Hence, not without design, does our author quote the words: "who met Abraham returning from the slaughter of the kings," from Genesis, where they

¹ *Hist. O. Covenant*, I. (2nd ed.), p. 172 seq. Melchisedek's history is here clearly given.

stand as spoken of the king of Sodom. This king, beside the luminous form of Melchisedek, is like a dark leaf from the black realm of heathendom. Salem and Sodom are opposites, like Babel and the later Jerusalem. The king of Sodom would give to Abraham the goods of his city, now recaptured. But Abraham gave back all, declaring that he would not take a thread even to a shoe-latchet, which belonged to the heathen king. But gladly he consents to be refreshed by Melchisedek's bread and wine, and receives his blessing. Abraham's different course, in the two cases, reveals his relation to Melchisedek. Taking nothing from one king, he takes bodily and spiritual gifts from the other. And how different is the paying of tithe to one, from the course toward the other. The patriarch refuses all connection with the profane king, but even subordinates himself to the holy priest-king.

Of the old simple account, the author, in v. 2 seq., gives the spiritual meaning and application. He does not proceed in an arbitrary, trifling, Rabbinical way; but the Spirit, in him, shows what is the mind of the Spirit in the Mosaic account. We have here one of those numerous cases where the O. T. history becomes, as it were, transparent to the N. T. writers, so that they see the deeper divine thought pervading it. From this truly spiritual apprehension of the sacred record, there is indeed for us, uninspired men, but a step to ingenious trifling. Witness the Epistle of Barnabas.

Melchisedek is now first called "king of righteousness." The old names of scripture are full of meaning. When first given, they corresponded with some real fact. The name of Melchisedek answered to such a fact in the case of the kings of Jerusalem. With our priest-king it had its full inner meaning. It proves that, while, all around, heathenism spread out its darkness and horror, there was still the light of God's pure service at Jerusalem. The name consists with the fact of his being priest of God. For the righteousness attributed to the king must be that of God. Pious antiquity knows of no other. A true priest of God, he ruled with a righteous sceptre, and diffused righteousness among his people.

But righteousness prevailing among a people, there is the attendant blessing of peace. For "the work of righteousness is peace, and the effect of righteousness rest and security forever" (Isaiah). Therefore the kings gave the name of "peace," or Salem, to their city, thus indicating the peaceful prosperity which should attend their righteousness from God. This is the first Jerusalem, of which we know nothing except from its king. But knowing the little we do, we are able the better to comprehend how David, inspired with this picture of righteousness and peace, should feel compelled to compare Messiah with Melchisedek. Already in the primitive time, before Abraham was called, there was a Jerusalem, where the true God was purely served, where righteousness and peace kissed each other. The same which became the centre of other revelation, was also the last bright spot under the primitive revelation. Jerusalem was an oasis in the waste of heathendom. It resembled the garden of tradition, found on some bald, desolate, snow-decked mountain. Though its light comes to us as it were through the merest fissure, yet Abraham must have known of the character of city and king, else he would not have bowed so profoundly and with so little ado, before Melchisedek. The king of righteousness and his city of peace represent, thus, the primitive religion, and the original close relation of God and man, before it was wholly spoiled by heathenism. Abel, Enoch, Noah, and Shem represent the same. They were instances of the original child-relation of man to God, which bears, in itself, security of eternal life. And he who is priest in this condition of union with God, is priest forever. The Jerusalem of Melchisedek is not the later one, bowed under the yoke of the law, gendered unto bondage, but one altogether free and in the filial relation to God. Hence it pointed away to the upper Jerusalem, just as the promise, founded on filial belief, pointed beyond the law to the gospel fulfilment. In this way is Melchisedek a type of Christ. True, the king of Salem, notwithstanding his piety, was unable to stay the tide of heathenish apostasy; and hence God chose Abraham and brought in the

legal scheme, so as afterwards to offer the world the privilege of sons. But the way of the law was on account of the hardness of the heart, for from the beginning it was not so; and, before this way, the believing fathers entered into a better relation to God than could possibly have come by the laborious process of the law. From this, we proceed to find a definite meaning for the negative expressions in the third verse.

Both old and new interpreters are generally agreed respecting the explanation of the words: "without father, without mother, without genealogy." The last adjunct, which mentions that scripture gives no genealogy of the descent of Melchisedek, explains the two first. The author would not say that the priest had no parents, but only that scripture does not name them; and this silence is significant. "The holy scripture would mean something by its very silence" (Stier). It is not the objective fact, which the author uses, but the peculiar account of the O. T. This he takes in the sense in which the Hebrews themselves, in their inclination to the Levitical worship, would treat it, and confutes them by it. Here, as in the whole epistle, he keeps close in the track of scripture. What Genesis does not say, and the Psalm says, decides his course in the present instance; which gives us a key to the definition of his expressions. According to our author, then, we have before us one whom the O. T. names "priest," to whom the name is first applied, who does not belong to the stock of Levi, upon whose origin, in fact, the scripture lays so little stress as not to give it at all. But with priests under the law, so important was the matter of descent, that under Nehemiah, such as found not their register, were debarred from the priesthood. The O. T. itself thus recognizes a priesthood before and superior to the law, not grounded in fleshly ordinance, but resting in the free person and on his spiritual belief. How like a flash of lightning must this fact break in upon the Judaistic views of his readers! We are reminded of Jesus, in the parable, placing the Samaritan above the priests and Levites, and of Paul, in *Romans*, grounding the filial relation to God in the

spiritual nature of the promise of grace and faith, and not in any fleshly descent from Abraham. Compare also Matt. 3: 9; Jno. 8: 39. The same kind of weapons are borne against the Hebrews now falling away from faith, as had everywhere been used against faithless Judaism. Against those who might again boast, "We have Abraham for our father," the *ἀπάτωρ* would hold, the one without father, whom the O. T. itself had praised and placed above Abraham in a parallel with Messiah.

The next expression, "having neither beginning of days nor end of life," is another negative one and is explained also, like the preceding, from the silence of scripture, the unrecorded genealogy. The priest-king is not only outside of the holy seed of Abraham and Levi, but scripture reckons him not even in the series of the earlier patriarchs whose birth and death are given on account of being in the Messianic line of descent. Melchisedek belonged, indeed, to the *Coryphei* of the primitive revelation; but while they and the Israelitish patriarchs had their birth and death scrupulously given as having significance in the unfolding of God's kingdom, while in the case of most, nothing else is noted but this, in our priest's case there is not a word of this, and stress is laid alone on his spirit and relation to God. Thus is he like Christ; to whom Paul has applied the words: "We know not Christ after the flesh; and we know, in fact, no one any longer after the flesh."

We pass to the next clause. Its logical relation to what precedes, may be thus indicated: Melchisedek possesses none of the advantages of fleshly descent, etc.; *and yet* he is on this very account put, or placed, like the Son of God. We say "put like," and embrace two meanings. (1) "like," or "made like," and (2) "likened," or "compared." It has, by all means, the first sense. Melchisedek is so put down in the Mosaic account, that one sees that God would here bring forward one like his Son, and pointing typically to him. The sacred account so speaks of him, or is in such a way silent concerning him, as to make him like the Son of God. As the latter came forth from the hidden depths of

eternity and returns thither in a most mysterious way (1 Tim. 3:16), so does Melchisedek come forth from his concealment and fall back again, leaving his origin and end a mystery. — But the verb does not mean simply “made like,” in point of fact, but also recognized to be such in the view of another, hence “likened.” Melchisedek is made like Christ by the facts of history, and is likened to him by the declaration of God’s word. He is compared with Christ in the Psalm. That our author thinks partly of the declaration in the Psalm, is shown by the closing words of the verse. In the Psalm, Melchisedek and Christ are mutually compared; but the author thinks only of the comparison of the former to the latter. This need not lead us to suppose, with Bengel, Bleek, and Stier, that the writer to the Hebrews carries his mind back to the eternal Logos, who as Archetype is older than Melchisedek. For with the eternal Logos, as such, Melchisedek has nothing in common; but rather with the incarnate Logos. And, besides, the “Son of God,” in our passage and the entire epistle, is not the ante-temporal Logos, but the eternal Son in his historical manifestation as Messiah. He is here purposely named God’s Son, and not Christ or Jesus, because, while his fleshly nature is recognized, he is regarded more on the side of his divine dignity, in the light of being, after all, superior to flesh; as, in the case of Melchisedek, his earthly condition, though real, does not come so much into view as his relation to God, his righteousness, his peace, and his royal priesthood.

The predicate, “abideth a priest continually,” finally follows. The words are taken from the Psalm; only *εἰς τὸ διηνεκές*, “continually,” is put in place of *εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα*, “forever” (5:6; 6:20). But it is entirely synonymous with the other, as the reference in 10:12, 14 shows, and the verb “abideth” requires. The epistle refers directly to Melchisedek what the Psalm predicated of Messiah; but this is on account of the words, “after the order of Melchisedek,” appended in the Psalm. It is most natural to find, in the comparison, not only the priesthood of each compared, but also the eternity of that priesthood. Christ is not only priest,

but priest forever, after the order of Melchisedek. Thus it is that, in some sense, an eternal priesthood is ascribed to the king of Salem. How can this be, is the difficult question, to which we are expected to reply. We have already indicated our view in what has been said; but a consideration of v. 8 will make the answer plainer.

In this verse Melchisedek is, in a striking manner, set over against the Levitical priests. They are "dying men;" he "lives." But he has also died; for the word "lives" can no more exclude him from death, than the words "endless life," in v. 16, do Christ. How then can he be opposed to the legal priests? Let us see. The Levitical priests are appointed only in accordance with the prescription of a carnal commandment, which does not reach beyond the region of temporal death. Their priesthood depends on descent, not on serving the living God in spirit and in truth. They are carnal, and not in living and life-giving fellowship of God. At least, this latter is unessential. The law does not and cannot require it. On the other hand, we know that Melchisedek was priest in living power, by the very nature of his holy, spiritual character. According to Genesis, all the stress falls on his spiritual and not on his natural life. The carnal life perishes, but the spirit is life because of righteousness. He stood in the living, filial relation to God, similar to believers under the new covenant. It is the same with him as with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob in Matt. 22 : 31, 32, who are "living," because God calls himself their God. He who serves the living God in truth, is in a fellowship delivering him from death. Thus in Rom. 2 : 7, 10, eternal glory is given to those who do good in believing patience. So in Heb. ch. xi., it is amply shown that the ante-Christian believers were strangers and foreigners in this life, and in their true nature belonged to the heavenly fatherland, where he who is not ashamed to call them their God, hath prepared them a city with foundations and hence eternal. Thus the difference between the dying Levites and the living Melchisedek is the same as that between "dead works," under the law, and the "service (9 : 14) of the living God," under grace.

Hence we get an understanding of Melchisedek's eternal priesthood. He is priest by virtue of his relation to God, his life in God, and his service of God. But this relation, life, and service are eternal. Hence he is an eternal priest. For his priesthood is inseparable from, and rests entirely in his spiritual service. He belongs to those "kings and priests" who are before the throne of God, and serve him night and day in his temple; so that the designation "kings and priests," found in Revelation, can be explained by our passage in Hebrews, just as well as by the references in Ex. 19:6 and 1 Pet. 2:9. Hence we discover one of the many points of contact between our Epistle and the Apocalypse. The designation seems transferable from type to Antitype, and so to all believers under the new covenant. The idea of expiating sin belongs as little to the heavenly priesthood as to the universal priesthood so familiar to us. It is the priesthood consisting of the holy, free approach of the soul to God, of the service of God in the evangelical sense.¹ The same is implied in the representation, everywhere, concerning Melchisedek. There is not a word said, anywhere, of an atonement by this priest; and a glance at the parallel between Christ and Melchisedek, in Heb. 7:11—22, will show that it has respect to their personal character, and not at all to a work of expiation, which first comes into notice in succeeding chapters. "Aaron, with all his shedding of blood, typifies the atoning Saviour, while Melchisedek typifies Christ's life and power in God and what is thereby wrought out in his eternal priesthood and kingly office" (Steinhofer).

Melchisedek is thus eternal priest in no other sense than are all glorified spirits. That this view is not foreign to our epistle, although naturally not developed in our chapter, is easily shown, as already suggested. Compare 9:14; 10:19; 12:28; 13:15. See, too, 8:5; 9:6. But the evan-

¹ Compare remarks in Auberlen's work on the Prophet Daniel and the Revelation of John, German edition, p. 338 seq. A translation of the work is published by Warren F. Draper, Andover, and favorably noticed in Bib. Sac., Vol. XII. p. 643.

gelical priesthood is eternal in itself; its representatives partake of an eternal inheritance in the city of God. So Melchisedek exercises eternally his priesthood in the heavenly, archetypal Jerusalem, of whose freeness and peace his earthly Salem was so happy a type.

§ 4. *On the Special Advantage of this Explanation.*

An instance of our view we find in the writings of Marcus Eremita, an Egyptian monk, who lived about A. D. 400. He suggests that the words "abideth continually," or "forever," are uttered in the same sense concerning Melchisedek as they might be in the case of all the holy ones, as Isaiah and the apostles. These not only abide continually in the silence of scripture, but they remain forever in the presence of God (Bleek I. p. 139; II. 2, p. 321).

Since the time of this monk, this view appears to have found no other friends. The succeeding exegetes fall into the two classes above indicated. Now what is the position our view holds to the explanations of these two classes? What is the advantage of our own explanation? We remark that it obviates those insurmountable difficulties which appear not only in the nature of the case itself, but in the records concerned, as soon as Bleek's view, that Melchisedek was a supernatural being, is for once entertained. It agrees with the commonly received opinion from Theophylact to Ebrard, in the chief point, that Melchisedek was a holy man like those noted in the 11th of Hebrews, and also in explaining the negative attributes given to the priest-king by silence of scripture. But it diverges from the prevalent interpretation in seeking to explain the ascription of eternal life and priesthood from an altogether different point of view. To explain this also from the silence of Genesis would not only seem artificial and forced, but would not allow of such a direct reference to the Psalm as the disputed passages plainly have. We would refer back to Genesis and the Psalm each their own. We recognize what is real as well as what is merely represented. Heartily agreeing

with Bleek, that the prevailing exposition goes over the difficulties without really solving them, we at the same time do not seek to mend the matter by a most impracticable assumption of a miraculous existence, but by taking a deep spiritual view of the character of Melchisedek in harmony with the circle of ideas peculiar to the N. T., to Paul, and to our epistle.

It is in favor of our view that it provides a connecting link between the negative predicates drawn from Genesis, and the positive ones drawn from the Psalm. One might say that the expression "having neither beginning of days nor end of life," is so like the one "it being witnessed that he lives," that we are not allowed to explain them from different points of scripture. In reply we submit that, according to the obvious circumstances of the case, denied by no one, the first expression is made from regard to the silence of Genesis, while the latter, with its word "witnessed," points back just as plainly to the word "forever" in the Psalm. So at all events the sources of the two expressions are different. As it regards their meaning, we do not deny the likeness. We have recognized it in our view. But Genesis does not lay all stress upon the earthly life of the priest, but more especially upon his spiritual life; and so the Psalm may point to him as one who lives eternally. Thus we allow the natural reference of the predicates, while at the same time we find the bond of connection between them. The only question which can be raised is, whether our epistle does not then put too much into the Psalm. In reply, we have only to unfold and sum up some points already indicated. It was remarked that it is grammatically most natural to refer the word "forever" in the Psalm to Melchisedek; so that David would regard him as an eternal priest. But how came he to this?

The 110th Psalm is the fruit of one of the most consecrated hours of David's life. Never did he speak more truly in the Spirit. Never did he take a deeper look into the nature and course, past and future, of the kingdom of God. He beheld his great Successor as about to sit

upon the divine throne of Israel in such a manner as to fill up all the deficiencies which had pertained to himself or his rule. In him the kingdom of Israel would find its consummation. This could not be in the case of David, as he himself confesses. Dwelling in fact in the neighborhood of God's house, he yet could not enter as priest into the holy place. If he, so his people, would be excluded. And, besides, the tumults of his reign must have sorely reminded him that the people were far from being a kingdom of priests, a holy people, willing to yield to Jehovah and his Anointed. But if the king could become priest in the deep sense suggested to David's mind by the Spirit (Ps. 40: 7—10; Heb. 10: 5—10), then the people also would become a priestly people, a willing offering in holy ornaments. In Messiah's reign both things are realized, the holy willingness of the people, and the confirming of one, otherwise called King, as Priest of Jehovah. Then comes a victory over all enemies. When the perfect Priest-king once begins his authority on earth, all the enemies of God's kingdom must become humbled. Compare course of thought throughout the Psalm.

Then with the Priest-king's advent should be inaugurated a new order of things. What was impossible under the old covenant, the king's and priest's offices would now be united in one person. But this union would not be merely outward; it answers to something deep in the inner nature. David by the Spirit saw all this. He saw the character in which Messiah would appear; that he would not be like the O. T. bearers of office, but one in whom all which was separated under the old order would be inwardly associated. There could be no other priesthood and kingship, and so no more Messiahs. What Christ is, he is absolutely, for every and all time. Complete as an advocate of men before God, and as a representative of God in humanity, he is the eternal Priest-king, in whose exalted person the entire operation of God in the world finds its fulfilment.

Now this discovery of such a glorious character to come, was made all the clearer to David by the Holy Spirit's bringing before his vision a representation from the past,

which in its mysterious exaltation was adapted, as no other was, to shadow forth the Messiah. As the O. T. order, with its divided and ever-changing offices, was to yield before the coming King and Priest in Zion, so already had the same order bowed to Melchisedek, in the person of Abraham. Precisely the fact that the friend of God, the possessor of the promise, the father of a holy people, of his own accord humbled himself before Melchisedek, lends the latter peculiar excellence in the eyes of all the enlightened and pious. For how would the patriarch, having a glimpse of faith and the Spirit, allow himself to be blessed by a man, give him the tithe, and recognize him in this twofold way as priest of God, unless he were such in very truth. Outward authority the priest-king possessed in no respect above Abraham. Of no patriarchal race, without qualification for the theocratic offices, his authority rests on the eternity-stamp in his appearance, on his holy, majestic personality. Thus he stands there, great and sublime. He spreads out his hands over Abraham, blessing him and the future Israel, while the patriarch *willingly* gives back the tenth. So one day would Messiah bless his people, while they would become a free will-offering in the beauty of holiness. Melchisedek towers above Abraham, and Messiah above Israel, by virtue of his own holy Person. These truths the Holy Spirit would excite in David's mind, as there came before his eye the wonderful picture of the past, so astonishingly rich even in its minor features.

And now we will wonder no more that the singer of Israel saw Melchisedek as an eternal priest. The priestly dignity was grounded entirely in the personal. Office and person stood in harmonious unity, such as spiritual life ever insures, whether in Christ or all true men. One was but the outflow and expression of the other. And so should it be, since the priestly office concerns the deepest relations of man to his God. To whatever extent Melchisedek should cease to *live*, he would cease to be *priest*. True priesthood is life, and true life is priesthood. This is not a perversion of the idea of priest, but only applying it in its deepest

sense, as the Spirit of God gives it. David is assured of himself even, that, because God is with him, death has no power over him, and his way leads to fulness of joy and eternal pleasures before the face of God. From the same consciousness of life, flowing from fellowship with God, and pervading his whole being and thought, Abraham also believed in an awakening from the dead, while in the same manner the O. T. believers generally hoped for eternal reward in the heavenly city of the living God.

Thus are we well assured that the author of the epistle to the Hebrews does no violence to the sense of the Old Testament; but only unfolds it to us for the first time in its full depth, with that apostolic exegesis which Paul characterizes in 1 Cor. 2: 13—16, which, if it shall often seem to us like a hard saying, will be better and better appreciated by our theology.

ARTICLE IV.

THE RELIGIOUS LIFE AND OPINIONS OF JOHN MILTON.

BY REV. A. D. BARBER, WILLISTON, VT.

MORE biographies have been written of John Milton than of any other man that has lived in modern times; more perhaps than of any other man that has ever lived. Mr. Reed, in 1841, enumerated no less than twenty-five. Three are known to the author to have appeared since. These biographies are tinctured with every variety and shade of opinion, poetical, political, moral, and theological. They have, as Mr. Reed says, "issued from the pens of poets, of antiquaries, of divines, of scholars, of painters, from Churchmen and Dissenters, from Infidels, from the heightened Aristocrat, the Whig, and the Chartist."

Besides the biographers there have been hosts of critics

and commentators, as diverse in character and fitness for their work as it is possible for men to be. They have left us a medley, — a hash, in which, if it be difficult to find the truth, it is not at all difficult to find something to gratify every variety of taste, and confirm every diversity of opinion.

"If a man would set himself down," says Arch-Deacon Blackburne, in Hollis's Memoirs, "to devise one of the highest entertainments his imagination could furnish, he could not succeed better, if he was a man of genius and judgment, than in exhibiting a conversation between Shakspeare and Milton, in the shades, on the operations of their several critics and commentators. What infinite pleasantries would arise from their several observations! Shakspeare would appear in as mangeld a condition as Deiphobus; Milton's wounds might perhaps be counted:

Bis sex thoraca pettum
Perfossunque locis,

but would amount to ten times the number of those of Mezentius." [Hollis's Memoirs, vol. II., p. 532, 4to. Lond. 1780.]

It is not our purpose to criticise the critics, or clear up the contradictions of the commentators. This we shall do only so far as to show how some of the erroneous opinions that are now entertained concerning Milton, have come to prevail, and to bring out what Milton himself held on some fundamental subjects in theology and religion, — particularly the doctrines of the Trinity, and the Persons in the Godhead. If in doing this we are compelled to dissent from, and convict of error, any of the great and good men, who in real affection and veneration of Milton, have endeavored to hold him up for the world's admiration, this we sincerely regret. "We could find no pleasure," to use the fine figure of Dr. Channing, "in sacrificing one great name to the manes of another." Nor do we wish to be thought so vain as "to stretch to the tiptoe height of our small stature to strike a blow at lofty names." We deem it due however to Milton, and to truth, to vindicate, if possible, his name and memory from any aspersions that accident, or haste, or hate, or imperfect knowledge, may have thrown upon him.

"*Religiosissimi mortales*," says the historian Sallust, in

describing the character of the early Romans. Without flattery or abatement, this characterizes John Milton. He is indeed the most religious of mortals. Solemnity and sanctity thoroughly permeate and pervade his very spirit. They are the sub-stratum of his character, cropping out continually in the bold prominences of his thought and feeling, and of his words and deeds. These all come up from religious depths, and naturally flow out in religious channels. More than any other man, John Milton makes upon us the impression of one who is all the time conscious of the Divine presence, and under the powers of the world to come. His conduct is everywhere of the sanctity of a vow. As we might expect them, when we consider the depth and clearness of his mind, his control of language, giving him unlimited power of expression, his religious opinions are clearly conceived, firmly held, precisely and broadly stated. They are seen too wherever Milton is seen, because they belong to the man. They are the man. They peer out from all his works in poetry and prose; from his controversial writings, from his political treatises, from his histories, state papers, tracts, and letters, as well as his strictly doctrinal and devotional works. References without number might be made to verify this statement. Thus in his "Reformation in England," "Prelatical Episcopacy," "Animadversions upon Rem. Defence," and no less in the "History of Great Britain," as well as in "Paradise Lost," it can easily be learned how he held the doctrine of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit; how he regarded worship, especially the chief part of it, prayer and praise. Also in "Areopagitica," "Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce," "Likeliest Way to Remove Hirelings out of the Church," it is not difficult to ascertain the reverence Milton paid the Holy Scriptures, the Sabbath, the Church, and what he thought of Creation and Providence, of the primitive state of man, sin, freedom, predestination, and necessity, and generally of the doctrines of the Christian religion. Religion was Milton's imperial theme. It was the controlling and harmonizing idea of his life.

"It is impressive to hear the boy Milton," says the lamented Reed, "in his early verses, pleading with his father that poetry is a *holy thing*; and again, to hear him in the prime of manhood, amid the stern words of one of his controversial publications, announcing that the great achievements of poetry must rest on devout prayer to that Eternal Spirit who can enrich with all utterance and knowledge, and sends out His seraphim with the hallowed fire of his altar, to touch and purify the lips of whom he pleases."

There is doubtless in the case of Milton, as in that of other great minds, as there ever must be where there is any intellectual and moral growth, a progress of opinion towards completion and perfection, so that what is held and said to-day is not always harmonious, much less equal in depth and extent of understanding and meaning with what was held and said yesterday, or shall be held and said next year, or at the end of the next quarter of a century. Opinion in Milton, and especially in his youth, is what he most justly says of it in the good man, "only knowledge in the growth." Milton's works at large, then, and particularly those that he gave birth to in the fulness of his development, are the works that must have most weight in the search we have undertaken. We must lay fast hold of those opinions by which Milton himself would wish to be known and judged. These are not the opinions of his youth and school-boy days, correct as many of these were, but of the writer of "*Areopagitica*," "*The Defence*," "*Paradise Lost*." The former are to the latter what "the pang and the throe are to the living birth." By taking the opinions of youth as equal to those of manhood and old age, and much more as preponderating over them, we match the boy against the man, and nullify the maxim, that wisdom dwells with age, and experience with gray hairs.

The Discovery of Milton's Theological Treatise,—The Christian Doctrine: Knowledge of it among his Contemporaries.

In the year of our Lord 1823, there was discovered, in the State Paper Office of Great Britain, a theological treatise,

in manuscript, written in Latin, and professing to be the work of John Milton, but diverse in sentiment and style from all that had hitherto been known as his.

It seems to have been known to some of the contemporaries and friends of our author, that he engaged in the compilation of a theological work. At least Anthony Wood, who was the first to write and publish any account of Milton that has come down to us, mentions such a work. In the *Fasti Oxonienses*, published in 1691, seventeen years after Milton's decease, Wood gives a brief but connected narrative of Milton's life and works. The facts embodied in this narrative, Wood does not pretend to give from personal acquaintance with Milton, but on the authority of a friend, who, he says, "was well acquainted with Milton, and had from him, and from his relatives after his death, most of this account of his life and writings following," i. e., the life and writings in which Wood mentions the *Theological Treatise*.

The name of the friend Wood does not give. Biographers of Milton, however, say this friend was John Aubrey, the antiquarian. He made "Collections for the Life of Milton" in 1681, and left them in manuscript.¹ They further say that Wood was allowed the use of these Collections when he compiled his account of Milton in the *Fasti Oxon.* above referred to. (See Godwin's *Lives of Edward and John Philips*, pp. 274, 335: 4to., Lond., 1815. Hollis's *Memoirs*, vol. I. p. 238. Warton in *Hol. Mem.*, II. p. 542: 4to., Lond. 1780. Todd's *Life of Milton*, in his *Edit. of the Poet. Works*, vol. I. p. 13: 12mo., Lond. 1826, 3rd Ed.)

Edward Philips, also, Milton's nephew and pupil, in his *life of Milton*, in 1694, speaks definitely of a theological work, which the pupils of Milton, he among the number, were required, at their master's dictation, to write, as a part of their Sunday's Work. (Philips's *Life of Milton*, in Godwin's *Lives*, p. 363.)

¹ These Collections were preserved in MS. in the Ashmolean Museum, Oxford, till 1815, when they were printed by William Godwin, in connection with his *Lives of Edward and John Philips*. The author has a copy of Godwin's *Lives* with Aubrey's Collections.

Aubrey and Philips are the only friends and biographers of Milton, so far as we can discover, that speak from anything like personal knowledge of Milton's Theological Treatise. In regard to Aubrey, there is reason to doubt, as we shall show, whether he had any other than hearsay knowledge of this treatise; rather there is reason to believe that he knew nothing reliable about it.

Toland, the next of Milton's biographers, and after him Newton, Symmons, Todd, Mitford, Bridges, Keightley, and others, refer to the Theological Treatise; but it is evident from the manner of their reference, that they had no other knowledge of it than what they gained from Aubrey and Wood, and refer to it only on the authority of these biographers.

Toland's reference is in these words: "He wrote likewise a System of Divinity, but whether intended for public view, or collected merely for his own use, I cannot determine." (Toland's *Life of John Milton*, p. 136: 12mo., Lond. 1699 and 1761.) Newton, in his reference to the work, gives Toland as authority. (See Newton's *Life of Milton* in his *Edition of Paradise Lost*, vol. I. p. 54: 4to., Lond. 1754.) Symmons gives Wood as authority. (See Symmons's *Life of Milton*, in his *Edition of the Prose Works*, vol. VII., p. 500: Lond. 1806.) Todd gives Aubrey and Wood. (See Todd's *Life of Milton*, in his *edition of the Poetical Works*, vol. I. p. 293: 3rd Ed., Lond. 1826.) Mitford refers to Toland, Aubrey, and Wood. (Mitford's *Life of Milton* in his *edition of the Poetical Works*, vol. I. p. 96: 8vo., Boston, 1845.)

Aubrey and Philips are the only authorities we have concerning the Theological Treatise in question. Their accounts are contradictory. Which is to be credited we shall see hereafter.

*Ignorance of Milton's Contemporaries and Early Biographers,
of his Theological Work.*

The early biographers of our author inform us that he entered upon the composition of a theological work. This is

about all they seem to have known of it. At least, it is about all that can be learned from them concerning it. None of them inform us of the specific character of this work, or of its object, whether it was intended for public, or only for private use.

Toland, with all his advantages for finding out these things, and they were not few,—for besides the collections of Aubrey, the *Life* by Philips, and that by Wood, Toland had access to both Milton's works in the original manuscripts, and to Milton's nearest relatives and friends. In his Introduction to his *Life of Milton*, he says :

"The amplest part of my materials I had from his own books, where, constrained by the diffamations of his enemies, he often gives an account of himself. I learnt some particulars from a person that had bin once his amanuensis, which were confirm'd to me by his daughter now dwelling in London, and by a letter written to me at my desire from his last wife, who is still alive. I perused the papers of one of his nephews ; learnt what I could in discourse with the other ; and lastly consulted such of his acquaintance as, after the best inquiry, I was able to discover." — *Toland's Life of Milton*, p. 3 and 4. 12mo. Lond. 1699 and 1761.

With all of these advantages and pains, Toland says of Milton's *System of Divinity*, as he calls it, "whether it was intended for public view, or collected merely for his own use, I cannot determine."¹—Id. p. 136.

Besides the lack of reliable information, in Milton's early biographers, concerning the time, specific character, and object of his theological work, there is the same lack concerning the title it bore, and even the language in which it was written. Aubrey, and Wood after him, call it "*Idea Theologiæ*." (See Aubrey's *Collections*, in Godwin's *Lives*, p. 348. 4to. Lond. 1815. Also, *Fasti Oxon.* Vol. I. p. 266. Fol. Lond. 1721.) They are supposed, as Todd says, "to

¹ It is well to recollect that Toland was the first to collect and publish Milton's *Prose Works*. This he did in 1698. In his *Life of Milton*, prefixed to this edition of the *Prose Works*, Toland gives a complete Catalogue of them, and shows no slight acquaintance with both their matter and spirit. "This *Life*," says Godwin, "is upon the whole perhaps the biographical monument most in unison with its subject, that has yet been erected to the memory of Milton." — Godwin's *Lives*, p. 282.

have been in error." Certainly "*Idea Theologiæ*" is not the title the work now bears. 'This is *De Doctrina Christiana ex Sacris Duntaxat Libris Petita, Disquisitionum Libri Duo Posthumi*.' This title however is believed, both by Todd and Mitford, on good grounds as we think, to have been added to the work after Milton's death, by those into whose hands the manuscript fell. (See Todd's *Life of Milton*, Vol. I. p. xcvi. Boston, 1845.)

Of the language in which the work was written, Dr. Sumner remarks :

"It is observable that neither Wood, nor any of the subsequent biographers of Milton, have mentioned the language in which his theological treatise was written. To prefix a learned title to an English composition, would be so consistent with Milton's own practice, as well as with the prevailing taste of his age, that the circumstance of Aubrey's ascribing to it a Latin name affords no certain proof that the work itself was originally written in that language."—*Preliminary Observations to Dr. Sumner's Translation of Christian Doctrine in Milton's Prose Works*. Vol. IV. p. vii. Bohn's Edit. Lond. 1853.

We have thought it fitting to state these facts, to show how little dependence can be placed upon the statements of Milton's early biographers concerning his theological work. They are, indeed, good authority that such a work was undertaken by John Milton; but of the time when it was begun, and completed, and of the character and object of the work, they tell us very little that is reliable. They inform us that it was, last, in the hands of Cyriac Skinner. Discoveries since 1823, the time when the work was found, trace it into the hands of Daniel Skinner, and show that he began a correspondence with Daniel Elzevir of Amsterdam, for the purpose of publishing it, and actually sent the work, in manuscript, to Elzevir for this purpose. Elzevir, on account of the heresy contained in the work, refused to publish it; whereupon Skinner took away the manuscript. (See Todd's *Life*, Vol. I. p. 296-7; also, Bohn's Edit. of *Milt. Prose Works*. Vol. IV. p. xcvi.)

Notwithstanding the omissions and uncertainties of Milton's early biographers concerning his theological work,

there is now no doubt but that John Milton composed a theological treatise, and that the *Christian Doctrine*, found in 1823, and translated by Dr. Sumner, is this treatise.

When was Milton's Theological Work, The Christian Doctrine, compiled? Dr. Sumner's Statement and his Authorities, Anthony Wood and John Aubrey.

On the settlement of this question all depends, because "The *Christian Doctrine*" is not only in its style different, but maintains opinions, and advocates doctrines, directly contradictory to those that are found in all of Milton's other works, the time of whose composition is known. Was the *Christian Doctrine* compiled in the fulness of Milton's development, so that it exhibits his opinions matured and settled; or in his youth, so that it exhibits the same in the process of inquiry and growth only? By which would Milton himself wish to be known and judged, the opinions and sentiments of the *Christian Doctrine*, or those found in all the other of his great works, extending through a period of more than a third of a century?

The general impression, among a certain class of writers and readers, that have only cursorily examined the question of the *Christian Doctrine*, is, I believe, this: that it is one of Milton's last works, and intended to be posthumous.

The impression that the *Christian Doctrine* was intended to be a posthumous publication, arises probably from two facts. 1st, It was not published until after the author's death; 2d, and chiefly, from the title the manuscript bore when found in 1823. (See the title above given.) This is the ground on which Dr. Sumner, the translator of the *Christian Doctrine*, bases his conclusion.

"It appears from the title," he says (*Preliminary Observations*, p. xi.), "that the work was originally intended to be a posthumous publication." And he goes on to give reasons, or conjectures rather, for this: "The reproaches to which its author had been exposed in consequence of opinions contained in his early controversial writings, may have induced him to avoid attracting the notice of the public, during the ascendancy of his political opponents, by a frank avowal of his religious sentiments."

But judge all who know John Milton, if such a supposition be not contradictory to the whole spirit and practice of the man. When did he shrink from openly and boldly declaring his opinions, or fearlessly advocating what he held as truth? Yea, when did he manifest any prudence or self-regard in this matter? Such a conclusion is unworthy of his able translator. Dr. Sumner himself, in another part of his Preliminary Observations, refutes it. Having added to what we have just quoted, as follows: that "high-church principles were at the zenith of their popularity," at the time Milton departed "so far from received opinions," — and, "it would have been the height of imprudence," if not inconsistent with the "safety of the author," to have provoked, by publishing his opinions, the animosity of that party in the state to whose lenity he already owed his life and fortune, he says:

"But of all the charges which private or political prejudice has created against the author, that of being a "time-server," according to the reproach of Warburton, seems to have been the least deserved. The honesty of his sentiments is sufficiently vindicated by the boldness with which he uniformly expressed them in times when freedom of speech was more than ordinarily dangerous, as well as by his consistent exposure of what he conceived to be erroneous, whether advocated by his own friends or by his opponents. Thus, on discovering that 'new presbyter was but old priest writ large,' he resisted the encroachments of the Presbyterians as resolutely as he had before contributed to overthrow Prelacy; and if it were necessary, his political independence might be no less successfully vindicated by adducing the spirited language which he addressed to Cromwell, in the plenitude of his power."

In this connection, too, to show Milton's independence and fearlessness, Dr. Sumner points us to his conduct while abroad, in the papal dominions, when, he says, Milton was "at so little pains to moderate his zeal for the reformed religion, as to be exposed to insult and personal danger in consequence of his known principles." (Id. p. xxv. and xxvi.)

Besides the violence that Dr. Sumner's conjecture does to the character of Milton, there is good reason to believe, as Todd and Mitford say, that the title to which Dr. Sumner refers as the ground of his conjecture, is not original, but

added by those into whose hands the manuscript fell after Milton's decease.

All that can be gleaned from the Dedication goes to show, that Milton expected the work would be published, and published in his life-time. He writes just as if he intended to make it public at once. After having stated his personal and individual reasons for undertaking it, he says :

"If I communicate the result of my inquiries to the world at large ; if, as God is my witness, it be with a friendly and benignant feeling towards mankind, that I *readily give as wide a circulation as possible to what I esteem my best and richest possession*, I hope to meet with a candid reception from all parties, and that none, at least, will take unjust offence, even though many things should be brought to light which will at once be seen to differ from certain received opinions. I earnestly beseech all lovers of truth not to cry out that the church is thrown into confusion by that freedom of discussion and inquiry which is granted to the schools, and ought certainly to be refused to no believer, since we are ordered 'to prove all things,' and since the daily progress of the light of truth is productive far less of disturbance to the church, than of illumination and edification. Nor do I see how the church can be more disturbed by the investigation of truth, than were the Gentiles by the first promulgation of the gospel ; since, so far from recommending or imposing anything on my own authority, it is my particular advice that every one should suspend his opinion on whatever points he may not feel himself fully satisfied, till the evidence of scripture prevail, and persuade his reason into assent and faith. Concealment is not my object ; it is to the learned that I address myself, or if it be thought that the learned are not the best umpires and judges of such things, I should at least wish to submit my opinions to men of mature and manly understanding, possessing a thorough knowledge of the doctrines of the gospel ; on whose judgments I should rely with far more confidence, than on those of novices in these matters. And whereas the greater part of those who have written most largely on these subjects, have been wont to fill whole pages with explanations of their own opinions, thrusting into the margin the texts in support of their doctrine with a summary reference to the chapter and verse, I have chosen, on the contrary, to fill my pages, even to redundancy, with quotations from scripture, that so, as little space as possible might be left for my own words, even when they arise from the context of revelation itself.

It has also been my object to make it appear from the opinions I shall be found to have advanced, whether new or old, of how much consequence to the Christian religion is the liberty not only of winnowing and sifting every doctrine, but also of thinking, and even writing respecting it, according to our individual faith and persuasion ; an inference which will be stronger in proportion to the weight and importance of those opinions, or

rather in proportion to the authority of scripture, on the abundant testimony of which they rest. Without this liberty there is neither religion nor gospel, — force alone prevails, — by which it is disgraceful for the Christian religion to be supported. Without this liberty we are still enslaved; not, indeed, as formerly, under the divine law, but, what is worst of all, under the law of man; or, to speak more truly, under a barbarous tyranny. But I do not expect from candid and judicious readers, a conduct so unworthy of them, — that, like certain unjust and foolish men, they should stamp with the invidious name of heretic, or heresy, whatever appears to them to differ from the received opinions, without trying the doctrine by a comparison with scripture testimonies." (Milton's Prose Works, Vol. IV., pp. 4—7. H. G. Bohn's Edition, London, 1853. See also the remainder of the Dedication. See too *The Reason of Church Government*, etc. Id. Vol. II., p. 475; and *Treatise of Civil Power in Ecclesiastical Causes*. Id. p. 528, for similar passages.)

All of this makes it quite clear that Milton was not restrained from publishing his theological work, as Dr. Sumner supposes, but that he intended to give it to the public in his own lifetime. Why should he fear to give such a work as he esteemed this to be, — his "*best and richest possession*," — in the very words of scripture too for the most part, to the public while he was living? "Concealment," he expressly says, "is not my object;" but that his opinions might be brought to the test of scripture by others as well as himself. Does he not all along manifest readiness and desire to change and retract his opinions, provided they can be shown to be contradictory to the word of God? But this desire could only be met by the publication of these opinions in his lifetime, and by the discussion which he expected they would call out. It could have no effect on him after his death. He had confidence not only in his own opinions, but in the judgment that the "men of mature and manly understanding," to which he submitted them, would form concerning them. He expected they would "meet with a candid reception," and be judiciously considered. Why then should he fear?

It is well known, too, that Milton published all his other works, many of which were as obnoxious to the prevailing sentiment of that time, and as much endangering their author as this, as they came from his hand. He scattered

abroad his thoughts while they were hot and hissing. He left no posthumous treatises besides this. Why should he make this, his "best and richest," an exception?

From Milton's own testimony, then, in the Dedication of *Christian Doctrine*, and from his general practice, we doubt not he intended to "communicate the results of his inquiries to the world at large" during his life, and at the time he wrote them. Nor can we so well understand how he failed to do this, as by the supposition that, having written, he soon changed his views on those points in which the *Christian Doctrine* differs from his other works, and from the commonly received opinions of that and the present time. He compiled *Christian Doctrine* early in life, before 1641, when he was in the thirty-third year of his age, with the intention of publishing it; but before it was sent to the press — before 1641 — possibly before it was finished, — for the work seems to have been left in an unfinished state,¹ — he came to hold views of the Son of God, and the Spirit of God, different from those he advocates in *Christian Doctrine*.

We say he changed his views before 1641, for in the works written and published this year, viz., "*Of Reformation in England*," "*Prelatical Episcopacy*," and "*Animadversions upon Remonstrant's Defence*," he maintains opinions respecting the Trinity, and the Persons of the Godhead, utterly irreconcilable with those of *Christian Doctrine*. And not only in the works of 1641, but in all his works published afterwards, till the day of his death. Can we believe, then, that John Milton left, to be published after his death, a work that contradicts all he wrote and published during his life; and this too without giving us any explanation or reason for thus retracting and contradicting himself? Is not the conjecture made above, — that *Christian Doctrine*, esteemed so high by its author at the time of its composition, was with-

¹ See the work, especially its close. Upon this Todd remarks: "The treatise closes so abruptly as to support an opinion that it is an unfinished composition. And certainly the interlineations, corrections, and pasted slips of writing in the manuscript, excite a belief that farther revision was probably intended." — *Todd's Life of Milton*, p. 345.

held from the public, because its author, soon after its completion, changed his views on certain doctrines maintained therein, or at least saw reason to doubt the correctness of his views,—is not this, we say, the most reasonable conjecture that the case allows?

Weight is added to this conjecture by the fact that the doctrines in the *Christian Doctrine* obnoxious to those in all his later works, and upon which there must have been a change of view, according to the conjecture now made, viz., the doctrines concerning the Son and Spirit of God, are treated near the beginning of *Christian Doctrine*, so that there was time for the author to have changed them before completing the work. Besides, logical consistency, or the agreement and harmony of the doctrines advocated as the *Christian Doctrine* proceeds,—such doctrines as the entire sinfulness of man, the atonement of Christ, the new birth, and others, on which Milton holds the evangelical or orthodox view,—these, we say, would require a mind so logical as Milton's to admit in the end the supreme divinity of the Son of God. It would require him to admit it as a coördinate doctrine, and necessary to the atonement and new birth.

But the weight of this conjecture will be better understood when it comes to be seen, as we trust it will be, that all of Milton's great works, beginning from 1641 and reaching down to 1674, the year of his death, contain admissions, and contain opinions, positively contradictory to those of the *Christian Doctrine*.

The other opinion,—that the *Christian Doctrine* is one of Milton's latest works, is equally without foundation. Dr. Sumner is, we believe, mainly responsible for this too. In *Preliminary Observations*, he says:

"It is mentioned by the biographers of Milton (Toland's *Life of John Milton*, p. 148: 12mo., London, 1699; Newton's *Life of Milton*, vol. I., p. 40, 63: 8vo., London, 1757; Symmons's *Life of Milton*, appended to his edition of the *Prose Works*, vol. VII., p. 500: London, 1806), that about the time when he was thus released from public business (meaning his release from the Secretaryship of Foreign languages in 1655), he entered upon the composition of three great works, more congenial to his taste than

the employments in which he had been recently engaged, and fitted to occupy his mind under the blindness with which he had been afflicted for nearly three years. The works commenced under the circumstances were *Paradise Lost*, a Latin *Thesaurus*, intended as an improvement on that by Robert Stephens, and a *Body of Divinity*, compiled from the Holy Scriptures; 'all which,' according to Wood (*Fasti Oxonienses*, Part I., 1635, col. 486, edit. 1817), 'notwithstanding the several troubles that befel him in his fortunes, he finished after His Majesty's Restoration'" [1660]. Milton's *Prose Works*, H. G. Bohn's Ed., vol. IV., p. 6.

Dr. Sumner here gives Toland, Newton, and Symmons, as authorities for the time of beginning this "*Body of Divinity*," and Wood for its finishing. But if the first three authors to whom he refers, carefully specifying the edition, volume, and page, be examined, they will not be found to mention any such thing. They, indeed, mention the *Body of Divinity*, but of the time of its beginning and completion they say not a word.

The passage in Toland to which Dr. Sumner probably refers, for it is the only one in which Toland speaks of Milton's *System of Divinity*, is found on page 136, instead of 148, as Dr. S. says. Toland has given the order and time in which Milton's several *Prose works* appeared. He has just given some account of the "*Treatise of True Religion, Heresy, Schism, Toleration, etc.*," which he says was "the last thing Milton wrote that was publisht before his death." After this Toland mentions, in one short sentence only, the "*Thesaurus Linguae Latinæ*," as "never publisht," and adds, "He wrote likewise a *System of Divinity*, but whether intended for public view, or collected merely for his own use, I cannot determine. It was in the hands of his friend Cyriac Skinner, and where at present is uncertain." (Toland's *Life of John Milton*, p. 132: 12mo., London, 1699 and 1761.)

Newton's account of Milton's *System of Divinity* is in the following words: "Besides these works (the works that Newton had been giving an account of), he wrote a *System of Divinity*, which Mr. Toland says was in the hands of Cyriac Skinner, but where at present is unknown." (New-

ton's *Life of John Milton*, appended to his *Edition of Paradise Lost*, vol. I, p. 54: 4to., London, 1749 and 1754.)¹

Symmons's statement concerning Milton's theological work, cited by Dr. Sumner, is in a note appended to the body of his *Life of Milton*. Symmons is speaking of Milton's last literary labors, and says: "With this work (a brief *History of Muscovy*), terminated his literary labors." He adds in a note at the foot of the page, "An answer to a libel on himself, and a system of Theology, called according to Wood, '*Idea Theologiæ*,' are compositions of Milton's which have been lost. The last was at one time in the hands of Cyriac Skinner, but what became of it afterwards has not been traced." (*Symmons's Life of John Milton*, appended to his edition of the *Prose Works*, vol. VII, p. 500, Note: Lond. 1806.)

These are the only passages in which the several authors, in their *Lives of Milton*, speak or make any allusion to Milton's theological work. From these we cannot understand how Dr. Sumner can make the positive statement above quoted. There is neither here, nor anywhere in the biographies of these authors, that we can find, any shadow of authority for it. They say nothing of the time of the beginning or completion of *Christian Doctrine*, as Dr. Sumner asserts. They do not appear to have had any knowledge of this work, as we have already said, except what they received from others. In their references to it they, without doubt, had in mind what Wood, on the authority of Aubrey, had before said. Indeed, in their statements, seen above, Newton refers to Toland, and Symmons to Wood. We must, then, go back to Wood, and ascertain definitely what he says.

Wood's statement concerning the *Body of Divinity*, is much too general and loose to decide the time at which it was begun and completed, even if it can be credited, of which there is the greatest doubt. Wood refers to this work

¹ Dr. Sumner refers to an 8vo. edition of *Newton's life*, London, 1757. The author has not seen this edition. His quotation is from the 4to. of 1749 and 1754.

in connection with *Paradise Lost* and the *Latin Thesaurus*. His words are the following :

" About the time he had finished these things [the *Second Defence*, and the *Answer to Alex. Moore*, published in 1654-5], he had more leisure and time at command, and being dispenced with by having a substitute allowed him, and sometimes Instructions sent home to him from attending his office of Secretary, he began that laborious work of amassing, out of all classic authors, both in prose and verse, a *Latin Thesaurus*; to the emendation of that done by Stephanus; also the composing of *Paradise Lost*; and of the framing a *Body of Divinity* out of the Bible. All which, notwithstanding the several troubles that befell him in his fortunes, he finished after his Majesty's Restoration" [1660].—*Fasti Oxon.* Part I. p. 265.

This is the only passage in which Wood speaks of the time of the beginning or completion of Milton's theological work. Note its indefiniteness. He places its beginning with two other works. The three were begun "*about*" such a time, 1654 or 5, for this is the period referred to, and finished "*after*" 1660. How long after, he does not inform us, if he knew.

It should be remembered that Wood professes to have received the facts he states concerning Milton from Aubrey, whether by word of mouth, or from the use of his "*Collections for the Life of Milton*," he does not inform us; probably, however, from the *Collections*, for several of the biographers of Milton, as above shown, declare this. But there is nothing in the *Collections* to justify Wood in making so positive a statement, or indeed any statement at all, concerning the beginning and completion of the *Body of Divinity*. In the very places where Aubrey speaks of *Paradise Lost* and the *Thesaurus*, the other works which Wood, holding him forward as authority, couples with the *Body of Divinity*, Aubrey does not mention this *Body of Divinity*, nor indeed any theological work.

Aubrey's first reference to *Paradise Lost* and the *Dictionary*, is as follows :

" After he [Milton] was blinde, he wrote the following books, viz.
Paradise Lost,
Paradise Regained,

Aubrey as authority on any point respecting Milton that requires accuracy and exactness, be heightened, if we scan more closely the Collections, in which this loose catalogue is found. These Collections are brief and fragmentary, without analysis and arrangement. Several of their statements are evidently hearsay remarks, introduced thus: "I have been told," "I heard." As a whole, Aubrey's "Collections for the Life of Milton" are destitute of that internal evidence of carefulness and accuracy necessary to give confidence to an author and his work. "Aubrey's memorandums," says Godwin, "appear to have been drawn up from memory only, with the addition perhaps of consulting some slight notes, which he might before have taken the precaution of committing to paper. It is clear that he did not even give himself the trouble of reading over, for this purpose, Milton's *Defensio Secunda*, in which the author has presented to the world so noble and interesting a sketch of the history of his early life."—*Godwin's Lives of Edward and John Philips*, p. 274. 4to. Lond. 1815.

If anything more be needed to invalidate the authority of Aubrey's catalogue, and weaken confidence in his statements concerning Milton, it may be found in the account he gives of *Paradise Lost*. Aubrey professes to have received his information concerning *Paradise Lost* from Edward Philips, Milton's nephew and pupil. Of this, the greatest of Milton's creations, Aubrey says:

"All the time of writing his *Paradise Lost*, his veine began at the Autumnall Equinoctiall, and ceased at the Vernall, or thereabouts (I believe about May), and this was 4 or 5 yeares of his doing it. He began about 2 yeares before the K. came in, and finished about 3 yeares after the K's restauration."—*Id.* Appendix No. I. p. 344.

Philips, whom Aubrey here professes to follow, in his *Life of Milton*, says *Paradise Lost* was begun in 1655, three years earlier than Aubrey places its beginning, and finished in 1666, three years later than Aubrey's account makes it end, occupying ten or eleven years in its composition rather than five. (See Philips's *Life of Milton*, in Godwin's *Lives*, Appendix No. II., pp. 375 and 378.)

Philips could hardly be mistaken concerning the *Paradise Lost*. He had the best opportunity to know and remember both when and how long Milton was engaged upon it.

"I have particular occasion to remember," are his own words respecting *Paradise Lost*, "for whereas I had the perusal of it from the very beginning, for some years, as I went from time to time to visit him, in a parcel of ten, twenty, or thirty verses at a time, which being written by whatever hand came next, might possibly want correction as to the orthography and pointing." (Id. 376.)

Other similar mistakes might be pointed out in Aubrey's "Collections for the Life of Milton." These, however, are enough, and more than enough, to show that he cannot be relied upon to settle disputed questions respecting John Milton, and particularly that of the Christian Doctrine.

John Aubrey is, we know, an antiquarian of no little celebrity. He has without doubt made valuable additions to our knowledge in History and Biography. Anthony Wood is said to have received valuable assistance from him in compiling the *Athenæ Oxonienses*. Aubrey, however, has not gained the credit of entire reliableness with the best authorities. Some of the mines in which he wrought, do not, to this day, heighten our confidence in him as worthy of the highest trust. His only published work, according to Robert Chalmers, is a

"Collection of popular superstitions relative to dreams, portents, ghosts, witchcraft, etc., under the title of Miscellanies."

"Aubrey has been too harshly censured by Gifford," says Chalmers, "as a credulous fool; yet it must be admitted that his power of discriminating truth from falsehood was by no means remarkable." (*Cyclopedia of English Literature*, vol. I. p. 527: Boston, 1847.)

Hollis's estimation of Aubrey is lower than this of Chalmers.

"This silly tale," says Hollis, referring to the tale that Milton was whipped while a member of College at Cambridge, "is retailed by Warton from some manuscripts of Aubrey, the Antiquarian, in the Ashmolean Museum, whose anile credulity has disabled him from being a writer of any authority." (Hollis's *Memoirs*, vol. II. p. 542. Article John Milton.)

Wood himself calls Aubrey :

"Credulous, roving, and magotie-headed, and sometimes little better than crazed." (Life of A. Wood, p. 577, Edit. Hearne, Th. Caii Vind., etc., vol. II., quoted from Todd's Life of Milton, p. 13.)

Thomas Campbell also says :

"Aubrey's authority is not very high." (Specimens of Brit. Poets: Art. John Milton.)¹

Negative Testimony of Philips, Johnson, and Symmons, concerning Wood's Statement about the Composition of Christian Doctrine.

These authors severally mention the works Milton began about the time Wood says he began "the framing a Body of Divinity," but the Body of Divinity is not one of them. The works these biographers now make their author enter upon are, History of England, Latin Dictionary, and Paradise Lost. Philips's words are :

"Being now quiet from state adversaries, and publick contests, he had leisure again for his own studies and private designs; which were his fore-said History of England, and a new Thesaurus Linguae Latinae, according to the manner of Stephanus, a work he had been long since collecting from his own reading, and still went on with it at times, even very near to his dying day. . . . But the height of his noble fancy and invention began now to be seriously and mainly employed in a subject worthy of such a muse, viz., a heroick poem, entitled Paradise Lost; the noblest, in the general esteem of learned and judicious persons, of any yet written by any either ancient or modern. This subject was first designed a Tragedy." (Philips's Life of Milton, in Godwin's Lives, p. 375.)

¹ The biographers, without exception, so far as the author has been able to find, maintain that Wood's information concerning Milton was received from Aubrey. Upon this Mr. Hunter remarks: "Wood's article on Milton is chiefly from information given him by Aubrey, but there are things which he did not derive from him; and this gives countenance to the statement of Mr. Loveday, that Wood received part of his information respecting Milton from — Joyner, a fellow of one of the Colleges at Oxford." (Hunter's Critical and Historical Tracts, No. III. Milton, p. 19, Lond. 1850.)

Who this Joyner is, or what information he gave to Wood, we have not been able to learn. Nor does it matter. Wood's statement concerning the Body of Divinity cannot be correct, as we shall show, whoever authorized him to make it.

Philips had just spoken of the "Answers to Alex. Moore," the works which Wood also mentions in the sentence before the one in which he makes his statement concerning the beginning of the Latin Thesaurus, and *Paradise Lost*. If Milton had now been engaged upon the *Body of Divinity*, Philips must have known it as well as Wood or Aubrey, for Philips frequently visited him at this time, as a kind of amanuensis. (See what he says above of his frequent visits, and correction of the manuscript of *Paradise Lost*.) He knew the other works on which his uncle was engaged. Knowing that he was engaged on the *Body of Divinity* also, he would have mentioned it in connection with those he does mention; for it must be remembered that Philips is now giving an account of Milton's employment at this period. Philips certainly had knowledge of this work. He had, at his uncle's dictation, written parts, perhaps the whole of it, in 1640, fifteen years before the *Paradise Lost* was begun, and fifty-four years before he wrote his *Life of Milton*.

Johnson refers to the three works above mentioned in these words:

"Being now forty-seven years old, and seeing himself disencumbered from external interruptions, he seems to have recollected his former purposes, and to have resumed three great works, which he had planned for his future employment: an epick poem, the history of his country, and a dictionary of the Latin tongue." (Johnson's Works, vol. VII. p. 89: Oxford, 1825.)

Symmons simply says:

"He was now engaged in the prosecution of three great works, a history of England, a Thesaurus of the Latin language, on the plan of that by Stephens, and an epic poem." (Symmons's *Life of Milton*, p. 397: 12mo., Lond., 1806.)

Philips, and Johnson, and Symmons were without doubt acquainted with Wood's account of Milton.¹ Johnson and

¹ Arch Deacon Blackburne in Hollis's *Memoirs* says, indeed, Philips "had not seen Wood's Account." But this is only an opinion, and the reasons he gives for it are not satisfactory. See Hollis's *Memoirs*, Vol. II. p. 519.

Wood's Account was published in 1691, and Philips's *Life of Milton* in 1694.

Symmons refer to it several times in the course of their narratives. But when they come to give an account of Milton's employment during the period Wood says he is engaged upon the Latin Dictionary, *Paradise Lost*, and the *Body of Divinity*, they omit to mention the *Body of Divinity*, and speak only of the other two. This omission then seems to be of purpose, and pretty sure testimony that they did not regard Wood's statement concerning the *Body of Divinity* as worthy of credit.

Authors that have followed Anthony Wood and Dr. Sumner.

The statement of Wood and Dr. Sumner concerning the Christian Doctrine, made without any reliable authority, has been allowed and followed, without question or doubt, so far as we can find, by nearly all writers upon Milton since Dr. Sumner's translation of the *Christian Doctrine* was published in 1825. First upon the list stands a name of no less celebrity than that of T. Babington Macaulay. In his article upon Milton in the *Edinburgh Review* of this year, Macaulay repeats essentially what Dr. Sumner says of the *Christian Doctrine* in the *Preliminary Observations* prefixed to his translation of the work. (See *Edinburgh Review*, 1825. Art. Milton.) Next is an anonymous but able writer in the *Quarterly Review* of this year:

"We can indeed," says this writer, "conceive of no moral spectacle more sublime than Milton, after the turbulence of the eventful times in which he had been engaged, retreating, as it were, to the serene and majestic sanctuary of his own intellect; girding up all his mental energies, and solemnly

Time enough surely intervened between the two for the latter to become acquainted with the work of the former. Nor can we easily suppose that one so well acquainted with the literature of that age as Philips was, would not be acquainted with Wood's work, and least of all the account Wood gives of Milton, — the most remarkable man of his age, and one to whom Philips was so related. Philips, it must be remembered, had in his "*Theatrum Poetarum*" of 1675, given a brief but just estimate of his uncle, "whose fame," he then said, "was sufficiently known to all the learned of Europe." Would Philips, then, when he came to write at length the life of Milton, fail to acquaint himself with so important a work as Wood's?

devoting and setting himself apart for the accomplishment of his three great meditated works, the complete History of his Country, his immortal Epic, and a Summary of Christian Theology." (Quarterly Review, vol. XXXII. p. 444.)

Further credit is given to the statement of Wood and Sumner by Dr. Channing, in his elegant Review of Milton in 1826 :

"We value Christian Doctrine," he says, "chiefly as showing us the mind of Milton on that subject, which, above all others, presses upon men of thought and sensibility. We want to know in what conclusions such a man rested after a life of extensive and profound research, of magnanimous efforts for freedom and his country, and of communion with the most gifted minds of his own and former times." (Channing's Works, vol. I. p. 4: Boston and New York, 1848.)

Dr. Channing is not satisfied to leave the subject here. On page 46 he returns to it again, and says :

"We are unable within our limits to give a sketch of Milton's strong reasoning against the supreme divinity of Jesus Christ. We must however pause a moment, to thank God that he has raised up this illustrious advocate of the long-observed doctrine of the Divine Unity. We can now bring forward the three greatest and noblest minds of modern times, and, we may add, of the Christian era, as witnesses to that great truth, of which, in an humbler and narrower sphere, we desire to be the defenders. Our Trinitarian adversaries are perpetually ringing in our ears the names of Fathers and Reformers. We take Milton, Locke, and Newton, and place them in our front, and want no others to oppose to the whole array of great names on the opposite side. Before these intellectual suns the stars of self-named Orthodoxy "hide their diminished heads." To these eminent men God communicated such unusual measures of light and mental energy, that their names spring up spontaneously, when we think or would speak of the greatness of our nature.

Their theological opinions were the fruits of patient, profound, reverent study of the scriptures. They came to this work with minds not narrowed by a technical, professional education, but accustomed to broad views, to the widest range of thought. They were shackled by no party connections. They were warped by no clerical ambition, and subdued by no clerical timidity. They came to this subject in the fulness of their strength, with free minds open to truth, and with unstained purity of life. They came to it in an age when the doctrine of the Trinity was instilled by education, and upheld by the authority of the church and by penal laws. And what did these great and good men, whose intellectual energy and love of truth had

made them the chief benefactors of the human mind, what, we ask, did they discover in the scriptures? — a triple divinity? three infinite agents? three infinite objects of worship? three persons, each of whom possesses his own distinct offices, and yet shares equally in the Godhead with the rest? No! Scripture joined with nature, and with that secret voice in the heart, which even idolatry could not always stifle, and taught them to bow reverently before the One Infinite Father, and to ascribe to him alone supreme, self-existent divinity." (pp. 46 and 47.)

To all of which apostrophic exultation over the youth Milton, we would only oppose the man Milton, and say: "Rejoice not against me, O mine enemy: when I fall, I shall arise."

A writer in the *Christian Monthly Spectator* also of this year waxes eloquent on the same subject:

"This great author," he says, "appears indeed sublimely interesting to us in closing his labors on earth in the pious attitude of an inquirer after truth at the oracles of God. We follow him joyfully from the tumultuous controversies in which he had been engaged during the Civil War and the Protectorate, into the still retirement of his private studies; to see him, with orbs quenched from the light of this world, employing the last days of his life in conning over the volume of eternal truth. We love to visit his 'chamber hung with rusty green' (*Richardson's Life*), and view him 'in his elbow chair' (*Richardson's Life*), illustrating, in his study of Christian Doctrine, the sincerity of the prayer which, with cheerful hymning, he raised to heaven over his blindness.

'So much the rather, Thou, Celestial Light,
Shine inward; and the mind through all her powers
Irradiate.'

"Yet notwithstanding all the interest with which we behold him closing the evening of his days in so pious employments as quaffing at the fountains of the Christian faith and hope, we lament that he should put down, as his last thoughts on religion, things so widely variant, as we apprehend several of his statements to be, from the testimony and the morality of scripture. These were clouds over his setting. Perhaps the mind that, with unbounded freedom, vented all its freedom in that age of storm, was led, insensibly, by its own ardent workings, into errors and prejudices. The sun perhaps that glowed with such blazing intensity, drew up these mists over its own declining orbs." (*Christian Spectator*, vol. VIII. p. 91.)

The writer goes on to conjecture further how Milton may

have been led to wander from the truth, but we need not follow him.

Wood and Sumner's statement is further repeated by a writer in the *North American Review* of this year (See Vol. XXII. p. 364). Todd also, in the third edition of his *Life of Milton*, issued this year (1826), adds his authority to give the statement of Wood and Sumner greater weight and wider celebrity. (See Todd's *Life*, pp. 293—346, third edit., Lond. 1826.) So too Mitford, in 1831, follows the same authority. (See Mitford's *Life of Milton*, Vol. I. pp. xcvi. and xcvi. Boston, 1845.) Sir Egerton Brydges, in his *Life of Milton* (1835), appended to what the publisher calls "the first complete and perfect edition of the poetical works of Milton," a truly excellent edition, follows in the footsteps of illustrious predecessors. (See Brydges' *Life of Milton*, p. lxxi. Boston, 1855.) So, too, a writer in the *North British Review*, of 1851. (See *North Brit. Rev.* Vol. XVI. p. 321.) Nor are Wood and Sumner contradicted, but silently followed, by perhaps the ablest of all of the editors of Milton's prose works, J. A. St. John. (See his *Preface to the Prose Works*, published by H. G. Bohn, Lond. 1848—1853.) After St. John is Thomas Keightley. In his "*Life, Opinions, and Writings of Milton*," in 1855, he has added some facts respecting the daughters of Milton, that we have not found in any earlier biographer. He, too, throws himself in to widen the wake of Wood and Sumner. (See Keightley's *Life*, etc., p. 11; also, 156—159. 8vo. London, 1855.) Last of all is Prof. David Masson, of University College, London. In his *Contribution to the eighth edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica* (1858), Prof. Masson gives a more succinct and circumstantial history of the Christian Doctrine than we have found elsewhere. He writes as follows: "In his mature life Milton, dissatisfied with such systems of theology as he had read, and deeming it to be every man's right and duty to draw his theology, for himself, from the scriptures alone, had begun to compile a system for his own use, carefully collecting texts and aiming at doing little more than grouping and elucidating them. He continued this work till he had fin-

ished it. Considering it of importance enough to be published, but knowing that it contained some matter which might be thought heterodox in England, he gave the manuscript, along with a transcript of his "State Letters," to Mr. Daniel Skinner of Trinity College, Cambridge (a relation of his friend Cyriac Skinner), who was going over to Holland, desiring him to arrange for their publication, with some Dutch printer. Elziver, in whose hands they were placed, having declined to have anything to do with them, they were given back to Skinner, who still remained abroad. Meanwhile the existence of these MSS. and the intention to publish them had become known to the English government, and letters were sent to Skinner from Barrow, the master of Trinity College, warning him of the risk he was running, and ordering him to return to his college on pain of expulsion. This was in 1676, two years after Milton's death, and Skinner seems to have returned, soon after, and to have delivered the MSS. to Sir Joseph Williamson, one of the secretaries of state. By him they were stowed away, with other papers in the press, when Mr. Lemon found them, a hundred and fifty years afterwards, still in the original wrapper." — *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Vol. XV. p. 30, 31, art. *Milton*. 8th edit. Boston, 1858.

A little further on, Prof. Masson says: "A question as to Milton's theological belief, suggested to some keen critics by certain passages of his *Paradise Lost*, has been answered in favor of their conjecture, by a discovery of his treatise on Christian Doctrine. In one chapter of that work, he expresses views at variance with the orthodox notions of the Trinity." Quoting now the summary Dr. Sumner gives of these views, Prof. Masson adds: "In other words, Milton in his later life was an Arian, and there is a trace of at least incipient Arianism in the *Paradise Lost*."—*Id.* p. 34.

Though the account Prof. Masson gives, above, of the Christian Doctrine be so circumstantial and connected, does not the very manner of it show that he felt, while preparing it, the ground under him was not quite firm?

In giving the reason that led Milton to undertake such a

work, Prof. Masson evidently has in view what Milton himself, in the Dedication of his work, says respecting the same thing. Yet Prof. Masson's words, on one point—the time of beginning—convey a meaning very different from those Milton uses. "In his mature life," says Prof. M., "Milton, dissatisfied . . . had begun to compile," etc. "*In my youth*," says Milton, "I began to study and prepare for such a work." (See Dedication, p. 3.) Prof. Masson says, very indefinitely indeed: "He continued this work till he had finished it," leaving the impression that this was late in life. But Milton says: "After a diligent perseverance in this plan for *several years*" [the plan begun in his youth], "I trusted I had discovered, with regard to religion, what was matter of belief, and what only matter of opinion." And now he speaks of the work as completed; for he says: "It was also a great solace to me to have compiled, by God's assistance, a precious aid for my faith, or rather, to have laid up, for myself, a treasure which would be a provision for my future life."—*Id.* p. 4.

The reason Prof. Masson gives for Milton's wishing to have the work published abroad, is not very different from the one Dr. Sumner gives for Milton's intention of leaving the work to be published after his death, and has been sufficiently considered.

Prof. Masson gives no data by which we can determine the precise time when Milton put the work into the hands of Daniel Skinner, desiring him to arrange for its publication in Holland; yet he evidently supposes that it was during the last years of Milton's life. This would make the arrangement with Skinner synchronous with the publishing of *Paradise Lost* (1667), or the composition and publishing of *Paradise Regained* (1671), or still later perhaps, the composition and publishing of "*True Religion, Heresy*," etc. (1673.) As these three works are in direct opposition on the doctrines of the Son, and the Spirit, and the Trinity to Christian Doctrine, to suppose that Milton, at any time within this period, endeavored to publish his Christian Doctrine, makes him hold and seek to publish contradictory opposite opinions at the same time.

We could point out what appear to us other discrepancies, and even things apocryphal, in Prof. Masson's account of the Christian Doctrine, did space allow. Prof. M. attributes to Milton what is inconsistent with the Arianism which he makes him hold. Thus he says, in the earlier part of this same Article: "Let us make whatever we can of the fact [the fact that Milton wore his hair long, spoke reverently of the richly stained glass and pealing organ of a Gothic cathedral; things to which the Puritans objected], he did belong, with his whole heart and soul, to the English Puritan and republican movement of the seventeenth century. He honored what it honored, he hated what it hated; he showed its detestation and intolerant dread of popery. If he was not a Puritan, it was because he was a Puritan and something more; and that 'something more' being an expression for much that Milton's mind, rolling magnificently within itself, had thought out properly as belonging to Puritanism and as necessary to be worked up into it, in order to give it its full development."—*Id.* p. 28. In the same connection, too, Prof. Masson sets forward Milton as a leader among the Puritans, and more than any one else the embodiment of their spirit, as he says: "the true spirit of a cause is better represented in its leaders than in its inferior adherents." In his *Essays* too, in 1856, Prof. Masson uses equally strong and definite language: "Milton was then," he says of the period between Elizabeth and the Restoration, "the representative of all that then was deepest in English society."—*Essays Biographical and Critical*, chiefly on Eng. Poets. p. 47. Cambridge, 1856.

Prof. Masson's account of the Christian Doctrine does not convince us, that he has studied the subject with the carefulness that it demands, or made any advances beyond preceding biographers. His information on the subject seems to be that which they have supplied. He has only brought into close connection their conjectures and scattered statements, trenching closely, we are almost ready to say, upon fiction to supply the information they lacked. We can hardly regard as other than fictitious the arrangement Prof. M. says Milton made with Daniel Skinner to publish the work in Holland.

The only dissent from the opinion of Wood and Dr. Sumner, we have been able to find, is that of Mr. R. W. Griswold. In the brief biographical Introduction to his edition of Milton's Prose Works, he says :

"To this period, the period of the Restoration [1660] has been generally referred Milton's recently-discovered Treatise on Christian Doctrine ; but that work, which he would never have given to the press himself, and which is, on every account, less worthy of praise than any of his other productions, was probably composed during the first years after his return from Italy,¹ and is the substance of familiar Lectures on Theology to his pupils. He had studied the nature of our Saviour before his mind attained the strength of its maturity ; as some have looked upon the sun until his sight, for a while, was darkened. In the end he was right. In none of his great works is there a passage from which it can be inferred that he was an Arian ; and in the very last of his writings, he declares that the doctrine of the Trinity is a plain doctrine in Scripture."

The reasons that led Mr. Griswold to the conclusion here given, he has not stated.

We have said the only dissent is that of Mr. Griswold. Todd gives a kind of half dissent. In the third edition of his *Life of Milton*, published in 1826, Todd agrees with Mr. Griswold in holding the early beginning of Christian Doctrine, but differs from him, and is in harmony with the biographers above named, concerning its close. "I must observe," he says of Christian Doctrine, that

"The treatise closes so abruptly as to support an opinion that it is an unfinished composition. And certainly the interlineations, corrections, and pasted slips of writing, in the manuscript, excite a belief that further revision was probably intended ; revision, perhaps, which would have produced still more to commend and admire than at present, and less with which to differ or remonstrate. They leave the reader, also, in that suspense respecting the work, which Toland long since expressed, viz. 'Milton wrote a System of Divinity ; but whether intended for publick view, or collected merely for his own use, I cannot determine.'"

"While these remarks have been passing through the press," continues Mr. Todd, "the authenticity indeed of the manuscript (the MS. of Christian Doct.), has been questioned. I must therefore retrace my steps, and

¹ Milton returned from the Continent about the middle of 1639, and was now thirty years of age.

proceed with redoubled care, in order to establish it. The present amplitude of the work is one of the arguments alleged against it. And it has been assumed that the compilation was not begun before the close of Milton's controversy with Salmasius in 1655; and that his numerous publications, from that period to the year of his death, render, therefore, the production also of a composition so large, and so elaborate, improbable. I repeat, what I firmly believe, that this treatise is the gradual accumulation of passages from theological writers, which he had first directed to be copied so early as in 1640 by his nephews, and from time to time to be continued; an employment which, during the more active scenes of his Secretaryship he had little leisure perhaps to pursue and regulate; but to which, when he was relieved in his official duties by a substitute, he appears to have turned his attention, and to have then commenced, as Anthony Wood terms it, 'the framing his Body of Divinity,'—that is, as I interpret the expression, the arrangement of numerous materials which he had collected, and a determination to gather more through the means of his several amanuenses, in order to show his opinions upon a subject, which, indeed, he had often changed, systematically; in a word, to embody his *Idea Theologiae*, the name by which his work was known to Aubrey, and which would probably have been the title of it, as I have said, if himself had published it." (Todd's *Life*, prefixed to his *Edition of Milton's Poetical Works*, vol. I. p. 345 and 346. See also p. 311.)

Testimony of Edward Philips concerning Milton's "System of Divinity."

We have now, as we think, exhausted the authorities for the late composition of *Christian Doctrine*. The search has disclosed no authority for this position. It has rather shown us a total want of authority for it. The only biographer that says anything, or seems to know anything definite and reliable about the time of the composition of the *System of Divinity*, is Philips. He speaks definitely and truthfully of it in a passage already referred to, but which we shall quote here at length. Philips is giving an account of Milton's method of instructing his pupils,—noting the studies they pursued, the authors read, and the way their time was spent.

"The Sunday's work," he says, "was for the most part the reading each day a chapter of the Greek Testament, and hearing his learned exposition upon the same (and how this savored of atheism in him, I leave to the courteous backbiter to judge). The next work after this, was the writing from

his own dictation, some part, from time to time, of a tractate which he thought fit to collect from the ablest of divines who had written of that subject, Amesius, Wollebius, etc., viz., *A Perfect System of Divinity*, of which more hereafter." (Philips's *Life of Milton*, in *Godwin's Lives of Edward and John Philips*, p. 363 : 4to., Lond. 1815.)

This statement of Philips, so carefully made, — made too by one who had not his knowledge from hearsay or second-hand, but was himself so related to it that he could not be mistaken, for he wrote, on a particular day, at Milton's dictation, the very work, or parts of it, at least, of which he speaks, — this statement, we say, is conclusive testimony that Milton was engaged in the composition of his *System of Divinity*, or the work now called *Christian Doctrine*, for there is no doubt of the identity of these works, in 1640, when he was but thirty-two years of age, and before he had published or written any of his *Prose Works*.¹

¹ The information Philips here gives concerning the *System of Divinity* is repeated by the principal biographers of John Milton. Drs. Birch and Newton repeat almost the words of Philips. (See Birch's *Account of the Life and Writings of Mr. J. Milton*, p. 33, 4to. Lond. 1753. Also Newton's *Life of Milton*, p. 13, 4to. Lond. 1754.)

Johnson's words are the following: "One part of his method" [his method of instructing his pupils] "deserves general imitation. He was careful to instruct his scholars in religion. Every Sunday was spent upon theology; of which he dictated a short system, gathered from the writers that were then fashionable in the Dutch universities." (Johnson's *Works*, Vol. 7, p. 77, 8vo. Oxford and London, 1825.)

Symmons notices the Sundays' work thus: "While this various reading" [reading of subjects he had just noticed] "fully occupied six days of the week, the seventh had its appropriate and characteristic employment. On this day, the pupils, after reading to their master a chapter in the Greek Testament, and hearing his explanation of it, wrote, as he had dictated, on some subject of theology." (Symmons's *Life of Milton*, in Vol. 7 of the *Prose Works*, p. 161, 8vo. Lond. 1806.)

Todd repeats Philips's words above quoted. See Todd's *Life*, p. 312, 8vo. Lond. 1826.

Dr. Sumner, in the *Body of Christian Doctrine*, has the following note: "It was partly from the work quoted above [Milton had just quoted a passage from Ames on the Sabbath], "and partly from *The Abridgment of Christian Divinity* by Wollebius, that Milton, according to Philips, compiled for the use of his pupils, a *System of Divinity*, which they wrote on Sundays at his dictation." (*Prose Works of John Milton*, Vol. V. p. 66, note. Bohn's edition.)

Mitford quotes Johnson as above, with this addition: "Pearce has observed
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Having now obtained all the light upon the time of the composition of *Christian Doctrine* that the biographers and critics give; having too been led by the positive and reliable testimony of Philips to a definite conclusion, viz., that *Christian Doctrine* was composed about 1640,— a conclusion that must stand unless there be something positive to overthrow it; let us consider how this conclusion, or statement of Philips rather, is affected by the internal evidence that can be brought to bear upon it. 1. By the appearance of the manuscript itself of *Christian Doctrine*. 2. By a comparison of *Christian Doctrine* with the works of Ames and Wollebius, the authors Philips says Milton "thought fit to collect from" in compiling the *System of Divinity* he [Philips] wrote in 1640. 3. By the evidence from the Dedication of *Christian Doctrine*, or Milton's own testimony as to the time when it was composed. 4. By a comparison of *Christian Doctrine* with the other works of Milton, the time of whose composition is known, particularly *Paradise Lost*, which Wood, and after him Dr. Sumner, says was undertaken and composed about the same time.

Evidence for the Early Composition of Christian Doctrine from the Manuscript.

The facts relating to the manuscript, as nearly as we can ascertain them from Dr. Sumner, Todd, and Mitford, are these: The manuscript is in Latin, and consists of 735 pages, closely written on small quarto letter-paper. The chirography is by different hands.

"The first part," says Dr. Sumner, "as far as the fifteenth chapter of the that Fagius was Milton's favorite annotator on the Bible." (Mitford's *Life of Milton*, p. 41.)

Thomas Keightley, the latest of the Miltonian biographers, says: "Every Sunday his pupils read a chapter of the New Testament in Greek, which he then expounded to them. A less useful part was their writing, from his dictation, a portion of a *System of Divinity* which he had compiled from the writings of Fagius and other theologians." (Keightley's *Life, and Opinions, and Writings of Milton*, p. 26.)

First Book" [comprising, according to Todd and Mitford, 196 pages of the Treatise], "is in a small and beautiful Italian hand, being evidently a corrected copy, prepared for the press, without interlineations of any kind. This portion of the volume, however, affords a proof that even the most careful transcription seldom fails to diminish the accuracy of a text; for although it is evident that extraordinary pains have been employed to secure its legibility and correctness, the mistakes which are found in this part of the manuscript, especially in the references to the quotations, are in the proportion of 14 to 1 as compared with those in the remaining three-fifths of the work. The character is evidently that of a female hand, and it is the opinion of Mr. Lemon, whose knowledge of the hand-writing of that time is so extensive that the greatest deference is due to his judgment, that Mary, the second daughter of Milton, was employed as amanuensis in this part of the volume." (Preliminary Observations, p. XIV. vol. IV. of the Prose Works, Bohn's Ed.)

Dr. Sumner goes on to corroborate Mr. Lemon's conjecture:

"Some of the mistakes above alluded to," he says, "are of a nature to induce a suspicion that the transcriber was merely a copyist, or at most imperfectly acquainted with the learned languages."

In short, they are just such as Milton's daughters, who wrote not from a knowledge of the language, but from the sound of the words when pronounced, would make. Dr. Sumner however adds at the close of this passage:

"This at least is certain, that the transcriber of this part of the manuscript was much employed in Milton's service; for the hand-writing is the same as appears in the fair copy of the Latin Letters, discovered, as has been mentioned, in the press which contained the present Treatise." (Id. p. XIV.)

Both Todd and Mitford assert the same thing concerning the identity of the hand-writing of the Latin or State Letters, and of the first 196 pages of Christian Doctrine. Later discoveries than Dr. Sumner and Mr. Lemon had access to when Dr. Sumner wrote as above, — "the character is evidently that of a female hand," — show that both he and Mr. Lemon were here in error. Todd and Mitford both assert, on Daniel Skinner's own testimony, that the hand-writing of the State Letters is his.

"The hand-writing of the 196 pages," says Todd, "is the same as that of the State Letters; which latter is attested by Daniel Skinner himself to be his, as it has recently been discovered in the State Paper Office." (Todd's *Life of Milt.* vol. I. p. 295. Also Mitford's *Life*, p. 97.)

All this agrees well with the fact before stated, that Mr. Daniel Skinner had the Treatise in his possession, and began a correspondence with Elzevir of Amsterdam in regard to publishing it. Nor is the conjecture of Todd unreasonable when he says, "From copying more of the Treatise Skinner perhaps desisted, when he found that Elzevir, to whom the whole of the manuscript was submitted, refused to print it." (Id. p. 296.) The evidence then is conclusive that Daniel Skinner was the copyist of the first 196 pages of *Christian Doctrine*.

Concerning the remainder of the manuscript, the biographers are at variance. Dr. Sumner, who had the best opportunity to find out the facts in the case, for he was the translator of the manuscript, says:

"The remainder of the manuscript is in an entirely different hand, being a strong, upright character, supposed by Mr. Lemon to be the hand-writing of Edward Philips, the nephew of Milton. This part of the volume is interspersed with numerous interlineations and corrections, and in several places with small slips of writing pasted in the margin. These corrections are in two distinct hand-writings, different from the body of the manuscript, but the greater part of them undoubtedly written by the same person who transcribed the first part of the volume. Hence it is probable that the latter part of the MS. is a copy transcribed by Philips, and finally revised and corrected by Mary and Deborah Milton, from the dictation of their father, as many of the alterations bear a strong resemblance to the reputed hand-writing of Deborah, the youngest daughter of Milton, in the manuscripts preserved in the Library of Trinity College, Cambridge; who is stated by Wood (*Fasti Oxonienses*, Part I. 1685, Col. 483), to have been 'trained up by her father in Latin and Greek, and made by him his amanuensis.'" (Preliminary Observations in Bohn's Edition of *Milton's Prose Works*, vol. IV. p. XVI.)

Todd gives the following relation of this part of the manuscript. Having given some account of Daniel Skinner, who transcribed the first part, he says:

"For the remainder of the manuscript is in an entirely different hand,

being a strong, upright character, undoubtedly the same hand which transcribed the beautiful sonnet of Milton beginning,

‘Methought I saw my late espoused saint,’

which is now among the manuscripts of Milton in Trinity College, Cambridge; and this scribe is believed to be his daughter Deborah, whom Wood expressly calls his amanuensis. This part of the volume is interspersed with interlineations and corrections, and in some places with small slips of writing pasted in the margin. The corrections are in different hand-writing, the writer of which cannot now be ascertained.” (Todd’s *Life*, p. 299.)

Todd here agrees with Dr. Sumner, concerning the body of this part of the manuscript. Both say it is in a “strong, upright character.” He uses the same words too of the interlineations and corrections. Todd, however, is at variance with Dr. Sumner concerning the person that wrote this strong, upright character, also concerning the one that wrote the interlineations. Dr. Sumner and Mr. Lemon suppose the strong upright character “to be the hand-writing of Edward Philips.” Mr. Todd says this *strong, upright character* is “undoubtedly the same hand which transcribed the sonnet ‘Methought,’ etc., now among the manuscripts of Milton in Trinity College,” — Deborah Milton.

Dr. Sumner ascribes many of the interlineations to Deborah Milton, because they bear so strong a resemblance to her “reputed hand writing,” in the same manuscripts in Trinity College. But Todd says the writer of these corrections cannot now be ascertained.

Mitford’s account of the latter part of the manuscript of *Christian Doctrine*, agrees with Todd. Mitford says nothing of the character in which it is written. His words are :

“The remainder of the treatise is written in a female hand, the same which transcribed the sonnet,

‘Methought I saw my late espoused saint,’

now among the manuscripts at Cambridge, and this scribe is supposed to have been his daughter Mary or Deborah. This part of the volume is interspersed with interlineations and corrections, in a different and unknown hand.”—*Mitford’s Life*, p. 97.

Concerning these somewhat conflicting statements, the following seems to us to be the truth. Neither did Todd nor Mitford obtain their knowledge of the manuscript of Christian Doctrine from personal examination. They intend to follow Dr. Sumner. Todd, though he speaks, in one place, as though he might have seen the manuscript, refers to Dr. Sumner no less than five times, in the account he gives of it, and Mitford agrees with Todd. Todd only adds a fact that came to light after Dr. Sumner wrote, viz. that Daniel Skinner, instead of Mary Milton, was the copyist of the first 196 pages of the manuscript.

Todd differs from Dr. Sumner from inadvertence, perhaps from neglect to note precisely what Dr. Sumner says; or from failure to remember exactly when he came to write. The agreement and differences are such as are best accounted for in this, for Todd agrees with Dr. Sumner as to the main facts of the manuscript. He copies his words. He differs from him as to the person that wrote different parts. Todd ascribes to Deborah Milton what Dr. Sumner had ascribed to Edward Philips. In other words, Todd ascribes the hand-writing of the body of the latter part of the manuscript, in the "strong, upright character," to the same individual that Dr. Sumner had ascribed some part of the interlineations and corrections, and for the same reason, — because they so much resemble the reputed hand-writing of Deborah Milton in the manuscripts of Trinity College.

Dr. Sumner ascribes the interlineations and corrections to Mary and Deborah Milton. His own testimony, however, or the facts he gives, with what has since been proved, shows that Daniel Skinner was the writer of these also; for he says, "the greater part of them are undoubtedly written by the same person who transcribed the first part of the volume. This person has been shown to be Daniel Skinner.

Besides, he says this first part — the first 196 pages of the manuscript — is in "a small, beautiful Italian hand." But it appears, according to Keightley, "from the fac-similes of the signatures to the receipts published by Mr. Marsh (receipts of Anne and Mary Milton, for money paid them by

their step-mother), that Anne Milton could not write, and Mary very badly"¹ (*Keightley's Life, etc., of Milton*, Corrections to page 90). Nor do we think the probabilities are very great, that Deborah Milton's hand appears anywhere in the manuscript. Daniel Skinner sent the manuscript to Elzevir, at Amsterdam, to be printed in 1675, the year after Milton's death. He probably copied the first 196 pages of it at this time. Deborah Milton was not *now* at hand, nor had she been at hand for some time previous, to take any part in the preparation of the manuscript for the press. According to her own testimony, "she was several years in Ireland, both before and after her father's death." (See Hollis's Mem. Vol. I. p. 113.)

The result of a careful study of the whole subject of the manuscript is this: The treatise was, at first, written by Edward Philips, at Milton's dictation, and left in this form. Daniel Skinner, into whose hands the manuscript came, after Milton's death, transcribed, in 1675, the first 196 pages for the press at Amsterdam, leaving the remainder, according to Dr. Sumner, and Mr. Lemon's statement, in Philips's own hand. And this is the hand of the "Perfect System of Divinity" he wrote in 1640. In other words, the hand and the work are the identical hand and work of 1540.²

Evidence from Comparison of Christian Doctrine with the Works of William Ames and John Wollebius.

Ames and Wollebius are the authors, Philips declares, Milton "thought fit to collect from," in compiling the System

¹ This agrees with what Dr. Johnson relates, on the authority of Mrs. Foster, the grand-daughter of Milton, of "his refusal to have his daughters taught to write." (Johnson's Works, Vol. VII. p. 118.)

² It seems to us that this question of the MS. might be settled by a little careful examination and comparison of facts. From the testimony of several, above given, it appears that the hand-writing of Deborah Milton is still preserved in the MS. of Trinity College; also that of Mary in the "receipts." It is most probable, too, that somewhere might be found signatures and samples of the hand-writing of Edward Philips. We can hardly think that all the manuscripts of so voluminous and well-known a writer as Edward Philips have perished. Where is the Godwin that will settle this question?

of Divinity he wrote in 1640. The comparison of Christian Doctrine with the works of these authors shows at least that the "Medulla Theologica" of William Ames, and the "Compendium Theologiæ Christianæ" of John Wollebius have been consulted, and to a great extent followed, in Christian Doctrine. On this subject Dr. Sumner makes the following remark in a note which he appends to his translation of Christian Doctrine. Milton had just quoted a passage, ad literam, from Ames's Medulla. Dr. Sumner adds a note, to show who this Ames is, and continues :

"It was partly from the work quoted above, and partly from the Abridgment of Christian Divinitie by Wollebius, that Milton, according to Philips, compiled for the use of his pupils a System of Divinity, which they wrote on Sundays at his dictation. An English translation of Ames's treatise was published by order of the House of Commons, in 1642, under the title of *The Marrow of Sacred Divinity, drawne out of the Holy Scriptures and the Interpreters thereof, and brought into Method*. It is divided into two books, of which the first, entitled "On Faith in God," contains forty-one chapters; and the second, "On Observance toward God," twenty-two. It is quite evident that Milton has frequently availed himself of this volume, both in the distribution of his subject and arrangement of the chapters, which frequently coincide with that of Ames, and in the citation of particular passages and applications of Scripture; though their opinions differ materially on several important points. Milton quotes, in his Tetrachordon, the definition of marriage given by Ames, and passes a just censure on it. The treatise of Wollebius is also divided into two parts, "On the Knowledge" and "On the Worship of God;" the first comprised in thirty-six, and the second in fourteen chapters. The plan of the latter division is very similar to the corresponding portion of Milton's work; and not only the arguments, but even whole sentences, are sometimes almost identically the same."—*Milton's Prose Works*, Vol. V. pp. 66 and 67, Bohn's Edition.

Dr. Sumner without doubt compared the Latin editions of Ames and Wollebius with the original Latin of Christian Doctrine, and could therefore see the identity of which he speaks. The author can only compare the English of Dr. Sumner's translation of the Christian Doctrine with the Latin of Ames's Medulla and Wollebius's Compendium. This comparison, however, shows that Dr. Sumner has not stated the matter of similarity too strongly. Milton names the two divisions of his work after Wollebius:

"Of the Knowledge of God and the Worship of God." He has the same number of chapters too, though they are a little differently arranged. There is a remarkable similarity between the definitions of Milton and Wollebius. Nor would it be at all difficult to cite many passages that are almost identical in the *Christian Doctrine* and the *Compendium Theologiæ Christianæ* of Wollebius. Taking now this similarity between the *Christian Doctrine* and Ames and Wollebius — the authors Philips says Milton "thought fit to collect from," in the tractate he [Philips] wrote in 1640 — we are, without any other evidence, forced to the conclusion that the *Christian Doctrine*, discovered in 1823, is the *System of Divinity* of 1640.

Evidence from the Dedication of Christian Doctrine, or Milton's own Testimony concerning the Time of its Composition.

In the Dedication of *Christian Doctrine*, Milton gives the reasons that led him to undertake the composition of such a work; he also states the manner in which he compiled it. Having noticed the fact that many treatises on theology had been published in the last century, "conducted according to sounder principles, wherein the chief heads of Christian doctrine are set forth, sometimes briefly, sometimes in a more enlarged and methodical order," he continues :

"I think myself obliged, therefore, to declare in the first instance why, if any works have already appeared as perfect as the nature of the subject will admit, I have not remained contented with them; or, if all my predecessors have treated it unsuccessfully, why their failure has not deterred me from attempting an undertaking of a similar sort.

"If I were to say that I had devoted myself to the study of the Christian religion because nothing else can so effectually rescue the lives and minds of men from these two detestable curses, slavery and superstition, I should seem to have acted rather from a regard to my highest earthly comforts, than from a religious motive.

"But since it is only to the individual faith of each that the Deity has opened the way of eternal salvation, and as He requires that he who would be saved should have a personal belief of his own, I resolved not to repose on the faith or judgement of others in matters relating to God; but

on the one hand, having taken the grounds of my faith from divine revelation alone; and, on the other, having neglected nothing which depended on my own industry, I thought fit to scrutinize and ascertain for myself the several points of my religious belief, by the most careful perusal and meditation of the Holy Scriptures themselves.

"If therefore I mention what has proved beneficial in my own practice, it is in the hope that others, who have a similar wish of improving themselves, may be thereby invited to pursue the same method."

Notice here, and all along, he compiles this work for his own improvement—"to establish his faith," and "assist his memory,"—objects that strongly incline us to believe in the early compilation of the work.

The time and manner in which he sought to assist his memory and establish his faith, he details as follows:

"I entered upon an assiduous course of study in my youth, beginning with the books of the Old and New Testament in their original languages, and going diligently through a few of the shorter systems of divines, in imitation of whom, I was in the habit of classing under certain heads whatever passages occurred for extraction, to be made use of hereafter as occasion might require."

Christian Doctrine answers exactly this description, and seems to have been made up just as now stated. It consists almost wholly of passages of scripture. The author, or compiler rather, has added only comment and remark enough to bind them together for his purpose. (See Christian Doctrine, everywhere.) He calls our attention to this peculiarity of his work.

"Whereas," he says, in the Dedication, p. 5, "the greater part of those who have written most largely on these subjects, have been wont to fill whole pages with explanations of their own opinions, thrusting into the margin the texts in support of their doctrine, with a summary reference to the chapter and verse, I have chosen, on the contrary, to fill my pages even to redundancy with quotations from scripture; that so as little space as possible may be left for my own words, even when they arise from the context of revelation itself."

But to return to Milton's manner, as above:

"At length I resorted," he continues, "with increased confidence, to some of the more copious theological treatises, and to the examination of the

arguments advanced by the conflicting parties respecting certain disputed points of faith."

Pursuing this method, Milton found frequent errors ; and besides, the truth supported by false methods and false argumentation.

"According to my judgment, therefore," he continues, "neither my creed nor my hope of salvation could be safely trusted to such guides ; and yet it appeared highly requisite to possess some methodical tractate of Christian doctrine, or at least to attempt such a disquisition as might be useful in establishing my faith or assisting my memory. I deemed it, therefore, safest and most advisable to compile for myself, by my own labor and study, some original treatise which should be always at hand, derived solely from the word of God itself, and executed with all possible fidelity, seeing could have no wish to practise any imposition on myself in such a matter.

"After a diligent perseverance in this plan for several years, I perceived that the strong holds of the reformed religion were sufficiently fortified, as far as it was in danger from the papists, but neglected in many other quarters ; neither competently strengthened with works of defence, nor adequately provided with champions. It was also evident to me, that, in religion as in other things, the offers of God were all directed, not to an indolent credulity, but to constant diligence, and to an unwearied search after truth ; and that more than I was aware of still remained, which required to be more rigidly examined by the rule of scripture, and reformed after a more accurate model. I so far satisfied myself in the prosecution of this plan as at length to trust that I had discovered, with regard to religion, what was matter of belief, and what was only matter of opinion. It was also a great solace to me to have compiled, by God's assistance, a precious aid for my faith, — or rather to have laid up for myself a treasure which would be a provision for my future life, and would remove from my mind all grounds for hesitation, as often as it behoved me to render an account of the principles of my belief."—*Prose Works of John Milton*, Vol. IV. pp. 2-4. Bohn's edition. Lond. 1858.

This, we think, settles the question of time, so far at least as to compel us to believe that the Christian Doctrine was compiled in the comparatively early life of its author. We see not how the Dedication could have been written until the work of which it speaks was completed. It speaks of it, all along, in the past tense, as something done. It gives the history of the work.

The Dedication positively states that the author, John Milton — for his initials are subscribed at the close — (see note,

at the close of the Dedication) began, in his youth, to collect passages of scripture and class them, "under certain heads," for such a work as *Christian Doctrine* is, and persevered "*several years*," until he had satisfied himself "that he had discovered, with regard to religion, what was matter of belief, and what only matter of opinion." And then he speaks of the work as done; for he says: "It was also a great solace to me *to have compiled*," etc.

We cannot, from this language, fix definitely the year Milton began his work, or ended it. The most specific phrases above quoted: "in my youth," and "*several years*," limit the time only partially. "In my youth" refers, without doubt, to the period of Milton's life that succeeded his childhood. It is well known that he was a diligent student from early boyhood. "From my twelfth year," he says, "I scarcely ever retired from my studies before midnight." Besides, Milton was designed, by his parents, for the church. This, in one so filial, would early turn his attention to the investigation of theological subjects. "In my youth," then, must be understood in its specific sense.

The phrase "*several years*," is also indefinite. But, while we cannot determine the precise number of years included in it, can we admit that it means forty or fifty — more than an ordinary life-time, as it must on the supposition of Todd, who is forced, from the testimony of the Dedication, and from that of Philips, to admit that *Christian Doctrine* was begun in Milton's youth, but maintains, against the same testimony, that it was not finished till near the close of its author's life, or rather not finished at all; (see Todd's opinion, before given;) — can, we say, this "*several years*" mean more than an ordinary life-time?

Besides, he compiled this original treatise "to establish his faith, and assist his memory;" so, too, that he "could *always* have it at hand," to remove from his mind all grounds for hesitation, "as often as it behoved him to render an account of his belief." Does this "*always*" include only the *few months*, or *years* at the *most*, that an old man may reasonably expect to live? Does it not rather point to the

many years that a young man, looking forward to a long life of active usefulness, expects; the years for which youth is the fitting time to lay up *treasures*, and make "*provision*?" Did Milton too, just as he was ready to fall into the grave, expect to be often questioned concerning the grounds of his faith, and so prepare Christian Doctrine that he might have at hand answers for his questions?

But there is more than positive declarations for the early composition and completion of Christian Doctrine. Near the close of the Dedication, Milton, though he commits himself, in much confidence, to his fellow men, seems to anticipate, and fear, that some will impute heresy to him in consequence of his dissent from "*received opinions*," and that so odious a name fixed upon him would prejudice them and others against his opinions. To forestall this, he says:

"For my own part, I adhere to the Holy Scriptures alone.— I follow no other heresy or sect. I had not even read any of the works of heretics, so called, when the mistakes of those who are reckoned for orthodox, and their incautious handling of Scripture first taught me to agree with their opponents whenever these opponents agreed with Scripture."—*Id.* p. 8.

This, at least, is best interpreted by the supposition that his dissent from "*received opinions*," or orthodoxy, was in early life. Late, he shows a minute acquaintance with the sentiments and works of the so-called heretics, and could not say he had not read any of their works. Besides, he did not dissent, or "*differ from the received opinions*" in 1641, but agreed with them. "*Reformation in England*," and other works, written and published this year, positively affirm the supreme divinity of the Son of God, and the trinity of the Godhead, doctrines as positively denied in the Christian Doctrine. His dissent, then, must have been before this year.

Besides, the very confidence with which he commits himself and his work to his fellow men, betrays his youth and inexperience. "*I hope to meet with a candid reception from all parties*," are his words. "*Concealment is not my object*." "*I wish to submit my opinions to men of mature*

and manly understanding." He did not expect from "candid" and judicious readers a conduct unworthy of them.

"For the rest, brethren, cultivate truth with brotherly love. Judge of my present undertaking according to the admonishing of the Spirit of God, — and neither adopt my sentiments nor reject them, unless every doubt has been removed from your belief by the clear testimony of revelation."—*Id.* p. 9.

These are closing words. Is not this the confidence of the young, and ardent, and inexperienced Milton? After he had had trial of the candor of the judicious readers of his age — such trial as he did have; when he came to grapple with the great evils of the day, and reflect the burning rays of truth upon them; after he had experienced the detraction, and hate, and scorn, and abuse that fell upon him in consequence of his manly defence of the truth, could he express himself in the same affectionate confidence?

The testimony Milton himself gives, in the Dedication of his work, of its early completion, must stand, unless there be something from his own mouth to overthrow it. It must unless the witness be impeached, or made to contradict himself. For such contradictions we have searched in vain. There is, indeed, in the body of *Christian Doctrine*, one or two passages that have been understood to refer to *Tetrachordon*, and the works on *Divorce*, as works then written. (See *Prose Works*, Vol. IV. p. 248.)

The works on *Divorce* were published in 1644 and 1645 when Milton was thirty-six years of age. The evidence above given is, that *Christian Doctrine* was compiled before 1641. It is far easier to believe that the passage supposed to refer to *Tetrachordon*, is misunderstood, or that it was added by the transcriber, than to reject all the evidence now and hereafter to be brought forward, for the earlier composition of the work. It is quite evident that the transcriber, or some other person, has added the title the work now bears; nor is it any more improbable that the passage above referred to, if it must be understood as pointing to *Tetrachordon*, has been added. Indeed, it is just such a passage as a

transcriber would be most likely to add by way of reference. At any rate, Christian Doctrine, so far as the Persons of the Godhead are concerned, is in direct opposition to the works of 1641, and all after this period till the day of Milton's death. 'This fact will be more fully brought out in the next division of the subject. "Abundant examples there are," in the words of Todd, "throughout his printed works, of orthodoxy professed by Milton as to the eternal divinity of the Son of God, and the essential unity of the three divine persons in the Godhead" (*Todd's Life*, p. 313). Symmons and Johnson unqualifiedly vouch for Milton's orthodoxy, in his works known to them, as all his works were, except the Christian Doctrine.—*Symmons's Life*, p. 522.

[To be concluded.]

ARTICLE V.

PARTISANSHIP IN HISTORY.

BY PROF. E. D. SANBORN, DARTMOUTH COLLEGE.

At the present day no ancient record is taken on trust. Everything old is questioned. Authority, both in church and state, is less valued than formerly. Creeds are reformed, while faith declines; history is rewritten, while truth is obscured. The old record was doubtful; the new is fictitious. The romance of history is succeeded by the dreams of philosophy. For the poetic narratives of an early age, are substituted the sapless disquisitions of learned critics. Heroes, statesmen, and philosophers are presented in a new dress. Those whose characters were supposed to be unalterably determined, are arraigned anew at the bar of public opinion, and the verdict of former generations is set aside.

Biography and history have become as fruitful in controversies as polemics or politics. The history of past ages is little more than the biographies of the leading men who enacted it. The record of their achievements constitutes the "warp and woof" of the narrative. To unsettle public opinion respecting these prominent actors in the world's drama, is fatal to the credibility of history. The great men of antiquity are undoubtedly over-estimated; their virtues have been exaggerated, and their vices concealed. The men of each successive generation consent to be thus deluded and amused, and they expect that posterity will show a like partiality in recording their deeds. When a public benefactor or hero dies, it is customary to load his memory with eulogies. Even his enemies forget their feuds, and allow his frailties to sleep in his tomb, and few are so hardy as to draw them from their "dread abode." In all ages, death, like charity, has been allowed to cover a multitude of sins. "Death," says Bacon, "hath this also, that it openeth the gate of good fame and extinguisheth envy;" and he quotes, in confirmation of his own dictum, the opinion of Horace:

"Extinctus amabitur idem."

But these venerable authorities are now discarded. The law of historic retribution has been repealed, and the public are beginning to adopt Swift's satirical version of an old and long-received maxim:

*"Nil de mortuis nisi bonum,
When scoundrels die let all bemoan 'em."*

Nero will not much longer rest under the load of infamy which has accumulated upon him for eighteen centuries, and Benedict Arnold will yet be presented to the public as a martyr to principle. Even Judas Iscariot has found an apologist. DeQuincey regards him as a man of excellent intentions; he was guilty of no treachery, but simply moved by a mistaken zeal for his Master's temporal promotion. He honestly believed that Jesus was to be the "King of the

Jews." He was anxious to hasten the crisis in his history, and force him to assume regal power, perhaps by miraculous agency. His ignorance, therefore, of the true nature of his Master's mission, converted his friendly salute into a traitor's kiss. How strange that the innocence of Judas was not vindicated by the pen of inspiration! It is now too late. Not even the teeming brain of the "opium-eater" can invent a plausible excuse for his treachery. Tiberius Cæsar was the contemporary of Judas. His infamy was as widely extended as his power. His public policy was dictated by private hate; and the victims of his malignity were as numerous as were the examples of rising merit in the world's capital. Yet we have been gravely informed that this moral monster was slandered by the democratic Tacitus, and that the injured despot ought at this late day to be justified at the tribunal of public opinion. Henry VIII. has likewise found a champion. We have been recently told, in the language of sober history, that this "Bluebeard" of English royalty was the unfortunate victim of domestic infelicities. By the aid of his friendly apologist, the old tyrant is clothed anew in robes of unsullied purity and honor. He is now presented to the admiring public as England's wisest and mightiest monarch. Says a competent critic, "There is scarcely one of Henry's actions,—persecutions, confiscations, multiplied acts of attainder, assumptions of dominion over conscience, violent and sanguinary revolutions of policy, bloody vagrancy laws, breaches of amnesty, inroads upon the constitution, benevolences, repudiations of loans, debasings of the public currency, diplomatic assassinations, which does not come out laudable to masculine and comprehensive minds." Under the reforming hand of Mr. Froude, this imperious and capricious despot is made the faultless hero and legislator of history.

Napoleon, too, has found an appreciative biographer, and by him has been exalted to a modern saintship, if not to an apotheosis; while the six millions of souls that

"Left the warm precincts of a cheerful day,"

at his bidding, are still expiating their sins in limbo. Of Bonaparte's present beatific state we may say, with due caution that it reach not the monarch's sensitive ear, what was once said by the witty servant of a profligate nobleman: "If he has gone to Heaven it is not best to have it known, lest others be deterred from going to the same place." The satirical portrait which LeClerc has drawn of the ecclesiastical historian, has had many originals both in church and state. "He must adhere," says he "inviolably to the maxim, that whatever can be favorable to heretics is false; and whatever can be said against them is true; while on the other hand, all that does honor to the orthodox is unquestionable, and everything that can do them discredit is a lie. He must suppress with care, or at least extenuate, as far as possible, the errors of those whom the orthodox are accustomed to respect, and must exaggerate the faults of the heterodox to the utmost of his power. He must remember that any orthodox writer is a competent witness against a heretic, and is to be trusted implicitly on his word, while a heretic is never to be believed against the orthodox, and has honor enough done him in allowing him to speak against his own side, or in behalf of ours." It is not the Romish church alone that produces such partisans. Civil history, too, has its bigots and inquisitors. The "dead past" is made to testify for the living present. The facts of ancient history are brought forward to confirm modern theories. The records of the past are carefully examined, not to elicit truth, but to establish the opinions of the writer. Every author looks out upon the world from his own point of view, and pronounces human actions right or wrong as they agree or disagree with his preconceived notions. The salvation of mankind depends upon the adoption of his views. The failures of the past are entirely due to the rejection of them. The earlier advent of each particular author would, in his own esteem, have stayed the tide of human woe, and prevented the fall of nations. Fame and wealth are the rewards of successful authorship. For these prizes partisans of every grade, and with every hue of opinion, contend.

Republicans and monarchists, whigs and tories, Romanists and Protestants, Christians and infidels, enter the lists, and like special pleaders endeavor to color the testimony of history in confirmation of their own creed or theory. Impartiality in history is as rare as perfection in morals. The greatest bigots boast most loudly of their freedom from prejudice. Hume prided himself upon his liberality, and yet his history is a systematic and wilful perversion of the truth. His infidelity rendered him incompetent to write the history of a period of religious reformation. He had no conception of the moral grandeur of the scenes he portrayed. He was cold, calculating, and selfish. He did not even sympathize with patriots, when despotism triumphed and liberty was defeated. He had no clear notions of spiritual life, and, of course, the language of Canaan was alien to his conceptions and his speech. He hated religion so much that liberty itself suffered in his esteem for being associated with it. Both the character and the writings of every Puritan met his unqualified condemnation. Speaking of Sir Henry Vane's theological works, he says: "This man, so celebrated for his parliamentary talents and for his capacity in business, has left some writings behind him. They treat, all of them, of religious subjects, and are absolutely unintelligible. No traces of eloquence, or even of common sense, appear in them." Alluding to the same essays, Sir James Mackintosh remarks: "Sir Henry Vane was one of the most profound minds that ever existed, not inferior perhaps to Bacon. His works, which are theological, are extremely rare, and display astonishing powers. They are remarkable as containing the first direct assertion of liberty of conscience." Here is a difference not of degrees, but of infinity. The opinions of the two critics are absolutely contradictory. Is it possible that both could have been honest in the avowal of their sentiments? Hume was an infidel and a monarchist. With such moral disqualifications for impartial investigation, he undertook to write the history of a religious reformation, and to describe the conflict of the people's rights with the king's prerogative. He has so dis-

guised the truth by his sophistry, and made falsehood so attractive by the inimitable graces of his style, that the reading world will probably never be wholly disenchanted from the spell which his fascination has thrown around them. It is affirmed that, at the present day, with all his prejudices and errors exposed by competent critics, "nine-tenths of the population of the British Empire are disciples of the Scotch philosopher; and Oxford still uses his history as a textbook." Gibbon says of him: "He was ingenious but superficial." He was all that, and more; he was dishonest and malignant; and the same epithets apply with greater force to the "luminous pages" of Gibbon. There is not found on record a more ingenious or a more bitter attack upon the Christian religion, than the fifteenth chapter of the "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire;" and yet, it is written with such apparent candor, with such a patronizing and apologetic tone toward the Gospel itself, that the uncritical reader, without previous admonition, would be likely to receive his special pleadings for the unvarnished testimony of history. In this way the very fountains of truth are poisoned. "It is no wonder," says a distinguished reviewer, "that faction is so productive of vices of all kinds; for, besides that it influences the passions, it tends much to remove those great restraints, honor and shame, when men find that no iniquity can lose them the applause of their own party, and no innocence secure them against the calumnies of the opposite."

Prejudice and party spirit once incorporated in history, are seldom effectually eradicated. Partisan writers bequeath their hoarded treasures of love and hate as a rich inheritance to their successors and assigns, who, like the old Germans, reverently receive and maintain both the friendships and quarrels of their ancestors. Readers are thus passed from one partisan to another, who, in his turn, gives his own version of past events; and thus our teachers and guides color "the light of all our seeing." They have been aptly compared to the stagemen in the old posting days of England, who, being in league with an inferior race of land-

lords, carried the traveller from one bad inn to another, so that all the way he had poor fare, hard beds, and lame horses. It matters not in what land or in what age the author pitches his tent, his opinions constitute his capital. His chief aim is, to make these the only circulating medium in the intellectual province which he has chosen as his home. Livy congratulated himself that he should be withdrawn from the contemplation of existing evils, and from all those influences which might "warp a writer's mind," while he was investigating the transactions of distant ages, and "transmitting to posterity the achievements of the greatest people in the world." This very assumption of the superiority of Rome to all other nations, betrays his partiality in the very beginning of his work; and it is precisely in those "remote ages," where he hoped to be entirely unbiased, that he has departed most widely from the truth. Mr. Ruskin expresses a hope that, at no distant day, men will cease to trouble themselves with histories written long after the events which they describe; that they will confine themselves to contemporary narratives of eye-witnesses, who relate what they saw, who share in the passions of their own era, and can, therefore, understand the actors in it. In that case every record of passing events, like a suit at law, would have two sides and two advocates. Truth could not be reached by the reading of a single author. *Audi alteram partem* would be the united cry of the defeated party. To reach any just conclusions respecting the political measures of the day, both sides must be patiently heard. To judge accurately of the value of contemporary records, the political and religious opinions of the writer must be known. The strong points in history, those which we are most anxious to investigate with care, always cause the most controversy, and give rise to the most palpable misrepresentations. Living partisans are precisely those who are most likely to color the narrative of passing events. Mr. Jefferson wrote down in his "Ana" the most noticeable events that passed under his own eye; recorded the very words of his opponents as they were uttered in his hearing, or reported by trustworthy

witnesses. These records he revised and prepared for publication in his old age, after many of the persons alluded to were dead, and all motives for coloring their sentiments for political effect had ceased to exist; and yet it cannot be doubted that he wrote in mature manhood, and rewrote in old age, under the influence of party prejudice. No sane man now believes that Hamilton, Adams, and Knox entertained the opinions, or advocated the theories, which he deliberately imputed to them. In this respect Jefferson was not peculiar. He resembled all other men of decided convictions and ardent party zeal. Let two writers, belonging to opposite political parties, give their own version of the events of the last four years, and a stranger would hardly believe that they could be contemporaries, or were describing the events and characters of the same period. Were he to give the writers credit for common honesty, he would be astonished at the forbearance of God in suffering such a people to live. Considering our superior intelligence, the inhabitants of the cities of the Plain, or even the antediluvians, would rise up to condemn us. Religious creeds and political opinions are the colored glasses through which we all gaze upon the great drama of life. In history, as in the Bible, every polemic seeks for confirmation of his private views. The present condition of the world is declared to be adverse to civilization, law, order, and religion, or the contrary, according to the theological convictions of the writer. The man who believes in the ultimate triumph of the gospel in the present age, will interpret all events according to the law of progress. He sees good omens everywhere. He is hopeful, joyous, confiding. In his view all things are working together "for good to them that love God." The church is daily enlarging her borders. Even the wrath of man, as exhibited in bloody and desolating wars, is made to praise God by opening "a great and effectual door" for the spread of the gospel. A spiritual millennium is at the very doors. But let a witness like Dr. Cumming take the stand, and he will portray a different scene. He has viewed the world through other optics. His vision has been strength-

ened by intenser efforts to penetrate the future and the hidden. He proclaims the end of all things at hand. He sees nothing but disorder and confusion in the governments of the world. The church is hopelessly corrupt; the heathen nations are incapable of reformation without a miraculous interposition; the labors of missionaries are destined to woful disappointment, and the boasted civilization of Christian nations has become effete and ready to vanish away. Though the world never enjoyed such general peace and prosperity since it had a written history, as it has for the last forty years, still the modern seer insists that the nations are rushing together in fearful shocks, which portend the immediate dissolution of the present order of things, and the introduction of the personal reign of the Messiah. Men who have persuaded themselves that they possess a keener spiritual vision than any of their contemporaries, and that they can comprehend the plans of God for the future better than any that have preceded them in the same path, are constantly rearing very lofty structures upon very insufficient foundations. They utter prophecies which the occurrences of the next day may prove false, and denounce judgments which may be averted before the printer's ink which recorded them is dry. If men cannot agree about the events which are to-day taking place beneath their own eyes, how can they expect to agree concerning those over which time has cast the mantle of oblivion? It is a remarkable characteristic of this age, that self-constituted hierophants have attempted to lift the veil from the unknown future and the unrecorded past. Inquisitive minds attempt to penetrate eternity both *a parte ante* and *a parte post*. Divination has left the tripod and the pythoness, and entered the schools of theology and the universities. Those who think to do honor to revelation by converting its prophecies into a syllabus of history, interpret its metaphors and symbols *literally*, and describe the future condition of the world with far more confidence than the ablest critics feel in explaining the written records of the past. In profane history scepticism has unsettled all the canons of belief, and learned critics, fond of

paradox, interpret the plain prose of ancient authors mythologically, or read it backwards, like a witch's prayer, to ascertain its true meaning. But this pretended "spirit of divination," whether applied to the future or past, is a very uncertain guide to truth. In the transactions of the day, where human passions and sympathies are the very springs of action, it is impossible for us to remain absolutely indifferent. We are so constituted that we must be partisans; indeed it is deemed by most men either contrary to nature, or unpatriotic, to be neutral in politics. Solon, in order to create a public spirit in the citizens, and excite in them a lively interest in the affairs of state, declared a man dishonored and disfranchised, who, in a civil sedition, stood aloof, and took part with neither side. The same wise legislator forbade speaking evil either of the dead or of the living. Such a decree in our day, literally enforced, would produce a general stagnation in social and public life, and strike the nation dumb. Personalities constitute the staple of much of our conversation, and of many of our journals and books. In the race of popular favor, eulogy and detraction are constant competitors. In reviewing Thackeray's History of the Earl of Chatham, Macaulay's ire is excited at the extreme partiality of the author. He says: "Biographers, translators, editors,—all, in short, who employ themselves in illustrating the lives or writings of others, are peculiarly exposed to the *Lues Boswelliana*, or disease of admiration. But we scarcely remember ever to have seen a patient so far gone in this distemper as Mr. Thackeray." * * * Pitt, it seems, was not merely a great poet in *esse*, and a great general in *posse*, but a finished example of moral excellence,—the first man made perfect. He was in the right when he attempted to establish an Inquisition, and to give bounties for perjury, in order to get Walpole's head. He was in the right when he declared Walpole to have been an excellent minister. He was in the right when, being in the Opposition, he maintained that no peace ought to be made with Spain, till she should formally renounce the right of search. He was in the right when, being in office, he silently acquiesced in a treaty by

which Spain did not renounce the right of search. When he left the duke of Newcastle, when he coalesced with the duke of Newcastle; when he thundered against subsidies, when he lavished subsidies in unexampled profusion; when he execrated the Hanoverian connection, when he declared that Hanover ought to be as dear to us as Hampshire; he was still invariably speaking the language of a virtuous and enlightened statesman." There is great force in this sarcasm. The critic, in that review, very happily exposes not merely the faults of Mr. Thackeray, but of a whole class of writers of which he is the type.

Modern biography is generally tainted with the vice of flattery. Hero worship is the disease of all ages, and especially of our own. The memoirs of eminent men give the reader but very imperfect notions of their true characters. They are generally written by kind friends, needy dependants, or weak admirers; and it is a remarkable fact that Boswell, whose name has become a synonym for sycophancy, should have written the best biography in the English tongue. Macaulay, in his recent writings, seems in no danger of contracting that fatal disease which he so much deprecates. Flattery finds no quarter with him. He wields the Damascus blade of Swift and Pope, rather than the wooden sword of Boswell. He, doubtless, intends to be both just and generous; but in reality he is oftener satirical and illiberal. In early life he gave proof of democratic tendencies. His noble vindication of the Puritans, in his Article on Milton, inspired a general confidence, in all lovers of liberty and religion, that he would, in his forth-coming history, correct the misstatements and slanders of his predecessors; but as he grew in years, his prejudices against cropped hair, sour visages, and long prayers became stronger; and, in his glowing pictures of the English Revolution, he has mixed more freely the darker shades upon his palette, when dissenters sat for their pictures. He seems to entertain a particular aversion to certain individuals. Though long since passed from the stage of action, he treats them as his personal foes. William Penn finds no mercy at his hands. He represents him as in league

with despotism, defiling his hands, like Judas, with the price of blood. Still, the evidence on which such grave charges are founded, is very slight. The historian finds, in the archives of the English Court, a letter written by one of the ministers of James II. to "Mr. Pen," who is addressed as the creature of the king, a pardon-broker, an agent of the maids of honor, who shared, with them, the redemption-money of innocent school-girls, condemned to death for marching in his procession, at the request of their teachers, when a flag was presented to the rebel duke of Monmouth. This foul calumny has been abundantly refuted by the friends of Penn; still Macaulay repeats it in the second edition of his work, and adds that this is not the worst of Penn's crimes. The single letter of the premier above alluded to, is the principal proof of the charge with which the public have been favored. The person there addressed was simply styled "Mr. Pen." The vindicators of William Penn maintain that the letter in question was directed to another man. The very spelling of the name indicates this fact. The historian replies that there was but one courtier who bore that name; and that the difference in spellings amounts to nothing, because there was, at that time, no uniformity in the writing of proper names. *Sic stat censura.* How strange that the posthumous reputation of an eminent statesman and philanthropist should rest upon so slight a query as whether the final consonant of his name was doubled. But Penn is not the only shining mark at which he has aimed his poisoned arrows. The most brilliant essayist of the age sometimes writes for effect. To make a strong impression, he colors highly, sometimes violating the spirit of his own criticism, when he says: "The practice of painting in nothing but black and white is unpardonable even in the drama."

He entertains a cordial dislike for Marlborough, and the "great captain" receives little favor at his hands. There is perhaps good reason for the exposure of the meanness of this royal favorite, but none for the depreciation of his merit. In wise counsel, executive energy, and undaunted courage,

he has no rival in English history but the "iron duke." In private morals, few men of his age would rank below him. He is described by Macaulay as one "who, in the bloom of youth loved lucre more than wine or women; and at the height of his greatness, loved lucre more than power or fame; who was not less distinguished by avarice and baseness than by capacity and valor; and whose whole life will ever appear a prodigy of turpitude." A miserly love of money is contemptible even in the lowly; but when associated with greatness, it becomes positively revolting. Either Bacon receiving gratuities from suitors, for the sale, as he pleaded, "of justice, but not of injustice," or Marlborough pocketing the price of soldiers' rations for years after they had fallen in defence of their country, is an object of loathing to every honest man; still the contemplation of this vice should not make us indifferent to the wisdom of the philosopher or the glory of the commander. It is to be feared that Mr. Macaulay is sometimes led captive by his own rhetoric. He is caught in his own snare. He loves to produce a sensation; and, if he fails to persuade others, he is himself convinced by his own logic. Hence he writes with warmth. His delineations of character are striking and graphic. His whole work has been aptly styled "a grand moving picture, a dramatic representation, glowing and gorgeous." He loves to abase the proud, and to sink the mean man lower in infamy. His antipathy to vice extends even to the physical defects of the criminal. These are made to stand out, upon the canvas, in bold relief. Of Ferguson, the supposed author of "the rye-house plot," one of the greatest villains of his age, he thus speaks: "His broad Scotch accent, his tall, lean figure, his lantern jaws, the gleam of his sharp eyes, his cheeks inflamed by an eruption, his shoulders deformed by a stoop, and his gait distinguished from that of other men by a peculiar shuffle, made him remarkable wherever he appeared." No doubt of it, if this description be true. He excites astonishment now, as he is viewed by the mind's eye. It is not wonderful that such a monster of deformity should attract unwonted attention, or that children should fly from

his presence. Titus Oates, who played so important a part in the popish plots in the reign of Charles II., is thus described: "A few years earlier, his short neck, his legs uneven as those of a badger, his forehead low as that of a baboon, his purple cheeks and his monstrous length of chin, had been familiar to all who frequented the courts of law." Fiction can scarcely present a parallel to this. Titus Oates must have been the prototype of Uriah Heep; and both the original and the copy add another proof to the prevailing notion that physical and moral deformity are generally associated in the same person. Mr. Macaulay is not often complimentary in his sketches of prominent characters. He entertains prejudices, too, against nations and races as well as individuals. A writer in *Blackwood*, reviewing Macaulay's *History*, says: "The English statesmen look as black as so many Satans, till we see the Scotch ones; and the Scotch ones are the perfection of evil till we suddenly stumble, through the darkness, into Ireland and see the native fools and madmen there, with the diabolical Frenchman in the midst of them." This criticism is probably penned with more feeling than candor. It is dictated by wounded patriotism, and speaks the sentiments of a champion vindicating the insulted honor of his nation. It is to be deeply regretted, however, that a popular writer should so incorporate his prejudices into a national work as to furnish just grounds for such fierce assaults. It is never safe to attack the character, morals, or institutions of whole classes, communities, or nations. The multitude, by involuntary sympathy, feel more keenly than individuals, the sting of contempt. Macaulay is "a good hater," both of nations and of criminals. His enmity is as vigilant and persistent as that of a fiend. In his pen there exists the power of life and death, even to a well-earned reputation.

But where a historian possesses so many excellences as Mr. Macaulay, it seems the dictate of ill nature to find fault with his minor blemishes. His patient research, his tenacious memory, his almost limitless stores of learning, his happy power of illustration, his imperial command of lan-

guage, his perspicuity of style, and his undying enthusiasm in the execution of his chosen task, render him the most attractive and possibly the most instructive writer of his age. It is too late now to warn the public of their danger, or to raise the popular cry : " *Foenum habet in cornu.*" His own language concerning Mr. Mitford, is equally applicable to himself. " To oppose the progress of his fame, is now almost a hopeless enterprise. Had he been reviewed with candid severity, when he had published only his first volume, his work would either have deserved its reputation, or would never have obtained it. Then, as Indra says of Kehama, then was the time to strike." He is certainly less exposed to the charge of religious intolerance, than certain historians of our own country. The annals of the world do not, probably, present a more marked perversion of the truth, or a more Jesuitical misrepresentation of all the facts, than is found in Mr. Peter Oliver's History of the Puritan Commonwealth. The writer seems to have commenced his work with the unqualified assumption that no good thing could possibly come out of this American Nazareth. In his view the Puritans possessed not a solitary virtue ; and neither the customs of the age, nor their own multiplied perils, constitute a shadow of excuse for their vices. They were traitors and hypocrites *ab initio*. They procured their charter by fraud ; and, with systematic treachery, violated every one of its sacred provisions. They grossly perverted the missionary intentions of their gracious monarch to worldly gain, sedition, conspiracy, and dissent. The magnanimity and forbearance of their injured sovereign find no parallel except in the calendar of the saints. In reviewing the controversy between the king and the Puritan colonists, Mr. Oliver thinks that the *candid inquirer* will meet with the following results : " He will behold a great monarch defrauded by a portion of his subjects, and resorting for redress, like the humblest citizen, to the courts of law. He will carefully watch each step of this remarkable process, from the issue of the writ to the final decree ; and he will look in vain for any abuse of power, or even undignified menace. Calm, quiet, patient

yet determined, is each feature of the curious exhibition. And when the proper tribunal has pronounced, at last, that a serious wrong has been inflicted, by a party of malcontents, upon their sovereign, he will find that no pomp or noise announces the royal triumph; but a simple order follows for the surrender of a perverted franchise; and a powerful corporation, the mere creature of law, becomes *ipso facto* resolved into its primary elements." The benign deportment of the benevolent grantor resembled the silent efficacy of sun and air in abrading and dissolving the everlasting hills. That Titanic power, whose throne was the tri-mountain that overlooks the Massachusetts Bay, which, like the rocky peaks of Olympus, seemed to bid defiance to the angry bolts of heaven, melted away beneath the genial influence of royal sunshine and dew! But divine Providence seemed to smile upon the pilgrims notwithstanding their rebellious spirit. Our author observes: "Puritanism in England had passed from the ideal to the actual, and Charles was called upon to struggle for his crown over the tottering ramparts of the church. Ought we not to have gentle thoughts of his memory, when we consider that his last wishes for New England were that the holy faith, which had rendered the mother country glorious for eight centuries, might bless the colonies that had received her name?" It would, doubtless, be very kind to do all this, were not our sympathies preoccupied by more worthy subjects. It was manifestly the will of God that the fugitives should still live and prosper under their "stolen charter." Indeed it mattered not, to them, whether they had a charter or not, provided royal tyranny would allow them to enjoy their exile in peace. Mr. Oliver argues respecting the suffering Puritans precisely as the barbarians did respecting the shipwrecked apostle when the viper fastened upon his hand. The king's minions fastened upon them their venomous fangs, and the historian, with holy horror, exclaims: "No doubt these men are murderers, whom, though they have escaped the sea, yet vengeance suffereth not to live." But they survived the hurt, and, according to the testimony of our veracious author, continued to practise cruelty, usur-

pation, tyranny, and persecution of the blackest dye. The "poor Indian" they robbed, cheated, and murdered, instead of christianizing, as "the royal martyr" Charles most piously intended. Their expensive missions were defeated by their bigotry and exclusiveness. "They attempted," says he, "at one blow, to substitute the ideal for the actual. A picture, a cross, the simplest work of art, would have aided their cause. But election, justification by faith, and sanctification, were the constant themes of their discourse, and were never comprehended by the savage." * * * "Can we wonder that Rome succeeded, and that Geneva failed? Is it strange that "the tawny pagans," the "rabid wolves," "the grim salvages," fled from the icy embrace of Puritanism and took refuge in the arms of the priest and Jesuit?" Mr. Oliver's entire work is not a history, as it purports to be, but an indictment of the Puritan Commonwealth for treason against their divinely constituted sovereign, for the malicious persecution and judicial murder of men who differed from the majority in matters of religion, and for the wholesale slaughter of defenceless savages, accompanied with testimony derived from state papers, from royal officials, from tory historians, and from the admissions of the parties arraigned, skillfully arranged under each specific count. A practised advocate, pleading for the conviction of the Puritans, in a court of justice, could not observe a more studied silence with regard to their good deeds, or select with greater acumen every act of doubtful expediency, or probable injustice, calculated to condemn them. It is an elaborate work prepared with careful research, written in a style of great beauty, clearness, and force. The motive for such a labor can scarcely be divined, unless it be to avenge the wrongs of a tory ancestor, who suffered some injustice from the "sons of liberty," at the commencement of the revolutionary struggle. It is hardly possible that he would undertake and execute such a labor merely for the benefit of men of his own creed; though he affirms that every intelligent churchman should be able to solve the questions he has discussed for himself; and adds: "He needs not turn over the brilliant pages of Bancroft, nor

lose himself amid the chaotic commonplace of Grahame, in the absurd expectation of arriving at the truth. He will be entertained or wearied, according as he reads the happy fiction of the one, or yawns over the stupid inventions of the other; but more he will not be." It is passing strange that he should be willing to trace the origin of the community in which he lived to such an unworthy source; that he should be willing to admit that "the old Bay State," with its pure religion, untarnished morals, superior intelligence, and almost unlimited wealth, was founded by such a band of outlaws. But it is quite manifest that these external proofs of high culture have no weight in his esteem; for he says, in justification of the tyrannical conduct of the king's commissioners in 1664: "If the schools trained fanatics, if commerce fattened on the violation of the laws, if agriculture was enriched by the blood of the Indian, if the meeting-house was the focus of disloyalty, and if all these held their place by usurpation from the church and crown, there was cause enough for interference." This quotation shows, with sufficient clearness, the animus of the writer, and here we leave him

— "alone in his glory."

Thus far we have spoken of the partisanship of writers of modern history. Here we should expect authors to differ in opinions, and to interpret facts according to their party predilections. Here, we should expect the "quarrels of authors" to be most conspicuous and most injurious to the cause of sound learning; but it is not so. Ancient history has been the great battle-field of chivalrous literati. As in national wars, the very doubts which render the justice of their cause uncertain, tend to exasperate the combatants and inflame their passions. Men will sooner fight for their opinions, than for their altars and hearths. It matters not if the cause of dispute be as insignificant as the splitting of a hair, the independent thinker is ready to make it a *casus belli* with all opponents, and to do battle in its defence against all comers. Every department of ancient history swarms with ad-

venturers, innovators, and theorists. They dispute upon all matters of antiquarian research. They differ with respect to the authors criticised, the subjects treated, the materials used by them, and the credibility of their narratives. The great "Homeric question" meets us at the very dawn of the poetic age of literature. This subject alone has engrossed the attention of scholars for more than half a century, and is still as open to debate as when it was first broached. Nothing has been definitively settled, though our knowledge of antiquity has been greatly increased. Much labor has been expended, many books have been written, violent and protracted controversies have been excited; and yet no foe has been slain, no victory won. The public mind, ever since its first surprise at the publication of Wolf's *Prolegomena* in 1795, has, like a pendulum, vibrated between the extremes of credulity and scepticism, till finally, it seems to have found its point of equilibrium in the belief of the existence of Homer and the substantial unity of his great epic. With many critics, the authority of Herodotus is less valued than that of Homer. It is certainly a very significant fact, that after the lapse of more than two thousand years, "the father of history" has no well-defined position in the world of letters. The impression has recently prevailed, that the discoveries, in Egyptian and Babylonian paleontology, were giving new and important confirmation to his history; but Col. Mure, whose work on the Language and Literature of ancient Greece is generally characterized by good sense and judicious criticism, places his authority as a truthful writer almost at zero. The partiality of former writers seems to have roused his hostility. Their excessive eulogy evidently moves him to undue depreciation. His blame is made to counterbalance their praise; therefore the uncritical reader is misled by both. A writer in the *North British Review* has some very just remarks upon Herodotus as a historian. "There are," says he, "three stages in the estimation with which an intelligent student of Herodotus regards his varied narrative. Beguiled at first by the charm of style and the winning graces of the narrator, into a nearly absolute

belief, the result of a more critical scrutiny commonly condemns the reader to an interval of doubt almost as absolute; from which he will at last emerge, if he only pursues the needful examination far enough, with feelings of qualified but more rational confidence, in which a settled conviction of the good faith of his guide is tempered by the consciousness that many of his materials were derived from very questionable sources; that the principles which he obeyed in writing, vibrate somewhat unsafely between historic and poetic laws; and that, therefore, while the whole may, in one sense, claim the praise of truthfulness and goodness, the praise of trustworthy history can be conceded only to some portions of the work." But where no discredit is cast upon the veracity of an ancient author, the descriptive portions of his work often give rise to bitter controversies. Ancient geography and topography have furnished endless themes for discussion. The most learned exegetes have never been able to determine, beyond dispute, the sites of cities and the localities of mountains mentioned in the Old Testament. Moses described the exodus of the Israelites, with the minuteness of a modern guide-book; and yet, scarcely any two travellers agree with reference to the exact route they pursued. Even Sinai and Pisgah have never been definitively located, though they have probably undergone no essential change since the Jewish lawgiver received the tables of stone from the hand of Jehovah, on the one, and ascended the other to view the promised land and receive the last offices of sepulture from the same divine hand. About four hundred years before Christ, the historian Xenophon led ten thousand Grecian mercenaries from Babylonia to the Black Sea, and described every mile of his journey, in language so simple and perspicuous, that beginners in Greek take his text for a manual; and still more battles have been fought by learned critics, all along the track of the retreating army, than were waged by themselves with the barbarian hordes through which they passed. About two hundred years before Christ, Hannibal led a motley crew of Carthaginians, Spaniards, and Gauls across the Alps, into sunny Italy. Po-

lybius the Greek, and Livy the Roman, two of the most accomplished writers of narrative our earth has known, have recorded, with great particularity, all the incidents of that march. They, however, disagree as to the route which Hannibal adopted. Their commentators have continued to disagree till this hour, and the matter is still *sub judice*. Almost every year presents to the public a new treatise on that subject, but no progress is made in determining the track of the invading army. With regard to the sites of ruined cities, the scenes of great battles, or the course of advancing or retreating armies, time gives occasion for dispute by obliterating ancient landmarks. The fame of heroes, statesmen, and orators, too, fluctuates with the advance of knowledge or through the caprices of partisans. The position which Socrates ought to hold in Grecian civilization is yet undecided. Socrates,

From whose mouth issued forth
Mellifluous sounds that watered all the schools
Of academics, old and new, with those
Surnamed Peripatetics, and the sect
Epicurean, and the Stoic severe,

is one day the Prince of Philosophers, and another the Prince of Sophists. Mr. Grote writes with admiration of the doctrines of Socrates; and yet he thinks he was legally condemned. "He was not attached, either by sentiment or conviction, to the constitution of Athens." Indeed he wonders that he had not sooner provoked the displeasure of the people. No other city but Athens, in the ancient world, would have borne with him so long; his trial proves little, his execution nothing, against the liberality of his fellow citizens! He dissents, however, from the strong assertion of the German Forchhammer, that he "was most justly condemned as a heretic, a traitor, and a corrupter of youth."

The greatest orator of Greece fares no better in the hands of partisans than the first philosopher. Demosthenes is made to run the gauntlet between files of aristocratic historians. Hear what Mr. Mitford says of him: "A weak habit

of body, and an embarrassed manner, seemed to deny him, equally as Isocrates, the hope of becoming a speaker, to win the attention of listening thousands, and he had the further great disadvantage of a defective utterance. With this, a sour, irritable temper was repelling to friendship; and an extraordinary deficiency, not only of personal courage, but of all that constitutes dignity of soul, made respect difficult, and esteem apparently impossible. Nor were these defects shown only among familiar acquaintances; they were exhibited in public, and made extensively notorious. In the earliest youth he earned an opprobrious nickname by the effeminacy of his dress and manner. On emerging from minority, by the Athenian law, at five-and-twenty, he earned another opprobrious nickname, by a prosecution of his guardians, which was considered a dishonorable attempt to extort money from them. Not long after, when in the office of choregus, which carried high dignity, he took blows publicly, in the theatre, from a petulant youth of rank, named Midas, brought his action for the assault, and compounded it for, it was said, thirty minae, about a hundred pounds. His cowardice in the field became afterwards notorious. Even his admirers seem to have acknowledged that his temper was uncertain, his manners awkward; that he was extravagant in expense and greedy of gain; an unpleasant companion, a faithless friend, a contemptible soldier, and of notorious dishonesty even in the profession of an advocate." Behold the picture! Had the subject of it been Mr. Mitford's political opponent at the hustings, then and there held on the day when he penned this unprovoked slander, he could not more completely have perverted the facts, or introduced more palpable misrepresentations, than he has done in this sketch of one of the greatest men that ever lived. Such a villain as he has described could never have achieved greatness; if he had gained temporary applause with his contemporaries, he would have lost it with posterity. Any one who knows the controlling influence which the orator exerted in the affairs of a declining state, would unhesitatingly pronounce Mr. Mitford's description of him

a gross calumny. Candid critics have already refuted the base charges, and exposed the defamer to public contempt.

Mr. Mitford is an admirer of tyranny and oligarchy; but democracy he hates with perfect hatred. He allows his political principles to color his whole narrative, and distort the plainest facts of history. The charges against his favorites, Pisistratus, Hippias, and Gelon, are all modified and softened to suit his theory; but when the democracies are assailed, "the blacker the story the firmer his belief; and he never fails to inveigh with hearty bitterness against them, as the source of every species of crime." He sees nothing to praise in the noble republics of Greece, but every measure in the administration of Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse, is paternal, sublime, godlike! Such special pleading enters into the very texture of his history, and in these particulars renders it worthless as authority. Party spirit is retrospective, as well as provident. It aims to secure the suffrages of the past as well as of the future. Most historians leave the impress of their political principles upon the works they write. Some do it through design, others unconsciously. The advocate of monarchy or of democracy explores the records of the past, for proofs of the superior excellence of his favorite form of human government. If, by a suppression of truth, or a suggestion of falsehood, he can secure for it the prestige of primogeniture, utility, and success, he can very confidently advocate its claims to universal adoption. "No sooner do we seek for information respecting the opinions that have been formed relative to the ancient condition of modern Europe," says Guizot, "than we find that the various elements of our civilization, that is to say, monarchy, theocracy, aristocracy, and democracy, each would have us believe that originally European society belonged to it alone, and that it has only lost the honor it then possessed, by the usurpation of the other elements. Examine all that has been written, all that has been said on this subject, and you will find that every author who has attempted to build up a system, which should represent or explain our origin, has

asserted the exclusive predominance of one or other of these elements of European civilization." Guided by such prepossessions and assumptions, no man can re-write the history of ancient nations with impartiality. Under such influences Mitford wrote his *History of Greece*, Hume his vindication of the Stuarts, and Clarendon his *History of the Rebellion*. Owing to the general prevalence of monarchy among the civilized nations of Europe, the advocates and defenders of popular rights have been sadly misused by aristocratic historians. No man expects justice from an opponent. A statesman's biography cannot be written with fidelity to the truth, while his principles remain unpopular. The advocates of necessary reforms will always be abused by those in power. Tyrants never relish discourses upon liberty, nor will bigots endure homilies upon toleration. "As a man thinketh in his heart, so is he." Let him once be convinced of the divine right of kings and priests, and his hostility to democrats and dissenters will know no bounds. The Romanists of to-day hate Luther as cordially as did his Catholic contemporaries. The cavaliers and churchmen of Victoria's reign repeat against Cromwell the slanders which their predecessors, in the reign of Charles II., invented and published. Till Carlyle undertook the vindication of "the high-souled Oliver," very few students of history dared to assert that England's mightiest monarch possessed a single redeeming trait of character; now few men have the hardihood to deny that he exhibited, in a high degree, those virtues which make human rulers both wise and good. That he had great faults, his warmest admirers must admit. No candid historian wishes to secure for him an apotheosis, because he has so long suffered in a historical purgatory. "This is a mode of writing," says Macaulay, "very acceptable to the multitude who have always been accustomed to make gods and demons out of men very little better than themselves; but it appears contemptible to all who have watched the changes of human character, — to all who have observed the influence of time, of circumstances, and of associates, on mankind, — to all who have seen a hero in the

gout, a democrat in the church, a pedant in love, or a philosopher in liquor."

Every page of England's history has been blackened by tory principles; with the progress of liberal opinions, these dark shades are fast disappearing, and the friends of freedom are receiving their just deserts. The same genial influence gives a new aspect to ancient history. The Athenian democracy has found a champion in Mr. Grote. He espouses the cause of his beloved "Demus" with the zeal of an advocate. He takes the people, with all their rashness, inconstancy, and violence, under his special protection. He is as bold in their defence as Mitford was in their condemnation. He follows his adopted children in all their aberrations, apologizes for their mistakes, palliates their crimes, allows no malicious foe to trumpet their vices, no careless friend to overlook their virtues. Even the ostracism, which has been pronounced indefensible by all authorities, except those who originated and employed it, finds in Mr. Grote an advocate, apparently because it was the offshoot, or, perhaps, an excrescence from free principles. Macaulay says of it: "Nothing can be conceived more odious than the practice of punishing a citizen, simply and professedly for his eminence; and nothing in the institutions of Athens is more frequently or more justly censured." This is the prevailing sentiment of political philosophers, except the Greeks; still Mr. Grote defends this odious institution, on the ground that it was essential to the preservation of those isolated and mutually hostile republics. His partiality for the Demus leads him to eulogize their leaders and teachers, the demagogues and sophists. These were both the natural products of their own soil, and of course entitled to protection. Cleon, whose name has been a synonym for political charlatantry and low demagogism for twenty-two centuries, is rescued from perpetual disgrace by Mr. Grote, and presented to the public as an able and efficient general. The maritime power of Athens, which has generally been regarded as tyrannical and oppressive to her allies, is also justified by the same author. A writer in the Westminster Review observes: "Col. Mure

controverts Grote's quixotic paradox on 'the character of Cleon,' and on 'the trials of the six generals;' but we suppose all competent critics would side with Mure against Grote in these two cases, yet it will not certainly be in consequence of Mure's summing up. We learn more from Grote when he is *wrong*, than from Mure when he is *right*. Mr. Grote is popular, precisely because he espouses the cause of the people. He pleads for humanity, for progress, for liberty. His very faults "lean to virtue's side." His partiality to Athens results from a noble and generous nature. In the words of Burke: "we pardon something to the spirit of liberty." It is better to err with such a leader, than to be right with bigots and despots.

Under Mr. Grote's limning, Alexander dwindles to the proportions of ordinary tyrants; in truth, he is little more than what the Thracian bandit represented him, "a mighty robber." His glory fades before the sunlight of democracy,

"As a dim candle dies at noon."

He was a great soldier; but he enslaved Athens, which "the great king" essayed to do some two centuries earlier, and failed. He was the conqueror of the East; but he subverted the liberties of all Greece, and in so doing, "had accomplished a result substantially the same as would have been brought about if the invasion of Greece by Xerxes had succeeded instead of failing." Is there no difference, then, between a Grecian despot and an Oriental sultan? between Grecian heroism and Persian effeminacy? between Grecian progress and Asiatic immobility? These questions need only be put to convince the reader that Mr. Grote is influenced by theory in his estimate of Alexander. But in judging of such an author we should be guided by the canon of the Roman critic. Where, as in the case of Mr. Grote, the protasis "*ubi plura nitent*" cannot be denied, we should cheerfully admit the apodosis,

— "*non ego paucis*

Offendar maculis quas aut incuria fudit,

Aut humana parum cavit natura."

The history of Greece has been very thoroughly studied, and often re-written, but with great diversity of opinion among authors. The character of the people, their mythology, laws, institutions, heroes, statesmen, and philosophers, have been excessively praised or censured, according to the point of view from which they were considered by the critic. Some writers pronounce the Hellenes unequalled in physical beauty and moral excellence. Others as stoutly affirm that they are destitute of both. The learned Wachsmuth says: "Their master passions were selfishness, avarice, lust, contentiousness, cruelty, and revenge." There is no substantial unity of sentiment respecting their great men. Dr. William Smith, in his excellent *Manual of Grecian History*, says of Thucydides: "His lofty genius did not secure him from the seductions of avarice and pride, which led him to sacrifice both his honor and his country for the tinsel of Eastern pomp. But the riches and luxury which surrounded him served only to heighten his infamy, and were dearly bought with the hatred of his countrymen, the reputation of a traitor, and the death of an exile." Was "the Saviour of Greece" a traitor as well as a miser? Is he, in these particulars, the prototype of Marlborough? The charge of treason has never been substantiated, and must ever remain an open question. Niebuhr says: "The rising power of Athens at sea, the voluntary adhesion of the other Greeks, and the rapidity with which Themistocles developed the greatness of Athens, — these were the causes which made the Spartans his implacable enemies. They accordingly caused a *false* accusation to be brought against him, charging him with being implicated in the conspiracy of Pausanias. Themistocles was perfectly innocent, as is clearly proved and attested. He felt that by his own personal greatness he was far more than he would have been as a tyrant; the period of tyrants, moreover, had then passed by, and had not yet returned. Neither Themistocles nor any other Athenian, could have conceived the preposterous idea which Pausanias entertained, of making himself king of Greece under the supremacy of Persia." The same author

also imputes the change of feeling which took place at Athens against Themistocles, to the intrigues of Cimon and the powerful party of which he was the leader. The active hostility of Sparta, and of the aristocracy of Athens, ought certainly to give to the accused the benefit of a doubt. Phocion is another questionable character in the annals of Greece. He was contemporary with Demosthenes, and belonged, with Isocrates, Iphicrates, and Chabrias, to the "Macedonian" party. Mitford remarks: "Phocion, not ill-selected by Plutarch from among all the worthies of all the republics of Greece, as a model of inflexible integrity in a corrupt age, the fittest parallel to the celebrated Utican Cato, had been coming forward under those three great men, but more particularly attached to Chabrias." He then proceeds to enumerate his virtues, and to set forth his patriotism, his honesty and wisdom, as exhibited in the several acts of his long life. Niebuhr espouses the cause of Demosthenes, against Phocion and the party of Philip; and so probably will every reader of Niebuhr, who, like him, sympathizes with the noblest and purest Athenian patriot then in existence, struggling manfully for the liberties of a falling state. He uses the following language: "Phocion, who is commonly called a model of virtue, did nothing but injury to his country, and more injury than any other man, except when matters had come to extremes, and his personal character made some impression; then, however, it was not his virtue that saved Athens, but the fact that Antipater recollected that he was the old opponent of Demosthenes, and of those whom Macedonia persecuted."

In another connection he adds: "Phocion belongs to that class of people to whom in modern times no honest man will erect a monument; he will pardon them, for they are not indeed wicked, but stand extremely low in a moral point of view, and are quite indifferent, and utterly incapable of any enthusiasm." It is very manifest that Niebuhr, as he says, entertained "a healthy aversion" to Phocion. In fact, he is a critic of very decided opinions; and he is fearless and bold in the avowal of them. The publication of his *History*

of Rome formed a new era in criticism. It has probably been more fruitful of discussion than any other similar work that was ever published. It is now nearly half a century since the learned Dane gave to the public his new and startling theories. Like the most recent of Arctic explorers, he penetrated so far into the unexplored sea of mythology and fable, that none of his contemporaries or successors have been able to verify or disprove his assertions. For more than a century prior to his advent, learned scholars in Europe had, from time to time, advanced views similar to his; but not one of them had secured the confidence of the leading public. Niebuhr undertook to reconstruct the history of Rome for the first five centuries of its existence. He brought to the task profound learning, accurate research, a tenacious memory, and an intense love for his chosen vocation. He, like Bonaparte, looked upon himself as the man of destiny, the divinely commissioned reformer of historic abuses. In his own esteem he possessed a deeper insight into the true meaning of ancient symbols, than any that had preceded him. His spirit of historic divination was at least equivalent to the Greek *μαντεία*, or the inspiration ascribed to their prophets and priests. He looked out upon the great ocean of early history, over which hung the clouds of fable and poetry, and peering into the darkness with the vision of a seer, sought, like Columbus, to discover lands hitherto unknown. He deemed himself successful. To his couched eye new continents seemed to rise from the deep, and he became a discoverer; for he calls his novel hypotheses and happy conjectures respecting the constitution and regal period of Rome, "discoveries." They are new, and possibly true; but mere assertion does not make them so. The proof is still in abeyance. He did what he could; more than any of his predecessors had done in the same department of labor, but was unable to create testimony where it did not exist. Speaking of his intense application for sixteen months to the early history of Rome, he says: "My sight grew dim in its passionate efforts to pierce into the obscurity of my subject, and unless I was to send forth an incomplete

work, which sooner or later must have been wholly remodelled, I was compelled to wait for what time might gradually bring forth. Nor has he been niggardly; but, though slowly, has granted me one discovery after another." This extract reveals the author's enthusiasm, and his patient toil. It also shows the estimate which he set upon the results of his labors. Upon many of his bold conclusions students are beginning to write what the great Arnauld wrote upon the inventions of Malebranche: "*Pulchra, nova, falsa.*" These oases of truth which he discerns amid the trackless waste of fiction and legend, may prove to be realities; but until proof positive is produced, we cannot be assured that they are not the effect of mirage. History is not made more certain even by plausible conjectures. It will not suffice to appeal to the internal evidence of the record to confirm the doctrine, because that testimony will vary with the judgment, taste, and opinions of the inquirer. It is not saying too much to affirm that the criticisms of Niebuhr and his disciples have raised more questions than they have answered, in Roman history. They have called the attention of students to the doubtful points, even when they have failed to throw light upon them. The science has been in motion, if it has not advanced. It seems to be making rapid progress, but the careful student always finds it in the same state. It resembles St. George on the signs of old English inns, who is always on horseback, but never goes on.

The first requisite of historic credibility is the testimony of contemporaries. In early Roman records, this cannot be had. It does not exist. It did not exist when Livy and Dionysius wrote; it did not exist when the earliest annalists quoted by them wrote; and of the first four hundred and fifty years of the city, it never did exist *in writing*, except in the most meagre form. The history of that period which has reached our age, was created by the earliest Roman writers, from very scanty materials. Tradition, laws, monuments, funeral orations, treaties, decrees of the senate, inscriptions on brass or wood, linen tablets, the "*lintei libri*" of Livy, lists of annual magistrates and existing institutions,

constituted their principal sources of information. To these Niebuhr adds a large body of national epics, lays, and songs, which, from *internal* evidence, he thinks are plainly discoverable in the pages of Livy. His office, therefore, was to dissect, from the commonly received narrative, the unsound portions, and then restore, by new creations, the mutilated body to its original integrity, and make it a beat ideal of true history. He exhibits greater boldness in amputating and cauterizing than in renovating and reconstructing the subject of his critical surgery. He pronounces the reigns of Romulus and Numa entirely fabulous and poetical, and the period from Tullus Hostilius to the first secession of the plebs, mythological and uncertain; while he maintains that a veracious narrative may be reconstructed from the date of the first secession down to the commencement of contemporary records. All this is supported by no external evidence, but rests entirely upon his private convictions. He has annihilated the founder of Rome, but has set up no one in his stead. Somebody must have led the freebooters, who first settled upon the Palatine and reared their huts to mark the site of a new city. His name may have been Romulus. Who knows? If it was not, perhaps the real name would be less euphonious to classic ears. Nothing would be gained by its substitution for that which the Romans, in the days of their glory, held in such veneration. The date of the foundation of the eternal city is unknown. Very well, we must be content to live without the knowledge of it. If the received date be set aside, we are deprived of a convenient starting point, but gain no compensation for the loss. The seven hills were doubtless occupied by Italian tribes, before the origin of Rome. Some of the names of those tribes, tradition has preserved; but it is impossible now to set bounds to the territories they inhabited, to describe their victories or defeats, or to point out, with any degree of certainty, the relations that existed between them. These advances and retreats were as inexplicable as those of a swarm of insects sporting in the rays of a summer's sun: "Upward and downward, thwarting and convolved." Nie-

buhr professes to have solved the enigma. "He," says Michelet, "took possession of Rome by right of occupation, *tanquam in rem nullius*, and set up his *prætorium* in the theatre of Marcellus. Issuing thence, day after day, for four years, he daringly *rummaged* the old city, and questioned it, and distributed it, like a master, among the races who founded it; now to the Etruscans, now to the Latins. He stirred up the dust of the kings of Rome, and dissipated the shadows which had, for so many centuries, played before the eyes of mankind." With such unbounded praise were his views received for some years after their publication. He was commended, alike, for destroying and for reconstructing; his dogmatism was as acceptable as his scepticism. He could not be proved to be wrong; he was, therefore, presumed to be right. Some of his admirers modestly questioned the certainty of his conclusions. Dr. Arnold observes: "Were I, indeed, to venture to criticise the work of this great man, I should be inclined to charge him with having overvalued rather than undervalued the possible certainty of the early history of the Roman commonwealth." Niebuhr claims the student's belief in a new history, differing from that which was received with confidence by Cicero, Dionysius, and Livy. We are required to regard the old narrative as fabulous; the new, as certain. Many critics have yielded to his claims; others have dared to question every one of his emendations. Such a result was to be expected, since his corrections often rested upon no authority internal or external, except his assertion. The authority of Livy is chiefly assailed. He is the Jupiter tonans of Roman archæology; and against him the giants of criticism have waged a war of extermination. His work, of one hundred and forty-two books, was designed mainly as a history of his own times. Like his predecessors in the same line, he began with the origin of the city and related, with comparative brevity, the events of the first five hundred years. The best portion of his work, that on which he bestowed most labor and for which he had abundant materials from contemporary witnesses, is lost, and he is judged mainly by the extant portion of his work, where he

was obliged to follow conjecture, or to use such uncertain records as time had spared. Of Livy's history only thirty-five of the one hundred and forty-two books which he wrote, have survived. Of the others, we have only dry and meagre epitomes, drawn up by some uncertain author, and of these two are lost. Livy cannot, therefore, be fairly judged as an author. In writing of the early period of Rome, he is not responsible for the absolute want of trustworthy records; but only for the manner in which he used those which were extant. He recorded the story much as he found it; and if it is incredible or contradictory, he may cry out, with Cicero: "*culpa temporum, non mea.*" Dionysius had no more authentic sources of information than Livy. He wrote of the origin and antiquities of Rome, to enlighten the Greeks, his countrymen, respecting the nation that had conquered them. He came to Rome twenty-nine years before Christ, and remained twenty-two years, having devoted all that time to the study of the Latin language and the composition of his History. Of the twenty books which he wrote, the first nine are complete; the tenth and eleventh are imperfect, and the remaining nine are only fragmentary. These are the principal authorities for the regal period, as it was understood at Rome, in the age of Augustus. Other writers made compilations and abridgments from these great works; and, of course, can add nothing to their value as authorities. If the fountain be bitter, it cannot send forth sweet waters. Neither wide diffusion nor long progression can heal them. A falsehood repeated through all time, and extended through all space, is a falsehood still. If contemporary records of the earliest periods were wanting, not even "the most vehement impulse of divination" can supply the deficiency. In history, as in science, we must be content not to know some things; and among them, we may as well admit, at the outset of the inquiry, that we can never determine, with certainty, the origin or the founder of Rome; and all besides the poetic and traditional legends, preserved by Livy, are mere hypotheses, unsustained by external evidence.

During the last two centuries of the republic, ending with

the death of Pompey, some twenty Roman historians, who lived during the occurrence of the events they record, are quoted by writers still extant. These solitary excerpts, like the fossil bones of extinct races of animals, demonstrate the former existence of those writers; but unfortunately there is no science of comparative anatomy, in literature, which can restore a lost work from a single fragment of its contents. But if these works had escaped the ravages of time and barbarism, they would throw no additional light on the first five centuries of the city. The same remark will apply, with equal force, to those Greek writers who wrote of Roman affairs, during the same period. Marcus Porcius Cato was the first Roman historian who wrote in the Latin tongue. He was born 234 and died 149 B. C. He wrote in his old age, about 170 B. C. His work, in seven books, was styled "*Origines*." His design, evidently, was to confine himself to early history; hence he wrote of the origin of the city and of the seven kings; then passing over, in silence, a period of two hundred and forty-six years, from the expulsion of the kings to the first Punic war, he resumes his narrative and describes, with great brevity, the events of the next one hundred and fourteen years. The contents of his work are described by Cornelius Nepos. Other ancient authors have quoted freely from the "*Origines*," but their citations, with two exceptions, are brief; but so indicative of the research and originality, the truthfulness and honesty of the author, as to make us deeply regret the loss of the principal part of his great work. Ennius, the father of heroic poetry in Rome, who wrote the annals of his country, in hexameter verse, and Nævius, who wrote, in Saturnian measure, a poem respecting the first Punic war, which took place in his life-time, were in existence when Livy wrote. But neither Cato, nor these early poets, were historical witnesses respecting the early history of Rome. They, like their successors, depended on tradition and monuments for their materials; and, if their works were now in our hands, we should know no more of the infancy of Rome than Livy or Dionysius have transmitted to us. The earliest Roman writers of history,

who wrote in prose, were Quintus Fabius Pictor and Lucius Cincius Alimentus. They were Roman senators, well acquainted with the civil and military affairs of their country. They lived during the second Punic war, and were entirely competent to write of what they heard and saw. They both wrote in Greek. This fact shows that their vernacular tongue was not then commonly employed in literary composition. The Greek was used, by the best educated writers, precisely as Latin was used by scholars in the dark ages, before the languages of modern Europe became sufficiently copious and polished for such service. Even Dante debated long, whether he should compose his "*Divina Comedia*" in the Latin or Italian tongue. The selection of the latter, in which to clothe his immortal creations, laid the foundation for his country's literature. Had Fabius and Cincius pursued the same course, their works would probably have remained to this day, and their nation would have become renowned in letters as soon as in arms. These two authors were often quoted by Livy, and were evidently regarded as the best authorities within his reach. Their chief object seems to have been to record the history of the first and second wars with Carthage, in the last of which they were actors. Both authors prefaced their works with a brief account of the origin of Rome and its early institutions. In Pictor's account of the Hannibalian war, Livy places implicit confidence, because he was an eye witness of the scenes he records: "*æqualem temporibus hujusce belli,*" as he styles him.

Cincius was equally prized by Livy as authority for the same period, because he was taken prisoner by Hannibal, who, being fond of literary men, treated him with great courtesy, and gave him much information respecting his march into Italy. Of the events in which they participated, these writers, according to Dionysius, wrote in detail; but of the earlier periods they gave only brief summaries. They were manifestly honorable and high-minded men, experienced in political and military affairs, and highly educated according to the standard of their times. They did not pos-

sess the antiquarian spirit of a modern German, still they were in a more favorable condition to collect and record old traditions than any writers who succeeded them. Cato, who, as above remarked, first used the Latin tongue in historical annals, followed close upon these authors; but he had no knowledge of the origin of Rome, or other Italian cities, which they did not possess. With these names the canon closes. We can ascend the stream of history no higher. Both its source and its tributaries, like those of the Nile, still remain concealed. Two thousand years ago men were attempting to find the origin of the Nile; at the same time other explorers were seeking for the origin of Rome; inquisitive men in our day are striving to solve the same problems. In the intervening period little progress has been made in either direction. Research and science will yet reveal the true sources of the Nile; but no human sagacity or "divination" will ever pierce the mantle of oblivion which time and barbarism have spread over the early history of Rome. Both the records and traditions are irrecoverably lost. If we had the history of Fabius, the most ancient writer of Roman annals, what could he tell us, with certainty, of the reign of Tullius, the most illustrious of the Roman kings, who lived 350 years before his time? If we admit that tradition might furnish a tolerably accurate account of the leading events of his country for a single century, few persons, who understand how oral traditions exaggerate even an "o'er true tale," will give much credit to interested accounts which have passed from father to son through a longer period. If all contemporary records of the discovery and early settlement of America had been destroyed one hundred and fifty years ago, it would be very difficult now to arrive at any certainty with reference to the history of that period. If those destroyed records had been very meagre and imperfect, the difficulty would be greatly increased. With all the light which a free press throws upon our history, many events and characters of our revolutionary war are still subjects of controversy. Take the best informed students of American history, and probably not one

in ten will, if suddenly questioned, answer with confidence the question: "Who commanded the American troops at Bunker Hill?" And not one in a hundred of our most noisy politicians can give a correct account of the origin and principles of the Federal and Republican parties in the days of Washington, Adams, and Jefferson.

Those great parties had their organs as soon as the Constitution was adopted; and their weekly issues were filled with mutual crimination and abuse. If a disciple of Jefferson were now asked to describe the old Federalists, following the records and traditions of his party, he would say: "They were the secret friends of monarchy and the open advocates of a strong, central, consolidated government, in opposition to the rights of the individual states; they were so partial to the mother country, that, during the second war with England, they publicly returned thanks to Almighty God, in their places of worship, for *her* victories over their own countrymen; and, finally with words of patriotism and benevolence upon their tongues, but with the spirit of Judas Iscariot in their hearts, assembled, by delegates, in treasonable conclave, at Hartford, to plot, like the followers of Catiline, the ruin of their country." Of this party, Hamilton is the central figure, whom all good Republicans were taught to hate as a species of political ogre, whose settled determination was to convert this government into a monarchy or perish in the attempt. Ask an admirer of the old Washingtonian Federalists his opinion of that party, and he will tell you that they were the followers of the great and good Washington; that they were the advocates of an efficient self-supporting government of the people, in opposition to a mere voluntary union of the states for common defence; that they were the jealous foes of regal power, and the warm friends of civil and religious liberty; and that by their agency the Constitution was saved from the open and secret hostility of the Republicans. He will tell you, too, with all honesty, that Hamilton was a high-minded, honorable patriot, whose pen and voice did more to secure the adoption of the federal Constitution than all other

agencies combined ; that Jefferson, his rival, was a Jacobin, an intriguer, and an infidel, professing friendship for Washington, yet secretly plotting the overthrow of his administration, remaining in his cabinet, yet deliberately recording, with his own hand, private conferences held there for the purpose of blackening the memory of individual members of it, and covertly disseminating sedition throughout the land. He will also affirm, that the party of which Jefferson was the acknowledged leader, were disciples of Robespierre, admirers of the abominations of the French Revolution, who, if placed in power, would subject every one of their opponents to the guillotine. To such contradictory results will party spirit lead men, even when public documents are thick as "leaves in Valombrosa ;" and, it is to be feared that sober history is not yet freed from this "bane of Republics." The careful readers of American history believe that they can discover, in some of our standard authors, traces of their political and religious opinions. It is reasonable to suppose that the old Romans were like other men in this respect. They had their party prejudices and their party heroes ; and their traditions were undoubtedly shaped with reference to these feelings ; and it is impossible for us, at this late day, to detect their falsehoods or reconcile their contradictions. Those compilations which were made by Roman writers, annually, were called "Annales." These were often quoted by Livy. The style in which they were written was dry and jejune ; the narratives, meagre and concise. In the "Annales Maximi," remarkable occurrences only were recorded. These were often such marvellous phenomena as required the attention of augurs and soothsayers, and were expiated publicly by religious ceremonies and sacrifices. Earthquakes, eclipses, fearful sights and sounds, prodigies and ostents of every description were recorded in these "greatest annals." Poor materials for history these ; and Livy has been severely censured for copying so many of them into his History. But if the men of that age deemed them the most note-worthy events of the time, deserving of national expiation, the historian who should omit them would be recreant to the first principles of his

chosen vocation. A fragment of Cato shows his contempt of such records. He says: "Non lubet scribere quod in tabula apud Pontificem maximum est, quotiens annona est cara, quotiens est lunæ aut solis caligo aut quid obstitent," etc. The Pontiffs usually kept these records, hence they are sometimes called "*Annales Pontificum*;" when written upon parchment or linen, "*libri Pontificum*."

These were the only public records in existence prior to the time of Fabius Pictor. Cicero informs us that it was the custom of the pontiffs to keep these brief records from the origin of the city to the consulship of Publius Mucius, B. C. 131. The question, then, occurs: Why were not these annals entitled to credit? Simply because most of those, probably all, that related to the first three centuries of the city, were mere restorations. The original tablets were lost. The city was almost entirely destroyed by fire about the middle of the fourth century of its existence, B. C. 490. This conflagration was kindled by the conquering Gauls. With the exception of the citadel, the destruction was so complete, that the Romans were with difficulty persuaded, by Camillus, not to abandon the ill-omened site and remove to the Etruscan Veii, which they had recently conquered. It is not probable that any public records survived this fire. It is doubtful even, whether the brazen plates, on which the laws of the twelve tables were inscribed, were not melted and their place afterwards supplied from memory. Cicero says that, in the days of the Republic, boys at school were required to commit to memory these laws; and it is probable that the people were made acquainted with them in this way, even before the establishment of regular schools. If all that had been recorded had been preserved, it would have furnished but few materials for history; for the annals were neither numerous nor full; and the subjects of record were unimportant to any but the priests. These having been lost, it is absurd to talk of contemporary records of the early centuries of Rome. The restorations of these annals having been made from memory and tradition, must have been very imperfect; the probability is, that with the exception of laws and treaties,

they never were restored with any trustworthy devotion to truth. Besides the restored annals of the high-priests, there were doubtless some monuments and inscriptions in the citadel and suburbs of the city, and in dependent towns in the vicinity, which served to throw some light on the past history of Rome and confirm oral traditions. But the first writers of history were not scientific antiquarians. They did not separate the precious from the vile. They were as likely to record fiction as truth. When they had collected all the materials that were patent to them, they made out "a lame and impotent conclusion." Cicero read these authors, and was a judicious critic. He compares their style to that of the old Greek logographers, Pherecydes, Hellanicus, and Acucilaus, mere story-tellers, who delighted in the marvels of an ignorant age, and recorded more that must be rejected than received. Pictor, Cato, Piso, and other Roman annalists, neglected all ornaments, sought only to be intelligible, and regarded brevity as the chief excellence of a writer. In addition to the above-named imperfect sources of information. Sir George Cornwall Lewis enumerates "Family Memoirs, Annals and Documents, of neighboring States, Deliberative Speeches, Funeral Orations, and Poems." How many of these existed, or were consulted, it is impossible now to affirm. The practice of reporting speeches, in short-hand, did not exist till near the close of the Republic; consequently all orations preserved from the general conflagration, and for some centuries later, must have been written out and preserved by the orators themselves. The earliest oration that Cicero was acquainted with, was that of Appius the Blind, delivered in the senate B. C. 280, when Cineas, the ambassador of Pyrrhus, came to Rome to treat of peace. Eulogies and funeral orations are of very ancient origin. Private families might retain such proofs of the virtues of their ancestors from ambitious motives; but these, like modern memoirs, would not be likely to contain anything but the good qualities and great deeds of the deceased, much exaggerated, which would not afford safe materials for history. It is not probable that any such eulogies came down from

the regal period. Such memorials, when printed, rarely survive a century. In a period when letters were rare and wars incessant, their long continued preservation would be almost a miracle. In later times, according to the testimony both of Cicero and Livy, the truth of history was notoriously falsified by those panegyrics of the illustrious dead. Distinguished families thus ennobled their ancestors by assigning to them offices and triumphs which they never enjoyed.

Livy speaks, also, of "*privata monumenta*." Some critics suppose that he refers to family memoirs, or inscriptions on busts and statues ("*imaginum tituli*"), and panegyrics. The annals of contemporary cities and states do not appear to have received much attention from Livy. He probably shared, with his countrymen, the general contempt for vanquished nations, and thus neglected their history and monuments. For this he has been severely censured. But admitting that he used, carefully and wisely, all the sources of information then known, his materials were utterly inadequate to the composition of a faithful narrative of Roman affairs. Niebuhr assumes the existence of a large body of national poetry, as the substratum of Livy's history. The theory that popular poems once sung and recited, but lost before the later Roman historians wrote, constituted the chief materials of the annalists, is based partly on conjecture. Cicero quotes Cato's assertion that the old Romans, centuries before his time, were accustomed to sing, at their banquets, the praises of great men, to the music of the pipe. Other writers allude to the same fact; but neither the names of the heroes nor their exploits are mentioned. This is the extent of the testimony. Great men were celebrated in song at their feasts. Niebuhr proceeds to inform his readers what was said, and how it was said; what was fact and what was fiction; who were praised and who were defamed; and what was selected and what rejected of the songs, by subsequent writers. Under his plastic hand, the song becomes an epic; the ballad, a heroic poem, with "a beginning, middle, and end;" an ingenious plot, a systematic development, and an impressive catastrophe. The reign

of Romulus is, with few exceptions, one continuous poem. Numa was honored only with "short lays." The history of the third king, with the story of the Horatii and the fall of Alba, form "an epic whole." In the reign of Ancus Martius, the Muses were dumb; but with the coming of Tarquinius, inspiration breathes anew, and a mighty "epopee" is the result. This is the highest effort of Roman genius, surpassing, in brilliancy of imagination, anything that subsequent ages produced. The truly Homeric battle, at Lake Regillus, closes "the grandest of Roman epics." Such is the theory. It is founded chiefly on internal evidence, elicited by his superior "divination," from the necessity of the case; for, if the history of the regal period, so full of poetic incidents, did not originate in genuine epics, whence did it come? It certainly has no other legitimate parentage. Macaulay, in his "Lays of ancient Rome," has endeavored to revive, in English ballads of surpassing beauty, the spirit and fire of the old Roman poetry. If their old Saturnian bards sung as he does, it is not surprising that their strains lingered, like a pleasant dream, in the memories of those sturdy warriors. It is not an unheard of thing that fierce fighters should be sweet minstrels. In Greece, Archilochus, the inventor of Iambic verses, of whom Horace says:

"Archilocum proprio rabies armavit iambo,"

was a soldier; Tyrtaeus, one of the founders of elegiac poetry, and Alcæus, the prince of lyric poets, followed the same profession. The greatest of ancient tragedians, Æschylus and Sophocles, bore arms in defence of their native land. But the Greeks were a more inventive, imaginative, and cultivated people than the Romans. It must be confessed that their literature was the legitimate offspring of poetry. All that can claim relationship to the Muses, in Roman story, is very happily set forth in the preface to the *Lays of ancient Rome*. We cannot do better than to quote the language. "The early history of Rome is, indeed, far more poetical than anything else in Latin literature. The loves of the Vestal and the god of war, the cradle laid among the reeds of the Tiber, the

fig-tree and the she-wolf, the shepherd's cabin, the recognition and the fratricide, the rape of the Sabines, the death of Tarpeia, the fall of Hostus Hostilius, the struggle of Mettus Curtius through the marsh, the women rushing, with torn raiment and dishevelled hair, between their fathers and husbands, the nightly meetings of Numa and the nymph by the well of the sacred grove, the fight of the three Romans and the three Albans, the purchase of the Sibylline books, the crime of Tullia, the simulated madness of Brutus, the ambiguous reply of the Delphian oracle to the Tarquins, the wrongs of Lucretia, the heroic actions of Horatius Cocles and of Clælia, the battle of Regillus, won by the aid of Castor and Pollux, the defence of Cremera, the touching story of Coriolanus, the still more touching story of Virginia, the wild legend about the draining of the Alban lake, the combat between Valerius Corvus and the gigantic Gaul, are among the many instances which will at once suggest themselves to every reader." These are 'the most striking passages that could be quoted in confirmation of the poetic origin of the history; and yet all mythology is made up of just such incidents. In fact a majority of the cases cited may be paralleled in the early history of any nation in Europe. Those portions which are wild and supernatural are common to the legendary lore of all nations in their infancy. Half the literature in the world is composed of just such materials, borrowed from plain prose narratives. The Decameron of Boccaccio, the Arabian Nights Entertainment, and Don Quixote, are prose compositions; and if poetic incidents and images evince a metrical origin, then these popular fictions must be disguised epics. All early history is poetic and fabulous. The imagination of a young people is intensely active; and the bold adventures of their heroes always assume a supernatural coloring in their traditions. The Indian legends which Longfellow has incorporated in his Hiawatha, never before wore a poetic dress; yet they are more wild and improbable than any of the marvellous tales of Roman invention. But if we assume that what is wild, romantic, and incredible in Roman history is of poetic origin,

how does that assumption aid us with regard to the larger and more important portions of the narrative, which are dry, prosaic, and technical? How happened this epic material to be literally buried in a mass of military, civil, and legal details, all wearing the guise of sober reality? For instance, the marvellous tales connected with the infancy of Servius Tullius are succeeded by a statistical account of his classification of the people, which is as destitute of poetry as the multiplication table. So throughout the regal period, the legendary portions of the narrative are inextricably blended with formal and minute accounts of the origin of the government, institutions, laws, religious rites, orders of society, and military organizations, which present nothing touching or picturesque to the imagination. All this is dull, sober prose. Niebuhr speaks of historic episodes alternating with romantic lays. How were the real and the fictitious so strangely associated? We know that a poem may be historical, reciting the facts of life in musical numbers, or clothing them in the garb of fancy; but no true poet ever "built the lovely song" by uniting the creations of his imagination with the repulsive verities of history in *alternate strata*, as a mason rears a palace of stones and cement. The ballad theory of Niebuhr accounts very well for the marvellous and incredible portions of Roman history, but it does not explain the growth of the legal and constitutional divisions of it. It does not satisfy the inquisitive mind to say, with Michelet: "When man desired to have men-gods, he was fain to heap whole generations in one person; to combine, in one hero, the conceptions of a whole poetic cycle. It was thus they obtained historic idols — a Romulus, a Numa." Such sweeping, philosophical generalizations do not originate with barbarians. Constitutions are not created in a day; they are usually the growth of ages. The traditions, mythology, legends, and finally the history of a people, are all slowly developed with national progress. Nothing great has great beginnings. "*Crescit occulto velut arbor ævo*," is the law of history as well as of the institutions which history describes. More than seven centuries elapsed before the

marble palaces of Augustus stood upon the hill where Romulus reared his straw-covered huts. During that period, many hands contributed to the architectural beauty of the city; and many minds to the embellishment of its recorded achievements. But the Romans were never a poetical people. Even in their palmiest days, their inspiration was borrowed. Their epics and lyrics; their drama and their eclogues, were copies of Grecian models. They were a stately, dignified, and practical people, not romantic nor imaginative. They are far more renowned for their jurisprudence than their literature. The epic origin of their history has no support from analogy. The Sabine frugality and industry ascribed to the early Romans, forbid the supposition of high poetic culture. They had neither professional bards nor rhapsodists. They had no Parnassus nor Helicon. No muse had an altar among them, except by courtesy or the laws of hospitality. Horace tells us that their first efforts at metrical composition were rude and repulsive. The few fragmentary verses that have escaped oblivion, confirm this assertion. We must conclude that the specious theory of Niebuhr is not sustained by facts. His imagination has converted their mythology into stately epics, and Cato's dinner-songs into Homeric episodes. That the Romans were not destitute of rhythmical compositions, before the days of Ennius, is known from the fact that defamatory verses were prohibited by the twelve tables; but that they had advanced beyond rude and unpolished doggerels, is not proved. If Fabius Pictor, Cincius Alimentus, and Cato derived their narrative mainly from historical ballads transmitted by oral recitations, it is very remarkable that Livy and Dionysius, who so often quote from them, did not discover and record a fact so important. Ballads, it is true, are common to all uncivilized nations. The North American Indians have their war songs; but these are peans of victory, not historical recitative. The legendary lore of the old Romans, like that of the Greeks, was a mixture of fact and fable. For more than four centuries it was floating in the public memory, while, from time to time, creative

minds probably added rhetorical embellishments; and possibly it derived from popular songs some interesting and touching incidents. The first historians gave continuity to these detached traditions. They endeavored to bring order out of confusion, and give unity and integrity to their narrative, which was composed of heterogeneous and discordant materials. Discrepancies and contradictions weakened the credibility of their story. Subsequent writers copied their mistakes; and after the lapse of two thousand years, it is impossible for us to correct them. Our only safe course is to take the record as we find it, and where we cannot reconcile conflicting accounts, to adopt that interpretation which seems most credible. If emendations are attempted, each critic will publish a new version of the facts; and we shall have as many Roman histories as there are compilers. Some students of history as in theology, love best those subjects which do not admit of definite solution. The more profound the mystery, the greater seems the courage that approaches it, and the more extraordinary the erudition that promises to explain it. Niebuhr was a lover of paradox. Conscious of his own superior attainments, he played the despot among inferior critics. He was bold, positive, dogmatical. Few were competent to meet him in his chosen field; and, for many years, none dared to oppose him. He undoubtedly did great service to the cause of sound learning; not so much by the new regions he explored, as by opening a safe path to subsequent discoverers; not so much by laying firm foundations, as by removing old obstructions. If he had done no more than to rectify the popular notions respecting the agrarian laws, he would not have lived in vain. He who justifies, at the tribunal of posterity, the advocates of popular rights, is a public benefactor. In Rome, the friends of the plebeians were grievously slandered by the aristocracy. The senate and the patricians loved power and office too well to be willing to share them with the common people; hence the leaders of reform were assassinated, and their memory loaded with infamy. An agrarian, in all ages, has been synonymous with leveller, demagogue, and anar-

chist. It is, therefore, a noble service to humanity to rescue such martyrs to the people's liberty as Spurius Cassius and the Gracchi, from undeserved reproach.

Niebuhr has also broken up that indiscriminate admiration for everything old which defeated the very object of study. He has directed attention to philology as an instrument of exploration in tracing national affinities. "He has shattered an obstruction, supplied implements, prepared materials, and done all this in the most difficult and the most dignified of sciences." But no divination of his, no intuitive perception of truth robed in fiction, can supply the place of contemporary records. Ingenious hypotheses may amuse, but do not satisfy, the inquisitive student. Such brilliant fancies, like pyrotechnics, soon vanish and leave the heavens more dark and forbidding. The interests of the reader are sacrificed to the reputation of the writer; mistakes are multiplied, and the discovery of truth rendered more difficult. Sir George Cornwall Lewis, after an elaborate survey of the whole question of the credibility of Roman history, arrives at the following result. "All the historical labor bestowed upon the early centuries of Rome will, in general, be wasted. The history of this period viewed as a series of picturesque narratives, will be read to the greatest advantage in the original writers, and will be deteriorated by reproduction in a modern dress. If we regard a historical painting merely as a work of art, the accounts of the ancients can only suffer from being retouched by the pencil of a modern restorer. On the other hand, all attempts to reduce them to a purely historical form by conjectural omissions, additions, and transpositions, must be nugatory. The workers on this historical tread-mill may continue to grind the air, but they will never produce any valuable result." This doctrine is theoretically safe and practically true; for even the most sturdy impugnors of the regal history of Rome are often led astray by the very phantoms which they have demonstrated to be unreal. Niebuhr denies the existence of Romulus; and yet in the next breath, talks of his reign as a reality. These old kings are as brave in history as in conflict. They neither fly

nor yield. Their spirits will not down at the bidding of the most potent magician. They have gained a niche in the temple of fame, and no modern thunderer can dislodge them. It is in vain to deny the existence of the Trojan war, or of the Roman kings. Achilles will continue to nurse his wrath, and Romulus to rear his walls, undisturbed by the missiles of noisy critics. The wild legends contained in "the tale of Troy divine," and on "Livy's pictured page," will continue to be conned and credited by the young, doubted and denied by the old, so long as poetry has an admirer or the Muses a worshipper.

ARTICLE VI.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

1.—JENKYN ON THE ATONEMENT.¹

It is with books as with men. The faults of some are easily discerned, and their excellences are more occult, yet their excellences are greater than their faults. The excellences of others are apparent at the first sight, and their faults are hidden, but the faults are greater than the excellences.

The treatise of Dr. Jenkyn, although it is improved in the present edition, has yet obvious defects. It were easy to enumerate them. They are counterbalanced, however, by very high merits. The volume abounds with rich hints, with sound, sensible remarks, with acute distinctions, with Biblical and practical truths, which are well fitted to exert an influence on inquisitive thinkers and good men.

We often discover, in Dr. Jenkyn's definitions, a sharp insight of the truth. His definitions often fail in exactness; but they as often suggest, with peculiar distinctness, the points most essential to be discriminated. Thus we find a volume of meaning in the following definitions and descriptions of the atonement:

"An atonement is any provision that may be introduced into the admin-

¹ The Extent of the Atonement, in its relation to God and the Universe. By the Rev. Thomas W. Jenkyn, D. D., late President of Coward College, London. Third Edition, carefully revised by the Author for the American Edition. Boston: Gould and Lincoln, 59 Washington Street; New York: Sheldon, Blake-man and Co.; Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1859. pp. 376. 12mo.

istration of a government, instead of the infliction of the punishment due to an offender — any expedient that will justify a government in suspending the literal execution of the penalty threatened — any consideration that fills the place of punishment, and that answers the purposes of government, as effectually as the infliction of the penalty on the offender himself would ; and which thus supplies to the government just, safe, and honorable grounds for offering and dispensing pardon to the offender.

“ This definition or description may be more concisely expressed thus : ATONEMENT is an expedient substituted in the place of the literal infliction of the threatened penalty, so as to supply to the government just and good grounds for dispensing favors to an offender.” (p. 14.) See also pp. 252, 269.

“ The sufferings of the Son of God were substituted in the room of the execution of the penalty threatened to the offender. The atonement in the death of Christ is not the literal enduring of the identical penalty due to the sinner ; but it is a provision, or an expedient, introduced *instead* of the literal infliction of the penalty ; it is the substitution of another course of suffering, which will answer the same purposes, in the divine administrations, as the literal execution of the penalty on the offender himself would accomplish. (p. 19.)

“ Atonement is not an expedient contrary to law, but above law : it is what law, as *Law*, cannot contemplate. It is introduced into an administration, not to execute the *letter* of the law, but to preserve ‘ the spirit and the truth ’ of the constitution. The death of Christ is an atonement for sin committed ; it is a public expression of God’s regard for the law which has been transgressed ; and it is an honorable ground for showing clemency to the transgressors.” (pp. 19, 20.)

“ The substitution of Christ was twofold, — a substitution of his person instead of the offenders ; and a substitution of his sufferings instead of their punishment. By this substitution is meant a voluntary engagement to undergo, for the ends of divine government, degradation, trouble, reproach, and sufferings, in order that the penalty threatened by the law may *not* be executed on the offenders. Such a substitution implies no transfer of moral character, no commutation of delinquency and responsibility : for the nature of things makes such a transfer and commutation impossible. This substitution of suffering also excludes the idea of a literal infliction, upon the substitute, of the *identical* penalty that was due to the offender.” (p. 41.)

“ It is said, ‘ Death was threatened in the penalty, and eternal and immutable veracity, therefore, requires that the substitute should suffer the identical death threatened to the transgressor, just as Pythias would have suffered for Damon.’

“ This is the strongest argument in favor of the position that Christ suffered the literal penalty of the law. In this argument, however, it is overlooked or forgotten, that eternal and immutable veracity requires that *THE sinner ONLY* should die, and not a substitute. The threatening is, ‘ the

soul that *sinne*th, IT shall die.' Therefore, should a substitute even suffer the identical death, truth is still very far from being literally fulfilled, and, consequently immutable truth remains unhonored. If eternal veracity can dispense with the identical *sufferer*, may it not also, under the direction of perfect wisdom, dispense with the identical *sufferings*?" (pp. 70, 71.)

"Jesus Christ suffered *for* us, the just *for* the unjust. He was made a curse *for* us — and a sin-offering *for* us. When it is said that Christ suffered *for* us, it is not meant that he suffered the sufferings due to us in law, but that *his sufferings were endured as substituted instead of our sufferings*. An atonement goes on the supposition that the identical sufferings which were threatened against man, are suspended, and that other sufferings are substituted instead of them.

"This exchange, or commutation of sufferings, in the expedient for redemption, was intimated in the first promise made to Adam. Man by transgression had become liable to the literal sufferings which were threatened in the penalty annexed to the law. From these sufferings he was to be delivered by the Seed of the woman. This deliverance was to be effected, not by power, but by a price of substituted sufferings, designated the "*bruising the heel*," a very different kind of suffering from that which was threatened to Adam." (p. 154.) See, likewise, pp. 246, 250, 261.

The treatise of Dr. Jenkyn is felicitous in suggesting the reason for the *kind* of sufferings which constituted the atonement. Why might they not have been *private, concealed* pains? The powers that be are ordained of God. What they inflict, He inflicts. Their punishments are his chastisements. When they condemned Christ to death, the Father bruised him and put him to grief. His crucifixion was, therefore, the special providence of God, setting Christ forth, holding him up, as the representative of men condemned to death.

"The nature of things," says Dr. Jenkyn, "and the order of society, also, seem to show the propriety, that an atonement should be as much *like* the infliction of the threatened punishment, as could, under the direction of infinite wisdom, be consistent with its nature as an expedient for the suspension of the literal penalty. Hence, the illustrious Mediator assumed a nature that could sustain visible sufferings, and endure a public death, even the accursed death of the cross. By such an arrangement, the whole government has been honored in the *nature*, if not in the *persons* of the offenders. 'If one died *for* all, then *did* the ALL die.'" (p. 35.)

It is often said, that, unless we define the atonement as consisting partly in the active obedience of Christ, we diminish the value of that obedience. It is forgotten, that the obedience is essential to the import and worth of the sufferings. It is forgotten, that the sufferings must be endured in the spirit of obedience, or they cannot avail as an atonement.

"Mere relationship to the offender," says Dr. Jenkyn, "is not a sufficient ground for a safe dispensation of pardon: the person who intercedes must have also a worth, and weight of character, in the estimation of the government.

"When Amyntas interceded with the Athenian senate for the life of his brother Æschylus, he pleaded, by lifting up the stump of his arm, the honors which he had achieved for the government at the battle of Salamis. The senate, at the instance of a person of such character and worth, granted the pardon. It was on this principle that Abraham interceded for the sparing of Sodom and Gomorrah. His plea was the moral worth of fifty righteous souls and the efficacy of the plea is distinctly recognized by the Angel Jehovah. Paul also interceded with Philemon for Onesimus, by pleading his own character in the estimation of Philemon, as 'being such a one as Paul the aged, and now also a prisoner of Jesus Christ.' This is the principle on which the Lord Jesus Christ makes intercession for transgressors, by representing, to the moral governor, his own infinite worth as an honorable ground for sparing them. It is as *THE JUST*, that he died for the unjust. It is as *THE RIGHTEOUS*, that he is now an Advocate with the Father.

"Hence we learn the design, and the place, of what is called the active obedience of Christ, in the plan of the atonement. The atonement did not consist in the death of Christ, simply as death, or as the death of a person so related to the offenders, but it consisted in being *such* a death of *such* a person. The Lord Christ would not have been *such* a person in his sufferings and death, had not the perfect obedience of his life preceded his agonies. The obedience of his life gave him a mediatorial character in the estimation of the divine government, so that it is an honor to the moral law to honor him." (pp. 37, 38.)

When we deny that Christ's atonement consisted in his obedience, we mean *his obedience as mere holiness*. We do not mean his obedience as a *humiliation*. This *humiliation* is as really a part of the atonement, as is any other humiliation; and as it is a humiliation to obey the law, it honors the law. Thus Dr. Jenkyn says:

"The life and character of the atoning Mediator demonstrated the loveliness, the justice, and the goodness of the law, which offenders had violated and trampled. It was an honor to the moral law to have been obeyed by such a Personage. In proportion as his obedience magnified the law and made it honorable, it condemned the transgression and the transgressors of it. The life of Jesus Christ teaches us that the law is adapted to our circumstances and faculties, that it is possible to observe and keep it, and that it deserves the affection and obedience of all men. The Mediator was 'higher than the heavens,' in supreme dominion, omnipotent power, and exalted station, yet he regarded this law as worthy of all the respect and honor with which he could invest it by his obedience. If any might think themselves above it, he more. Yet he yielded to it an obedience which the whole divine government contemplates with ineffable approbation and complacency. The life and the character of the Mediator clearly showed to mankind that this law was not unreasonable in its demands. It required no impossibilities. Jesus Christ could not obey it, but with the same faculties that we possess; and we are not destitute of a single power or faculty with

which Christ obeyed the law. His were mental powers and intellectual faculties in which he grew and made advances; and in every state of his progress as a child, a youth, and a man, he honored and kept the law.

"It was an honor to the law to be exhibited as sufficiently good, and free, and broad, to be the rule even for the mediatorial life of the Son of God. As God and Man he was a Personage new to the universe. The life of such a Personage, in a course of transactions between God and man, would be unexampled and eminently extraordinary. The law which he recommended to the esteem of mankind, he himself took for the rule of his own life. He was made of a woman, and made under the law, the very law on which men had trampled. He showed by his obedience to it what kind of life the law required from man. He obeyed to the highest perfection all its perfect commands. In the entire course of his life, he kept his eye fixed on this rule. In him was found no sin; he was completely perfect; yet he was not more perfect than this law required him to be! O how amiable and lovely must that law be, that was a sufficient pattern for the transcendent loveliness of the mediatorial character of the Son of God! When the highest being in the universe took upon him the form of a servant, and entered upon a course of obedience, and suffering, and glory, he observed this law, both in all his stupendous transactions with the divine government, and in all his merciful dispensations towards rebellious man. In all his undertakings he established the law. By his obedience he gave a demonstration to the universe, that he did not wish to save sinners by breaking through the laws and principles of moral government, but by honoring and establishing them, as the immutable and indestructible elements of the divine empire." (pp. 241, 242.)

Dr. Jenkyn often uses the word "Redemption" as synonymous with the word "Atonement." He recognizes, however, the distinction between the two terms.

"Redemption," he says "means either the ransom *price*, or the price of redemption — or it means the *act* of paying down that price; — or else, by metonymy, it means the *effect* of such a payment, meaning the *state* produced by such a ransoming. The effect, in the case of a sinner is, a state of forgiveness, acceptance with God, and admission to heaven." (p. 113.)

Is it not more common to employ the word "Redemption" as denoting, not the payment of a price for ransoming the sinner, but the actual ransoming of the sinner; not the effect produced, but the active producing of the effect; not the state of salvation, but the introducing of the sinner into that state?

We are particularly pleased with the chapter (VII.) of this volume "On the Atonement in its Relation to the Providence of God;" with the clear elucidation of the truths that all providence centres in the atonement, is subservient to it; and the administration of providence is founded on it, and is analogous to the administration of the atonement. Although there are various expressions in this chapter which might be amended, yet we have seldom noticed a more lucid proof, that the atonement holds the central position among the various correlated doctrines of the revealed system.

2.—BARNES ON THE ATONEMENT.¹

THE author of this volume has now attained the age of sixty years; and, in addition to numerous essays, treatises, and sermons, has published eleven volumes of Commentary on the New Testament and five volumes on the Old Testament. The number of copies of his Commentary on the New Testament, which have been circulated in this country, is more than four hundred thousand, and a still larger number has been circulated in other countries. About a million copies of different works from his fruitful mind have been given to the Christian world.

The prevailing spirit of his publications is that of the New England divines of the last hundred years. His extensive study of the inspired volume, his rich pastoral experience, his ripened moral virtues, have commended to his own mind that system of doctrines which is the most consistent with itself, the most beneficent in its practical working, and the most congenial with the word of God. That branch of the Presbyterian church to which he belongs, has been indebted to him, more than to any other man, for its efficiency; and is sure to lose its vital force, if it be ever left to abjure his spirit of deference to the Divine Word and the Divine Works.

We need not say, that we are pleased with the present treatise from his pen; for it exhibits a large, wide view of moral government, abounds with striking analogies between the principles of the natural and those of the revealed system, with eloquent illustrations of the worth of the atonement, and with Biblical as well as sensible exhibitions of its nature.

We are particularly pleased with the comprehensive statements of Mr. Barnes with regard to the relations of the work of Christ. Men are in danger of limiting their idea of this work to one point, and of forgetting that the atonement has varied and expanded relations, and cannot be fully explained in one phrase. Mr. Barnes says: "Atonement must relate to one or all of the following things: to the law itself, that its authority may be maintained; to the penalty of the law, that the object contemplated by the penalty may be secured; to the offenders in whose behalf it is made, or who are to receive the avails of it, that it may make their reformation and future good conduct certain; to the community, that it may have nothing to apprehend if the guilty are pardoned; and to the character of the lawgiver, that that character may stand fair before the world, and be such as to inspire confidence, if the just penalty of the law is remitted." (p. 78.) See, likewise, pp. 239 seq.

Mr. Barnes is very explicit in his statement, that the atonement of Christ does not consist in his enduring the literal penalty of the law. He says:

"The essential idea in the doctrine of the atonement is that of *substitu-*

¹ The Atonement, in its relations to Law and Moral Government. By Albert Barnes. Philadelphia: Parry and McMillan, successors to A. Hart, late Carey and Hart. 1859. pp. 358. 12mo.

tion or *vicariousness*. If the doctrine of substitution is admitted at all, it would seem to be most probable that it would extend to the kind of suffering and to the amount of suffering, as well as to the sufferer himself. For the same reason that it is admissible in reference to one of these points, it must be admissible in reference to the others also; and it cannot be assumed that there is a substitution in one of them only, or that the same principle may not be extended to all that enters into the notion of the atonement.

"It is nowhere affirmed, in the Scriptures, that the Redeemer endured the same *kind* of suffering which they, for whom he died, would have endured if they had borne the penalty of the law in their own persons. It is, indeed, abundantly affirmed that he died for sinners; that he bore the sin of many; that the Lord had laid on him the iniquity of all; that he was made a curse for us; that he was wounded for our transgressions and was bruised for our iniquities. But it is nowhere affirmed that the sufferings which he endured in behalf of the guilty were of the same nature as those which the guilty themselves endure for their own crimes; and it would be impossible for man to embrace such a doctrine if it were affirmed.

"It would be impossible for a substitute to endure the same sufferings which the sinner himself will endure in the future world for his sins. There are sufferings caused by sin which belong only to the consciousness of guilt, and these sufferings cannot be transferred to another. The sin itself cannot be transferred; and, as it is impossible to detach the suffering from the consciousness of guilt, it follows that a substitute cannot endure the same kind of suffering which the sinner would himself endure. Remorse of conscience, for example, — one of the keenest sources of suffering to the guilty, and which will be a most fearful part of the penalty of the law in the future world, — *cannot* be transferred. I *cannot* be made to feel remorse for what another has done. I may feel deep regret that it was done; I may feel shame, mortification, and humiliation from the fact that it was done by one who is intimately connected with me; I may suffer deeply in person, in property, or in my social position, on account of the offence; but I *cannot* be made to feel remorse. There is no way conceivable by which this feeling can be transferred from the guilty to the innocent. To transfer it is not an object of *power*; for, by the eternal and unchangeable constitution of things, it is attached only to the crime and the criminal; and, as it is impossible that the guilt should be transferred, so it is impossible that the remorse which belongs to it should be made over to another.

"It follows, therefore, that whatever may enter into an atonement, it cannot be implied that the substitute endured the same *kind* of sufferings which the guilty would themselves endure." (pp. 227—229.)

"An atonement is, properly, an arrangement by which the *literal* infliction of the penalty due to sin may be avoided; it is something which may be *substituted* in the place of punishment; it is that which will answer the same end which would be secured by the literal infliction of the penalty of the law." (p. 230.)

"*The atonement is something substituted in the place of the penalty of the*

law, which will answer the same ends as the punishment of the offender himself would. It is instead of his punishment. It is something which will make it proper for a lawgiver to suspend or remit the literal execution of the penalty of the law, because the object or end of that penalty has been secured, or because something has been substituted for that which will answer the same purpose. In other words, there are certain ends proposed by the appointment of a penalty in case of a violation of the law; and if these ends are secured, then the punishment may be remitted and the offender may be pardoned. That which will secure these ends is an *atonement*.

"The thing aimed at — the result to be reached — is the remission of the penalty, or the manifestation of mercy to the guilty. It is not an *abstract* thing — a mere display of an attribute of the lawgiver — that is contemplated; but it is a practical work, in the pardon of the guilty, and in placing him in a condition *as if* he had not violated the law. The essential reason why this is done, is that God is merciful; the manifested reason is, that the same ends have been secured, so far as the design in the appointment of the penalty of the law is concerned, which would have been if the offender had been punished; in other words, mercy can now be manifested consistently with justice; for the act of pardon does not imply, by a fair construction, any disregard of the claims of justice or of the real interests of the community." (pp. 244, 245.) See, likewise, pp. 277, 288, 300, 337.

In explaining the doctrine of imputation, Mr. Barnes, like Dr. Jenkyn, makes a broad distinction between the phrase "Christ was treated as a sinner," and the phrase "Christ was treated *as if* he were a sinner." He says :

"If it was literally true that he [Christ] was made 'sin,' that he was a 'curse' for us, that he bore 'iniquity,' then it would follow that there was a *transfer* of criminality to him, — that he became so *identified* with sinners for whom he died, that he was properly and justly regarded as a sinner. It would follow that he was not treated *as if* he had been a sinner, but that to all intents and purposes he was regarded and treated as a sinner, or as *deserving* all that came upon him. It is not easy to see how this conclusion could be avoided, or how we could escape the absurdity of holding in words — what no man can really believe in fact — that a transfer of moral character actually took place." (p. 298.) See, likewise, pp. 296, 304, 306, 314, 315.

There are many other particulars in which Mr. Barnes has defended the truth with fidelity and success. Thus he proves that "the atonement does not change God," does not *make* him mild and forgiving, but God was propitious before the atonement, and he originated the atonement *because* he was propitious (pp. 219—224, 263); that the atonement may have been designed to affect other worlds than our own, and justify the ways of God not only to man, but also to unnumbered higher intelligences (pp. 272, 273, 274); that the atonement "is available for all," and is not limited to a part of mankind, by intention and purpose; that it was not "*intended* only for the elect," but "*was* designed to refer to mankind as such." (pp. 316—358.) Perhaps, indeed, the most felicitous part of the volume is the ninth chapter,

proving the General Atonement. In showing the *extent*, we necessarily develop the *nature* of the atonement. Thus our author teaches:

"If the true idea of the atonement is, that Christ endured the literal penalty of the law, then the doctrine of a limited atonement must be true. For, in that case, all that the law demands has been accomplished; all that a penalty implies has been endured. But there is no such thing as a *general* penalty. The penalty of law pertains, always, to individuals. The demands of the law are demands on individual men; the penalty for violating law pertains to the individuals who do it. If they could themselves bear the penalty, they would have a right to a discharge; and if another should bear it for them, they would have an equal right to it. If, therefore, the literal penalty must be borne, the transaction must pertain to the individuals in reference to whom the claims of the law have been 'satisfied,' and can be extended to no other. If a murderer pays the penalty of the law on the gallows, that fact cannot avail to the acquittal of another murderer; still less can it be the ground of a proclamation that *all* murderers may now be acquitted. The murderer himself, if he should return to earth, could not be again indicted, convicted, and executed for the offence; for he has met *all* that the law prescribed as a penalty, and, so far as the laws of human legislation go, he is free. If a man who is sentenced to a penitentiary for a certain number of years, 'serves out' that time, he has a right to a discharge. He has endured all that the law has prescribed in the case as a penalty. He cannot be tried and convicted again for the same offence. But the fact that he has borne the penalty of the law, cannot be made available to the benefit of any other offender; still less could it be made the ground of a general jail-delivery, or of a proclamation that the doors of all the penitentiaries in the land might be thrown open and all convicts be discharged. In like manner, if Christ bore the literal penalty of the law, it could avail only for those for whom he endured it. No offer of pardon could be made beyond that; or rather, since the penalty of the law has been *borne*, and the law has been '*satisfied*,' there can be no *pardon* in the case, any more than there is '*pardon*' when a burglar has borne all that the law prescribed as a penalty, and now *claims*, as an act of justice, a discharge. If this were the true nature of the atonement, then it would follow that the doctrine of a limited atonement *must* be found in the Bible; and then also, as in the other cases, all offers of salvation made to those for whom Christ did *not* bear the penalty of the law, must be based on falsehood and insincerity." (pp. 335, 336.)

In some respects we should prefer a different phraseology from that selected by Mr. Barnes. He says:

"While it [punishment] has, as a subordinate design, the purpose of deterring others from the commission of the same offence, and securing the safety of the community, it has a much higher end as its main design. It is an expression of the sense entertained of the value of the law, and is the measure of the sense which is entertained of that value. It is inflicted because it is *right* that it should be inflicted. It is inflicted because the offence *deserves* such an expression. There is, back of any idea of restraining others, or of

reforming the offender himself, or of protecting the community, the feeling that it is RIGHT that the offender should be made to suffer ; that he OUGHT to be punished ; that it would be WRONG if he were not punished. And when we see a man justly punished, we think of this not as tending to reform him, or as designed to protect the community, or to be an example to deter others ; but we think of him as suffering that which our nature tells us is right, whatever may be the consequences in these other respects ; and in that view of the matter, we acquiesce in the infliction. We may rejoice in the belief that these incidental effects will follow from the infliction of the punishment ; but we should regard it as a violation of justice if these views should guide the magistrate in determining the amount of punishment ; that is, if it were only so much as would best tend to reform the offender, or to deter others, or to protect the community. We demand something more : we demand that which will, in some proper sense, express what the crime *deserves*." (pp. 193, 194.)

We fully believe that every moral punishment is inflicted on the ground that the sin, for which it is inflicted, *ought* to be punished. We regard it as a mere misrepresentation of the true theory, to affirm that it denies the intrinsic ill desert of sin, and describes all *demerit* as resulting from the bad consequences of a sin, rather than the bad consequences as resulting from the demerit of it. We believe, also, that all moral punishment is designed to express the punisher's sense of the value of law. But we prefer to say, that while the ill desert of sin is the ground of the punishment, and while the punishment is designed to express this ill desert, and the value of law, and the lawgiver's sense of that value, it is designed mainly and *ultimately* to satisfy his general justice, his general, comprehensive benevolence. He chooses to express his regard for his law, because this expression satisfies his *ultimate* desire to make all things promote his own glory and the well-being of the universe.

Again. Does Mr. Barnes intend to teach that a government of strict justice, of *divine* justice, would be "harsh, severe, tyrannical?" Would an administration be an object of mere dread, "to be feared, not to be loved," which is governed by the law of God and the justice of God, when this law requires nothing but right, and inflicts nothing but that which *ought* to be inflicted? Is not strict justice an amiable attribute? (See pp. 245, 246.)

Further. We do not know that Mr. Barnes uses the word *supererogation* in the authorized way. He speaks of "the principle of supererogation, or of doing more than is required by the exact demands of law." He speaks of "not being bound by any claims of law or justice," of a case "where there is no obligation of any kind," where "the whole work is voluntary, and is, in the strictest sense, a work of supererogation ; that is, *beyond* what is demanded of him by any claim of justice or of law." He says that the case of the Redeemer is the only one "where a service could be rendered which was not required by a fair application of the law of God, and where, therefore, there could be such an accumulation of merit, or such a work performed, that it could be made available to others *as if* it were their own. This whole work

lay beyond the proper range and the proper demands of the law; and the avails of the work, therefore, could become the foundation of pardon and hope to others." (p. 312.)

"The only Being who ever could place himself in such a position that his obedience to the law *could* be made available to supply the deficiencies of others, is He who was not *bound* to obedience, from the fact that he was himself the lawgiver, and who could, therefore, so place himself in a condition of *voluntary* obedience that his merits could become available for others. This is the Christian idea of redemption; and in this respect the Christian scheme differs from all others in regard to a work of supererogation or of extraordinary merit." (pp. 204, 205).

According to these definitions and principles, it was a work of supererogation in God to provide a Saviour, for "by no consideration of justice or of law could he be brought under obligation" so to do (p. 312). It was equally a work of supererogation in the Son to become incarnate.

"We cannot conceive that God would require an innocent being to suffer in the place of the guilty; and if the Son of God was equal with the Father, or was in the true and proper sense of the term Divine, then there was no law which could bind him to undertake the work of the atonement, or to place himself in a position where he *would be* under law, either to obey it, or to suffer its penalties." (p. 313.)

"His was properly a work which could not have been claimed as a matter of justice, and might all be considered as a work of supererogation." (p. 314.)

But do we say that God is "*required*," by the "*exact demands of law and justice*" to continue the angels in existence? Is he not altogether "*voluntary*" in blessing them? Do we therefore call this an act of supererogation? Do we say that he was required by the "*exact demands of law and justice*," to create the universe? Is the act of creating, then, a work of supererogation? Is not the act of preserving the stars of heaven altogether "*voluntary* with the infinite Preserver? Is it, therefore, a work of supererogation? On this principle, must we not affirm that all God's works were supererogatory in his first inception of them? Of what works do we say, that they were *originally* and *from all eternity* exacted of him by the strict demands of law and justice? When we speak of the *demands* of law upon an agent who is *under* obligation to fulfil them, are we not understood as implying the existence of a Power superior to that agent?

But we may modify our phraseology. Instead of saying that God is *obliged* by the strict demands of law to perform his works, we may affirm that there is a law of the Divine Mind, to which he voluntarily conforms, and by which he requires of himself, for his own glory, to create and to preserve the universe, and to perform acts of *benevolence* for his creatures. But on this principle may it not be said, that he chooses to conform to a law of his infinite mind, ordaining that he exercise mercy and grace to his offending children? If he be obligated to himself to do *any* thing which is right, then he is obligated to himself to do *every* thing

which is right. If right always implies obligation, either to one's self or to a superior, then, in the Divine Mind, right implies obligation to Himself; and if *one* kind of right implies an obligation, then *every* kind of right implies an obligation; and acts of mercy and grace are no more really acts of supererogation, than are the common acts of benevolence. If the atonement was essential for the highest glory of God, and if it be right to promote this glory, then is it right to neglect it? Can it be right to prefer the greatest well-being of the universe, and also right to prefer the smallest, rather than the greatest?

We often say that God was under no obligation to make an atonement, for he was under no obligation to distributive justice, nor to the law of a foreign power. In the same sense, he was under no obligation originally to do anything. But we as often say, that he *owes it to himself*, is *obligated to himself*, has a law within his own perfect nature, to exercise all his illimitable perfections in the way most conducive to his own glory. Therefore none of his works are works of supererogation, as they stand related to his own infinite sense of right. We apprehend that a work of supererogation is one which it is perfectly right not to perform; which is not only voluntary, but is *optional*, in the sense of its being as proper to neglect it as to do it. We apprehend that there cannot be, in the strict sense of the phrase, a supererogatory act, and therefore the atonement, although not demanded by the law of distributive justice, nor by the law of simple, private benevolence, nor by any law imposed on the Deity by a foreign power, was yet necessary to the fullest glory of the Godhead and the highest good of his universe, and was, consequently, not a work which it would have been as glorious and as good and as fit and right for him to neglect, as for him to secure, and was, of course, not a work of supererogation. It was a work not of duty to men, not of duty to creatures, not of duty to be exacted of God by another being, but a work which he owed to his own infinite grace, and to the highest glory of his perfections. We do not apprehend that our ideas on this topic differ from those of Mr. Barnes. We query whether his use of the term "supererogatory" is conformable to the current use of it among theological writers.

3. — DARLING'S CYCLOPAEDIA BIBLIOGRAPHICA.¹

THIS is really a wonderful book. It professes to give a catalogue of all the works which have been published of direct explanation or illustration of the Bible or any part of it. It is very full and complete in regard to works published in English and Latin; not so full in regard to the Biblical literature of other languages; yet on the whole quite satisfactory as to the

¹ Encyclopaedia Bibliographica, a Library Manual of Theological and General Literature, and Guide to Books for Authors, Preachers and Literary Men, Analytical, Bibliographical, and Biographical, by James Darling. Subjects — Holy Scriptures. London: James Darling. 1859. pp. xii. col. 1900.

French, German, and Greek. The wonder is, not that it is, in some parts, defective; but that it is, on the whole, so complete and instructive. How could mortal man ever hunt up the titles of so many books, on a given set of subjects, and give them so good a classification? On a careful estimate, without undertaking the labor of a direct count, it would seem that some sixty thousand different works, or parts of works, are here enumerated and arranged under their appropriate heads.

On the Pentateuch and book of Genesis alone, exclusive of commentaries on the whole Bible and on the Old Testament in particular, we find here catalogued about twenty-five hundred different works; on the Psalms, about five thousand; on Isaiah, about two thousand; on the four gospels, as a whole, and Matthew in particular, exclusive of commentaries on the whole N. Test. and the other three gospels singly, about six thousand; on the apostle Paul, and the epistle to the Romans in particular, about three thousand; on Revelation, about two thousand; and so in proportion of the other books. It will surprise many to see that nearly three times as many books have been written on Matthew and the Psalms, as have been written on Revelation; and that even the epistle to the Romans has one third more than that prophetic book. Some appear to imagine that more books have been written on Revelation than on any other part of the Bible. This is here shown to be a great mistake. The more practical and important books, the Gospels, the Psalms, Romans, and Genesis, have evidently excited the most attention among Christian writers in all ages. This, certainly, is as it should be.

On looking over this ponderous work, one is impressed with the conviction, that each generation must make its own books, notwithstanding all the literary labors of the past. The three thousand commentaries on the Romans will not obviate the necessity of three thousand more in time to come. Each generation has its own peculiar intellectual horizon, its own moral atmosphere, and needs the green grass of its own age to mingle with the dry hay of other times, and cannot subsist without it. So those whose fingers are itching to write, need not despair; and those who suppose that Owen on the one hundred and thirtieth Psalm, or Flavel on Keeping the Heart, will supersede all modern literature, must, sooner or later, find themselves mistaken. Old books have their interest and their place; but we cannot live upon them alone. It is only the best of the past that lives in the subsequent generations, and contrasting that with the mediocrity of the present, we indeed appear small; but that of the present which will live to the future, will be as good as any of its companions from other ages, to say the very least of it. For certainly, in the human mind, on the large scale, there is progressive improvement; and as each generation requires its own nutriment and its own cookery, mental as well as physical, so each generation, as a general fact, is somewhat superior to any which has preceded it; and so it will continue to the end, unless the old prophets were all deceived. But this result can be secured only by constant activity and productiveness.

The perusal of the work before us, also, somewhat clips the wings of expectation, as to the obtaining of immortal fame by writing commentaries on the Bible, or making books of any kind. Of the three thousand who have written on Romans, of the five thousand who have written on the Psalms, of the six thousand who have written on Matthew, how many, as they toiled on from day to day, diligently scratching, with the pen, one sheet of paper after another, did it without any reference to a lasting celebrity? Yet how many of them are now read, or ever will be read again? How many of them probably survived the first ten years after publication? But what of that? It is still true that *those who by patient continuance in well doing, seek for glory, honor, and immortality, shall have eternal life*; and those who work for worldly fame, will have what they can get.

Mr. Darling has had peculiar advantages for compiling the work which he has published. For thirty years or more he has been engaged in a large antiquarian bookstore in London, near Lincoln's Inn Fields. He is a great lover of books, and a good judge of them; and at his rooms the purchaser finds the best of books in the best condition. The book before us is but one instalment (the second — the first being a List of authors and their Works, published in 1854) of a much larger work which he contemplates, — a work embracing all the departments of theology and general literature. May he live to finish it! It will be of great use to purchasers of libraries, and to writers who have access to libraries, while to those who have not books, and cannot get them, it will be the vine of Tantalus.

4. — SPIEGEL'S AVESTA.¹

EVER since that indefatigable Frenchman, Anquetil du Perron, about one hundred years ago, enlisted as a private soldier in the French Indian army, in order to obtain a passage (which he was too poor to pay for) to some Asiatic port where he might find and study the Zend books in their original languages, the history and religion and literature of the Zoroastrian religionists have occupied the earnest attention of many of the most distinguished Oriental scholars; and the great problems connected with this subject are not even yet satisfactorily solved. Anquetil, considering his time and opportunities, accomplished wonders; and we are glad to see Dr. Spiegel paying so hearty a tribute to his merits (B. II. S. xiii.), while he differs so widely from him in many of his own results. The most careful investigations, thus far, seem to authorize the following conclusions, namely: that Zoroaster was a historical and not a mythical person; that he was, in time, less than a century anterior to the prophet Daniel; that he was not the founder of a new religious system, but the reformer and organizer of an old one, which had been confirmed and established as a state religion by the

¹ Avesta, Die Heiligen Schriften der Parsen — aus dem Grundtexte übersetzt, mit steter Rücksicht auf der Tradition von Dr. Friedrich Spiegel. Erster und Zweiter Band. Leipzig, 1852 and 1859. pp. viii., cxxiv., 295, 222.

good king Djemschid, about the time of the Hebrew prophet Jonah and the old Greek Homer, though its first origin is lost in an antiquity far greater than that; and that the most ancient of the Zend books which we now have, contain but scattered fragments of the writings of Zoroaster, compiled by the later Magi, intermingled with their own compositions, and some traditional sentences older than even Zoroaster himself.

The most interesting feature of the Zend books, to the Christian scholar, is the very great similarity of some of their teachings to several of the most important doctrines of the Hebrew and Christian scriptures, such as the primitive paradise, the fall of man, the restoration by a Redeemer, the resurrection of the body, the final judgment, etc. It is true that the new and more accurate translation by Spiegel makes the features of these doctrines much less distinct and characteristic than they appear in the old work of Anquetil du Perron; but still they are there with sufficient clearness to awaken the curiosity and stimulate the inquiries of the Christian theologian. It is a noticeable fact that the doctrines of revealed religion contained in the Zend books are mainly those which are found in the book of Daniel. Some three generations after the time of Zoroaster, this Hebrew prophet was appointed chief of the Magi, which office, or what was equivalent to it, he held for many years (Dan. 2: 48. 6: 28). Of course, the doctrines of religion known to Daniel, would find their way into the Zoroastrian system, and be preserved there with some considerable degree of distinctness. Daniel is the only one of the prophets who undertakes to determine the time of the Messiah's advent (Dan. 9: 25, 26). This idea passed into the Magian literature; and there, by the conquests of Alexander, it came into the literature of Greece and Rome, as we see in the writings of Josephus, Tacitus, Suetonius, and others; and when Christ was actually born, it was the Magi who were waiting for him, and ready to journey to Jerusalem to do him homage, as soon as his star appeared (Matt. 2: 1, etc.). Balaam, who was from the *mountains of the East* (Num. 23: 7), had long before prophesied of Christ under the image of a star (Num. 25: 17). It is everywhere obvious that, from the time of Abraham at least, if not earlier, the whole region about the head waters of the Tigris and Euphrates, and so on eastward and southward, had been visited by some scattered rays of revealed truth. It is a most gratuitous and improbable assumption, that the Hebrews borrowed from the Zoroastrians, and not the Zoroastrians from the Hebrews. There is not a single historical fact yet ascertained to substantiate the former hypothesis, while every historical probability is strongly in favor of the latter; and, unless revealed religion be all a fable, the latter hypothesis is certainly the true one.

The translations of Spiegel, we have already intimated, differ essentially from those of Anquetil. So great is this difference, in many instances, that it is impossible to recognize the two as but different versions of the same work. This difference Spiegel ascribes to the better knowledge now possessed of the original languages, and the more familiar acquaintance with the religious traditions and usages of the Zoroastrian religionists. This un-

doubtedly is true in part; but we are inclined to think that Spiegel errs on his side some, as well as Anquetil much on his; and this opinion is confirmed by the many expressions of doubt and uncertainty which Spiegel gives in reference to his own translations. Indeed, it is much to the credit of Spiegel that he is as modest and frank as he is industrious and scholar-like. In the new names which he gives by his more accurate representations of the originals, we scarcely recognize our old acquaintances. For example, Zoroaster becomes Zarathurtra, Ormuzd is Ahura-mazda, Ahri-man is changed to Agra-mainyus, and so of the rest. The style of monotonous repetition, so conspicuous in these books, being so much like what we find in the arrow-head inscriptions of western Asia and the Chaldee documents of the book of Daniel, is one very strong proof of their genuineness. We will give a single example from the second section of the Verdadid :

"1) There inquired Zarathuritra of Ahura-mazda : ' Ahura-mazda, the Heavenly, the most Holy, Creator of the worlds gifted with bodies, the Pure One :

"2) With whom as the first of the men hast thou entertained thyself, thou who art Ahura-mazda ?

"3) Besides me, the Zarathurtra, to whom hast thou taught the law which came from Ahura, the Zarathurtrian?

"4) To this replied Ahura-mazda : With Yima the Beautiful, provided with a good assembly, O pure Zarathurtra.

"5) With him, as the first of the men, have I entertained myself, I who am Ahura-mazda.

"6) Besides thee, the Zarathurtra, to him have I taught the law which came from Ahura, the Zarathurtrian.

"7) Then spake I to him, O Zarathurtra, I who am Ahura-mazda,

"8) Harken to me, O Yima, the Beautiful, son of the Vivaghao, as Reminder and Bearer for the law.

"9) Then replied to me Yima, the Beautiful, O Zarathurtra,

"10) I am not the Creator, not the Teacher, not the Reminder, not the Bearer for the law.

"11) Then spake I to him, O Zarathurtra, I, even I, who am Ahura-mazda,

"12) If thou wilt not hearken to me, Yima, as Reminder and Bearer for the law,

"13) Then spread out my worlds, then make my worlds fruitful, then act to me as the Protector, Nourisher, and Overseer of the worlds.

"14) Then replied to me Yima, the Beautiful : O Zarathurtra,

"15) I will spread out thy worlds, I will make thy worlds fruitful, I will hearken to thee as Protector, Nourisher, and Overseer of the worlds." and so on.

The Yima of Spiegel is the same with the Jemshid or Giamshid or Dnhemshid of Anquetil and Kleuker.

These two volumes of Spiegel, with the learned introductions and dissertations, are throughout exceedingly interesting, and well worthy the perusal of every Biblical scholar and theologian.

5. — BUNSEN'S EGYPT'S PLACE IN UNIVERSAL HISTORY.¹

THE German edition of Baron Bunsen's work on Egypt, in five volumes, was completed in 1857, the first volume having been published in 1844. The present volume of the English edition contains all that the author has written on the Synchronisms; he has made such changes from the German edition as to bring into this English volume "everything that belongs either exclusively or principally to chronological history." This arrangement gives more unity to the English than to the German edition.

By means of the data furnished by the Egyptian monuments and the catalogues of dynasties drawn up by Manetho and by the Greek chronographers, the author gives, as he thinks, "a perfectly trustworthy Egyptian chronology, reaching as far as the fourth millennium before Christ."² By means of a chronology resting upon such data, he professes to be able to correct the chronology of other nations, and among these that of the Hebrews. In this volume he compares the chronology of the Egyptians with that of the Hebrews, the Chinese, the Arians in India, the Ionians in Asia Minor, Babylonians, Phœnicians, etc. Of the varied and comprehensive learning, and the unwearied and extensive researches of Baron Bunsen, no one can raise a question; but whether it is safe in the present state of Egyptology, much as we cheerfully concede to have been accomplished, to trust to a chronology which rests on a basis so unsettled, is not a question which scholars of cool judgment, who have no theory to support, will stay long to discuss. While the views of distinguished students of Egyptian history are at variance on points of vital importance; while some of the dynasties with which the data furnished by the monuments are compared, are regarded by some scholars as succeeding each other, and by others as contemporaneous dynasties; while some of the results claimed are reached only by arbitrary assumptions here and rejections there, the true scholar, who never builds on mere hypotheses, will not surrender his judgment and admit the new results; he waits for more light.

The results reached in the volume before us are too often based on mere assumptions, or dogmatical assertions. Expressions like the following are of frequent occurrence: "If therefore we had a fixed date for the age of Joseph . . . we should have a turning-point for the whole chronology of the Abrahamites, which *perhaps* might lead us up to the immigration of Abraham himself" (p. 337). "Assuming this to be the case, all the rest tallies" (p. 335). "If by simply following out these two assumptions," etc. (p. 341). "If we look at our own assumptions" (p. 351). "I start therefore upon the assumption," etc. (p. 458).

¹ *Egypt's Place in Universal History: An Historical Investigation in five books.* By C. C. J. Baron Bunsen, D. Ph., D. C. L. and D. D. Translated from the German by Charles H. Cottrell, Esq., M. A. Vol. III. London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans, and Roberts. 1859. 8vo. pp. xlv. and 638.

² Kurtz's *History of the Old Covenant*, Vol. I. p. 33.

The temper and spirit of some of the remarks made in reference to those who reject or oppose the opinions advanced, are not such as should have been expected from one who ranks with the most eminent of living scholars. We find such statements as the following: "The ordinary chronology, then, we declare to be devoid of any scientific foundation; the interpretation by which it is accompanied, when carefully investigated, makes the Bible a tissue of old women's stories and children's tales, which contradict each other." . . . "It contradicts all reality, and necessitates the denial of facts which are as clear as the sun" (pp. 348, 349). "And all this [referring to the view taken by the ordinary chronology] is said to be for the honor of God and the Bible, though neither of them know anything about it" (p. 349). . . . "That it is not all an invention of Egyptologers from hatred of the Bible, as some wiseacres and boys in England have archly insinuated" (p. 355). "The historical investigator, who has merely to deal with real histories and historical realities, will neither be afraid of old women's prejudices, nor shrink from the labor which careful research demands of him. . . . The discovery of truth is his compensation for persecution and contempt" (p. 264). Some of the "facts" which the author here claims to be "clearer than the sun," as well as some of the "real histories and historical realities," rest as yet on too unsettled a basis to be put forth with so much arrogance; and an earnest and honest searcher after the truth has no occasion to treat with disrespect the opinion of those who may differ from him in a field where there is more or less doubt at every step.

Some of the author's modifications of the chronology of the Bible are startling. He places the immigration of Abraham from his native land about the year 2876 B. C., instead of about 1920, according to the common chronology. The author's chronology makes the period of bondage in Egypt 1434 years, while the Bible states it to be 430 years (Ex. 12 : 40). Lepsius, however, the most eminent Egyptologer, makes the period but about 90 years. Bunsen fixes the time of the Exodus about 1320 B. C., about 170 years later than the common chronology. He makes the period from the Exodus to the building of the Temple 306 years; the Bible, 480. According to our author, the Israelites reached the frontier of the country east of the Jordan in three years from the time of the Exodus; Moses was leader but 22 years after the Exodus, while Joshua was leader 18 years in the country east of the Jordan! Other similar modifications of the Biblical chronology are made in different parts of the Bible.

In the changes which Baron Bunsen would introduce into the chronology of the Bible, he claims that he does not intend any disrespect to the Bible itself. He says :

"It is no longer of any avail to tell men of sense that an attack is made upon the Bible, because the above chronological system is shown to be erroneous for the very purpose of proving that the Bible is a rational book, and the traditions it contains true, and therefore possible" (p. 354). Notwithstanding the honesty and good faith with which this and other similar statements are made, Christian scholars will be reluctant to yield assent to

most of the results which our author has reached in regard to Biblical chronology; and they will deeply regret that these and other rationalistic views are to be introduced into his great work on the Bible, which is now in course of publication. And the want of confidence in him as a reliable interpreter of the Scriptures, will be the greater when he is known to have the boldness to deny so plain a fact as the destruction of Pharaoh in the Red Sea. "If," says he, "there is any historical fact well established, it is this: that, however great the loss sustained by the Egyptians in horses and riders, in their hasty pursuit through the foaming waves, the Pharaoh himself did not perish" (p. 265). Though the same position had been taken by Wilkinson, neither the language of the original, nor the circumstances under which Pharaoh set out in pursuit of the Hebrews, will warrant any such interpretation.

But the most startling position in the volume before us, is the statement in the Preface, which has been added, by the author, to the English edition: "That man existed on this earth about 20,000 years B. C.," and "That the historical deluge, which took place in a considerable part of Central Asia, cannot have occurred at a more recent period than the tenth millennium B. C." These, and other theses, the author proposes to establish in the fourth volume of the English edition.

The proof that man existed on this earth 20,000 years B. C. Baron Bunsen finds in his theory of the growth and development of language; in the "history of the languages of Asia, and their connection with that of Egypt." . . . "The languages of mankind, when once the principle of their original development and the time necessarily required for the formation of a new language out of the perishing remains of an old one, are understood, form the strata of the soil of civilization, as the layers of the Nile-deposit warrant the existence of ages necessary for the successive formations of the humus." (Pref. p. xxvii.) But how uncertain a foundation is this, on which to build so bold a theory! The growth of the Asiatic languages, and their relation to each other, and to the Egyptian, are certainly not yet sufficiently understood to give us reliable data. Besides, some of the most eminent philologists reject Baron Bunsen's theory of the growth and development of language.

Within a few months, and since the publication of the German edition of this work, the author has found, as he thinks, very reliable confirmation of his theory respecting the long existence of man on the earth. At the suggestion of Mr. Leonard Horner, researches had been made near Cairo, "with a view to throw light upon the geological history of the alluvial land of Egypt." As a historical point he selected the statue of Ramesses II. at Memphis. From the base of this statue to the present surface of the ground, he found the sediment to be nine feet and four inches. Then computing the middle of the reign of Ramesses to be about 1360 B. C. (for it is not absolutely determined), and adding to this period 1854, the year in which the excavation was made, we have 3214 years for the accumulation of nine feet and four inches, which is about three and a half inches a century. By bor-

ing at the statue, the Nile sediment under the base is found to be thirty feet; hence taking three and a half inches to be the regular increase in a century, the lowest part of the sediment must have been deposited 18,500 years before 1854. In boring near the statue, the instrument brought up a fragment of *pottery*, thirty-nine feet from the surface, the whole extent being through pure Nile sediment. Fragments of *burnt brick* have also been brought up from considerably greater depths.

Now the reasoning of our author is, that this pottery was deposited where it was found, more than 18,000 years since, and that men had then lived so long, and were so far advanced in civilization, as to make use of pottery. But how many doubts may be raised in regard to these data! Is it certain that the increase of the Nile deposit has been uniform from century to century? Is it not reasonable to suppose that the increase was greater in the earlier centuries? And then as to the pottery — is it certain that it came there in the manner indicated? May there not have been rents or fissures in the ground, and the fragment of pottery have been dropped in? Or may not such changes have taken place in the course of the Nile, as to explain the fact? The possibility that the facts adduced might be accounted for in any of these ways, or in still others which might be suggested, would greatly diminish the confidence in the results sought to be established.

In the remarks which have been made on some of the views and reasonings of this eminent German scholar, it is not intended to depreciate the studies of Egyptologists, but merely to indicate that these studies have not yet been carried far enough to give undoubting confidence in the data they have furnished.

6.—TISCHENDORF'S CRITICAL GREEK TESTAMENT.¹

In these two volumes Tischendorf gives us the results of nearly twenty years' active and incessant labor on the Greek text of the New Testament. They contain an aggregate of over 1650 closely-printed 8vo pages. The mere text of the Testament, of the same type and similar form, would comprise about 350 pages. From this may be estimated something of the amount of matter which the volumes contain in addition to the Greek text. And there are no superfluous words here; everything is stated in the most concise manner, and with such constant abbreviations, that even the alphabet of the notes is a study; and yet there is nothing which is not directly pertinent to the great object in view. It is, on the whole, the most valuable contribution which has yet been made towards a critical revision of the New Testament text. The author, in addition to his own original investigations,

¹ *Novum Testamentum Graece. Ad Antiquos Testes denuo recensuit, Apparatum criticum omni Studio perfectum apposuit, Commentationem Isagogicam praetexit A. F. C. Tischendorf. Editio Septima. Lipsiae, Sumptibus Adolphi Winter. 1859. Pars Prior. pp. cclxxx. 696. Pars Altera, pp. 681.*

has diligently availed himself of all that his predecessors have ever done in the same field. In his Preface he gives us an interesting and amusing account of his travels, and labors, and principal helpers; in the Prolegomena, he describes with minuteness the investigations which he has made, explains at large the principles which have governed him; gives a historical account of the different critical editions of the New Testament which have been published, the most important MSS., the ancient versions, the ecclesiastical writers, and whatever else pertains to the great object of his labors. So complete and succinct a history of this whole matter can scarcely be found in any other publication. Dr. Tregelles' edition, whenever it is published, will have the advantage of all Tischendorf's labors, and also the very great advantage of being accompanied with a revised text of the old Latin translation, on the admirable plan of Professor Lachmann's edition.

We learn from the Preface that Tischendorf has made five journeys through Europe, two to the East, including Egypt, the Libyan desert, Mt. Sinai, Jerusalem, the island of Patmos, etc.; has spent two years among the libraries in Paris; has visited, at three different times, the libraries in London, Oxford, and Cambridge; after having examined all the principal libraries of Germany, Italy, and Holland; in short, has ransacked every place in Europe, North-Eastern Africa, and the Levant, where a MS. or the fragment of a MS. of the Greek Testament was likely to be found. So enthusiastic and single-minded was he in this pursuit, that in 1840 he started on his travels without money and with no baggage but an over-coat, and that not paid for. But in every place he found earnest and helpful friends; and the names, which he mentions, of those who afforded him aid, include not a few of the most celebrated men of our time, and some of the most distinguished promoters of literature in almost all its branches, such as Humboldt, Guizot, Affrè, archbishop of Paris, Cureton, the duke of Sussex, chevalier Bunsen, Horner, cardinals Mai and Mezzofanti, pope Gregory 16th, Charles Albert, king of Sardinia, Leopold, grand-duke of Tuscany, the king of Saxony, Alexander of Russia, and many others, Catholic, Protestant, and Mohammedan.

His researches, in the East especially, have been greatly facilitated by letters from the sovereigns and statesmen of Europe, and especially the czar of Russia. No student, in this particular branch of literature, has ever before enjoyed so great advantages; and none has ever made a more diligent and faithful use of the facilities afforded him. Of course the Biblical student will cherish high expectations of profit from these volumes, nor will his expectations be disappointed. The Prolegomena and Notes are full of information, generally important, accurate, and reliable. We cannot say that we are satisfied with all his results: in some of the readings we still prefer Lachmann, and we cherish expectations of still greater improvement in the promised edition of Tregelles. Still, on the whole, this is the most perfect text that has yet been attained, and well worthy the study of every Biblical scholar.

The price of the two volumes (\$8 bound) seems high for a copy of the Greek Testament; but it is, in fact, very low when we consider the im-

mense amount of labor and expense which have been laid out upon them. We hope the author and publisher will be remunerated by a rapid and extensive sale of the work, and the Christian public proportionately benefited. Let the text of the New Testament be once fairly settled, and then the only discussion will be in regard to its meaning, and here truly learned and candid men cannot long or widely differ; and the *only* division will at length, and at no distant period, be between those who *believe* the sentiments of the New Testament and those who *reject* them.

The critical value of the MS. which it is said Tischendorf has recently discovered at Cairo, and which he hopes to be able to publish by the patronage of the Russian government, time only can determine. This much is certain, that the present is a time of great intellectual activity in all the branches of literature and science; and that the Greek Testament has a strong hold on the attention and interest of the leading minds of the age. The Lord be praised that it is so.

7. — CARDINAL MAI'S REPRINT OF THE VATICAN CODEX OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.¹

WE at length have, by the enterprise of Protestant publishers, an accessible edition of the Vatican Codex of the New Test. Still it is far from being what it ought to be. It ought to be an exact reprint, word for word and letter for letter, of the Vatican MS. But this it is not, and does not pretend to be. The same ecclesiastical illiberality and theological timidity which has so long debarred all Protestant editors of the Greek Test. from a proper examination of the MS., are everywhere visible in its mode of publication by cardinal Mai. The text throughout is *corrected* by the editor, and its deficiencies *supplied*; and these corrections and supplements are all printed, in one uniform type, with the MS. text, and designated only by brief editorial notes; so that it requires a keen and careful eye to detect the genuine Vatican text amid all the amendments and additions with which it has been encumbered. These, if printed at all, ought to have been put in a different type; that the genuine text might at once be obvious to the most hasty reader. It is a pity some competent editor had not been employed to do this work; and also to superintend, more carefully, the printing, for the book is not free from typographical errors, which, in a work whose chief value depends on its literal accuracy, are very grave defects. For example: in Rom. 5: 20 we have *ὑπερεπλάσσειν* instead of *ὑπερεπλάσσειν*.

Still, we have here the Vatican text, the text of one of the oldest and best MSS. of the New Test.; and the scholar, with due pains-taking, can pick it out; and for so much we will be thankful.

It used to be said, some years ago, that the ancient text had been tampered with to favor Trinitarian views; but this oldest text known is, in some

¹ Codex Vaticanus H *Καὶνὴ Διαθήκη*. Novum Testamentum Graece, ex antiquissimo Codice Vaticano edidit Angelus Maius, S. H. E., Card. ad Fidem editionis Romanae accuratius impressum. New York: D. Appleton and Co. 1859. pp. iv. 503. 8vo.

respects, more decidedly and roughly Trinitarian than the *textus receptus* itself. For example: Coll. 2: 3, in the Vatican, reads *ἐς ἐκλήρωσιν τοῦ μωσῆ- πλου τοῦ Θεοῦ Χριστοῦ*, an expression which has been greatly softened in the received text. The common reading, Θεοῦ, in Acts 20: 28, which has been so much objected to on account of its harshness, has the full sanction of the Vatican MS.

This edition of the Greek text, notwithstanding its defects, is a very welcome and useful present to the Biblical scholar; particularly as the MS. itself is still inaccessible for critical use.

8.—THE ANDOVER MEMORIAL.¹

THIS volume is elegantly printed, and will readily attract the attention of men interested in theological education. It has been prepared for the press by Rev. John L. Taylor, Treasurer of the Seminary and author of the Memoir of the late Judge Samuel Phillips, who projected the Academy at Andover. It contains the Commemorative Discourse of Dr. Leonard Bacon, which is one of the most masterly historical documents which we have ever perused. It also contains the Anniversary Addresses of Dr. Asa D. Smith, Dr. Joel Hawes, Dr. Leonard Withington, Dr. William Adams, Dr. John W. Chickering, Dr. Rufus Anderson, Dr. Milton Badger, Dr. William I. Budington, Hon. Josiah Quincy, Sen., Rev. John L. Taylor, Dr. William A. Stearns, Dr. Francis Wayland, Dr. Milton P. Braman, Dr. George W. Blagden, Dr. Nehemiah Adams, Dr. George Howe, Dr. Samuel C. Jackson, Rev. Mr. Newton, Rev. Prof. Stowe, Rev. President Sears, Rev. Prof. Brown, Rev. Mr. Wolcott, and others. These Addresses are gracefully connected together by various historical and explanatory remarks, which Mr. Taylor has inserted, and which give to the Memorial both vivacity and unity. It presents not only a vivid picture of the Semi-Centennial Festival, but also a graphic history of the Seminary during the last fifty years. The sketches of the Founders of the Institution, of the early and the deceased Professors, of the Alumni who now rest from their labors, of the relations of the Seminary to the cause of Foreign and Home Missions, to the charitable and philanthropic Associations of the day, to the religious press, to other Theological Seminaries, to the Colleges of our land, furnish the data on which every faithful history of the Institution must depend. The volume suggests many instructive lessons on the past and present tendencies of theological opinion, on the right structure of Theological Seminaries, on the importance of theological learning, on the proper use of wealth, on the duty of ministers and educators. We trust that these lessons will be carefully studied by men of science, and men of pecuniary resources, by patriots and philanthropists. The history of a large Theological Seminary, for fifty years, is a history of many civil and even national developments. Religious learning lies at the basis of all solid improvement in society.

¹ A Memorial of the Semi-Centennial Celebration of the Founding of the Theological Seminary at Andover. Andover: Published by Warren F. Draper. 1859. pp. 242. 8vo.

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ARTICLE I.

COMPARATIVE PHONOLOGY; OR THE PHONETIC SYSTEM OF
THE INDO-EUROPEAN LANGUAGES.¹

BY BENJAMIN W. DWIGHT, CLINTON, N. Y.

PHONOLOGY is, to modern apprehension generally, a new science. Several centuries, however, before Christ, Sanskrit scholars had thoroughly studied and classified its facts and principles; although, in every other language, it has remained, while possessing a potential presence in it, unappreciated as a science to this day. The ear of the Greek was, beyond that of any other people, vitally susceptible to its charms; but the Greek mind was, in this as in all other relations, too averse from the real God that made heaven

¹ The design of this Article, which is an independent treatise by itself, and the only one upon the subject in our language, is to present, in a succinct view, the leading results of recent investigation into the variations of the same radical forms, in different languages. The works to which special reference has been made, in its preparation, are the following: Bopp's *Comp. Gram. trans.* by Eastwick; Bopp's *Vergleich. Gram. neue Auflage*; Benary's *Lautehre*; Hofer's *Beiträge*; Rapp's *Vergleich. Grammatik*; Heyse's *System der Sprachwissenschaft*; Diez's *Gram. der Romanischen Sprachen*; Diez's *Lexicon Etymologicum*; *Zeitschrift für Sprachforschung*, especially several Articles in it by Ebel, Benary, Kuhn, Förstemann, and Corssen; Georg Curtius's *Schulgrammatik*; Max Müller's *Survey of Languages*; Sophocles's *Hist. Greek Alphabet*, etc. etc.

and earth, in its position, to contain to any large degree, in itself, any of the attributes or even instincts of true science; so that all its high philosophical architecture, in every field of intellectual labor, was only of the speculative order of composition. But, recently, phonology, a science utterly forgotten among men, looking out, itself, like an all-seeing spirit, from within the folds of every language, but seen of no one while lurking there, has been detected and caught by scientific modern exploration, and led forth again, a willing captive, exultingly to view. By the comparison of words in different languages, on an extended scale one with the other, as well as by the careful study of the various graphic symbols of sound in the ancient tongues, the secret treasures of this long-lost science have been finally disclosed; and modern phonology is found, when reduced to its last analyses, to be exactly the same that Sanskrit grammarians, more than two thousand years ago, defined its elements to be, in their own primeval language.

Two lines of investigation are open to the student of words, in the department of etymology: the one concerning the anatomy of their individual constitution, and the other concerning their pathology, or the influence of time and circumstances upon them; or, which is the same thing, their genetic structure as living organisms, and their subsequent history and experience, as they have been borne from one climate or age to another. As, in the forms of matter, we find an inorganic element as the base, in combination with one organic and vital; so, in the forms of words, the stem, theme, or base is the material element, and pronouns, in the shape of suffixes, whether for verbs or nouns, constitute the formative or organic element of language. A similar distribution exists, to some extent, between consonants and vowels, as the individual components of a word. The consonants form its skeleton; and the vowels, the living fulness of its strength and beauty. They give language all its variety of hue, and all the play of light and shade upon its surface. In the disposition of the consonantal elements of a word, lies the mere drawing of its outlines; while the com-

mingling of the different vowel-sounds constitutes its full pictorial presentation to the ear and eye.

The fundamental constituents of speech are necessarily, in all languages, alike; and not only so, but the same elemental bases also prevail in all the occidental languages of the world, and constitute their common osseous structure. Although therefore these languages, like those who use them, are divisible into different families and races, they are all still of one origin, and possess one similar nature; and yet each has some sounds or classes of sounds that others reject, for euphonic, as we generally say, but really for euphemic or eulogic, reasons; as it is the greater ease of utterance in one case compared with the other, more frequently than the mere greater pleasure had in the hearing of a different sound, which determines the reason of its adoption. The seeming differences, accordingly, of the Indo-European languages, however great, are, the mass of them, only seeming, and not real.

The organs of speech are the lungs, throat, tongue, lips, teeth, nose, and roof of the mouth. These are all greatly affected, in their separate and combined development and action, like the other several parts of the body, by climate, food, occupation, habit, character, and culture. The influence of natural causes, in determining the specific peculiarities of different nations, tribes, and families, in reference to the cranium, the face, the eye, the voice, the chest, the figure, and even the most minute bones and organs of the body, is very decisive, beyond the philosophy or fancy of most even intelligent men, who are not specially conversant with the marvels of this sort, which abound in the natural history of man. One people use more or less easily, and therefore naturally, their lips, tongues, or nose, their teeth, or throat, in speech than others do, from the larger or smaller development of some specific organ or organs, that, from greater relative fulness or feebleness, are thereby specially strengthened, or restrained in their action. A difference also of more or less, in the general structure of the minute parts of the ear, may sometimes perhaps determine wide differences in this re-

spect. It is a familiar fact, that climatic influences occasion wonderful varieties of appetite and taste for food, among men in the several zones of the world, and even, during different seasons, in the same zone. And not only each latitude, but also each local region in the same latitude, under the influence of its specialities of landscape, air, sky, and various surroundings, furnishes its individual types of national stature, strength, complexion, and features; so that every nationality is made to bear inevitably its own seal perpetually upon its brow. And, as thus in the outer, so also in the inner bones, angles, and muscles of the mouth, face, and ear, climatology opens to view, as the result of its wonderworking magic, in each varying portion of the earth, a surprising number of diversified effects of its own upon man, made purposely by his Maker the most impressible of all His works by its influence. As in our compound nature, matter and spirit are mutually interlinked, and made strangely magnetic and retroactive each upon the other; so, with a double tie of reciprocal adaptations, we are placed, body and soul, within the physical universe, to act freely and fully upon it, and in return to receive at all times into every inlet of our being, in ways the most secret and silent, the subtle contact of its manifold influences.

The greater preponderance, accordingly, of vowel-sounds, in languages spoken in mild sunny latitudes, and on the contrary the greater prevalence, as a general fact, of consonants, in those which are spoken in cold or mountainous regions, is not accidental. There are no accidents anywhere in the entire realm of human causation, any more than in that of divine agency. And so likewise the fact is founded on determinate physical causes, that the French like nasal sounds so much, while the Germans entirely reject them and prefer gutturals, which the French dislike; and that the English and Americans have naturally high voices, as also that those, in other climates and of other characteristics, have an utterance of a deep barytone quality. The same primitive radical, as it took on, in different places and ages, the influence of Celtic, Greek or Gothic soil and culture, de-

veloped into quite a different word-growth, of greater or less strength and fulness in its foliage, of more or less brightness and largeness in its flowers, or of greater beauty and sweetness in the fruit hanging upon its boughs.

In phonology more difficulties are to be met, than in any other field of philological investigation ; mistakes are easily made here, and at times indeed seem, on the review of them, to have been almost unavoidable. It requires a much more exact and critical scrutiny of the organs of speech, than one not versed in such matters would suppose, and of their varied functions, as well as of the most subtle affinities and repellencies of sounds themselves, which are often as difficult of complete mastery, as any harmonist like Mozart, Haydn, or Beethoven, could feel them to be in musical relations, when searching for the beauties or wonders of sound. Phonology is not therefore, as one of the inductive sciences, a mere mass of linguistic facts standing majestically, like geology, as a column of beauty by itself. Its complications, on the contrary, are many and wide ; and it rests for its base on a thorough philosophy of the human voice and of all its necessities, capabilities, and conveniences.

As it is the design of this Article to present rather a clear general outline of the subject, than one conformed, in its details, to a minute and exhaustive analysis of its entire contents, it will not be unprofitable to survey, at the outset, in a distinct synopsis by itself, the general outlines of the course of inquiry, which will be traversed.

I. A general statement of the elementary analysis of words, in the three classical languages.

II. Their vowel systems, severally :

1st, Structurally,

- (1) In reference to simple vowels.
- (2) In reference to compound vowels.

2d, Pathologically,

- (1) Counterpoises,
- (2) Compensations.
- (3) Variations in the radical vowel.
- (4) Contracted forms.

(5) Strengthened forms.

(6) Weakened forms.

(7) Euphonic additions.

III. Their consonantal systems, severally :

1st, Structurally,

(1) Simply.

(2) In combination.

2d, Pathologically,

(1) Generally, with a view of the general laws of change in word-forms.

A. Substitutions :

1st, Literal,

(1) Absolute.

(2) Assimilative.

2d, Topical,

(1) Metathesis.

(2) Hyperthesis.

B. Insertions and additions :

1st, Prosthesis.

2d, Epenthesis.

3d, Epithesis.

C. Suppressions :

1st, Aphæresis.

2d, Elision and ecthlipsis.

3d, Apocope.

D. Weakened Consonantal forms.

E. Strengthened Consonantal forms.

(2) Specially,

A. The Greek.

1st, Its dialects.

2d, The phonetic force of its different letters, in alphabetic order.

3d, Special pathological affections.

(1) Digammatation.

(2) Sibilation.

(3) Aspiration.

(4) Reduplication.

(5) Nasalization.

B. The Latin.

1st, Benary's classification, in brief, of the fundamental principles of its special phonetic system.

2d, The phonetic force of its letters, in alphabetic order.

I. A general statement of the elementary analysis of words, in the three classical languages : the Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin.

In the language of Benary, "the natural classification of sounds according to their organs, and the distinction of mutes and liquids, and of vowels and consonants, was recognized by the Greeks and adopted by the Romans, without any high standard of criticism or any conscious demand for them in their language. But the finer differences in their use, the relationship of the vowel with the consonant, the mutual attractions and affinities of sounds one to the other, or their mutual repellencies ; the influence of the mechanical weight of the syllable, upon the vowel and the consonant contained in it ; all these are questions which have been first thrown upon our own age, and for whose solution it is toiling." With the qualification already indicated, that this exposition of the new work of our age has no reference to the progress of early Sanskrit scholarship in the same direction, it is true ; true of all languages in all ages, but that one noble representative of the whole Indo-European family, whose remains were locked up so carefully in India, until the time when the world was ready to appreciate and employ them, for the illumination of all the other languages of mankind..

A comparison of the classical languages, one with the other, in respect to their different phonetic elements, is interesting. This Förstemann, who may well be denominated the philological statistician of the age, has carefully made, and announced the result as follows : among one hundred sounds, reckoning diphthongs and double consonants as simple sounds, the relation of vowels to consonants in Sanskrit, Greek (the Attic dialect), Latin, and Gothic, is expressed in the subjoined table.

	SANSKRIT.	GREEK.	LATIN.	GOTHIC.
Vowels,	42	46	44	41
Consonants,	58	54	56	59

Thus, in the three classical languages and the Gothic also, the vowel element falls much behind the consonantal: in the Sanskrit and Gothic most; and in the Greek, least. In the Greek, the vowels compare with the consonants, in number, as 6 to 7; in the Latin, as 4 to 5; in the Sanskrit, as 7 to 9; and in the Gothic, only as 7 to 10. In reference to their proportional mixture of these two elements, the Greek and Latin on the one hand, and the Sanskrit and Gothic on the other, compare most nearly with each other; while the Latin and Gothic agree less, and the Greek and Gothic least. In all the four languages, the liquids are far more abundant than the mutes. In respect to the whole mass of consonants, the Greek prefers the mutes most, and the Gothic least; while, vice versâ, the Gothic adopts liquids most, and the Greek least; the Latin occupies medial ground between them, while the Sanskrit uses liquids more than the Greek or Latin, but less than the Gothic. Linguals (d, t, l, n, r, s) are more abundant, in all four languages, than either gutturals (c, k, g, q) or labials (b, f, p, m), or both combined. As to the distinction of smooth, middle, and rough mutes, the smooth are most abundant in Greek, and nearly quite as numerous in Latin; while in Gothic they occur only one-sixth as often as in Greek. The Latin shows a decided dislike for aspirates, while the Greek and Gothic exhibit as striking an inclination towards them. The most frequent liquids, and indeed the most frequent consonants (excepting t in Latin), in the Latin, Greek, and Gothic, are n and s, and after these, m and r; and, last of all, l; which letter also occupies, in Sanskrit, a less conspicuous place than in the European languages. The greatest disproportionate use of any consonant in the Greek and Latin, occurs in the letter m, which in Latin is used three times as often as in Greek. In Latin also, r is more abundant than in Greek, while in the latter s occurs more frequently than in the for-

mer. Sibilants indeed were favorite with the Greeks, most of all; while in Sanskrit they occurred least of all: the Latin and the Gothic occupying medial ground in respect to them.

As to the vowels, the most equal distribution of them occurs in Latin. The vowel *i* is, in this language, most abundant; in Greek, the *e* and *o* sounds take the lead of the other three; while in the Gothic, *a* forms more than a third part of the whole mass of vowel sounds, diphthongs included. In the Latin, diphthongs occur but one-sixth as often as in Greek, and only one-tenth as often as in the Gothic; so that the Latin and the Sanskrit occupy the negative pole of diphthongal development, and the Greek and Gothic the positive.

The vowel differences, therefore, of these great primal languages are wider than the consonantal. The Greek and Latin agree most with each other in their abundant use of vowels: the Latin and Gothic next; and the Greek and Gothic least. In the following table, the vowel correspondences of these different languages are presented in detail.

VOWEL.	GREEK.	LATIN.	GOTHIC.
a,	17	16	35
e,	ε 19 } 32	24	4
	η 13 }		
i,	7	27	18
o,	ο 13 } 19	14	4
	ω 6 }		
u,	6	16	9
ai,	6	0	12
ei,	4	0	6
oi,	2	0	0
au,	1	1	11
eu,	1	0	0
ou,	5	0	0
ae,	0	2	0
iu,	0	0	0

Calling *ā*, *i*, *u*, the older vowels, and *e*, *o*, the more recent, we find :

of	GREEK.	LATIN.	GOTHIC.
The older,	30	59	62
More recent,	51	38	8

Here is a sure testimony to the great unchanged antiquity of the Gothic vowel system, and to the striking degeneracy, also, of that of the Greek, from its primeval state. Calling *i* and *e* bright vowels, as philologists sometimes do, and the vowels *o* and *u* opaque, then we have the following comparison, as to the pictorial elements of syllables, or the relative amount of their light and shade.

	GREEK.	LATIN.	GOTHIC.
Bright,	39	51	22
Dark,	25	30	13

So that, in all these languages, the bright vowels occupy nearly twice the space of the others.

While such a mere statistical analysis¹ does not interest the writer, as would one that was philosophical and inward rather than outward in its scope, it is still of sufficient value, in itself, to deserve the limited space which it occupies in this Article; and there are many minds, in every department of labor, that greatly relish statements in figures. Figures, they say, cannot lie; which, if true in one sense, is not in all; since no form of demonstration is more apt to lie in blank forgetfulness, than arithmetical tables; which are usually thought to stand so well, in their place, in books, marshalled in solemn rank and file, that they are seldom if ever transferred to their admirer's mind, as the living companions of his thoughts.

Förstemann's inductive analysis covers the ground which Heyse² denominates the specific substance of sounds. He

¹ *Zeitschrift der vergleich. Sprachforschung*, Vol. I. pp. 163—179, and Vol. II. pp. 36—44.

² Heyse's *System der Sprachwissenschaft*, p. 262.

divides the elements of speech into two general kinds : those substantial, and those accidental ; each of which he separates also into two subordinate classes ; embracing in the substantial, the specific substance of each word, on the one hand, and its specific weight, on the other ; and in the accidental, the two elements of quantity and accent.

II. The vowel systems of the three classical languages, viewed separately.

1st, Structurally :

(1) In reference to simple vowels.

A vowel (vocalis) is a mere utterance of voice, an audible expulsion of air through the throat, when in a more or less open or compressed state. The vowel, emitted with the greatest ease from the throat, in its most natural open condition, is *a*, pronounced *ah*. This vowel was originally ever present in Sanskrit words, and therefore, without doubt, in the primeval parent-Arian tongue itself ; being a sort of universal solvent for every consonantal sound. Every consonant, with whatever sound it began, ended, in the earliest era of the Sanskrit, in that vowel ; so that, while it was rich in letters, it was yet poor in sounds. Thus *b*, *p*, *k*, *t*, were each uttered by themselves, as *bah*, *pah*, *kah*, *tah*, and so on throughout the whole range of mutes. Such a system of vocalization, admitting no play of light and shade among the elements of speech, tended of course to utter phonetic monotony. And yet it must not be supposed that all original syllabication ended uniformly in a vowel ; as ultimate verb-roots are found, ending in *al*, *an*, *ar*, as well as in *da*, *sta*, etc.

The three vowels *a*, *i*, *u*, form the diatonic scale of vowel sounds, and are therefore sometimes called the original or primary vowels. These are the only simple vowels found in Sanskrit and Gothic ; the others (*e* and *o*) are but modifications of them in any language, and are therefore called, relatively to them, the secondary vowels. Each vowel has its own separate scope and power ; and, when heard in a succession of syllables, or found greatly prevailing in syllabic combinations, its effect is very specific and distinct ; as

much so as that of different keys, in the style and quality of their musical expression.

The vowel that has what philologists call the greatest mechanical weight or effect is *a*; that is, this vowel has a greater amount of vowel substance in it; and so acts as a makeweight, in a combination of sounds otherwise light, or gives them a gravity of utterance beyond any other vowel. The lightest of the vowels is *i*, while *u* occupies a medial place; *e* and *o*, although commonly regarded as simple sounds, are formed from *a*, by its combination with *i* and *u*, and are really, therefore, diphthongs. Short *a*, in Sanskrit, united with *i*, becomes *ê*; which corresponds exactly with the phonetic value of *ai* in French, pronounced as if *ê*, as in *j'ai* and *jamais*. Compare also the absorption of *i* subscript in Greek, in the dative forms of the 1st or A-declension, and also its short pronunciation, or its estimation as short for purposes of accentuation, in the plural nominative form *αι* of the same declension. In a similar manner the Greek *αι* becomes, in Latin, *ae*, except in a few proper names, as *Aglaia*, *Maia*, etc. A long *a* formed in Sanskrit, with *i*, the diphthong *ai*; as in English, in the word *aisle*. In combination with *u*, *a* forms likewise, in Sanskrit, *o*, as a diphthong; a result corresponding, precisely, with the same fact in French, where *au* is pronounced *o*, as in *aune* and *autre*.

Heyse, in order to represent the different degrees of fullness of sound possessed by different vowels, ascribes to the sum of both the openings of the mouth in the utterance of *a*, eight degrees, and to *u* (pronounced as *oo*) six, and to *i* four degrees. The two openings alluded to, are that made by the lips, and that made between the tongue, according to its different positions, in the utterance of the different vowels, and the roof of the mouth. The secondary vowels *e* and *o*, have also the same sum of degrees (6), in the two openings of the mouth as *u*, and yet are lighter; inasmuch as, in the utterance of *o*, and especially of *e*, the roof-space of the mouth is much narrower than in the utterance of *u*. In this space, as in an open chamber, the voice is

immediately received from the throat and resounds from the arch above, as from a sounding-board, just as it came from the larynx, or is modified by the tongue, in this part of its passage to the lips. The different widths of openings in the roof-space are five in u, four in o, and two in e; so that o is lighter than u, and e much lighter than o. So also, as the differences of breadth, in the sum of the mouth-openings, between a and u are made by the lips; which chiefly serve to give utterance to sounds, as they are in themselves for substance, rather than to determine their volume or force for them: u is much less light than a, in its individual weight, less indeed than the difference of degrees would indicate; inasmuch as the roof-space is greater in u than in a, in the proportion of five to three. The vowels are to be ranked accordingly, in reference to their weight from heaviest to lightest, in the following order: a, u, o, e, i.

The vowel a is the stable or fixed element, in the diphthongs e (a+i) and o (a+u); and the vowels i and u are movable or floating elements; by the combination of which two kinds of elements, all diphthongs are formed. In Sanskrit the vowel a represents properly, in a final analysis, the stable element of all diphthongs; and from this element the diphthong obtains its true quantitative value. When, in any language, either of the incidental elements i or u occur first in the diphthong, and are followed by the stable element a, or by one of the floating vowels i or u themselves, then the last vowel determines the quantitative value of the compound, and the first one falls back into its corresponding consonantal equivalent; so that i and a become ya, and u with a makes va.

Ebel calls a, on account of its greater weight in a syllable, in all the classical languages, the masculine vowel, and the vowels e and i, on account of their lightness, the feminine vowels. Philologists of the modern school divide them, also, not only into long and short, as others have done, but likewise into hard and soft: calling a, e, and o (α, ε, η, ο and ω) hard, and the vowels i and u soft; and likewise

into dark or opaque, middle, and clear; calling o the opaque, a the middle, and e the clear or bright vowel.

The vowel-system of the Sanskrit is the most antique in its style, next to which stands the Gothic, followed immediately by the Latin; while the Greek has degenerated most of all, from the primitive Indo-European vowel-system.

Both philology and history agree in representing a to be the great fundamental primordial vowel, of which the others are but successive weakenings. A striking example of the change of an original a into each of the weaker vowel-sounds, in the other classical languages, occurs in the Sanskrit ordinal saptamas, the seventh; represented in Greek by ἑβδομος, and in Latin by septimus; where the same vowel a appears variously, as ε, and ο, and also as e, i, and u. Similar variations also appear in the Sanskrit madhya (s) middle, Gr. μέσος, and Latin medius; and also in ποδός, πόδες, and πόδας, all different cases of ποῦς, and each having one and the same correlative form, padas, in Sanskrit. Behold, also, the following examples of the diversified representation of the Sanskrit a, by various vowels in the other languages:

	SANSKRIT.	GREEK.	LATIN.
ε.	api, towards. ad, to eat.	ἐπί ἐσθίω	ob. edo.
η.	{ mâttri, a mother. mâs, the moon. } { mâsa, a month. }	μήτηρ μήν μήνη	mater. mensis.
ι.	{ aṣvas, a horse. kas, who. }	ἵππος τίς (for κίς)	equus. quis.
ο.	{ apa, from. naman, a name. svasar, a sister. upa, under. }	ἀπό ὄνομα <hr/> ὑπό	ab. nomen. soror (for sosor). sub.
υ.	{ kalasa, a cup. nakhas, a nail. sam, with. }	κύλιξ ὄνυξ σύν	calix. cum.
ω.	çvan, a dog.	κύων	canis.
ει.	tan to extend.	τείνω (for τένω)	tendo.

In Latin, *i* being lighter than *a*, generally supplants it, when a root with an original *a* would be too much burdened by a reduplication of the radical syllable, as in *tetigi* for *tetagi*, and this, without any change, for *tatagi*. So, also, radical *a* and *e* both encounter alteration at once in this language, when the root is laden with prefixes of whatever sort, as may be seen in instances without number, in verbs compounded with prepositions.

As Ebel well says: "one of the most difficult questions concerns the relation of short *e* and *i* in Latin. Does *e* pass into *i*, or *i* into *e*; and under what conditions does a become *e* or *i*?" These questions he has investigated with care, and arrived at the four following results, of a general kind: 1. *a* passes regularly, in the beginning and middle of words, into *i*, before single consonants, except *r*, *h*, *v* (preceding which *a* everywhere remains unchanged), and before the nasal *ng*. For examples, see *adjicio*, *confiteor*, *immineo*, *tubicen*, *flammiifer*, and *transigo*. It passes, regularly into *e* before *r* and *r*-combinations and double consonants, particularly *ss*, *st*, *ps*, *x*, *nt*, *nd*, double mutes, double liquids, and mutes with liquids, as in such examples as *adjectus*, *condemno*, *confessus*, *imberbis*, *inermis*, *iners*, and *infectus*. The declaration here made is, however, but a little more minute statement of the general rule given by Bopp, that "an original *a*, when loaded with additional elements by composition or reduplication, is in most roots exchanged for *i* in open syllables; but before two consonants, and, in end-syllables before one, it is generally weakened into *e*." 2. When the root-vowel becomes variously *e* and *i*, in different cases, as in *princeps* *gen. principis*, the analysis of the fact is, that they are, each, successive weakenings of an original *a*-vowel in the root. The retention of *e* before double consonants instead of *i*, in verbs, where in the first root *i* had been used before a single vowel, shows the felt necessity of guarding the radical vowel against being overborne in its force by the consonants accompanying it: *e* remains, also, in many roots where one would expect *i* before single consonants, as in the compounds of *metior*, *meto*, *pe-*

to, seco, sequor, tego, and some of the flexion-forms of nouns in es.

3. The relation of the two vowels appears very clearly in end-syllables, before single consonants, namely s and n.

I takes the place of a before s: in the genitive of the third declension; in the 2d sing. present of the third conjugation, as in legis for legasi; and in all 2d singulars passive and 2d plurals active. In such forms as deses (verb-root sed), superstes (verb-root sta), -ses is for seds and -stes for stets, in which e is still retained, although by abbreviation the d and t are lost. In such words as vomis compared with vomer, and so cinis, pulvis, cucumis (gen. cucumeris), with stems all ending in -er, we have undoubted instances of the convertibility of s and r final, as in arbor and arbos, honor and honos, together with the subsequent shortening of the e into i, according to the usual rule; so that as genus (gen. generis) is for genes (like γένος for γένης, its stem), cinis is for cines and this for ciner, the proper base of the word. In such words as sanguis (gen. sanguinis, stem sanguin), s is the gender sign and n is dropped before it for euphonic reasons.

4. In some circumstances e seems to be formed from an original i, as in judex (jus+dicō). In comes (cum+eo), as in eo itself (stem i), and eum accusative of is (demonstrative stem i), we have gunalized forms of the original stems.¹

Kuhn's analysis, also, of a few facts of the Latin vowel-system is worthy of notice here. "The history of the Latin vowel-system," he says, "presents, as is well known, a considerable number of difficulties, whose solution can be obtained only in a strict methodical way. As the Sanskrit has kept generally the older and fuller endings of words; by a comparison of a, in the end of Sanskrit words, with the endings of similar forms of the Latin, some principles can be obtained which will serve to elucidate the Latin vowels.

The Sanskrit a has, in the end-syllables both of declen-

¹ Zeitschrift der Vergleich. Sprachforschung, Vol. V. p. 181.

sion and conjugation, a much wider scope than in Latin ; whose endings have been partly rejected and contracted, and partly, as those of the passive, supplanted by others. The following facts are arrived at by examination :

1. Sanskrit a final sometimes becomes e in Latin : as in the vocative in e (Cf. Latin *lupe* with Sansk. *vrika*) ; in the 2d pers. sing. and pl. imperative (Cf. Lat. *tunde* and *tundite* with Sansk. *tuda* and *tudata*) ; and also in some particles and indeclinable words (Cf. Latin *que* and *ne* and *quinque* with Sansk. *ca*, *na*, and *pañca*).

2. Sanskrit a final is sometimes rejected in Latin ; as in the dative of the 2d or O-declension, which has lost a previous i, representative of a Sanskrit a ; which that it actually once had in old Latin, is apparent from the Oscan dative *ui* and the Umbrian *ê* and *î*.

In the exceptional imperative forms *dic*, *duc*, *fac*, and *fer*, the same tendency to an abrasion of e appears on a small scale, as also in the conjunctions *ac* and *nec* for *atque* and *neque*. So the conjunction *at* is for Sansk. *atha* ; as *nam* is also for *nâma* ; the original a, or its representative e in Latin being rejected in these and other instances after c or a liquid.

3. Sometimes Sansk. a becomes long â ; as in *utî*, Sansk. *uta*. In a few instances a final is found in Latin, where it does not occur at all in Sanskrit ; or, if it ever did, it has fallen off,¹ as in the cardinals *triginta*, *quadraginta* (*τριάκοντα* and *τεσσαράκοντα*), compared with the Sansk. *trinçat* and *catvarinçat*.²

In Latin, as in Greek, e is the prevailing representative of an original a ; while o is also often, but less commonly so than in Greek. The following are a few of the numerous examples in o : Sansk. *avis*, a sheep ; *mar* and *mri*, to die ; *ashtau*, eight ; *svan*, to sound ; Latin, *ovis*, *moriôr*, *oc-to*, *sono*. The long Sanskrit â is most generally repre-

¹ That it has actually dropped off in the Sanskrit appears, almost if not quite absolutely certain, from the Zend forms, in which it occurs, *thrisata* and *chatva-resata*.

² *Zeitschrift der Vergleich. Sprachforschung*, Vol. VI. p. 436.

sented by *ō*, as in *sōpio*, Sansk. *svāpáyāmi*. The Latin *e* is of double origin, being either like the Greek *η* and Gothic *ê*, a weakening of long *â*, as in *sēmi*, half, Gr. *ἡμι*, Sansk. *sâmi*, and *rēs*, a thing, Sansk. *râs*. So the Sansk. *dêvaras* (for *daivaras*) is represented by *lêvir* (for *laivirus* for *daivirus*), Gr. *δαῖρ* for *δαίερ*.

That *i* is not only lighter in Latin than *a*, but also than *u*, appears by its adoption in compound forms, where, for the sake of a compensative lightening of the vowel-weight of the root, a radical *u* final is changed to *i*; alike in the middle of the compound, as in *corniger* (*cornu*) and *fructifer* (*fructum*), and also in a final syllable, as in *imberbis* for *imberbus*; in which last word, as the proper adjective-form for an *a*-word, as *barba* is that in *-us*, *-a*, *-um*, the *u* is changed to *i*, on the principle that *i* has less weight than *u*, in an end-syllable. In Latin, the soft Greek *υ*, which was the same as the French *u* and the German *ue*, is entirely wanting. An original *u* in Latin was indeed sometimes changed to *i*, as in *libet* from *lubet*, Sansk. *lubh*, and *optimus* from *optumus*; while in other cases it seems to have wavered to and fro, at different times, towards *o* and back again to *u*, as in *vult*, *volt*, *vult*, and *vulnus*, *volnus*, *vulnus*.

In Greek, as elsewhere, *a* is the heaviest of the vowels, acting most strongly as a counterpoise when added to forms otherwise light; while *e* is the lightest of the vowels, being used in forms otherwise heavy; and *o* is employed in those forms which are of intermediate weight. In *τέμνω* (stem *ταμ*), 2d Aor. *ἔταμον* and the derived noun *τόμος*, and so also in *στέλλω* (stem *σταλ*), perf. *ἔσταλκα* and *στόλος*, the balancing influence as counterpoises of these different vowels, and so their different phonetic force in themselves, may be clearly seen. The Greek vowels, accordingly, are *a*, *e*, *i*, *o* long and short, and short *u*, which was long only in the diphthong form *ou*.

The short *ε* and *ο* sounds of the Greek were wanting in Sanskrit, as also in the Gothic, the oldest Germanic dialect. The short Sanskrit *ă* is oftener represented by *ε* or *ο* in Greek, than by short *a*; while the long Sanskrit *â* is more

frequently represented by η or ω than by long alpha, as in $\tau\acute{\iota}\theta\eta\mu\iota$,¹ Sansk. *dadâmi*, I place, and the dual suffix $-\tau\eta\nu$, Sansk. *tâm*. In the Doric dialect, however, we find long α abundantly where, in the Attic dialect, we have η , as in Dor. $\acute{\alpha}\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha$, Attic $\acute{\eta}\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha$, day, and $\tau\acute{\iota}\mu\acute{\alpha}$, honor, for $\tau\acute{\iota}\mu\eta$. Indeed, long α was a special peculiarity of the Doric dialect, and caused that broad pronunciation, for which the Dorians were so noted.

The Sanskrit diphthong \hat{e} ($a+i$) appears in the Greek variously, as $\epsilon\iota$, $\omicron\iota$, $\alpha\iota$, as in $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\mu\iota$, I go, Sansk. *êmi*; $\omicron\acute{\iota}\delta\alpha$, I know, Sansk. *vêda*, Dat. $\mu\omicron\acute{\iota}$, Sansk. *mê*; while the Sansk. \hat{o} ($a+u$) appears as $\omicron\upsilon$, as in $\beta\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, Sansk. *gô*, gen. *gavas*, a cow.

The vowel u retains the most obstinately of all, in Sanskrit, its form and place; and in reduplicated syllables, although a itself is weakened to i , the vowel u maintains its position unchanged, as in *yuyuts* the desiderative form of *yudh*, to struggle, and *tutôpa* (for *tutaupa*, perf. of *tup*, to strike, Gr. $\tau\acute{\upsilon}\pi\tau\omega$, perf. $\acute{\tau}\epsilon\tau\upsilon\phi\alpha$). In Latin, as in *tutudi*, perf. of *tundo*, and *pupugi*, perf. of *pungo*, and also in the Gothic, u shows much more of the same pertinacity of existence than it has in the Sanskrit, than it does at any time in the Greek.

In the Doric and Attic dialects, α is the most and υ the least abundant; while in the Ionic ϵ abounds most, occurring with great frequency in uncontracted forms, as in $\epsilon\alpha$, $\epsilon\epsilon$, $\epsilon\eta$, $\epsilon\omicron$, $\epsilon\omega$, $\epsilon\acute{\iota}$. The vowel ι occurs most in the Doric, next in the Ionic, and least of all in the Attic, being so often subscript.

In reduplicated syllables, a in Sanskrit often appears as ι in Greek, as in $\tau\acute{\iota}\theta\eta\mu\iota$ (stem $\theta\epsilon$), Sansk. *dadâmi*, I place, and $\delta\acute{\iota}\delta\omega\mu\iota$ (stem $\delta\omicron$), Sansk. *dadâmi*, I give. The Greek, however, shows generally far less sensitiveness to the question of the greater or less vowel-weight of the root under new additions, than the Sanskrit, Latin, or even German.

But the vowel-systems of the classical languages must be considered structurally, also,

¹ Cf. in same way $\tau\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\eta\mu\iota$, Sansk. *tishthâmi*, I stand, and $\delta\acute{\iota}\delta\omega\mu\iota$, Sansk. *dadâmi*, I give.

(2) In reference to vowel combinations.

These are of two sorts: vowel-unions of the same kind, and compound vowels of any kind; or, long vowels and diphthongs. Consonants are indeed the staple elements of speech, and vowels are subordinate, both in theory and in fact, to them; having their chief function in affording them a truer utterance, or in enabling them better to follow each other, in successive syllables, or to combine together in the same syllable. Not only, therefore, are original stems all short, being monosyllabic, but also the original radical vowels of those stems. In the progressive stages, however, of lingual development, vowels have been variously strengthened and lengthened; sometimes for mere phonetic reasons, as, to restore the disturbed equipoise of a derivative or composite word, or, which is the same thing in effect, to preserve the stem-syllable from being overborne to the ear, by prefixes or suffixes connected with it; and sometimes also for etymological reasons, to represent to the eye the fact, that abridgments and abrasions have occurred; as well as sometimes for dynamical effect, so as to individualize and emphasize some grammatical characteristic of a word. Short radical vowels have been, for such purposes, accordingly, strengthened, in great numbers in all languages; which can happen in a direct manner only, of course, by adding to them a new vowel-element. If the vowel added be of the same kind, the resultant is a long vowel; but if of another kind, then it is a diphthong; and such a long vowel is, in its true analysis, but the short one doubled in the time of utterance, being twice repeated in the same breath. In the German, such vowel-geminations abound, as in *haar*, *maass*, etc. In ancient Latin inscriptions and records, also, similar instances appear, as in *paacem* (*pacem*) and *moos* (*mos*). In the Greek ω , this fact is directly symbolized to the eye, as a combination of two short omicrons. If two vowels of the same kind do not, when repeated, melt together into one long one, they are changed, by the conversion of one of them to a lighter vowel (as of $\epsilon\epsilon$ into $\epsilon\iota$, and of $\omega\omega$ into $\omega\upsilon$) into a diphthong.

A diphthong is phonetically the union of two vowel sounds,

a hard and a soft, in one. The hard vowels, it has been said, are a, e, o (Gr. α, ε, η, ο, ω) ; and the weak ones, i and u. When the hard vowels are long in Greek, as ā, η, and ω, the ι united with them is thrown underneath, and thus preserved to the eye, while lost to the ear. In Greek, υ and ι are also sometimes combined into a diphthong, as in υίος.

The synthetic result of a diphthongal union is presented in the symbol used, but not always its analytical constitution : as in the vowels e and o ; which, although appearing to be simple, like the other vowels, are yet compound, as has been stated, in their structure. The Sanskrit affords, in respect to the constituent elements of vowel-combinations, a more precise analysis graphically, in correspondence with their scope and power phonetically, than any other language. As a was in the primary state of the Sanskrit, and therefore, without doubt, of the original mother-tongue itself of the whole Indo-European family, the one only vowel utterance employed ; out of which flowered forth, as a matter of historical manifestation, all the rest in due time, each in a separate way, by itself. I and u are, accordingly, but successive weakenings of the primal vowel a. And while e (a+i) and o (a+u) were, in the earliest stages of phonetic development, but diphthongs, they came by frequent use to be regarded, like a itself, as simple sounds having an independent existence of their own.

In Greek, other special vowel-combinations occurred, as a+e and e+a = η or ε̃ ; and also a+o and o+a = ω. Diphthongs, like ηυ and ωυ, were of a strictly dialectic origin, and differed graphically rather than phonetically from ευ and ου. But in no other language have the vowel elements of the various diphthongal combinations, whether latent or manifest, kept their identity in such algebraic distinctness as in the Sanskrit ; where they seem to move on each other, like particles of molten silver. On this very account they were more impressible to new modifications and new combinations, than in any language besides.

In Homeric Greek we see, also, the vowel-elements, at first distinct that afterwards mingled into one apparently simple

sound, which yet was, in fact both historically and phonetically composite, preserved to us still in clear outline; each vowel maintaining its own individual place and sound, as in the syllabic form of the temporal augment, as well as uncontracted forms generally of both verbs and nouns.

The weak vowels *ι* and *υ* remain before the firm ones *α*, *ε*, and *ο* unchanged, as in *σοφία* and *λύω*; while the firm make, with either of the weak ones, a diphthong.

There is a class of vowel-juxtapositions in Greek, not of the kind above described, which demands here special consideration: those once containing the digamma between them, by whose subsequent omission the vowels have thus fallen casually together; as in *ὠόν* for *ὠFόν*, Lat. *ovum*: *ὄϊς* for *ὄFις*, Lat. *ovis*; *αἰών* for *αἰFών*, Lat. *ævum*; *βοός* gen. of *βοῦς* for *βοFος*, Lat. *bovis*; *νέος*, Lat. *novus*, Sansk. *navas*. To a practised eye, the very proximity of these vowels to each other carries with it, at once, the evidence of a departed digamma; for vowels connected with each other have not commonly power in themselves, to maintain their own separate existence. In many cases indeed, after the rejection of the digamma, the two concurring vowels were blended into a diphthong, as in *ναῦς* for *ναός* for *ναFος*, Lat. *navis*; and *πλοῦς* for *πλόος* for *πλόFος*. That such words have any of them remained uncontracted, is owing to the peculiarity of their origin; for, although greatly averse from an hiatus, whether original or derived, the Greeks were still more disinclined to obliterate the original etymological features of their cherished mother-tongue. They had an acute and subtle sense of the true demands of art, in the elaboration of language, which was possessed by no other people.

The three classical languages compare, in respect to their diphthongs, as follows: the Sanskrit and Latin are alike poor in them, which is another of their many points of resemblance; while the Greek is very rich in them, as is also indeed the Gothic.

There are properly but six normal diphthongs, in any language: *ai*, *au*, *ei*, *eu*, *oi*, and *ou*. The other vowel-combinations, found in some languages, as *ea*, *eo*, *ua*, *ue*, *uo*,

ui, ia, ie, io, iu, are all, if regarded as diphthongs, those of an entirely abnormal type. In the enunciation of a diphthong, either of the combining elements may have the most determinative force; but commonly it is the first, except in the diphthongs *ei* and *oi*, where manifestly *i* has the preponderance.

In the Sanskrit, there are two kinds of diphthongs; in the first of which short *a* melts, with *i* or *î* succeeding it, into *ê*; or, with *u* or *û*, into *ô*. In the combination of vowels made by this class of diphthongs, neither of the constituent elements appears in the result; but, as in the chemical union of two substances, they both blend in a third sound, distinct from each of them. In the second class, long *â* forms, with a following *i* or *î*, the diphthong *âi*; and with *u* or *û*, the diphthong *âu*. In these diphthongs, each of the uniting vowels preserves, not only its own form, but also its own distinct utterance; and especially is this true of the *â*. As a diphthong can never occur in Sanskrit except before a consonant, two can never be found side by side; and no hiatus is possible, in any case, from other vowel or diphthongal admixtures.

The first class of diphthongs, formed of short *a* with *i* or *u* both long and short, is made by *guna* (virtue); and the second, consisting of long *a* in combination with *i* or *u* both long and short, is made by *vridhhi* (increase). These are two remarkable affections of Sanskrit vowels, that need to be understood, in order to appreciate the influence exerted by them, in determining many derived forms in other languages. To Bopp, that great natural genius in philology — bearing, like Grimm in all his high successes, as manifestly as Luther, Bacon, Newton, or Washington, the proof of his special ordination for the work that was, in itself, so needful and which he has done so well — we are indebted for an analysis of the nature, power, and scope of these affections, which previous Sanskrit grammarians had stated as facts, but had never disclosed in their true light, as inward forces at work within the machinery of language. *Guna* consists in prefixing short *a*, and *vridhhi* in prefixing long

a, to another vowel ; so that the a melts, together with the original vowel to which it is prefixed, into a diphthong, according to certain euphonic laws. Before vowels, however, these diphthongs fall back again, into their composite elementary form, becoming ay and av respectively. Guna influences are very clear and decided, in the Greek, Latin, Gothic, and Lithuanian languages.

In the Greek, diphthongs have a strong foundation of their own, as phenomenal facts of the language, and maintain their place firmly, not only before consonants, but also before vowels. Any hiatuses thus caused are generally distributed, as we say of the discords of a full-keyed musical instrument, by accentual discriminations, so as to be of a softened kind to the ear. The Greek diphthongs are *αι*, *ει*, *οι*, and *ου*, which are those that occur most frequently in the various dialects ; and also *αυ* and *ευ*, which are next in frequency ; so that the six genuine diphthongs, belonging to human language as such, are all to be found in Greek. The combinations *υι*, *ηυ*, and *ωυ* occur but seldom, the first two only being found in the Attic dialect ; and if called diphthongs at all, as they often are, are but those, as has been said, of an illegitimate character. In Homer *οι*, and in Herodotus *ου*, occur most frequently. The diphthongs ending in *ι* had the preference, of the Greeks, over those ending in *υ*. The diphthongs *αυ*, *ευ*, and *ου*, when not arising from contraction or the lengthening of the *ο* for the purposes of a strengthened utterance, occur at times, at least, from the substitution of the vowel *υ* for its original consonantal equivalent the digamma, as in *Ζεύς* for *Ζεϝς*, Sansk. *devas*, Lat. *deus*.

Diphthongs originate, in Greek, chiefly from contraction. Contraction in the flexion-forms of verbs, if not also in those of nouns, abounds much more in Greek than in Latin. Person-endings, particularly, had but very little tenacity of life in Greek. How much do *τύπτω*, *τύπτεις*, *τύπτει* differ from their originals *τύπτομι*, *τύπτεσι*, *τύπτει*, as also *ἔτυπτον*, *ἔτυπτες*, etc., from *ἐτύπτομι*, *ἐτύπτεσι*, etc. ! So also such forms as *η* in the 2d pers. sing. pres. passive for *εσαι*, as in

τύπη for τύπτεσαι and ου of the 2d pers. sing. imperf. passive, as in ἔτυπτον for ἐτύπτεσο, have greatly degenerated from their primitive state. In Homer, we often find the medial uncontracted form, which constituted the transition-step from the first full form to the final abridged one ; as in μίσγεαι and λιλαίεαι, Attic μίσγη and λιλαίη for μίσγεσαι and λιλαίεσαι, and also in λύεο, Attic λύνου for λύεσο, and ἔλυεο for ἔλύεσο, Attic ἐλύνου. It is also a very interesting fact that, in Homer, we find the subjunctive present active of a few verbs, as ἐθέλωμι, ἐθέλῃσι, etc., standing up before us, in full representation of the original forms, according to theory, of the subsequent Attic contractions ἐθέλω, ἐθέλῃς. It is worth the while, also, to observe the fact of a contrary sort, that sometimes the σ of the 2d perf. pass., which is preserved unimpaired in the Attic, is here entirely lost, as in μέμνηται for μέμνησαι.

The principles of vowel union in Greek are simple, and are embraced in the following rules :

1. Two like vowels melt together into a long one of the same class : as λᾶας, λᾶς ; ζηλώω, ζηλῶ ; φιλέητε, φιλήτε. Exceptions : doubled ε becomes ει and doubled ο becomes ου, as indeed both ε and ο when followed by ο, and ο followed by ε become likewise ου, as in φίλεε, φίλει ; πλόος, πλοῦς. Before diphthongs also a vowel, like the first one of the two, is obliterated, while the memory of the fact is preserved by affixing the circumflex accent to the diphthong ; as in πλόου. πλοῦ, and φιλέη, φιλή.

2. Unlike vowels form when in combination a diphthong, and the dark heavy one overpowers the bright or light one in the union ; so that

¹ αο becomes ω, as in τιμάομεν, τιμῶμεν ;

οα becomes ω, as in αἰδῶα, αἰδῶ ;

¹ The analysis of such contracted forms as τιμῶμεν or αἰδῶ is this : that, in the first place, the α was assimilated to the ο, as so often happens to consonants one towards the other ; so that each word became respectively τιμόμεν and αἰδόο, from which point it was but a second step, of graphic convenience, to change οο in them both to ω ; since ω is in fact but a short mode of writing two ο's in one, and so doing to the eye in ω, as a lengthened ο, what had been previously done to the ear, in sounding οο in one protracted utterance.

οη becomes ω, as in δηλώητε, δηλῶτε ;
 ου becomes ω, as in τιμάου, τιμῶ ;
 εο becomes ου, as in γένεος, γένους ;
 οε becomes ου, as in δήλοε, δήλου ;
 εου becomes ου, as in χρυσέου, χρυσοῦ.

The vowel *o* always gives, indeed, a determinate character to all contract forms into which it enters, as one of the combining elements. In forms where the vowel *a* enters without *o* and occurs first, it decides the contract form to be of its own kind ; as does likewise *e* when that stands first, in combinations that do not contain *o*. Thus *αε*, *αη*, *αι*, and *αη* become *a* and *ā* when contracted, as in ἀέκων, ἄκων ; τιμάητε, τιμάτε ; αἶδω, ἄδω ; τιμάης τιμάς ; and so *εα*, *εαι*, and *ηαι* become *η* and *ῆ*, as in κέαρ, κῆρ ; τύπτεαι and τύπτηαι, τύπτη.

As, in Greek, the short Sanskrit *a* is often represented by *ε* ; so here we find the influence of *guna*, in the lengthening or strengthening of a radical *ι* or *υ*, by prefixing an *ε* to it. Thus, as in Sanskrit, the *ê* of *êmi*, I go, is formed by prefixing *guna* or short *a* to the verb-root *i*, to go ; with which form of the 1st pers. sing. pres. compare also the 1st pers. pl. *imas*, we go : so in Greek *εἰμι*, the *ε* represents *guna*, and the 1st person plural *ἴμεν*, we go, compares with it, as the two persons compare with each other in Sanskrit. So in *φεύγω* (stem *φυγ*) the *ε* is inserted by *guna* : compare Sansk. *budh*, to know, with *bôdh* (for *baudh*, by *guna*), as found in some of the tenses. *Vêda*, I see (Gr. *οἶδα* for *Φοῖδα*), represents in the same way *vaida*, formed by *guna* from *vid*, to see, Lat. *video*. In the same way *λείπω* for *λείκω* (Lat. *linquo*, pure stem, *liq.*), compares with the pure stem *λιπ* for *λικ*. In *αἶδω* (Sansk. *indh* ; properly, *idh*, to burn), with which compare *ἰαίνω* (for *ἰδαίνω*), to warm, we have also plainly the proper *guna* vowel *a* ; as also in *αὔω*, to set on fire, Sansk. *ush*, to burn ; with which compare, in Latin, *uro* ; supine, *ustum*, and *aurum*, gold, as a form derived by *guna* from *uro*, and also *aurora*.

The diphthong-system of the Latin is very meagre in its proportions. Hiatus seldom occurs ; the half-vowel *i* is

freely rejected, and the previous vowel is lengthened, as in *amās* for *ama-is*, 2d pers. sing. pres. indic. of *amo*. The Latin diphthongs, so called, are *ae*, *oe*, *au*, *eu*, *ei*, and *ui*, the first four of which existed in the classic period; and only the first three, *ae*, *oe*, and *au*, are properly entitled to consideration, as having any real living value in the language. Of all genuine diphthongs in Latin, as in Greek and Sanskrit, either *a*, *e* or *o* is the initial letter, and *i* or *u* the terminal. The diphthong *ae* never represents the combination of *a* and *e*, but only that of *a* and *i*; as is seen by comparing it with equivalent Greek forms in *ai*, and also in old Latin inscriptions, where *ai* stands for the later form *ae*, as in such ancient forms as *aiternus*, *aidilis*, *quairo*, and the archaic datives, *aulai*, *terrai*. So also *oe* represents not a fusion of *o* and *e* as such into one sound, but of *o*¹ and *i*; and *oe* sometimes runs into *ae*, as a lighter form, and even into *ê*. Thus compare *coelum* and *caelum*, *proelium* and *praelium*, *foemina* and *femina* (Gr. *φύω*, Sansk. *bhû*), *coena*, *caena*, and *cena* (originally, without doubt, *coesna* = *con*, together, and *edo*, to eat): *oe*, also, signifies sometimes the combination of an original *u* and *i*, as in *poena*, *punire*, Sansk. *pû*, to purify, and *moenia*, *munire*, Sansk. *mû*, to bind; so that *poena* and *moenia* are for an original *puina* and *muina* like *ruina*. The diphthongs *ae* and *oe* must be regarded, therefore, as abnormal in Latin.

Long *ē* represents, occasionally, the combination of *a*+*i* in the flexion of verbs, as in the pres. subj. act. of the 1st Conj. *amēm*, *amēs*, *amēt* for *ama-im*, *ama-is*, *ama-it*. In the future of the consonantal conjugation (the present third), as in *legam*, *leges*, *leget*, we have in the 1st pers., as throughout the pres. subj. of this conjugation, *legam*, *legas*, *legat*, etc., *a*+*i* changed to *ā*; while, in all the persons of the fu-

¹ As in *coelum* (Gr. *κόλος*); *coetus* for *co-itus* (*co-co*); *foedus* (cf. *fides*, Gr. *πίστω*, perf. *πέπειδα*, stem *πισ*); *poena* (*ποινή*). An original *oi* was in some cases afterwards changed to *u*, as in *oinus*, first form of *unus*, *oitilis* (*utilis*), *ploirumus* (*plurimus*).

² *Ama* is the verb stem and not *am*, as stated in our ordinary grammars; and *-im* is the person ending (*mi* abridged), with the union vowel or mood-vowel *i* combined with it, as in *sim* (for *es-i-m*), *velim*, etc.

ture besides the first, we find the same combination represented by *ē*. In the corresponding subj. forms pres. of the 2d and 4th conjugations, as in *doceam*, *audiam*, etc., we obtain by analysis a similar result; as *doceam* for *doce-a-im* and *audiam* for *audi-a-im*. The verb-stems are *doce-* and *audi-*; *a* is an union vowel uniting the verb-stem to the mood vowel and person ending. With stem, *stes*, *stet*, subj. pres. act. of *sto*, *stare* for *sta-im*, *sta-is*, etc., compare, for similarity of form, *σταίνην*, *σταίνης*, etc.; the contracted form being, when restored to its full archaic condition, *sta-i-mi*, and *σταίνην* being *στά-ι-μι*. The common style of contraction, which such forms undergo in Latin, is simply the absorption of the second vowel (*i*) and the lengthening of the first (*a*), by way of compensation, into *ē*. The diphthong *au* is of comparatively infrequent occurrence and wavers, in some words, between its own form and the vowel *o*, as in *caudex* and *codex*, *lautus* and *lotus*.

In the beginning of words *ae*, *oe*, and *au* are all found, as in *aetas*, *audio*, *poena*; and in the middle, as in *longaeus*, *inauratus*, *pomoerium*; while at the end of words, *ae* alone is found, as in the gen. and dat. sing. and nom. pl. forms of the 1st declension.

Such vowel-combinations as *ei*, *eu*, and *ui* in Latin, must be remembered as improper diphthongs. The original diphthong *ei* ran readily, in subsequent times, into mere *i*, as in *dico*, at first *deico* (Cf. *δεικνυμι*), and *hic*, at first *heic*; or, if still preserved unaltered, the two vowels were thrown, by a separate pronunciation, out of a diphthongal state, as in *diei* and *fidei*. The combination *eu* is found but in a few words containing a dissolved *v*, as in *ceu*, *neu*, *seu*, which are but contractions of *ceve*, *neve*, *sive*; and also in a few words having an initial *u* compounded with *ne*, as in neuter (*ne-uter*). In *nullus* (*ne-ullus*), *nunquam* (*ne-unquam*) and *nusquam* (*ne-usquam*), words formed in precisely the same way as neuter, the *e* of the negative particle has fallen entirely out. The combination *ui* is found in *qui* and its compounds, and some few other words, as *re-qui-ro*, *nequitia*, etc. In these combinations, the *u* has no

diphthongal effect upon the *i*, or any modifying influence upon it whatever, or indeed any vowel value even of its own. The Romans pronounced *qu* as the French now do, simply as hard *k*; uttering *qui*, *quae*, *quod* as if written *ki*, *kae*, *kod*. Our own pronunciation of *qu* as if written *kw*, is entirely German in its origin. In *cui* and *huic*, for the archaic datives *quoi* and *hoic*, as still found in old Latin inscriptions, *ui* is not radical to the form, but only a contraction of *oi* or *uoi*. *Qui* itself, restored to its earlier state, would be: *N. quos*, *G. quojus*, *D. quoi*, etc. *Oi* was not euphonic to the Roman ear, and therefore, in the middle and end of words, was exchanged for *ui*; which, as a dissyllable, is of frequent occurrence and is pronounced as such in nearly all cases, as in *fui*, *docui*, *fructui*.

Latin diphthongs arise from two sources: contraction and *guna*.

1. Contraction. The first of the two uniting vowels usually absorbs the other; preserving, in its elongation, the combined length of the two, but keeping no traces of the phonetic quality of the one rejected, as *deābus* for *deaibus*, *amānt* for *ama-unt*, 3d pers. pl. pres. of *amo*.

When, however, the second vowel is radical to the form, as such, then it is often retained; and the first one is, in such a case, either rejected, as in *pennīs* for *penna-is* (for *penna-i-bus*) and *famosus* for *fama-osus*; or it is weakened, as in *huic* for *hoic*, *cui* for *quoi*; or else the natural hiatus is endured, as in *diis* and *domuum*.

Hiatus, made by the occurrence of two of the stable vowels *a*, *e*, *o* together, does not occur in proper Latin; such words as *āēr* and *poīta* being merely Latinized Greek words; nor does a stable vowel make such a hiatus, with one of the movable vowels *i* and *u*. *Āi* does not occur except in archaic forms, as *aulāi*; and this genitive form in *-āi*, like that in *-as* of *familia*, is but an abbreviation of the full original form in *āis*, Sansk. *ayas*; with which compare the Greek genitives *-ας* and *-ης* of the 1st declension, and *-οις*, *-οιω*, and *-ου* of the 2d, and *-ις*, *-εως*, and *-ις* of the 3d. *Āi* is found only in Greek proper names, as in *Menelaūs*.

When hiatus is allowed, it is commonly either to preserve unimpaired both the radical and flexional elements of a word, although not in euphonic union with each other, as in *radiis* (stem, *radi-*; dative suffix, *-is*), or to indicate that an original consonant has fallen out between the vowels, whose concurrence has been thereby made inharmonious, as in *boum*, gen. pl. of *bos*, for *bovum*. In the former case, etymology is honored by the genius of grammar; and in the latter, by that of phonetics.

2. Guna. The effect of guna, in strengthening vowel-stems, is more palpable to the eye in Sanskrit, than in Greek and Latin; as its phonetic analyses are all preserved in such graphic distinctness. Guna has, in Sanskrit, a double force: (1) mechanical, acting as a counterpoise, to keep the stem or theme from being overborne in sound, by the addition of suffixes; (2) dynamical, bringing out into full relief the idea expressed by the stem as such. The one is outward in its effect, and the other inward; or, still more plainly, one is phonetic in its bearings, and the other intellectual. Besides these objects, the Sanskrit aims at but one other end in gunaizing or diphthongizing vowels; and that is, to strengthen the stems of its weak conjugation-forms. One of the best specimens of guna in Latin, is that found in *eo*, to *go*, stem *i* (Sansk. *i*, to *go*; Gr. *εἶμι*, stem *ι*), in which *e* is for *e+i*; as also *eum*, accus. of *is*, stem *i*, which is for *êm* (originally *eim*), which form Festus indeed gives, although unable himself to explain it, as one which he found in antique Latin. By guna Benary ingeniously explains the length not only of such words as *dīco*, *ēre* for *deico*, and *fīdo* for *feido*, but also *lābor*, *labi*, to fall, compared with *lābo*, *āre*, and *lēx*, law, with its derivative *lēgo*, *āre*, as compared, each of them, with *lēgo*, *ēre*. Who can help saying, with Corssen: "I see not how any one can explain, otherwise than by guna, *fīdes* and *perfidus* in connection with *fīdo*, *confīdo* and *foedus*." From the root *fid* would come, by guna *faid*, for which *foed* in *foedus* stands (Cf. *πέποιθα* perf. of *πειθω*).

As the Latin allows but the smallest possible margin to

diphthongs, the changes wrought by the original action of *guna*, are so overlaid with other changes, and so mutilated, as not often to strike the eye as being of such an origin. They do not therefore always, even when found by careful analysis to exist, carry their evidence full in their face, except to an eye practised to search appreciatingly for them.

In closing this branch of the subject, it will not be unprofitable to present, in one view, a summary of the various resulting forms, of different vowel-combinations in Latin, in alphabetical order.

I. A.

1st, A and I. These form, when united,

- (1) a : as in *legamus* for *legaimus*, *deabus* for *deaibus*.
- (2) e : as in the subj. pres. of the 1st conjugation, *amemus* for *amaimus*.
- (3) ae : as in *pennae* for *pennai*.
- (4) î : as in *pennis* for *pennais*.

2d, A and O.

- (1) â : as in *mālo* for *maolo* for *mavolo*.
- (2) ô : as in *amō* for *amao*.

3d, A and U.

- (1) â : as in *amūnt* for *ama-unt*.
- (2) u : as *arula* for *ara-ula*.
- (3) au and ô : as *lotum* for *lautum* (for *lavatum* from *lavo*, to wash).
- (4) ê : as *obedio* for *ob-audio*.

II. E.

1st, E and I.

- (1) ê : as *docēs* for *doce-is*, *debeo* for *dehibeo*.
- (2) î : as *pernicii* for *perniciei*.

2d, E and O.

- (1) eo : as in *moneo*, *equuleo*, *leo*.
- (2) o : as *speciosus* for *specie-osus*.

III. I.

I and E.

- (1) ie : as in *audies*.
- (2) î : as *vestibam* for *vestiebam*.

iv. O.

O and I.

- (1) ô : as in dative *dominō* for *domino-i* and *bōbus* for *boibus* for *bovibus*, *nōsti*, etc.
 (2) u : as in *prudens* for *providens*, *bubus* for *bovibus* as well as *bobus*.

The vowel-systems of the three classical languages have been hitherto considered structurally. We turn, now, to the next division of our subject.

2dly. The vowel systems of the classical languages, pathologically considered.

The pathology of human speech, if not so various in its forms, as that of the human body, is yet quite as clear and distinct a part of its true history and philosophy.

(1) The doctrine of counterpoises in derived forms. The whole system of checks and balances adopted by the Greeks, in the lengthening and shortening of words, was full of the beautiful effects of phonetic art.

The following are the principal modes in which, when words were lengthened in derived forms, they were at the same time, by way of counterpoise, lightened, in respect to the mechanical weight of one or more of their syllables.

§ 1. In a reduplicated syllable, one or both of the vowels reduplicated, is generally shortened, in both Greek and Latin; so as to balance, by less weight within, the increased volume of the word without; as in *λέλυκα*, perf. of *λύω*, and *γέγραφα* of *γράφω*, and *cēcīdi* and *tētīgi*, perfs. of *cado* and *tango*. A counter effect seems indeed to have been sought, or at least allowed, by the Greeks in a few words within a limited range, the philosophical or normal boundaries of which it is not easy, in all respects, to define, as in *τέτροφα*, *λέλοιπα*, *έώρακα* from *τρέφω*, *λείπω*, and *όράω*. What the necessity was, which the Greek ear felt, for lengthening the radical vowel, in a few exceptional cases like these, it is difficult to say. In such forms as *είληφα*, perf. of *λαμβάνω* (stem, *λαβ*), *είληχα* (*λαγχάνω*), *είρηκα* (*ρέω*), the *λ* and *ρ* were dropped, as not euphonious, from the original regular

forms *λέλαφα*, *λέλαχα*, and *ρέρεκα*, and the *ε* lengthened by way of compensation for the loss, which involved at once the necessity of lengthening also the radical vowel itself, in which the very sense of the word was embosomed, and so increasing its dynamical effect in the new form of its perfect.

§ 2. The vowels of prefixes and suffixes are made constitutionally short, on the same principle of preventing the addition of too great weight to the words to which they belong.

§ 3. When a preposition is prefixed to a verbal root in Latin, the radical vowel of the verb is generally weakened.

(1) A or ae and often e were changed to i: as in *inhibeo* (*habeo*), *accido* (*cado*), *iniquus* (*aequus*), *inquirō* (*quaero*), *adimo* (*emo*).

A was also, in a few cases, changed to u, as in *insulsus* (*salsus*), *insula* (in *sale*), *inculco* (*calx*).

(2) Au was also changed, sometimes to u and sometimes to o, as in *incuso* (*causa*), *includo* (*claudo*), *applodo* (*plaudo*).

(3) O passed, in a few cases, into i, as in *cognitus* (*notus*); and u, as in *exsul* (= *ex*+*solium*).

(4) U sometimes changed to e, as in *dejero* and *pejero* (*juro*). The influence of prepositions upon the radical vowels to which they were prefixed, was much less in Greek than in Latin.

§ 4. The weight of a person-ending often caused, in Greek, a shortening of the preceding vowel, as in the passive forms *ἵσταμαι*, *δίδωμαι*, *τύπτομαι*, compared with the active forms *ἵστημι*, *δίδωμι*, and *τύπτω*.

The effect of the person-ending on the previous radical syllable, in some of the Romanic languages, is deserving of notice here, on account of its analogy with what occurs in Greek. Thus in French, compare the *e* in *tenons* and *acquerons*, 1st pers. pl. of *tenir* and *acquérir*, with *tiens* and *acquiers* the 1st pers. singular. So also in the 3d pers. pl. pres. of verbs, as the final syllable *-nent* is entirely silent in pronunciation, the original radical form of the tense is restored again, as in *tiennent* and *acquièrent*. In Spanish, likewise, as in *querimos*, we seek, compared with *quiero*, I

seek, the same fact appears. In German, also, the change of a radical *a* or *u* into the middle sound *ae* and *ue*, which the Germans call *umlaut* (change of sound), is produced by the addition of a final syllable for purposes of inflection, as in the pl. forms *Länder*, *Wörter*, *Häuser*, of *Land*, *Wort*, and *Haus*.

§ 5. There is a limited class of cases among consonants, where the law of counterpoises seems to be also at work in Latin; and they are all connected with the labial nasal *m*. As *m* is a stronger nasal than *n*, any change from *m* to *n*, in compound or derivative words, is of course a weakening. They are such words as *clandestinus* from *clam* (for *celam* from *celo*), *tandem* from *tam*, *princeps* (*primus*+*capio*), *tunc* (*tum*+*ce*).

There is a class of vowel-changes in Latin, that perhaps deserve to be called rather specimens of vowel assimilation than of counterpoises, as *nihilum* (*ne-hilum*), *familia*, from *famulus*, *exsilium*, from *exsul*, *similis*, from *simul*; and so, in Greek, *σώφρων* (*φρήν*), neut. *σῶφρον*, is of the same sort.

(2) The doctrine of compensations.

In the Greek, when letters radical to the stem were rejected from it, a compensation was made, both phonetically and graphically, to indicate the fact. Counterpoises and compensations are manifestly opposite, in their effect, one to the other: the one preserving the proper equipoise of the different parts of a word when increased; and the other preserving its etymological integrity, so far as possible, when diminished.

In Latin, contracted syllables are long, as well as in Greek; but, as there are not two modes of writing *e* and *o* in the former, as in the latter, and as diphthongs (as *eu* and *ou*) are not used to indicate forever alike the contracted and uncontracted constitution of such words or parts of words; both the fact and the form of compensative influences are much clearer in Greek than in Latin. The following are the chief modes of compensation in Greek:

§ 1. The lengthening of the vowel preceding the rejected letter or letters.

The rules for lengthening vowels, compensatively, are the following :

A is generally made long *α*, and, if a monosyllable, circumflexed, as in *πᾶς* for *πάντες* ; but otherwise not, in a final syllable, as in *τύψας* for *τύψαντες*.

E becomes *ει*, as in *εἰμί* for *ἐσμί*, *εἰς* for *ἔς*, *εἰς*, into, for *έντες*, and also the participle suffix *-εις* for *-εντες*, as in *τυφθεῖς* for *τυφθέντες*.

O generally becomes *ου*, but sometimes *ω*, as in *τύπτουσι* for *τύπτοντι*, and *τύπτων* for *τύπτοντες*.

So also in French, in shortening original Latin forms from two or more syllables to one, the radical vowel is often diphthongized by way of compensation, as in *loin* (from *longus*) ; *foin* (*fenum*) ; *croire* (*credere*) ; *aimer* (*amare*) ; *gloire* (*gloria*) ; *sain* (*sanus*).

§ 2. When, in a medial or final syllable, an aspirate was rejected, instead of being entirely thrown away, it was transferred to a preceding or succeeding syllable, as in *θρίξ* (stem, *τριχ*), gen. *τριχός*, *τρέφω*, fut. *θρέψω*, *ταχύς*, comp. *θάσσω*, and *πάσχω* (stem, *πάθ*) for *πάθσχω*. Whether the reason for thus transferring and preserving the aspirate, was one of an etymological or phonetic kind, it is difficult to say.

In English, as in French, compensation is made in pronunciation, although not graphically, for the rejection of the sound of a final letter, as in *robe* compared with *rob*, and *smoke* compared with *smock*.

(3) Variations in the root-vowel, for other reasons than those of counterpoise or compensation.

The most mobile of all the vowels in radical forms is *e*, which when changed, in derivatives, is usually converted into *o*. In Latin, the interchange of *e* and *o*, in this way, occurs but seldom, compared with the Greek ; yet it does appear in a few instances, as in *metior* and *modus*, *tego* and *to-ga*, *sequor* and *socius*, *sedeo* and *sodalis*, *bene* and *bonus*. In Greek, however, such variations are abundant, not only in verbs and their nominal derivatives, as in *λέγω* and *λόγος*, *τρέχω* and *τρόχος* ; but also in different parts of the same verb, in several instances, to denote differences of time, as in

τρέπω, Aor. ἔτραπον, perf. τέτροφα. The range of these transmutations, in Greek, is bounded by the three hard vowels, short *a*, *e*, and *o*.

The change of the radical vowel, in such perfect forms in Latin as *egi*, perf. of *ago*, and *cepi* of *capiō*, is of another origin than that spoken of above; as they are but abbreviations of reduplicated forms; *egi* being contracted from *e-agi*, and *cepi* from *cecipi*.

Interchanges, like those of *a*, *e*, and *o* in Greek, occur in some of the modern languages of Europe, from the influence of assimilation, as among the Hungarians and Turks, who have both hard and weak forms of words; all the succeeding syllables of which accommodate themselves, in reference to their vowels, to that of the first syllable, and become, according as that is hard or soft, *ó*, *o*, *u*, *e*, *oe*, or *ue*.

(4) Contracted forms.

These arise generally from the rejection of one vowel before or after another; but sometimes also from the rejection of an entire syllable, of two or more letters.

Abridged forms are abundant, in both Greek and Latin. The early Alexandrian grammarians, who invented the whole system of written accents, for the purpose of preserving to posterity their loved old mother-tongue, as unimpaired as possible even in its minutest features, were exceedingly careful to show by the circumflex accent, whenever original forms had been mutilated, that such was the fact. The service that they thus unconsciously rendered to philology, as derived from Sanskrit sources, is for value like that of Homer, in preserving for us the full Ionic forms of his day, which show what the Greek, in its medial transition state was, when decided changes had begun, and old and new forms were struggling together for the mastery; and so make all the more certain the line of connection between the past and the present: the primitive mother-language of the Indo-European family and all its modern representatives.

A contraction is always a contrivance: a plan for removing a difficulty; and that difficulty is an hiatus which, whether for uttering or hearing, is alike disagreeable. A

love of variety is not only everywhere exhibited by the Deity himself, in his works, but has been purposely also planted by him in the very constitution of our nature. We do not naturally like to make the same effort, with the same vocal organ, twice in immediate succession; nor does the ear like a repetitious impression, of the same sort, upon the tympanum. Contractions accordingly, somewhat like slurs in music, serve to make the passage more smooth from one point to another, in the flow of speech.

The forms of contraction and its principles were presented so fully, under the subject of diphthongation, as to need no further treatment.

(5) Strengthened forms.

Vowels may be strengthened in two ways: first, simply; that is, in a stronger utterance of the same sound by its greater prolongation or more forcible enunciation, as in long *a*, *e*, *i*, *o*, compared with the shorter ones; and secondly, by compounding another sound with them, as in diphthongs. The two combining vowels, which are thus united with others in one emission of the voice, are *i* and *u*. Greater emphasis is given to sounds thus agglutinated; and what Goethe says, is proved true, that "a diphthong is an act of pathos in speech."

In such words as *χαίρω* (stem, *χαρ*) for *χαρίω*, *ἀμείνω* (stem, *ἀμεν*) for *ἀμενίω*, *τείνω* (stem, *τεν*) for *τενίω*, *φαίνω* (stem, *φαν*) for *φανίω*, we have by metathesis of the *ι*, a strengthened radical vowel in a class of original forms, that, when having *γ*, *κ*, or *χ* before *ι*, are changed to *σσ*, as in *τάσσω* for *ταγίω* and *ῥήσσω* for *ῥηκίω*.

The mode of strengthening vowel-forms has been discussed sufficiently, under the head of diphthongs; and the enumeration of this class of vowel-changes is made here, more for its significance as a part of a true analysis of our subject, than for any other reason.

(6) Weakened forms.

§ 1. All vowel-changes, made as counterpoises, are weakenings of the original radical forms.

§ 2. Original forms were also weakened, sometimes, by

the rejection entirely of a radical vowel, as in *sum* for *esum* (old Greek, *ἐσμή*, Sansk. *asmi*). Similarly, the Eng. word *stranger* (Lat. *extraneus*, Spanish, *estrangero*) has lost the radical *e*, which yet, in the verb *estrangle*, is still preserved.

(7) Euphonic additions.

§ 1. Euphonic prefixes. In Greek, *a*, *e*, and *o* were often prefixed to words, in order to give them greater volume to the ear.

The following are specimens of such additions :

	SANSKRIT.	GREEK.	LATIN.
a.	mê, to exchange.	ἀμεύειν and ἀμείβειν	meare and movere.
„	mrij, to wipe off.	ἀμέλγειν	mulgere.
e.	laghu (s), light.	{ ἐλαφρός ἐλαχύς	levis.
„	{ rohitas, red. rudhira, blood.	ἐρυθρός	ruber.
o.	naman, a name.	ὄνομα	nomen.
	nakhas, a nail.	ὄνυξ	ungula.
	paschat, near, after.	ὀπισθε	post.
	raj, to rule.	ὀρέγειν	regere.
	bhrus, the eyebrow.	ὀφρύς	frons.

§ 2. Union-vowels.

An union-vowel is an intermediate vowel, employed to connect the stem of a word and its person-ending together, with which many verbs were originally endowed, in Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin. It is in itself of no value whatever, either etymologically or grammatically, but only in a phonetic way, and therefore readily changeable in its form. It came however, ere long, to have as fixed and influential a status in the word, as any of its other elements; and has served therefore, in some cases, to complicate considerably some of the more abstruse inquiries of the scientific etymologist. Georg Curtius, in his “*Die Bildung der Tempora und Modi*,” first opened to view the hidden riches of this department of philological investigation.

In the Greek verbs in *-μι*, the verb-stem and person-ending are joined together without any such copula: as in *τιθημι* (stem, *θε*) we have, on the one hand, the verb-stem reduplicated and its radical vowel lengthened, and on the other, the person-ending in its original unchanged form *-μι*, and nothing else. So in Latin, in such forms as *est* and *estis*; *fers* and *fert*; *is*, *it*, *imus*, *itis*, different persons of *eo*, to go, stem *i*, we have the different verb-stems *es*, *fer*, and *i*, in immediate connection with the person-endings *s*, *t*, *mus*, and *tis*, without any union-vowel. In Greek, all verbs of consonantal stems (or barytone verbs) and all pure dissyllabic verbs have union-vowels in some or all of their persons, as in Latin also, have the simple verbs of the consonantal or third conjugation.

The union-vowels, called also technically, in the different-moods, the mood-vowels, are in Sanskrit *a*, in Greek *ε* and *ο*, and in Latin *i* and *u*. In the conjugation of the contract verbs in Greek (*αω*, *εω*, *οω*), as of the 1st, 2d, and 4th conjugations in Latin *ao*, *eo*, and *io*, which are also vowel conjugations like those in Greek, the union vowel is wanting. The stems of these verbs are all vowel stems, or stems ending in a vowel; and remain unchanged throughout all the forms of the verb, with a few trifling exceptions, as in the 1st pers. pres. sing. of *amo*, which is for *ama-o*, and in the tense-stem of the preterite of *doceo*, as in *docui* and *docueram*, which are for *doce-fui* and *doce-fueram*. In Greek, as the union-vowel and stem-vowel of the contract verbs, coming into juxtaposition, made an hiatus which could be endured only for some etymological or other imperative reason; one of the two vowels was sacrificed to the other;

¹ Thus *ἰβούλευον*, *ἰβουλεύει*, etc., analyzed becomes

Augment.	Verb-stem.	Union-vowel.	Person-ending.
ἰ	βούλευ	ο	ν (for μι).
εἰ	βούλευ	ε	ς (" σι).
ἰ	βούλευ	ε	wanting (" τι).

So in Latin, *rego*, in its different persons, is analyzable in the same way, as

	Verb-stem.	Union-vowel.	Person-ending.
2nd pers. Sing.	reg	i	s (for si).
3rd " "	reg	i	t (" ti).
3rd " "	reg	u	nt (" nti).

sometimes the union-vowel to the stem-vowel, and sometimes the latter to the former. In *τιμά·ω*, *τιμῶ*, *τιμά·ει·ς*, *τιμῆς*, *τιμά·ει*, *τιμῇ*, the stem-vowel *a* is preserved, and the lengthened union-vowel *ει*¹ thrown out; but in *τιμά·ο·μεν*, *τιμῶμεν*, the stem-vowel is sacrificed, and the union-vowel *ο* is lengthened into *ω*. The stem-vowel has, as it of course should have, the greatest tenacity of the two when they come in conflict; and, except in the subjunctive mood and the participial forms, maintains its own precedence with great uniformity. In Latin also, the stem-vowels of the three vowel conjugations, maintain themselves firmly before the union-vowel; so that it disappears entirely in them, except in the third pers. pl. of verbs in *io*, *ire*, of the 4th conjugation, as in *audi-u-nt* (for *nti*). *Amo*, *amas*, *amat*, are accordingly for *ama-o*, *ama-i-s*, *ama-i-t*; so *doceo*, *doces*, etc. are for *doce-o*, *doce-i-s*, *doce-i-t*; and *audio* is for *audio*, *audi-i-s*, *audi-i-t*.

III. The consonantal system of the classical languages, viewed severally.

1st Structurally.

(1) Simply. Consonants exhibit a much greater strength of life, in passing from one age, country, or language to another, than vowels, which are of a much weaker constitution. We have, indeed, in these two components of syllabication, that same mixture of conservative and progressive or of stable and mobile elements, which is ordained to form the steady equilibrium of the social state. The consonants or conservatives are more perpendicular in their form, longer-rooted, and of greater rigidity of position; and, when removed, are not readily rolled from their place, but forcibly borne away; while the vowels are easily set in motion, one upon the other, before any strong phonetic impulse to a change.

The Greek and Latin are very much alike, in their consonantal systems; the Latin and Gothic less so, and the Greek and Gothic least of all.

The framework of the consonantal system of all the Indo-

¹ The proper union-vowel being *ε*, it has been made in the 2nd and 3rd pers. Sing. pres. of verbs in the active voice *ει*, by way of compensation for shortening the original person-endings *-σι*, *-τι*.

European languages consists of three great divisions, represented by the three leading sounds *p*, *k*, and *t*; that is, labials or lip-sounds, gutturals or throat-sounds, and linguals or tongue-sounds, of which the lightest and most flexible is *t*. Each of these separate orders of consonants has other cognate sounds, that constitute a class with it, as :

	GREEK.	LATIN.
P.	β and φ.	b, f, and bp.
K.	γ and χ.	g and ch.
T.	δ and θ.	d and th.

Each of these classes is subdivided, in the order in which they here stand, into smooth, middle, and rough mutes. They had also, in early Greek, and have more or less now, in various languages, a breathing appropriately belonging to each class. These were, with the labials the digamma *F*; with the linguals, *σ*; and with the gutturals, the rough breathing, our *h*. With the linguals coalesce also *l*, *n*, *r*; and with the labials, *m*. The three fundamental vowels *a*, *i*, *u*, almost agree themselves, also, with this classification :

a is a guttural vowel ;

u, pronounced as the Greek or French *u*,¹ is a labial vowel,
as is also *o* (= *a*+*u*) ; while

i is a high guttural vowel compared with *a*, which is a low one.

There can, of course, be no dental vowel, as, in order to utter a vowel, the mouth must be open, and no use is made of the teeth in its enunciation. The consonants may therefore be thus grouped :

	GREEK.	LATIN.
Palatals,	κ, γ, χ.	c, g, ch.
Dentals,	δ, τ, θ, λ, ν, ρ, σ.	d, t, th, l, n, r, s.
Labials,	β, π, φ, μ.	b, p, f, ph, m.

¹ The French *u* may be at once rightly pronounced by fixing the mouth as if going to whistle, or as when pouting or kissing, and while keeping it in that position saying *e*. It is accordingly sometimes called the pouting vowel.

Of the three great classes of consonantal sounds, the linguals are the most light and flexible, and the gutturals the most hard and heavy; so that the labials are intermediate between them both, in ease of utterance and in degree of syllabic effect or weight. The k-sounds, accordingly, occupy the highest point of the consonantal scale for force; and the t- and p-sounds may be viewed as successive reductions of vocal force.

It has been said, that the consonantal elements of words form the groundwork of language, and the vowel-sounds its superficial coloring; and also that the Sanskrit is the most simple of all languages, in its vowel-system; its great all-prevailing vowel being a, to which however the Latin and Greek languages, in their greater sensitiveness to consonantal influences of all sorts, respond at various times with the whole scale of vowel-sounds. Although, therefore, in respect to the number of its consonants, the Sanskrit is very copious, yet from the great prevalence of the a-sound in all its forms, it is poorer in the elements of phonetic beauty than any other language of the same family. Like tunes that must be all played upon an instrument of only one string, its consonantal effects can be developed in only one limited direction.

As, in diphthongal combinations, there is a stable element in union with one mobile, so, in consonantal mixtures, there occurs a similar difference of firm and weak, or of fixed and incidental. Thus the semivowels (λ , μ , ν , ρ , σ) are so feeble, as their name indicates, as to be midway in strength between consonants and vowels, or, which is the same thing, to have less mechanical weight than the other consonants. The semivowels, like the vowels, can be uttered continuously, so long as the breath can be expired; while the mutes are capable, in themselves alone, of only one definite explosive utterance.

The lightest of all the consonants in mechanical weight, the most bodiless in sound, are j and h. In Sanskrit, j is so weak that it occurs even initially after n and m. Next in lightness of vocal substance are r and l, and in this order. They readily change, in different languages, into each

other, as do likewise *r* and *s* in Latin; and other letters also drop, from weakness, into them; while, contrarily, no tendency appears, anywhere, to rise or harden into them. As the mutes are heavier than the semivowels, the two readily combine with each other, some in one language and others in another; while in Sanskrit, where scarcely any consonantal combination seems impossible, they are all of them, or nearly all, found in conjunction in initial syllables, as *tn*, *tm*, *ts*, *tsn*, *mm*, *ml*, *hñ*, *hl*, *ddh*, *dbh*, *rdr*, *rtsn*.

There are, strictly, but two simple nasals, *m* and *n*; but in Sanskrit, by assimilation with other letters combined with them, a fivefold variety of nasals has been created. Of these *m*, the labial nasal, is stronger in mechanical force than *n*, the dental nasal. We find accordingly in Greek, when the two occur together, as they do even initially, *μ* preceding the *ν*, as a staff upon which it may lean, as in *μνάομαι* and its derivatives, and also *μνίον* and *μνός*. In Latin no consonant can precede a nasal in the same syllable, except *g*; and this occurs only before *n*, as in *gnarus* and *gnosco*, the archaic form of *nosco* (cf. *γινώσκω*). The compound nasal *ng* (as in our word *anger*), is found abundantly in both Greek and Latin, as in German and English; as in *ἄγγελος* and *longus*.

(2) In combination. The modes of consonantal combination are threefold :

§ 1. The concurrence of any two different consonants.

§ 2. The duplication or gemination of the same consonant.

§ 3. The union of two consonants into one compound sound, as *ψ* (*π+σ*), *ξ* (*κ+σ*), *ζ* (*σ+δ*). As *ζ* so abundantly represents (in Greek) the Sanskrit *j* and Latin *j*, it is probable that its sound was *dsh* or *j*.

Consonants, blending into one sound, may be compared with those standing together uncombined, as a diphthong compares with two vowels separated from each other by diæresis, as *παῖς* with *παῖς*.

It is in the first of the three modes of consonantal combination described, that the chief interest of the investigator lies; and this in three different directions :

(1) In reference to the beginning of words.

(2) In reference to the middle of words.

(3) In reference to the end of words.

There will be a double advantage, it is believed, not only in form but also in fact, in surveying this part of the subject, both synthetically and analytically.

First, synthetically, or generally.

1. In the beginning of words.

Initial combinations of consonants are much more varied and abundant in Greek than in Latin. Beside those to be found in Latin, the following also occur : βδ, as βδέω ; δμ, δμωή ; δν, δνόφος ; δρ, δράω ; κμ, κμητός ; κν, κνάω ; μν, μνᾶ ; πν, πνίγω ; πτ, πτύω ; τμ, τμήγω ; and τλ, τλάω ; and likewise the double consonants ξ (κ, γ, χ, and σ) and ζ (σ and δ) as in ξένος and ζάω. In Latin, not only would all of the above initial combinations be abnormal ; but there is also very much less fondness for such combinations generally, except when the second letter is a liquid ; and then the first is always one of the labials (b, f, or p) or of the gutturals (c or g), or the letter s or t. But never, as in Greek, can d or m be initial, and at the same time be followed immediately by another consonant ; or any letter come after g or t, in the same initial syllable, but r. With l or r, any consonant may be blended initially, except t and d with l. No consonant can be doubled, when initial, in a word ; for no such duplication of a letter could be made or heard, without the intervention of a vowel, which would at once destroy the very fact of its duplication. In some of the modern languages, indeed, as the Spanish, double letters occur initially, as in llano, plain (Lat. planus), and llave, a key (clavis) ; but the letter thus doubled to the eye, is not also double to the ear, but a distinct letter by itself, or graphic symbol, for the representation of what is called the liquid l, or ly : llano being pronounced as if written lyah-no as a dissyllable.

2. In the middle of words.

Consonantal combinations, in the middle of words, are more nearly the same in style and number, in the two lan-

guages, than in the beginning; although the range of the Greek is wider also here than that of the Latin. Thus *d* and *r*, while frequently meeting in Greek, in the middle of a word, occur in Latin in but two words, *dodrans* and *quadrans* with its derivatives; and so *bl*, *cl*, *gl*, and *ld*, and *cn* never occur in pure Latin forms, that are uncompounded. *Cocles*, a proper name, in which *cl* occurs once, may be a contraction for *caecus oculus*, as in *poculum* and *saeculum*; occasional poetic forms for *poculum* and *saeculum*; or it may be of other than Latin origin. *Publius*, in which *bl* also occurs once, is a contraction for *Populicus*, as *ld* likewise in the one word *valde comes*, by contraction, from *valide*. But how often, in Greek, do we find such combinations, in the middle of words, as *δμ*, *δν*, *κμ*, *κν*, *πν*, *τμ*, *τν*, *τλ*, *σγ*, *σθ*, *σθλ*, *σμ*, as in *ἴδμεν*, *ἔδνα*, *ἀκμή*, *ὄκνος*, *ὑπνός*, *ἀτμός*, *φάτνη*, *Ἀτλας*, *μίσγομαι*, *λοῖσθος*, *ἐσθλός*, *ὄσμή*.

The duplication of the same letter, in the middle of a word, does not occur in Latin, on any such scale as in the Greek. The letters *d*, *f*, *g*, *l*, *m*, *n*, *p*, *r*, *s*, *t* are indeed often thus duplicated, but almost always only because of a prepositional prefix, whose first letter is assimilated; and when duplication does occur in the middle of a word, it never exists in the same syllable. In this particular the French has departed widely from the phonetic law of its parent tongue; for in French, duplicated letters in the middle of a word are put together in syllabication undivided, with the following vowel: thus, *vaisseau* is spelled *vai-sseau*; and *fille*, *fi-lle*.

(3) At the end of words.

The Latin allowed here a far greater number of consonantal combinations than the Greek. In neither was the doubling of the same letter when final, so common in the Teutonic languages, allowed. *Mel* accordingly (stem, *mell*), *fel* (stem, *fell*), and *os*, a bone (stem, *oss*, Gr. *ὀστέον*, Sansk. *asthi*), each gave up in the nominative, their final radical letter under the force of this law. Of all combinations of final letters in verb-forms, that of *-nt* was the favorite in this language. In nouns, *s*, preceded by a liquid as in *mens* and *pars*, or, itself compounded with a guttu-

ral and then so preceded, as in *arx*, *lanx*, etc., occurred quite frequently.

In Greek, the addition of the gender sign *σ* caused at once the rejection, for the sake of euphony, of the final letter of the root, in consonantal stems, as in *Θίς* (stem, *Θιν*) for *Θίης*, *πᾶς* (stem, *παντ*) for *πάντης*, *λαμπάς* for *λαμπάδης*.

The most frequent of all consonantal combinations, are those of mutes with liquids or with the semivowel *s*.

Mutes combine with liquids on the principle that, in the beginning of words, the mutes must precede the liquids; while in the middle and end, contrarily, the liquids must precede the mutes; or, which is the same thing in effect, the liquid must always be in immediate connection with its syllabic vowel, whether preceding or following it, as in *artem* and *trado*. In neither the Greek nor Latin can one of the semivowels *l*, *n*, *r*, or the letter *h* be combined vocally, as first of the two in the same syllable, with any of the mutes.

Secondly : analytically, or, particularly.

I. The combination of mutes and liquids.

1st. Mutes and liquids in the beginning of words.

1. *l*. In Greek and Latin we have *bl*, *pl*, *fl* (*φλ*), *gl*, *cl*, (*kl*), *χλ*, and in Greek alone *τλ* (*τλητός*) and *θλ* (*θλίω*).

2. *m*. In Greek only, we find *δμ* (*δμάω*), *τμ* (*τμήγω*), *κμ* (*κμητός*).

3. *n*. In Greek and Latin *gn* (*γνώσις*, *gnosco*), and in Greek *κν* (*κνάπτω*); as also dental and labial combinations with *ν*, as *δνόφος*, *θν* (*θνητός*), *πν* (*πνεύμα*).

4. *r*. In both languages, the mutes generally are capable of uniting initially with *r*.

The combinations with *l* and *r* are most abundant.

2d. Mutes and liquids in the middle and end of words.

In both Greek and Latin they occur abundantly in the middle of words; where they can stand between two vowels.

In Latin, some combinations of the kind are found, at the end of words, but not in Greek: *as*, *nt* (*amant*), *lt* (*vult*), *rt* (*fert*), *nc* (*nunc*). In union with final *s*, the same combinations and quite a wide range of others also can be found, in both languages, as *rb* in *urbs*, *rc* in *arx*, *lc* in *calx*, *nc* in *lanx*, *rt* in *ars*, etc.

II. The combination of different consonants with s.

1st, s can precede mutes, in the beginning and end of words. If it follows them, it unites with them into a double consonant.

(1) We find in both Greek and Latin, sp, st, sc (sk), occurring initially, and each admitting an l also in threefold combination: like, for consonants, the triphthongal combinations among vowels (as *εοι, εαι*), sometimes found in Greek. The following triconsonantal mixtures are found accordingly in Greek and Latin respectively: spl (*σπλάγχχον* and *splendo*); spr (*spretus*); stl (*στλεγγίς* and *stlembus*); str (*στρώνυμι*, *stratus*); skl (*σκληρός*); scr (*scribo*); skn (*σκνίπτω*). In the Greek we find also σ, in combination with the aspirates, as σφ, σθ, σχ, as in σφήξ, σθένος, σχαδών.

(2) In the end of words, st, in which the sibilant precedes the mute, occurs in Latin (*ast*), but not in Greek. With the mute preceding s, we have in Greek ψ and ξ. As for ζ, while it represents σδ, it never does δς. In Latin, beside x (= c+s and g+s), we find also bs, as in *coelebs*.

2d. The combination of s with liquids, is of two kinds:

(1) In the beginning of words, σ can precede μ in Greek, as in *σμάω*. In *suadeo* and *suavis* in Latin, we have σ preceding the liquid v-sound.

(2) At the end of words, in the combination of s with a liquid, the liquid must precede. The only combinations of this kind in Greek are those in λς and νς, as in *ἄλς* and *ἔλμυς*; and in Latin, those in ns and rs, as in *mons* and *pars*.

III. The combination of two mutes.

This is of more infrequent occurrence than the other combinations. The classes of mutes that thus unite together, are always either labials or palatals, on the one hand, and dentals, on the other; and they must always be homogeneous, in reference to being smooth, middle, or rough. The combinations of this kind, and the only ones that occur in Greek, in the beginning and middle of words, are the following: βδ, γδ, πτ, κτ, φθ, χθ. Of these, γδ occurs initially but in one word and its derivatives in Homeric Greek, *γδοῦπος*. Not one of these consonants can

occur in Latin, in the beginning or end of words, but only in the middle; where *bd*, *pt*, and *ct* (*kt*) are to be frequently found. Here too the law of homogeneousness is in force, as in *scriptum* (stem, scrib) and *rectum* (stem, reg).

Harsh consonantal combinations are not only allowable in Sanskrit, but even very abundant; while in Greek and Latin they were commonly avoided. Excepting the verb-roots *ἐσ-* to be, and *ἰδ-* to see, in Greek; and *es-* to be, *fer-* to bear, and *vel-* to wish, in Latin, no verb having a consonantal stem can have a person-ending attached to it in any tense, without the intervention of an union vowel, except in the perfect passive in Greek; where, when the person-ending is affixed, the final consonant of the stem is modified, and harmonized euphonicly with the initial consonant of the personal suffix. In Sanskrit, such unharmonized forms as *τέτυπμαι*, *τέτριβμαι*, *πέπλεκμαι*, *τέτυχμαι*, would be entirely proper; but not in Greek, where they are changed immediately, by the inexorable laws of phonetic instinct, to *τέτυμμαι*, *τέτριμμαι*, *πέπλεγμαι*, and *τέτυγμαι*.

A syllable is, as the word in its very etymology (*συν* and *λαμβάνω*, to take together) defines itself to be, the taking together of a consonant and a vowel, for the production of one whole united sound. Says Heyse, quaintly: "a mere vowel forms a naked syllable: united with a consonant, the syllable is clothed. When a consonant precedes the vowel, the syllable is open, and closed when it follows; while, when having a consonant both before and after it, it is enclosed." Syllables, alone or in combination, form all the varieties and uses of words. In every language, words can end in vowels. As for consonants, the liquids and *s* can freely stand at the end of words; and, in a few words, *b*, *c*, *d*, and *t*, as in the prepositions, are found as final letters. In Greek, only *σ* and the liquids *ν* and *ρ* are found, except *κ* in a few particles.

THE SANSKRIT CONSONANTAL SYSTEM.

In Sanskrit, the consonants are arranged according to the organs used in uttering them, into five classes. A sixth

Lip-sounds. Teeth-sounds. Roof-
[sounds.

as (2) made by the nose, nasals; m, ¹n, ng;
as (1) made by the mouth, orals; l, r;

B. Explosive sounds.

II. silent or paralyzed sounds

Mutes: complete articulation, with
accompanying breath.

(1) With the soft breathing.

(a) weak (middle): b, d, g.
(b) hard (smooth): p, t, k.

(2) With the rough breathing.

Aspirates:

(a) weak, bh, dh, gh.
(b) hard, ph (ϕ), th (θ), kh (χ).

All the above consonants are pure or simple. The entire system is developed in no one, by itself, of the old or new European languages; but to the fullest degree in the Sanskrit.

¹ Rapp distinguishes the nasals and liquids as consonants, which draw in the breath or at least hold it back, while the others drive it forth.

[To be continued.]

NOTE.—In the Article on the Indo-European languages, and also that on the Science of Etymology, some mistakes occurred in printing, to which attention is here called for their correction. On page 769 (1857), line 8, “or a smooth mute,” etc., should read *on*, etc. On page 111 (1858), “from the root *str*,” should read *stu*, etc. On page 114, in note, “as in *sarstro* mi,” should read *carstro* mi. On page 120, “*with*,” in a line with Sansk. *vash*, Gr. *εἰχέσθαι*, etc., should be *wish*. On page 126, “that greatest possible amount of good, etc,” should read *the* greatest, etc. On page 401, in the Science of Etymology, *correspondencies* should be *correspondences*. On page 402, “great people and languages,” should be *prople*, etc. Also, “firm aesthetical,” should be *fine*, etc. On page 416, “Diversions of Perley,” should be of *Purley*. On page 420, make “specialities,” specialities. On page 427, in French column, make “jong,” *joug*. On page 428, in Sanskrit column, make “hausas,” *hansas*. On page 443, make “sweet bells though heard far off,” etc., *when* heard, etc.

ARTICLE II.

THE ATONEMENT, A SATISFACTION FOR THE ETHICAL NATURE OF BOTH GOD AND MAN.

BY PROF. WILLIAM G. T. SHEDD, ANDOVER.

It is a very important question whether, in the reconciliation of man with God, the change of feeling and relationship that confessedly occurs between the parties, is solely upon the side of man, or whether that method which proposes to bring about peace and harmony between the sinner and his Judge, contains a provision that refers immediately to the being and ethical nature of God. Is the Divine Essence absolutely passive, and entirely unaffected by the propitiatory death of Christ, and is all the movement and affection that occurs confined to human nature; or is there in the Godhead itself, by virtue of its essential nature and quality, something that requires a judicial satisfaction for sin, and which when satisfied produces the specific *sense* of satisfaction, or, to use a Biblical term, of "propitiation," in the Deity himself? In short, is the reconciliation of man with God merely and wholly subjective, an occurrence in the human soul but no real event and fact in the Divine Mind? Is the sinner merely reconciled to God, God remaining precisely the same towards him that He is irrespective of the work of Christ, and antecedent to his appropriation of that work; or does God first, by and through a judicial infliction, of his own providing and his own enduring in the person of the Son, — Himself the judge, Himself the priest, Himself the sacrifice,¹ — conciliate his own holy justice towards

¹ The Christian doctrine of Atonement has never been stated more densely and comprehensively than in the words of *John Wessel*, one of the forerunners of the Reformation: "Ipse Deus, ipse sacerdos, ipse hostia, pro se, de se, sibi satisfecit. — *De causis incarnationis*, c. 17. *Pascal* makes a similar statement among his fragmentary reflections: "Agnus occisus est ab origine mundi. The judge, the sacrifice." — *Thoughts*, London ed. by *Pearce*, p. 255.

the guilty, and thereby lay the foundation for the *consciousness* of reconciliation in the penitent?

The phraseology of scripture teaches, beyond a doubt, that the transaction of reconciliation is not confined exclusively to human nature. We are told, for example, by the apostle John, that "Jesus Christ the righteous is the *propitiation* for our sins."¹ Propitiation is the strong word employed to denote the real nature of Christ's work by that mild and loving apostle whose intuition of Christianity some Biblical critics would array against that of Paul, and in whose writings they profess to find only the doctrine of spiritual life and sanctification, and not that of expiation and justification. But this term certainly implies two parties, — an offending and an offended one. "A mediator," argues Paul, in his Epistle to the Galatians, "is not a mediator of one;" that is, in order to mediation, there must be two persons between whom to mediate. In like manner, propitiation implies that one being has wakened the just displeasure of another being, and that the latter needs to be placated by some valid and satisfactory method. Propitiation, therefore, — an idea that weaves the warp and weaves the woof of the entire scriptures, — if it has any solid signification, looks Godward.² God, and not man, is the party primarily offended by sin. It is *his* nature which requires the propitiatory sacrifice, and he himself provides it.

¹ 1 John 2: 2.

² This is very apparent when we analyze those words in different languages which bring to view the relation of sinful man to the Supreme Being. The primary meaning always implies that the *Deity* is displace, and it is only the secondary signification that refers to the creature. The word *ἰλασμοῦ*, for example, in Homer, is always objective in its signification when applied to the gods. *ἰλασκεσθαι θεόν* primarily means to appease God, to produce a favorable feeling or affection in God, and then in a secondary sense to reconcile oneself to him, to attain a peaceful feeling subjectively. — The Saxon *bot* (whence the modern boot) signifies a compensation paid to an *injured* party, a redressing, recompense, amen, satisfaction, offering; then a remedy, or cure, effected by such compensation; and lastly a repentance, renewing, restoring wrought out by means of boot or satisfaction given. In this way repentance is inseparable from atonement; and its genuineness is evinced by the cordiality with which judicial satisfaction is rendered, if it can be, or appropriated as rendered by a substitute, in case it cannot be.

"Since in his crucifixion," says John Howe, "Christ was a sacrifice, that is, was placatory and reconciling, and since reconciliations are always mutual, of both the contending parties to one another, it must have the proper influence of a sacrifice immediately upon *both*, and as well mollify men's hearts towards God, as *procure that he should express favorable inclinations towards them.*"¹

Another very pointed scripture text, from which we cannot deduce anything but the doctrine of a real satisfaction of the Divine Nature by the work of Christ, is the declaration of Paul, that "if while we were yet [impenitent] sinners Christ died for us, much more, then, being now justified by his blood, we shall be *saved from wrath* through him."² Whose wrath is this, from which, the apostle teaches, we are saved by the propitiatory death of Christ? Is it the wrath of man, and not the wrath of God? Most certainly it is not from that selfish and wicked passion in the human heart, which we most commonly associate with the term *anger*, that we are delivered by the blood of redemption. But may it not be our own moral indignation *merely*, and not that of our Creator and Judge, to which the apostle refers? May not the appeasing effect of Christ's blood of expiation be confined to the human conscience solely, and there be no actual pacification of any attribute or feeling in the Deity? But this is only a part of the truth. We do, indeed, need to be saved from the terrible wrath and remorse of our own consciences as they bite back (*remordere*) upon us after the commission of sin,—and of this we shall speak in its place,—but we need primarily to be saved from the judicial displeasure of that immaculate SPIRIT, in whose character and ethical feeling towards sin the human conscience itself has its eternal ground and authority, and of which it is the most sensitive index and measure.

The natural teaching, then, of these and similar passages of scripture is, that the atoning sacrifice of the God-man renders "*propitious*" towards the transgressor, that particu-

¹ *Living Temple*, Pt. II. c. 5. (Vol. I. p. 81. New York Ed.).

² Romans 5: 8, 9.

lar side of the Divine Nature, and that one specific emotion of the living God, which otherwise and without it is displace and unappeased. This atonement is a satisfaction for the ethical nature of God as well as man. This propitiation sustains an immediate relation to an attribute and quality in the Divine Essence, and exerts a specific influence upon it. By it God's holy justice and moral anger against sin are conciliated to guilty man, that man's remorseful conscience may, as a consequence of this pacification in the Divine Essence, experience the peace that passeth all understanding. It will therefore be the purpose of this Article to evince that the piacular work of the incarnate Deity sustains relations to *both* the nature of God and the nature of man; and more particularly to show that the pacification of the human conscience itself is possible only in case there has been an antecedent propitiation and satisfaction of that side of the Divine Nature which is the deep and eternal ground of conscience.

Before commencing the discussion, we would in the very outset guard against a misconception, which almost uniformly arises in a certain class of minds, and which is not only incompatible with any just understanding of the doctrine of atonement, but prevents even a dispassionate and candid attention to it. When it is asserted that "God requires to be propitiated," and that "his wrath needs to be averted by a judicial infliction upon the sinner's substitute," the image immediately arises before such minds, of an enraged and ugly demon whose wrath is *wrong*, and who must be pacified by some *other* being than himself. Such minds labor under a two-fold error, of which they ought to be disabused. Their first fatal misconception is, that the Divine anger is selfish and vindictive, instead of just and vindicative of law. And their second consists in their assumption that the placation issues from some other source than the offended One himself. Assuming as they do that anger in God is illegitimate, the attribution of this emotion to him, of course undeifies him. And assuming, still further, that wrath against the sinner's *sin*, cannot exist at the same in-

stant with compassion towards the sinner's *soul*, they find no pity in the Deity as thus defined. His sole emotion must be that of wrath, because, as they imagine, He can have but one feeling at a time, and therefore the creature who has incurred God's displeasure, must look elsewhere than to God for the source of hope and peace.

Now this whole view overlooks the complex nature, the infinite plenitude, of the Godhead. For at the very instant when the immaculate holiness of God is burning with intensity, and reacting by an organic recoil against sin,¹ the infinite pity of God is yearning with a fathomless desire to save the transgressor from *the effects of this very displeasure*. The emotion of anger against sin is constitutional to the Deity, and is irrepressible at the sight of sin. But this is entirely compatible with the existence and exercise of another and opposite feeling, at the very same moment, in reference, not indeed to the sin but to the *soul* of the sinner.² Mercy and truth meet *together*, righteousness and peace kiss each other, in the Divine Essence; and it is a mutilated and meagre conception of the Godhead that can grasp but one of these opposites at once. Even within the narrow and imperfect sphere of human life there may be, and were man holier, there often would be, the most holy and unselfish indignation at wrong doing, united with the utmost readiness to suffer and die if need be for the eternal welfare of the wrong doer.

¹ The inspired words that express the emotion of displacency in the Divine Being are startling from their energy and vividness. The primary sensuous meaning, or the visual image called up by them, illustrates this. The verb פָּזַז , employed in Ps. 7: 11, signifies to foam at the mouth; the verb פָּרַק means to cut up, or break up, into pieces; the verb פָּרַק signifies to breathe hard through the distended nostrils; etc.

² The two emotions of which we are speaking, are clearly discriminated from each other by the fact that one of them is constitutional, and the other voluntary. The Divine wrath (ὀργή Θεοῦ , Rom. 1: 18) issues from the necessary antagonism between the pure essence of the Godhead, and moral evil. It is, therefore, natural, organic, necessary, and eternal. The logical idea of the Holy implies it. But the love of benevolence, or the Divine compassion, issues from the voluntary disposition of God, — from his heart and affections. It is *good-will*. It is, consequently, easy to see that the existence of the constitutional emotion is perfectly compatible with that of the voluntary, in one and the same being, and at one and the same moment.

Such being the actual relation of indignation to compassion in the Divine Essence, it is plain that it is God himself that propitiates himself to the transgressor. In the *incarnate* person of the Son, God voluntarily endures the weight of his own judicial displeasure, in order that the real criminal may be spared. The Divine compassion itself bears the inflictions of the Divine indignation, in the place of the transgressor.¹ That ethical emotion in the being of God, which from the nature and necessity of the case is incensed against sin, God himself placates by a personal self-sacrifice that inures to the benefit of the creature. The "propitiation" spoken of by the apostle John is, therefore, no oblation *ab extra*, no device of a third party, or even of man himself, to render God placable towards man. It is wholly *ab intra*, a *self-oblation* upon the part of Deity itself, by which to satisfy those immanent and eternal imperatives of the Divine Nature which without it must find their satisfaction in the punishment of the transgressor, or else be outraged. Neither does the purpose to employ this method of salvation, to provide this satisfaction of ethical and judicial claims, originate outside of the Divine Nature. God is inherently willing to forgive; and there is no proof of this so strong as the fact, that he does not shrink from this amazing *self-sacrifice* which forgiveness necessitates. The desire to save his transgressing and guilty creature wells up and overflows from the depths of his own compassionate heart, and needs no soliciting or prompting from without. Side by side in the Godhead, then, there dwell the impulse to punish and the desire to pardon; but the desire to pardon is realized in act, by *carrying out* the impulse to punish, not indeed upon the person of the criminal, but upon that of his substitute. And the substitute is the Punisher Himself! Side by side in the

¹ In all these statements we would be understood as making them in harmony with, and subject to, all the limitations of the Catholic doctrine of the two natures in the one Person of Christ. The Divine Nature, in itself, is impassible; but we have scriptural warrant in Acts 20: 28, for saying that God *incarnate*, or the *God-Man*, is passible, and suffers and dies. Hence, while there can be no transfer of predicates from one nature to the other, the predicates of both natures alike belong to the *Person*, and that Person is God as well as man.

Godhead there reside the emotion of moral wrath and the feeling of pity; but the feeling of pity is manifested, not by denying, but by asserting, the entire legitimacy of the emotion of moral wrath, and "propitiating" its holy intensity by a sufficient oblation. And that oblation is incarnate Deity Itself!

Viewed from this central point, and under this focal light, how impossible it is not to recognize *both* love and wrath in the Godhead,¹ and how impossible it is to conceive of a schism in the Divine Being, and separate his justice from his mercy. It is a real "propitiation" of the Divine anger against sin that is effected, but it is a propitiation that is effected by the Deity himself, out of his own self-sacrificing and principled compassion.

Turning now to the discussion of the theme proposed, the first step requires us to consider the relation which the ethical nature of man sustains to the ethical nature of God. For if both alike are to be satisfied by one and the same atoning work of one and the same Person, the Lord Jesus Christ, it is plain that there must be some common kindredness and sympathy between them. What then is the actual relation that exists between conscience in man and the attribute of justice in God? Do they give differing judgments with respect to the demerit of sin, and do they require different methods of satisfaction for it? Is the human conscience clamorous for an atonement, while the Divine Nature is wholly indifferent? Or, does the judicial sentiment in the Deity demand the infliction of penalty upon crime, while that of man is opposed to such an infliction? Is there, or is there not, an entire and perfect agreement between the finite faculty and the infinite attribute, upon these points, so that in reference to sin and guilt, what God requires, man's moral

¹ The inspired assertion that "God is a consuming fire" (Heb. 12: 29), is just as categorical and unqualified as the inspired assertion that "God is love" (1 John 4: 8), or the inspired assertion that "God is light" (1 John 1: 5). Hence it is as inaccurate to resolve all the Divine emotions into love, as it would be to resolve them all into wrath. The truth is, that it is the divine *essence* alone, and not any one particular attribute, that can be logically regarded as the unity in which all the characteristic qualities of the Deity centre and inhere.

nature also insists upon, and what an awakened conscience craves, eternal Justice also demands?

The moral reason, as containing for its substance and inlay the moral law of God, and the conscience as the faculty that testifies with respect to the harmony or the hostility of the will with this law,—this side of human nature is a part of that “image and likeness of God,” after which man was originally created. These faculties have to do with what is religious, ethical, eternal; and, notwithstanding the apostasy and corruption of man’s heart and will, they still constitute a point of connection and communication between the being of man and the being of God. The moral reason and conscience are the intellectual media whereby, if we may so speak, man and his Maker are put *en rapport*. When the Eternal Judge addresses the creature upon the subject of religion, upon the duties which he owes, and the liabilities under which he stands, he speaks first of all, not to his imagination, or his taste, or his hostile heart, or his perverse will, but to his moral sense and sentiment. When God begins the work of conviction, and in order to this throws in an influence from his own holy and immaculate Essence, He first shoots a pang through this part of man’s complex being. This, like Darien, is the isthmus of volcanic fire that both divides and joins the oceans.

Here, then, if anywhere in the being of man, we are to look for views of the Deity that correspond to his real nature and character. And here, in particular, we are to find the true index of his *judicial emotions* towards sin, and the clue to what his ethical nature and feeling demands in order to its remission. We must not ask the sinful heart, or the taste, or the mere understanding, what God thinks of sin, and what is his feeling respecting it. Upon these points we must take counsel of the conscience. For the God of the selfish heart is the deity of sentimentalism; the God of the imagination and the taste is the beautiful Grecian Apollo; the God of the understanding merely is the cold and unemotional abstraction of the deist and the pantheist; but the God of the conscience is the living and holy God of Israel,—the God

of punishments and atonements. This ethical part of man's being, then, has a closer affinity than any other part with the Divine Essence, and consequently its phenomena, its pangs and its pacification, have a more intimate connection than those of any other of his powers, with the processes of the Eternal Mind. This is the finite contacting point in man that corresponds with the infinite surface in God. The moral reason and conscience, thus having their counterpart and antithesis in the Deity, must, therefore, be regarded as indexes of him, and particularly of what goes on in his being in relation to human sin and guilt. The calm condemnation of man's ethical nature, and the unselfish organic remorse of his conscience, which are consequent upon his transgression of law, are effluences from that Being whose eyes "devour all iniquity." The righteous indignation into which the judicial part of the human soul is stirred by sin, is the finite but *homogeneous* expression of that anger against moral evil which burns with an eternal intensity in the purity of the Divine Essence.

Hence it follows that a careful examination of what we find in the workings of this part of the human constitution, instead of deterring, will compel us to transfer in the same species to God, what exists in man in only a finite degree. In other words, the emotion of the human conscience towards sin will be found to be the same in *kind* with the emotion of God towards sin. The analysis must, indeed, be very careful. We must eliminate from the indignation of the moral sense all elements of selfish passion that have become mixed with it, owing to that corruption of human nature which prevents even as serious a power as conscience from working with a perfectly normal action.¹ We must clarify

¹ *Trench* remarks upon Eph. 4:26, that "St. Paul is not, as so many understand him, condescending to human infirmity, and saying, 'Your anger shall not be imputed to you as a sin, if you put it away before nightfall;' but rather, 'Be ye angry, yet in this anger of yours suffer no sinful element to mingle;' there is that which may cleave even to a righteous anger, the *παροργισμός*, the irritation, the exasperation, which must be dismissed at once; that so, being defecated of this impurer element which mingled with it, that only which ought to remain, may remain." — *Synonymes of N. T.*, § 37.

remorse until the residuum left is pure spiritual wrath against pure wickedness. We must do our utmost, under the illumination of divine truth and the actuation of the Holy Spirit, to have conscience do its perfect, unmixed work; and then we need not shrink from asserting, that this righteous displacency of the moral sense, against the voluntary wickedness, is precisely the same emotion *in specie* with the wrath of God.¹

It will aid us if at this point we direct attention to the distinction between the human conscience and the human heart; and particularly to the difference between *emotion in conscience* and *emotion in the heart*. The feelings and passions of the corrupt human heart we cannot, in any form, attribute to God. Envy, pride, malice, shame, selfish love, and selfish hatred, cannot possibly exist in that pure and blessed Nature. Hence it is, that we are so apt to shrink from those portions of scripture which clothe the Deity with indignant and condemnatory feelings, because this class of emotions are those in and by which the depravity of the human heart is most wont to display itself. But the emotion of which we are speaking is not a passion of the human heart. The heart of man *loves* sin; but we are describing *remorse*,

¹ Hence the Divine injunction in Ps. 97:18: "Ye that love the Lord, *hate evil*;" and in Rom. 12:9: "*Abhor that which is evil*." This pure and spiritual displacency towards moral evil, unmixed with any elements of sinful and human passion, is one of the last accomplishments of the Christian life. Hear the following low and sad refrain from the spirit of the intensely earnest and ethical Master of Rugby, as he muses under the dark chestnut-trees, and beside the limpid waters, and beneath the cerulean sky of Lake Como: "It is almost awful to look at the overwhelming beauty around me, and then think of moral evil; it seems as if heaven and hell, instead of being separated by a great gulf from one another, were absolutely on each other's confines, and indeed not far from every one of us. Might the sense of moral evil be as strong in me as my delight in external beauty; *for in a deep sense of moral evil, more perhaps than in anything else, abides a saving knowledge of God!* It is not so much to admire moral good; that we may do, and yet not be ourselves conformed to it; but if we really do *abhor* that which is evil, not the persons in whom evil resides, but the evil that dwelleth in them, and much more manifestly and certainly to our own knowledge, in our own hearts, — this is to have the feeling of God and of Christ, and to have our spirit in sympathy with the spirit of God. Alas! how easy to see this and say it, — how hard to do it and to feel it!" — *Arnold's Life and Correspondence*. Appendix D.

which is the wrath of the conscience *against* sin. We are delineating the operations and processes of a very different part of the human constitution from that which is the source and seat of earthly passions and sinful emotions. We have passed beyond the hot and passionate heart of man to the cool and silent *judicial* centre of his being; and here we find feelings and processes of an altogether different and higher order. Indignation in conscience is a totally different emotion from indignation in the heart. A man's moral displeasure at his own sin is an entirely different mental exercise from his selfish displeasure towards his neighbor. The former is an ethical and impartial emotion, totally independent of the will and affections, and called out involuntarily from the conscience by the mere sheer contact between it and the heart's iniquity. Hence a man never condemns himself for the existence of such a species of displeasure within his breast. He may be angry in this style and sin not. The sun may go down upon this kind of wrath. And yet it is not a virtue for which he can take credit to himself; for it is no product of his. It is not an emotion of his heart or his will, but is simply an involuntary and irrepressible efflux from his rational nature. He may only give glory to his Creator for it, as the only relic left him, in his total alienation of heart and will from God, of his primitive and constitutional kindredness with the First Perfect and the First Fair.

Again, this judicial emotion, this *conscientious* wrath, of which we are speaking, differs from the selfish and partial emotions of the human heart, in that it is not intrinsically an unhappy feeling. It does not, like the latter, of necessity render the being in whom it exists miserable. Envy, hatred, malice, shame, pride, are each and all of them unhappy exercises in themselves, as well as in their consequences. They cannot exist in any being without mental suffering. But it is not so with the moral displeasure of the moral sense. Whether this just and legitimate emotion be a torment or not, depends altogether upon the state of the heart and will, upon the moral character. It is indeed true that it causes unhappiness in a *sinful* being, because in this

instance the emotions of the heart are in antagonism with the emotion of conscience; because the executive faculty is not in harmony with the judicial faculty. But where there is no personal sin, both the wrath of conscience and the wrath of God are as innocuous as fire upon asbestos. Hence this very same emotion of moral indignation and abhorrence exists in an intense degree in the angels and the seraphim, but is productive of no disquietude in them, because there is nothing evil in their *own* character upon which it can wreak its force. There is a perfect harmony, within them, between the emotions of the heart and the judicial emotion, between the character and the conscience. And, in like manner, this same feeling of ethical displeasure exists in an infinite degree in the being of God, without disturbing, in the least, the ineffable peace and blessedness of that pure nature which is the paradise and elysium of all who are conformed to it. For this judicial sentiment is a *legitimate* one, and nothing that is legitimate can be intrinsically miserable. And therefore it is that the saints and the seraphim, as they look down from the crystal battlements with holy abhorrence and indignation upon the sorceries and murders and uncleanness of the fallen Babylon, are not distressed by their emotion, but, on the contrary, rejoice with a holy joy at the final triumph of justice in the universe of God, and say, Alleluia, as the smoke of that just torment rises up for ever and ever.¹ And therefore it is that God himself carries eternally, in his own blessed nature, a righteous indignation against moral evil, that is no source of disquietude to him, because there is no moral evil in him, nor to the angels and saints and seraphim, because there is none in them; but only to those rebellious and wicked spirits into whom it does fall like lightning from the sky.

¹ "And after these things, I heard a great voice of much people in heaven, saying, Alleluia: Salvation, and glory, and honor, and power unto the Lord our God: for true and righteous are his judgments, for he hath judged the great whore which did corrupt the earth with her fornication, and hath avenged the blood of his servants at her hand. And again they said, Alleluia: and her smoke rose up forever and ever. And the four and twenty elders, and the four beasts fell down, and worshipped God that sat on the throne, saying, Amen, Alleluia." — Rev. 19: 1—4.

For if the emotion of moral indignation were intrinsically one of unhappiness, then the existence of evil would be the destruction of the Divine blessedness; because God "cannot look upon evil with allowance,"¹ and yet he is constantly looking upon it. But it is not so. On the contrary, the Deity is *blessed* in his displacency at that which is vile and hateful. For pleasure is the coincidence between a feeling and its correlated object. It implies intrinsic congruity and fitness. It would therefore be unhappiness in any being to hate what is lovely, or to love what is hateful; to be pleased with what is wrong, and displeased with what is right; because the proper coincidence between the emotion and the object would not obtain. But when God, or any being, hates what is hateful, and is angry at that which *merits* wrath, the true nature and fitness of things is observed, and that inward harmony which is the substance of mental happiness is maintained. Anger and hatred are almost indissolubly connected in our minds with mental wretchedness, because we behold their exercise only in an abnormal and sinful sphere. In an apostate world, as such, there is no proper and fitting coincidence between emotions and their objects. A sinner hates holiness, which he ought to love; and loves sin, which he ought to hate. The anger of his heart is not legitimate, but passionate and selfish. The love of his heart is illicit; and therefore, as it is styled in the scriptures, is mere lust or evil concupiscence (*ἐπιθυμία*). In a sinful world, as such, all the true relations and correlations are reversed. Love and hatred are expended upon exactly the wrong objects. But when these emotions are contemplated within the sphere of the Holy and the Eternal; when they are beheld in God, exercised only upon their appropriate and deserving objects; when the wrath falls only upon the sin and uncleanness of hell, and burns up nothing but

¹ "Thou art not a God that hath pleasure in wickedness. Thou hatest all workers of iniquity" (Ps. 5: 5, 6). "God is angry with the wicked every day" (Ps. 7: 11). "Who may stand in thy sight when once thou art angry" (Ps. 76: 7)? "Who knoweth the power of thine anger? Even according to thy fear so is thy wrath" (Ps. 90: 11). "He that believeth not the Son, shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him" (John 3: 36).

filth in its pure celestial flame; the emotion is not merely legitimate, but beautiful with an august beauty, and is no source of pain either to the Divine Mind or to any minds in sympathy with it. It is only upon this principle that we can explain the blessedness of the Deity, in connection with his omniscience and omnipresence. We know that sin and the punishment of sin are ever before him. The smoke of torment is perpetually rolling up in the presence of the Omnipresent. And yet he is supremely blessed. But he can be so only because there is a just and proper correlation between his wrath and the object upon which it falls; only because he condemns that which is intrinsically damnable.¹ The least disturbance of this coincidence, the slightest love for the hateful, or hatred for the lovely, would indeed render God a wretched being. But the perfect harmony of it makes him "God over all," hell as well as heaven, "blessed forever."² Were this ethical feeling once to be outraged by the final triumph of iniquity over righteousness; were the smoke of torment to ascend eternally from pure and innocent spirits, and were the revelry of joy to steam up everlastingly from the souls of the vile and the worthless; were the great relations of right and wrong, sin and penalty, happiness and misery, once to be reversed in the universe, and under the

¹ It is at this point that the metaphysical necessity of endless punishment appears. For if sin be intrinsically damnable, it is intrinsically punishable. If then the question be asked: How long is it intrinsically damnable and punishable? there is but one answer. There is, in fact, no logical mean between no punishment at all of sin as an *intrinsic* evil, and an absolute, that is, an endless punishment of it.

² It is a standing objection of infidelity to the Biblical idea and representation of the Deity, that it conflicts with the natural intuitions of the human mind. It is asserted that the instinctive sentiments of the soul repel the doctrine of anger against sin. The ethics of nature, say these theorizers, are contrary to the ethics of scripture upon this point, and hence mankind must make a choice between the two. But a careful study of the most profound systems of natural religion does not corroborate this assertion. Probably no mind, outside of the pale of Christianity, has made a more discriminating and truthful representation of the natural sentiments of the human mind, than Aristotle. But this dispassionate thinker asserts that "He who feels anger on proper occasions, at proper persons, and in a proper manner, and for a proper length of time, is an object of praise." — *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book IV. c. 5.

government, of God, then indeed this quick sense of justice, and this holy indignation at sin, would be a grief and a sorrow to its possessor. And therefore it is, that, in all the Divine administration, and in the entire plan of redemption, the utmost possible pains is taken to justify, and legitimate, and satisfy this judicial sentiment, and to see that its demands are fully met.

There must be this correspondence between the judicial nature of man and the judicial nature of God, or religion is impossible. How can man even know what is meant by justice in the Deity, if there is absolutely nothing of the same species in his own rational constitution, which, if realized in his own character as it is in that of God, would make him just as God is just? How can he know what is meant by moral perfection in God, if in his own rational spirit there is absolutely no ideal of moral excellence, which if realized in himself as it is in the Creator, would make him excellent as he is excellent? Without some mental correspondent, to which to appeal and commend themselves, the teachings of revelation could not be apprehended. A body of knowledge alone is not the whole; there must be an inlet for it, an organ of apprehension. But if there is no such particular part of the human constitution as has been described, and these calm judgments of the moral sense, and this righteous displeasure of the conscience, are to be put upon a level with the workings of the fancy and imagination, or the selfish passions of the human heart, then there is no point of contact and communication between the nature of man and the being of God. There is no part of his own complex being upon which man may fall back, with the certainty of not being mistaken in judgments of ethics and religion. Both anchor and anchoring-ground are gone, and he is afloat upon the boundless, starless ocean of ignorance and scepticism. Even if revelations are made, they cannot enter his mind. There is no contacting surface through which they can approach and take hold of his being. They cannot be seen to be what they really are, the absolute truth of God, because there is no eye with which to see them.

Assuming, then, that there is this correspondence and correlation between the moral constitution of man and the Divine Nature, we proceed, in the light of the fact, to evince the doctrine, taught in the scripture texts which we have cited, that the atonement of Christ is a real satisfaction both on the part of God and man. The death of incarnate Deity has always been regarded, by those who have believed that the Deity became incarnate in Jesus Christ, as *expiatory*. As such, it relates immediately to the attribute of justice in the Creator, and to the faculty of conscience in the creature. And the position taken here, is that it sustains the *same* relation to both. It satisfies that which would be dissatisfied both in God and man if the penalty of sin were merely set aside and abolished by an act of will. It placates an ethical feeling which is manifesting itself in the form of remorse in the conscience of the transgressor, only because it has first existed in the nature of God in the form of a judicial displeasure towards moral evil.

A fundamental attribute of Deity is justice. This comes first into view, and continues in sight to the very last, in all inquiries into the Divine Nature. No attribute can be conceived of that is more ultimate and central than this one. This is proved by the fact that the operation of all the other Divine attributes, love itself not excepted, is *conditioned* and *limited* by justice. For whatever else God may be, or may not be, he must be just. It is not optional with him to exercise this attribute, or not to exercise it, as it is in the instance of that class of attributes which are antithetic to it. We can say: "God may be merciful or not, as he pleases;" but we cannot say: "God may be just or not, as he pleases." It cannot be asserted that God is inexorably obligated to show pity; but it can be categorically affirmed that God is inexorably obligated to do justly. For the attribute of justice is a necessary one; while, if we may accommodate a Shakspearean phrase, "the quality of mercy is not *strained*." Hence the existence of justice can be demonstrated upon *a priori* grounds, while that of mercy is known only by a declaration or *promise* upon the part of God. It is for this reason, that man can have

no certainty that the Deity is a merciful being, except as he obtains it from a special revelation. When the thoughtful pagan looked up into the pure heavens above him, or into the deep recesses within him, he had no doubt that the Infinite One is just, and a punisher of evil doing, because he *must* be such. Hence he trembled; and hence he offered a propitiatory sacrifice. But neither from the heavens, nor from anything in his own moral constitution, could he obtain certainty in regard to the attribute of mercy; because there is nothing of a *necessary* nature in this attribute. God might or might not be merciful to him. Man may dare to hope that there is pity in the Deity; but whether there actually is, he cannot know with certainty until the heavens are opened, and a voice issues from the lips of the Supreme himself, saying: "I will show mercy, and this is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased." The light of nature is sufficient for man's damnation; but it casts not a ray in the direction of his salvation. There is ample evidence from natural religion that the Deity is holy and impartial; but it is only from revealed religion that the human mind obtains its warrant for believing in the Divine clemency. From the position of natural ethics alone, man is merely condemned to retribution; and, as matter of fact, while standing only upon this position, his conscience accuses him, and fills him with fears and forebodings of judgment. Nothing but a *promise* of forgiveness, from the mouth of God, can remove these fears; but a promise to pardon is not *a priori*, and necessary, like a threatening to punish.

The absolute and indefeasible nature of justice is seen, again, by considering the nature of law. If we regard the moral law as the efflux of the Divine Nature, and not, as in the Grotian theory, a positive statute which may be relaxed in part, or wholly abrogated, by the law-making power, we find this same stark necessity existing. The law is *obligated* to punish the transgressor, as much as the transgressor is obligated to obey the law. Human society, for instance, has claim upon law for penalty, as really as law has claim upon human society for obedience. Law has no option. Justice

has but one function. The necessity of penalty is as great as the necessity of obligation. The law itself is under law; that is, it is under the necessity of its own nature; and therefore the only possible way whereby a transgressor can escape the penalty of law, is for a substitute to endure it for him. The language of Milton respecting the transgressor is metaphysically true :

"He, with all his posterity, must die ;
Die he, or justice must ; unless for him
Some other able, and as willing, pay
The rigid satisfaction, death for death."¹

And the mercy of God consists in substituting Himself incarnate for his creature, for purposes of atonement. Analyzed to its ultimate elements, God's pity towards the soul of man is God's satisfying his own eternal attribute of justice for it. It does not consist in outraging his own law, and the guilt-smitten conscience itself, by simply snatching the criminal away from their retributions, in the exercise of an unprincipled and an unbridled almightiness, or in substituting a partial for a complete atonement; but in enduring the full and entire penal infliction by which both are satisfied.

Still another proof of the primary nature of justice is found in the fact of human accountability. The most necessary characteristic of man is evidence of the most necessary characteristic of God; and thus the correspondence between the Divine and the human meets us again. Man is not a link in the necessary chain of material nature. He is by creation a free creature; capable of continuing holy as he was created, or of turning to sin. Now over against this freedom and responsibility on the part of man, there stands justice on the part of God. This great divine attribute presupposes the hazardous human endowment of *will*, and holds the possessor of it accountable for its use or abuse. Without such a characteristic, man could not stand in any sort of relationship to such solemn realities as law and justice. There would be nothing in his constitution that could feel the tre-

¹ *Paradise Lost*, III. 209—212.

mendous swing and blow of penal infliction. For justice smites a transgressor as one who has illegitimately assumed a centre of his own, and who is wickedly standing upon that centre, in hostility to the being and government of God. In a certain sense, though not that which excludes the permissive decree and the preventive power of the Supreme Being, justice supposes the sinner to be sustaining something of the isolated and self-asserting relation to God that the principle of evil in the system of dualism sustains to the principle of good; and when the accountable self-will of a creature attempts to set itself up as an independent and hostile agent in the doing of evil, it then feels the full force of the avenging, vindicating stroke of law, as if it were a single disconnected atom, all alone and by itself, in the middle of creation.

Any just view of sin as *guilt*, as the product of *will*, is, consequently, corroborative of the position that the attribute of which we are speaking is an immanent and necessary one in the Divine Nature. We might conceive of the same amount of evil consequences as those which flow from human transgression; but if this latter were not the real work and agency of a responsible creature, Eternal Justice could take no cognizance of it. Unless sin is *crime*, penalty has no more relation to it than it has to the disease and corruption in the material world about us; and the fall of man could no more be visited by the infliction of judicial suffering, than could that process of decay which is continually going on in the forests, by means of which a more luxuriant vegetation springs up, and a more glorious forest waves in the breeze.

It has been a query among those who have speculated upon the nature of the Deity: What is the base or substrate of His being? The inquiry has too often been so answered as to bring in a subtle pantheism, because there was more reference to the natural than the ethical attributes of the God-head. Whether the question in such a reference can be answered by the finite mind, we do not pretend to decide here; but with reference to God's *moral* constitution, with reference to that congeries of *ethical* attributes which belongs to him

as a personal being, it is as certain as anything can be, that the deep substrate and base of them all, is eternal law and impartial justice. This pervades all the rest, keeps them in equilibrium, and constitutes, as it were, the very divinity of the Deity. And this view of the primary nature of justice coincides with the convictions of men in all ages. In all time, justice has been the one particular divine attribute that has pressed most heavily upon the human race. This always comes first into man's mind, when the idea of the Deity overshadows him. He trembles when he remembers that God is just; and he remembers this when he remembers nothing else. Nor let it be objected that this is owing to the fact that man is sinful, and that this quality in the Supreme Being would not be so prominent in the mind of an unfallen creature who has nothing to fear from it. The utterance of the pure burning seraphim is: *Holy, Holy, Holy*. That which comes first into the minds of the spotless and unfearing worshippers in God's immediate presence — they whose spirits, in the phrase of Jeremy Taylor, "are becalmed, and made even as the brow of Jesus, and smooth like the heart of God," — is that particular characteristic in the Divine Being, by virtue of which he has a right to sit on the eternal throne; that specific attribute upon which the moral administration of the universe must be established.

Now if this be a correct statement of the necessary nature and the capital position of Divine Justice, it is plain that any plan or method that has to do with sin and guilt, must have primary reference to it, and must give *plenary satisfaction* to it as it exists in God himself. Inasmuch as justice, and not mercy, is the *limiting* and *conditioning* attribute, its demands must be acknowledged and met in order that mercy may make even the first advances towards the transgressor. Compassion cannot, by mere arbitrary will and might, stride forward to reach its own private ends, and trample down justice by sheer force; but must come forth, as she does in the bleeding Lamb of God, as the voluntary servant and victim of Law, doing all its behests, and bearing all its burdens, and enduring its sharp, inexorable pains, *in the place of* (vice, vi-

carie) the helpless object whom vengeance suffereth not to live. The cup must be put to the lips of him who has volunteered to be the Atoner, and he must drink it to the bottom, for the guilty transgressor whose law-place he has taken. The God-man having, out of his own free will and affection, become the sinner's *Substitute*, must now receive a sinner's treatment, and be "numbered with the transgressors" (Isa. 53 : 12). He cannot therefore escape the agony and passion, the hour and the power of darkness. He may give expression to his spontaneous shrinking from the awful self-oblation, as the hour darkens and draws on, in the utterance: "O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me;" but having taken the place of the *guilty*, it is not possible, and he must sweat the bloody sweat, he must cry: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" that his voice may then ring through the universe and down the ages: "It is finished, —the atonement is made."¹

For the Deity cannot, by an arbitrary and unprincipled procedure, release the transgressor's Substitute from the penal suffering, and inflict a wound upon that holy judicial nature, which is vital in every part with the breath of law and the life of justice. By reason of an immanent necessity, he cannot disturb his own eternal sense of righteousness and ethical tranquillity, by doing damage to one whole side of his Godhead.

He has not. In the voluntary, the cordially offered, sacrifice of the incarnate Son, the judicial nature of God, which by a constitutional necessity requires the punishment of sin, finds its righteous requirement fully met. Plenary punishment is inflicted upon One who is infinite, and therefore competent; upon One who is finite, and therefore passible; upon One who is innocent, and therefore can suffer for oth-

¹ "The *justice* of God is exceedingly glorified in this work. God is so strictly and immutably just, that he would not spare his beloved Son when he took upon him the guilt of men's sins, and was substituted in the room of sinners. He would not abate him the least mite of that debt which justice demanded. Justice should take place, though it cost his infinitely dear Son his precious blood; and his enduring such extraordinary reproach, and pain, and death in its most dreadful form." — Edwards's Works, IV. 140.

ers; upon One who is voluntary, and therefore uncompelled. By this theanthropic oblation, the ethical feeling, the organic emotion of displeasure in the Deity is, in the scripture phrase, made "propitious" towards the guilty, because it has been placated by it. Thus God is immutably just while he justifies (Rom. 3 : 26), and his mercy is, in the last analysis, one with his truth and his law.

We turn, now, to the other half of the proposition derived from the scripture texts that have been cited, and proceed to show that the atonement of Christ effects a real satisfaction upon the part of man. We have seen that the propitiatory death of the God-man meets the immanent ethical necessities of the Divine Nature. We have now the easier task of evincing that it meets the moral wants of human nature.

In discussing the fact of a divinely-established correspondence between the judicial nature of man and that of God, we have already observed that the attribute of justice naturally selects this judicial part of man as the inlet of approach to him. Eternal law has, in all ages, poured itself down through the human *conscience*, like a fountain through the channel it has worn for itself, and in this instance like hot lava down a mountain gorge. Hence by watching its workings within this particular faculty, we are enabled to determine what man's judicial nature requires, and also incidentally to throw back some more light upon the relations of the atonement to the Divine Nature. It is indeed true that Divine Justice manifests itself in other modes than this. There are revelations of it in the written word, and in the course of providence and human history. But we are endeavoring to establish the position that the atonement has an *internal* necessity grounded in the very moral being of man. It is necessary, therefore, to look at the principle of law in its vital and felt manifestation within the soul of the criminal himself. By the analysis of the contents of a remorseful conscience, especially if it has been made unusually living and poignant by the truth and Spirit of God, we may discover much of the real quality of Eternal Justice. As this august attribute acts and reacts within the breast of man upon his

violation of law, we may obtain some clear and *conscious* knowledge of its nature and operations; and also of what the human conscience itself demands, and with what it is satisfied.

The commission of sin is either attended or succeeded by the sensation of *guilt*, — one of the most distinct and unique of all the sensations that emerge within the horizon of self-consciousness. Provided conscience does its unmixed work, the transgressor is conscious, not merely of unhappiness, which is a very low form of feeling, but of *criminality*, which is a very high form. Nay, the more profound and thorough the operation of the moral faculty becomes, the more does the sense of mere wretchedness retreat into the back-ground, and the sense of ill-desert come forth into the foreground of consciousness. It is possible for this latter element to drive out, for a time, the particular feeling of misery, and to absorb the mind in the sense of *horror* and *amazement* at the past transgression. The guilty, in the final day, are represented as calling upon the rocks and the mountains to fall upon them, as inviting new forms of suffering, in the vain hope that the awful consciousness of crime may be drowned thereby.

Now seizing and holding the experience of the transgressor at this point, let us examine it more closely. Notice that this consciousness of guilt, pure and simple, is wholly *involuntary*. It comes in upon the criminal, not only without his will, but in spite of it. He would keep it out, if he could. He would drive it out, if he could. His experience at this stage, then, is the result of no voluntary effort upon his part, but of the simple *reaction of law*, the most dispassionate and unselfish of all realities, against its violator. In the conscience, that part of the human constitution which we have seen to be the proper seat and organ for such an operation, the commandment is making itself felt again, not as at first in the form of command, but of condemnation. The free agent has responsibly disobeyed the holy, just, and good statute, and is now feeling the tremendous reaction of it in his own moral being. This remorse, or damnable emotion, therefore, is the work of God's

law, and not of man's will. There is consequently very little of the selfish and the earthly, but much of the unearthly and the eternal, in the transgressor's experience held at this point. He can take no merit to himself, because it is of such an intensely ethical and spiritual character, since the entire process, so far as he is concerned, is involuntary and organic. It is provided for in his judicial constitution, and as an operation within himself it is to be regarded, not as the working of his corrupt heart, but as the *infliction* of Divine retribution and justice, in and through the judicial faculty. Man can take no merit to himself because he possesses a power that condemns evil, and distresses therefor. For this is the workmanship of the Creator, and it exists in hell as well as heaven. The workings of conscience are as much beyond the control of the will, are as truly organic, as those of the sympathetic nerve, and therefore are worthy of neither praise nor blame. Given conscience and sin, within one and the same soul, and remorse must follow as a matter of necessity. Hence remorse is never made the subject of a command. Man is commanded to melt down in godly sorrow, but never to be filled with remorse; for this is provided for in the moral constitution given by Him who makes it the fiery chariot by which he himself rides into man's being, in majesty, to judgment.

Hence this sense of ill-desert, though its sensorium is the human conscience, must be traced back for its first cause, to a yet deeper ground; and a yet higher origin. For if it were a fact, that remorse had nothing but a human source, though that source were the highest and most venerable of the human faculties, and the transgressor should know it, he could overcome and suppress it. Nothing that has a merely finite origin can be a permanent source of misery; and if the victim of remorse could but be certain that the just and holy God has had nothing to do with the origin of the distress within him, he could ultimately expel it from his breast. If he could be assured that the terrible emotion which follows the commission of evil, though welling up from the lowest springs of his own nature, yet has no connection with the nether fountains of the Divine Essence, he could put an end

to his torment. For no man is afraid of himself alone, and irrespective of his Maker and Judge. That which renders a portion of our common and finite humanity terrible to us, is the fact, that it is grounded in and supported by that which is more than human. In the instance before us, the highest part of the human constitution supports itself by striking its deep roots into the holiness and justice of the Godhead ; and therefore it is that conscience makes cowards of us all, and its remorse is a feeling that is invincible by the strongest finite will, and requires, in order to its extinction, the blood of atonement.

We are, therefore, compelled back into the being and character of God, for the ultimate origin of this sense of guilt, and this "fearful looking-for of judgment and fiery indignation." And why should we not be? If Justice is living and sensitive anywhere, it must be so in its eternal seat and home. If law is jealous for its own authority and maintenance anywhere, it must be in that Being to whom all eyes in the universe are turned with the inquiry: "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" What, therefore, conscience affirms, in the transgressor's case, God affirms, and is the first to affirm. What, therefore, conscience feels in respect to the sinner's transgression, God feels, and is the first to feel. What, therefore, conscience requires in order that it may cease to punish the guilty spirit, God requires and is the first to require. In fine, all that is requisite in order to the satisfaction and pacification of conscience towards the sinful soul in which it dwells, is also requisite in order to the satisfaction and "propitiation" of God the Just ; and it is requisite in the former case only because it is first requisite in the latter. The subjective in man is shaped by the objective in God, and not the objective in God by the subjective in man. The consciousness of the conscience is the reflex of the consciousness of God.

But what, now, does conscience require, in order that it may become pacified with respect to past transgression? We answer, simply and solely an *atonement* for that past transgression ; simply and solely that just *infliction* which is

due to guilt. That is a powerful, because profoundly truthful, passage in Coleridge's play of "Remorse," in which the guilty and guilt-smitten Ordonio is stabbed by Alhadra, the wife of the murdered Isidore. As the steel drinks his own heart's blood, he utters the one single word "*Atonement!*" His self-accusing spirit, which is wrung with its remorseful recollections, and which the warm and hearty forgiveness of his injured brother has not been able to soothe in the least, actually feels its first gush of relief only as the avenging knife enters, and crime meets penalty.¹ And how often, in the annals of guilt, is this principle illustrated. The criminal has wandered up and down the earth, vainly seeking repose of conscience, but finds none until he surrenders himself to the penalty of law. Those are the only hopeful executions, in which the guilty goes to his death *justifying* the judicial sentence that condemns him, and, as a completing act of the solemn mental process, appropriating that yet more august and transcendent expiation which has been made for man by a higher Being than man. A guilty conscience, when it has come to a clear consciousness, *wants* its guilt expiated by the infliction of punishment. It feels that strange unearthly thirst of which Christ speaks, and for which he asserts that his blood of atonement is "drink *indeed*." It cannot be made peaceful except through the medium of a judicial infliction; that is to say, of a particular species of suffering that will *expiate* its guilt. The mere offer of kindness, or good-humor, to remit the sin without any regard to that eternal law of retribution which is now distressing the soul by its righteous claim, does not meet the ethical wants. The moral sense, when in normal action, feels the *necessity* that crime be punished. Hence the human conscience is a faculty that is unappeased, and gnaws like a blind worm, until it hears of the Lamb, the *Atonement*, of God, that taketh away the *guilt* of the world. Hence, however much the selfish

¹ Remorse, Act V. Scene 1. Coleridge's Works, VII. p. 401. — The psychology of crime, or the analysis of the consciousness of guilt (*Schuldbewusstsein*), is a portion of mental philosophy that has been generally neglected. The only treatise specifically devoted to it, that we have met with, is the *Criminal Psychology* of Heinroth.

heart may desire to escape at the expense of right and justice, the impartial conscience can do no such thing. Before this judicial faculty can be pacified, crime must incur penalty, transgression must receive an exact recompense of reward. When this is done, there is entire pacification; there is great peace, such as death, and Satan the accuser, and the day of judgment, and the bar of justice, and the final doom, cannot disturb with a single ripple.

For the correlate to guilt is punishment; and nothing but the correlate itself can perform the function of a correlate. A liquid, for example, is the correlative to thirst, and nothing that is not liquid, however nutritious, and necessary to human life in other relations it may be, can be a substitute for it. There may be the "fat kidneys of wheat," in superabundance, but if there be not also the "brook in the way," the human body must die of thirst. In like manner, a judicial infliction, or *suffering for purposes of justice*, is the only means by which culpability can be extinguished. Sanctification, or holiness, in this reference, is powerless, because there is nothing penal, nothing correlated to guilt, in it. The Tridentine method of justification by sanctification, is not an adaptation of means to ends. So far as the guilt of an act, — in other words, its obligation to punishment, — is concerned, if the transgressor, or his *accepted* substitute,¹ has

¹ Accepted by the law and lawgiver. The primal source of law has no power to abolish penalty any more than to abolish law, but it has full power to *substitute* penalty. In case of a substitution, however, it must be a *strict* equivalent and not a fictitious or nominal one. It would contravene the attribute of justice instead of satisfying it, should God, for instance, by an arbitrary act of will, substitute the sacrifice of bulls and goats for the penalty due to man; or if he should offset any *finite* oblation against the infinite demerit of moral evil. The inquiry whether the satisfaction of justice by Christ's atonement was a strict and literal one, has a practical and not merely theoretical importance. A guilt-smitten conscience is exceedingly timorous, and hence, if there be room for doubting the strict adequacy of the judicial provision that has been made for satisfying the claims of law, a perfect peace, the "peace of God," is impossible. Hence the doctrine of a plenary satisfaction by an infinite substitute is the only one that ministers to evangelical repose. The dispute upon this point has sometimes, at least, resulted from a confusion of ideas and terms. Strict equivalency has been confounded with *identity*. The assertion that Christ's death is a literal equivalent for the punishment due to mankind, has been supposed to be the same as the assertion, that it is identical with it; and a punishment identical with that due to man

endured the infliction that is set over against it, the law is satisfied, and the obligation to punishment is discharged. And so far as guilt, or obligation to punishment is concerned, until the affixed penalty has been endured, by himself or his accepted substitute, he is a guilty man, do what else he may. Even if he should be renewed and sanctified by the Spirit of God, this sanctification has in it nothing *expiatory*, or correlative to guilt, and therefore could not remove his remorse. Food is good and necessary, but it cannot slake thirst. Personal holiness is excellent and indispensable, but it cannot perform the function of atonement. Hence sanctification is wrought by spiritual influences, but justification by expiating blood. The former is the work of the third Person in the Trinity; the latter is that of the second. Hence, when the convicted man is distressed because of what the Psalmist denominates the "*iniquity of sin*," its intrinsic guilty quality, in distinction from its miserable consequences, he craves expiation sometimes with a hunger like that of famine. And hence his desperate endeavor to atone for the past, until he discovers that it is impossible. Then he cries with David: "Thou desirest not sacrifice" — such atonement as I can render is inadequate — "*else would I give it.*"¹ Taking

would involve remorse, and endless duration. But identity of punishment is ruled out by the principle of *substitution* or *vicariousness*, — a principle that is conceded by all who hold the doctrine of atonement. The penalty endured by Christ, therefore, must be a *substituted* and not an identical one. And the only question that remains is, whether that which is to be substituted shall be of a *strictly equal value* with that, the place of which it takes, or whether it may be of an inferior value. When a loan of one hundred dollars in silver is repaid by one hundred dollars in gold, there is a substitution of one metal for another. It is not an identical payment; for this would require the return of the very identical hundred pieces of silver, the *ipsissimæ pecuniæ*, that had been loaned. But it is a *strictly and literally equivalent* payment. All claims are cancelled by it. In like manner, when the suffering and death of God incarnate is substituted for that of the creature, the satisfaction rendered to law is strictly plenary, though not identical with that which is exacted from the transgressor. It contains the element of infinitude, which is the element of value in the case, with even greater precision than the satisfaction of the creature does; because it is the suffering of a strictly infinite Person in a finite time, while the latter is only the suffering of a finite person in an endless but not strictly infinite time. A strictly infinite duration would be without beginning, as well as without end.

¹ The true and accurate rendering of Psalm 51: 7, is not "*purge me with hyssop*"

him at this point in his experience, his desire is for *justification*. He wants, first of all, to be *pardoned*; and, be it observed, *to be pardoned upon those just and eternal principles that will not give way in the great judicial emergencies of this life and the life to come*. Then he will commence the good fight of faith. Then he will run in the way of obedience with an exulting heart, because he is no longer under condemnation. "Whom he justifies, them he glorifies."

Such, it is conceived, is the general doctrine of atonement, to be deduced from the sharp and pointed texts of scripture cited in the outset of this discussion. The Christian atonement possesses both an objective and a subjective validity; it is a satisfaction for the ethical nature of both God and man.

Having thus contemplated the inward and metaphysical nature of that atoning work of incarnate Deity, which is the most stupendous fact in the history of the world, and one upon which all its religious hopes and welfare hang, we naturally turn, in conclusion, to the more external and practical aspects of the great theme. And the application of the doctrine will be found to be all the more acceptable to the Christian heart, and profitable for Christian edification, if the principles and theory from which it flows are profound and thorough. The cup of cold water is all the more grateful to the thirsty soul, if it has been drawn up from the deep wells; and it is certain that divine truth gains, rather than loses, in popular and practical efficiency, upon both the mind and heart, if it be sought for in its purest and most central sources. That view of the work of Christ which represents it as meeting all the ethical necessities of both the divine and the human natures, is well fitted to inspire belief and trust in it, and to draw out the heart towards its Blessed Author.

1. One of the first and obvious inferences, then, from the subject as it has been unfolded, is, that an atonement for sin is no arbitrary requirement on the part of God. If the posi-

sop." but "*atone me* (אַתָּה תְּכַפֵּר) with hyssop." David, in the poignancy of his consciousness of guilt, prays, not for a cleansing merely, but for an *expiatory* cleansing.

tions taken in this discussion are correct, the doctrine of expiation contains a *metaphysique*, and is defensible at the bar of philosophic reason.

One great obstacle to the reception of the evangelical system lies in the fact, that very many are of opinion that the scripture method of forgiving sin is needlessly embarrassed by a sacrificial expiation. "Why should not God," they ask, "forgive the creature of his footstool in the same manner that an earthly father does his child? Why does he not, at once, and without any of this apparatus of atonement, bid the erring one go his way, with the assurance that the past is forgotten? Is not this expiation, even though made by the Deity himself, after all, a hinderance rather than an encouragement to an approach to the eternal throne? Is it not, at least, something that is not *strictly* necessary, and might have been dispensed with?" This lurking or open doubt, with regard to the rationality and intrinsic necessity of an atonement for sin, cuts the root of all evangelical faith in a large class of men.

Indeed, it may be a question whether the preacher in Christian lands has not a more difficult task to perform for a certain class of minds, in reference to the doctrine of Christ crucified, than the missionary in pagan lands has; and whether Christian theology itself would not have an easier labor than it now has, to vindicate the ways of God to man, in the respect of which we are speaking, if the Old-Ethnic, or, what is far better, the Old-Jewish ideas respecting guilt and retribution were more current than they are in a certain class in nominal Christendom. Taking a portion of men in the modern civilized world as the sample, it would seem as if the unregenerate Christian world does not possess such a spontaneous and irrepressible conviction that guilt must be punished, as did the old unsophisticated Pagan world.¹ The

¹ The barbarians of Melita, when they saw the venomous beast hanging upon the hand of Paul, said among themselves: "No doubt this man is a murderer, whom though he hath escaped the sea, yet vengeance (*Δίκη*) suffereth not to live." Their ethical instinct was sound and healthy, though their knowledge of the facts in the case was inaccurate. But when, in the middle of the nineteenth century, and upon a spot where the edifices and emblems of government cast

system of bloody sacrifices, an emphatic acknowledgment of this great truth, was almost universal among them; and the doctrine that mere sorrow for transgression is a sufficient ground for its forgiveness, had little force. The Grecian Nemesis, or personification of vindictive justice, was a divinity to whom even Jove himself was subject. The ancient religious institutions and ceremonials, fanciful and irrational as they were in most of their elements, yet distinctly recognized, through their sacrificial cultus, the amenability of man to law, and his culpability. Add to this, the workings of natural conscience, and we have, even in the midst of polytheism, quite a strong influence at work to keep the pagan mind healthy and sound upon the relations of guilt to justice. Men could not well deny the need of sin-expiation before whose eyes the blood of the piacular victim was constantly smoking, in accordance with a custom that had come down from their ancestors, and which fell in so accordantly with the workings of a remorseful conscience.

But a portion of the modern world have made use of Christianity itself to undermine the very foundations of Christianity. The Christian religion, by *furnishing* that one great sacrifice and real atonement, to which all other sacrifices look and point, has of course abolished the system of external sacrifices, and now that class of minds who live under its outward and civilizing influences without appropriating its inward and spiritual blessings, reject the legal and judicial elements which it contains, and deny the necessity of satisfying justice in the plan of redemption. There is nothing, in the religious rites and customs under which they live, to elicit the sense of guilt; and hence, from an inadequate knowledge of their own consciences and a defective apprehension of Christianity, they strenuously combat that fundamental truth, "without the shedding of blood there is no remission," upon which Christianity itself is founded, and

their solemn shadows, a human being, in the heat and fury of his heart, slays his foe to mutilation in the illegal redress of his own wrongs, and the public conscience is found to be so debauched that only one in one hundred of the resident population condemns the deed, the comparison between Christendom and Paganism is humiliating.

in reference to which alone it has any worth or preciousness for a guilt-smitten soul.

The same tendency to underestimate the fact of human criminality, and the value of the piacular provision for it in the gospel, is seen also in the individual. How difficult it is to bring the person, for whose spiritual interests we are anxious, to see himself in the light of law and condemnation. How we ourselves shrink from the clear, solemn assertion of his culpability, and turn aside to enlarge upon the unworthiness or the unhappiness of his sin. When we make the attempt to charge home guilt upon him, how lacking we are in that tender solemnity, and earnest truthfulness of tone, which make the impression. And, even if we have succeeded in wakening his conscience to a somewhat normal action in this respect, how swiftly does he elude the terrible but righteous feeling, which alone can prepare him for the sprinkling of the blood of Jesus.

When we pass up into the Christian experience, we discover the same fact in a different form and degree. How difficult does the believer find it to obtain such a clear and transparent conception of his own guiltiness, that the atoning work of his Redeemer becomes all luminous before his eyes, and he knows instantaneously that he needs it, and that it is all he needs. Usually, this crystal clearness of vision is reserved for certain critical moments in his religious history, when he must have it or die. Usually it is the hour of affliction, or sickness, or death, that affords this rare and unutterably tranquillizing view of the guilty self and the dying Lord. "We have the *blood of Christ*," said the dying Schleiermacher, as, in his last moments, he began to count up the grounds of his confidence on the brink of the invisible world. Here was a mind uncommonly contemplative and profound; that had made the spiritual world its home, as it were, for many long years of theological study and reflection; that, in its tone and temper, seemed to be prepared to pass over into the supernatural realm without any misgivings or apprehensions; that had mused long and speculated subtly upon the nature of moral evil; that had sounded the

depths of reason and revelation with no short plummet-line: here was a man who, now that death had actually come, and the responsible human will must now encounter Holy Justice face to face, found that nothing but the *blood*, the *atonement*, of Jesus Christ could calm the perturbations of his planet-like spirit. The errors and inadequate statements of his theological system, which cluster mostly about this very doctrine of expiation, are tacitly renounced in the implied confession of guiltiness and need of atonement, contained in these few simple words: "We have the *BLOOD* of Christ."

It is related that bishop Butler, in his last days drawing nearer to that dread tribunal where the highest and the lowest must alike stand in judgment, trembled in spirit, and turned this way and that for tranquillity of conscience. One of his clergy, among other texts, quoted to him the words: "The *blood* of Jesus Christ cleanseth from all sin." A flush of peace and joy passed, like the bland west wind, through his fevered conscience, as he made answer: "I have read those words a thousand times, but I never felt their meaning as now." And who does not remember that the final hours of the remarkably earnest, but too legal, life of the great English Moralist were lighted up with a peace that he had never been able to attain in the days of his health, by the evangelism of a humble curate?

Such facts and phenomena as these, evince that it is difficult for man to know sin as guilt, and thoroughly to apprehend Christ as a Priest and a Sacrifice. But one of the best correctives of this tendency to underestimate both guilt and expiation, is found in the clear perception that the two are *necessarily* related to each other, and that consequently the death of the Redeemer has nothing arbitrary in it. When one is convinced that Christ "*must needs* have suffered," he is relieved from the doubts respecting the meaning and efficacy of the atonement, and surrenders his conscience directly to its pacifying influence and power. He that *doubteth* is damned, in this respect also. The least shaking of belief that this great gospel provision is absolutely necessary, if sinners are to be saved; the faintest querying whether it

may not, in the nature of things, have been a superfluity ; so far as it tends at all, tends to dull the edge of man's contrition, and destroy the keenness of his sense of the Divine pity.

It has often been remarked, that the Passion of the Redeemer performs two functions. It not merely removes the sense of guilt, but it also elicits it. The experience of the Moravian missionaries is frequently cited to prove that a contemplation of the sufferings and death of Christ sometimes accomplishes what the naked exhibition of the law fails to accomplish, in bringing men to a sense of their sinfulness. The stern commandment had been applied to the hardened conscience of the savage, and iron met iron. The pity of a dying, atoning High Priest was shown, and the rock gushed out water. And such, undoubtedly, is often the case in the history of conversions. But shall we not find in this instance, also, that the force and energy of the impression made, results from a perception, more or less clear, that this death of the Substitute was *inexorably necessary*, in order to the criminal's release ? The operations of the human mind are wonderfully swift, and difficult to follow or trace. Though the Esquimaux passed through no long process of reasoning, he *felt* in his conscience the unavoidableness of that mysterious Passion of that mysterious Person, in case his own wicked soul was to be spared the just inflictions of the future. By a very rapid but perfectly legitimate conclusion, he inferred the magnitude of his guilt from the greatness and necessity of the expiation. For suppose the lurking query, to which we have alluded, had sprung up in his mind just at this moment, and instead of the felt necessity of an atoning sacrifice, the faint querying had arisen whether his sin were not venial without the satisfaction of justice, would he have *instantaneously* melted down in contrition ? So long as men are possessed with the feeling that the New-Testament method of salvation is an arbitrary one, containing elements and provisions that might have been different, or that are superfluous, they will receive little or no moral impression from it. But when they see plainly, that in all its parts and particles it refers directly to what is ethical in

both themselves and the Eternal Judge, and is necessitated by the best portion of their own constitution, and by the perfect nature of the Godhead, they will then draw a very quick and accurate inference with respect to the intrinsic nature of that transgression which has introduced such a dire and stark necessity. When a man realizes that the great and eternal God cannot pardon his individual sins except through a passion that wrings great drops of blood from every pore of incarnate Deity, he realizes what is involved in the transgression of moral law.

2. A second obvious inference from the doctrine, that the sacrifice of Christ is a satisfaction for both the Divine and the human nature, is, that such an atonement is thorough and complete. It leaves nothing unsatisfied or dissatisfied, either in God's holy nature or in man's moral sense. The work is ample and reliable.

This is a feature of the utmost value and importance in a scheme of Redemption. For no method will be put to a more fiery trial, ultimately, than the gospel method of salvation. It undergoes some severe tests here in time. The dying-bed draped with the recollection of past sins and transgressions, the pangs of remorse shooting through the conscience, and the fears for the future undulating through the whole being,—all this solemn experience before the soul shoots the gulf between time and eternity, calls for a most "*sovereign* remedy." And we may be certain that the disclosures and revelations that are to be made in the other world, and particularly upon the day of judgment, will subject the atoning work of the Redeemer to tests and trials such as no other work, and especially no "dead work" of a moralist, can endure for an instant. The energy of justice, and the energy of conscience, and the power of memory, and the searchings of God the Holy Ghost, will at that bar reach their height and combination; and any provision that shall legitimately countervail that energy, and enable the human soul to stand tranquil under such revelations, and beneath such claims, will be infinite and omnipotent indeed. But the believer need never fear lest the work of the Eternal

Word, who was made flesh, the co-equal Son of the Eternal Father, prove inadequate under even such crucial tests. He need only fear lest his feeble, wavering faith grasp it too insecurely. If he does but set his feet upon it, he will find it the Rock of Ages. All judicial claims are cancelled, because the oblation to justice is an infinite one. "There is *no* condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus."¹

For we have seen that the very mercy of God, in the last analysis, consists in the entire satisfaction of God's justice by God himself, for the helpless criminal. What method of Redemption can be conceived of, more perfectly sure and trustworthy than this? "What compassion," says Anselm, "can equal the words of God the Father addressed to the sinner condemned to eternal punishment, and having no means of redeeming himself: 'Take my only-begotten Son, and make him an offering for thyself;' or the words of the Son: 'Take me and ransom thy soul?' For this is what both say, when they invite and draw us to faith in the gospel. And can anything be more just than for God to remit all debt, when in this way he receives a satisfaction greater than all the debt, provided only it be offered with the right feeling?"² "The pardon of sin," says an old English divine, "is not merely an act of mercy, but also an act of justice in God."

¹ Michael Angelo, that loftiest and most religious of artists, gives expression, in the following sonnet, to this natural shrinking of the soul in view of the fiery judicial trial that awaits it, and also to the cheerful reassurance induced by the recollection of Christ's Passion.

"Despite thy promises, O Lord, t' would seem
Too much to hope that even love like Thine
Can overlook my countless wanderings :
And yet Thy *blood* helps us to comprehend
That if Thy pangs for us were measureless,
No less beyond all measure is thy grace."

Harford's Life of Angelo, II. 166.

How immensely deeper is the intuition of divine things, how immensely clearer is the insight into the nature and mutual relations of God and man, which is indicated by such a sonnet from the soul of him who poised the dome of St. Peter's, and crowded the frescoes of the Sistine chapel with grandeur and beauty, than that of the modern brood of *dilettanti*, as expressed in much of the current literature, and the current art.

² *Cur Deus homo?* II. 20.

By this he means that mercy and justice are concurrent in the gospel method of Redemption: mercy satisfies justice, and justice acknowledges the satisfaction. "What abundant cause of comfort," he adds, "may this be to all believers, that God's justice as well as his mercy shall acquit them! that that attribute of God, at the apprehension of which they are wont to tremble, should interpose on their behalf, and plead for them! And yet through the all-sufficient expiation and atonement that Christ hath made for our sins, this mystery is effected, and justice itself brought over, from being a formidable adversary, to be our party, and to plead for us. Therefore the apostle tells us that God is faithful and *just* to forgive us our sins."¹

Consonant with this is the well-known language of the elder Edwards: "It is," he says, "so ordered now, that the glory of the attribute of Divine justice requires the salvation of those that believe. The justice of God that [irrespective of the atonement] required man's damnation, and seemed inconsistent with his salvation, now [having respect to the atonement] as much requires the salvation of those that believe in Christ [and thereby appropriate the atonement], as ever before it required their damnation. Salvation is an absolute debt to the believer from God, so that he may in justice demand it on the ground of what his Surety has done."² Do these last words sound rash? But scrutinize them. "Salvation is an absolute debt to the believer *on the ground of what his Surety has done;*" not on the ground,

¹ Bp. Ezekiel Hopkins's *Exposition of the Lord's Prayer*. Works, I. 124.

² Works, IV. 150. New York Ed. For the soteriology of this eminent writer, see his discourses on "Justification by Faith alone," "The wisdom of God displayed in the way of salvation," and "Satisfaction for sin." Among his positions are the following: Justification frees from all obligation to eternal punishment (IV. 78, 104, 150). Christ's suffering is equivalent to the eternal suffering of a finite creature (IV. 101, 551). Christ experienced the wrath of God (IV. 182, 195). God's wrath is appeased by the atonement (IV. 142). God cannot accept an atonement that falls short of the full claims of justice (IV. 94). The voluntary substitute is, in this capacity, under obligation to suffer the punishment due to the sinner (IV. 96, 137). Justice does not abate any of its claims in the plan of redemption (IV. 140, 552). Christ satisfied "revenging," or distributive, justice (IV. 150, 189).

therefore, of anything that the believer has done. It is merely saying, that the soul which feels its own desert of damnation, may plead the merit of Christ with entire confidence that it cancels *all* legal claims, and that there is nothing outstanding and uncovered by that Divine atonement upon which it relies for justification. It is simply asserting that God incarnate, the redeeming Deity, can demand, upon principles of justice, the release of a soul that trusts solely in his atoning death; because by that death he has *completely*, and not partially, satisfied eternal justice for it, and in its stead.¹ They are the bold words of a very cautious

¹ It is needless to remark, that Edwards does not concede that the mere atonement itself gives any and every man a *claim upon God for the benefits of the atonement*, — as is sometimes argued by the advocates of universal salvation. God is under no obligation to make an atonement for the sin of the world; and after he has made one, he is at perfect liberty to *apply* it to whom he pleases, or not to apply it at all. The atonement is *his*, and not man's, and he may do what he will with his own. Hence, according to Edwards, two distinct acts of sovereignty on the part of God are necessary in order to a soul's salvation. The providing of an atonement in the first place, is a sovereign act; and then the application, or giving over, of the atonement, when provided, to any particular sinner, is a second act of sovereignty. And the second of these sovereign acts is as necessary as the first, in order to salvation. But when *both* of these acts of sovereignty *have taken place*, — when the atonement has been made, and has actually been given over to and accepted by an individual, — *then*, says Edwards, it is a matter of strict justice that the penal claims of the law be not exacted from the believer, because this would be to exact them twice; once from Christ, and once from one to whom, by the supposition, Christ's satisfaction has actually been made over by a sovereign act of God. For God to do this, would be to pour contempt upon his own atonement. It would be a confession that his own provision is *insufficient* to satisfy the claims of law, and needs to be supplemented by an additional infiction upon the believer. It would be an acknowledgment that the atonement, when it comes to be actually tested in an individual instance, fails to satisfy the claims of justice, and therefore is an entire failure. The sum of money which was given to the poor debtor, with the expectation that it was large enough completely to liquidate his debt, is found to fall short, and leaves him still in the debtor's prison, from which he cannot come out "until he has paid the uttermost farthing."

That this is a correct representation of the views of Edwards is evident from the following answer which he gives to the question: What does God's sovereignty in the salvation of man imply? — "God's sovereignty in the salvation of men implies that God can either bestow salvation on any of the children of men, or refuse it, without any prejudice to the glory of any of his attributes, *except where he has been pleased to declare that he will or will not bestow it*. It cannot be said absolutely, as the case now stands, that God can, without any preju-

and accurate thinker; but are they any bolder than that challenging jubilant shout of St. Paul: "Who is he that condemneth? It is CHRIST that died." As if, flinging his voice out into all worlds, and all universes, he asked: "What claims are those which the blood of the Eternal Son of God has not been able to satisfy? Is the atonement of the great God Himself not equal to the demands of his law? Is the Deity feebler upon the side of his expiation, than upon the side of his retribution?"

It is a false humility, and not unmingled with a legal spirit, that would prevent the believer from joining in these bold and confident statements respecting the amplitude and completeness of the work of his atoning Lord and God. He need be under no concern lest he underestimate the attribute of justice, if he make this hearty and salient evangelical feeling his own. He disparages no attribute of God, when he magnifies and makes his boast in the atonement of God. Christ was equal to all he undertook; and he undertook to satisfy the claims of the Divine law for the sin of the world, down to the *least jot and tittle*; to pay the immense debt to the *uttermost farthing*. "Think not," he says, "that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets. I am not come to destroy, but to *fulfil*. For verily I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law till *all* be fulfilled." And the incarnate Deity did what he undertook. He had a view of the extent and spirituality of law, and of the demerit of sin, such as no finite mind is capable of entertaining, and he

dice to the honor of *any* of his attributes, bestow salvation on *any* of the children of men, or refuse it, because concerning some, God has been pleased to declare either that he will or that he will not bestow salvation on them; and thus to *bind himself* by his own promise. And concerning some he has been pleased to declare that he never will bestow salvation upon them; viz. those who have committed the sin against the Holy Ghost. Hence, as the case *now* stands, he is obliged; he cannot bestow salvation in one case, or refuse it in the other, without prejudice to the honor of his *truth*. But God exercised his sovereignty in *making these declarations*. God was not obliged to promise that he would save all who believe in Christ; nor was he obliged to declare that he who committed the sin against the Holy Ghost should never be forgiven. But it *pleased him so to declare*." — *Edwards's Works*, IV. 530. N. Y. edition.

knew whereof he affirmed when, at the close of his life of sorrow and his death of passion and agony, he bowed his head and gave up the ghost, with the words significant beyond all conception: "*It is finished*, — the oblation is complete." Jesus Christ, the God-Man, in the garden of Gethsemane, and on the middle cross of Calvary, had a conception of the rigor of justice and the exaction of law, such as no human or angelic mind can ever have in equal degree; and the believer may be certain that when He invites him to rest his complete justification, and the entire satisfaction of all judicial claims, before that law, upon what He has wrought in reference to it, he is not invited to a procedure that will be a disparagement, or dishonor, either to law or to justice.

Man is not straitened in the atoning work of incarnate Deity. He is straitened in his own blind and unbelieving soul. He only needs to take a profound view of justice, a profound view of sin, and a profound view of God's atonement for it, to come out into a region of peace, liberty, and joy unspeakable. Feeble views upon any one of these subjects debilitate his Christianity. He should distinctly see how sacred is the nature of justice, and how indefeasible are its claims. He should distinctly feel the full impression and energy of this attribute. Then he should as distinctly see how complete and perfect is the liquidation of these holy claims, by the death of the incarnate Son of God, — that august Personage denominated by the prophet as "the Wonderful, the Counsellor, the Mighty God, the Everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace."

That very interesting mystic of the Middle Ages, Henry Von Suso, enlarging in his poetic manner upon the compassion of God towards a sinful world, tells us that the "blood of Christ is full of love and red as a rose."¹ This roseate conception of the atonement is not the one that will meet the necessities of man's conscience, in the solemn hour of his mental anguish and his moral fear. There is love unutter-

¹ "Minnerrichen, rosenfarbenen Blute."

able in that blood, but it was wrung from a heart to which all merely *sentimental* affection was as alien as it is to the vengeance of eternal fire. He only can appreciate and understand that love of principle, that love of self-immolation, who sympathizes thoroughly with that regard for the holiness and justice of God, united with compassion for lost souls, that led the Redeemer to undertake the full expiation of human guilt.

Whoever is granted this clear crystalline vision of the atonement, will die in peace, and pass through all the unknown transport and terror of the day of doom with serenity and joy. It ought to be the toil and study of the believer to render his conceptions of the work of Christ more vivid, simple, and vital. For whatever may be the extent of his religious knowledge in other directions; whatever may be the worth of his religious experience in other phases; there is no knowledge and no experience that will stand him in such stead, in those moments that try the soul, as the experience of the pure sense of guilt quenched by the pure blood of Christ.

ARTICLE III.

BRECKINRIDGE'S THEOLOGY.¹

THE portion of this work now before the public consists of two octavo volumes, of 524 and 697 pages respectively ;

¹ 1. *The Knowledge of God, Objectively considered.* Being the First Part of Theology considered as a Science of Positive Truth, both Inductive and Deductive. By Robert J. Breckinridge, D. D., LL. D., Professor of Theology in the Seminary at Dansville (Danville?), Ky. *Non, sine luce.* New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1858.

2. *The Knowledge of God, Subjectively considered.* Being the Second Part of Theology considered as a Science of Positive Truth, both Inductive and Deductive, etc., etc.

to which, we are told, a third may be added. The author has long been a leading presbyter in his denomination, and, somewhat more than twenty years ago, bore a prominent part in the schism which rent the Presbyterian church in twain. Dr. Breckinridge commenced his public career as a lawyer; and was at one time honored, we have been informed, with a military title. He certainly brought into the church something of the atmosphere of the forum and the camp; and it was owing, in no small measure, to the remarkable *tone* which he gave to the controversy, that the rupture just referred to, was successfully driven through. For the past six years, he has occupied the chair of theology in a western Seminary; and in these volumes presents himself before the world as a candidate for the honors of a theological teacher.

Dr. Breckinridge opens his book with stating, that he had "thought it would have been of great advantage to mankind, if it had happened that each century of the past had left to us in a distinct form, its systematic view of divine truth, according to the general attainments of that age, and the general faith of the earnest Christians thereof." But this has not been done; and "what we have really received from the past," "appears to me [the author] to leave theology as a pure science of positive truth, in the disordered condition of many inferior sciences, and more really than they, needing to be restated in a form as far as possible general, but at the same time simple, natural, and complete." Thinking that the spirit of Orthodox Christianity, at the present day, "is not unsuitable to such an attempt," and that "the type of Christian life" in the Old School Presbyterian church "affords some advantages towards its execution," Dr. Breckinridge is further encouraged in his undertaking by the belief, that "such an endeavor *springing from the midst of that immense reaction toward the divine life in man, which signalized that church in this age,*¹ retrieving its destiny and modifying the Christianity of our times, might not be without its

¹ It is due to the author, to say, that the italics in the quotations from his work are generally, if not always, our own.

use — if it could survive ;” and he supposes, to quote his own words again, “there are special reasons why, holding the views I do, occupying the position I hold, and led by Providence as I have been, my brethren who have exacted this service at my hands might be excused,” etc.

It will be acknowledged that the aim of our author is high ; and that the task which he proposed to himself was one that men of very considerable theological erudition and ability might have been reluctant publicly to undertake. Many would have preferred, that the deed should have been its own herald ; and that the “age” should have discovered, for itself, that its “systematic view of divine truth,” in “distinct form,” had been embodied in a volume, and “left” to the ages that come after. But it was, at least, a high ambition, to fuse in one bright and perfect combination the ripest and last products of Christian Theology, up to A. D. 1858, and plant it a landmark and memorial to, all time. His readers will, perhaps, be willing to allow, that the type of Christian life in the author’s denomination — inasmuch as it is substantially the same that prevails in other kindred households of the Lord — affords “some advantages” toward the execution of such a plan. When, however, he proceeds to claim, as we understand him to do, that there may possibly be some *peculiar* advantage, in the springing of this endeavor from the bosom of the *Presbyterian exscinding movement* of 1837, — in which the author was so prominent, and which he now views as “immense,” — and that there are special reasons why *he*, of all men, with his “history,” should be the man to make it, a large class, at least, of his readers, will have to be pardoned, if unable altogether to repress a sense of amusement.

That a grand work on Scientific Theology, bringing it up square with the last results of more than eighteen centuries of Christian life and study, was to be *expected* to spring, with peculiar advantages, from a movement so purely in the interest of a single denomination, so narrow in its theories and in its sympathies, so violent and so unscrupulous ; and that the man in whom these traits found their natural

and strongest expression should, for these reasons be thought, even by himself, the one elect person, whose call it was, thus to gather the light of the centuries into his bosom, and pass it on colorless to the future—to organize in one pure, consistent statement the “disordered” thought of orthodox Christendom, and do for the nineteenth century what few or none of the centuries of the past had been so fortunate as to have done for them; that this man should not only entertain, in private, such an idea of this “reaction,” and of himself, but should suggest it to the world, as a modest excuse for the grandeur of his plan—all this together constitutes, in our apprehension, an example of hallucination that has few parallels of the kind.

Dr. Breckinridge's first volume treats of the “knowledge of God, objectively considered;” embracing not merely a discussion of the Divine being and attributes—as might be inferred from the phraseology of the title—but also treating, in full, of man, and of the Mediator, a “God-man,” presenting, in short, “the whole sum and result of Exegetic and Didactic Theology,” “as pure systematic truth unto salvation.” The two volumes, we are informed, each takes in the whole system—the first stating it in scientific method, as truth; the second, in scientific method, as truth, “actually saving man.” The former method, Dr. B. calls objective; the latter, subjective. A third volume is to treat of The knowledge of God *relatively* considered, giving the “confutation of all untruth, militating against the salvation of man; by which somewhat comprehensive phrase we are to understand, in brief, “Polemic Theology.” Some of the merits of this new system, which our author explains and defends at considerable length, can hardly fail to become apparent in the course of our investigation. We are advertised that ornaments of style are discarded, and that the “writer is not aware that a single sentence foreign to the absolute purpose of the treatise has been allowed a place in this volume.” The student of its pages must therefore be satisfied with a method strictly scientific and exact—the pure truth as *truth*.

The volume before us deserves brief notice; and that which we give would be much briefer than it is, but for the fear that the truth would hardly be credited, or indeed comprehended, without some illustrations in detail.

The Table of Contents gives us the first insight into the peculiar excellences of the new system adopted by this Master. His first book treats of *man*; the second, of the Mediator or *God-man*; the third, of God; the fourth, of the *sources of knowledge*; and the fifth gives the *sum and result*. It will be apparent, at a glance, that this order has characteristics of originality. The reader, probably, if venturing upon the preparation of a treatise upon The knowledge of God, scientifically considered, would *commence* with an investigation of the "sources of this knowledge." He might next unfold what he had obtained from these sources; and would tell us all that he knew concerning *God*. It would not be strange, if he were next to set forth God's *work* in the creation, and what followed; and so we should come to *man* and his fall, and be taught concerning the relation in which he once stood, and the other relation in which he now stands toward God, whose being and character had been before explained. Thus he would be led, thirdly, to show us God and man united, in the person of the *God-man*, together with the work of this Mediator and the redemption of the race. He might naturally end with the "sum and results." We must confess to a degree of prejudice, in favor of some such system as this; but our author has managed differently. He begins his treatise upon "God" with a book upon "man;" and examines into his "sources of knowledge" after he has got through with the whole — giving, however, his "results" in conclusion, as well as, let it be said, elsewhere throughout all the work. We are constrained to believe, that the position of his last chapter does not agree with the law of arrangement followed in the other four; and we venture to suggest that if, in future editions, he would make a slight change, his system would gain in self-consistency. We recommend the following order, viz.: Book First, The Sum and Result; Book Second, Man; Book Third, Man and

God; Book Fourth, God; Book Fifth, the Sources of Knowledge. We fancy there is a beauty in this arrangement which is somewhat marred in the one adopted. And yet it must be conceded that if in this, the inversion of the natural order is the more complete, in the author's own, for this very reason, the confusion is the more perfect. So that on the whole, it is not possible for us to decide. We submit the matter.

But Dr. Breckinridge is equally and similarly original in the *details* of his plan. Take, for example, the chapters of his "First Book." The title of this book would indicate that it treated exclusively of "man;" and as the Divine Being has not yet been so much as named, — since this is the *first* book, — the reader naturally expects, here, only such an unfolding of man's character and state, as does not necessarily presuppose the knowledge of God; and that this portion of a work so strictly scientific, will adhere closely to the one theme. What is his surprise at finding, not only the knowledge of God, but also of the scriptures, taken for granted — the first three chapters setting forth the whole relation of sinful man to his Maker, the "covenant of works," the Mediator, and the redemption; the fourth chapter treating of the Divine interposition for his salvation; the fifth, instituting an *a priori* argument concerning "the *being of God*, and the manner thereof;" and the sixth turning back to treat of man and his immortality. Thus we have the whole position of man in reference to God, including the scheme of redemption, unfolded, before anything has been told us of God; after that, we hear of God's interposition in redemption; finally, we hear of God himself, and his being is proved, in the most elaborate argument, upon the theme, that the whole work contains; and then, last of all, we are taught that man is not a clod, but is immortal.

Here, again, it will be observed, the inversion is left incomplete; so that the principle of *order* in this book is the same with that which we have seen to govern the world as a whole. Our author's aim, in the invention of this new scientific method, would seem to have been, to make his sys-

tem omnipresent, so as to have it "all, everywhere." In this, he has succeeded as well as could be expected, in view of that law of all finite existence, which forbids any two superficial objects to occupy the same space at the same time.

The Third Book, which treats of "God," further exemplifies the same rare faculty for the analysis and organization of thought. The Divine attributes are here classified into, first, the Primary attributes; second, the Essential; third, the Natural; fourth, the Moral; fifth, the Consummate. The *primary* attributes are stated, in the "argument," to be "Infinity, Eternity, Immutability, Self-existence." The *essential* attributes are "Infinite Understanding, Infinite Will, Infinite Power." The *natural* attributes "have direct relevancy to the distinction between the True and the False. He names them (p. 285 seq.), "Wisdom" and "Knowledge." The *moral* attributes "have direct relevancy to the distinction between good and evil." They are enumerated (p. 291) as Infinite Rectitude or Holiness, Justice, Goodness, Grace, Love, Mercy, and Long-suffering. The *consummate* attributes "are such as transcend the conception upon which each previous class rests, and embrace the perfection of many Infinite Perfections." They are (p. 310) Life, Majesty, Omnipresence, All-sufficiency, Oneness, and Blessedness.

According to this system of classification, which the reader will find elaborated and discussed in the seventeenth chapter, the primary attributes of God are not essential; nor the essential, primary; while neither the natural nor the moral attributes are either essential or primary; infinite understanding has no "direct reference to the distinction between the true and the false;" infinite power is not primary; eternity is not essential; life and omnipresence are neither primary, essential, or natural. And *this* is the system of an author who esteems himself called of Providence to heal the "disordered condition" of theology as "a positive science," and to put into "distinct" form, for the benefit of coming generations, "the whole knowledge of God unto salvation," "according to the attainments" of this nineteenth century, so that "all confusion should be escaped, that all dislocation

of truth should be avoided, that clear statements should become convincing proofs!"

But the confusion which we have seen to characterize this work as a whole, and some of its main divisions and classifications, is not confined to them. It is found everywhere—in books, chapters, paragraphs, phrases, words, and even in the punctuation, which is uniformly inelegant and inaccurate, and not seldom misrepresents the author's obvious meaning. Dr. Breckinridge thinks (p. 87) that the proper point for discussing "the whole question of Scripture Evidences," is where, having finished the book upon "man," and shown his lost estate in Adam, and the plan of salvation through a divine Mediator, he has also just concluded his narrative of the life of Christ, of the outpouring of the Spirit on the day of Pentecost, with remarks upon the office and ministry of the apostles and Christ's second coming. He forbears to introduce the topic there, lest he "break the continuity" of the subject upon which he has entered. Before this, however (p. 38), he had come upon the question of a Divine Revelation—generally supposed to have something to do with "Scripture Evidences"—when, in his book upon "man," he was treating of "God's interposition." At that time, he deliberately adjourned the whole matter over to Polemic Theology, where, we suppose, it may eventually turn up; since, in the present work—whose "main object is," merely "to present, in a perfectly distinct and connected manner, and to demonstrate as positively certain, the *sum and system* of divine knowledge unto salvation"—we do not find it. In this chapter on the Divine interposition, is also introduced a statement of the mode of the Divine being, and an enumeration of the attributes upon the scheme first given.

The author carries the same traits into his *definitions*. The reader will be interested in noting the points in that which he gives of "the true and the false," on the 6th page.

There is doubtless," says Dr. B., "an eternal and inflexible distinction in *things*, which we express by saying some of them are true and some of them are false." Of this, however, he is not sure; for, in the next sentence, he adds:

"At any rate, such a distinction, let it be founded as it may, exists for us." "It is upon the *steadfastness* of this distinction that all the *certainly* of our knowledge depends; as it is upon our *capacity to perceive* the distinction itself wherever it exists, that our *ability to increase* in knowledge rests." Possibly, the above statements will be clearer if reduced to distinct propositions, thus :

- a. There is an ineffaceable distinction in *things* ; so that,
- b. Some of the "things" are true, and some are false.
- c. This distinction is steadfast; and therefore,
- d. Our knowledge is certain.
- e. We can perceive this distinction; and, therefore,
- f. Our knowledge can increase.

From all which, it follows, that without a capacity for perceiving the distinction between things true and false, we might still possess a *certain amount* of knowledge, only this could not be increased.

We cannot avoid inviting attention to "another distinction" which, to adopt our author's statement, is so important, that without it, "the very ideas of duty, of virtue, and of *happiness*, become incomprehensible; nor is it possible to conceive how we could exist afterwards, except as idiots or as demons." "We express this distinction," says Dr. B., "by saying, that in the nature of things some of them are good and some of them are bad; and we express the feeling in us corresponding to them respectively, by saying we *approve* the good and condemn the bad."

From this statement we learn, 1st, that there is a fundamental distinction upon which the ideas of duty, virtue, and *happiness* rest; which distinction, 2dly, is expressed in the words "good" and "bad;" and our feeling of it, 3dly, by saying we "approve" the one, and "condemn" the other; and 4thly, if we had not this sense of this distinction, we could exist "only" as idiots or demons;" who therefore, by necessity, are not possessed of the sense in question. This sense of "good" and "bad," our author informs us, is the foundation of "the fitness of all our relations to God;" and among these relations we suppose him to include that of

moral obligation. Whatsoever being, therefore, approves anything that seems to him to be in its nature good, or disapproves anything that seems to him in its nature bad, *is not* an idiot or demon; but *is*, in contradistinction, a being capable of "duty, virtue, and happiness." No idiots "approve" of pleasant fruits; no demons "condemn" penal fires. — In view of the progress made in such definitions, is it too much to hope that the day may come when, in books of theology at least, *oysters* — by virtue of some gentle "approval" that they feel, as the tide returns over them loaded with soft consolations — may yet become good Christians — without being eaten?

We had noted other passages; but these may suffice. It is hardly possible to open the book without meeting with illustrations of its fatal inaccuracy and confusion. Other examples will occur in our presentation of a matter which is even more serious than this. We come now to Dr. Breckinridge's *indebtedness to Stapper* for materials which he has not duly acknowledged.

The "Few Preliminary Words," with which Dr. Breckinridge prefaces his volume, are turgid with the consciousness of a grand theme and a vast achievement. Yet the author stoops to concede, in general phrase, the "immense advantages" that he has derived from the labors of others. "The fruits of such attainments" as he has painfully made, "will manifest themselves to the learned." He disclaims any "proper originality touching the subject matter," and *acknowledges*, that "the details which have been wrought out by learned, godly, and able men in all ages, of many creeds, and in many tongues, have been freely wrought into the staple of this work, when they suited the place and the purpose, and turned precisely to the [my] thought." He claims originality only in "the conception, the *method*, the digestion, the presentation, the order, the spirit, the impression of the whole."

The above is the most definite and particular acknowledgment of obligation which we have been able to discover in the work. It is no more than *would have been understood*

if it had not been expressed; since no writer on theology, at the present day, presumes to create the science anew, either in its system or its details. The church has not studied so long in vain. But this acknowledgment by no means implies, much less does it say, that Dr. Breckinridge has taken complete paragraphs, whole pages, and the substance of entire sections, from another author! — which we now proceed to prove; premising, however, that while we find scanty indication of the “all ages,” “many creeds,” and “many tongues,” from which the erudite doctor claims to have drawn, we do find traces that his attainments from a single work in the Latin tongue were “painfully made,” as will be “manifest to the learned,”—and to those of little learning, also—upon brief inspection. We freely concede, that Dr. Breckinridge has acknowledged a broader indebtedness than he seems to owe; the misfortune is, that his acknowledgment is not so particular as it should have been; and that the jewels which he borrowed, he has often so bruised in his mis-setting, as greatly to diminish their beauty and their value. Stapfer was a nice workman; and it was not safe, to assail the compact and strong-built order of his delicately-finished and dovetailed sentences with the hammer and tongs of a crude logic; and to reset the shining fragments in its raw paste. The reader will see, before we finish with Dr. Breckinridge, that he has worked a rich mine with poor results. The facts are as follows:

The eighteenth and nineteenth chapters of Dr. Breckinridge's work are mainly taken from the “*Institutiones Theologicæ Polemicæ* of Joh. Fred. Stapfer,” Vol. I.; and are substantially identical with CHAP. iii. SEC. 1 (the first part), SEC. 2, SEC. 3, and SEC. 4. We have also noticed a number of passages in the twenty-first chapter of the former work, making about two pages and a half, which ought to have been credited to the latter. But, to be more particular: in the eighteenth chapter of Dr. B.'s work, paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and the first part of 4, in SEC. i., find their equivalent in Stapf., PROP. 271—277; in SEC. ii., paragraph 1, commencing with the words “and the highest idea,” 2, and 3; in SEC. iii., para-

graphs 1—6 inclusive, are distinctly from Stapf., PROP. 297—320. In the nineteenth chapter of Dr. B.'s work, SEC. i., paragraphs 1—9 inclusive are from Stapf., PROP. 321—370; SEC. ii., paragraphs 2, 3 (the substance of it), 4, 5, 6, are from Stapf., PROP. 371—420. That is to say, these two chapters embrace the first part of Stapf's SEC. i., and his SEC. ii., iii., and iv., *consecutively*, including nearly their whole substance, much of it appropriated in the form of a direct and moderately accurate translation; while other parts are a loose, but evident, paraphrase; and others still, we are unable more appropriately to describe, than as a *reductio ad absurdum*, the materials of this reduction, which is mechanical and not chemical, being derived from the same mine. The larger portion is an inaccurate translation, wherein the admirable method and clearness of Stapf are almost wholly lost, and his niceties of logical phrase are "painfully" translated. Some passages in our author's twenty-fifth chapter, pp. 347 and 348, will hereafter be noticed.

But justice, alike to Dr. Breckinridge and to ourselves, demands that some examples be given in proof of the foregoing assertions. We take, therefore, the opening paragraphs of his eighteenth chapter, and present them, side by side, with the corresponding paragraphs in Stapf. They afford, in our opinion, a favorable illustration of the merits of his translation.

BRECKINRIDGE, CHAP. XVIII.

STAPF, SEC. I.

I. — 1. The simplest idea we can form of God is, that he is a self-existent Being, distinct from us and from the universe, who contains in himself a sufficient ground and reason for the existence of ourselves and the universe. Stated in other words: that God is a Being absolutely necessary and independent, in whom and upon whom all things are contingent and dependent.

PROP. 271. Per Deum intelligimus ens a se, a mente nostra et hoc universo diversum, in quo continetur ratio sufficiens existentiae hujus mundi et animarum nostrarum, sive quod est absolute necessarium et independens, a quo autem omnia reliqua dependent.

PROP. 272. Priusquam existentiam

2. As it is impossible for anything to be, and not to be ; it follows that a sufficient reason exists, and can be given, why any particular thing is, rather than is not ; and why it is in a particular mode, rather than some other. This sufficient reason being discovered and stated, nothing more can be required concerning the fact or mode of the existence of that thing.

ejus demonstramus, principia quaedam generalia sunt premittenda.

PROP. 273. Impossibile est idem simul esse et non esse. Quod Principium indemonstrabile est.

PROP. 274. Omnium rerum datur ratio sufficiens ; unde cognoscitur, cur aliquid potius sit, quam non sit ; cur sit, hoc quam alio modo, et quæ posita nihil amplius ad rei existentiam explicandam requiritur.

The third paragraph, and the first part of the fourth, are translated, in similar style, from Stapfer's PROP. 275, 276, and 277. Stapfer (and of course Breckinridge) proceeds to affirm that the theory of an "infinite series" does not furnish the "ratio sufficiens" sought for ; and, therefore, that whosoever wishes to assign such a reason, and demonstrate the Divine existence, must prove the existence of an "Ens a se et absolute necessarium" upon which the universe depends. Having thus laid down the "general principles" spoken of in PROP. 272, Stapfer proceeds with the steps of his proof, which advance, in regular mathematical succession, to the conclusion — the whole argument standing in beautiful unity with the introduction ; the substance of which has just been given. Dr. Breckinridge *omits this argument*, after using the introduction to it, and substitutes *four* of his own, neither one of which needs the introduction which he has copied, or stands in any obvious relation with it, save that of local contiguity. The first of these is as follows : He who denies the existence of God affirms one or all of the three following propositions : 1. There is no *essence* whatever. 2. There is no *self-existent essence*. 3. There is "no *life* in which it might be." None of the terms here used have been distinctly defined by our author ; and we are left to our own conjectures concerning his meaning. It seems likely that by "self-existent essence" he means an eternal and spiritual, as distinguished from a merely material entity. But what does he understand by "life" — "life *in* which" the essence may inhere ?

It is generally supposed that life is a quality, or state, belonging to essence, rather than a substance of which the latter is an attribute. Then again, do not both the atheist and the pantheist hold to an essence, that this essence has life, that it is eternal, and, *in a certain sense*, spiritual and self-existent, viz. in the sense that it is not crudely material, nor dependent upon anything else for its being or its action? Further, what is the obvious connection between this argument (?) and the Introduction abstracted from Stapfer?

The second argument is this: That which we conceive of as having life of itself, must exist, if existence is possible. But this is the conception of God. Therefore, God must exist, unless existence is impossible.

Dr. B. has not told us what he means by "having life of itself." Will an eternal physical essence, sole, and therefore independent of all other essences, thus "having its life" in and of itself alone, answer his conception? If so, he has only proved, at the very best, the truth of pantheism.

But *why* must something that has life in itself, really exist, when we "conceive" of it? What has our empty conception to do with *reality*? Will it hold, as a general proposition, that whatever we conceive, must exist, unless existence is impossible?

The third argument proceeds thus: To say that an attribute is "contained in the conception of a thing," is to say that it is inseparable from that thing. But this is true of *necessary existence*, as an attribute of God. Therefore this *is* an attribute of God; that is, he necessarily exists.

This presupposes either, that the existence of God has before been proved (in order that his necessary existence may follow, as a conclusion), or, that the conception of a thing renders certain its real existence.

The fourth argument proceeds as follows: Ability to exist is an ability. Inability to exist is a debility. "But if all existences are finite, and not one that is infinite does or can exist; it follows, that every finite "has more ability" (i. e. is more powerful) than any infinite existence; which is utterly absurd. Wherefore, there is either no existence; or, there is an infinite existence.

Apply the same kind of argument to other objects, thus : Ability to exist is an ability. Inability to exist is a debility. Yonder fly exists ; therefore is able to exist. All the horses that do not exist, are not able to exist. Therefore, yonder fly has more ability than all non-existent horses ; which is *true*, not absurd. Thus again : All the race of megatheria are unable, etc. Hence a fly is stronger than all the megatheria. True, again ; but as inept as before.

On the next page (269) our author resumes his translation from Stapfer, as follows :

BRECKINRIDGE, CHAP. XVIII.

STAPFER, SEC. II.

II. — 1. The highest idea we can have of him [Jehovah] or of our being, is *that* which we call his nature, his essence. In this essence is the foundation of whatever does or can exist in the being.

2. Now whatever has its sufficient reason solely in the essence, and proceeds from it only, we call an attribute of that being. The fundamental conception of God, therefore, is of his essence, from which everything that appertains to him flows. But the simplest idea of God, as has been shown, is that he hath a being necessary, and of himself. Whence it immediately follows that the essence or nature of his being consists in this, that it is absolutely necessary and self-existent.

PROP. 297. Primum quod de re cognoscitur, et unde ratio reliquorum, quae ei insunt, vel inesse possunt, redditur, dicitur Entis Essentia. Quicquid autem rationem sufficientem in sola essentia habet et ex ejus essentia sequitur, dicitur attributum.

PROP. 298. Primum ergo quod de Deo cognoscitur, et ex quo reliqua sequuntur, quae Deo competunt, est ipsius Essentia.

PROP. 299. Primum autem quod de Deo cognoscitur, juxta demonstrata, est quod sit Ens absolute necessarium, reliqua autem omnia, quae Deo competunt, inde fluere et rationem sufficientem, in hac absoluta existentiae necessitate habere, videbimus in sequentibus ; unde sequitur Essentiam Dei in hoc consistere, quod sit Ens absolute necessarium.

For the benefit of those who may be unfamiliar with Latin, we give Stapfer's argument in English. He reasons as follows : PROP. 297. What is recognized as *fundamental* in any being, and which supplies the sufficient reason of all

else that it includes or involves, is called its *essence*. But whatsoever finds its sufficient reason in the essence only, and is deducible therefrom, is called an *attribute*.

PROP. 298. What is "recognized as fundamental" in *God*, therefore, and from which all else that centres in him is deducible, is *his* "essence."

PROP. 299. But that which "is recognized as fundamental in *God*, as was just shown, is that he is an *absolutely necessary* being; . . . whence it follows that the *essence of God consists in this*, that he is an absolutely necessary being.

Can any statement be more orderly or more beautifully luminous than this? But in Breckinridge, what confusion! The "highest idea," he tells us, that we can have of *God*, "or of our being," is "his nature, his essence." But Stapfer was not treating of the "highest" idea, but of the first, the fundamental, conception; and of the fundamental conception of any *thing*, or object of thought—the conception of *God* belonging in the next proposition (which Dr. B. also translates), and that of "our being" appearing nowhere in this part of the argument. Moreover, what Stapfer affirms is, that this "primum" (not altissimum) is the *essence* of the being contemplated; a word that by no means finds a suitable synonym in "nature," which often includes, according to present usage, both essence and attributes. Stapfer is, in this proposition, *defining* "essence," and *distinguishing* it from attribute. Dr. Breckinridge goes out of his way to mix them up, and adds to the confusion by talking about "our being." The reader having found such confusion in the first proposition of this series, will not be surprised to discover that the series itself is not preserved, in logical integrity. Dr. Breckinridge divides Stapfer's PROP. 297 in the middle, annexing the latter half to PROP. 298 and PROP. 299, fusing the whole into a single paragraph, thereby *confusing* the general order, as well as the particular phrases, of the original statement. The result is, that his second paragraph begins with the proposition, that "whatever has its sufficient reason solely in the essence" is an attribute. "Therefore," proceeds Dr. B., "the fundamental conception of *God* is of

his essence." But how does this follow from the foregoing definition of "attribute?" And what does he mean by "fundamental conception?" This is a new phrase. He had before spoken of "highest idea;" he afterwards speaks of "simplest idea;" and one who is so fortunate as to have the original at hand, will discover, that these three phrases are all translations of the same. What intelligent meaning had Dr. B. in these changes? Stapfer says, What is fundamental in anything is "essence;" what is fundamental in *God*, therefore, is *his* essence. But our author says [—] can the reader tell what he does say? How it was possible for a person of ordinary good sense, *with the Latin before him*, to make such a muddle of so lucid and simple an argument as Stapfer's, passes our comprehension. It must have been an "attainment" "painfully made."

Another illustration of our author's unparalleled acumen appears on the 270th page; where, having demonstrated, out of Stapfer, from the simplicity of the Divine essence, that it is "incorporeal," he next demonstrates, out of Breckinridge, but by precisely the *same argument*, that it is *also* "immaterial." In similar style, he proves (p. 269, bottom) that the Divine existence "is also necessary; which very proposition is the *definition* with which he commenced the chapter, and on which his (or, rather, Stapfer's) whole argument depends.

We have now gone over with somewhat less than the first three pages of the author's eighteenth chapter, without by any means doing justice to their manifold absurdities; but the substance of all this and of the following chapter is taken, consecutively, from Stapfer, with portions of the twenty-first and some paragraphs in the twenty-fifth; how much more, we do not know. It is obvious, therefore, that to do full justice upon Dr. Breckinridge, would require a small volume. The scholar who is curious to pursue the subject further, will find abundant amusement in the pompous blunders and infelicities of statement, with which all this portion of the work is filled. We have room for but a single illustration more. We give the original and the translation.

BRECKINRIDGE, CHAP. XXV. I. 3.

STAPFER, SEC. V.

(BOTTOM OF P. 347.)

If the determination of the will of God is from eternity, his decree is also from eternity. If the will of God is perfectly free and perfectly immutable, so is his decree. If the will of God is not a simple and pure cause, destitute of intelligence and a sufficient reason, neither is his decree. If God can and does will things inscrutable to us, so can he and will he decree them.

PROP. 425. Deus omnia ab æterno voluit (PROP. 374), ideo etiam Deus omnia decrevit ab æterno.

PROP. 427. Voluntas Dei est liberima (PROP. 418): Ergo, etiam Decreta sunt liberrima.

PROP. 428. Voluntas Dei non est casus purus (PROP. 419): Hinc etiam Decretum divinum non est casus purus.

PROP. 429. Voluntas Dei est immutabilis (PROP. 400): Ergo, et Decretum est immutabile.

PROP. 430. Deus aliquid velle potest, cujus rationes nobis sunt incognitæ (PROP. 410), hinc etiam Deus decernere potest, quæ, cur decernat, homo intelligere nequit.

PROP. 431. Imperscrutabile est, cujus rationes nobis non penitus sunt perspectæ; Decreti divini, etc.

It will be observed that Dr. B.'s first sentence is from Stapfer, PROP. 425. (The preceding sentence is from Stapfer, PROP. 422 and PROP. 424.) The next sentence is obviously Stapfer's, PROP. 427 and PROP. 429; and the third, a most remarkable version of PROP. 428; the remainder being from PROP. 430 and PROP. 431.

We commend this passage to the particular attention of scholars as a psychological curiosity. When first meeting with the argument, that "if the will of God is not a simple and pure cause, destitute of intelligence and a sufficient reason, neither is his decree," the reader naturally rubs his eyes to see if his vision be clear, and if he be really awake. The next supposition is, that there must be a typographical error. Failing with this hypothesis, he imagines that, after all, there may possibly be a recondite meaning, which, through an unskilful nicety of expression on the part of the writer, or some unusual slowness of his own perception, had escaped him. But all theories, at last, fail; and the irrepressible

question bursts from his lips : How COULD *the translator make such a mistake* ? Ignorance of the meaning of the word "casus" might, indeed, lead to a mistranslation of that one word ; but how came he to insert the words "destitute of intelligence and a sufficient reason," which do not appear in the paragraph that he was copying, and which so ludicrously confound the sense ? The matter is readily explained. Stapfer lays down the premise : "The will of God is not mere chance ;" and refers, for authority, to a previous paragraph, viz. PROP. 419. Turning to this, we read : *Casus purus est actualitas destituta ratione sufficiente* ; Deus autem agit propter rationem sufficientem (PROP. 371) : Ergo, Actus voluntatis divinae non est casus purus. (" Mere chance, is an actuality that is destitute of a sufficient reason (of its existence). But God acts in view of a good and sufficient reason, as was proved in PROP. 371. Hence, the act of the Divine will is not mere chance.")

It seems therefore that our learned author, *feeling* that the proposition, "the will of God is not a simple and pure cause," was somewhat obscure ; and honestly desirous of handing down to future ages the particular "systematic view of divine truth," now prevalent, "according to the general attainments of the age ;" and finding under his hand an authoritative definition of this dark sentence — inserted it ; and still feeling (for it is impossible to suppose that he saw, here) that the words "destitute of a sufficient reason," left a slight penumbra around the sense, sought to dispel this by adding a synonym of his own, — as the reader will remember he has elsewhere done, — making it read : "destitute of *intelligence and* a sufficient reason." From this it would seem that Dr. B. understood by "ratio sufficiens," sufficient mind, intellect, "intelligence." And yet it seems impossible that, throughout this argument, whenever Stapfer was speaking of the sufficient ground, cause, "reason," of the existence of a thing, Dr. Breckinridge supposed that he was referring to the sufficient *intelligence* of that thing ! And yet, again, if Dr. B. *ever had* a clear and definite comprehension of the meaning of this phrase, how was it possible for him to have

mistaken it, in an instance so clear as this? The only answer that we are able to give to this inquiry, and it is an answer amply borne out by the facts, is, that all through these chapters, Dr. Breckinridge's mind was in an exceedingly confused state; that he often failed of a full and clear comprehension of his author's meaning; and that the present example is illustrative of this fact. But "he must, at least, have supposed that he had a meaning in what he wrote." Doubtless; and the ingenious reader may be able to hit upon more than one theory of explanation; but it is hardly necessary to discuss the matter further here.

The attention of the public was directed to this indebtedness of Dr. Breckinridge, not long after the appearance of his first volume, by a Presbyterian pastor in North Carolina. The audacious spirit in which the statements and proofs of his co-presbyter were then met, and the cold assumption with which the subject is treated in the "Preliminary Remarks" prefixed to the second volume, are calculated to awaken a sense of shame in men of Christian or of scholarly honor. The truth is, that if there is any meaning in the word, Dr. Breckinridge has *plagiarized*; and he might as well assume to deny the sun out of the heavens, as, by denial, to blot out so obvious a fact. There may be explanations which, if known by the public, would strip the fact of much of its present bad meaning. We hope there are. But *the fact* stands. And Dr. Breckinridge can claim no peculiar charity of his brethren while in his present attitude. It were well if a more Christian spirit might come to rule in his counsels.

With the second volume we must be very brief. We are thankful to say that it is neither so poor nor so bad as the first; but yet it has faults enough; as the reader who has followed attentively our account of the first, must see is a necessity of the case.

His introduction gives a sketch of the progress of theological science, arranged so as to show the precise point occupied by the present work. At the end of the *seventh* cen-

tury, Dr. Breckinridge thinks that the doctrine of the church was fully settled ; and the "science of theology ought immediately to have risen and . . . to have pressed steadily and rapidly to its perfect state." Instead of this, we have a "period of eight centuries, during which scholasticism is the most conspicuous manifestation of thought." The schoolmen "added almost nothing to theology," "whether as to its conception, the method of its proper treatment, or its practical development." Then came the Reformation ; and "the scientific treatment of Divine truth followed" this movement more closely than it did the first planting of Christianity. But "that the Reformed theology did not adequately avail itself of its great position, nothing can prove more clearly than that, after three centuries, the first attempt — that of Calvin — retains its supremacy. Augustine, even with his strange conception of the papal church, finds no name to match him — till Calvin. And Calvin's great work, which I had no small share in restoring to general circulation, — though it is arbitrary in its method, and though abstract, practical, and controversial theology, truth objective, subjective, and relative, are mingled confusedly throughout it, — has no rival amidst the hundreds which have followed it." ¹ Our author proceeds to account for this failure of the Reformed theology, from the "imperfect conceptions" which have hitherto prevailed — first, as to what theological science is ; secondly, as to the "method responsive to the true conception" of it ; added to which was "necessarily" a failure of "adequate breadth of spiritual insight into the Divine proportion of that truth, which was itself the very substance of the whole science of theology." The author adds : "Whoever is willing to survey, with candor, the whole field of scientific theology, abstract, practical, and controversial — Latin, Lutheran, and Reformed — since the Reformation was firmly established and its first fruits gathered, will see small cause to be satisfied that the critical, speculative, or philo-

¹ Poor Stapfer ! Not so much as a word of mention ! And Turretin, where is he ? Nobody but Calvin, and "I." Has Dr. Breckinridge made a new translation of the Institutes ? or edited an old translation ? or — has he advised some Church Board to make a reprint ?

sophical methods of the ages which have succeeded that great period, are to be preferred to the arbitrary and artificial method they would supplant, or perhaps even to the best specimens of the scholastic spirit which the Reformation overthrew." "Is there, then," exclaims Dr. Breckinridge, "no natural method, whereby theology . . . may develop itself as a science of positive truth. It is a science; it must have a best method; this, all theologians have hitherto failed to observe; while, on the other hand, what *I* maintain is, that if there be a science, it must have a method responsive to its nature." All this, with wearisome prolixity and feeble, needless proof, is demonstrated and illustrated; and after long labor, we finally arrive at the grand result, to wit: "Truth is capable of being considered systematically and absolutely, simply as truth reduced into a scientific form. Thus understood, but not otherwise, *any* system of truth is afterwards capable of being considered in all the possible effects and influences of that system of truth." Again, this system, "considered in both aspects, is capable of being precisely distinguished from all serious error." This is the canon, not for theology alone, but also for all science. "When so stated and understood," observes Dr. B., "*every* pure science is placed in the *only* position in which its own perfect development is possible."

"It took seven centuries for theologians to settle, in scientific form, the great elements of their science." . . "It took the theologians eight centuries more to obtain the grand position of the Reformers." . . "I have pointed out both the failure and the causes of it, of the scientific progress of the Reformed theology beyond the position won for it in the sixteenth century." This failure, he repeats, is to be attributed to a want of a proper conception of the true method (which the present work follows); and he again reiterates the opinion, near the foot of the page.

It is a matter of some interest, if Dr. Breckinridge have indeed invented a new *organon*, applicable to "any system of truth," whereby both the errors and the short comings of the Fathers may be avoided, that we clearly understand

what it is. — The titles of the two volumes before us would lead us to suppose that the “positive science” of theology was divided by Dr. Breckinridge into three parts; for the first volume is “the first part of theology considered as a science of positive truth;” and the second volume is the “second part of” the same. From the titles, therefore, we gather, that the three volumes are *all* to be devoted to the exhibition of the truth as truth in positive and strict scientific form. Turning, however, to the 11th page of the Preliminary Remarks, prefixed to vol. 1st, this impression is corrected. We there learn that it is in the first volume only that theology is treated as “mere knowledge;” which volume, we read again on the 14th page, “contains a distinct outline of the whole knowledge of God, attainable by man, unto salvation, objectively considered,” “a science of positive truth.” The same affirmation is frequently repeated. The reader now thinks, we presume, that he understands it: the whole *science* of theology is in the first volume, under the head of “objective;” the *whole* of the truth being there given, in its pure form, as *truth*, *all* the great topics being there treated with methodical exactness; while, in the author’s words (p. 11), the “intimate and transforming *effects* upon man,” of this truth, are given in the second volume. What is the intelligent reader’s embarrassment, however, when he finds that he must look to the second volume for the discussion of such subjects as “The Covenant of Grace,” “Regeneration,” “Justification,” “Sanctification,” “Faith,” “Repentance,” “The New Obedience,” “The Infallible Rule of Faith and Duty,” “The Fundamental Idea and Elemental Principles of the Church of God,” including the whole doctrine of the Church, together with the Ordinances, the Sacraments, Church Government, and Final Rewards and Punishments! Do none of these topics belong to the truth *as truth*, “objectively considered?” Have we the *whole* knowledge unto salvation, “attainable by man,” without a knowledge of these things? Is “the truth” all apart, separate from these subjects, and have we, in them, merely its “effects?” So says Dr. Breckinridge. First (vol. ii., p.

13), "the mere truth;" next, "the effects of truth;" lastly, the two former "confronted with untruth." And yet he also tells us (vol. i., p. 12) that the objective and subjective treatises "each takes in the whole sum and result of exegetic and didactic theology, once as pure, systematic truth unto salvation, and once as pure, systematic truth actually saving man." What, then, *are* we to understand? We are told, in the titles, that these volumes are severally *parts* of a "positive science." Next, we learn that the whole science, as such, is condensed into the first volume. But anon we are pointedly instructed that the whole truth, in pure, systematic form, is in both volumes: in the one as "mere truth;" in the other, as "truth actually saving" us. On first inspection, it is obvious that whole *regions* properly belonging to the domain of scientific theology are omitted from each. A more minute examination reveals the fact that, in both, subjects the most diverse are mixed up, in brief, unsatisfactory statements and discussions; while, continually, matters of great interest are overlooked or slighted. And this is an example of the new "*system*," which neither Augustine nor Calvin could discover; and for lack of which the Reformed theology has been floundering in hopeless blindness and incompetency since Luther's day; so that even "Calvin's great work" failed to be appreciated, and had passed out of "general circulation," until "I" restored it. This is the *new* system, that is to lay once more, and forever, the foundations of theology, whereon it may be expected immediately to rise and "pass, steadily and rapidly, to its perfect state." This is the New School to which the Old School, in its "immense reaction," has at last laboriously arrived. Augustine may still occupy the leisure of scholars curious of the past; Calvin may be read, not without profit, by such as can tolerate his "arbitrary and artificial method;" but these, with all the ancient masters of thought, are not needed longer; Turretin has been driven from his refuge in the peaceful shades of Princeton; the Nineteenth Century has spoken, and all the rest hide their diminished heads. "*Objective*," "*Subjective*," "*Relative*!"

Words worthy of being written, in letters of gold, blazoned over portals of universities, inscribed over every tutor's chair! For these are the *NOVUM ORGANUM* now, in this favored century, after the fruitless toil of ages, after Augustine and Calvin, discovered and invented at "Dansville," in the State of Kentucky, by Robert J. Breckinridge.

It would be a tiresome and a useless task, to pass the opinions of such a writer in review. His doctrines are, in general, those of the "standards." That is enough. He shows a tolerable *practical* knowledge of theological truth, and of the modes of presenting it current in his own denomination; a knowledge sufficient for the purposes of the pulpit, in a community not deeply agitated with religious questions, or earnest to distinguish, and sift, and search out, with thoroughness. His style, in some passages, exhibits very considerable practical force and raciness, but is ordinarily repetitious and wordy; and is sometimes almost ludicrous in its verbose solemnity of pious phrase. We should judge this second volume to be largely made up from sermons, sufficiently scientific for a good practical effect upon a sensible audience; but ill fitted to be the basis of a formal theological treatise. The work is of no value to the scholar, and but poorly suited to the wants of the unlearned. Beside the great masters in theology, the author is a child babbling confusedly. He uses phrases which contain whole theories and the pith of controversy between opposing schools, as innocently and with as little apparent consciousness that any one could think of raising a question upon them, as if he were merely bidding you—Good morning; and is continually leaving behind him difficulties unsolved, without so much as a hint that any solution is needed. Topics that you have passed come up again; ideas, familiar from childhood, are repeated and re-repeated; so that, reading in this book is like swimming in eel-grass; what you had fondly supposed was left behind, still pursues and clings to you, till, in mortal fear of your life, you hastily quit those waters forever. We quote, in conclusion, a portion of one of the sonorous sentences of Dr. Breckinridge, already given in a different connec-

tion — with addenda. “Whoever is willing to survey, with candor, the whole field of scientific theology, abstract, practical, and controversial, Latin, Lutheran, and Reformed, since the Reformation was firmly established and its first fruits gathered [we beseech the reader not to suppose that the writer of this Article claims for himself this learned achievement], will see small cause to be satisfied that the Critical, Speculative, or Philosophical methods” of the Nineteenth Century — as presented in the present work — “according to the general attainments of the age” — “are to be preferred to the arbitrary and artificial methods they would supplant,” which were pursued by the worthies of past ages, the founders of schools and the framers of the Church’s creeds, “or perhaps even” to that of Stapfer himself. These two volumes on theology are a misfortune to their author, and calculated to bring discredit upon the scholarship of the country. Such enormous pretension we have never before seen conjoined with so humiliating a performance.

And now, if there be any in whose bosoms the passions of past conflicts survive, and who still cherish unkindly remembrance of what seemed to them abuse and violence, we conjure them to bury such thoughts, in peace, forever. Dr. Breckinridge has written a book — this book. It is enough.

ARTICLE IV.

INDIA—THE BHAGVAT GEETA.

BY REV. B. F. HOSFORD, HAVERHILL, MASS.

It has been our good fortune to read one of the very few copies of a translation of the Bhagvat Geeta found in the country; and to realize, in reading it, all we had been led to anticipate from the fine tantalizing extracts we had, from

time to time, seen floating, as waifs, among our literature. We have thought we might do a pleasant service to literary and religious curiosity among many of our readers by giving to them the few facts we have been able to gather with respect to this gem of Sanscrit wisdom, together with a variety of extracts from it. We are fully aware that there are others who, were they so disposed, could give this picture a far richer setting. We have kept silence for years, hoping they would do this; and we now undertake, in their presence, a long neglected work which properly belongs to them, only as we hope that the lively interest recently awakened in everything pertaining to that vast, hazy country, may be some compensation for our lack of personal furnishing for the work.

The Encyclopedias inform us that the Bhagvat Geeta, or, as some write it, Bhagawat Gîta, is a chapter, or rather episode in a chapter, of the Mahabharat. This Mahabharat is a historical poem or epic, whose principal subject is Bhurrit the Great, and the house he founded in the early history of the country. The genealogy and history of this royal house, and particularly of the wars which occurred between two branches of it, the Kooroos and Pandoos, are celebrated in more than one hundred thousand metrical stanzas of two lines each.

The theatre of these marvellous events was Central India, not far from the scenes of the recent tragedies; and these events transpired, if at all, in ages so remote that the imagination of man can hardly run to the contrary; but this record of them in the Mahabharat was made, according to the best modern authority in Oriental literature, about 1200 B. c., or not far from the time when Joshua, and Gideon, and Samson were working their real wonders in Judea.

Little reliance can be placed upon the histories and chronologies of a people so fond of the marvellous as these Orientals are, especially when we find them claiming for some of their earlier dynasties a reign of ten thousand years, battles lasting eighteen days, and other things in keeping with these enormous periods.

Still these absurdities are no stumbling-blocks to the credence of the Orientals; and so we find the Hindoos not only regarding this Mahabharat as one of their sacred books, but attributing to it the highest inspiration. They call it a "fifth veda," as we sometimes speak of an "eleventh commandment." To them, Kreesna, its principal character, is not merely an incarnation of Vishnu, but is Vishnu incarnate — the eighth incarnation or avatar of that remarkable personage. A plausible explanation of that particular avatar is this. Kreesna may have been a veritable person of mark in their early history. His notable deeds became more and more wonderful as they rolled down, traditionally, from generation to generation of his imaginative admirers, until their prodigious magnitude necessitated a higher than human origin. They could no longer be believed except on the assumption that the worker was divine. This was a "*nodus vindice Dei dignus*;" so a god put his shoulder to the burden of achievement under which a poor mortal would have sunk; and thus, instead of a simple hero, Kreesna, they now have Kreesna an incarnation of Vishnu.

This episode in the Mahabharat — the Bhagvat Geeta, is in form a dialogue between Kreesna and his devout and favorite disciple Arjoon. A third person, Sanjay, occasionally puts in a word of explanation, inference, or conciliation, as Elihu did in the conference between Job and his three friends, or as the Chorus was wont to do in the Greek drama.

The doctrine of the book is in appearance monotheistic, yet really pantheistic. Brahm is not only in everything, but *is* everything; and hence the design of the book seems to be to unite all the various forms of worship, and centre them on the supreme Brahm.

Of the literary merits of the book, the extracts we give will be as good specimens as translations usually are of their originals. It may not be amiss however to quote, on this point, the testimony of three persons of different professions and nations who had ample opportunities for a correct judgment. An American missionary, long resident in India, says: "It is compared, for its beauty, to a deep and noble

forest, abounding in delicious fruits and fragrant flowers, shaded, and watered by perennial springs," etc. A French Professor of Oriental literature says it is the "fruits of a most poetic imagination, of the boldest meditations, of the most practised reason," etc.

Warren Hastings, under whose patronage this translation was made and published, says in the Introduction: "With the deductions, or rather qualifications, which I have thus premised, I hesitate not to pronounce the Geeta a performance of great originality; of a sublimity of conception, reasoning, and diction almost unequalled; and a single exception, among all the known religions of mankind, of a theology accurately corresponding with that of the Christian dispensation, and most powerfully illustrating its fundamental doctrines."

We incidentally mentioned the sacred regard of the Hindoos for the book from which the *Bhagvat Geeta* is taken. Towards this particular part of it, they cherish a still higher veneration. The Brahmins say it contains all the secrets of their religion, and they treat it accordingly. They have more commentaries upon it than we have upon the Apocalypse. At the same time they guard it with extreme jealousy, keeping it a secret from all other Religions, and even from the vulgar of their own faith. Their authority for this is no less than Kreesna himself, who, at the close of this revelation, having called it his "supreme and most mysterious words," adds: "This is never to be revealed by thee to any one who hath not subjected his body, by devotion, who is not my servant, who is not anxious to learn, nor unto him who despiseth me."

But these scruples of the Brahmins were gradually softened and worn away by the artful policy, mingled with the real kindness, of the Governor General, Warren Hastings. By the most careful toleration of all their religious opinions and practices, and by a special respect shown to their learned class, he got possession of this sacred book, and of whatever facts might be needed in introducing it to the English reader.

It was carefully translated by clerks in the employ of the Company, and under the immediate supervision of the Governor; commended by him to his fellow-countrymen in a prefatory Letter of no mean literary merit, and finally "published under the authority of the Court of Directors of the East India Company by the particular desire and recommendation of the Governor General, Warren Hastings."

It is a memorable incident in the history of this great bad man, this Anglo-Indian Napoleon, that in connection with his absorbing greed for gold, he had yet a sharp relish for literary luxuries; and that, in the midst of his wicked conquests of productive territory, in the name of the authorities at home, he could yet find time to search out, translate, and publish a book of no value whatever except as a literary or theological curiosity.

We only wish he had been as tender of the pecuniary rights of poor Nuncomar and of the Begum princesses as he affected to be of the religious scruples of the Brahmins; and that he had plundered more of curious Sanscrit antiquities and less of Hindoo gold; or at least, that he had expended more of the wealth he had at first extorted from these harmless and helpless natives, in acquainting the Christian world with the unique treasures of their ancient literature and religion. Had he done this, the ponderous and immortal sentences of Burke's glowing eloquence had fallen with a less crushing power upon his unshielded head, and there had been, to-day, a much less fearful unanimity of indignation in the Christian world against his unscrupulous tyranny, as well as against all those, his successors in authority, whose arbitrary and avaricious course took both stimulus and direction from the success of his gigantic wickedness.

But it is time the reader were presented with a bouquet culled from this gorgeous blossoming of Oriental Paganism. Our first quotation shall be a declaration of Peace Principles, humane and Christian in spirit, yet in substance strong enough to satisfy a Worcester Convention, save that it is utterly lacking in that warlike twang with which Non Resistants usually enun-

ciate their principles by their heavy ordnance— Resolutions. The conference takes place on the field where the two armies are awaiting the fight.

“ Having beheld, O Kreeshna, my kindred thus standing anxious for the fight, my members fail me, my countenance withereth, the hair standeth on end upon my body, even my bone escapeth from my hand, and my skin is parched and dried up. . . . When I shall have destroyed my kindred, shall I longer look for happiness? I wish not for victory, Kreeshna; I want not dominion; I want not pleasure; for, what is dominion and the enjoyments of life, or even life itself, when those for whom dominion, pleasure, and enjoyment were to be courted, have abandoned life and fortune, and stand here in the field ready for battle! Tutors, sons and fathers, grandsires and grandsons, uncles and nephews, cousins, kindred, and friends! Although they would kill me, I wish not to fight them; no, not even for the three dominions of the universe, much less for this little earth! . . . Now, O Kreeshna, can we be happy hereafter, when we have been the murderers of our race? What if they, whose minds are depraved by lust of power, see no sin in the extirpation of their race, no crime in the murder of their friends; is that a reason why we should not resolve to turn away from such a crime, we who abhor the sin of extirpating the kindred of our blood? In the destruction of a family, the ancient virtue of the family is lost. Upon the loss of virtue, vice and impiety overwhelm the whole race. From the influence of impiety, the females of a family grow vicious; and from women that are become vicious, are born the spurious brood called Varna Sankar [i. e. they who people hell]. Woe is me! What a great crime are we prepared to commit! Alas! that for the lust of the enjoyments of dominion, we stand here ready to murder the kindred of our own blood! I would rather patiently suffer that the sons of Dhreetarashtra, with their weapons in their hands, should come upon me and, unopposed, kill me unguarded in the field!”

When Arjoon had ceased to speak, he sat down in the chariot between the two armies; and having put away his bow and arrows, his heart was overwhelmed with affliction.

Kreeshna reproaches him for this unmanly and disgraceful weakness; tells him it is contrary to duty, and the foundation of dishonor, and bids him stand up. Whereupon Arjoon continues:

“ How, O Kreeshna, shall I resolve to fight against such a Bheeshma and Dron, who, of all men, are most worthy of my respect? I would rather beg my bread about the world, than be the murderer of my preceptors, to whom such awful reverence is due. We know not whether it would

be better that we should defeat them, or they us. . . . My compassionate nature is overcome by the dread of sin.

Tell me truly what may be best for me to do, . . . for my understanding is confounded by the dictates of my duty [as a soldier], and I see nothing that may assuage the grief which drieth up my faculties, although I were to obtain a kingdom without a rival on earth, or dominion over the hosts of heaven."

Having thus spoken, and having declared, moreover, that he would not fight, Kreeshna endeavored to stimulate his courage and overcome his scruples, by what we will venture to call an Indo-Platonic discourse upon —

The Nature of the Soul, Death, and Immortal Happiness.

"The man who believeth that it is the soul which killeth, and he who thinketh that the soul may be destroyed, are both alike deceived; for it neither killeth nor is it killed. It is not a thing of which we may say — it hath been — it is about to be — or is to be hereafter; for it is a thing without birth; it is ancient, constant, and éternal, and is not to be destroyed in this its mortal frame. . . . The weapon divideth it not, the fire burneth it not, the water corrupteth it not, the wind drieth it not away; for it is indivisible, inconsumable, incorruptible, and is not to be dried away; it is eternal, universal, permanent, immovable; it is invisible, inconceivable, and unalterable; therefore believing it thus, thou shouldst not grieve.

"But whether thou believest it of eternal birth and duration, or that it drieth with the body, still thou hast no cause to lament it. Death is certain to all things which are subject to birth, and regeneration to all things which are mortal; wherefore it doth not behoove thee to grieve about that which is inevitable. . . . The spirit being never to be destroyed in the mortal frame which it inhabiteth, it is unworthy for thee to be troubled about all these mortals."

After pressing the reluctant Arjoon still further with the argument of duty to his tribe, and the fact that the gates of heaven would be opened to those who engage in such a glorious fight, just according to their wish; also that he would be accused of cowardice should he refrain from fighting, or retire from the field, Kreeshna continues :

"If thou art slain, thou wilt obtain heaven; if thou art victorious, thou wilt enjoy a world for thy reward; wherefore arise and be determined for the battle. Make pleasure and pain, gain and loss, victory and defeat the

same, and then prepare for the battle; or if thou dost not, thou wilt be criminal in a high degree. Let thy reason be thus applied in the field of battle."

Here follow some sensible observations upon the superior importance of Motive over the visible results of action.

"The determined judgment of such as are attached to riches and enjoyment, and whose reason is led astray by this doctrine, is not formed upon mature consideration and meditation. . . . Let the motive be in the deed and not in the event. Be not one whose motive for action is the hope of reward. Let not thy life be spent in inaction. Depend upon application, perform thy duty, abandon all thought of the consequence, and make the event equal, whether it terminate in good or in evil. . . . The action stands at a distance inferior to the application of wisdom. Seek an asylum, then, in wisdom alone; for the miserable and unhappy are so on account of the event of things. Men who are endued with true wisdom are unmindful of good or evil in this world. Study, then, to obtain this application of thy understanding; for such application in business is a precious art. Wise men who have abandoned all thought of the fruit which is produced from their actions, are freed from the chains of birth, and go to the regions of eternal happiness."

Here is the Oriental *Wisdom*, or the *Philosophy of true Happiness* — the original of the Grecian Stoicism; suggesting the idea that Zeno, in his "pre-existent state," had his Porch somewhere on the luxuriant banks of the Ganges.

"A man is said to be confirmed in wisdom, when he forsaketh every desire which entereth into his heart, and of himself is happy, and contented in himself. His mind is undisturbed in adversity, he is happy and contented in prosperity, and he is a stranger to anxiety, fear and anger. . . . The wisdom of that man is established, who in all things is without affection; and, having received good or evil, neither rejoiceth at the one nor is cast down by the other. His wisdom is confirmed, when, like the tortoise, he can draw in all his members, and restrain them from their wonted purposes. The hungry man loseth every other object but the gratification of his appetite; and when he becometh acquainted with the Supreme, he loseth even that. The man who hath his passions in subjection, is possessed of true wisdom. The man who attendeth to the inclinations of the senses, in them hath a concern; from this concern is created passion; from passion, anger; from anger is produced folly; from folly, a depravation of the memory; from the loss of memory, the loss of reason; and from the loss of reason, the loss of all.

"A man of a governable mind, enjoying the objects of his senses, with

all his faculties rendered obedient to his will, and freed from pride and malice, obtaineth happiness supreme. In this happiness is born to him an exemption from all his troubles; and his mind being thus at ease, wisdom presently floweth to him from all sides. . . . The man whose passions enter his heart, as waters run into the unswelling, passive ocean, obtaineth happiness; not he who lusteth in his lusts. The man who, having abandoned all lusts of the flesh, walketh without inordinate desires, unassuming, and free from pride, obtaineth happiness. This is divine dependence. A man being possessed of this confidence in the Supreme, goeth not astray; even at the hour of death, should he attain it, he shall mix with the incorporeal nature of Brahm."

This further expression of the idea of practical wisdom or true happiness, is commended to the special attention of restless, greedy, insatiable Americans.

"Wise men call him a Pandeet [Pundit], whose every undertaking is free from the idea of desire, and whose actions are consumed by the fire of wisdom. He abandoneth the desire of a reward of his actions; he is always contented and independent; and although he may be engaged in a work, he, as it were, doeth nothing. He is unsolicitous, of a subdued mind and spirit, and exempt from every perception; and as he doeth only the offices of the body, he committeth no offence. He is pleased with whatever he may, by chance, obtain; he hath gotten the better of duplicity, and is free from envy. He is the same in prosperity and adversity; and although he acteth, he is not confined in the action."

. . . "The man who hath his passions in subjection, and with his mind forsaketh all works, his soul sitteth at rest in the nine-gate city of its abode, neither acting nor causing to act."

Here is the Hindoo's easy solution of the problem upon which the Christian Apostle reasons so eloquently and so pathetically in the 7th chapter of his Epistle to the Romans — the conflict between the higher and the lower self in the soul.

Arjoon. "By what, O Kreeshna, is man propelled to commit offences? He seems as if, contrary to his wishes, he was impelled by some secret force.

Kreeshna. "Know that it is the enemy lust, or passion, offspring of the carnal principle, insatiable and full of sin, by which this world is covered as the flame by the smoke, as the mirror by the rust, or as the fetus by its membrane. The understanding of the wise man is obscured by this inveterate foe, in the shape of desire, who rageth like fire and is hard to be appeased. It is said that the senses, the heart, and the understanding are the places where he delighteth most to rule. By the assistance of these, he

overwhelmeth the reason and stupefieth the soul. Thou shouldst, therefore, first subdue thy passions, and get the better of this sinful destroyer of wisdom and knowledge."

In a discourse upon the destiny of the soul, good or evil, we find this remarkable but somewhat redundant catalogue of virtues and vices.

"The man who is born with divine destiny is endued with the following qualities: exemption from fear, a purity of heart, a constant attention to the discipline of his understanding; charity, self-restraint, religion, study, penance, rectitude, freedom from doing wrong, veracity, freedom from anger, resignation, temperance, freedom from slander, universal compassion, exemption from the desire of slaughter, mildness, modesty, discretion, dignity, patience, fortitude, chastity, unrevengefulness, and a freedom from vain-glory — whilst those who come into life under the influence of the evil destiny, are distinguished by hypocrisy, pride, presumption, anger, harshness of speech, and ignorance. The divine destiny is for *Mosksh* or absorption in the divine nature; and the evil destiny confineth the soul to mortal birth."

Kreeshna thus assigns the best of reasons for his successive incarnations or avatars :

"Although I am not, in my nature, subject to birth or decay, and am the lord of all created beings; yet, having command over my own nature, I am made evident by my own power; and as often as there is a decline of virtue, and an insurrection of vice and injustice in the world, I make myself evident; and thus I appear from age to age for the preservation of the just, the destruction of the wicked, and the establishment of virtue."

Some of our readers whose hard destiny it is, in the labor of their wits to eat their bread, will be under obligations to Kreeshna for this specific for concentrated and successful thinking :

"The *Yogee* constantly exerciseth the spirit in private. He is recluse of a subdued mind and spirit: free from hope and free from perception. [?] He planteth his own seat firmly on a spot that is undefiled, neither too high nor too low, and sitteth upon the sacred grass which is called *Koos*, covered with a skin and a cloth. There he whose business is the restraining of his passions, should sit, with his mind fixed on one subject alone, in the exercise of his devotion for the purification of his soul, keeping his head, his neck, his body steady without motion, his eyes fixed on the point of his nose, looking at no other place around. . . .

"The man who keepeth the outward accidents from entering his mind, and his eyes fixed in contemplation between his brows; who maketh his

breath to pass through both his nostrils, alike in expiration and inspiration; who is of subdued faculties of mind and understanding, and hath set his heart upon salvation; and who is free from lust, fear, and anger, is forever blessed in this life . . . he shall also obtain me and be blessed."

One of the most remarkable chapters in this book is that which relates a conversation between *Kreeshna* and *Arjoon*, concerning God. From this protracted dialogue, we select some characteristic passages, setting forth the nature of the Deity.

Arjoon. "Thou alone, oh first of men [i. e. in human form], knowest thy own spirit; thou who art the production of all nature, the ruler of all things, the god of gods, and the universal lord! Thou art now able to make me acquainted with those divine portions of thyself by which thou possessest and dwellest in this world. How shall I, although I constantly think of thee, be able to know thee? In what particular natures art thou to be found? Tell me again, in full, what is thy connection, and what thy distinction; for I am not yet satisfied with drinking of the living water of thy words.

Kreeshna. "Blessings be upon thee! I will make thee acquainted with the chief of my divine distinctions, as the extent of my nature is infinite. I am the soul which standeth in the bodies of all beings. I am the beginning, the middle, and the end of all things. . . Amongst the faculties, I am the mind; and amongst animals, I am reason. . . Amongst floods, I am the ocean, and I am the monosyllable [name of god] amongst words. I am, amongst worships the *Yap* [silent repetition of the name of god]; and amongst immovables, the mountain Heemalay. . . Amongst weapons, I am the thunderbolt. I am the prolific god of love; and, amongst serpents, I am their chief. I am *Yam* [the judge of hell] amongst all those who rule; and time, among computations. Amongst purifiers, I am the air; . . and among rivers, I am *Ganga*. Of things transient, I am the beginning, the middle, and the end. Of all science, I am the knowledge of the ruling spirit, and of all speaking, I am the oration. I am, also, never-failing time; the preserver, whose face is turned on all sides. I am all-grasping death; and I am the resurrection of those who are about to be. Amongst females, I am fame, fortune, eloquence, memory, understanding, fortitude, patience. Amongst the Seasons, I am Spring; amongst the frauds, I am gaming; and of all things glorious, I am the glory. I am victory, I am industry, I am the essence of all qualities. Amongst rulers, I am the rod; and amongst those who seek for conquest, I am policy. Amongst the secret, I am silence; and among the wise, I am wisdom.

"I am, in like manner, O *Arjoon*, that which is the seed of all things in nature; and there is not anything, whether animate or inanimate, that is without me. My divine distinctions are without end, and the many which I have mentioned are by way of example. And learn, O *Arjoon*, that every

being which is worthy of distinction and preeminence, is the produce of the portion of my glory. But what, O Arjoon, hast thou to do with this manifold wisdom? I planted this whole universe with a single portion, and stood still.

Arjoon. . . . "It is even as thou hast described thyself, O mighty lord. I am now, most elevated of men, anxious to behold thy divine countenance; wherefore, if thou thinkest it may be beheld by me, show me thy never-failing spirit.

Kreeshna. "Behold, O Arjoon, my million forms divine, of various species, and divers shapes and colors. . . Behold things wonderful, never seen before. Behold in this, my body, the whole world, animate and inanimate, and all things else thou hast a mind to see. But as thou art unable to see with these, thy natural eyes, I will give thee a heavenly eye, with which to behold my divine connection.

Sanjay. "The mighty compound and divine being having thus spoken, made evident unto Arjoon his supreme and heavenly form: of many a mouth and eye; many a wondrous sight; many a heavenly ornament; many an upraised weapon; adorned with celestial robes and chaplets; anointed with heavenly essence; covered with every marvellous thing — the eternal god, whose countenance is turned on every side. . . The son of Pandoo then beheld, within the body of the god of gods, standing together, the whole universe, divided forth into its vast variety. He was overwhelmed with wonder, and every hair was raised on end. He bowed down his head before the god, and thus addressed him, with joined hands :

Arjoon. "I behold, O god, within thy breast, the angels and every specific tribe of beings. I see Brahma, that deity sitting on his lotus-throne; all the saints and heavenly serpents. I see thyself on all sides, of infinite shape: formed with abundant arms, and bellies, and mouths, and eyes; but I can neither discover thy beginning, thy middle, nor, again, thy end. O universal lord, form of the universe! . . I see thee, difficult to be seen, shining on all sides, with light immeasurable, like the ardent fire or glorious sun. Thou art the supreme being, incorruptible, and worthy to be known. . . Thou art the never-failing and eternal guardian of religion. . . I see thee . . of valor infinite; of arms innumerable; the sun and moon thine eyes; thy mouth assuming fire, and the whole world shining with thy reflected glory. . . . The space between the heavens and the earth is possessed by thee alone. Of the celestial bands, some I see fly to thee for refuge; whilst some, afraid, with joined hands sing forth thy praise. The *Maharshees*, holy bands, hail thee and glorify thy name with adoring praises. The worlds, alike with me, are terrified to behold thy wondrous form gigantic! . . Having beheld thy dreadful teeth, and gazed on thy countenance, emblem of Time's last fire, I know not which way I turn. I find no peace. Have mercy then, O god of gods, thou mansion of the universe!

The universe rejoiceth because of thy renown, and is filled with zeal for thy service. The evil spirits are terrified and flee, on all sides, whilst the holy tribes bow down in adoration before thee! And wherefore should

they not, O mighty being, bow down before thee, who, greater than Brahma, art the prime creator! . . . Reverence! reverence! be unto thee, a thousand times repeated! Again and again, reverence! Reverence be unto thee before an behind! Reverence be unto thee, on all sides, O thou who art all in all! Thou includest all things; wherefore, thou art all things! Having regarded thee as my friend, I forcibly called thee *Friend*! But alas, I was ignorant of this thy greatness, because I was blinded by my affection and my presumption. Thou hast, at times, also, in sport been treated ill by me, in thy recreations, in thy bed, on thy chair, and at thy meals; in private and in public; for which, O being inconceivable, I humbly crave thy forgiveness! . . . I bow down, and, with my body prostrate upon the ground, crave thy mercy, lord, worthy to be adored! For thou shouldst bear with me, even as a father with his son, a friend with his friend, a lover with his beloved. I am well pleased with having beheld things before never seen; yet my mind is overwhelmed with awful fear!"

Kreeshna, in compassion to his weakness, then resumed his milder form, and thus assuaged the fears of his favorite servant. Whereupon Arjoon replies :

"Having beheld thy placid human shape, I am again collected; my mind is no more disturbed, and I am once more returned to my natural state."

MISCELLANEOUS MORAL AND RELIGIOUS MAXIMS.

"Remember the gods, that the gods may remember you. Remember one another, and ye shall obtain supreme happiness."

"He who enjoyeth what hath been given unto him by the gods, and offereth not a portion unto them, is even as a thief. Those who eat not but what is left of the offerings, shall be purified of all their transgressions."

"Those who dress their meat but for themselves, eat the bread of sin."

"The learned man, by industriously performing all the duties of life, should induce the vulgar to attend to them."

"A man's own religion, though contrary to, is better than the faith of another, let it be ever so well followed."

"It is good to die in one's own faith, for another's faith beareth fear."

"There is not anything in this world to be compared with wisdom for purity."

"Neither this world, nor that which is above, nor happiness, can be enjoyed by the man of a doubting mind."

"They whose minds are attached to my invisible nature, have the greater labor to encounter, because an invisible path is difficult to be found by corporeal beings."

"Neither this world, nor that which is above, nor happiness, can be enjoyed by the man of a doubting mind."

"Know, O Arjoon, that all the regions between this and the abode of Brahm, afford but a transient residence."

"The enjoyments which proceed from the feelings, are as the wombs of future pains. The wise man who is acquainted with the beginning and the end of things, delighteth not in these."

"He who can bear up against the violence which is produced from lust and anger, is properly employed, and a happy man."

"Whatever thou doest, O Arjoon, whatever thou eatest, whatever thou sacrificest, whatever thou givest, whatever thou shalt be zealous about, make each an offering unto me."

Charity.

"That charity which is bestowed by the disinterested, because it is proper to be given, in due place and season, and to proper objects, is of the *Satwa Goon* [truth qualities]."

"That which is given in expectation of a return, or for the sake of the fruit of the action, and with reluctancy, is of the *Raja Goon* [passion qualities]."

"That which is given, out of place and reason, and to unworthy objects, and at the same time ungraciously and scornfully, is pronounced to be of the *Tama Goon* [darkness qualities]."

Worship.

"That worship which is directed by divine precept, and is performed without the desire of reward, as necessary to be done, and with an attentive mind, is of the *Satwa Goon*."

"The worship which is performed with a view to the fruit, and with hypocrisy, is of the *Tama Goon*."

"The worship which is performed without regard to the precepts of the law, without the distribution of bread, without the usual invocations, without gifts to the Brahmins at the conclusion, and without faith, is of the *Raja Goon*."

"Those who worship the *Devatas* [angels], go unto them; and those who worship me alone, go unto me."

"He who beholdeth me in all things, and all things in me, I forsake not him, and he forsaketh not me. I am extremely dear to the wise man, and he is dear unto me."

"Those whose understandings are in him [deity], whose souls are in him, whose confidence is in him, and whose asylum is in him, are, by wisdom, purified from all their offences, and go from whence they shall never return."

Let us now hear the conclusion of the whole matter, in the words of the dispassionate, but deeply interested listener,

"*Sanjay*. "In this manner have I been an ear-witness of the astonishing and miraculous conversation that hath passed between the son of *Va-*

soodev, and the magnanimous son of Pandoo; and I was enabled to hear this supreme and miraculous doctrine, even as revealed from the mouth of *Kreeshna* himself, who is the god of religion, by the favor of *Vyas*. As, O mighty prince, I recollect again and again this holy and wonderful dialogue of *Kreeshna* and *Arjoon*, I continue more and more to rejoice; and as I recall to my memory the more than miraculous form of *Haree*, my astonishment is great, and I marvel and rejoice again and again! Wherever *Kreeshna*, the god of devotion, may be, wherever *Arjoon*, the mighty bowman, may be, there too, without doubt, are fortune, riches, victory, and good conduct. This is my firm belief."

The End of the Geeta.

We cannot dismiss this subject without raising the inquiry, What was the civilization which preceded and prepared the way for this remarkable book? for it could not have stood alone. It must have had kindred ancestors, as it had kindred though degenerate descendants. It narrows, somewhat, the gulf we had supposed to exist between the Book of Job and all contemporaneous works of uninspired men. The mind which wrought out the loftier parts of the Bhagvat Geeta, might have made some approximation towards the Book of Job, had it been set at work upon the deep problem of God's Providences.

The morality of the book rises as high, probably, as the human mind can rise, without divine help. We are told that Sanscrit poetry is generally licentious; but from that great mass of defilement, this book stands out in distinct and beautiful relief. Many interesting parallels, theological as well as moral, might be traced between this and the Christian Code. Hence that remarkable Hindoo reformer *Rammohum Roy*, in carrying out his great idea, translated into the vernacular tongues of India extracts from the Vedas and from the Bible, sending them forth as joint influences in the same good work. Now, is there any more plausible or rational explanation of this resemblance, than that these pure and lofty sentiments are fragments of an original divine revelation to the race,—as it were, scattered scintillations of a rocket which broke high in air, but whose remains continued to shine as they fell earthward? Are they not what we might expect the remote descendants of Cain or of Ishmael would show, in broken tradi-

tions of what their great ancestors, Abraham and Adam received direct from Jehovah? This supposition is the more plausible from the fact that all Hindoo traditions in respect to the origin of their people and religion, point toward the north-west: that is to say, towards a country in that neighborhood where the first divine revelations were made to the race, "the country of the origins," as Prof. Guyot calls it, that historic highlands from which arts and religions, as well as nations, seem to have flowed off and down in every direction.

But these lofty truths are interpolated with much that is extremely foolish and absurd,—a natural consequence of a natural degeneracy for a period of 2500 years from primitive days to the time when the *Bhagvat Geeta* was written; and a *rate* of degeneracy, too, which would promise for the present time a vast preponderance of absurdity, and even of immorality,—as we find practical Hindooism now to be; even as there are now immense quantities of basest rubbish accumulated upon every small fragment of ancient art around the Forum or under the brow of the Acropolis.

The esteem which such a people as the modern Hindoos manifest for such a book as this, is attended with some paradoxes which, it should seem, might startle the credulity even of Orientals. For instance, the Brahmins, their learned class, believe all these fine doctrines of Vishnu; and on the authority of the same book, the *Mahabharat*, they believe that somewhere to the north of India is Mount Sumeru, the abode of the gods, 600,000 miles high; of which, Vishnu's estate is a circuit of 85,000 miles. They believe Vishnu to be a god, and yet believe stories of his birth which are too vile to be hinted at in Christian English.

They reverence him as he enjoins this pure morality upon his worshippers, and still they bedeck his temples and statues with the most obscene pictures imaginable. They guard, with extreme jealousy, the book which contains these pure sentiments, and yet they tolerate the worshippers of the author of these sentiments in the grossest licentiousness. They believe it contains the choicest secrets of their religion, and yet they withhold it from the great mass of the people, who

are trying to practise that religion. And so on to the end of the chapter. Much of this we might think utterly impossible, were it not that the Romish branch of the Christian church furnishes us with lively parallels, in holding to a Bible which must be withholden from the people, and which enjoins a morality which is openly set at nought by numerous doctrines and practices of both priesthood and people.

But as the worshipper of images in the Romish church, when pressed by argument, retreats to the theory that it is a something behind the visible representation which he worships, so we imagine a shrewd Brahmin, when crowded by the Christian Missionary, will carry the argument back of all the present absurdities and immoralities of his religion, to the doctrine of its primitive sacred books. And here he might stand a long siege, had these books committed themselves only on morality or poetry. But fortunately for the cause of Christian truth, their morality and poetry are closely interlaced with the most absurd and ridiculous pretensions as to history, geography, and physical science. Here is the vulnerable heel of their vaunted hero. Hereby all the educated Hindoo youth are easily made sceptics as to their native religion. A host of such have already graduated from the schools of the East India Company, and not a few from the missionary schools. They have cast their idols, Vishnu and all, to the moles and the bats, though they have not always installed, in their places, Jehovah and his incarnate Son. They have become very intelligent and thrifty worldlings, but very questionable Christians. Still, if light and truth does, at first, only this work of demolition, the Christian's duty in the premises is clear. He must labor on till the whole imposing structure of Hindoo idolatry is in the dust, trusting that the ever-progressing Providence of God will, in due time, raise up a Christian temple upon its ruins.

We close our remarks upon this rare book with the modest suggestion that "the Poet-Sage of Concord," who possesses one of the very few copies of it to be found in this country, and who has many points of sympathy with its peculiar philosophy and theology; whose broad and rich learn-

ing enables him, if so disposed, to throw collateral light upon it by a full Introduction or by copious Notes, and who surely is no high-caste Brahmin that he should desire to keep this rich vein of gold covered from the eyes of his curious countrymen, should now devote a portion of his "elegant leisure" to preparing an American Edition of the Bhagvat Geeta for the many who would read it not only with liveliest interest, but with substantial profit.

ARTICLE V.

THE ANGEL OF JEHOVAH.

BY HENRY A. SAWTELLE, M. A., LIMERICK, ME.

IN the early time, when the revelation of a spiritual sphere was dawning upon the race, and God was impressing his rightful claims, by striking visitations, upon a stupid world, the new forms that appear are often mysterious above later manifestations. The twilight confuses shapes which would otherwise be distinct. The fleeting agents of the strange unfolding speak not of themselves. They, for the time, carry their beholders to what is upward and onward; and would not, as instruments, be thought of, any more than is the word which is the sign of a thought. Certain it is that an activity is going on, the mode and incitement of which are above the ordinary process of nature. Clear and unmistakable is the immediate and practical object of each new supernatural appearance. And yet the sensible agency producing the effects, the messengers of the revelation, are not so certainly recognized in every case. In what order of existence do these agents belong? Or, if there be but one, is he divine, or is he less than divine? Such questions arise to the inquiring mind, as it first begins to reflect upon the revealer as well as thing revealed. As natural as it is for the

human mind to speculate, so natural is it to inquire how, by whom, by what, God has acted in bringing the supernatural sensibly to our capacity.

Nor is the inquiry altogether vain. Those dusky forms of the past grow distinct as we gaze at them; and as we have clearer light, we possess greater joy. The search confirms the abstruser doctrines; and these, going more deeply into conviction, add fundamental strength to moral life. That which at first seems dark and confused in the shadows of God's movements, in his early discipline of mankind, is so only relatively, and yields clearer lines of order and definition to the patient investigator; just as the distant spheres have gradually taken their orderly positions before the astronomer's piercing look. If it be essential rightly to interpret some remote and difficult item in the ordinary development of human events, it must be regarded as of use to study well all that which even mysteriously appears in the course of God's miraculous dealings with his chosen people. Let us then turn our eyes towards the activity that is manifested in the horizon of sacred antiquity, encouraged if we may gain so much as an earnest of a better understanding in the world of light.

Among the objects which stand half-disclosed down the vista of revelation, is one of uncommon interest, which the sacred writers have styled *THE ANGEL OF JEHOVAH*. This character claims our present investigation. At one time manifesting traits not unfamiliar to common life, and again leaving proof of possessing a power and condition above men, and even above ordinary heavenly visitants; now appearing for an object apparently small; and now transacting in respect to the covenant of ages; his personality sometimes nearly concealed, and again expressed with startling authority, he hardly fails to leave an impression of mystery; nay, more, of mysterious grandeur. In the inquiry excited, one sooner or later suspects the presence of Divinity in him, in consequence of beholding, even in the concealment, the outcropping of Godlike attributes. For, as with God, there is glory in his very hiding. Our curiosity is

rather increased than relieved as to his position in the scale of existences, by the manner in which his earliest told advent is recorded on the sacred page, and by the merely passing notices he receives whenever subsequently introduced to the reader.

As we should already infer, there has been a variety of opinions in regard to the essential standing of this early messenger of God. The difference of view, however, as we apprehend, must be traced more generally to a subjective cause, since it has commonly expressed itself in accordance with the prior theological beliefs of those who deal with the subject. The statement applies especially to later times. But all may not come to the investigation with equal prejudice. One will prejudge the less as he admits a greater number of facts into his creed. The theologian, for example, who believes in a triune God capable of revealing himself, at the same time that he entertains the doctrine of angels, is less liable to an *a priori* judgment in the case, than one who believes in the visitation of angels while denying the Trinity. He has already, in possession, more categories with which to compare his new fact and prolong his doubt. Would that we might always come to the truth dispossessed of everything which prevents it from having its native power and normal effect in our minds!

The ancient Jews, with few exceptions, as evinced by their extra-scriptural writings, believed the Angel, now being considered, to be the revealing God mediating by his own limitation a supernatural revelation to the race of man. They called him the Metatron,¹ the Prince of the countenance of God, the co-equal Revealer of the Divine Being. The leaning of the Jews to a general view of the Angel's divinity is indeed slightly traceable in the Septuagint version, particularly in the passage in Isaiah (9:2), where so many Divine appellatives are attributed to the coming Messiah. The Seventy evidently regarded the Mighty God here promised, as identical with the great Angel of the past, since

¹ For a learned account of the history, use, and diverse derivations of this term, see Hengstenberg's *Christology* (English edition), Vol. I. p. 178 seq.

they translate what to us is "Wonderful, Counsellor, God," by "the Angel of great counsel." The Revealer, anticipated as coming in the future with peculiar tidings and power, was all the same as the Revealer, heretofore making his appearance. To the view entertained by a majority of the Jewish interpreters, have adhered, in the main, the Fathers of the Christian church, the Protestant theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the orthodox of the present day. These latter have, of course, better defined and more consistent views of the Revealer in his position with respect to God. His Divinity and distinct personality are regarded in the same way.

Others have maintained that the frequently-appearing Messenger of the old Covenant is absolutely identical, in person and substance, with the one God. He was, indeed, under the assumed conditions of manifestation; but such a manifestation as a Sabellian would regard the one God as capable of effecting in his own behalf, without violence to his absolute singleness of person. Supporters of this opinion hold the chief terms in the formula *Angel of Jehovah* to be appositional, and translate "Angel Jehovah," or "Jehovah Angel:" they think of God as his own messenger to his people. A few Hebrew scholars of some distinction contend for this translation. Mr. MacWhorter, in his recent work,¹ thus renders the formula, maintaining the absolute identity of the Angel and Jehovah, but, as our readers are aware, holding *Jehovah* to be a name everywhere in the Old Testament exclusively applicable to the future Messiah and the Revealer of God in all time. Thus in form he is attached to the Sabellian class, but in reality stands with the more numerous class in Christian history who have regarded the Angel as a second Person and Revealer of the Godhead.

Passing by the ignoble and *pachydermatic* naturalist, who seems to be destitute of any power to expand in his conceptions out of the trodden circle of the material and sensible, and who, consistently with his narrow position, regards this

¹ YAHVEH CHRIST; or the Memorial Name. Gould and Lincoln (Boston, 1857). See also Article in Bib. Sac., Jan. 1857, p. 98 seq.

Messenger as nought but the voice of nature, a visible sign, or the hallucination of a superstitious mind, we would mention, as the third leading class of expounders in this reference, those who discover in the Visitant of the Jews an angel merely, like others noticed in scripture narrative, who, appearing in the name and with the commission of Jehovah, and thus for the time standing as God's representative, utters language, performs acts, and receives attention as Jehovah himself. Origen and Jerome, as some maintain, although their language is susceptible of other meaning, and certainly Augustine, inclined to this explanation of the import of the Angel of Jehovah. The Socinians of any age would naturally embrace it. So also would Roman Catholics, who thereby produce a sanction for their angel worship. We may state, on the authority of Hengstenberg and Kurtz, that the view was entirely agreeable to the Arminians. The middle rank of rationalists would undoubtedly, as a whole, from what we know of a few, find their place in this class.¹

A few passages of scripture, we admit, seem happily reconcilable with the view last indicated; and a greater number would harmonize with the second exposition above expressed, could that be made out, in spite of the testimony to the contrary. And yet, while allowing this to be true, and conceiving it quite possible for a sound trinitarian to incline to one or the other meaning, we are constrained to believe and so represent, that the great body of scripture testimony fairly compared and interpreted, together with the weight of the argument constructed on a legitimate inference from the hints and implications of the Bible, is surprisingly in favor of the opinion regarding the Angel which was noticed in the first place. To this conviction we have come from a careful study of the testimony in point, aided by the common laws of interpretation; while, in commencing our investigation, our bias was certainly in another direction. We pro-

¹ Among recent writers in Germany who stand in the interest of the view just noticed, might be named Vater, Baumgarten-Crusius, Schneider, Baumgarten, Stendel, and Hoffman. Gesenius, thought by Hengstenberg to belong to this class, certainly in later life held the orthodox view (*Lex.*, p. 570).

pose in the present case to adduce, to some extent, the argument derivable from the Bible, *first*, in confirmation of the deity of the Angel of the Lord as a real person, distinct from the One whose messenger he is; and, *secondly*, as showing the identity of this Divine Person of the olden time with the Messianic Revealer of the New Dispensation, in his higher nature. Without attending very minutely to the other views, we shall bestow upon them incidental notice, believing their surest refutation to be the result, or mere complement, of the positive establishment of the usual orthodox theory.

Let us turn first to the bare formula מַלְאָךְ יְהוָה, or מַלְאָךְ הָאֱלֹהִים, and develop the import thereof, so far as we can, in disconnection from the context with which it belongs in the scripture. It occurs about seventy-five times in all, in a variety of circumstances. The adjunct of *Jehovah* is far more frequent than that of *Elohim*. The first word, translated *Angel*, is in itself, as all parties acknowledge, expressive of office or relation, and in no respect of nature or essence. Any existence capable of being sent forth upon service of any kind, in the economy of divine providence, or in the interest of any intelligence, may, in the capacity of being sent, be properly denominated an angel or messenger. In entire consistency with this apprehension of the case, the term is applied repeatedly in the Bible to men as well as to the higher order of created beings more usually receiving this designation. We might refer, by way of example, to 1 Sam. 11:3. 16:19. Job 1:14. Eccl. 5:5. (Heb.) Hag. 1:13. Mal. 2:7. 3:1. It is interesting also to note the compounding of the term in the name of *Mulachi*,¹ which Gesenius views as a compressed or apocopated combination of the Hebrew words answering to *Angel* and *Lord*. Our leading interpreters define *angels* and *ministers* in Ps. 104:4, as predicates, so that the idea obtains that God makes even the winds his angels. From all this it is evident that, in respect of use as well as derivation, our term can express nothing as

¹ Hengstenberg, Ewald, and Henderson find in this name the expression of Angel, but deny for it the remains of the name *Jehovah*.

to the substance of its subject, and hence that the initial name of the object before us can afford not the slightest presumption as to the order of his being.

But what is the significance of the fuller expression *MALAK JEHOVAH*, so far as it can be determined on the principles of grammar? The first word is plainly in the construct state with respect to the second. The second stands as some fuller definition of the first. But does the close construction of the words, thus indicated, imply on the part of the second word an appositional, or a more strictly genitive relation? MacWhorter very quietly assumes for his purpose that the relation is that of apposition. While admitting the possibility of this interpretation, since the Hebrew furnishes some instances that would be quite analogous, we are yet induced to regard the relation in question as more strictly *genitive*, with thereby a distinction of subjects in the formula. For,

1. It is the more common one. The appositional relation being the exceptional one, there needs to be something peculiarly decisive for it, in the nature or condition of the subjects, in the given case. But this condition, so far as the terms in themselves are concerned, does not exist. The decisiveness in this direction, if appearing at all, must rest on a course of proof drawn altogether from without.
2. The general analogy with respect to the term *Jehovah*, in its use with other words in the construct state, guides to the view, that the subjects in the case we are considering, are not ultimately identical. Compare, for instance, the phrases, "Sprout of Jehovah," and "Servant of Jehovah," in Isaiah, and "Glory of Jehovah," in Ezekiel.
3. There are several cases in which the same expression brings to view, in the most unequivocal manner, a separation between the construct word and its adjunct in their application, as in the prophecies of Haggai and Malachi, where the expression embraces the distinction as broad as that existing between man and the Being on whom he depends. This would seem to afford a presumption in favor of a distinction as real, if not so wide, between the subjects which are not, and cannot be, so fully known.
4. Finally, the evidence of the ancient versions of the scrip-

tures, together with the known treatment of the great majority of modern criticism, is for the translation "Angel of Jehovah," rather than "Angel-Jehovah," thus implying that the Angel is messenger with respect to and for Jehovah, and not simply as Jehovah. Such considerations, though, as we admit not entirely decisive, appear to be greatly in favor of the view which we are inclined to hold. They, at least, forbid a silent assumption like that with which Mr. MacWhorter is chargeable, and impose on him the burden of proof, if he persists in the comparatively novel rendering so convenient for his purpose.

The disuse of the article before the phrase in hand, is in accordance with the common idiom of the Hebrew language. The omission indicates by no means a want of definiteness on the part of the opening word in a combination like the present; since the limiting noun, or pronominal suffix, more usually dispenses with the use of the article, defining as it does, with more or less plainness, the limited word without further addition. So much as this we know to be defined, that the messenger, whoever or whatever he may be, has a particular relation to Jehovah. But whether he be of the description to be identified with some preëminent or well-known character, cannot, as Kurtz would seem to teach, be determined by the construct relation *per se*. Although, if such preëminence could otherwise be made out, the expression we have would be all the Hebrew would require to answer to it, and would in itself warrant the more special rendering of "the Angel of Jehovah;" while at the same time, under other circumstances, the precise expression is all the Hebrew has to reflect the less definite idea of "an Angel of Jehovah." It is perhaps true, that the combination in question more usually conveys the more particular idea; and that, at first sight, we should be more ready to introduce the article into our rendering, than not to do so. But confidence in such procedure can be gained only from an extensive comparison of the passages, and from a knowledge of the explanation in the text surrounding or introducing that which is spoken of in a particular manner. It is our further

historical and exegetical investigation which is to justify and determine the full and particular phrase, "The Angel of Jehovah," *par eminence*. Thus the German writer referred to just above, has not, we think, the warrant of a correct philology, when he would regard the formula as importing in itself the eminence of the Angel; and what is more, suppose the adjunct, in its relation here, to indicate attributively the nature or kind of the messenger; to suggest, in short, as he avers, "his essential Divinity." Its grammatical quality forbids the one supposition; its occasional application to men, forbids the other.

The next thing in order will be to examine critically several of the passages in which the words under discussion occur; and thus by our induction gain some corroborative evidence of the Angel's personality, in distinction from the Father's, as well as testimony in regard to his proper position in the scale of spiritual existence.

The earliest appearance of the Angel, now considered, in the sphere of sensible perception, of which the scriptures apprise us, was beside a fountain of the wilderness on the way to Shur, in the presence of Hagar the Egyptian handmaid, as she fled away from her sensitive mistress.¹ It is easy to trace the presence and operations of the same agent in the chapter preceding the first express mention of the name, where Abraham, in the vision, receives direct encouragement from God, and becomes party to the divine covenant. The covenant-watcher was the covenant-founder. In the account of the visitation to Hagar it is interesting to observe, in the first place, the abrupt and informal mention of the visitant's title. Unwarned we stumble at once on a name which, in view of its repetition again and again in the sacred narrative, seems to have been at the time a well-known designation. When we learn its succeeding frequent use and singular application, we feel a surprise at the simple introduction of it at this point. It looks as if the Angel was presupposed to be known, by the reader, in the

¹ Gen. 16: 7 seq.; compare 21: 17, 18.

eminent character which he maintains in the record; as if the entire designation was that of a proper name already known. The writer's previous acquaintance with the name and personage, seems also to be implied. We may notice, secondly, the frequent repetition of not a part but the whole title of "Angel of Jehovah," in the same general connection; which shows that, however other messengers might be named, this one has nothing less than the whole expression as his appropriate title. Hebrew formality cannot account for the full use, over and over again, in successive verses. There is a peculiarity in the naming; which must be founded on a peculiar character, and relation to God. One should mark the different manner of mentioning the recurring angel in the narrative of John's birth as well as in that of our Saviour's birth.¹ But the narrative in view, here in Genesis, reveals something more positive as to the dignity and quality of the heavenly visitant, if we will but make a natural inference. He comes indeed officially, as one sent of God. And yet he appears spontaneously to say, as it were on the foundation of his own inherent power, when encouraging Hagar, "I will multiply thy seed exceedingly." Such a prerogative we do not discover, in men or ordinary angels. The sacred writer intimates to us that the fountain by which the revelation was made, was named for the Revealer, and yet for him as one whose permanent character it was to *live*,² and bestow provident care on the outcast servant. Now, it is to nothing less than a Divine Being that we attribute pre-eminently life and causation, and ascribe an all-seeing disposal of the families of men. Finally, the inspired penman not only refers divine action to the Angel, but calls him directly *Jehovah*; while the maid herself, with no existing intimation of her being mistaken, addresses him as *God*. It is remarkable that these appellations, bestowed in so unstudied a way, by a transition which seems to occur as a matter of course, indicate to us the current estimation in point of essential rank in which this messenger was held even at the

¹ See Luke 1: 11—38, and 2: 9—21.

² Note the Hebrew, Gen. 16: 14.

time when Moses first expressly brings him upon the arena of action.

But proving the high nature of the Angel, do not such divine titles go further and prove his absolute personal identity with the ultimate God? We answer, No. For, 1. Though he be named with the becoming title of Deity, that is not the prevalent manner of the sacred writer. He is more usually distinguished by a name which marks not a false, but a true, relation, namely, such as is really involved in a ministry and commission. Though he be in fact Divine, he must not lose the consistency of his character in being one sent forth on an errand, and as such coming from a Source. The representation of his being a Messenger is not, we may suppose, a cheat. He would not be, absolutely and singly, Sender and Sent at the same moment. He is a minister not for himself alone; which fact must be rejected on any Sabellian hypothesis. Let us have a theory so broad and adequate as to embrace all and exclude none of the patent facts. The implied relation of the Angel, real for the time, so remains; since in the very character in which he performs his mission to Hagar, he lives and abides in order to execute the consoling prediction. 2. No man hath seen God at any time, i. e. the ultimate Person of the Godhead. Neither hath this one declared himself, i. e. in being his own representation to his creatures. But in the passage before us, as well as in others, as will be seen, appears a veritable Revealer, possessing, as we know, divine titles and attributes, and evidencing a real personality, formal and spiritual, to some extent comprehended by the befriended wanderer and the inspired recorder. Jehovah, or the one so called, was seen. Our conclusion then is, that while the revealing Person was true Deity, he yet subsisted in some positive distinction from the invisible and delegating Person of the Godhead. He was second to the one whom he, in a substantial way, represented. Such a view, scriptural as it is, is at the same time philosophical, for it takes into the account all the facts. The personal distinction may not have been so definitely thought of in the age which supplies our theme, as

we at present represent, nor may we comprehend it in its transcendent bearing; but to make these things a ground for silencing all inquiry and all statement in the case, is to suppose our relation to the facts and our convenience for studying them to be the same as were possessed by those ancients, and is to shut up our minds forever to an intelligible part whose complement may be above the reason.

All this however being allowed, is not, after all, the Angel of Jehovah entirely the same as the one properly named *Jehovah*? Though he be distinct, in a real sense, from the invisible God, is he not *Jehovah*; the latter term being strictly and only applicable to the Revealer of God? And is not such a conclusion forced upon us, in part, by the fact that the Angel, who is confessedly a Divine Revealer, is here and elsewhere called *Jehovah*? The author of "*Yahveh Christ*," to whom reference has already been made, would make an affirmative reply to these questions. We cannot, as yet, lend our assent to such an admission. We cannot receive the view that, in general, when *Jehovah* is referred to in the Bible, the Revealer and second person of the Trinity is meant, and by consequence that the Angel and *Jehovah* are one and the same. The reasons of our dissent are as follows :

1. The view of Mr. MacWhorter is forbidden by the most probable grammatical relation of the words in our formula. Some four considerations were offered above, which seemed to warrant the interpretation of a genitive and not an appositional relation of the second principal word to the first. If this conclusion is worth anything, it implies that the latter term in the phrase is logically the more generic one; and not only that it is distinct in its application from the other, but that it has, if the other belongs to one specifically Divine, a wider application to the Divine Genus, the comprehensive Godhead. We should thus apprehend that *Jehovah* is God in the most original sense; and while identified at times, in the conception, with one person of the Godhead, as with the Angel in the course of the record under examination, would more usually be identified with that person who

seemed to maintain the starting point of action, namely, the Father.

2. It is opposed, somewhat, by the easy interchange of the terms *Jehovah* and *Elohim*, in various instances,¹ as adjunctive to the one and same *Angel*. This interchange of the adjuncts occurs sometimes more than once in the same continuous narrative. No one would suppose that they mean anything different in the position which they thus, by turns, occupy. There would be something very awkward in the rendering "Angel God, or "God Angel;" partly, because one is unused to it; but more because it violates the usual conception that the whole of the idea conveyed by the term *God*, is not exhausted by that which is implied by the *Angel*. It is quite evident that the term *Jehovah* covers the same idea in the formula that the term *God* does; and an impropriety in the use of one attaches no less to the other.

3. The place taken and the character shown by *Jehovah*, in a number of Messianic passages, ought to disturb our contemporary's confidence in his theory. When *Jehovah* appears in revelation, conversing with him who is to be the Messiah, is not here a fact forbidding such a specific application of his name to the Revealer as has been assumed? Does not the fact go to show that the appropriation of the name to God the Father is the more natural? If *Jehovah* were so exclusively *He who will be*; if *Jehovah* is the "memorial name," just fitting to the promised Messiah, should we expect the Father to take away that name to himself, that name so very nicely and anciently applying to the Messiah, and that too at an occasion, in reference to events, in connection with which we should anticipate the very least inconsistency and confusion in the designation of the Persons? But the Father does, repeatedly, take the name in question at points when, if ever, it should belong to the Revealer. When the Sender and the One to be sent appear in the same exhibition of history or prophecy, the Sender is invariably *Jehovah*. Let us note, for example, the words of

¹ Gen. 21 : 17. 31 : 11. Judges 6 : 20. 13 : 6.

the Messiah, when, as one of the interlocutors in the second Psalm, stationed as it were in heaven's council-chamber, he says: "I will make proclamation respecting the decree. Jehovah hath said to me, 'my Son art thou, I this day have begotten thee. Ask of me, and I will bestow the Gentiles as thine inheritance, and as thy possession the ends of the earth.'" If any evidences of personality exist at all in the dialogues of scripture; if the representation here has any correspondence in reality, then is there, in this case at least, a distinction between Jehovah and the Revealer who declares him. But so is it, in repeated instances equally strong, as in Ps. 110: 1, 2, 4. 16: 2 (with Christ the speaker), 7, 8. 22: 20. Isa. 42: 5, 6. 53: 6, 10. Zech. 6: 12 sq., etc., where, to make Jehovah answer to the second Person in the Godhead, would be but to introduce a puerile confusion into the sublime transactions of Heaven.¹

4. Finally, with all the rest, there is nothing in the etymology of the term *Jehovah*, even on Mr. MacWhorter's supposition, that *Yahveh* is the true form, to prevent its application fittingly to God the Father, who is unseen. The imperfect (or future) tense of the verb to *be* or *become*, on which the form is supposed to be founded, by no means necessitates an absolutely future translation. The idea conveyed by it is more commonly that of an action or state which is protensive, or continued. "The imperfect, in Hebrew, denotes the unfinished and continuing; that which is being done or coming to pass, and so is future, and often so called. It also denotes that which is in progress and in connected succession in past time" (Gesenius). Thus it is the imperfect idea which generates the future; and not the latter which is independent, or indeed prior, in its idea, to the former. Does this fact, however, seem to be well considered in our author's absolute and confident future rendering of

¹ It is due, perhaps, to the suggestion of a distinguished scholar, who may represent the wish of others, that we should present several instances more extendedly, as the one in the second Psalm. The fear that we are taking already too much space must be our excuse for cutting short these convincing illustrations. We may say, *ex uno disce omnia*.

Jehovah, or Yahveh, as *He who will be*? We confess to a feeling that assumption lies in some of the fundamental definitions of Yahveh Christ. To regard *Jehovah* as meaning *He who continues to be*, and so applying to one who possesses and exercises, now, the resources and disposition of deliverance, as well as in the future, affords a more pregnant and embracing thought, and is an occasion, to men of all time, for repose on the continuous rescuing activity of a benign Deity. On such an idea was founded the grateful trust of Jacob at Haran, when he was feeling the blessing of Jehovah so much, that,

"As wont,
In the devoutness of that evening hour,
He recognized the covenant fulfilled,
A God still with him."

These several considerations, then—the genitive relation, and frequent interchange of the adjuncts in the formula, "Angel of God" and "Angel of Jehovah," the historical use of the term, and the etymology of it also, compel us to withhold assent to the hypothesis that *Jehovah* is the proper and exclusive appellation of God's Revealer, whether in the person of the Angel or Messiah. It is indeed capable of expressing the all of the Angel, and may be and is applied to the latter just as *God* is used of the Son in creation, and of the Spirit in regeneration; but not hence is *Angel of Jehovah* co-extensive with it in the comprehension of relations, nor like it capable of an appropriation to the invisible God. It is gratifying to be assured by Mr. MacWhorter's investigation, that Jehovah is the Revealer in the Old Testament oftener than has been supposed, thus confirming the impression of the Deity of the latter, already so strong.

But all this for a name, as regards the Angel; although, for an essential fact in respect to the active Person or Persons of the Godhead, in the progress of revelation. The Angel's personal distinction was already established. That essentially is not denied by the author whom we have considered. This phase of the discussion, therefore, while legitimately

suggested by the attribution of the Deity's title to the Messenger in our passage, looks more to a question related, in a collateral way, to our theme, than to the furtherance of the dogma of the Angel's divine personality.

If it be objected that the name of *Angel* appears to be a derogatory title for a divine being, it may be replied that its peculiarly *constant* association with a distinguished adjunct, sets it off in the light of unusual grandeur and holy dignity. Nor is the term, in itself, an inferior designation; for, being a name suggested by office or relation, its whole dignity comes from the nature of the subject or mission, in connection with which it is employed. Not unlike is the propriety and significance of the name *Apostle*, as used of Christ, when it is said: "consider the Apostle and High-Priest of our profession, Christ Jesus" (Heb. 3:1).

If, once more, it be urged that the Revealer of the Lord, and hence the Angel, had to do, in olden times especially, with the covenant people of God, so that it is strange that his first named appearance should be to the Egyptian maid, it may be said that Hagar belonged to the house of Abraham in the capacity of servant, that at this time she had come under a special relation to him, and that the seed she bore was included in the general reference of the blessing of Abraham involved in the covenant now instituted. The visitation was besides, as Kurtz remarks, "humane, condescending, and saving in the highest degree."

We have thus endeavored to dispose of a variety of questions naturally arising as soon as the first account of the Angel's advent, with its strange relations and deep implications, is presented to our notice. These questions being at once attended to, with all the greater force will succeeding confirmatory passages take their place in the basis of our theory, and to some of them we briefly turn.

By collating several verses in the narrative of the Lord's visit to Abraham in the plains of Mamre, we learn that the "Lord," who appeared, was one of the "three men;" that

¹ Gen. xviii. *passim*; 19:1.

the one termed Lord is singled out for Abraham's address, as it would seem, from some superior dignity of person; that from all that appears, he may be called an angel as well as the two associates who are incidentally named thus as they journey to Sodom; that hence he is, no doubt, the Angel of Jehovah; that, as such, he receives freely the title of simple *Jehovah*, and is treated with great reverence and extreme self-abasement on the part of Abraham, who begs the Lord not to be angry with him, and in the comparison regards himself as but "dust and ashes." Under a divine name, the Messenger proceeds to bring judgment on Sodom; in allusion to which the sacred writer pens these striking words: "Then Jehovah [referring, as is supposed, to the Angel] rained upon Sodom and Gomorrah brimstone and fire from Jehovah [namely, the final Divine Source] out of heaven" (Gen. 19: 24). Thus distinction is made, as Hengstenberg avers, between Jehovah and his Messenger. As says an old Jewish writing: In all these appearances, it was the Angel of the Covenant.

When the faithful patriarch was obedient to the yet unexplained requisition for the sacrifice of Isaac his son, in the midst of his dark and mournful service, the Angel of the Lord calls to him out of heaven, saying: "Now I know that though fearest God, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son, from Me" (Gen. 22: 12). As the Angel calls to Abraham the second time, in order to provide ground for assurance, he, like Jehovah, "swears by himself," as if there were none greater. He presents himself as the efficient executor of the Covenant with the servant of God and his seed; and for this, as well as for his succeeding agency in unfolding the now ratified covenant, receives afterward the suggestive distinction of Messenger of the Covenant, implying the same thing as Covenant God.¹

¹ Gen. 22: 15 seq. Mal. 3: 1. Some doubt attaches to the designation referred to in Malachi, as to whether it arises in view of the Hebrew or Christian covenant, having reference as it does to the Messiah. Henderson (*Minor Prophets*, p. 457) is decided in the opinion that the reference is plainly to the old economy, of which the Angel was the founder and head.

We step forward to the first mention of the Angel's coming to Jacob. Here the Messenger of the Lord declares, for himself: "I am the God of Bethel, where thou anointedst the pillar, and where thou vowedst a vow unto me" (Gen. 31: 13). He identifies himself with God, who appeared in the vision of Jacob's ladder,¹ and whose angels ascended and descended before the patriarch. In that vision there are, thus, the Angel of Jehovah and ordinary angels, presented at the same time; and the former compared and rated with the latter directly by inspiration, to the entire confusion, as it would seem, of all such as contend for the Messenger's common angelic nature and order.

"And Jacob was left alone: and there wrestled a man with him until the breaking of the day."² It is not said, in so many words, by the narrator of this, that the "man" was the Angel of the Lord. He seems, however, to be regarded as the immediate source of blessing; and two names, now only applied, indicate his essential rank: *Israel*, marking the power had with God, and *Peniel*, the remembrancer of a face divine being seen of man, stand as monuments of the recognized exhibition of the Divine presence. In allusion to this matter, Hosea³ says that Jacob "had power over the Angel." Jacob's conviction that he was struggling with the Deity is confirmed by the prophet, who styles the strange Wrestler as the Lord God of Hosts, and supplies, what is not told us before, that he was treated as divine, in the act of Jacob's prayer. It would appear that the characteristics of the Revealer were more than usually concealed in this exhibition, since Jacob inquires his name; although this would not be inconsistent with a silent conviction of the high quality of his temporary Antagonist.

Heretofore the Being whom we consider, appears less in the character of practical kindness, than in that of authority, though the former is not rejected. But we now rise to a time when the constant benevolence of his course is more touchingly acknowledged. Israel, who himself bore a name of

¹ Gen. 28: 10—22.² Gen. 32: 24.³ 12: 4.

wonderful testimony, approaching the hour of dissolution, bears affecting witness¹ to the goodness of his former Visitant. Stretching forth his drooping hands, and laying them on Joseph's sons, he utters a blessing in the Angel's name, and pronounces a high eulogy on his provident redeeming activity, such as is appropriate always and especially to the adorable God, and none other. It is matter of interesting observation, in this connection, that not a visible sign, nor any inferior representative person coming in the range of finite perception, with no higher life, is here termed the Lord's Angel, but a now invisible agent. This shows that, in conception, Jacob carried his whilom earthly deliverer facilely to the unlimited regions of spirit without denying to him, but rather implying for him, the permanency of the office and character which has been thus far insisted on.

In Exodus we have, in general, the miraculous revelation of God in connection with Moses and the chosen nation, in the progress towards entire emancipation. The superintending Medium of all this, alike in the call of Moses and the deliverance from Egypt; in the terrible legislation of Sinai, and the disciplinary advance to Canaan, was, by all testimony, in general terms, the Lord God; and, in more particular language, his consubstantial revealing Angel. At one time, in the sacred record, his distinctive traits on the side toward man is the ground to the title assigned him; while, again, without necessarily overlooking this reference of his character, the narrator is controlled in respect to the naming, by the more essential divine attributes recognized in the majestic Agent. Hence the alternation; which is sometimes the source of indefiniteness with respect to the spiritual relations of the invariable Deliverer, and of partial or one-sided conceptions, as we strive to shape him to our minds. Now we are prone to think of an object altogether too low: as of a limited, automatic, created agent of God, who, in himself, wins not our love or veneration; and, again, we are straining our gaze away upward, to comprehend one

¹ Gen. 48: 15, 16.

beyond the sphere and shape of intelligible manifestation. We may suppose that the subjects of the divine conduct in the wilderness had a more uniform and adequate apprehension of the proper nature of their Leader, as he revealed himself, than we are accustomed to have. They thought of him as divine, and yet as near, and in a measure apprehensible. That certain, revealed, perceptible, yet self-originating character which, in our clearest reflections, we ascribe to the Redeemer, of the later era, was perhaps designed to be suggested to those of old, in regard to the Angel, by the light which they had. And in some such character should we best contemplate him. By commingling the descriptions and ideas which the names suggest, as they occur, for example, in the book of Exodus, we rectify and symmetrize our conception of the ancient Revealed.

The following condensed statements present the prominent confirmation of the divine standing of the Angel as furnished in the book already introduced. 1. The usual title is bestowed, identifying him at once with the Visitant of the past; and that, too, as early as the call of Moses.¹ 2. He is, in all places, finely distinguished from the strange material phenomena which surround him; as a critical estimate of the language will impressively prove.² 3. In his conversation with Moses, he utters his voice on the ground of inherent authority, without for once legitimatizing his claim to be heard or obeyed by a "Thus saith the Lord," as God's inferior messengers would do. 4. His own person renders

¹ Ex. 3: 2 seq.

² This point deserves a fuller treatment, for it has been overlooked in quarters where we should not have expected it. That Herder, with his pantheistic tendencies, should confound or identify the Angel with the inanimate natural phenomena that accompanied his visitation, is not surprising; but that Dr. Whately should thus do, while entertaining his belief in the spirituality and absolute supernatural elevation of Jehovah, is matter of wonder, and with the scripture so explicit as it is in separating the Angel from the bush and the fire, reflects not a little upon the Archbishop's examination at this point. "It was the Lord himself," he says, "who held communication with his servants through the means of the appearance of the flame accompanied with 'thunderings and voices,' etc.; and the *flame* is thence called his messenger or angel." — *GOOD AND EVIL ANGELS* (Am. Ed.), p. 16.

holy the spot whereon he stands, and the very atmosphere of his presence. 5. The name itself, as well as prerogatives of Jehovah, are freely and naturally bestowed on him. This is done in the ordinary progress of cool narration, and not in the extravagant style or high-wrought mood of poetry. 6. In his call to Moses he proposes to deliver Israel out of bondage. Afterward, he who dispenses the law on Sinai identifies himself with him who delivers out of bondage; by which, as by the manifestations which he makes at the time of giving the law, he proves himself, without directly expressing it, to be the Angel. 7. With a pillar of cloud or fire for the symbol of his presence, he goes before the Israelites;¹ and they acknowledge him to be sent for this purpose by Jehovah.² But with the Messenger designated, as he sometimes is, we have the problem of Jehovah sent by Jehovah. "And this," says the older Michaelis, "is, according to my best power of understanding, the most ancient intimation³ of the Trinity; or, to speak more properly, since the passage treats of only two, of the doctrine of two persons in the divine essence."⁴ 8. In one place (Ex. 32: 34 sq.), the Angel of Jehovah is carefully distinguished from an ordinary angel whom the Lord threatened as a curse to the people on account of their disobedience. When they repent, he promises that his Presence (meaning his revealing Angel; comp. Isa. 63: 9) shall go with them, and this restores consolation. In the twenty-third chapter, obedience is demanded towards the Angel, because in him was God's NAME; that is, not simply the name, for that would be frivolous; but all that for which such a name stood—Jehovah's nature and character. 10. Near the close⁵ of Moses' sayings, under the name of Jehovah, he is alluded to as he that dwelt in the bush, and from whom all blessings should be implored. 11. Finally the martyr Stephen,⁶ in the Acts of the Apostles, alludes to events in Exo-

¹ Ex. 14: 19.

² Num. 20: 16.

³ Taking into the view also the Angel's entire history.

⁴ Quoted in J. Pye Smith's *SCRIPTURE TESTIMONY TO THE MESSIAH*, Vol. I. p. 485.

⁵ Deut. 2: 16.

⁶ Acts 7: 30 seq.

dus, and, while applying to the Deliverer there the name of Angel, does not omit to set down his inspired testimony to the legitimacy of his more God-ward title of Lord, or Jehovah.

In the narrative¹ of Balaam's perverse resistance, the old formula is instanced, in full, not less than nine times — a significant fact as regards its single and eminent application. There it is said that the occasion was unworthy of the personal interference of God. To which it can well be replied, that it was no less worthy of the Deity to restrain Balaam, by interference, from his mad effort against his people, than it was to appear to him in the first place and advise with him respecting the call of the Lord's enemies to do an unrighteous thing. It is not less noble to stay the perverse hand, than to question at the first the moral decision that bears it aloft; to check a headlong career, than to dissuade from first entering on it. The final object of the Angel was to protect God's people. We remark that the sin of Balaam was aggravated in being against the Angel who talked with him.

As it respects the touching passage in the early part² of the book of Judges, it is allowed that the Jewish commentators, for the most part have thought that the "angel" here denotes a prophet, commissioned as a messenger; whom they aver to have been Phineas the high-priest. A similar view must have been held by our translators, as may be inferred from their unprecedented translation of our phrase at this point. The connection of Gilgal with the Angel has contributed to this modification; while, in reality, it was adapted to inspire confidence in the rendering, here, of "the Angel of Jehovah" as the divine Messenger of the past. For Gilgal, at least one, was on the borders of Jericho, where it is said³ that Joshua was met by the man (Israel's manifested Guide) with a drawn sword. As another miraculous manifestation of the kind is not mentioned before this account in Judges, how natural, nay how beautiful, that the

¹ Num. xxii *passim*.

² 2: 1, 4

³ Josh. 5: 13—15.

sacred writer should bring his eminent Actor upon the stage, taking him, as it were, from the strange scene on which his eyes last closed ; especially as the present mission pertained to an object then treated, and would naturally call for similar qualities of authority on the part of God's Messenger. The scene at Gilgal being fresh in the minds of the people, and associated with the one now appearing, their feelings would be affected, in view of their sinful default, much more than under other circumstances. The peculiar reference to the past transaction would bring into view a side-figure by which to estimate the present leading object in the drawing ; or rather provide a rightly shaded background, which should bring into sharper view the subject-forms of present interest. The happy design is successful ; for the people weep, and *Bochim* is the memorial.

The Angel of Jehovah is commemorated in the immortal song of Deborah, as authorizing the bitter curse she measures out. He is present with Gideon in the seclusion of Ophrah's oaken grove, qualifying him to undertake for the children of Israel in their dire extremity as the slaves of Midian, and leaving the pledge of his accompanying presence. With more than usual mystery, he comes before Manoah's wife ; revealing the terrible countenance whose description appears to have been matter of current tradition, speaking strangely of the offering about to be made, and establishing himself in the eyes of the wife and husband as, in fact as well as in reputation, THE WONDERFUL¹ in nature and works. His wisdom, as a standard of comparison, is more than once² instanced in the books of Samuel, as a thing impliedly of well-known and confessed distinction. Instead of saying that David's wisdom was godlike, the narrator shows that it might be compared to the Angel's. He is evidenced at Araunah's threshing floor as the powerful Messenger of

¹ Compare Judges 13 : 18 in the Hebrew, with Isa. 9 : 6.

² 1 Sam. 29 : 9. 2 Sam. 14 : 17, 20. 19 : 27. Some who sympathize in the general theory we have maintained, think the references here to be to an ordinary angel. But while there is nought in the context to disprove, there is that in the history which favors, an allusion to the great Angel.

judgment on account of David's sins, and is confirmed by the prophet Isaiah,¹ as the self-reliant Smiter of the Assyrian camp. Elijah receives his gracious and efficient ministration in the wilderness, and his prophetic instruction with respect to the messengers of Samaria. In Zechariah's fruitful vision, he appears among the myrtle trees, distinguished from an inferior interpreting angel accompanying him; now possessing Jehovah's prerogatives, and again indeed praying to Jehovah of hosts, on whose level he stands. Finally, he is acknowledged by the piety of Israel's later age as the Protector of the righteous and the Saviour of his people;² and, as the Old Testament canon closes itself, is pronounced to be the great Messenger, who gathers up into himself the covenant process of the past, and who now gives promise of some new and clearer advent which shall better interpret his long activity and light up his mysterious relations to the world and to God.

The fact of there being such an application of divine titles and prerogatives to the Messenger of God as has been pointed out, is not so easily denied. But our immediate deductions therefrom, that they indicate certainly that their subject is the substantial God, a Person of the holy Trinity, have been evaded, sometimes by seeking to bring into play, here, the canon, *Quod quis per alium fecit, ipse fecit*. Under the shadow of this, it is said that the Angel, as the medium of the divine revelation, though himself altogether inferior in his essence, is revered, receives titles, and reliably acts, as Jehovah. It is said that passages like Ex. 4:16 and 7:1, where Moses is declared to stand in the place of God, and those instances in which the prophets seem to speak from Jehovah's person, are brought forward as plausible ground for such a view. As to the reference in Exodus, these two things may be taken as true, to begin with: 1. That Moses is not expressly named as the Divine Being; and 2. That if he were the one so named, he would be perfectly well known, so that there could be no confusion of persons; and

¹ Isa. 37: 36; comp. 2 Kings 19: 35.

² Ps. 34: 7, "The Angel of the Lord encampeth," etc.; 35: 5, 6; Isa. 63: 6.

also, just the capacity or extent in which he acted as God, would be plainly defined. In respect to the instances adduced of prophets speaking as Jehovah, it might with some assurance be said, that they do not thus speak, or so pretend ; that, where they seem to do so, they are simply uttering the *verbatim* inspiration, or a direct quotation of the words, of God ; which, from the nature of the messenger, or other possible indications, patent to the times in which he spoke, and sometimes traceable by us, would occasion no misunderstanding or confusion. If, however, one persists in pressing the instances upon us, and feels not the force of our answer, we can do no better than to translate, and present in a condensed form, the rejoinder of professor Kurtz.¹ Those, he says, who think that the prophets do this without any express authorization, and suppose, accordingly, that a created angel might bear himself in the same way that the Angel of the Lord does, mistake entirely the import of the facts ; which are :

1. That an entrance of the prophets without referring their message back to a divine commission, is the most infrequent exception to a general rule ; while, in the case of the Angel of Jehovah, it is the common rule without exception. A particular expression of the prophets must be judged of by the general rule. If there occur a change, on their part, to Jehovah's person, at some infrequent occasion, we should ascribe it to a momentary oratorical passion, rather than to a permanent right like that which the rule in the Angel's case argues for him.

2. That in the case of the prophets there can be no ground for misapprehension leading to the deification of the creature, or a confusion of the representative and the represented with each other ; while, in the case of the Angel, proceeding as he does from heaven, this would be liable to occur, if he was temporarily assuming Jehovah's prerogatives. He would endanger the first commandment.

3. That, in the instance of the prophet, such an enallage

¹ *Geschichte des alten Bundes*, Band I. s. 124.

as is supposed, comes to pass only in the height of prophetic ecstasy, when his mind is caught away from his actual mediate position, by the force of his theme; whereas the Angel of the Lord speaks and acts in his high character in such a cool, dispassionate mode, that one cannot doubt his individual authority.

4. That supposing the prophet to forget himself so far as to utter Jehovah's decrees, as if he himself had determined them and would perform them; yet he never suffers himself, nor could suffer himself, to be worshipped and presented with offerings, as if he were God. Would, indeed, Jacob have received homage and offerings on the ground of a seeming assumption of Divine right in Gen. 49:7; or would Elias, from what is said in 1 Kings 17:1? Or would they not rather have done as did Paul at Lystra, when they would do sacrifice to him?

5. That, in fine, the Bible authors themselves, in cool historical narrative, call the Angel by a divine name, with no further qualification; whereas, in no case, does a historian call a prophet thus, without immediate modification.

Hoffmann strangely contends that the use of *ἄγγελος κυρίου* in the New Testament, for example in Matt. 1:20 and Luke 2:9 seq., in application to a confessedly inferior being as compared with God, casts suspicion on the relative position of the Angel of Jehovah. We remark that he does not claim for the Greek phrase the character of a proper name, nor regard the first term as denoting an object of which but one exists. Hence, probably,¹ the translation "*an angel*," etc., is the proper one in the N. T. Hence the dispensing with the adjunct after the first introduction in a given connection. But we have seen that the Hebrew formula appears, from its frequent repetition in its entire shape, to be a title *κατ' ἐξοχήν*. The cases, therefore, do not belong to the same class. But beyond the philology of the examples, it may further be said: 1. That the business of the angel in the instances alluded to in the N. T. is known to be in the

¹ Winer, *Idioms*, § 18. On the Omission of the Article with Nouns.

service of the Revealer of God; which cannot be said of the Angel of Jehovah, even excluding the evidence of the especial exaltation of the latter; 2. That the descriptions of the record by which we are to ascertain the dignity of one possessing a merely official title, are entirely different in respect to the angel in the New, and the Messenger in the Old, Testament. To one is given great particularity and eminence; to the other, mere generality; and, 3. That, in view of the undeniable distinction of the Angel of the O. T., and his identity so plain in the progress of the ages, be his nature high or low, we should expect to find him, if presented in the novel relations of the N. T., expressly identified with the old representative of God and bearing in evidence the memories of the past in his connection with the people of God; or, if succeeded by one on the same level, we should look for his obvious exclusion. Apart, however, from these several points, the supposition of Hoffmann has plainly no weight at all in view of all the proof of the Angel's standing as already exhibited.

Thus far the personal deity of the Messenger of Jehovah. The course of argument offered does not remove all the darkness that attaches to a question of this kind, before stepping into the clearer light of the new dispensation. It is manifest that the distinctions and revelation of the Godhead are more definitely and gloriously presented in an age that is fitting, according to the plan of Him who bringeth forth everything in its season, and that which is most perfect in the fulness of time. We may not, however, be blind to the force of the phenomena attending a great doctrine as it was breaking its road; nor reject the natural questionings excited purposely in the early stage of events in order for the answering evolution of the future time to be better appreciated by the race.

It remains to glance at those facts and reasonings which assure those who adhere to our preceding view, of the identity of the Angel of Jehovah and the Logos, or higher nature of Christ. Our limits decide for us that these must be drawn in mere outline.

In the first place, taking into the account their divine nature, the fact that both are described as *sent forth on service* from God, is presumptive of their identity. They are alike commissioned by God; and thus far occupy precisely the same relation to him. They each come forth from the bosom of the Father. As in nature, so in the Godhead, action may be supposed to be in accordance with the conservative law of parsimony. Whom coëqual, the Father sends once, the same would renewedly receive his commission. In proof that both stand in the same relation of those who are *sent*, note the meaning of the term *angel*, the expression in Zech. 2:8, 9, and the testimony of John's Gospel (3:34) and his first Epistle (4:9, 14). Christ's being called *servant* in Philippians (2:7), refers to his relation to God in ministering to him, and not to man. So that this term, together with that of *Apostle* in Hebrews (3:1), may well be compared with the name applied to the Revealer of the old dispensation.

And not only is the one and the other put on service, but the kind of service they each do, is sufficiently similar to suggest the inference of their sameness of person. The work of the Angel has been such as to obtain for him, by general consent, the name of *Revealer*. He bore forth, into the sphere of human comprehension, somewhat of the will and attributes of Jehovah. His object appeared largely to be, to present God as a more definite and comprehensible object of service and veneration on the part of the ancient Jews. And this object was secured by exemplification as well as verbal revelation. In this character and for this object, as well as others, was the coming of the Logos. The only-begotten Son declares God. Besides the similarity of their work as regards revealing God and his will, we find a general sameness in it in respect to its subjects and its aim manward. The operation of the Angel had to do with the deliverance and direction of a chosen people of God; and this was involved, though indeed in the end less visibly and more spiritually, less prophetically and more consummately, in the work of Christ.

Again, the manner of each with regard to the people of God, over and above the fact of their leading the people, is strikingly alike. Now the Angel exhibits great severity towards the erring children of Israel. To Joshua he appears as a man of war; at Bochim, he makes the people weep; and in the case of David, he not only appears to him in the attitude of terror, but goes on to destroy the king's subjects, in execution of the divine vengeance. So our adorable Redeemer manifested, on various occasions, the severer traits, and is to come, in the final day, as a destroying angel, to all the wicked. Again, the Angel of Jehovah is characterized as peculiarly tender and protective; and so he acts. How benign his visit to Gideon! How Jacob recounts his goodness at the benediction of Joseph's sons! How touchingly beautiful the signalizing of his benevolence, in the poetry of David :

Encampeth the Angel of Jehovah
Around his pious ones;
And he delivereth them.¹

The prophet also says, in relation to the history of Israel : "In all their affliction he was afflicted; and the Angel of his presence saved them. In his love and in his pity he redeemed them; and carried them all the days of old" (Isa. 63:9). As the house of David to David, so was the Angel of the Lord a protection to the feeble and to those who stumble and fall. The counterpart of all this, in the Son of God, is too plain to require stating at this point.

Passing by the incidental proof to be gained from the comparison of the Angel to the Son of God and Son of Man, in the book of Daniel, we notice next that Michael the Archangel, who appears to be identical with Prince Emmanuel, is also shown to be, undoubtedly, the same as the Angel of Jehovah; and if so, the relation of the two latter is at once obvious. It is maintained by Hengstenberg, very fairly, that Michael, "that great Prince," is identical with the pre-existent Logos, because his name, signifying *who is like God*,

¹ Ps. 34:8 (Heb.).

suggests this; because his appearance, as Daniel says, is like that of the Son of Man: and because his attitude, as the chief combatant of Satan, is like that of Christ.¹ To us, such a view seems entirely plausible of him —

“ Celestial, whether among the thrones, or named
Of them the highest, for such of shape may seem
Prince above princes.”—*Par. Lost*, xi. 296–8.

But with at least as much probability is Michael identified with the Angel of Jehovah. For, in the first place, the appositional appellation of *Archangel* appears to be germane with the eminent designation of the Messenger, in its entire shape. Secondly, the warlike office of both as leaders of the armies of heaven, is suggestive of their sameness. The Angel (Josh. 5 : 14) is represented as the Captain, or Prince, of the Lord's host, and presents the drawn sword. The Archangel bears also the name of Prince, and bears on the celestial war against the kingdom of Satan. One gets the impression, in reading the book of Daniel,² that he regards Michael as the Angel deliverer of Israel. Finally, eminent interpreters understand the ninth verse of Jude to recall the scene in the vision of the prophecy of Zechariah (3 : 1 sq.); and thus, on the ground of Jude's testimony, assert the oneness of the Angel and Michael. And hence the former, through the latter name, is seen to be attached to the higher nature of Christ.

Lastly, writers in the New Testament affirm, most strongly, the identity of the Logos and the Angel, by attributing acts, in a special way, to Christ, which the Old Testament writers, with as much particularity, have predicated of the Messenger of Jehovah. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews refers the shaking of Sinai, when the law was given, to Christ; while, as has been shown, it was, before, properly attributed to the Angel of God. Paul asserts³ that the sup-

¹ Compare 1 John 3 : 8 with Rev. 12 : 7.

² See 12 : 1 seq., and before.

³ Cor. 10 : 4. Prof. Hodge says: “ This passage distinctly asserts not only the preëxistence of our Lord, but also that he was the Jehovah of the Old Testament ” (on First Corinthians, p. 175). The latter clause here appears much too strong; for reasons heretofore adduced. See remarks above on Yahveh Christ.

plying Source, on the exodus of the Israelites, was Christ; whereas the Angel was the accompanying Provider in the record of Moses. It is said in Hebrews (11 : 26) that Moses esteemed the reproach of Christ greater riches than the treasures of Egypt; while it is the Angel on whose account he acts, and whom he particularly obeys, in Exodus. Once more : Luke (1 : 15—17) tells us that John goes before the Lord Christ, in fulfilment of the prophecy of Malachi; and Malachi says that it is the Messenger of the Covenant before whom the new Elias goes.

Such, then, are the Scriptural grounds for believing that our Saviour, in his higher nature, is one and the same with the substantial Theophany, which, under a peculiar title, we considered at length in the former division of our discussion.

We have now canvassed our subject in the various bearings purposed at the commencement; and we close the lengthened review with deepened convictions of our Redeemer's Deity, and with a brighter sense of his preëxistent relation to the people of God. The many interesting memories of the ancient days which cluster around his existence, the hallowed dignity which attaches to his dimmest manifestation, even in the remotest past, and above all, the abundance of his activity in deeds of grace and judgment from the earliest time, come unitedly to view, leaving an impression of grateful admiration and adding important interest to a Being whose evolving glories we can never exhaust. It is pleasing to know that God, who shadowed forth the pathway of his later Messianic people by the outward history of a nation especially related to himself, did also, by early manifestations of the Divine One, mysteriously limited to perceptible shape, prefigure the condition of the coming Christ; thus intimating the possibility, as well as promising the reality, of God manifest in the flesh.

ARTICLE VI.

THE ONENESS OF GOD IN REVELATION AND IN NATURE.¹

BY AUSTIN PHELPS, PROFESSOR AT ANDOVER.

Thus saith God the Lord, He that created the heavens, and stretched them out; He that spread forth the earth, and that which cometh out of it; He that giveth breath unto the people upon it, and spirit to them that walk therein; I the Lord have called thee in righteousness, and will hold thine hand, and will keep thee, and give thee for a covenant of the people, for a light of the Gentiles. — ISAIAH 42: 5, 6.

It was one of the querulous objections of Voltaire to Christianity, that the "priesthood," as he loved to call even the protestant clergy of his day, persisted in selecting brief and isolated passages from an obsolete volume, as the texts of their discourses. It argued, he said, their own poverty of thought, and the puerility of the superstition by which they would enslave the minds of men. But the Bible, aside from its inspired dignity, is more affluent in thought than any other volume in any literature. Although, for the most part, it is a plain book, written by plain men, composed of plain histories and biographies, of familiar letters, and of stories for children, yet it is dense with principles, which the philosophy of the ages has struggled for in vain, until it has condescended to inquire of these plain scriptures. A single paragraph of the scriptures often contains a truth, which, had it been a discovery of human science, would have made the name of the discoverer immortal. Such is the character of the text.

The first of the two verses is a description of God; the second is a declaration of his purposes. "Thus saith God the Lord, he that created the heavens and stretched them out" — that is, "thus saith that Being whose power and wisdom are displayed in the stellar universe." "He that spread forth the earth, and that which cometh out of it" — that is,

¹ A Discourse delivered before the Convention of Congregational Ministers of Massachusetts, in the Brattle Street Church, Boston, May 26, 1859.

"thus saith that Being who formed the terrestrial continents and oceans, and has given life to the processes of vegetation." "He that giveth breath unto the people upon it" — that is, "thus saith that Being who has called into existence the sentient creation upon the earth." "He that giveth spirit to them that walk therein" — that is, "thus saith that Being, who is the God of mind, and the disposer of its laws of action." Thus the prophet describes God as the God of nature. What then, is the declaration which is introduced so impressively? It is often an idiom of prophetic speech, and especially of the style of Isaiah, when a declaration is to be made respecting the work of redemption, to give it the form of a direct address to the Messiah; and to declare *to him* the thing which God was about to perform. Such is the idiom now before us. "I" that is, "the God of nature" who had just been described, — "I, the Lord, have called thee in righteousness" — that is, "I who created the heavens, have summoned thee as the Redeemer of men, in execution of my righteous purpose." "I will hold thine hand and will keep thee" — that is, "I, the Former of the earth, will be faithful unto thee." "I will give thee for a covenant of the people, and for a light of the Gentiles" — that is, "I, the Author of the souls of men, will give thee as a pledge of my love, and the nations shall be redeemed."

The sentiment then, which I understand to be embedded in this language is, that the God of nature is the God also of redemption. The God of nature and the God of grace are one. All that we see of God in the one department of his working, is an indication of the same perfections which he exercises in the other. We may look through all that science teaches us of nature, and all that revelation teaches us of grace, as through a single avenue, by which we approach a truthful conception of God. Taking our position at either end, we see through an unbroken perspective to the other, and discern one plan, one character, one will, one perfect Being in all.

In the present discourse, I wish to assume the truth of the identity of the Author of nature with the God of revela-

tion, and to consider certain lessons which follow as corollaries from it.

In the *first* place, from the fact that the Author of nature and the God of revelation are one, we may infer that religious investigation should be characterized by the spirit of docile inquiry.

If there be one thing which more than another vitiates the methods by which men form their religious opinions, it is the want of the humility of *inquirers* after truth; and yet, if there be one thing more firmly settled than another in the methods of science, it is that the docility of inquiry after truth, is the only spirit becoming to scientific discovery. How often are we compelled to note the distinction, that in religion men feel at liberty to create their opinions; while in natural science, and in all that domain of truth which lies outside of the realm of conscience, they feel bound to seek for their opinions. In the one case we assume that we know, in the other we consent to be taught. Especially is the faith which men think they derive from revelation, often formed arrogantly. We are apt to fashion our theology, by dictation to the words of God, as to what they ought to teach, not by inquiry into the facts they do teach. We are prone to come to the whole question of a revealed religion, with preconceived assumptions of what we will believe—not with the upturned eye of faith, asking simply what we may believe. We bring to the subject a burden of habits of mind, of purposes in life, of usages in society, of the demands of science, of the necessities of philosophy, and of authorities in theology, and then our strange vocation is to *make up* a religious faith out of such fragments of truth or error as can be wedged into the vacancy which has been left for its accommodation. Pursuing our researches in this mood, we do not discover our facts; we make them. We do not search for our proofs; we create them. We do not ask for a revelation from heaven; we impose one on our convictions, by declaring what it ought to teach, and that nothing else will we believe.

But what would the world say to a man who should ap-

proach in this spirit any other department of knowledge? What *is* the spirit, which the world commends in science and philosophy? The name of Bacon has become immortal, for the humility with which he announced the spirit of all knowledge to be the spirit of inquiry. The modesty of Newton, as expressed in his simile of the pebbles and the shells on the seashore, has become one of the common-places of the world's thought. That prince of modern scholars, whose incredible learning made him the counsellor of kings, illustrated as well the humility of science, by a spirit which made him the companion, to the last, of youthful inquirers who have just followed him by thousands to his burial. The spirit of docility in any search for truth, is so well established in civilized science, that now to raise a question concerning it, is to answer that question. What judgment is now pronounced upon the ancient belief which Lord Bacon did not venture to deny, that a birch-tree might grow from the root of an oak; or of the faith that a flint-stone might be transmuted into gold; that a star ascendant at the hour of a man's birth controlled his destiny; and that somewhere, in some unknown clime, was a stream whose waters could confer upon old age the vigor of undecaying youth? What verdict would now be pronounced upon an astronomer, who should shut himself up at noon-day, to evolve from his own mind a theory of the heavens, and should form his diagrams, and locate his systems of stellar worlds, and describe their laws of motion, and predict their eclipses and mark the procession of their equinoxes, and then at nightfall should go out, not to study the heavens as they are, but to fit them to his diagrams, and to label the planets by the names which he has given them, and should announce *that work as the science of astronomy?* What *is* the reception which the civilized world now gives to the old astronomy of the Ptolemies, which mapped out the heavens like a Chinese atlas? Do not our children smile at the grotesque figures which mythological astronomy has transmitted to our geography of the heavens, and which metes out the jewelry of our skies, among bears, and lions, and

dogs, and dragons, and scorpions? Yet this is a fit emblem of the map of theology, as men define and paint it, when they come to the scriptures, not as inquirers, but as dictators. The truth which we infer as indisputable from the fact of the oneness of the God of nature, with the God of revelation, is that the disclosures of God in the one, should be received in the same spirit as the disclosures of God in the other. We should come to the recorded oracles of God in the scriptures, as we go to the pictured oracles of the same God, in the earth and the heavens. The same docility, the same sense of ignorance, the same freedom from preconceived theories, the same calm, trustful, fearless disposition to interpret God truthfully, should bring us to the doctrines of the gospel, as that with which we go out, on a clear evening, to look upon the skies and ask: "What are those orbs of light, and what are the laws of their movement?"

This teachable spirit in the search of inspired truth will not be fruitless. It is a spirit which will not in the result be thrown back upon itself, as finding in the humility of inquiry, its own reward; for, from the identity of the God of nature with the God of revelation, we may infer, *secondly*, the presumption that in a revealed theology will be found a definite and positive system of truth.

This remark suggests one of the most singular inconsistencies of opinion with which the christian scriptures have been received by a class of cultivated minds. That philosophy which approaches the word of God arrogantly, and dictates the interpretation of the record, is the same, with a difference of mood only, with that philosophy which falls back upon the assumption that the record contains little which is susceptible of definite interpretation, and little, therefore, which can be positively affirmed. Side by side with christian dogmatism there grows up a christianized scepticism, within the range of scriptural thought. On the one hand, it is claimed that a revelation *shall* teach *this*, and on the other hand, that this revelation, properly speaking, can *teach* nothing. We come to it indeed in the spirit of inquirers after truth, but in the result we have our inquiry

for our pains. We begin with inquiry, we end with inquiry. A point of interrogation marks every step of our progress, if that can be called progress, which is no advance into the realm of faith. This theory of the aims and achievements of inspiration, leaves it questionable whether Christianity has added any light to the gloom which hung over the Greek and the Roman mind, at their point of highest culture. An inquirer after the God of the Bible, can only grope his way among Sybilline leaves, darkened by the same incertitude which lay like a nightmare upon the ancient systems of philosophy, when they cleared themselves from mythology.

Our modern literature often gravitates towards this effeminacy in its relation to the scriptures, when it is yet too thoroughly imbued with christian culture to yield itself to a more truculent scepticism. An illustration of this tendency is seen in the advice of Robert Southey, to a young friend whose mind had been aroused to religious inquiry. "I think," says the poet-laureate, "that you might derive more good from Epictetus than from studying yourself. There is a proud independence in the Stoic philosophy which always pleased me. I could, indeed, send you to a better system than that of Epictetus, where you would find a better model on which to form your *conduct*. But the mind should have arrived at a certain stage, to profit properly by *that* book. It should be cool and confirmed." It is no marvel that one who could thus advise an inquirer after the way of life, should have been incompetent to compose other than a heartless biography of such a man as William Cowper.

What lesson, then, is taught to this spirit of dubious and distant politeness to the scriptures, by the doctrine of the oneness of God in revelation and in nature? It is refreshing to turn to the confidence which men feel, and with which they express their convictions, in the natural sciences. That very word "science;" how courageous is its etymology! What a lordly dignity it claims! It teaches as one having authority. It affirms its facts with the calm consciousness that they are indisputable. It starts with

axioms which it is proof of insanity to deny, and then it deduces its laws with a power of command which is obeyed, because what it speaks it knows. It is power because it is knowledge. It pursues inquiry in the spirit of knowing. It advances with the expectation of knowing that which it seeks for. Its conjectures germinate into truths. Its hypotheses ripen into principles. Thrown out as tentatives here and there into the darkness of the unknown, they spring up radiant with revelations, so that the very night unto night showeth *knowledge*. Even in those departments of nature which cover the world of mind, philosophy assumes to *know* something. It believes that it knows things which are not demonstrable. It refuses to be restricted in its knowledge to the theorems of Euclid. It claims the right to assume first principles, to read intuitions, to test even imaginings and longings as hints reaching up, like tendrils, to lay hold of hidden realities. The great embodiments of thought in the world to-day, in systems of belief, in governments, in arts, and in all forms of social life, and of unorganized usage, exist upon the assumption that *science* of the worlds both of matter and of mind is a verity. It is the expression of things and of beings, of operations and powers, which are realities. Some of these are believed to be so far beyond the reach of respectable scepticism, that if sciolism denies them in the name of philosophy, the world instantly detects the cheat, and greets it as an ass in the lion's skin, with the broad laugh of common sense. All honor, then, to the sciences of nature! We bow to them as authorities, because we respect them as knowledges.

But our God is one God. When, therefore, we turn from his handiwork in nature, to his word in revelation, we must presume that we shall find there also, a similar definiteness and positiveness of truth. We must expect to find there a theology which shall be at least *as* strongly marked in its outline, and *as* boldly affirmative in its claims upon the human mind, as astronomy, or mineralogy, or chemistry. We must look for a theology which is a system, not of inquiries, but of answers. We must anticipate the discovery of a

theology, which, in a word, is a science — is knowledge — is something which we can believe because we know it, and can preach because we thus believe it. Why should it not be so?

We must presume, especially, that when we open this revelation of God in language, we shall come upon certain verities which shall be patent on the face of the record, to unperverted inquiry. We do not so much find them here, as that they find us. They are verities which unbiassed readers in all ages will read here, and will believe; verities which infidelity will always read here; and verities which it is as unphilosophical for a believer in the inspiration of the Bible to deny, as it is for any sane mind to refuse credence to the elementary facts of geology, or of anatomy. What philosophic wisdom can prove *a priori* that this should not be so? We must expect to find in the scriptures, a theology distinguished by grand peculiarities which shall mark it as a novel revelation. For, no two disclosures of God elsewhere merge themselves confusedly into each other. No single blade of grass is a duplicate of another. We must anticipate a theology whose towering material shall *command* the eye of faith like Alps and Himalayas. We must look for a theology whose breadth of suggestion beyond all that it can express to finite thought, shall awe a believing spirit, like astronomic orbits and geologic ages. Yet we must find a theology which, in its immensity of range shall still lie open to philosophy and faith alike. It must come home to the heart of a child as a verity and a power, as readily as to that of a sage, just as the facts of nature do, on the face of the earth, and in the heavens. What authority of the schools can decree that this should not be so?

Moreover, we must presume that these scriptures contain a theology, not only of robust material, and of graphic outline, but of such firmness of construction that it can be positively preached. As a working instrument, we must expect to find it so welded that it will not come to pieces by handling. It must be free from self-contradictions, as other sci-

ences are, so that an athletic faith can use it. It must be a power which will not shatter itself by the rebound of its own blow, or fall asunder by the friction of its own machinery. We must no more anticipate that James has contradicted Paul, or that John has belied David, than we believe the telescope to give the lie to the microscope. We must look for a theology so compact in its self-consistency, so far free from anomaly in its structure, and so balanced in its combination of forces, that it can be preached with singleness of aim, and with no more misgivings of its working than we feel respecting gravitation or light. And we must look for a theology which, when it is thus preached, shall prove itself to be a power in the earth. We must presume that it will show its great strength in its methods of working. It will penetrate and agitate and instrumentally regenerate individual souls. It will change the beliefs of men. It will probe the wounds of diseased social life. It will upheave to the light organized systems of wrong. It will make venerable institutions obsolete. It will reform abuses of usage which no law can reach. It will breathe its great soul into the organs of the world's life, by revivals of religious vitality which shall seem to come as the wind that bloweth where it listeth, and to go, no man can tell whither, and yet shall come because the world needs them, and when the world needs them, and shall meet emergencies in history, which could be met in no other way. The normal development of this theology as a working power, we must expect to be a development of inquiry, of agitation, of change, of revolution, of creation, at least not *less* palpable (and how feebly does this language express the truth before us!), than the development of other sciences, in the changes they have wrought all over and all through the structure of modern civilization. We must find in the Bible a theology of this positive, formative, creative character; or we must concede, as infidelity affirms, that the Bible is incongruous with all other revelations which God has made of himself to men.

The view here presented, I must believe, suggests a caution which we shall do well to heed, respecting the conces-

sions often made by the friends of the Bible, in their expressions of sympathy with doubt as to its authority or its teachings. From the earnestness of those expressions, regarded as a fraternal gentleness towards weakness of faith, I would not abate one jot. On the contrary, the acidity of our theological polemics, it must be confessed, needs a much larger infusion than it has of such alkaline correctives. But sympathies with doubt often express more than this. The argument with unbelief, I cannot but think, is sometimes altogether too apologetic for the regal character of a revealed theology. We are apt to yield at the outset one and another and a third of our strongholds, to the diplomacy or the courtesy of an antagonist, as if for the pleasure of retaking them by dint of hard fighting. The difficulties of revelation are allowed to be thrust so confidently in advance of its evidences; its seeming inconsistencies are paraded so ostentatiously in the foreground of its congruities; such lugubrious confessions are made of mental struggle against unbelief; and such admiration is insinuated towards a downright infidelity, which needs no sympathy, and which scorns the credulity that offers it; that in the result, many a looker-on infers from the policy which Belief adopts, that Unbelief is the the more probable and respectable of the two. By implication, doubt comes to be regarded as the normal state, at least of cultivated minds, respecting the teachings of the Bible. Scepticism and mental strength become synonyms. The prince of the apostles is not Peter, nor James, nor John, — the chosen friends of our Lord — but the sceptical Thomas, rather. They are deemed a “feeble folk,” whose faith in God’s word has grown up spontaneously, calmly, and has worked with the steadiness of gravitation. A scholarly faith must bear signs of convulsive agonies, buried in their mental history like the prints of geologic cataclysms.

I must think that it is time for us as *believers* in the word of God, to have done with a policy which so recoils upon the faith we cherish. We have no right to concede to infidelity, within the court of scriptural inquiry, what we never dare to concede to it, and it never dares to claim, in the

court of natural science. The world should understand that we find in the scriptures the materials of a *faith* — of an *undoubting* faith. We find a theology which is a science. In a truthful sense we know it, and we preach it because we know it. Our sympathies with unbelief are not with the strength of its logic, not with the intrinsic formidableness of its difficulties, but with the misfortune of its mental disease. We hold, that faith, in revelation, as in nature, is the normal state of a full grown mind. It is the only legitimate state of an educated mind. We think that the most symmetrical and vigorous intellects of the race have been the most profound and capacious believers. There is a wisdom whose soundings go infinitely below the bottom of scepticism, in those words, "Blessed are they that have *not seen*, and yet have believed." We expect to commend to the world this word of God successfully, because it gives full assurance of hope. We cannot but speak the things which we *have seen*. I repeat, Fathers and Brethren, we must *find* in the scriptures a faith which can be thus preached, or we must *let them go*, as unworthy to rank even by the side of the revelations of God, which men read in the heavens, and in forests, and in oceans. We can never preach successfully any other than such a gospel. Men will not hear it. They will turn away, and say with the revolutionary orator of France: "it is not the gospel I invoke, it is Plato." A doom fixed as eternity awaits anything that is doubtful in this world, if it must make its way side by side with anything that is certain. The sure thing will crowd out that which is not so. An affirmative is taller than a negative. Assurance will beat down suspense. Faith will sap unbelief. And it is *knowledge* which will run to and fro in the earth. Men will turn from the preacher of an apologetic faith as from a bewildered guide, whose own distrust creates disbelief. He seems to them as one "that lieth on the top of a mast." Men will turn to the material sciences and to the arts that grow out of them, and will say: "these be our gods — we know these — as for this Moses, we wot not what has become of him." Such preaching must die out of the world.

Prelections upon it may yet be read in Music Halls, of a Sunday, as on one of the "lost arts."

From the unity of God in nature and in revelation, we may infer, *thirdly*, the certainty that the facts of these two departments of God's working will never contradict each other.

The well-known trial which Christianity has undergone, from its imagined conflict with the discoveries of science, is one of the most instructive phases of its history. It is much for our faith in Christianity, that now this trial itself *has* a history. It may perplex us to explain why assaults upon the Bible have been characteristic of every period of scientific awakening in the learned world. There is something formidable, indeed, at the first, in the apparent conspiracy of the sciences against any recognition of a revealed theology. Now by astronomy, and then by geology; on the one side by archæology, and on the other by ethnography; here by philology, and there by comparative anatomy—the scriptures have been summoned to surrender this chapter and that of their histories, this narrative and that of their biographies, and this one and that of their doctrines, till scarcely a page remains across which the wisdom of the ages has not drawn its mark of erasure.

The contrast is remarkable between the pertinacity with which the Oriental nations cling to their sacred books, and the ease with which the wise men of the West are induced to abandon our Christian oracles. An unnatural value is often attached to a discovery that seems to clash with the word of God, though that discovery may have been wormed out of the archives of a fabulous history, or mumbled by a science that is scarcely out of its embryo. "I believe," says a living writer, "had the books of Moses not been preserved by Christianity, but discovered for the first time, among the Jews of China, or by Dr. Buchanan among those of Malabar, they would have been received as a treasure of historical knowledge, by the very men who have slighted and blasphemed them."

But what answer may we give to these wise blasphemies? The history of science in its relations to the scrip-

tures, confirms the faith which we should presume to cherish from the oneness of God in revelation and in nature. If anything may be regarded as fixed in the laws which govern the progress of beliefs in the world, we may rest assured of this,—that science will never destroy the faith of the world in the Christian scriptures. The world is too old for that. The time when this might have seemed possible, has gone by. Science itself has established it as an axiom, that there are no insulated departments of inquiry. Every science plays into the hands of every other. There may be occasion for suspense of opinion, but for belief in a contradiction to the scriptures, never. Sciences are all tributaries to a consentient system. It is, therefore, as unphilosophical for natural science to discard the claims of sacred philology, as for philology to attempt to dislodge geology, or astronomy from the beliefs of the world. The history of the conflicts of secular science with the Bible, demonstrates the unreal character of those conflicts. So sturdy is its significance, that we are not arrogant in challenging the future in this controversy. When men think they discover in nature something antagonistic to revelation, we may safely reply, as did the three men at the mouth of the furnace, “We are not careful to answer thee in this matter. If it be so, our God whom we serve is able to deliver us, and he *will* deliver us.” Our God is one God. His word does not contradict his works, and his works will never be found to contradict his word. The most unlearned faith may rest in this assurance; and the most accomplished faith comes back to this position, after travelling the circuit of the sciences, and brings with it those very sciences as tributaries, to take their place by the side of this lowly trust in God’s word. “We are never alarmed,” says a christian scholar, “when we see an infidel philosopher of real talents, commence an investigation into the works of nature. We hail his labors as destined to be auxiliary to the cause of truth. We have learned that here Christianity has nothing to fear; and men of science, we believe, are beginning to understand that here infidelity has nothing to hope for.”

It is no arrogance to take this ground of the impregnability of the Scriptures, [as *proved* by the history of scientific discovery. It is a fact, which no candid friend of science will deny, that "no man has yet investigated the works of nature for the purpose of assailing revelation, who did not rather in the end evolve facts in its confirmation." Does geology affirm that he who made this globe and revealed the order of its creation to Moses, did not know its age? Be it so. We are not anxious to deny the facts of geology. Let geology alone, till it has run through the circuit of the eighty anti-Mosaic theories, which the French Institute once reckoned among its trophies of progress, and the result is, that this noble science spurns from itself, like cobwebs, on this side and on that, one after another of its eighty theories, till not one of them clings to it, and it comes around in the freshness of its strength to sit at the feet of Moses, and pay its tribute to the cosmogony of the first chapter of Genesis. Does astronomy affirm that he who made the heavens with his fingers, taught David a falsehood, by inspiring him to praise God "from the rising of the sun unto the going down of the same," — or indeed that God never made the sidereal universe; for by the gravitation of stardust it has created itself? Be it so. We need not refuse to look through the telescope of Galileo, nor take thought for the morrow, by reconstructing our architecture of the heavens. Let astronomy alone, and it shall disclose to interpreters of the Bible, a most beautiful evidence of God's condescension in inspiring the prophets to speak in the language of unlearned men — saying "sunrise" and "sunset" as we all do — thus revealing unto babes things which are hidden from the wise. And the wise men themselves shall construct for us new instruments of science, like Lord Rosse's telescope, which shall refute many of their reasonings, and they shall come back to the believer, and shall say, "we knew not that whereof we affirmed." Do ethnography, and physiology, and comparative philology, come to us arm in arm, and staggering under the burden of their parchments and their anatomic specimens, to tell us that he who made man, did not create him of one stock, so

that in Adam *all* die. Be it so. We are not careful to answer the wise men. We cannot read the parchments, and, in our ignorance we must confess it, the dry bones are very dry to us. As theologians we do not care whether they prove five races or ten. Let the wise men see to that. Let them decipher the hieroglyphics and the analogies. They are fellow laborers with us, though they think not so. We will counsel our princes to give them gold for their libraries and their cabinets, and by-and-by, when the world is a little older, and the wise men are a little wiser, and come to agreement among themselves, the libraries and the cabinets will read to them an advanced lesson, and they, too, will go and sit down with certain other wise men of Athens, and hear Paul discourse of that unknown God who hath made of one blood *all* nations on *all* the face of the earth.

So, too, if possibly—for more marvellous things than this have happened in our times, and that is a cowardly goodness which shrinks from contemplating the possibilities of science—if possibly, the vagaries of spiritualism should assume the dignity and the honesty of a science, and should come to us, affirming that miracles are no proof of a divine message, for, behold! the Egyptians do so with their enchantments; or that if miracles *are* evidences of a message from God, behold! here is given to us another gospel by angels from heaven,—be it so. We will not believe the angel from heaven, nor are we careful to answer the angel in this matter. *Let spiritualism alone*, till science shall explore this region of strange sights and voices, and reduce to order its conflicting phenomena, and by-and-by science will return from this foray also, bending under the weight of the spoils it has taken, in tribute to something in the word of God. Perhaps it will illustrate the ancient witchcraft, a fact in the world's history which neither science nor theology has explained. Perhaps it will illustrate the personality of Satan, a fact which the world always forgets when it can. Perhaps it will confirm the record of demoniacal possessions, a fact which the Scriptures nowhere assert to have been either of miraculous occurrence, or of temporary dura-

tion. Perhaps it will fulfil the prediction of false Christs and false prophets, who should show great signs and wonders; insomuch that, if it were possible, they should deceive the very elect. Our God is one God. The Bible and the sciences of nature are not enemies to each other. That is a needless and unsafe concession to atheism which has been made by a brilliant writer of New England, that "the two great modes of thought—that of Christianity in the supernatural department of God's plan, and that of science in the natural,—are so different that a collision is inevitable, and a struggle necessary to the final liquidation of the account between them." We do not so read either nature or the supernatural. We do not lodge our faith in a supernatural Bible as in a citadel that is beleaguered by the sciences. It never stands on the defensive against them. Its gates are all open, and always open. The portcullis is always up. It invites the sciences to enter with their treasures. "Come," is the message it sends forth, "if ye will inquire, inquire ye."

From the identity of the God of nature with the God of revelation, we may infer, *fourthly*, that we should expect to find the revealed government of God to be a system characterized by sacredness and uniformity of law.

In the natural world we find no such thing as caprice. Everything there goes on by the guidance of laws, known or unknown. The mechanism and movement of the most accurate chronometer, are but a feeble emblem of the ramifications of law in the material universe. Natural science is but the record of natural laws. The growth of the forests, the flowing of the rivers, the currents of the ocean, the falling of the dews, the gathering of twilight, all proceed by the operation of laws, not one of which is more flexible than the laws which governed the primal work of creation. Physicians tell us that disease has laws which are as beautiful in their operation as the laws of health. Where can you find in the material world evidence of the working of a capricious mind? In a whirlwind? In autumnal leaves? In snowflakes? In a summer shower? In the shifting clouds at sunset? Yet not one of these could be other than

they are. The whirlwind could not reverse its rotation ; the autumnal leaf flitting hither could not flit thither instead ; the snowflake, falling southward, could not fall south-eastward, rather ; the summer shower could not descend by one moment sooner, or by one moment later, or by one moment more rapidly ; the sun could not gather its drapery of clouds otherwise, by so much as the tracing of one golden fringe more or less, — without giving a shock to the universe, such as it has never felt since it came from the Creator's hand. So mighty are the forces of this machinery of law in God's works, that astronomers tell us they can calculate the day, the hour, the minute, the second, when it will roll back planets to the precise conjunction in the heavens where they are now ; and that they can point out the spot where an unknown planet ought to be, must be, will be discovered ; and the clockwork of sidereal movement will not deceive them. Yet so feminine is the touch of this finger of law in God's works, that the smallest groove of a muscle in the limb of an antelope will disclose to a naturalist the disposition of the antelope ; and there is a certain fragile bone in the frame of a humming-bird which will tell him the species and the habits of the humming-bird.

Why then should we not expect to find in a revelation respecting the moral world, a similar omnipresence and omnipotence of law. So close is the relationship between the two, and analogy so interweaves each with the other, that it has been the faith of many wise men, that a shock given to either, on a large scale, awakens the sympathy of the other. The ancient Persians, the Egyptians, Thucydides, Niebuhr, Dr. Arnold, believed that there was often a concurrence of moral with physical convulsions in this world — revolutions of nations and earthquakes breaking out together, as if at the breath of the same destroying angel. Be this as it may, our God is one God ; and that system of laws which interpenetrates the material universe, is an emblem of that by which he governs the world of mind, and which, with life and immortality, are brought to light by a revelation. If there be one feature of religion in practice, which

a believer in the works of God ought to welcome more cordially than another, it is that of the decalogue and the sermon on the mount. And if there be one doctrine of religion in theory, which a natural philosopher should embrace more generously than another, it is the doctrine of Decrees. Law in nature,—Decree in religion. The two revolve around each other like twin stars. Both are developments of one truth—that God acts by plan, and not by caprice.

Science has here paid a tribute to religion, the sublimity of which is unsurpassed in our literature. We may not inaptly regard it as the dying testimony of Hugh Miller, to a theology, which to him was the product of two revelations. "In looking abroad on that great history of life," he writes, "of which the latter portions are recorded in the pages of revelation, and the earlier in the rocks, I feel the grasp of a doctrine first taught me by our Calvinistic catechism at my mother's knee, tightening, instead of relaxing. 'The decrees of God,' I was told, 'are his eternal purposes, according to the counsels of his own will, whereby for his own glory, he hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass.' And what I was told early I still believe."

Why should he not believe it? What would this universe be, if it were the expression of the mind of a Creator who knew no law? Can you reverently venture for a moment upon the conception of an infinite mind, putting forth its infinite energy in the construction of a universe with infinite caprice? Infinite forces, acting with infinite diversity of invention, grooving out for themselves infinite channels of movement, yet with no order, no harmony with each other, no unity in diversity, nothing but infinite chances to rule them,—can you conceive of him who should sit upon the circle of such a universe and take pleasure in such an expression of himself? What then must be the God of a universe of lawless mind? Our minds sink back from the effort to form that conception. It cannot enter into the heart of man. But do we not drink in with new refreshment those words that come over to us from Galilee: "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of *them* shall not fall on the ground with-

out your father. The very hairs of your head are all numbered. Fear ye not therefore."

It would be instructive, if we had time, to pursue this analogy between law in the natural world and law in God's moral government, to certain other results. We might see, first, how accordant with *nature* it is, that the laws of religion cannot be violated with impunity. We might observe, secondly, how *natural* it is, that fatal consequences in respect of religion should follow from apparently trifling disobedience of God's commands. We might remark, thirdly, the foundation which is laid in the *nature* of things, for that law of God's government by which sin often reaches over from the time when it is committed, and strikes its penalty in a remote experience of the sinner. Hence we might infer, fourthly, from the course of *nature* here, the credibility and the probability, that the sins of one brief life on earth, should pass on, beyond the grave, to reap their reward in eternity. And we could not but discern, fifthly, the *naturalness* of the faith, that, if God has devised any remedial scheme to meet the emergency of sin, it must be one that shall honor delicately and rigidly the sacredness of law. These doctrines of revealed religion are the doctrines of *nature* also. They are taught by the elements. They spring up at our feet. They look out from our skies. They burden our atmosphere. If we obtain any relief from them, it must be from another revelation of God than that which these articulate.

But let us pass to observe in the *fifth* place, that from the unity of God in nature and in revelation, we have reason to expect the occurrence of mysteries in a revealed theology.

The mysteries of theology always meet us before we have travelled far on any track of religious inquiry. A finite mind, in any coherent religious thought, is like a dweller on an island, who cannot walk far towards any point of the compass, without finding his steps arrested by the ocean. But this is no anomaly peculiar to religious thought. The analogy between the mysteries of religion, and the mysteries of nature, has become a trite theme. Yet it is illustrated

so affluently, just in the proportion to which modern science extends the boundaries of our knowledge, that, to any well informed mind, the chief anomaly conceivable in the case, should be that of a religion without a mystery, or even of a religion not made up of mysteries. Science in the world of matter, is thwarted in all its investigations, sooner or later, by insolvable mysteries. It comes, on all sides, upon powers whose methods it cannot discover, and whose products it cannot imitate. If it seems to pass beyond the boundary, and to discern that which it is not given to man to know, it is only for a little time that it sits like the Danish monarch on the shore at low tide, and amuses itself with its childish mandates to the sea. The tide rolls in, as it did aforetime, and the monarch retreats. Certain problems in mathematics, and in the physical sciences, have thus baffled the wisdom of the ages; and just so, and no otherwise, is it with certain problems in religion. Nor is it any more marvellous that revealed theology does not solve such problems in the one realm of thought, than that natural science does not solve them in the other. Is the permission of sin in the universe of a holy God a mystery which revelation leaves untouched? Not less so is that structure of things in nature, which permits brute suffering in the universe of a benevolent God. "The whole subject of brute suffering," says Dr. Arnold, "is to me one of such painful mystery, that I dare not approach it." Is regeneration a mystery, an inconceivable work of divine power lying back of the laws of mind? But do we know any more of that work of omnipotence which is going on back of the laws of matter, in the rosebud or the orange blossom at our window? Is the entire subject of prayer left by revelation in such darkness, that we take no pleasure in the impenetrable privilege? But what more do we know of electricity or of photography? In certain moods of mind, do the decrees of God as taught in the epistle to the Romans, appear like brazen heavens over our heads when we *would* look up? But do we find any more comforting repose in that operation of physical laws, by which a purpose of God is revealed, that a young

man, the only son of his mother, and she a widow, shall be dashed from the summit of a building to the ground; or in that combination of physical laws, by which purposes of God come to light, that the son of a dying clergyman shall fall from a precipice, and the father, bending under disease, shall have so little strength to embark for his home, where he hopes to die among his kindred, that he brings his own coffin by the side of his son's remains? Is the connection of the race with Adam, one of the hard sayings of a revealed theology? But is the problem more facile of solution, that the vices of a father, by a law latent as fire in flint, in every man's frame, become a poison in the veins of his children and his children's children, by which often the degenerate stock is burned hollow and crushed in? Is the triunity of the Godhead such an absurdity that we cannot away with it? But are we any wiser in our faith respecting the structure of a man; man, at the same time a body and a soul; man, on the one hand a *thing*, ponderable, measurable, visible, palpable, mortal, corruptible, incapable of thought; a *thing*, such that an atheistic physiologist, recently deceased, said that he "could reduce all that he knew about man to a gas," and on the other hand, man a *being* who is *all* thought, who sustains no relation, that we know of, to weight, to form, to sight, to feeling, to death, to decay; and yet a being who can use the earthen organism that encloses him, looking out at *its* eyes, hearing with *its* ears, speaking with *its* lips, moving with *its* limbs, and feeling with *its* nerves; and yet again a being who is reacted upon by this dull organism in which he is imprisoned, and is so sensitive to the state of it, that Pascal says truly: "Do not wonder that he reasons ill now; a fly is buzzing by his ear,"—I repeat, do our physiological and psychological probes make us any wiser respecting the humanity of this *man*, than revelation has made us respecting the ontology of the mind of *God*? One of the most eminent statesmen of our own country could not credit the triunity of the Godhead; yet he could say of Milton: "His genius is beyond my conception. I can only gaze at him in astonishment, without com-

prehending the compass of his capacity." Why should not this coincidence of mysteries in religion, with mysteries in nature, lead us to a similar self-distrust in the study of a revealed theology? Why may we not gaze with astonishment at the trinity of God, while we do not comprehend the compass of *its* capacity? "Knowledge," says an old writer, "has two extremities which touch each other. The one is that pure ignorance in which we are born; the other is that point to which great minds attain, who, having gone the whole round of possible human knowledge, find that they know nothing." Can we fail to perceive how close is the sympathy between this modesty of greatness amidst the mystery of science, and the childlikeness of faith in the mysteries of religion? Our God is one God; and therefore it is, that the teachings of nature obeyed by a great mind, lead to a state so analogous to that to which the teachings of the Bible lead, when obeyed by a pious mind.

The subject before us is prolific of other suggestions, which the time will not allow me more than to name. Thus, certain developments of God's working in nature, lead us reasonably to infer the probability, that a revealed theology will contain some remedial scheme to meet the emergency of sin. Certain other disclosures of God's methods in nature, lead us to presume, that the theology of revelation will have a history of progressive development; a history worked out in its own construction, and a history also of its development as a science comprehensible by men. Still further peculiarities of God's wisdom in nature, prepare us to find in the structure of a written revelation, the expedient of prophetic types and symbols.

I pass by these and other similar topics, within the limits of this theme, to observe in the *last* place, that, from the oneness of God in nature and in revelation, we may infer a confirmation of our faith in the certainty of this world's conversion to Christianity.

We are too often unmindful that the creation of this world, and the redemption of this world are, in a truthful sense, parallel acts of omnipotence. It is as certain

that the one will occur as that the other has occurred ; for the revelation of that which God will do in the one case, is as worthy of trust as the history of that which he has done in the other. The energies of the mind of God have been pledged to both events. History and prophecy are to his mind as one. The government of the natural world by the forces of natural law, is no more fixed in the purposes of God, no more invariable in its operation, no more certain in its results, than that government of the moral world, by the forces of moral law, which is working out the plan of salvation. Our God is one God. The necessity of law in nature, — the certainty of law in redemption. You may reason from the rising of the sun to-day, from the Spring which has decked our fields, from the tides in your harbor, from the flowing of rivers to the valleys, from the respiration of your own lungs, or the beating of your heart, or the rise and fall of your eyelids, — with the scriptures in your hand, you may reason, — to the *assurance* that this world will be converted to Christianity. The heart is in the hand of the Lord, *as* the rivers of water ; he turneth it whithersoever he will.

Who has not observed the profusion with which the natural world is made emblematic in the prophetic scriptures, of the final triumphs of the gospel ? Listen for a moment, to the manner in which the exuberance of omnipotence in the elements of nature, is made tributary to an expression of the certainty of omnipotence in redemption. “As the *rain* cometh down and the *snow* from heaven, * * so shall my word be ; * * it shall accomplish that which I please.” They shall be a “*branch of my planting.*” “The fruit thereof shall shake like *Lebanon.*” “The glory of *Lebanon* shall come unto thee.” “The *mountain* of the Lord’s house shall be established in the top of the mountains.” “I will extend peace to her like a *river.*” “The earth shall be filled with the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the *sea.*” “His name shall endure as long as the *sun* ; there shall be abundance of peace so long as the *moon* endureth.” The *animal* creation come at the bidding of the prophetic mind, as they came at the bidding of Noah to the ark, to minister to the

visions of the world's conversion. "The multitudes of camels, * * the dromedaries of Midian, * * the flocks of Kedar, * * the rams of Nebaioth, shall minister unto thee." Even the wild beasts leave their savage nature in their dens, to come forth and symbolize the change which this world shall undergo. "The wolf shall dwell with the lamb, the leopard shall lie down with the kid, the calf and the young lion, and the fatling together; the cow and the bear shall feed, the child shall play on the hole of the asp, and put his hand on the cockatrice's den." This luxuriance of metaphor which the kingdom of nature yields up to the portraiture of the kingdom of grace, springs from no fortuitous resemblances. Our God is one God; and therefore it is, that a mind inspired to foresee the success of omnipotence in redemption, carries over into the moral kingdom its conceptions of the working of omnipotence in nature. The two kingdoms are separated by an imaginary line; the mind crosses and recrosses at its pleasure. The mountains, rivers, seas, flocks of Kedar, sun, moon, in which God *has* wrought, become, not only the emblems, but the pledges of the mighty works which he *will* do for man's recovery.

The analogy between these two departments of God's working discloses some striking resemblances of *method* in the details of his work. These, I had purposed to illustrate more fully, but they must now be named with brief remark.

A resemblance between the divine methods of working in nature and in grace, is seen in the law common to both kingdoms, that great results ensue from feeble beginnings. The certainty of this world's conversion seems chimerical, when we regard only the weakness of the instruments employed, and the insignificance of their first efforts. When William Carey entered upon the modern missionary movements of Great Britain, it was no marvel that almost all the literary, and political, and commercial mind of the kingdom was arrayed against the poor cobbler as a monomaniac. It is not singular that the sarcasm of Sidney Smith upon a band of English missionaries to India, as a little detachment of lunatics going to make conquest of one hundred mil-

lions of men, should have gone the round of the press, as a more flippant wit is now performing similar gyrations on this side of the Atlantic. But what reply does nature give to such aspersions upon the work of missions to the heathen? Is it a lunatic who paints the first flush of light in the east at daybreak? Who is the lunatic that commenced the Amazon and the Mississippi with a trickling rivulet which you can dam up with your hand? What lunacy planned the infantile beginning of the life of Sir Isaac Newton, and Napoleon? Our God is one God.

It is also a law of the two kingdoms of God's working, that results are often for a long time suppressed from human view. The work of this world's conversion is a discouraging work; so long a period intervenes between the labor and its reward; so many ages must elapse often, in which preachers seem like miners underground, who scarcely see broad daylight. But Kepler said, when he published his system of astronomy, that the world had waited six thousand years for some one to read the heavens aright. The coal mines of Pennsylvania, and the quarries of Quincy, were forming before the garden of Eden existed. Who can tell us why this western continent lay for fifty-four centuries unknown to the dominant races of men? Our God is one God.

It is furthermore a law in the two kingdoms of God's working, that results often come to human view suddenly and by seeming accident. This work of the world's conversion does not always disclose its epochs of success in accordance with the forecast of men. The radiant points in the line of its progress, are not always luminous with the importance of the human instrument in effecting that progress. Revivals of religion often surprise an unprepared church. The chosen instruments of them are not always those of our choice. The mighty wind,—we cannot tell whence it cometh. The kingdom of God cometh not with observation. But have we not told our children of the falling apple, which was so instructive to the mind of Newton; and of the invention of the mariner's compass by an unknown

genius; and of the gold mines of California, which a laborer accidentally discovered in building a sawmill? Our God is one God.

It is, finally, a law of the two kingdoms of God's working, that his work proceeds with great apparent waste. This work of the world's conversion is a costly labor; though, who can speak of other cost, after that price with which we have been bought! But it is a labor, sometimes, of apparently wasteful cost. It costs much to support one preacher of the gospel. It costs a large sum to support the ministry of the two denominations of Christians in Massachusetts, which are represented here to-day. Three hundred and eighty thousand dollars annually, more or less, must be expended upon our six hundred and thirty-three pulpits. Yes, for six hundred and thirty-three years of ministerial labor must be paid — am I wrong? — from one-third to one half as much as would be expended upon the erection and the machinery of a single cotton mill!

It costs much to support our organizations for the religious instruction of the young; our societies for the rescue of the tempted; our refuges for homeless children; our homes for sailors; our asylums for the fallen, and our retreats for the inebriate; — that golden cluster of benevolences which are shedding such radiance upon the history of our time. It costs a large gift of gold to sustain them. I dare not estimate the amount with confidence, but probably a half million of dollars thus expended, is required to secure efforts equal to the continuous labors of five hundred men. Yes, for five hundred years of Christ-like toil, we pay — will you believe it? — one half as much as is about to be expended in one of our Atlantic cities, on a single metropolitan hotel!

It costs much to send one preacher to the heathen. It costs a vast amount of money to support, for a single year, the operations of the two Foreign Missionary Boards, represented in this Convention. Four hundred thousand dollars, more or less! With a great sum do we obtain this freedom for three hundred and ninety-three missionaries to preach Christ to the nations. Yes, for three hundred and ninety-

three years of missionary labor, you pay — is it possible? — almost one-third as much as has been expended upon the building and equipment of a single ship of war! To what purpose is this waste? Might not this alabaster box of very precious ointment have been given to the poor? But, still, this *is* a costly work. It costs hard-earned dollars. It costs labor; it costs weariness, and watching, and cold, and hunger, and sometimes stripes and imprisonments. It costs lives, the lives of men and women of whom the world is not worthy. That should be a great cause for which strong men, and women of refined culture, give their lives. Who of us did not feel, when we heard of the fall of that, — I had almost said youthful missionary; for when I last saw him, he was so light of heart, so full of a sense of the privilege of his work, and so hopeful of the future, that the memory of his words, and of the gladness of his eye, has since been like a song in the night — yes, I will say, that youthful missionary,¹ who, a little more than two years ago, fell asleep, and was borne by devout men to his burial on Mount Seir, — who of us did not feel that this work of preaching Christ to the heathen *is* a costly work? Who of us has not felt, in listening to the appeals which are annually made in this house, in behalf of that — shall I call it charity?² — which has no plea to urge upon your beneficence, but the remembrance of ministerial services which have often been brought, as *we* have said in our thoughtlessness, to an *untimely* end, — who of us has not felt that there is constantly going on within our own fraternity, a sacrifice, a loss, a prodigality in expenditure of power and life, the worth of which only God appreciates? Precious in the sight of the Lord is the death of his saints!

But this is the method of God's working. His plans have this evidence of their greatness, that they go on with that which to us appears like waste. The earth every year produces food sufficient for three times its burden of inhabi-

¹ Rev. David Tappan Stoddard died at Oroomiah, Jan. 22. 1857

² The Convention of Congregational Ministers of Massachusetts are the almoners of a fund for the aid of the families of deceased clergymen.

tants. The sun wastes two-thirds of its beams on trackless waters and deserts. The stars are not put out like your street lamps, when the traveller has no further need of them. Poets have sung of flowers that waste their sweetness. God works on a generous scale. Even of suffering he is not sparing in the laws of his providence. How much of apparently useless suffering is endured under the laws of disease! What a waste of life do we see everywhere in the death of the young! In this seeming prodigality of the divine procedure, we see evidence that God has plans too deep for us to fathom. And these plans run under the two systems of nature and of grace alike. Our God is one God; and therefore it is, that we believe he *will* do his pleasure in the conversion of this world, as he *has* done his pleasure in its creation and its government. It is fixed — in the purposes of him who said, “Let there be light and there was light” — it is fixed, that this world is to be converted to Jesus Christ.

ARTICLE VII.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

1.—HENRY BULLINGER’S LIFE AND SELECT WRITINGS.¹

NEXT to the principal reformers of the sixteenth century in Germany, few, if any, present a more useful and instructive life than Bullinger of Zurich. If he had not the daring and heroism of Luther, the graceful erudition and softness of Melanchthon, the acuteness and pungency of Zuingli, or the merciless logic of Calvin, he had fewer defects of temperament than any one of these. He was always sober and self-possessed, judicious and wise, firm and conciliating. Though his character was almost faultless, it

¹ Henry Bullinger’s Life and Select Writings, from Unpublished and Contemporary Authorities, by Carl Pestalozzi: Elberfeld, 1858, pp. 646. (Heinrich Bullinger, Leben und Ausgewählte Schriften.)

was far from being negative. He was singularly self-reliant and independent in his opinions, earnest, conscientious, and faithful in his duties, and at the same time possessed of that fearlessness and energy which made him the leading man in Switzerland during that critical period which intervened between the death of Zuingli and the height of Calvin's power at Geneva. In those times of prostration and despondency, when the Swiss Protestants were humbled by the fatal battle of Cappel, in which Zuingli fell, no character seemed better adapted to rally the strength of the Protestants, unite them in a common cause, complete the church organization, which Zuingli left in an imperfect state, and create a strong bulwark against the insolent power of the Papal party, than the man whom Providence selected to succeed Zuingli at Zurich. Almost every chapter of his life contains a lesson of the soundest practical wisdom. Unerring in his judgment, clear and well settled in his opinions, strong and convincing in the obvious correctness of his positions, he knew how to instruct the uninformed, to expose the cunning and deceitful, to confound and baffle the perverse, and to inspire and carry with him all good and fair-minded men. No one can rise from the perusal of this exhaustive and admirable life of the second reformer of Zurich without feeling the truth of every word we have now uttered. Everything, from the beginning, conduced to make him a reformer. His father, though a priest, lived in wedlock, against the doctrines of the church; and when Samson sold indulgences in Switzerland, as Tetzl did in Saxony, this courageous priest resisted him, and said he would do so to the end, "even though it should cost him his life." At that time Zuingli had been only two months in Zurich. Bullinger's father conquered, and Samson was obliged to leave Switzerland.

On an elevated bank of the Reuss, a few miles west of Zurich, stands the village of Bremgarten, where Henry Bullinger was born July 18, 1504. The first twelve years of his life were spent in his native place. In his third year he could read well and repeat the creed and the Lord's prayer. As a boy he would often steal into the church, ascend the pulpit, and preach to the empty pews. From his fifth to his twelfth year he attended the elementary school of his own village. After that, he was sent far from home to a school eminent for learning and the spirit of piety which prevailed in it. Most of the learned schools of Germany were then in a very corrupt state. Pupils wandered from place to place, begging and stealing alternately as they travelled, and remaining but a few months at any one school. The elder Bullinger, therefore, placed his son in one of the schools of the Brethren of the Life in Common, of which Ullmann gives such a full account in his "Reformers before the Reformation." The boy first left his home July 11, 1516, and took passage in a boat and sailed nearly the whole length of the Rhine to the last town in Germany before entering the Netherlands, to Emerich in Cleves, where a flourishing Latin school of the Brethren then existed. Here he learned not only to read, write, and speak Latin, but, what was more important, acquired those habits of great assiduity and self-contemplation, characteristic of the school, which proved of

the greatest use to him in after life. Here he remained three years, and, at the end of his preparatory course, repaired to the university of Cologne. It would seem that his resorting to a university so bitterly opposed to the Reformation, would be unfavorable to his religious character. After studying logic and the Roman classics, learning by heart the whole of the *Æneid*, he devoted himself to the Sentences of Lombardus for his theology, and to the Decretals of Gratian for ecclesiastical law. Observing that these authors referred continually to earlier writers, to the church Fathers, he read Chrysostom, Ambrose, Origen, and Augustine, and found they taught a different kind of Christianity from that represented in the Sentences and Decretals. Some of the writings of Luther afterwards fell into his hands, in which, as in the Fathers, he found constant reference made to the scriptures. He therefore procured a copy of the New Testament, and studied it with the aid of Jerome's Commentaries; and, at last, read Melancthon's *Loci*. Thus, by degrees, and by a natural course, was Bullinger led, from the study of the scholastic theology to the study of primitive Christianity, and his religious opinions formed upon his own personal investigations and reflections. He always regarded himself as standing within the church, and met his opponents with the statement that they had departed from its true standards, the scriptures, and the Fathers which adhered to them. After three years' residence in Cologne he returned, in the spring of 1522, to Bremgarten, and spent the residue of the year in study, and in confirming his new faith by reading Athanasius, Cyprian, and Lactantius, and in perfecting himself in the Latin classics and in Latin composition. Ten miles south of Zurich and about as far south-east of Bremgarten, is situated the cloister of Cappel, on the southern declivity of the Albis, commanding a beautiful view of the basin of Lake Zug, of Mount Pilatus and Rigi beyond, and, far in the distance, of the snowy summits of the whole circuit of the Alps. To this place Bullinger was invited by the pious abbot, to take charge of the new cloister school established by him. The invitation was accepted on condition that he be left entirely free in matters of religion, and have nothing to do with monastic superstitions. He taught the Latin classics four hours each day, and delivered theological lectures one hour every forenoon. He not only lectured on all the books of the New Testament, with the aid of the commentaries of the best of the Fathers, but on Erasmus's Introduction to the Study of Theology, and even on Melancthon's *Loci*. These lectures were attended by the abbot, by all the monks, and by other persons living in the vicinity, especially in Zug. Reformatory doctrines were, in reality, inculcated by Bullinger; which, finally, called forth violent opposition from persons who lived over the line of the adjoining territory of Zug, which was strongly Catholic, while the canton of Zurich, to which Cappel belonged, was under the influence of Zuingli. It was near the end of his first year in Cappel (1527), that Bullinger first heard Zuingli preach, and made his personal acquaintance. He was greatly delighted both with the preaching and the amiable and frank character of the Zurich reformer. "I felt," said he, "the more drawn to him,

because I had already, for four years, been a zealous adherent to the same doctrines. "I was greatly confirmed by his powerful, just, and scriptural teachings." These words define accurately the relation of Bullinger to Zuingli: not that of a dependent pupil, leaning upon his teacher; but that of a younger friend, already prepared to become an able and vigorous coadjutor. The work of the Reformation was begun by Zuingli as its leader and champion; but was completed by Bullinger as its protector and defender in times of greatest peril, and as the founder of the church system that was afterwards organized. How admirably were these men paired together: Zuingli, quick and fiery; Bullinger, quiet and gentle; Zuingli, sharp and witty; Bullinger, cool and thorough. During the six years that he remained at Cappel, he wrote many treatises bearing upon the reformation, which were circulated among the people with great effect. The cloister itself was reformed, and finally abolished.

In 1529 he succeeded his father as preacher in his native place; where, for two or three years, he labored with great success in grounding the people in the doctrines of the Reformation. Near the close of this period, war broke out between the Catholic cantons and the canton of Zurich, in which the latter was defeated, Zuingli slain, Bremgarten captured, and Bullinger obliged to flee to Zurich for safety. How changed was Zurich! It was no longer what it was when Zuingli was the soul both of the state and the church. He and many of his powerful friends, seven of the Smaller Council, nineteen of the Greater, and twenty-five preachers, had fallen in battle. The enemies of reform, in the city, gathered strength and took courage. The latter became timid. Bullinger was urged to come to the rescue by appearing in the pulpit of the great minster and rallying the friends of the gospel around its standard. He did so with indescribable effect. He came forward with such courage and power, so boldly denounced the sins of the people, and so pressed upon them the consideration of God's manifest judgments, that they were reminded of the eloquence and zeal of their former teacher, and expressed the desire that Bullinger might be chosen as his successor. The choice was accordingly made, by the Greater Council, a few days after.

The evangelical ministers had been accused of exciting the people against the government, and the city authorities had promised to the state or canton that it would prohibit such preaching hereafter. All the clergy were summoned to appear before the council of Two Hundred. The burgomaster announced the election of Bullinger to the place vacated by the death of Zuingli; and then enjoined upon all the ministers, in their discourses, to confine themselves to the Gospel, and let all secular matters alone. Bullinger saw the importance of the moment and the evil consequences that might arise from one false step taken at such a time. He had the firmness to say that he could not accept the appointment without a clearer understanding of what was meant by this restriction. He requested time to confer with his brethren. A masterly reply to the restriction was drawn up by Bullinger, and presented to the council the following Wednesday. The

points in it were : that they would willingly preach the Gospel in a peaceful and orderly way ; but as there was an eternal strife between good and evil, truth and error, the gospel must often disturb wicked men ; it must have its edge ; the salt, if it is good for anything, must have its savor. We are required to let secular matters alone. That will we do, so far as the gospel will allow. We will follow the scriptures in this matter. Are not the writings of Moses and of the prophets full of things that relate to secular affairs ? We shall be satisfied with all you require, if you will only leave us free and unrestrained to preach the doctrines and precepts of the Bible. *The word of God must not be bound.* The young orator spoke before the highest council of the land, before scholars, senators, and generals, as became a man who knew the dignity of his sacred office. It produced great sensation. A warm discussion ensued, after the ministers withdrew, which lasted three hours. One party insisted on adhering to the letter of the restricting clauses, thinking thereby to weaken the power of the Reformation. The other party contended that the young preacher was right ; that if they insisted on gagging the pulpit, the clergy would resign, as Bullinger had intimated. All they ask is, that they may be free to preach according to the scriptures. The simple question is, whether they shall be allowed to adhere to the Bible, or not. The latter party prevailed ; and the decision communicated to the preachers was, " that they should be left free to preach the Bible without restraint and without conditions."

This is a fair specimen of the wisdom, candor, and firmness of the new pastor at Zurich. It were easy to multiply examples equally striking. But our space does not allow. This one must here stand as the representative of many.

Bullinger had now found his true position, and entered upon a most important sphere of duty, in which he continued with honor and success for a period of forty-four years. We cannot follow him through the whole of his long career. Let us rather cast a glance at the work that was now before him. Zuingli had begun the work of reformation, but was cut off in the midst of it, and a stormy period of reaction had commenced. It required the greatest effort to maintain the ground already won, and still more to fortify it, and make it the centre of operations for further conquests. The church organization was to be completed ; a system of education to be established ; the legislation of the canton to be conformed to Christian and Protestant principles. Indeed, a great work of religious, social, and political reorganization was to be accomplished in the midst of bitter opposition from the Catholics, and of controversy and angry contention with the ultra Lutheran party in Germany. Zurich itself was not then the orderly, high-minded, straight-forward and industrious community that it was afterwards. Mercenary warfare, with corruption, luxury, and wild disorder, as its fruits, endangered the peace and stability of society. To meet these evils and hold them in check, and to combine and strengthen the elements of order required immovable firmness and assiduous labor, coupled with uncommon wisdom and patience.

Inasmuch as evangelical principles had not yet permeated society, it was necessary in reorganizing a Christian state to consult, even in civil matters, those who were acknowledged to be the ablest exponents of Christianity. No important question, in state affairs, in legislation, in internal administration, or foreign relations, no event affecting the city or canton of Zurich, or its evangelical allies, or the Swiss church, could occupy the public mind, without requiring the particular attention of the pastor of the Zurich minister. Hundreds of such subjects were, by the public authorities, laid before Bullinger and his associates, for their opinions. Bullinger showed so much composure and skill, so much prudence and care, so much zeal and goodness in all these cases, as to win general confidence and acquire an almost unbounded influence. Instead of being a servile imitator of Zuingli, as Luther's followers were of him, he avoided the faults of his predecessor, and established and maintained a better order of things than Zuingli himself would have done.

Among the numerous cares and labors of the new reformer, none perhaps are more interesting to us than those which relate to education. An attempt was made to secularize the foundations of the collegiate church, and apply the funds to defray the expenses of the late war with the Catholics. Bullinger opposed the measure, and insisted on preserving the public faith by adhering, as near as possible, to the purpose for which the funds were originally given, by converting the establishment into a preachers' seminary, where old and middle-aged preachers, no less than young candidates for the ministry, should prosecute their biblical and theological studies. Thus did Bullinger make ample provision for theological education, which, for three centuries, has shed its light and blessing upon Zurich and upon Switzerland. In the university in which the languages, history, mathematics, and the natural sciences were taught, the theological faculty was most prominent, and was provided with four professors at the outset. There was a gymnasium with a rector, a conrector, and several teachers, in the city; and a progymnasium, or lower Latin school, in Cappel. Scholarships were established for students of superior talents and character—three at first—which were gradually increased, by Bullinger's care and economy, till they amounted to eighty. The most distinguished young men were, after completing their course, sent abroad, at the public expense, to study in foreign universities. The largest number were sent to Basle, as being near at hand. Fries, afterwards rector of the gymnasium, was sent to Strasbourg and to Paris; Conrad Gesner, the well-known naturalist, to Strasbourg and to Bourges, where the celebrated Wolmar was classical teacher; Werdmüller, afterwards professor in Zurich, to Wittenburg; Rudolf Gwalter, Bullinger's successor, to several universities successively.

In the various conferences and colloquies held with the leading theologians of Switzerland and Germany, he showed the same traits of character, the same wisdom and balance of mind, which appeared in all his public acts, and which distinguished him so much from the violence of Luther, the timidity of Melancthon, the heat of Calvin, and the chameleon character of Bu-

cer and the Strasburg theologians. In temper and manner, he was a model of a Christian controversialist: less able, and yet more convincing, than Zuingli or Calvin. Bullinger was the warm and steady friend of the latter, notwithstanding some differences of opinion that existed between them. He was equally the generous and firm supporter of Farel in his troubles. With Melancthon he was always on good terms, and exchanged many letters in respect to a union between the German and Swiss churches. For Luther he cherished respect; but felt obliged to defend himself and the Swiss theologians against his severe attacks. A friendly correspondence between them was finally resumed. He showed great kindness to the refugees who resorted to him from Italy and England: to Bolsec, Ochino, Curioni, Vergerio, and especially Peter Martyr; to Hooper, Parker, Jewell, and many others. With Bucer, Capito, and others in Strasburg, and Brentz in Suabia, he was intimately acquainted, but did not sympathize with them in their views of the eucharist. Laski, who successively resided in different countries, was a dear friend to him through life. Pellican the great orientalist, Grynæus the learned professor at Basle, and Vadian the able and pious statesman, and burgomaster of St. Gall, were men before whom he bowed with a respect which was fully reciprocated, and with whom he had confidential intercourse through life. Musculus of Augsburg, when driven away by the victorious Catholics in the Schmalcald war, was, with his wife and nine children, supported by Bullinger for six months. Myconius of Basle was one of his dearest and most intimate friends, as were Blaarer of Constance and Haller of Berne. At home he was greatly beloved by the professors and clergy, and by the leading men of the government, and especially by the two burgomasters Roist and Haab, and by the elder Lavater.

About three years before his removal from Bremgarten to Zurich, Bullinger had married a superior lady of good family in Zurich, who had been in a nunnery. The letter, eight pages long, in which he wooed his bride, is still extant; and, by its admirable style and character, and earnest, frank, and delicate spirit, shows that he understood his business in that private affair as well as in more public matters. The letter was an effectual address to the religious sentiment, the intellect, and the heart, and, in ten days, brought a favorable reply. Her dignified carriage in future life, her frugal housewifery, her hospitality, her entire sympathy with her husband in promoting all the interests of religion, and especially in aiding and even supporting the distressed and persecuted, rendered her, in every respect, a suitable consort for such a man. When he removed to Zurich in 1531, his family consisted of only his wife and two children. On his removal from his first residence in the "Green Castle," in 1536, to the new parsonage, which for three centuries has since been the abode of the "Antistes of Zurich," as the first preacher of the city is called, his household consisted of fifteen persons. He, at the outset, took into his family the widow of Zuingli and her two orphan children. Her daughter Regula grew up to be a stately and accomplished young lady, and was married to Gwalter, who had

also been reared in the house of Bullinger, and who became his successor in office. Ulrich Zuingli, the reformer's son, who by his success in study rewarded the care bestowed upon him, after entering the ministerial office in 1549, married Bullinger's eldest daughter Anna. His father, dean Bullinger (who lost his estate in the Cappel war), and his mother, both lived with their son, most of the time, till their death. Of his own children, eleven in number, two died early. His eldest son, Henry, was a distinguished scholar, having studied theology in Strasburg and Wittenburg, after finishing his course in Zurich. He married Gwalter's daughter, was his assistant as preacher at St. Peter's, and his successor as pastor on the promotion of the latter to the place of Bullinger, at his decease, in 1575. The second son pursued a similar course, but was less distinguished. The third son became a knight in the service of Philip of Hesse, furnished eight horsemen in time of war, and finally died near Chalons, in the unfortunate campaign of William of Orange against France. Ludwig Lavater, son of the distinguished general and ambassador Rudolf Lavater, married Bullinger's second daughter, and was himself, finally, Antistes of Zurich. Another daughter was married to the no less celebrated Josias Simler.

In this remarkable family circle did Bullinger find his chief recreation. "His distinguished sons-in-law," says his biographer, "Josias Simler, Ludwig Lavater, and Ulrich Zuingli the younger, as well as the somewhat elder Rudolf Gwalter, his former foster-son, were truly his, having been educated under him, and now united with him in literary and theological pursuits." "For his recreation he went occasionally, in company with his friends, to the castle Kyburg, and to Winterthur, where his old friend Ambrosius Blaarer resided, or to Eglisau, Rheinfell, or to his son's residence in Berg. — To Urdorf he was accompanied by his son-in-law Zuingli, and by his brother John, preacher in Cappel, and by his brother-in-law Stadler, while his associates Gwalter, Lavater, Wolf, Collin, Ammann, and many others, visited him and were hospitably entertained by him. In Gyrenbad were with him, besides his brother and wife, his two daughters Dorothea and Veritas, then (1567) twenty-two and twenty-four years old. In 1571, the two last, together with his two sons, visited this watering-place, "and returned by God's mercy," he says in his diary, "fresh and sound." On these occasions it was no uncommon thing to receive from friends tokens of affection and respect. In 1571, the dean of the chapter at Winterthur, brought him a goblet in behalf of the clergy; a deputation, a fine, large goblet from twenty-four members of the Great Council of Zurich; and another deputation, a covered goblet from twenty-four masters and journeymen. On his return to Zurich he, according to custom, invited these forty-eight friends to an entertainment.

It is necessary, here, to turn from these joyful scenes to others more painful and sad. Death made fearful ravages among his friends. The two professors, Werdmüller and Wolf, who were his faithful associates and assistants, the former of whom had been educated under his care, were removed by death. The years 1564 and 1565, in which the plague pre-

ailed, proved fatal to many of his dearest friends. Calvin, Bibliander, and Hyperius of Marburg, died in 1564. He himself, who had so often visited, unharmed, those who were dying with the epidemic, was himself seized with the plague, and, under its festering sores, lay two days in unconsciousness. In the midst of his peril, his wife, who forgot herself in her solicitude for him, was also seized, and died the ninth day. In little more than a month afterwards, his daughter Margaret, the wife of Lavater, was attacked and died. At this time he writes to his particular friend Fabritius: "To you I write my first letter, I cannot say after my sickness, but in my sickness. If the Lord did not wonderfully sustain me, I know not how I could ever recover under blow upon blow and affliction upon affliction. It is six weeks since he removed my dearest wife from me. You know what she was to me, and can easily conceive of my grief. But now, only five weeks later, on the same day of the week on which she was buried, my daughter Margaret is carried to her grave, having also fallen a victim to the plague." To his friend Blaarer he wrote, that they two were the oldest of the Swiss ministers. If he himself should never rise from his bed of sickness, he would soon follow. Blaarer was, within a few weeks, another victim of the plague. Farel was now the only clergyman in Switzerland older than Bullinger, and he died the next September. The contagion raged fearfully, and thousands were swept away by it. In Rheinfeld, Bullinger's brother-in-law and all his children, except the youngest, were carried off. In 1565, in the month of November, his foster-daughter, Regula Zuingli, daughter of the Reformer and wife of Gwalter, and his own two daughters, the wife of Simler and the wife of the younger Zuingli, were torn from him by the same destroyer. In December, of the same year, he writes: "Last night died Conrad Gessner, that rare ornament not only of Zurich, but of Switzerland. He continued his work till his last breath. Yesterday he was still writing, and requested me to say farewell for him, to his friends, all of whom were known to me, in the emperor's court, in Germany, France, England, and Italy. He gave me his hand, declared his dying faith and his hope of eternal life through Christ, and took his leave of me." In the same year, he was called to part with his brother-in-law Stadler, and his dear friend John Fabritius, preacher in Chur. "May God have compassion on me," he exclaimed a few years after, "that I must outlive all my dear faithful brethren, Leo, Pellican, Bibliander, Gessner, Peter Martyr, Otto, Megander, and Fries. Not a single one is now living, of all who served the church when I was called of God fifty years ago." He followed his friends, in 1575, after a life of rare usefulness and honor.

2. — DRUMANN'S HISTORY OF BONIFACE THE EIGHTH.¹

THERE was a period when the political power of Papal Rome rose above its ordinary level, like a mountain ridge from a high table-land. This extraordinary elevation began with Gregory VII., reached its height in Innocent III., and ended with Boniface VIII. The first sat on the Papal throne from 1073 to 1085; the second from 1198 to 1216; the third from 1294 to 1303. Boniface "crept into power like fox, ruled like lion, and died like a dog." So thought his contemporaries. Gregory created his own power by the astonishing force of his character. Innocent asserted and maintained his like an emperor. Boniface came upon the stage too late, making all the display of authority claimed by the greatest of his predecessors, after the age in which it was possible to exercise it had passed away. The charm of the papacy was broken; and Philip le Bel, of France, who was as haughty and daring as Boniface himself, set limits to his authority and reduced his successors to the rank of vassals of the French crown. These were the days of the weakness and humiliation of Rome, "the Period of the Captivity," when, for seventy years, the popes resided at Avignon, in France. Boniface may be said to be the last of the popes, in the same sense as Brutus was the last of the Romans. No Roman pontiff after him ruled over nations as others had done before him, and as he himself vainly attempted to do. Had he lived in an earlier age, he would have been more successful. But both temporal rulers and the people at large, had come to a consciousness of their rights; the terror of the ban ceased to be felt when there was no power to enforce it; and the people began to learn that popes could be subdued and humbled, no less than kings, when they exceeded the just limits of their power.

The history of the pontificate of Boniface is an epitome of the history of Europe for nine years. The shortness of the period and the extent of the theatre of action render it most convenient to arrange the subject by topics, without any further division of time. Such is the method adopted by the author. Both Italy and Europe were in a state of tumult, as was the case throughout the Middle Ages. Questions between the church and the several states, between rival powers, from the empire down to the smallest feudal lord, between sovereigns and their more powerful barons, were settled by force, if they were settled at all. But the truth is, nothing was permanently settled. That which appeared so was disturbed the moment either party acquired the power to support its claims.

The attention of the Roman Pontiff was first directed to Sicily, of which he claimed to be the feudal lord. His predecessors had favored its separation from Naples, in order that Rome might have two weak vassals instead of one strong one, either of which could be used as a check upon the other.

¹ Geschichte Bonifacius des Achten, von W. Drumann, in zwei Theilen. Königsberg, 1852. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 252 and 270.

But Frederic and his Sicilians determined to be independent: and, though the Pope, with the assistance of Naples, and even with the encouragement of France and Spain, attempted to subdue the island through a protracted and desperate struggle, Frederic remained invincible, and Sicily maintained its position in defiance of the haughty Pontiff.

The authority of the Roman bishop was not limited to Naples and Sicily. "He was by God placed over all kings and kingdoms." "Hungary belonged to him in a peculiar manner. Its first Christian king, knowing that no one should receive such an honor, except as he was called to it of God, had surrendered it to the vicar of Christ, and then received as a gift the diadem from him, and from no other one." Such are the words of Boniface, when he claimed the right to settle the succession between the rival pretenders to the throne of Hungary. The contest was not ended during his life; and it was not till after his death that the claimant whose cause he had espoused, Charles Robert, succeeded and was made king of Hungary.

The next contest of Boniface with the secular powers related to the crown of Poland. Wenzeslav II., of Bohemia, had been chosen king of Poland and had assumed the title. The Pontiff claimed Poland as a fief, and threatened the king with the ban and excommunication if he persisted in claiming the crown. The latter, however, continued to do so, and his son after him did the same, and not till after the death of both parties did the crown revert to the rival claimant, Wladislaw of Poland.

Erich VIII., of Denmark, imprisoned the primate of Sweden, for which he was put under the ban and interdict, with a heavy mulct, by Boniface. After eight years of strife, and only one year before the death of the Pope, Erich submitted.

In the rivalries and jealousies which existed between Venice and Genoa, then contending for supremacy in the Levant, and which finally broke out into open warfare, the Bishop of Rome attempted to impose his authority as supreme arbiter, but without effect. They disregarded the ban and interdict, continued the war as long as they pleased, and then finally concluded a treaty of peace without any reference whatever to the will of the Pope.

But the long continued and desperate struggle of the Papacy with Philip le Bel of France, and Edward I. of England, exceeded all others in interest and importance, inasmuch as on its issue hung, as in a trembling balance, the fate of the spiritual or temporal supremacy. The contest, conducted with consummate ability on both sides, and with a boldness and energy that indicated a full comprehension of the magnitude of the interests at stake, was decisive, and resulted in a defeat of the Pontiff so humiliating that it caused his death.

As a prelude to the opening scene of this great contest, may be regarded the war between England and France, originating in the jealousy and ambition of Edward and Philip, distinguished both as warriors and as statesmen, and involving as allies Flanders on the one hand and Scotland on the other. This is the interesting period of English and Scottish history when Baliol and Wallace contended against Edward, the latter pretending to be

the feudal lord of Scotland, and under that pretence claiming the right to settle the disputed succession. France espoused the cause of Scotland, and the Roman Bishop, as superior to both, undertook to act as arbiter, which Philip resented as an insult, acknowledging no superior on earth in temporal things.

The seat of the war was at length transferred to Flanders, the ally of England. In the armistice for two years, which was concluded through the mediation of Boniface, it was stipulated that his act should be considered as that of a private individual, and not as Bishop of Rome. But, by afterwards proclaiming the armistice officially, and authoritatively requiring the fulfilment of its conditions, he gave new offence to France. The breach between the parties was made complete when the Pope issued his notorious bull, "*Clericis Laicos*," in which he put under the ban all laymen (meaning Philip especially) who levied contributions on the clergy, and all clergymen who should comply with the requisition. This step led to a somewhat spicy correspondence. The bishop, after some further provocation, wrote, or rather was, by Philip's ministers, represented as having written, to the king thus:

Bonafacius episcopus, servus servorum Dei, Philippo Francorum regi. Deum time, et mandata ejus observa. Scire te volumus, quod in spiritualibus et temporalibus nobis subes. Beneficiorum et præbendarum ad te collatio nulla spectat. Et si aliquorum vacantium custodiam habeas, fructus eorum successoribus reserves. Et si quæ contulisti, collationem hujusmodi irritam decernimus et, quantum de facto processerit, revocamus. Aliud autem credentes hæreticos reputamus. Datum Laterani.

To which this tart reply was made :

Philippus, Dei gratia Francorum rex. Bonifacio se gerenti pro summo pontifice salutem modicam seu nullam. Sciat maxima tua fatuitas in temporalibus nos alicui non subesse ; ecclesiarum ac præbendarum vacantium collationem ad nos jure regio pertinere ; fructus earum nostros facere ; collationes a nobis hactenus factas et in posterum faciendas fore validas in præteritum et futurum, et earum possessores contra omnes viriliter nos tueri. Secus autem credentes fatuos ac dementes reputamus. Datum Parisiis.

This reminds us of the correspondence between Maria Theresa and Frederic the Great, who claimed Silesia, which the Empress refused, in these words : *Silesiam astra dant ;* which were sent back with a different division of the syllables, thus : *Sile, si amas, tradant.*

The Pope explained, and in explaining retracted in part, and a temporary peace, or rather a state of mutual forbearance, followed.

The contest between Boniface and Philip at length became more and more determined. Each resolved to stake everything upon the result. As it was a conflict between the temporal and spiritual powers, it was the more important that the king of France should have the moral sentiments of the French people on his side. In other words, the king must make sure of the favor and of the support of the Gallician Church. The task was a delicate and difficult one, but was performed with consummate ability. The

church was not left to independent and separate action, but a national assembly was called in which the church was represented; and to bring the greater secular influence to bear upon it, the third estate was for the first time called to the councils of the nation. In such an assembly of the nation the clergy must either act in concert with the other estates, or hazard the good will both of the king, the nobility, and the people. The clergy knew their own interests too well to cling to the Pope at the expense of losing the sympathy of those on whom they were chiefly dependent.

To complete the moral impression upon the people, a formal accusation was brought by able jurists in the king's interest against the Pope, before the national assembly. It was easily proved that he had improperly used his pontifical power, and that there were good reasons for not acknowledging him as head of the church. Although such action by the French people could not dethrone the Roman bishop, it had all the desired moral effect of rendering his anathemas harmless. This being done, it was easy for the French monarch not only to maintain himself, but to overthrow his deadly enemy by his superior physical force. The means, however, resorted to, of employing intriguing and desperate men, and bitter enemies, to seize him with a few hundred hired ruffians, in Anagni, his villa, and dishonor him, were disreputable and unjustifiable. But the effect was decisive. The Pope was not only humbled, but, in the weakness of old age, soon died of grief and mortification, and his successors were brought entirely under French influence, and into a state of dependence on the king's will. The residence of the Popes at Avignon, which followed, was a fatal blow to the mediæval papacy. The charm was broken, and the great powers of Europe have never since feared the power of the Roman See. All this prepared the way for the great councils of Constance, Basle, and Pisa, and for the Protestant Reformation.

8. — CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY IN THE PRESENT AGE: A HISTORICAL VIEW BY DR. WILLIAM HERBST.¹

EVER since the first French Revolution, there has been a tendency in a large class of individuals in all parts of Europe to pay less regard to the past as shaping the affairs of mankind, and more to theoretical and philosophical views of society. Even in Germany, whose scholars have been supposed to live more in the past than in the present, the influence of the Revolution was felt, and many individuals were led to theorize upon society and government in a manner unknown to their ancestors. This tendency among the thoughtful, which, from motives of prudence, was kept partly concealed from the government for more than half a century, manifested itself more openly in the July Revolution of 1830, and broke over all barriers in 1848. Though both revolutions were suppressed, and the old political order was re-

¹ Das Classische Alterthum in der Gegenwart, eine geschichtliche Betrachtung, von Dr. Wilhelm Herbst. Leipzig, 1852. pp. 224. 8vo.

stored, the current of human thought and speculation has kept on, and the convictions of the active and enterprising men of the age have received a modern type which nothing can efface. As in France, so in Germany, though in a much less degree, the veneration for antiquity has declined; and in this altered state of things, the study of the ancient classics is materially affected. It is the object of the author to discuss the subject under this particular point of view, and to inquire what importance ought to be attached to the literature of Greece and Rome in the present new era in German history. The work before us is not a new defence of classical learning after the manner of Niethammer's reply to the Philanthropists, but a more general view of the connection of the past with the present, as a condition of the progress of society. For a period of twenty years, there has been in pamphlets and literary journals, a warm discussion of what is called "the school question;" that is, the adjustment between classical and other studies in the higher schools. With the flippant writers, who would brush all antiquity away, as being of no further use to society, the author has little to do. Such men he does not consider as worthy of anything more than a passing notice. He sees in the nature of the subject, and in the deductions of history, an invincible argument in favor of the study of antiquity. But he believes there is evidence that the golden age of philology has passed away; that with all their increased knowledge of the ancient world, philologists still want the enthusiasm and inspiration of their predecessors. The cause of this change is twofold; first the study was over-valued; and secondly, the interest of the people in subjects purely intellectual, is yielding to that which relates to material things. When classical literature was pursued in connection with the national literature, as in the time of Winckelmann, Lessing, Herder, Klopstock, and the Schlegels, it had vitality and power; but when it was separated from modern life, the antiquaries formed a caste by themselves, and society at large was swept along by the current of present material interests. That period of predominant classical influence was followed by the present, in which the Romantic school has the ascendancy. The newly awakened study of the old German dialects and history, and the purely speculative character of the prevailing Hegelian philosophy, both tended to withdraw attention from antiquity.

The corrective lies in first showing that the formative power of ancient literature over modern nations is not yet exhausted, but is still necessary to the most complete mental development—as can be demonstrated with irresistible force from historical evidence,—and secondly, in arranging plans of study and directing education so as to connect the past with the present, and in aiming directly, by means of ancient learning, to train men in a manner better adapted to the present wants of society.

Besides the most perfect development of the intellectual faculties, by a proper combination of classical studies with others of a different character, which is the first object in a thorough system of education, there is needed for the largest practical influence, that knowledge and comprehension of the ancient world, of its philosophy, its arts, and civilization in general, which

shall give one a commanding view of the progress of society, and enable him to understand, not only the general laws of history, but, on all practical subjects, to see in the tendencies of the past and present combined a prophecy, as it were, of the future.

There is also a certain crudeness or tendency to extravagance in the intellectual character of a people who have risen to power without the influence of ancient culture. The energetic, but irregular, soaring and extravagant German mind was trained to symmetry, order, and moderation, by the spirit of the classic writers and artists of antiquity. A substantial form and just proportions were given to its volatile, ideal thoughts, and a unity and harmony to its multiform conceptions. The study of the beautiful in connection with all the productions of human genius, operated as a preventive of the aberrations to which the German intellect is most exposed. Even the language of the Germans, both in prose and poetry, was polished and perfected in its form by the influence of the ancient classics. Let any one compare the language as it was before the time of Klopstock and Lessing, with what it is at the present day, and he will understand what we mean. The irregularities which are beginning to creep into our most recent literature, and to deform the works even of men of genius, are the natural result of the change above-mentioned, in the studies and spirit of the age, and can be best remedied by returning to the essential principles of taste, as exemplified in the Grecian models of literature and art.

The schools have an important problem to solve, namely, how they can adapt themselves to society without surrendering their hold on ancient learning. The exigency will not be met by any new adjustment of the *quantity* of classic and other studies, conceding to the latter what was denied them before. It is rather in the *manner* of conducting classical study, than in diminishing its amount, that a treaty of peace and amity is to be concluded between the high contracting parties—ancient literature and modern science. Divine Providence has ordained that men in Christian countries shall come to an understanding of their historical position in the world, by proceeding in their knowledge from Christianity, and the ancient world, through all the centuries till they reach the present. In this manner they can view society in its grand movement, knowing not only what it is, but whence it came, and whither it is tending. This is to be the guiding principle in reviving ancient learning. The aim should be, not so much the multiplication of studies,—something outward and objective,—as the unity of knowledge by a powerful internal organ,—by the mind itself as an instrument of thought, bringing all its attainments around one common centre. Antiquity is to be studied, not only for its formal influence upon intellectual tastes and habits, but for the purpose of being comprehended as a whole, so that it may exist in the mind as a grand organism, with all its fulness of ideas and facts. The study is to be pursued so as to illustrate antique life in its whole extent. All its phases and forms are to be viewed in comparison with their correspondencies in modern society. Every branch of ancient literature is to be compared with what answers to it in modern literature, so that the pupil

shall have, in the end, a knowledge of the present age, viewed in the light of the past. With a historical foundation thus laid, it will be possible, in more advanced stages, to complete a fabric of substantial knowledge which will qualify one to act intelligently upon the great interests of society. Such is the spirit of the work under review, and we commend it to those who think that the present age has no more to do with antiquity, and that it can look philosophically into the present, and prophetically into the future without looking first historically into the past.

4.—VOIGT'S NEW NECROLOGY OF THE GERMANS.¹

THIS is an annual obituary of distinguished Germans, which appeared regularly for thirty years, when it closed with the sixtieth volume, for want of patronage. It is particularly interesting to Americans, as covering the whole period which has intervened since their intimacy with German literature commenced. Scarcely a man whom they have known, either personally or through his published works, has died in Germany during this time, whose name will not appear in these volumes.

The work is not a continuation of Schlichtegroll's *Nekrolog der Deutschen*, which extended from 1790 to 1806, in twenty-nine volumes, but is rather a revival of it, after it had been interrupted by the French war, and discontinued for sixteen years. Nothing better shows the value of such a work, than the impossibility of filling up that chasm by any knowledge to be derived from all the books extant.

The New Necrology contains notices of over forty thousand individuals, all the eminent Germans who died during that period of thirty years, with hardly an exception. The spirit of the entire life of the nation is given in the history of so many of its most distinguished men. The work is limited to no class. Every one who has done honor to his calling, or influenced the public mind, or in any way materially affected the condition of the people, has his proper place, and his proportionate degree of attention in the collection. What a treasure will this be to the future historian! What completeness will it give, in all coming ages, to the knowledge of that limited period! Scarcely any question relating to the internal history of Germany, during those thirty years, can arise, which will not be set in a clear light by the many-sided views furnished in the lives of the various individuals who were concerned in the transactions to which it refers. In this manner we obtain, not the cold generalizations of the grave historian, which are indeed very necessary in their place, but the warm pulsations of the hearts of individuals, giving vitality to the otherwise lifeless mass of materials. The complex web of public sentiment is seen in its primitive form, and even in the act of formation from its original elements. Such a minute analysis of

¹ The New Necrology of the Germans, by B. F. Voigt. Weimar, 1823—1853. (*Neuer Nekrolog der Deutschen*.)

the structure of society furnishes a means of comprehending it, second only to that of living in the midst of the events themselves.

Of the forty thousand names which appear in the work, the greater part, of course, are found in the obituary list at the end of each volume, with a very brief notice, occupying from two to about twenty lines. Only leading characters have a full biography. Men of inferior note have their lives sketched more or less extensively, according to their relative importance. Herein consists the chief difference between the *New Necrology* and that of *Schlichtegroll*. The latter limited itself to a small number, and was, in fact, a series of biographical essays, and nothing more. They were, however, well selected, and well written. The last volume of the former work, that for the year 1852, embraces twelve hundred and sixty-nine names, three hundred of which have biographies, longer or shorter, attached to them. Of these three hundred persons, the largest number, fifty-four, were civil officers, forty-four were clergymen, thirty-five were military men, thirty-two professors, nineteen statesmen, eighteen physicians, twelve artists, eleven manufacturers, and men of various other occupations, in smaller numbers.

No expense or pains were spared to procure able contributors to the work, from all parts of Germany. The number of these was usually about seventy or eighty. They all followed the same general plan. All extraneous matter, and general observations not essential to the subject, were carefully excluded; but whatever was necessary to give a complete view of an individual's life, was presented fully, though in as few words as possible. Finally, every article passed through the editor's hands, who, without attempting to do away with diversities of style and manner, gave greater symmetry and perfection to whatever needed revision.

The whole undertaking, from beginning to end, has been a labor of love. The patriotic editor, who was also publisher, has for thirty years, not only without any remuneration, but without even receiving enough, by far, to pay the cost of publication, continued to labor, with unremitting zeal, in erecting literary monuments to thousands of his countrymen. While preserving materials for history, teaching the lessons of practical wisdom, and stimulating to nobler endeavor the living by the virtuous examples of the dead, he hoped to make his countrymen, divided as they are into many states, with separate interests, feel that they have not only a common origin and a common language, but a common interest in the memory of their great men.

Though the editor has sacrificed on the average five hundred rix dollars a year, amounting in all to fifteen thousand dollars, and could not, of course, hope to find any one ready to take the work off from his hands, he would still, he says, have entered upon the fourth decennial period, had not advancing age warned him that he probably would not live to finish it. He therefore prepared an elaborate index, in three volumes, one for each decennial period, for the convenience of his readers, and retired. Among the obituary notices of the present year, in the German papers, we have just seen the following: "B. F. Voigt,† Weimar, Feb. 17, 1859."

5.—BUSCH'S GUIDE-BOOK FOR GREECE.¹

A GUIDE-BOOK for Greece! What classical scholar can restrain himself from taking an imaginary tour in a land of so many enchantments? Is there a reality in these detailed directions and descriptions, or are they fancy pictures, to give an air of reality to a tale of romance? We have read Anacharsis and Wordsworth; we know the Athens of Stuart and Revett, of Leake, and of Bulwer. Do we now come down to a real, palpable, comfort-taking Murray? Dr. Busch is both a scholar and a traveller, a German linguist, and antiquary, and, at the same time, a man at home with the life of the modern Greeks. His is just the book for the student who wishes, in his own closet, to learn, somewhat as a traveller would, that veritable world which was under the eye of the old Greeks. As a German, he takes a steamer at Trieste, and in four days is in Syra. He there takes a smaller boat, and in ten hours he is at the Piræus. In the mean time, he has been turning the leaves of Vischer's *Errinnerungen und Eindrücke aus Griechenland* (Reminiscences and Impressions of Greece, 1857). Ross's *Königsreisen* (Journeys of King Otho) is reserved for hours of severer study. Impatient to see Athens, he only glances at the old harbor, and then takes a coach, and orders the driver to take him to the Hotel d'Angleterre, or the Hotel d'Orient, in Aeolus street. He passes along cultivated fields, olive groves, and vineyards, and soon sees the ruins of the Acropolis, at the right; and a little after, the new city appears in front, lying at the north of the Acropolis, beyond which towers the royal palace, in the east, and the Lycabettus to the north-east. Passing along on the west side of the city, he sees the temple of Theseus, in its russet hues and wonderful state of preservation, and enters the city through Hermes street, which, running east, cuts the city into two halves, as Aeolus street does running north and south. The Acropolis, which was the centre of the ancient city, is found to be on the south side of the modern city. The whole area is a plain, rising a little in the south towards the Acropolis, and in the east towards the palace. From the centre of the modern city, where the two streets above mentioned cross each other at right angles, one sees the temple of Theseus, on the west border of the city, the palace on the east, the Acropolis on the south. Behind the western extremity of the Acropolis, viewed from the same point, the Odeon lies concealed, and behind the eastern, the theatre of Bacchus. A little west of the northern declivity of the Acropolis is the Areopagus, and between them, in the distance, is the Bema, and beyond it the Museum Hill. The temple of Jupiter lies far in the distance, to the south-east, near the Illissus. So much must the traveller know, if possible, before he sleeps. The next day he walks out, and finds the north-east part of the city regular in its plan, and attractive in its appearance; but as he goes south of Hermes street, he finds narrow and crooked alleys, and a swarming population, amid

¹ Busch's *Griechenland*. Trieste, 1859. pp. 217.

filth and ruins. The two main streets, already named, have sidewalks and gas lights; but none of the streets are paved, neither were they in ancient times. One little lane is called Demosthenes street; another, Euripides street; a third, Pericles street; and a fourth, Sophocles street.

In following our guide in his various excursions from the city, we find in him excellent judgment and taste in selecting the objects of his attention, ample and rare learning in ancient history and antiquities, and all the knowledge requisite to compare Greece as it was with Greece as it is, in all the localities which he visits. In his journeys he gives you graphic pictures of the country, points out the changes which it has undergone in its appearance, gives the relative position and importance of the old towns and villages and the new, describing places as they now are, sketching what is most characteristic in their ancient history, and then presenting a general view of their fates and fortunes during the long interval of more than twenty centuries. This method is often pursued in regard to single public buildings, so as to show us, as it were, the very process of decay, the persons that plundered them, and the present resting places of what has been removed to other countries. The author is no literary hack, lumbering his book with the doubtful learning or garulous ignorance of an ordinary cicerone, but an adept such as is rarely found, saying infinitely less than he knows, and yet the very best things that could be said.

6.—LAZARUS AND STEINTHAL'S JOURNAL OF NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY AND LANGUAGES.¹

A journal of an unknown science! What is national psychology? Psychology is the science of the mind, its nature and powers as learned from individual consciousness and experience, and confirmed by observation. National psychology is the science of the collective public mind, the mind in its social relations, that which constitutes the national spirit of a people. It is the study of human nature as it is manifested in collective bodies of men, that which is common to all the individuals belonging to them. The individual is here regarded, not as an isolated being, but as a member of society. This science treats man as essentially a social being; teaches that he is made what he is by society; that in a solitary life neither thought nor speech, nor human nature itself, could be properly developed; that, as an animal, man might possibly live alone, but, as an intellectual and moral being, he can become what he was designed to be only by society. Every educated person has been essentially influenced by his ancestry, as well as by his associates. There is a traditionary life and character, a connection between generation and generation, so that the individual grows out of society as a flower does from the stock. It is true that society is constituted of individuals. But it is no less true that society makes individuals what they are.

¹ Lazarus and Steinthal's *Journal of National Psychology and Languages*, No. 1—3. 1859. (*Zeitschrift für Völker-psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*.)

By this science, the result of all that gives character to a people is to be accurately ascertained, and then traced back to its causes. The influence of race, language, climate, institutions, usages, religions, government, literature and art, is to be carefully marked as being that from which national peculiarities spring. Such a science, it is believed, if soberly and successfully pursued, would greatly aid in rendering history a true picture of the life and spirit of a people. What is termed the philosophy of history is too much of a metaphysical abstraction, a construction *put upon* history by a speculative mind; whereas the study of national character wholly in the light of facts, is the most legitimate way of reaching the system of things as it exists in nature. Such a system applied to history will elucidate what would otherwise be dark, and show the harmony of many things which now often appear strange or contradictory.

Language is connected with this study, not as a matter of philology in general, but as that in which the spirit of a people has its purest expression. How clearly do Saxon and Norman words reveal the Saxon and Norman character! The Hebrew, the Arab, the Greek and the Roman, all appear in the words and structure of their respective languages. Language, viewed in this light, is itself a treasury of knowledge in respect to national psychology. Such is the general idea of the subject of which the editors propose to treat in their journal.

7.—THE SYMBOLISM OF THE SEPULCHREAL MONUMENTS OF THE ANCIENTS.¹

THIS book is a treasure of the rarest learning. The number of leading topics is small, consisting of explanations of four plates containing symbolical representations. But the range of discussion under each topic is as wide as the field of Greek and Roman literature. The number of passages from ancient writers brought together and explained on certain far-reaching principles is immense. It requires the utmost degree both of learning and of enthusiasm, to produce such a work. Even if the conclusions reached were to be rejected, the examination and comparison of so many out-of-the-way passages would be highly instructive. No one can peruse such a work without greatly enlarging the sphere of his knowledge. No author, ancient or modern, who has touched even incidentally upon the points under consideration, seems to have been overlooked. Like Creuzer, whom he follows in his method, he may give too profound a meaning to some of the passages he quotes, but to many of his conclusions he comes in the clear light of demonstration. When so many passages, from authors remote from each other, being placed side by side, give a meaning involving facts and principles common to them all, it is difficult to account for such an agreement on any other ground than that of their having been rightly interpreted. After such a result has been once gained, the fuller comprehension of all the passa-

¹ The Symbolism of the Sepulchral Monuments of the Ancients, by J. J. Bachofen. Basle, 1859. (*Versuch über die Gräbersymbolik der Alten.*)

ges in their several connections follows as a matter of course. It is this feature of the work which will recommend it especially to the student of classical philology. But the researches of the author are not limited to philology. The remains of ancient art have been as carefully collated, and are found, in a great multiplicity of forms and variations, to speak the same general language with the authors who have written on the subjects. The monuments of ancient art are to the passages from the ancient writers, what pictorial illustrations are to the letter press. In short, there is a happy union of literature and art in these extensive investigations.

8. — ANGLO-HEBREW BIBLE EXPOSITOR.¹

THE author begins by divesting the Hebrew original text "of the points and every other human invention;" and then (since the Hebrew cannot be read without points, i. e. vowels) supplying these from his own invention, and representing them, moreover, by English letters. He tells us, indeed, that the vowels which his method of reading supplies, "are employed for no other purpose than to facilitate *pronunciation*, but claim no title to determine the meaning, or to adjust the grammatical place of any word." He makes himself merry with the fact that, in the pointed text, "Daghesh forte makes one letter two!! and *u* and *s* are forced perpetually to change their phases!!!" Now if he has but a tolerable acquaintance with the family of languages to which the Hebrew belongs, he must know that the vowels, as well as Daghes forte, play a most essential part in determining the meaning and adjusting the grammatical place of words. It must have been so in the Hebrew unpointed text, when the language was written, as it is now in the unpointed Arabic. In truth, the unpointed text was designed for those who knew the language, and could, from their knowledge of it, determine the vowels and Dagheses to be supplied, and change the phases of *u* and *s*. That the learner may gain any thorough and comprehensive knowledge of the language, he must in some way restore, as nearly as possible, its ancient vocalization, which is so inseparably interwoven with both its grammar and its lexicography. The only question is whether, in this respect, the Masoretic punctuation, notwithstanding some infelicities connected with it, is the best available source of information — a point on which Hebrew scholars are generally agreed. In the author's criticisms on "the confusion and contradiction involved in the *Masoretic plan*," he shows that he does not comprehend it, in its historic relation to the unpointed text. As such, it involves no confusion or contradiction, but is only burdened with an over-labored attempt at exactness in little matters.

¹ Synoptica Hebraea. Anglo-Hebrew Bible Expositor. A Manual for Self-instruction, for the use of Bible-classes, Students, and Young Men's Christian Associations. In three parts. I. A Primer and Syllabarium. II. A concise Hebrew Grammar. III. A Pocket Lexicon. By the Rev. James Orange. London: Judd and Glass, etc. 1858.

9. — LEGAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DEAF AND DUMB.¹

A VERY interesting volume, unique in its kind; in which the author gives the history of legislation and jurisprudence in respect to the deaf and dumb, so far as known, from the earliest times to the present. The right of those born deaf and dumb to possess and transfer real estate, make contracts for goods, to marry, and receive the sacraments, to be witnesses in courts of justice, etc.; and their liability to be arraigned and tried for criminal offences, are discussed, and illustrated by interesting reports of cases in law. Dr. Peet's long connection with institutions for the education of the deaf and dumb, has given him rare facilities for the accomplishment of such a work as the present. We understand also that, in the matter of legal authorities, he had the assistance of an eminent jurist of the city of New York.

10. — DR. TAYLOR'S WORKS.²

ONE volume of Discourses, from the pen of Dr. Taylor, has been already noticed in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*. We have now received three additional volumes; two of them containing his *Essays and Lectures on Moral Government*; and one of them, his *Essays and Lectures upon Select Topics in Revealed Theology*. Perhaps his *Lectures on Moral Government* will be considered his great work. They have been elaborated with immense care and toil. They deserve a faithful and laborious study. While we cannot adopt all his theories, we admire the acuteness and strength of Dr. Taylor. In one aspect of his works, they will be welcomed by many of his evangelical opponents. No theologian is more bold and uncompromising than Dr. Taylor in defending the justice of eternal punishment, and in demonstrating the amiableness of God in subjecting the wicked to an everlasting banishment from his presence. There is too little profound reasoning, and too much of airy sentimentalism in the modern treatises on this subject. Dr. Taylor defends the orthodox doctrine with clear, deep argument, and powerful appeals to the conscience.

It is earnestly desired by many who agree, and by many who disagree with

¹ On the Legal Rights and Responsibilities of the Deaf and Dumb. By Harvey P. Peet, LL. D., President of the New York Institution for the Deaf and Dumb. Reprinted from the Proceedings of the Fourth Convention. Richmond, Va.: C. H. Wynne's Steam-power presses. 1857. pp. 109. 8vo.

² Lectures on the Moral Government of God: By Nathaniel W. Taylor, D. D. late Dwight Professor of Didactic Theology in Yale College. New York: Published by Clark, Austin and Smith, 3 Park Row, and 3 Ann Street. 1859. pp. 417 and 423. 8vo. — *Essays, Lectures, etc., upon Select Topics in Revealed Theology*. By Nathaniel W. Taylor, D. D., late Dwight Professor of Didactic Theology in Yale College. New York: Published by Clark, Austin and Smith, 3 Park Row, and 3 Ann Street. 1859. pp. 480. 8vo.

Dr. Taylor, that his complete system of Theology may be published, and particularly his *Essays and Lectures on the Will, on the Reasons for the Permission of Sin, and on the Means of Regeneration*. The speculations of a man who reflected so long, so conscientiously, and so independently, on the more recondite themes of sacred science, ought to be made known to clergymen and students, in the exact language which he preferred and adopted. We trust that Professor Porter, the careful and learned editor of Dr. Taylor's Works, will give them to the public, in their complete form.

11.—SPRAGUE'S ANNALS.

THE fifth and sixth volumes of Dr. Sprague's *Annals of the American Pulpit* have now made their appearance. The fifth¹ was published several months ago, and a brief review of it has been deferred from one Number unto another of the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, until all our readers have or ought to have, examined the stately octavo. It is devoted to the Episcopalians. We have been particularly interested in the notices of some of the early clergymen of this denomination, as Dr. James Blair, Dr. James McSparrar, John Usber, Dr. Timothy Cutter, Dr. Samuel Johnson, Bishop Berkley, George Whitefield, and others. In general the Letters relating to the Episcopal Clergy are written with unusual care. An even balance is held between the different schools and parties of the Episcopal Church. The impartiality of Dr. Sprague is no less conspicuous in the present volume, than in the four which have preceded it.

The sixth² volume is devoted to the Baptists. The readers of this volume will generally refer at once to its biographical sketches of Baldwin, Boardman, Chapin, Chaplin, Cone, Morgan Edwards, Judson, Manning, Maxey, Rogers, Staughton, Stillman, Sharp, Winchell, and other eminent divines. The notices of these more prominent clergymen are faithfully and ably written. We have been, however, more particularly interested in the sketches of some less noted clergymen whom we personally knew, and whose virtues deserve to be commemorated in a volume like this. The majestic voice, itself a sermon, of Dr. Stephen Gano, his ripe experience as a Christian, his rare fidelity as a pastor, we are glad to find embalmed in such fragrant memories. Dr. Bolles, and Dr. Going; the enterprising missionary, John Taylor Jones; the scholarly and amiable preacher, professor

¹ *Annals of the American Pulpit: or Commemorative Notices of Distinguished American Clergymen of Various Denominations, from the early settlement of the country to the close of the year eighteen hundred and fifty-five. With Historical Introductions. By William B. Sprague, D. D. Vol. V. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1859. pp. 822. 8vo.*

² *Annals of the American Baptist Pulpit: or Commemorative Notices of Distinguished Clergymen of the Baptist Denomination in the United States, from the early settlement of the country to the close of the year eighteen hundred and fifty-five. With an Historical Introduction. By William B. Sprague, D. D. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1860. pp. 860. 8vo.*

and editor, James Davis Knowles; the faithful George Leonard; the earnest, eloquent Ludlow; John Pitman, than whom there has seldom lived a more honest, upright, venerable divine and patriot; William Williams, an humble, successful pastor and teacher — these and many other names are preserved for coming ages to honor. One of the noblest achievements of Dr. Sprague, is to have rescued from oblivion the merits of men who are venerated now, but who have left no distinctive memorials of their worth for a remote posterity. The entire series of his *Annals* will be doubtless, the *thesaurus* from which historians in coming times will derive many of their treasures. Dr. Sprague is one of the men to whom posterity will acknowledge a debt of gratitude. We desire to express our present thankfulness to him, in anticipation of the acknowledgment which will be paid him by future historians.

12. — NEMESIS SACRA.¹

THE design of this work is to show that God not only chastises his friends in love, but also punishes them in anger, while on the earth. This is attempted to be shown partly from reason, but chiefly from revelation. The argument from revelation consists in detailing the history of Adam, Abraham, Lot, Jacob and his sons, Moses, the Judges, Eli, David, Solomon, and others, and tracing the connection between their sufferings and their sins.

The writer exhibits an occasional tendency to magnify the wickedness of good men, if indeed any wickedness can be represented as more enormous than it really is. We do not mean that he affirms their guilt to have been greater than it actually was, but greater in *comparison* with the guilt of other men, and with the grace of God. Thus the author says (p. 283) of the high eulogium pronounced on David, in 1 Kings 15:5,—"there is not, we will venture to say, a thoughtful reader on earth who, in view of David's enormous crimes, would admit the inspiration of such a passage as this." Often the writer of the *Nemesis* seems unmindful of the Oriental style in which the Bible is written, and is therefore too free in amending the sacred text. If he had made a plainer distinction between punishment and chastisement, he would have been far more successful in his argument. Still, the volume is interesting and instructive.

¹ *Nemesis Sacra*: a Series of Inquiries, philological and critical, into the Scripture Doctrine of Retribution on Earth; with the correction throughout of Words, Phrases, and Sentences, erroneously or inadequately rendered in our Authorized Version. A Work designed both to vindicate a truth old as the world, and to aid in diffusing sounder principles of Interpretation. London: Seeley, Jackson, and Halliday, Fleet Street; and B. Seeley, Hanover Street, 1856. Andover, Mass.: Warren F. Draper. 1858. pp. 550. 16mo.

13.—DWIGHT'S MODERN PHILOLOGY.¹

THE conquest of India by the English was an event of great value to the interests of philology. It made English scholars acquainted with the Sanskrit, which is the great storehouse from whence the materials have been drawn for the structure of modern philology. The connection which is now known to exist between the Indo-European languages, was unrevealed till the key was found in the study of the Sanskrit. Something was known of the affinity between some of the Indo-European languages before the study of the Sanskrit was commenced by European scholars, but the results of the comparison made were very meagre. Whether the Sanskrit be of Asiatic or European origin,—a matter which is yet unsettled,—it is clear to every student of modern philology, that there are undoubted affinities between the Sanskrit, Persian, Greek, Latin, German, Slavic, etc. The different circumstances under which these languages—though of common origin—have been developed, have wrought in them great changes. Variety of climate, difference of pursuit or habits, greater or less isolation, all do something in modifying kindred languages. But, great as the difference has become in the Indo-European languages, the modern scholar, from his new point of observation, cannot fail to see that they are the offspring of a common parent. Even where the external diversities are the greatest, there will still be found grammatical correspondences. “Not only the forms of declension and conjugation are found under the lens of true analytic and phonological investigation, to be identical in all the Indo-European languages, but also the various parts of speech, down to the merest particles of these languages, and their very prefixes, suffixes, and terminations. A given radical may be selected, in both its simple and its composite forms, and its nominal, adjective, adverbial, and verbal derivatives, may be compared in different languages, form with form and kind with kind; and everywhere, both generally and particularly, in great things and little, the most intimate union and communion will be found to exist between them.”²

Nor has modern philology merely indicated the relationship between a particular class of languages; it is giving clearer evidence, as the field of its investigations becomes broader, of the unity of all languages, and is furnishing independent corroboration of the scripture statement, that God “hath made of one blood all nations of men.”

The “New Philology” of Mr. Dwight consists of three parts. The First is a Historical Sketch of the Indo-European Languages, giving their classification, with the general characteristics of each, their development and

¹ Modern Philology: its Discoveries, History and Influence. With Maps, Tabular Views, and an Index. By Benjamin W. Dwight, author of “The Higher Christian Education.” New York: A. S. Barnes and Burr. 1859. 8vo. pp. 354

² Modern Philology, p. 325.

respective correspondences; the Second is the History of Philology, from the early labors of Reuchlin, Erasmus, Scaliger, Leibnitz, Bentley, and Porson, to the great advancement which it made by the honored efforts of Bopp, Grimm, Max Müller, Mommsen and others, accompanied with criticisms on the authors who have labored in this department; the Third is devoted to the Science of Etymology, embracing its history, its empirical and scientific treatment, its constituent elements, advantages of the study, etc.

The First and Third parts appeared first in this Journal, but they are now presented in a greatly enlarged and improved form. These essays are the result of extensive and careful study. They are fresh and vigorous, and form a valuable contribution to the department of modern philology. The author has studied the subject in its original sources, and has clear, sharp, and comprehensive views of it. He has evidently bestowed much labor in the preparation of his work. Few of his readers will ever understand how many knotty questions were to be settled, how many delicate points to be adjusted, before the principles embraced could have been presented with so much accuracy and force. Some of the principles we should state with more caution, and from some of the criticisms on the authors in the department of philology we should dissent; but the work, as a whole, we can commend without abatement. All students engaged in the study of language will find this a pleasing and very profitable treatise. It will give freshness to a department of study that, from the narrow principles on which it has been conducted, has too often been dry and unattractive. Language, to be studied profitably, must be studied in its broadest aspects, in its relations to other languages, in its history, and in the various modifying influences to which it has been subject, from peculiarities of climate, custom, and the like. The work of Mr. Dwight is well adapted to awaken fresh interest in this department of study, to produce a taste for such investigations, and to lead our scholars into new fields of inquiry, which will yield rich and abundant fruit.

The mechanical execution is in the very best style.

14.—WINER'S GRAMMAR OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.¹

WE have received from the publishers a copy of the first volume of Winer's Grammar of the New Testament Diction, translated by Edward Masson, M. A., formerly Professor in the University of Athens. It is made from the sixth edition of the original, in respect to which the learned author

¹ A Grammar of the New Testament Diction: intended as an Introduction to the critical study of the Greek New Testament. By Dr. George Benedict Winer. Translated from the sixth enlarged and improved edition of the original, by Edward Masson, M. A., formerly Professor in the University of Athens. Vol. I. Philadelphia: Smith, English and Co., No. 40 North Sixth Street; New York: R. Carter and Brothers; Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 1859. pp. 372. 8vo.

says: "The quotations have been verified anew; and, so far as I know, not a single work on biblical literature, that has appeared since 1844, has been passed over without being turned to some account, or at least mentioned." Winer's *Grammar of the New Testament* stands too high, and is too well known, to need any commendation from us. It ought to be in every student's hands. We trust this new appearance of the work in English costume will contribute to its more enlarged circulation.

15. — THOLUCK ON THE GOSPEL OF JOHN, TRANSLATED BY KRAUTH.¹

We hail with much pleasure the appearance of Krauth's translation of *Tholuck on the Gospel of John*. It is made from the sixth edition of the original work, which, as is well known, was thoroughly revised throughout, and greatly enriched by new researches. A seventh edition of the original having appeared before the publication of the present translation, additions have been made from it, which are indicated by brackets.

The pure evangelical spirit and scholarly research that pervade this commentary throughout, have made it a great favorite with the Christian public. The translation, so far as we have been able to examine it, is able and faithful, and we trust the work, in this its English dress, will find a wide circulation.

16. — BRONSON'S HISTORY OF WATERBURY.²

THIS volume is important, not only as it gives the history of an enterprising township, and of many scenes interesting in an educational, political, and military aspect, but also as it gives the genealogy and various historical reminiscences of well-known men, such as Rev. Tillotson Bronson, D. D., Judge Bennet Bronson, Professor Matthew Rice Dutton, Rev. Luther Hart, Rev. Samuel Hopkins of Springfield, Mass., Rev. Samuel Hopkins, D. D. of Newport, R. I., Rev. Daniel Hopkins, D. D. of Salem, Mass., Lemuel Hopkins, M. D., one of the "Hartford wits," Samuel Miles Hopkins, LL. D., Rev. Jonathan Judd, Junius Smith, LL. D., John Trumbull, LL. D., another of the "Hartford wits," William A. Alcott, M. D., and other individuals of national or local celebrity. Our ecclesiastical as well as political history must be gleaned, in coming years, from authentic narratives of particular townships and men. Dr. Bronson, the author of this volume, deserves

¹ *Commentary on the Gospel of John*. By Dr. Augustus Tholuck. Translated from the German, by Charles P. Krauth, D. D. Philadelphia: Smith, English and Co., No. 40 North Sixth Street; New York: Blakeman and Mason; Boston: Gould and Lincoln; Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, No. 38 George Street. 1859. pp. x. and 440. 8vo.

² *The History of Waterbury, Connecticut: The Original Township embracing Watertown and Plymouth, and parts of Oxford, Wolcott, Middlebury, Prospect and Naugatuck*. With an Appendix of Biography, Genealogy and Statistics. By Henry Bronson, M. D. Waterbury: Published by Bronson Brothers. 1858. pp. 582. 8vo.

the gratitude of his countrymen for his contribution to our religious and civil history. Not every township will afford to the annalist so many and rich materials as Waterbury offers; but every ancient settlement will furnish some memorials which ought to be collated and published. Such publications are by no means of merely local or ephemeral value.

17.—DR. CLARK ON SIGHT AND HEARING.¹

THIS volume is popular in its style, but scientific in its principles. It avoids empirical rules, and contains many rational suggestions with regard to the proper treatment of the eye and the ear. The volume is eminently useful to students, and especially to American students. In few lands are diseases of the eye, among scholars, so common as in the United States. (See pp. 153, 154.) The volume suggests many sound principles to artisans, and particularly to architects. On the proper arrangements for lighting church edifices, and other structures for public addresses, valuable hints are dropped throughout the volume, as on pp. 98, 99.

We are happy to perceive that Dr. Clark acknowledges the great worth of an Article written for the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. XII., pp. 385—396, by Dr. George A. Bethune, on "the Conservative Use of the Eye," and makes various quotations from it.

18.—DÖDERLEIN'S LATIN SYNONYMES.²

NO ONE can obtain an accurate knowledge of a language, without learning the distinctions between what are called its synonymous terms. In the statement of these distinctions, the English and American lexicographers have accomplished much less for their vernacular tongue, than has been done for some other languages, particularly for the Latin. The works of Ramshorn, Döderlein, and other lexicographers of the Latin language, give more precise and scientific discriminations of terms, than we find in the majority of our English Dictionaries. The present hand-book of Döderlein, notwithstanding all the criticisms which have indirectly been made upon it in this Journal, and notwithstanding all the faults which undoubtedly disfigure it, is yet remarkable for the brevity, distinctness, perspicuity and appositeness of its definitions. It will richly reward not merely the classical, but the general student, for the labor he may devote to it. It is difficult to open the volume, even at random, without discovering some hint which may be useful to a theologian. Thus on page 54 we find the following instructive distinction between *Damnum*, *Detrimentum*, and *Jactura*:—

¹ A Popular Hand-book. Sight and Hearing, how preserved and how lost. By J. Henry Clark, M. D. *Obsta principiis*. Fifth thousand, carefully revised. New York: Charles Scribner, 124 Grand Street. 1859. pp. 351. 12mo.

² Döderlein's Hand-Book of Latin Synonymes. Translated by Rev. H. H. Arnold, B. A. With an Introduction by S. H. Taylor, LL. D. Andover: Warren F. Draper; Boston: Gould and Lincoln; New York: Wiley and Halsted; Philadelphia: Smith, English and Co. 1858.

"Damnum (*δάρδν*) is a loss incurred by one's self, in opposition to *lucrum*, — whereas *detrimentum* (from *detrivisse*) means a loss endured, in opposition to *emolumentum*." [*Lucrum* denotes a gain deserved and earned by one's self, in opposition to *damnum*; *emolumentum* denotes a gain falling to one's share, without any exertion of one's own, in opposition to *detrimentum*. p. 126]. Lastly, *jactura* is a voluntary loss, by means of which one hopes to escape a greater loss or evil, a sacrifice. Hence *damnum* is used for a fine; and in the form, "*videant Coss., ne quid respublica detrimenti capiat*, the word *damnum* could never be substituted for *detrimentum*." So, accidentally opening the hand-book on page 232, we find the following discrimination between *Vindicta*, *Ultio*, *Talio*, *Pœna*, *Mulcta*, *Castigatio*, *Puniri*: "1. *Vindicta* (*ἀνιδέκτης*) is an act of justice, like avenging; *ultio* (*ἀλαλκείν, ἀλέξειν*), an act of anger, like revenge; *talio* (*τλήναι*), an act of retaliation. 2. *Ultio*, *vindicatio*, and *talio* take place in consequence of the supreme authority of an individual; *punitio*, *mulctatio*, and *castigatio*, in consequence of the demand of others; *pœna* (*ποινή, πείνα, πένωμα*), as a punishment which the violated and offended law demands, by any mode of suffering; *mulcta* (*μαλδάει*), as an amercement which justice and equity demand, as a compensation for injuries done, especially a fine; *castigatio*, as a chastisement which may serve to improve the individual, especially a rebuke. *Pœna* is for the general good; *mulcta*, for the good of the injured party; *castigatio*, for that of the guilty party. 3. *Pœnire* means to punish according to the principles of justice; whereas *puniri*, in Cicero, to take vengeance into one's own hands."

Dr. Taylor's Introduction to this volume is brief, but pithy and suggestive. The value of the work may be still further augmented by appending an Index of the words defined, and by prefixing numerical designations to the words. Still, as the volume is now prepared, it is well adapted to supply a want, and stimulate the zeal of the classical student, and must be of great service in the school-room, and on the table of the advanced scholar.

19. — HUGH MILLER'S POPULAR GEOLOGY.¹

THIS volume evinces the same richness of learning, liveliness of imagination, and excellence of religious spirit, which are found in the other works of its lamented author. It is written in a popular style, and many passages in it are of sterling eloquence. Without accepting all its theories, we still regard the volume as eminently serviceable to the cause of sound theology. Both ministers and laymen will find it a valuable auxiliary in their interpretation of the Bible, and in their musings on the works of God.

¹ Popular Geology: A Series of Lectures read before the Philosophical Institution of Edinburgh. With Descriptive Sketches from a Geologist's Portfolio by Hugh Miller. With an Introductory Résumé of the Progress of Geological Science within the last two years, by Mrs. Miller. Boston: Gould and Lincoln, 59 Washington Street. New York: Sheldon and Company. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1859. pp. 423. 12mo.

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
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